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
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


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11 April 1918]

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Errata in Vol. VI

- p. 77, l. 19, for " Hungary " read " Russia."
 p. 81, l. 30, for " enemy " read " name."
 p. 94, l. 1 (title) and l. 16, for " *Neue Zeit* " read " *Glocke*."
 p. 269, l. 26, for " so " read " do."
 p. 304, l. 30, for " occupied " read " occupied."
 p. 370, l. 1, for " victors " read " victors."
 p. 379, l. 22, for " attacks " read " attack."

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The New Europe

"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

VOL. VI, No. 66 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 17 JANUARY 1918

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"When I heard that Buonaparte had declared that the interests of small States must always succumb to great ones, I said, 'Thank God! he has sealed his fate: from this moment his fall is certain' "

—Coleridge ("Table Talk")

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The Next Step

To see ourselves as others see us is proverbially difficult ; but we are not sure that it is not more difficult to see the policy of an ally in the light in which he himself sees it. We have, therefore, put forward our plea more than once during the past year in favour of that oft-promised Conference on War Aims by which we believed that misunderstandings would be removed and a real sense of Allied Unity would be created. It is doubtless true that the chaotic condition of Russian affairs during recent months has stood in the way of such a meeting ; but it would be a calamitous error to suppose that either Bolševik excesses or the Russo-German negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have put the idea of such a conference out of court. On the contrary, we must observe that the parleys at Brest have made everyone in Europe ask the question, Who are the real and sincere partisans of self-determination? And, if in order to prove our claim to that honourable title we may have to recognise—in an international sense—a Russian Government whose domestic policy is anathema to complacent and orderly people in Western Europe, we ought not to be deterred from that course by any squeamish abhorrence of the social revolution now rampant in Petrograd. Germany dreads the infection of the revolution far more than we possibly can, because it is nearer her own border and corresponds, in some degree, to the ferment of discontent in certain strata of German society. She will, therefore, do all in her power to place a frontier-barrier, composed of Courland, Lithuania and Poland, between herself and the worst centres of infection. But in doing so she must reveal her fundamental distaste for the self-determination of peoples in Eastern Europe and her desire to gain the economic advantages of a separate peace with Russia without paying the only valid price. Therein, undoubtedly, lies the opportunity for shrewd and enlightened statecraft. If our Governments will take the necessary steps to prove to the Russians—and incidentally to a good many other people—that we sincerely mean to develop the policy of self-determination not merely in Europe, but by every

THE NEXT STEP

appropriate and timely measure in other parts of the world, they will have done a good day's work for the good name of our democratic Alliance. Proof of such sincerity of purpose is already implied in the recent declarations of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Balfour. All that is now required is to place our policy in such a light that the Russian people, as a whole, cannot fail to discern its true lineaments. Whether the Bolševiks continue to retain power in Russia or not, the result of an Allied Conference which proved that all its members cherish the same international ideals—however wide may be the gulf between their domestic policies—could not fail to be good.

We said last week that the Prime Minister had at last proved that he and his War Cabinet were in earnest in their quest of a new Europe. Since then Mr. Balfour has added a most valuable footnote to British war aims. His speech at Edinburgh on 10 January contained several remarkable passages. Answering one set of critics who say: "Why have this crusade, in order to remedy ancient wrongs, to deal with far-off peoples whose very names, perhaps, are strange to some of the inhabitants of these islands?" he developed a most significant argument in which he laid stress on the support of the lesser nations of Eastern Europe as a necessary part of our general resolve to destroy the *Realpolitik* of Germany—"that brutal system in which power is not only all that counts, but all that ought to count in the arrangement of the world." Passing from this negative aspect to the more positive and constructive task of establishing a new Europe composed of liberated peoples, he said:—

" If we are to have a League of Nations which is to guard the stability of international relationships, you must surely give them to start with an arrangement of territory which shall not too grossly violate equity and freedom. If the German peace be carried out you would leave all over Europe what I believe physicians describe as "foci" of infection, centres from which morbid effects flow. You would leave France with the great wrong of Alsace-Lorraine unredeemed. You would leave Poland still a maimed and dismembered community. You would leave the great work of Italian unification imperfectly accomplished. You will leave large fractions of the East under the alien and most sterilising rule, often the brutal rule, of the Turk; Armenia will still be there, a helpless sacrifice; Greece will be handed over to those who have already betrayed her; nothing will have been done for the great Slav populations of South-Eastern Europe."

THE NEXT STEP

“ This,” says the *Westminster Gazette*, in words which we welcome from such a quarter, “ puts admirably the point upon which we have always insisted—that a *status quo* peace might well be the most disastrous of settlements.”

A new internationalism founded on a satisfied nationalism thus finds in Mr. Balfour a welcome and powerful advocate. His invitation to the civilised world to take the problem of a League of Nations in hand “ and see it through ” is the most explicit endorsement yet given by the British Government to the idea of the League and tends to remedy one of the defects in the Prime Minister’s speech. It will find an echo throughout this country and America; for no one will miss the significance of such words on the lips of one who is commonly regarded as the most cautious and conservative statesman in Great Britain.

Now, anyone reading the Edinburgh speech as a commentary on Mr. Lloyd George’s declaration would naturally ask himself, “ What more do the Russians want? Our public men have now furnished clear proof of their sincere intent.” That, to us, is self-evident; and the welcome given to Mr. Lloyd George’s speech by many diverse voices shows that he has expressed the public mind of Great Britain. But our public mind is a very different thing from the public mind of Russia—if, indeed, the latter can be said to exist in any definite sense. It is different, too, from that of our Allies or of neutral countries. And if we could overhear the candid comments upon our policy which are made in Petrograd, for instance, we should probably hear something like this:—“ Great Britain proclaims her European policy to be the self-determination of peoples. But she confines it hypocritically to Europe; and even in Europe she is not candid; look at Ireland! Outside Europe she has a hundred ‘ places in the sun ’ where she denies political rights to the native races. She holds Gibraltar by force alone; no recognition of nationality there. She holds Egypt and India as possessions, and is as reluctant to recognise their national aspirations as she is fulsome in her advocacy of the same aspirations in the lands under Turkish rule.” And so on. We have heard the argument before, and have hitherto dismissed it as a German plea put about the world to embarrass Great Britain. In some respects the argument is false; in others, it is disingenuous; but, when all allowance has been made, it is not negligible.

THE NEXT STEP

It constitutes the main barrier to an understanding with revolutionary Russia and must be removed. We know the answer to it; but Russia does not. It should therefore be the main task of the Government, loyally supporting a well-chosen British agent in Petrograd, to explain the whole policy of Great Britain in such a manner as to prove that in espousing the principle of self-determination for European peoples we are only applying a doctrine which is the life-blood of the British Commonwealth. We do not believe that even Mr. Trotski is blind to the difference between the Polish problem and the Egyptian; nor do we think that, at a Conference, he would be deaf to an argument which expounded our new Indian policy or our intention to place equatorial Africa on a new basis freed from the Colonial rivalries of the Great Powers—for as such we interpret Mr. Lloyd George's announcement. Be that as it may, the alternative to such a discussion with Russian representatives is a deepening of the lamentable gulf between Russia and Western Europe which, in the long run and perhaps immediately, must assist the worst purposes of Berlin.

Russia, however, is not the only country in which the exposition of our democratic purpose would take effect. Germany would not be immune from its influence. For the moment, the domestic situation in Germany is too obscure for us to read; and certain reports seem to suggest that reaction is in full blast in Berlin against democratic reform. But throughout the country there is deep unrest which showed itself very plainly in the Leipzig elections; and though its main cause is economic, it tends to create a congenial political atmosphere for the Minority Socialists who are daily gaining strength. This situation calls for a shrewdly-designed moral offensive conducted with the weapons which the most recent declarations of our Government have given us. As both sides in the German domestic struggle use the speeches of British statesmen as ammunition, we should see to it that the material we supply is such as will strengthen the offensive of the liberal forces. And with an eye to our own home-front, at a moment when we are calling up new reserves of man-power, it is of the utmost importance that the country should be assured of the power and the will of the War Cabinet to give the fullest expression in their policy to the genuine altruism of the British people throughout the war. Mr. Balfour truly

THE NEXT STEP

said, " We never went into the war for selfish objects; we did not stay in the war for selfish objects; and we are not going to fight the war to a finish for selfish objects." Our disinterested motive pleads strongly in favour of our good faith in the war-aims which we have proclaimed; and as long as the Government steers its course by that light it can go forward in the sure knowledge that it is leading a united nation to the haven of a secure peace.

A. F. WHYTE.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(I) IRELAND

PERHAPS the hardest exercise that the average Englishman can set himself is to realise that his country and himself are not isolated, but really and essentially a part of Europe, to be judged by foreigners by the same standards and in the same manner as he himself judges other nations. We cannot argue about the future of Europe without arguing about our own future as well. If this is so we cannot contest the reasonableness of the widespread desire of our Allies in Russia and in other places for a clear statement of the British position in regard to Ireland. Can we justify our present national policy towards Ireland to critics who believe it inconsistent with our professions and policy in relation to similar problems abroad? Are we applying to it those principles which we think ought to be applied to the cases of other small nations whether in the south or east of Europe? It is the present writer's belief that the British people and Government have an unanswerable case in this respect. It seems worth while stating exactly in what that case consists.

So far as social and economic organisation is concerned the modern record of Great Britain towards Ireland is clear and unashamed. It is safe to say that no nation in the world, incorporated as Ireland is in a larger unity, has received State encouragement, so continuously generous and so signally successful, towards its economic development. Ireland at the present moment is fifty years ahead of England in its system of land tenure, in the application of State aid to the alleviation

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of agricultural distress and the betterment of agricultural prosperity, and in the practical application of co-operative and socialistic ideas to the development of the land. As a result of the great series of Land Acts which culminated in the Act of 1903 and its supplement in 1909 more than half the total area in Ireland is already in the hands of peasant proprietors. Of the remainder one half is either mountain or bog land, useless and uncultivable. The rest is either about to come under the operation of the land purchase scheme or is being administered by the Government itself in the interest of peasants whose holdings are too small to come under the Land Purchase Acts or else it is demesne land, the last remaining vestiges round their houses of the estates of the old landlords broken up to create a peasant proprietary. Nearly ten years ago a German writer declared that the Irish tenantry have had assured to them conditions more favourable than any tenants in the world enjoy. To accomplish this the British investor has already contributed over £100,000,000 of which the British taxpayer guarantees the interest. It is estimated that another 60 millions sterling will be required to complete the transaction. The Irish Convention is at present discussing this question. There is little doubt that it will decide, as indeed it ought to, that this will continue to be a charge on Great Britain, not on Ireland, and that after the institution of Irish self-government England and not Ireland will bear the balance of the cost of this great and revolutionary legislative achievement.

The record of the last decade in Ireland has been no less striking so far as the practical application of modern socialistic theory is concerned. The Irish Agricultural Organisation Society and the Department of Agriculture which grew out of it are things of which any country might be justly proud, and which we in England are still far from possessing. Here is a movement whose founder, Sir Horace Plunket, is now the chairman of the Convention (to which it has supplied some of its most remarkable delegates) which has succeeded in combining the activities of the farmers with the inspiration of the intelligentsia of Dublin and the universities, and which already, ten years ago, numbered among its members 100,000 farmers and had organised in this small country 950 co-operative societies, including creameries, to which farmers

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could send their milk to be worked co-operatively, co-operative banks from which they could borrow money at low rates of interest, societies for the development of all kinds of commodities, and, in a word, for all kinds of rural occupation. As a recent writer on Ireland has written (Barker, "Ireland in the Last Fifty Years") :—

" In the districts where co-operative societies existed they became the units of social life. They expanded—or perhaps it would be more true to say that they are expanding—into what have been called 'general purposes' societies. A successful dairy society, for instance, may undertake other functions, and thus, as 'Æ' has written, it may 'gradually absorb into one large well-managed association all the rural business connected with agriculture in the parish.' A new spirit and a new *moral* naturally accompany such developments. The local society, managed by a committee elected by its own members, becomes a centre of living interest. Each member is concerned in the work of his fellows, since his profit depends on a general level of good management; and public opinion condemns the man who does not play his part properly in the working of the group. It is no wonder that those, who, like 'Æ,' have lived in the midst of these developments, should see in them a new hope for Ireland, and indeed for the world. Within the last few years a movement called Guild Socialism has arisen in England, and its leaders have prophesied as if they had found a new thing. As a matter of fact their fundamental principles are many years old in Ireland; and years ago 'Æ' saw the vision of 'a society within the State—not controlled by the State, but finally controlling its necessary activities'—a society containing 'a number of free associations of workers and producers which, in the country, would have the character of small nations, and in the towns of the ancient guilds.' "

So much for the agrarian aspect of the Irish problem. What of the political situation there, viewed from the European angle? Can the British people claim with any show of reasonableness that they have applied to Ireland those principles of political justice which are coming generally to be recognised as the basis of a stable world peace—principles recognised by us as applying to such communities as Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine, for instance, in other countries. Let us try and find an answer to these questions.

In the first place it is important to observe that the Home Rule Bill is now not a Bill but an Act; self-government for Ireland is on the Statute Book, passed by both Houses of Parliament, and only prevented from being put into operation by a measure of suspension which was interposed because there

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seemed no prospect of agreement between Irishmen themselves. *Had the majority of citizens in Ireland found itself able to agree to the desire of a community in one of its provinces to remain outside the area of Home Rule, Home Rule would now be in operation.* Irish self-government has not been impeded by a denial on the part of Great Britain of the principles of self-determination but by what many people here have regarded as an excessive deference to it. Successive British Governments have refused to coerce Ulster into abandoning what she conceives to be her cultural and political rights as a minority, in obedience to the wishes of the larger unit of nationality represented by Ireland as a whole. The attempt of Great Britain to solve (with Irish assistance) the Irish problem broke down on this crucial point. A fresh attack on the problem had to be made, and it is significant of the fundamental attachment of British statesmanship to this principle of self-determination (a principle which found its first practical application in Canada and Australia, and most strikingly of all in South Africa), that this new approach took the form of leaving the whole matter to the Irish themselves. A Constituent Assembly was chosen representing all Irish interests. Those who had recently been in rebellion were invited to send delegates equally with parties which desired to maintain the Union with Britain. When they refused, steps were taken by the Government itself to invite delegates who would represent the most extreme Nationalist point of view. The British Government pledged itself to pass into law, and put into operation, any measure recommended by this Constituent Assembly, the Convention, on which there should be a substantial agreement. The battle-ground of the Irish problem is therefore not London but Dublin, and London remains merely to register what Dublin decrees. It seems reasonable to claim that the principle of self-determination has received in this matter a fuller practical recognition than has been accorded to it as yet in any part of Europe. Whether it achieves success remains still to be seen, though the Convention is believed to be on the point of completing, for good or ill, its labours. If success comes it will be because the majority of Irishmen have been able to devise safeguards for the cultural, religious, and political rights of the Ulster minority, which will induce that minority to abandon its claim for separate treatment.

H. M.

Trotsky

[The publication of the following article from a well-informed correspondent does not commit THE NEW EUROPE to the opinions expressed therein.]

LEO BRAUNSTEIN, better known as Trotsky, was born in Odessa some forty years ago of a Jewish family. Because of his name and the embarrassment which he has caused to Great Britain he is currently reported in this country to be a German Jew, who found it convenient to hide his identity under an assumed Russian name. His original name really proves that his family did not come from Germany, and the new name was meant to disguise his person, not his race or extraction.

Braunstein is one of those innumerable names, compounded of German, common to Jews in Eastern Europe. At the time when Poland was partitioned, most Polish Jews had no family names, but were simply known by their personal names and patronymics—as Abraham, son of Moses, or Isaac, son of Solomon. The Prussian and Austrian officials, who in 1795 obtained dominion also over what is now known as Russian Poland, manufactured names by the thousand for the Jews, going through the whole gamut of flowers, animals, colours, and stones, sometimes venturing to the best of their German taste upon attempts at humour. If a Jew's name is Offenbach or Hildesheimer or Speyer, one may assume that his family has come from one of the Rhenish towns, but if it is Blumenduft (scent of flowers) or Unterleibsgeschwür (abdominal ulcer—an authentic case!), it is clear that an ancestor of his was the object of German mockery, or of subsequent Russian imitation. If such a man goes to Germany he will immediately be recognised by the true Teuton as an East-European Hebrew under his name, and he has to travel all the way to England before he is conceded the status of a full-blown German or of a German Jew.

Braunstein-Trotsky had no reason to hide his race, which was a matter of complete indifference to the Socialists among whom he has spent his life. Names for special use in party activities, the so-called "party names," were assumed by Jewish and Gentile revolutionaries alike, and the tale which they tell is of the years which, for the sake of an ideal, these men have spent without a home and without a real name—hunted beasts, hiding their identities from the most highly-organised secret police in the world. When Leo Braunstein chose his "party name" he naturally did not feel bound to imitate

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the humour or the scientific methods of the German officials who had labelled his ancestors; yet the name Trotski still suggests a Jewish origin to the average Russian, for it is derived from the town of Troki, in the very heart of the old Jewish Pale.

When a student of the Juridical Faculty at Odessa, Trotski joined the Socialist movement. Some revolutionary *fracas* or conspiracy led to his expulsion from the University and started him on his career of Socialist propaganda, diversified by years in Siberia and in prison. The men of the Russian Revolution are now frequently described in Western Europe as "wind-bags" or "talkers" by people who have never known Russian prisons or Siberia. Let them read the gruesome story of Maria Spiridonova, which at one time made the whole civilised world shudder (the recent Peasants' Congress at Petrograd elected Maria Spiridonova its president). Or let them read Leo Deutsch's "Reminiscences of Siberia" or any other lives from that new martyrology. There has been horror in the past experience of these men and women; a madness has been engendered by it and a fanaticism which alone has enabled them to endure all things and conquer in the end.

In Trotski the fanatic is much less conspicuous than in most Bolševik leaders. Socialism supplies him with an outlook rather than with doctrines. He is clear-sighted, he understands the logic of events, the force of ideas, their uncompromising nature, and the need for simplicity and cogency in political thinking. Where minor men are unbending from pedantry, experience forbids Trotski to compromise where principles are concerned. He knows the only terms on which one can fight with the arms of the spirit against material weapons, and he knows how to capture the man behind the machine gun instead of countering the two in their own kind. In 1905 he fought autocracy and succumbed—the Russian army had remained with the Tsar; twelve years later it went over to the Revolution. In July he fought Kerenski and succumbed; the army was with his rival. In November he won without having raised or armed new forces. He is now trying the same game on Germany, nay, on the entire world—each man has only one method of acting, just as he has only one face.

Can Trotski win this time? He will undoubtedly succumb again, but the seed will have been sown. That quaint idea of

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“ the dictatorship of the proletariat ” will remain, a burning sign to those who have a sense of wrong ; it is not democracy which the Bolševiks aim at, but “ a turn of the wheel ”—the rule of the down-trodden. They address to the upper classes what Meredith calls “ the parent question of humanity ” : “ Am I thy master or thou mine ? ” If their sign is to endure, if their teachings are to work in the consciousness of the masses, they must remain pure. For ideas, compromise with reality means a kind of decay ; it is like the decay of fruit at seed time ; if the fruit perishes when the seed is still immature, the loss is unredeemed and uncompensated. Conservatism is the philosophy of reality ; revolution results from the logic of ideas.

If Trotski compromises he is lost ; if he does not, he is probably lost too—which few men are likely to regret more than he himself. He is not a calm, iron ascetic with a deeply human heart and an inhuman mind, like Lenin. His *naturel* has proved too strong even for the long schooling of Russian revolutionary life. Trotski enjoys life, loves pleasure, is very ambitious and rather vain ; he cares for Trotski and thinks a deal of him, so much indeed that at moments this foolhardy fighter becomes accessible to doubt and fear. He enjoys power and has a sense of humour, and the humour of power seems to appeal to him almost as much as its responsibility (this also fits him admirably for dealing with European Chancelleries). There is nothing of the pathos about him which attached to Kerenski, the Hamlet of the Russian Revolution. He will make himself respected, men shall reckon with him, the world must not forget Trotski or leave him out of account. He imposes himself on it by his cleverness and energy. These qualities have served him well with crowds and with women. To vain men no one can replace success on the wider stage so well as women ; they are the perfect audience for “ Kings in Babylon.”

Trotski has been poor all his life. He has lived in garrets, has starved, and yet has thought of how the world should be ruled. He knows what life is to those cast into the outer darkness. Easeful pleasure is suited for men who safely possess ; destruction is the instinct, the living art and the wild joy of the dispossessed—the dark, cynical, defiant face of Michael Angelo’s statue of Brutus menaces the exquisite and aristocratic beauty of Leonardo da Vinci. As Trotski has been poor all his life, the usual stories are now told of his

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having been bribed by the Germans. "German agent" is the most appropriate label for anyone who does not suit us. The curse of being a politician and poor is temptation, and next, that even if the man resists temptation, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest the opposite. The only temptation which approaches the rich politician and to which he duly succumbs is that of giving bribes—he "nurses" his constituency, subscribes to party funds, ends by buying hereditary legislative power in the House of Lords and remains "respectable—damned respectable."

Trotsky achieved prominence for the first time during the revolution of 1905. Nosar ("party name": Hrustalev), an insignificant person, was chairman of the Central Sovjet. Trotsky, his assistant, supplied the brains of the movement, and it was with him that the Prime Minister, Count Witte, negotiated previous to the publication of the October Manifesto. After the collapse of the revolution, Trotsky sought refuge abroad and relapsed into comparative obscurity. Unequaled as an agitator, a speaker, a man of action, Trotsky is not the leader for a persecuted creed who could fortify them in their devout prayers in the Catacombs, or—to give the Russian-Socialist equivalent—take part with all seriousness in their sterile discussions in exile. Trotsky's socialism is sincere, his very temperament is revolutionary socialism, he is carried away by it. He thinks through his temperament. In the white heat of abstract passion he sees issues with a logical consistency such as cannot be attained in the everyday perception of reality, when comparatively small accidents of environment compete with the ideas which are the work of the speculative human understanding. To Trotsky socialism and its creed have become his world, and he could hardly live or act outside their sphere. But the theoretical differences between the various socialist groups were unessential to him at a time when as yet none of their doctrines could give rise to action. His restless ambition, his excitable temper, his desire for action, made him shift from one socialist group to another, while blind zeal and lack of humour made other men persevere and attain leadership. Trotsky finished by being called "the morass" by those strong in faith—the uncertain, dangerous ground between the immovable mountains.

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August, 1914, found him in Paris. His first move was an attack on the German Socialists for having voted war-credits. During the next two years he edited a Russian Socialist paper. Towards the end of 1916 the French Government, to dis-embarrass itself of Trotsky, decided to put him across the Swiss frontier; it seemed that there he would remain high and dry till the end of the war. He succeeded, however, in getting himself sent to Spain instead, and thence embarked for America. To one born in bondage, chained in his youth, exiled in his manhood, the revolution was the sign that the days of sterile misery had come to an end. Not yet! By order of the British authorities Trotsky was forcibly taken off a homeward-bound Norwegian steamer and interned at Halifax. Those few weeks of detention in Nova Scotia did not kill him; but, as Machiavelli, puts it—*si vendicano gli uomini delle leggiere offese; delle gravi non possono*. The remembrance of wrong done to his own person rendered more pointed Trotsky's action for the release of Čičerin. Yet the first document compromising to the German Government which he selected for publication was a letter from the Kaiser to the Tsar, complaining of the asylum accorded to revolutionaries in Great Britain, and proposing joint representations on that subject. Trotsky thus reminded his comrades of the time when Prussia had offered itself as an assistant to their hangmen, and when it was Prince Bülow, not the *Morning Post*, who sneered at "Silberfarb" and "Mandelstamm"! Not even our most God-forsaken official underlings with a *flair* for the psychological moment when petty chicanery creates the maximum of irritation can altogether wipe out the memory of those other days.

The pre-revolutionary opposition in the Duma was political; the revolution which broke out in the streets, social. The Cadets aimed at constitutional reform and at a more efficient prosecution of the war. They could not give the sign for active revolt lest it should interfere with the conduct of the war. The revolution was made by men to whom the war was not the first concern. The Cadets joined it after the day was won. The peasantry and army cried out for land and peace. The Cadets desired to go on with the war till victory was won and to check social revolution. These were two irreconcilable programmes. Kerenski tried to reconcile them. He wanted

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all classes to unite, to offer sacrifices and to have confidence in each other. The masses were to submit to the leadership and discipline of the educated *bourgeoisie*, suffer yet further in a war of which they hardly understood the meaning, and trust to the upper classes not to use in future their regained power for preventing the social revolution. The upper classes were to work cheerfully, viewing with equanimity the certain doom in store for them on the conclusion of peace. Kerenski's endeavours were met with opposition, nay, with direct *sabotage*, from the Right and the Left, and with scant understanding among the Western Allies. His attempt broke down.

Then came Trotski's day and burden. With him and the Bolševiks the strangest factor has entered the war—a belligerent power to whom war on national lines has neither sense nor meaning. The only war which they understand is between classes, and that war knows no frontier. It is not peace which they carry to the world but strife; they are militants, but in a different dimension. Could Trotski raise, arm, and officer a sufficiently big army he would menace, not the Central Powers alone but all the bourgeois governments of the world; though he would probably try to avoid fighting their armies in battles which indiscriminately sacrifice bourgeois and proletarians. He naturally demands complete self-determination for all nationalities throughout the world—which implies, among other things, the end of German imperialism, the complete disruption of the Habsburg Monarchy and of the Turkish Empire (one has to come to England to find socialists or "democrats" who from sheer controversial perversity become champions of such dynastic creations!). But to Trotski self-determination is merely one aspect of a much wider problem. "Why should people object so strongly to the dominion of one nation over another," the Bolševik would say, "and yet within the same nation admit that one man should be born in economic subjection to another man? Why talk about 'submerged nationalities' and be silent about submerged classes?" To the Bolševiks the different ideas of possession and dominion are but parts of one organic whole of which the vital nerve may be destroyed by a violent blow, but which it is almost impossible to transform by degrees. Evolution comes after revolution to eliminate the moribund forms by a gradual process. That is why systems survive revolutions and yet cannot be killed

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apart from revolution. As Grillparzer put it in 1848, referring to the constitutional problem raised by the French Revolution:

“Das ist der Zeiten bittere Not
Der Widerspruch der schwer zu heben,
Dass die Monarchie wohl tot,
Aber die Monarchen leben.”

Most of Trotski's ideas are incomprehensible to the illiterate masses in the armies and peasantry of Russia which have raised him to power. They want peace because they are tired of fighting, not because they hold any particular views on international relations. They desire to expropriate the rich without any clear idea of the condition which is to supplant the order they destroy. The immense, almost inconceivable, suffering inflicted on the Russian peasant-soldier during the first three years of the war by the criminal callousness and corruption of the *ancien régime* has resulted in a psychological catastrophe—a disappearance of military and social discipline unequalled in history, and a collapse of routine and tradition, the framework of everyday life. The intellectual revolutionaries sail in the storm and their sails rise over the waves, in appearance a triumphant sign of the storm itself. Yet they have no real control over the blind elemental forces which cannot be disciplined, least of all by the revolutionaries themselves. For if Trotski tried to coerce them and succeeded in that attempt—which in reality is impossible—he would break the very spirit and force of the revolution. He is not the man for such work.

Without an army at his command, with a country plunged in anarchy and demanding peace, with masses only very dimly comprehending the meaning of the events which now unfold, Trotski has to face the Teutonic power. It would seem that he is at their mercy. And yet a dark fear haunts his opponents. There is the suffering and despair of their own peoples, their craving for peace, their rage, which, hitherto silent, may any moment burst out in a desperate cry. They, too, have heard the watchword about “the rule of the downtrodden” and “the turn of the wheel.” It is to them that Trotski speaks over the heads of their rulers. What do the starving German masses care for dominion over other races? Has not enough blood been shed; are the maimed and crippled too few in number? Trotski speaks sincerely about peace. Russia sets all her nations free. She

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threatens nobody. If peace negotiations break down, will anyone believe that it was through Russia's fault? German and Austrian statesmen wriggle, they manœuvre for positions; they make the most amazing professions of principle and contradict them in the same breath, they try to set themselves right in the eyes of their peoples. Trotski unmasks their game and analyses aloud each move they make. The scene is almost grotesque. As Dr. Harold Williams put it in one of his Petrograd despatches, the Germans "are in the position of the mediæval knight, playing a weird game of chess with supernatural powers."

If the war continues, what can the German Government do? Can it risk ordering its armies across the undefended Russian front? Will they obey? Will they attack the country which was the first to offer peace? Perhaps. But if the Germans get to Russia—again, what can they do? They cannot coerce Russia. Revolutionary Russia is already a nightmare to them, and even from their own country Germany's rulers cannot eliminate any more the forces and ideas which the war has set in motion. "N."

A Policy for Turkey

A NEW policy towards Turkey was announced in Mr. Lloyd George's speech on 5 January. President Wilson endorsed it in the twelfth point of the programme he laid down in his message of 8 January; and since there has been no disclaimer from Italy or France, we may take it to represent the present policy of the Allies.

"While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople—the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalised and neutralised—Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions."

These are Mr. Lloyd George's words. They differ both in tone and content from the Allies' programme of a year ago; and if we compare them with the Ottoman Government's aims we shall find a distinct approach towards agreement.

Ottoman aims have been stated during the last three

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months in Tala'at's speech at the annual congress of the Union and Progress Party, in the Turkish reply to the Papal Note, and again in a speech delivered in Parliament on 6 December by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. They can be summed up under three heads: (i) internal independence, (ii) Turcification, and (iii) territorial integrity—and of these three the first two have virtually been accepted by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George.

They accept the maintenance of the Turkish Empire as a sovereign state, implicitly abandoning the Capitulations and Customs Treaties by which Turkish sovereignty was encroached upon before the war, and the repudiation of which has been the essential step towards internal independence from the Turkish point of view. They also disclaim the intention of depriving Turkey of Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Thrace, on the ground that these are "predominantly Turkish in race"—a recognition of the new Turkish national consciousness which centres round Asia Minor, Constantinople, and Adrianople. A point is still left at issue in the reservation about the Straits, for the control of them is a traditional test of Turkish sovereignty, and has become a symbol of the national awakening through the defence of the Dardanelles. The Turks will retort by demanding guarantees for the international agreements—in force under the *status quo*—which provide for the neutrality of the Suez Canal. It is a case for reciprocity, and may involve an international regulation of all such territorial waterways. But if the question is translated into general terms, the Turks will almost certainly accept its solution in their own case, as the application of a common and voluntary rule.

We are left, then, with the issue of territorial integrity, and here the aims of the Allies on the one side and Turkey and Germany on the other are still irreconcilable. Indeed, our acceptance of the first two heads makes it all the more impossible to yield on this. If Ottoman sovereignty is to be freed from the former international restrictions upon it, it can only be exercised over Turks and Turkish lands. The record of Ottoman finance, justice, and administration makes it impossible for other peoples and countries to be left at the Ottoman Government's mercy without guarantees. This difficulty is realised by the Turkish Liberals now in exile, who desire integrity with devolution, but propose as a corollary that the

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“Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane” (an international authority) shall be given complete financial control in the reconstructed empire. The suggestion is Utopian, since it is the very thing the Committee of Union and Progress refuse, and there is no sign that the Liberals will be able to take the government out of their hands. The Committee has behind it the Turkish national movement, and the new nationalism makes integrity more impossible still. Experience has shown that recently awakened nationalities are almost incapable of toleration. The “Turcification” of every person and institution in the Ottoman State is the second Turkish war aim; the Armenian massacres of 1915, which were an attempt to carry it out, combined the new fanaticism with the ferocity of the old *régime*, and regions where non-Turkish elements form any considerable part of the population can no longer be exposed to the horrors which the programme of Turcification involves. In the case of the Armenians, the Hejaz and Irak Arabs, and the Jewish colonists in Palestine, the British Government has already pledged itself to this, but the civilised world is morally bound to save the other non-Turkish peoples to whom no specific undertaking has been given. Mr. Lloyd George has stated categorically that “it will be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories concerned.”

This disposes of the Turco-German projects in the Middle East, of which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is the starting point, and the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian propaganda the tools. Under this scheme Persia is to be brought into the same relation to Turkey that Austria-Hungary stands in to Germany now; the Armenians are to suffer the fate of the Jugoslavs; the Georgians are to play the Bulgars’ part; the Azerbaijani Tatars of Baku and Tabriz, like the Letts, Lithuanians and Poles, are to be brought into the fold by “self-determination”; and the road will be opened to Turkestan—the Oriental Ukraine. This is implicit in the “territorial integrity” which is the Ottoman Government’s third aim in the war, and explains why on this point the Allied Governments admit no compromise.

But if the Turco-German programme is ruled out, the future of the non-Turkish territories of the Ottoman Empire and of the whole Middle East has still to be settled, and here the Prime Minister only speaks in negative terms. “These

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countries," he says, "are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions"; but "what the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed." A constructive rather than a detailed policy is the need of the hour, and this formula does not give it to us; but at any rate it helps us to frame one ourselves by a process of elimination, since it rules out the programme of the secret documents published by the Bolševiks as well as the Turco-German solution.

Certain agreements about the Middle East are recapitulated in one of these documents—a Russian Foreign Office Memorandum—and on the face of them they are incompatible with the recognition of the "separate national conditions" of the Persians, Armenians, and Arabs. Moreover, as the Prime Minister frankly declares, "new circumstances"—in Russia—"have changed the conditions under which these arrangements were made."

The programme of the secret memorandum simply carried to its logical conclusion the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The policy involved, which is known in Germany as "the policy of encirclement," was adopted by Great Britain in that year, and was a profound modification of the policy we had pursued for a century before.

During the 19th century we had tried to insulate our Oriental Empire from continental Europe by maintaining a barrier of neutral independent states, and since these states were chiefly Moslem, our policy was in effect an entente with Islam. By the beginning of the 20th century, however, two European powers—Germany and Russia—had begun to press so hard upon this neutral area that we could no longer keep both of them out of it by our unaided diplomatic strength, and we therefore went into partnership with one of them to hold the other at bay. Russia was the partner we chose, and the partition with her of the "insulating region," or in other words the Middle East, which the Anglo-Russian Entente ultimately involved, cost us inevitably the friendship of the Moslem world. But at the moment when we are being made to pay the price in full by the publication of the final agreements, the policy for which we made this sacrifice has broken down. The programme of the Tsardom has been repudiated by Revolutionary Russia, and the Prime Minister openly accepts the fact in the case of Constantinople; but it

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is no less a fact in the Middle East where British policy is more vitally concerned.

We cannot carry on the policy of 1907 alone. We cannot step into Russia's shoes and take over her former sphere in the Middle East in addition to our own. It would involve extending the range of British responsibility to the Caucasus Mountains and the Trans-Siberian Railway; as a permanent undertaking, with the Turks and Germans standing on our flank, this would be altogether beyond our strength, and it would also alienate Moslem sympathies from us beyond recovery. Nor can we confine ourselves to what, under the agreements, seems to have been regarded as the British sphere, and stand on the defensive in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Southern Persia. This would involve the abandonment of Armenia to begin with, and the Turks and Germans would penetrate across the desert they have made there to Trans-Caucasia, Northern Persia and Turkestan. The key positions would be in their hands, not ours, and we should be driven at their good time into an unequal struggle, which would end in our expulsion and would leave them masters of the whole Middle East.

But this Turco-German domination of the Middle East is the very settlement which is ruled out expressly in the Prime Minister's speech, and if an Anglo-Russian partition has been repudiated by Russia, and Great Britain alone cannot prevent a Turco-German condominium from taking its place, the alternative is a return to our traditional policy. We must renew, if possible, our entente with the Moslem world, and neutralise once more the vast area that lies between Turkish Asia Minor and the frontiers of Egypt and India. The Russians have already renounced penetration here. We must renounce it too, and secure some *régime* instead which will also put German and Turkish penetration out of the question.

But what is this new order to be? Self-determination? It is easy enough to map out Persian, Arab, Jewish, Armenian, Georgian, Tatar national states; but will they be capable of independence? Will they be able to reconstruct themselves? Persia, the only one of these states that exists already, has signally failed to do so; and the Armenians, who possess the necessary qualities in greater measure, perhaps, than any of the others, have expressly declared through their leaders that, after what they have suffered, they will need outside help for at least twenty-five years. But whose help? That is the problem, for

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British help means indirect annexation to the British Empire, while German help means the prolongation of "Central Europe" to the Suez Canal and the North-West Frontier. There is no solution unless we can find some third party disinterested enough to take this area in trust and hold its peoples in wardship until they are capable of standing by themselves. No power can do this except some authority constituted by a League of Nations, and it is difficult to see how the particular problem of the Middle East can be solved at the Peace Conference unless the League of Nations is called into existence at the same time.

SELEUCUS.

Neutralist Tactics in Italy

THE resignation of the Boselli Ministry in October was a foregone conclusion and had no connection with the disaster of Caporetto. It was equally desired by Interventionists and Neutralists. The former were exasperated by the Government's continued bungling of food administration, by its tolerant attitude towards *Saboteurs* of the war, and its reluctance to deal drastically with enemy subjects resident in Italy. Among those whom for the sake of brevity we have called Neutralists, though the term has lost precision, a revolt had for some time been gathering head against the ban under which they have lain since the "days of May," 1915, against the *prepotenza* of the Interventionists and their claim to a monopoly in patriotism. The movement dates from the time of Signor Orlando's successful speech in Secret Committee in June. *La Stampa*, of Turin, whose editor is the Senator Frassati, a devoted friend of Giolitti, made the most of the occasion, interpreting the general applause with which Orlando's defence of his internal policy had been greeted in the Chamber as a rebuff for Interventionism and even as a recognition of the "true patriotism of a certain great personality."

A second *étape* is marked by the address which Giolitti delivered in August at Cuneo on the occasion of his election to the Presidency of the Provincial Council. The speech betrayed no want of appreciation of Italy's effort in the war, nor any desire for premature peace. The significant part of it was that which dealt with the profound change in public feeling in regard to the social inequalities and injustices revealed and exaggerated by the war, and the necessity that

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statesmen should treat the question of reconstruction in a spirit of sympathy and gratitude towards the masses, who had deserved so well of their country.

The speech, which was the first public utterance made by Giolitti since May, 1915, was at once interpreted by Interventionists as a bid for Socialist support, and recent events seem to show that they were right. It showed, too, that in Giolitti's judgment the moment was propitious for emerging from the "Coventry" into which he had almost literally been driven by the war-demonstration of May, 1915. The Russian Revolution, the intervention of the United States, and the prolongation of the war had had their effect on the Italian public and on the Government also. The official tone with regard to war aims had been modified, the Chauvinist press had been restrained and the more reasonable views of democrats allowed a hearing.

The next step—the preparation of the parliamentary stage for Giolitti's reappearance—had not long to be waited for. In October Deputies were invited to join a group formed with the professed object of defending the authority of Parliament against the reactionary encroachments of Interventionism and against the Government, if and so far as it identified itself with reaction. The original nucleus of the group consisted mainly of undistinguished Giolittians and Clericals*—or, as one journalist put it: "(1) Nullità; (2) Giolittiani puri; (3) Tedescofilii; (4) Clericali." It was received with jeers by the Interventionists, but continued to grow in spite of them. *La Stampa* was, of course, enthusiastic, and *Avanti*, the Socialist organ, and the Catholic *Corriere d'Italia* were markedly friendly. Before the end of the month the original "45" had become more than 100, and now came to be known by the more dignified name *L'Unione Parlamentare*. Giolitti was careful not to recognise it, and its organisers disclaimed all intention of forming a regular party. Thus it gained adherents from the Radical party and the Reformist Socialists among such as hated reaction more than they feared Giolittian pacifism.

In the Session of October the new group had no opportunity to play a striking part. But, in view of the December

* At the time of the elections of 1913, to which most of the present deputies owe their position, some sort of compact for reciprocal support existed between Giolittians and Clericals.

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Session, it put forth a demand for the creation of Standing Parliamentary Committees to control foreign and military policy. The proposal formed the chief subject of discussion in the press during November and was supported by the Radicals and Reform Socialists. Presently it leaked out that under cover of this demand attacks on Sonnino and Cadorna were being prepared. These rumours and the obvious friendliness of the Official Socialists for the new group aroused the suspicions of the Interventionists of the Left, and they withdrew their support to the demand for Commissions. They were out on a constitutional question, not to weaken the war-policy of the Government. A secret session was suggested as a substitute, and the idea found support. When Parliament met, the proposal for secret sittings was accepted by the President of Council, made a question of confidence, and carried.

The secret sittings duly followed; the attacks on the Foreign Minister, the late Commander-in-Chief, and Signor Bissolati—in other words, a solidarity with the Allies and War—were made with varying degrees of directness, but were met and shouted down (for the proceedings seem to have developed very great heat) by a League of National Defence, rapidly reorganised to meet the peril and support the Government. The Government stood firm, Orlando declaring that the Cabinet as a body identified itself with, and accepted full responsibility for, the foreign policy followed by Baron Sonnino. The result was that the attack was not pressed home, and when it came to voting, Giolitti and all but a very few of his followers, supported the Government, judging, doubtless, that it was not yet time to declare themselves.

In the interpellation of which Signor Tittoni—Foreign Minister at the time of the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and once described as an outpost of the Triple Alliance—had given notice in the Senate, involving discussion of the foreign and military policy of the Government and generally of the use made by it of the extraordinary powers granted to it, a sympathetic movement was at once detected and a Senatorial League of Defence organised to defeat it. As, however, the prolongation of the secret sittings of the Chamber involved the postponement of the interpellation until it had lost all point, Signor Tittoni, on plea of indisposition, withdrew it.

Thus, for the present, the attempt of the Giolittian faction

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to replace or to "penetrate" the Government had been definitely defeated, and opportunity for renewing it is hardly likely to occur before the end of the war.

Various attempts were made in the course of the public sittings, which followed the secret session, to goad Giolitti into making some declaration of policy. The most successful was that of the Interventionist Deputy, Pirolini, who produced a tumult by alluding to Caillaux as "the French Giolitti." This drew from Giolitti the declaration that he did not advocate a separate peace nor any action inconsistent with loyalty to the Allies of Italy. The question whether Giolitti has a definite programme, if so, what it is, cannot be discussed at the end of an article. That he would, if he returned to power or gained control of the Government, work for an early peace, and would be ready to pay a high price in order to avoid antagonising the Central Empires, may be taken for granted. He may not be a Caillaux, but if it came to a choice between the friendship of Germany and that of the Western Powers, there is little doubt as to the side towards which his inclinations would lean.

J. C. POWELL.

The Secret Treaty with Italy

(26 April 1915)

[The following is the text of the Secret Treaty with Italy, which is included in the Russian Secret Documents series, but which has not yet been published in this country.]

The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, on instructions from his Government, has the honour to communicate to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, to the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, the following Memorandum:—

I. The Great Powers of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy shall, without delay, draw up a military convention, by which are to be determined the minimum of military forces which Russia will be bound to place against Austria-Hungary, in the event of the latter throwing all her forces against Italy. This military convention will also regulate the problems relating to a possible armistice, in so far as these do not by their very nature fall within the competence of the Supreme Command.

II. Italy on her part undertakes to conduct the war with all means at her disposal, in agreement with France, Great Britain, and Russia, and against the states which are at war with them.

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III. The naval forces of France and Great Britain will lend Italy their active co-operation until such time as the Austrian fleet shall be destroyed, or till the conclusion of peace. France, Great Britain, and Italy shall in this connection conclude without delay a naval convention.

IV. By the future treaty of peace Italy shall receive : the Trentino ; the whole of Southern Tirol, as far as its natural and geographical frontier, the Brenner ; the city of Trieste and its surroundings ; the county of Gorizia and Gradisca ; the whole of Istria as far as the Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian Islands, Cherso and Lussin, as also the lesser islands of Plavnik, Unia, Canidoli, Palazzuola, S. Pietro Nerovio, Asinello and Gruica, with their neighbouring islets.

NOTE 1.—In carrying out what is said in Article IV. the frontier line shall be drawn along the following points : from the summit of Umbrile northwards to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Rhætian Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Eisach, then across the Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the Etz and Ziller peaks. The frontier then turns southwards, touching Mount Toblach, in order to reach the present frontier of Carniola, which is near the Alps. Along this frontier the line will reach Mount Tarvis and will follow the watershed of the Julian Alps beyond the crests of Predil, Mangart, and Tricorno, and the passes of Podberdo, Podlansko, and Idria. From here the line will turn in a south-east direction towards the Schneeberg, in such a way as not to include the basin of the Save and its tributaries in Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend towards the sea coast, including, Castua, Matuglia and Volosca as Italian districts.

V. In the same way Italy shall receive the province of Dalmatia in its present extent, including further to the north Lissarika and Trebinje [*i.e.*, two small places in S.W. Croatia], and to the south all places as far as a line starting from the sea close to Cape Planka [between Traù and Sebenico] and following the watershed eastwards in such a way as to place in Italian hands all the valleys whose rivers enter the sea near Sebenico—namely, the Cikola, Krka and Butišnjica, with their tributaries. To Italy also will belong all the islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast, beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura, and further north, and reaching to Meleda southwards, with the addition of the islands of S. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta and all the surrounding islets and rocks, and hence Pelagosa also, but without the islands of Grande and Piccola Zirona, Buje, Solta, and Brazza.

The following shall be neutralised : (1) The whole coast from Cape Planka on the north to the southern point of the peninsula of Sabbioncello on the south, this peninsula being included in the neutral zone. (2) Part of the coast from a point 10 kilometres south of Ragusavecchia as far as the river Vojussa on the south, so as to include in the neutralised zone the whole gulf of Cattaro with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, S. Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo ; with the reservation that Montenegro's rights are not to be infringed, in so far as they are based on the declarations exchanged between the contracting parties in April and

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May, 1909. These rights being recognised solely for Montenegro's present possessions, they shall not be extended to such regions and ports as may in the future be assigned to Montenegro. Hence no part of the coast which to-day belongs to Montenegro shall be subject to neutralisation in future. But all legal restrictions regarding the port of Antivari—to which Montenegro herself gave her adhesion in 1909—remain in vigour. (3) All the islands not assigned to Italy.

NOTE 2.—The following districts on the Adriatic shall by the work of the Entente Powers be included in the territory of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro:—To the north of the Adriatic the whole coast beginning at the Gulf of Volosca, near the frontier of Italy, as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the whole coast to-day belonging to Hungary; the whole coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume, and the small ports of Nevi and Carlopago, and in the same way the islands of Veglia, Pervicio, Gregorio, Kali and Arbe: to the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro are interested, the whole coast from Cape Planka to the river Drin, with the very important ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and S. Giovanni di Medua, as also the islands of Grande and Piccola Zirona, Buja, Solta, Brazza, Cikljan and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo can be assigned to the independent Moham-medan state of Albania.

VI. Italy shall obtain in full ownership Valona, the island of Saseno and territory of sufficient extent to assure her against dangers of a military kind—approximately between the River Vojussa to the north and east, and the district of Shimar to the south.

VII. Having obtained Trentino and Istria by Article IV., Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands by Article V., and also the Gulf of Valona, Italy undertakes, in the event of a small autonomous and neutralised state being formed in Albania, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain and Russia to partition the northern and southern districts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. The southern coast of Albania, from the frontier of the Italian territory of Valona to Cape Stilos, is to be neutralised.

To Italy will be conceded the right of conducting the foreign relations of Albania; in any case Italy will be bound to secure for Albania a territory sufficiently extensive to enable its frontiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the east of the Lake of Ohrida.

VIII. Italy shall obtain full possession of all the islands of the Dodecanese, at present occupied by her.

IX. France, Great Britain, and Russia recognise as an axiom the fact that Italy is interested in maintaining the political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her right to take over, when Turkey is broken up, a portion equal to theirs in the Mediterranean—namely, in that part which borders on the province of Adalia, where Italy had already acquired special rights and interests, laid down in the Italo-British convention. The zone to be assigned to Italy will, in due course, be fixed in accordance with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. In the same way regard must be had for the interests of Italy, even in the event of the Powers maintaining for a

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further period of time the inviolability of Asiatic Turkey, and merely proceeding to map out spheres of interest among themselves. In the event of France, Great Britain, and Russia occupying during the present war districts of Asiatic Turkey, the whole district bordering on Adalia and defined above in greater detail, shall be reserved to Italy, who reserves the right to occupy it.

X. In Libya Italy obtains recognition of all those rights and prerogatives hitherto reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty of Lausanne.

XI. Italy shall receive a military contribution corresponding to her strength and sacrifices.

XII. Italy associates herself with the Declaration made by France, Great Britain, and Russia, by which the Mohammedan holy places are to be left in the possession of an independent Mohammedan state.

XIII. In the event of an extension of the French and British colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognise to Italy in principle the right of demanding for herself certain compensations, in the form of an extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, Libya, and the colonial districts bordering on French and British colonies.

XIV. Great Britain undertakes to facilitate for Italy without delay and on favourable conditions the conclusion of a loan in the London market, amounting to not less than £50,000,000.

XV. France, Great Britain, and Russia undertake to support Italy, in so far as she does not permit the representatives of the Holy See to take diplomatic action with regard to the conclusion of peace and the regulation of questions connected with the war.

XVI. The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italy's adherence to the declaration of 5 September, 1914, this shall only be published after the declaration of war by and upon Italy.

The representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having taken cognisance of this memorandum, and being furnished with powers for this purpose, agreed as follows with the representative of Italy, who was also authorised by his Government for this purpose :

France, Great Britain, and Russia declare their full agreement with the present memorandum presented to them by the Italian Government. With regard to points I., II., and III. (relating to the co-ordination of the military and naval operations of all four Powers), Italy declares that she will enter the war actively as soon as possible, and in any case not later than one month after the signature of the present document on behalf of the contracting parties.

(Signed in four copies, 26 April, 1915)

EDWARD GREY, JULES CAMBON, IMPERIALI,
BENCKENDORFF.

Bohemia and the Allies

In No. 61 of THE NEW EUROPE reference was made to the new Bohemian army now constituted as an independent factor on the side of the Allies. The following Decree of recognition, dated 16 December, has been published in the French *Journal Officiel* under

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the signatures of the President of the Republic, the Premier and the Foreign Minister :—

“ (1) The Czecho-Slovaks, organised in an autonomous army and recognising the superior authority of the French High Command from the military point of view, will under their own flag fight against the Central Powers.

“ (2) Politically, this national army is placed under the direction of the Czecho-Slovak National Council whose headquarters are in Paris.

“ (3) The formation of the Czecho-Slovak army is guaranteed by the French Government.

“ (4) The Czecho-Slovak army will be subject to the same dispositions as regards organisation, hierarchy, administration, and military discipline as those in force in the French Army.

“ (5) The Czecho-Slovak army will be recruited from among—

“ (a) Czecho-Slovaks at present serving with the French army;

“ (b) Czecho-Slovaks from other countries, admitted to be transferred to the Czecho-Slovak army;

“ (c) All those who will voluntarily enter this army for the duration of the war.

“ (6) Ministerial instructions will later on settle the application of this Decree.

“ (7) The President of the War Cabinet, the Ministers of War, and Foreign Affairs are charged, each in his own sphere, to bring the Decree into effect.”

This Decree was recommended to M. Poincaré for signature in the following terms :—

“ Monsieur le Président,

“ France has always supported with all her power the national claims of the Czechs and Slovaks. The number of volunteers of these nationalities who placed themselves under the French flag from the declaration of war is important, and the gaps in their ranks prove incontestably the ardour with which they fought against our enemies.

“ Certain Allied Governments, and in particular the Russian Provisional Government, did not hesitate to authorise the formation on our front of units composed of Czecho-Slovaks who had escaped from the oppression of the enemy. It is just that these nationalities should be given means of defending under their flag side by side with us the cause of the right and liberty of the peoples; and it will be in accord with French traditions to assist the organisation of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army. If you share our view in this matter, we have the honour to invite you to sign the enclosed Decree. . . .

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU.
STEPHEN PICHON.”

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This army, which will, it is hoped, amount to at least 120,000 men, is being organised by, and will swear allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, whose headquarters are in Paris and whose committee consists of Professor Masaryk, Major Milan Stefanik (the well-known French airman, a Slovak by birth and an astronomer by profession), and Dr. Edward Beneš, late lecturer at Prague University.

Who is the Lady?

On 18 December, in the House of Commons, Colonel Faber asked the Foreign Secretary "whether Herr von Kühlmann, the German Foreign Minister, is able to correspond with a lady of high lineage in England, under cover of a neutral dispatch bag; and, if so, whether any steps are taken to prevent such correspondence." Lord Robert Cecil in his answer expressed "reluctance" to believe that any neutral Government would lend itself to such an abuse of diplomatic privilege. In view, however, of the persistence of such rumours, and of the fact that investigation proved that similar suspicions were not unfounded in the case of a well-known portrait painter now interned, we invite the Foreign Office to pursue its enquiries a little further. If it forbids Socialists to meet their enemy colleagues on neutral soil, it should see that persons of high lineage live under the same ban.

You Have Forged a Weapon: Use it

Taken together, the declarations of Mr. Lloyd George and of President Wilson make a firm basis for the constructive political work of the Alliance. They are clear and urgent; but, most significant of all, they have contrived to create a remarkable and unexpected unity of mind throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, Mr. Lloyd George has performed something little short of a miracle in winning approval from such diverse persons as the French Premier, Mr. Philip Snowden, and the editors of the *Humanité*, the *Times* and the *Temps*. In enemy countries, though the press affects to treat his speeches as a mere footnote to Jingo Never-Endingism—we really ought to acclimatise the expressive French *Jusqu'aboutisme* to express our meaning—the *Berliner Tageblatt* voices a widespread opinion in saying that there was a new constructive note and moderate tone in it. The Italian press significantly stresses the references to Austria; the *Corriere della Sera* in particular speaking as follows:—"The speech is a political event destined to have a powerful influence on the international situation . . . it is an arm of offence and defence . . . created at a most opportune moment and placed at the service of the Liberal Alliance. . . . *It may, perhaps, find a not unfavourable echo in Vienna.* . . . but London is loyally and entirely with Paris and Rome in the peace problem, and certainly can but consider as an imperfect sketch any conditions of peace relating to Austria-Hungary which have not had the previous appro-

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bation of the Italians, Czechs and Jugoslavs. The word is now with the peoples of the Central Empires." Our readers will not miss the point of the *Corriere's* argument, which has long been our own. But, at the moment, the urgent question is the propagation in every quarter of the world of the political thought contained in the two speeches of the British Premier and the American President. We learn that already the plan is laid to scatter the Wilson speech broadcast, including over one million copies to be delivered in Germany by aeroplane, while the work of translation is being done on a scale which almost justifies the American boast that within a few weeks the "President's programme of permanent peace will be brought within the reach of every human being who can read." Mr. Lloyd George's speech deserves the same wide publicity; but is it anyone's business to see that it is sent out, in expressive translations, to every corner of Europe? Has a consignment been sent to Switzerland, for instance? If not, why not?

Tokio, Peking and Washington

In more than one recent issue of THE NEW EUROPE we have discussed high policy in the Pacific Ocean in its Sino-Japanese aspect (see No. 59, "The Ishii-Lansing Agreement," and No. 62 "China, the War and the Open Door"). The British Government has now published the text of the Notes between the Japanese and American Governments on the subject of the relations of the three nations concerned. The Notes prove the truth of Signor Aldo Cassuto's statements in our pages last November, that the Ishii-Lansing Agreement covered wide and far-reaching purposes, which, if properly carried out, could not fail to establish concord in the relations of China, Japan and America. The Notes, of course, do not tell the whole story; and the diplomacy of China will need all its own vigour—and probably some disinterested support from other great Powers—if she is not to come off worst in any economic dealings with her alert and powerful neighbours in the Pacific. Japan is still in the throes of the expansionist movement, through which every virile nation passes; and her very youthful vigour is, in some ways, a menace to China. The most interesting page in the White Paper [China, No. 1, 1918] is that which contains Mr. Lansing's summary of the negotiations and his comment on them. He pays a high and obviously sincere personal tribute to Viscount Ishii, and, in other ways, strikes a note not often heard in the official world.

Lloyd's Bank and the Financiers' Conference

We have received the following communication, dated 11 January from the Chairman of Lloyd's Bank: "My attention was only called on Saturday last to the statement published in your issue of 20 Decem-

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ber last, in regard to a telegram of 17 September, 1917, from the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* in Berne to the Russian Foreign Minister." (See Supplement to THE NEW EUROPE, No. 62, Russian Secret Documents, No. IX.) "I am glad to respond to your invitation to disprove the allegations made in that telegram. The whole story, as far as Lloyd's Bank, Limited, is concerned, is a pure fabrication. In June last Lloyd's Bank, Limited, deputed one of the General Managers of its subsidiary, Lloyd's Bank (France), Ltd.—since reconstituted as Lloyd's Bank (France) and National Provincial Bank (France), Ltd.—to proceed as their representative to Switzerland on private business affecting the bank's interests in that country. We have no knowledge of any Mr. Tuckman, the name given in the paragraph. Our representative did not proceed from London as is stated, but went, as he was directed, from Paris. He discussed the business upon which he was sent, and which, as above stated, was purely private business, and had absolutely no connection with any political question and no other business of any kind. He took no part in any deliberations of the kind mentioned. He did not meet the parties whom he is represented as meeting, and neither Lloyd's Bank, Ltd., Lloyd's Bank (France), Ltd., their representative, nor anyone else connected with the bank, knew or knows anything about any conversations in Switzerland having any reference whatever to the subject mentioned by the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berne, nor have they any knowledge of any such conference as he alleges, nor of the members thereof, if such a conference ever existed."

Poland, a Prison Camp

Mr. Staniszewski, the Polish Minister of Labour, who, although personally a Conservative, is very popular among the Radicals and Socialists on account of his high personal character and broadness of views, visited on 18 December the camp at Shchipiorno where the Legionaries are interned who, following Pilsudski's lead, had refused to take the prescribed oath. According to the Socialist *Naprzód* of 22 December he addressed to them the following remarkable speech:—"The Regency Council greets you and thanks you for the exemplary service which you have rendered our country and encourages you to hold out. The entire country is at present a prison camp, surrounded by barbed wire, and the Regency Council is inside it. Shchipiorno is merely the crown of all that. The Regency Council will do all that is in its power to settle your case favourably. It cannot, however, summon you to return to the army, when as yet we have not got a Polish army."

Such is the language of a man who, with his colleagues, is denounced as pro-German by our short-sighted reactionaries. The Polish leaders are very wisely making the best of a desperate situation, and taking every national concession that is offered to them, without committing themselves in any direction. It is not their fault that at present only the Central Powers are in a position to make a tangible offer.

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The Jugoslavs to Mr. Trotski

The following telegram, which has been addressed to Mr. Trotski by the Yugoslav Committee, deserves to be carefully pondered by all those to whom self-determination is more than a mere phrase:—

“ We deny the title of the Austro-Hungarian Delegates to represent in a peace conference the Yugoslav lands inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The mandatories of Count Czernin are the oppressors of the Yugoslav people. There are no Jugoslavs or Czechs among the Austro-Hungarian Delegates, though their inclusion was explicitly demanded by the Yugoslav and Czech deputies in the Vienna Parliament. The Delegates thus represent only the despotic Governments of Vienna and Budapest. The Austrian and Hungarian constitutions which Czernin invokes are a delusion. The facts are that in the Austrian House of Representatives the Germans hold one half of the seats, though the Germans of Austria are less than one third of the population. The Upper House consists only of Archdukes and nominees of the Emperor. In the Hungarian House of Representatives the Magyars, who form only one third of the population of Hungary, have a monopoly of parliamentary mandates. The House of Magnates consists solely of aristocracy and of royal nominees. One third of the Croatian Diet at Zagreb (Agram) is composed of foreign nobles and great landowners, who sit without election. The members of the Bosnian Diet at Sarajevo—which was dissolved when war broke out—are chosen according to their religious denominations as if for some ecclesiastical council. Bosnia is utterly unrepresented either in the Parliament of Vienna or in that of Budapest.

“ The southern Slav territory, which covers one hundred sixty thousand square kilometres, is wilfully split up into eleven totally distinct administrations. The people, numbering seven millions, are denied means of education and of railway communication. Twenty per cent. of the entire population has been compelled to emigrate to America by the Magyar and German magnates and the Mussulman Beys of Bosnia, who own the richest lands and forests. Thus shackled, our people is at the mercy of the corrupt terrorism of its alien rulers. This is the Austro-Hungarian constitution under which Count Czernin would have us exercise our right of self-determination.

“ Our lands have been denuded of foodstuffs. Our people perish of hunger. Zagreb (Agram) alone shelters six thousand young children from the starving provinces. Thousands of our men and women have perished on the gallows and in prison. Our whole people has been outlawed, its voice is stifled. Therefore the Yugoslav Committee, which represents it, claims for it by this protest the right to live. We desire once for all to be freed from an atrocious despotism and to be united with our brethren of Serbia and Montenegro in democratic freedom and equality of right.

“ Remember this when you seek to negotiate a democratic peace with the Delegates of Governments who are the last remaining champions of autocracy, tyranny, and militarism—you who until yesterday were yourself outlawed by an autocratic Tsar.”

Diary of Current Events

- 29 Nov.—Allied Conference in Paris opens. Count Hertling's first speech in Reichstag as Chancellor; announces willingness to treat with Bolševiks. Lord Lansdowne's letter in *Daily Telegraph*.
- 1 Dec.—Permanent Inter-Allied Council inaugurated. Russian Constituent Election results.
- 2 Dec.—Bolševiks meet German delegates.
- 4 Dec.—President Wilson's address to Congress. Bolševiks enter Mohilev; General Duhonin lynched.
- 5 Dec.—Russo-German Conference opens: Russian terms announced: Suspension of hostilities for ten days, as from 7 Dec. 12 o'clock noon, agreed on.
- 6 Dec.—Cambrai salient drawn in. Mr. Trotski's Note to Allies.
- 7 Dec.—Friendly settlement of Irish Distribution scheme.
- 8 Dec.—Ecuador severs relations with Germany. Revolution in Portugal. Kerenski reported to have been elected as member of Constituent Assembly for Saratov. Roumanian Government reported to have been forced by Bolševiks to negotiate with Germany.
- 9 Dec.—British enter Jerusalem.
- 10 Dec.—Bolševik report of Cosack revolt. Revolutionary Committee set up in Portugal. Chinese troops reported to have entered Harbin, and Japanese Vladivostok. Mr. Churchill's speech at Bedford.
- 11 Dec.—Mr. Asquith's speech at Birmingham. Panama declares war against Austria-Hungary.
- 12 Dec.—Supplementary Vote of Credit debate in House of Commons. Text of General Dubail's accusations of M. Caillaux.
- 13 Dec.—Sir Eric Geddes on submarine menace. Maximalist Telegraph Agency announces defeat of Kornilov.
- 14 Dec.—Sir E. Carson on War Aims Committee. Mr. L. George's speech at Gray's Inn. Bolševiks report capture of Kaledin.
- 17 Dec.—Publication of British Labour Memorandum on war aims. Official Japanese contradiction of report of landing of Japanese troops at Vladivostok.
- 19 Dec.—Text of Russo-German armistice published in England. House of Commons war aims debate. Kerenski reported to be marching on Moscow.
- 20 Dec.—Premier on war aims in House of Commons.
- 21 Dec.—German peace proposal.
- 22 Dec.—Kaiser's speech to troops of Second Army.
- 25 Dec.—Czernin's speech on peace proposals.
- 26 Dec.—Admiral Wemyss becomes British First Sea Lord.
- 27 Dec.—M. Pichon on the peace proposals.
- 28 Dec.—Labour Memorandum on war aims adopted by National Conference. Mr. Henderson's message to Russia. Premier meets Labour Leaders. Finnish deputation to King of Sweden.
- 30 Dec.—Bessarabia reported to have declared itself a Moldavian Republic.
- 1918, 1 Jan.—Premier's New Year Message to Allies.
- 2 Jan.—Trotski denounces German peace proposals. Reported arrest of 300 Independent Socialists by German Government.
- 3 Jan.—Trotski's letter to French Socialists.
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VOL. VI, No. 67 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE
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**"They talk of Europe! What is Europe?
... a number of wicked old gentlemen with
decorations assembled round a green table"**

—*Sir Charles Dilke (1879)*

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VOL. VI, No. 67 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
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Petrograd and Brest-Litovsk

PETROGRAD witnessed on Friday the climax of the third phase of the Russian Revolution. Bolševism triumphant, repudiating the forms of representative democracy, has destroyed the Constituent Assembly and now proposes to set up a "proletarian autocracy" under the title of the Russian Republic of Soviets. By this act they declare an open state of civil war of which the rest of Europe must, perforce, remain spectators, and to which no one, not even the most sanguine Bolševik himself, can predict the issue. If the Bolševiks continue as they began last Friday they will go far to confirm the worst fears that were entertained of them when they first came into power. For the moment the democratic principle of self-government, expressed in the right of the majority to rule the country, is in abeyance and cannot revive unless the majority can organise itself in order to overcome the minority. This is, for Russia, a domestic issue: but even Mr. Lenin himself must recognise that, in present circumstances, it has more than a mere domestic effect. It tends to obscure the hopeful side of Russian affairs, as seen in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and to deepen the misunderstanding between Russia and Western Europe at the very moment when it is supremely important that the latter should not misapprehend the meaning of Mr. Trotski's diplomacy. For our part, we draw a sharp distinction, which probably no Bolševik will recognise, between Petrograd and Brest. Petrograd is a scene of civil strife, in which the disputants bear a tremendous responsibility for the future of Russia: Brest is the theatre of an even greater contest in which the whole future of Europe is at stake. It is, therefore, on Brest that we should fix our gaze. And we hope that public opinion in Great Britain will refuse to be led astray by its dismay at the turn of events in Petrograd, and will take steps to express its appreciation of the firm stand for principle made by the Russian representatives at Brest-Litovsk against the insincere manœuvres of the diplomatic and military delegates of the Imperial German Government and its Allies.

PETROGRAD AND BREST-LITOVSK

In last week's issue a well-informed correspondent described Trotsky's position in terms which deserve repetition. "Without an army at his command, with a country plunged in anarchy and demanding peace, with masses only dimly comprehending the meaning of events which now unfold, Trotsky has to face the Teutonic power. It would seem that he is at their mercy. And yet a dark fear haunts his opponents. There is the suffering and despair of their own peoples, their craving for peace, their rage which, hitherto silent, may at any moment burst out in a desperate cry. They, too, have heard the watchword of 'the rule of the down-trodden' and 'the turn of the wheel.' It is to them that Trotsky speaks over the heads of their rulers." It is, no doubt, true that Germany is working hard to mine the ground under Trotsky's feet in Petrograd itself, but none the less Trotsky's position is stronger than it looks. He can play upon Herr von Kühlmann's fear that Russian revolutionary ideas may gain ground in Germany, and upon Count Czernin's dread of returning to Vienna empty-handed. He knows that the German Government needs all the economic assistance which a separate peace with Russia would bring. Such knowledge weighs heavier in the scale to-day than any military power, and for the next two or three months it must operate against the Central Powers. And so long as Trotsky loyally uses it in the interests of the policy of "self-determination" he is entitled to claim the support of all good Europeans.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth**(II) INDIA**

THERE are certain rights which belong to every human being as such. These are sometimes expressed in the Kantian formula that every human being is an end in himself, never merely a means. Is self-determination one of these rights? Complete liberty of self-determination is obviously not. No one maintains, for instance, that a child, although certainly an end in himself, ought not to be under some authority, which, if need be, can use compulsion. That is to say, it is admitted that human beings of a certain kind of mentality are

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not qualified for self-determination. And if this is true of the individual child, cannot we say the same thing about certain races or nations whose mentality shows a backward stage of development on the political side?

Some such question as this is brought before us by the justification offered for the rule of European peoples in non-European countries. Even if you personally hold that the distinction made between European peoples and non-European peoples, in respect of their right to govern themselves, is merely European arrogance, still a clear line must be drawn in discussion between the case of European and non-European subject races, because the assertion that these peoples are backward in political development is, as a matter of fact, put forward as the justification for European rule over them, and is not put forward in the case of the Irish or the Czechs. You cannot, that is, tax an Englishman with inconsistency, if he demands self-determination for Czechs or Poles, and will not grant self-determination to the peoples of India. He may be wrong in his premise, but he is not illogical.

Suppose the situation in India at the present time were such as it was before the French and English began to acquire power in the country—a congeries of Oriental states, under despotic princes or successful military adventurers, with modes of government to some extent tyrannical, to some extent slipshod and corrupt, with petty wars going on in some regions and irregular bands in others levying blackmail on the villagers—it may well be questioned whether any European Power would do well to conquer the country in order to put it to rights. We might feel, with reason, that, imperfect as the native Governments were, it was better that the races of India should work out their own salvation, and that a more desirable result would be achieved by the slow operation of European ideas impelling the Indians to improve their political institutions by their own will than by our taking the government out of their hands. One motive, indeed, might even to-day urge a European Power to establish itself in such a country, the same motive which, together with the commercial one, urged our ancestors—the fear of the country passing into the possession of a hostile European Power. To our ancestors France was the great menacing autocratic and militarist Power; to prevent India falling into the hands of

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France and increasing her resources was, to their mind, a measure of self-defence. Such fear of being outstripped by each other has been all through, together with the commercial motive, the driving impulse in the process by which, during the last hundred and fifty years, the European Powers have subjugated so much of the non-European world.

But whatever it might be right to do if India to-day were the India of 1750, we must start with the situation as it is now, and as preceding generations have made it. The British rule in India was a fact before any man now living, British or Indian, was born. Our ancestors, for better or worse, did decide that they would reduce this disorganised bit of the world to order. A great administrative system has been built up, which has given the Indian people many good things.

The praise of the British government in India has been so common a theme with British writers, that if to-day any one is still unconvinced of its virtues one feels that fresh words from an Englishman are likely rather to bore than impress him. As a matter of fact, while the British officials in India have, as a class, had their limitations and imperfections, like any other class, there is substantial testimony from witnesses not British, both Indian and foreign, that they have set a high standard of integrity and devotion to duty, often under trying climatic conditions, of which their countrymen at home may well be proud. In the early days of British rule in the 18th century there were gross abuses and acts of exploitation. But under the influence of men like Burke and Fox the conscience of the British people was aroused. We may believe that the British rule in India, as it has been since the early days of the 19th century, has attained its high level just because so many members of the bureaucracy have been more than bureaucrats, and had a genuine desire to serve the people of India to the best of their power, so far as they understood the people's needs.

British rule has caused wars within the country to cease. Through a period when the nations of the West were increasing their military power to a degree unparalleled before, it has given India immunity from foreign attack. It has given India equal law and justice, fought famine, and made railways and canals. To a certain section of the people it has given the knowledge of a Western language, of Western

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literature and Western science, and to many thousands it has given training in various departments of the administrative machine, though most of the higher posts have been reserved for Englishmen. It has taken nothing from India in the way of tribute, and only required that, for work done, its European agents should be paid at the rates necessary to make men of ability choose a career in a tropical country rather than one at home. To get qualified men from Europe India had obviously to pay somewhat more than she would have had to pay for the services of home-born Indian officials, and the pensions of retired officials are, of course, so much money sent out of the country; but in the work done a good return is given to India for what she spends.

The British rule of India has not, of course, been unselfish, in the sense that the English have maintained orderly government in India to the prejudice of their own interests. Englishmen certainly believe that a state of order in India is profitable for Great Britain, inasmuch as it affords a secure field for British trade; and a large amount of British capital has been invested remuneratively in the country. But neither has British rule been selfish in the sense that any advantage has been given by customs-tariffs to British trade as against that of other countries. The Open Door has been maintained there, and German trade with India, for instance, was, before the war, growing rapidly and without any hindrance from the British. The bulk of the educated Indian community, indeed, felt it as a grievance that the British Government held fast to Free Trade, because they thought it fair that the native industries should be protected in their infancy against the adult industries of other countries, Great Britain's included. England in 1917 so far yielded to this feeling as to allow a small duty to be put upon certain imported cotton manufactures which gave a measure of protection to the industry of Bombay against that of Lancashire.

Suppose the British administration were now withdrawn before a new system of government in the hands of Indians was ready to take its place, the result would be anarchy. Had the British never gone into the country they would not have been responsible for any miseries which might be caused by bad native government; but if we now abruptly pulled away the elaborate structure of government, set up in the

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country before we were born, the responsibility for the collapse which would follow, with all its attendant sufferings, could not but rest upon us. It would be absurd to deny that the reason why some Englishmen desire to maintain the British rule in India is national pride or commercial profit, but it would be equally false not to recognise that any proposal to withdraw immediately from India would encounter the opposition of all that is best and most idealist in British feeling, which could not endure the thought of plunging the millions who have come to depend upon us into calamity.

Must we, then, accept the view that the principle of self-determination is inapplicable to India? Not, if we believe that to be self-governing is in itself, for human beings that are capable of it, a better thing than to be passively obedient to the best government in the world. Certain human beings may be less capable than others of self-government, and to give children the same rights of self-determination that are given to grown-up people would not be an act of generosity. But every wise father tries to develop in his children the faculties which will make them relatively independent of his direction. If, therefore, the Indians are capable of self-government, or if it is possible for them to become capable, we could not justly expect them to be satisfied with our rule, as a substitute, even though our rule were archangelic in wisdom and unselfishness.

Till recently two views prevailed among Englishmen. There was the view that the conditions in India were such, and the people of the country of such a mental constitution, that within no foreseeable time could the British relinquish the government without chaos ensuing and that it would, therefore, be our duty to retain our present position there practically for ever. This was the prevalent official view. The other view was that, although an immediate withdrawal would be a disaster, there was ground to hope that with the spread of education in India and with the growth of the Indian-born business community, a condition of things might well come about in the country, which would provide a sufficient number of Indians able, by training and character, to carry on a reasonably efficient government and—what is no less important—an alert and active public opinion able to keep the government up to the mark. But if this hope was justified, then it was plainly the duty of the British rulers

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to make self-government the goal which in all their activities they kept steadily in view and to which they brought the peoples of India by the straightest road possible.*

Between this latter view and the view of Indian Nationalists no hard-and-fast line could be drawn. For there were practically no Nationalists who wanted the British Government to retire immediately. They wanted, indeed, a much larger power given immediately to the Indian educated community in the government of the country, but they wanted to exercise that power "under the ægis" of the British monarchy—to use the phrase common both with English and with Indians in this connection, convenient just because of its poetic vagueness. Between the second British view just described and the view of Indian Nationalists there was no disagreement as to the goal of the process; it was only a question of the means by which it could be reached and the speed of the movement. And on the time-question, how *soon* India could be completely self-governing, obviously an infinite diversity of views was possible, as the points are infinite between one year and a hundred years.

Within the last few months the British Government has at last made a definite pronouncement, through the mouth of the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu, by which it adopts the second British view. It is now declared with authority that we have set the self-determination of the Indian peoples before ourselves as our goal. This is a pronouncement of epoch-making importance in the history of British India.

The great difficulty which has to be overcome in realising self-determination for India is the difficulty of discovering the "self." In India at present there seem to be so many selves—according to the divisions of race and caste and creed—selves not only separate, but to some extent antagonistic. The Anglo-Indians, for instance, fiercely deny the right of the small class of Indians of European education to speak for the "voiceless millions" of India; these millions, they maintain, are much happier under the paternal foreign rule than they would be if the government were put in the hands of Indian place-hunters, who, without popular control from

* The author of this article urged this view to the best of his ability in a little book published in 1913, "Indian Nationalism" (Macmillan).

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below, would simply seek to fill their own pockets or take life easily. We may answer that if all these millions are "voiceless" to-day, they may not be so a generation hence. Still, it must be admitted that self-determination is a highly complicated problem in a country with all the internal divisions of India. Even where a fairly solid opinion seems formed in the educated class, there are reminders that the appearance of unity is premature. The "Non-Brahmin Movement" in Madras, seemingly a spontaneous movement in the Indian educated community in opposition to the "Home Rule" movement, which is largely run by men of the Brahmin caste under the leadership of Mrs. Besant, may be more or less serious—the evidence as to what it is worth which has reached the present writer is conflicting—but it shows at any rate that the problem of finding a single "self" in any part of India is a difficult one. Or again, just after the educated part of the Mohammedan community seemed to have formed an alliance for political purposes with the Hindus, the riots at Arrah have unsettled calculations, and Mohammedans, even in far away parts of India, are asking each other whether after all co-operation with Hindus is not a mistake. The expedient of a *plébiscite* or *referendum*, which may in certain cases be applied to a relatively homogeneous European country, it would be ridiculous to apply to an Indian province under present conditions.

Yet self-determination is the goal, and we need not give up the problem as hopeless because it is intricate. Indeed, the profound interest of the task now before the British administrators is, one may say, due in part to its intricacy, and if our countrymen in India have the satisfaction of feeling that they have governed well in the past, that may give them heart to rise to the much more difficult, and yet much nobler, task of helping India to prepare to govern itself. What precisely the means must be and the path taken are questions upon which no one can express an opinion worth much without an intimate knowledge of the conditions. The important thing, if we are going to show the world that we are sincere, is that we should not merely promise, but take practical steps in the direction we have indicated. This, it seems, will be done in the near future, and Mr. Montagu is now in India examining the various sides of the problem on the spot, so that a well-considered scheme of changes in the administrative

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system may be formulated on his return, by which a real advance will be made in the way of Indian self-government. No doubt, whatever that scheme may be, it will not please everybody. Some will say that it goes much too far for safety, others will say that it does not go far enough for justice. One may hope that it will be such that the wisest opinion on both sides, British and Indian, will approve of it and that posterity will confirm their judgment. In any case, the British Government is now pledged that, if the scheme proves to work successfully, further steps will in time be taken along the same road. The goal can be reached only when India is governed by men whose home is in the country, and when the governed have the will and the intelligence to replace the men in power, if they fail to govern well.

EDWYN BEVAN.

* * * *The first article of the above series appeared in last week's number.*—EDITOR.

Germany and the Balkans : An Economic Conquest

[We draw the special attention of our readers to the following article in view of the visit of the Serbian Industrial Mission to Great Britain.]

IN a previous number of THE NEW EUROPE (No. 58) we concluded an examination of the economic future of Germany by saying that she would endeavour to obtain such terms of peace as would enable her to dominate the chief internal economic roads of Europe. Now the Balkans are a very important "junction" of these European roads, the control of which would greatly advantage Germany's economic position as regards both her railway and river communications, which would thus become roads of greater European importance than ever.

Let us consider what Germany expects from a domination of these roads, and what steps she has already taken, and is prepared to take, to secure such an economic position in the Balkans; and, in conclusion, what steps the Allies have taken, in theory or in practice, to circumvent this German plan. Before examining these questions one fact ought to be brought forward. It has been maintained of late that the fear of Germany's domination of Central Europe has been

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exaggerated, and that Germany herself does not desire such domination. There is some truth in this argument, but the conclusions drawn from it are wholly false. It is beyond all doubt that Germany has two economic aims for the future, which she hopes to achieve by the results of the war: (a) to obtain an unassailable economic and political position in Central Europe; (b) to become once again an economic World-Power with an active oversea trade in addition to the economic monopoly of *Mittel-europa*.

It has been considered in Germany that the plan of a Central European domination has been brought too much into evidence, and that her second economic aim has not received sufficient attention. It was thought that by emphasising too strongly her Central European plan Germany had betrayed her objects to the Allies and provoked the decision of the Paris Conference. This, of course, is very far from meaning that Germany intends to abandon her scheme of economic control in Central Europe. It is significant in this connection, that Naumann, replying to attacks on *Mittel-europa*, insists that he has been misunderstood, and that it would be wrong to imagine that by adopting the Central European scheme Germany must relinquish her idea of economic world-power. We go farther than Naumann, and say that Central European domination is the first step by which Germany means to regain her economic position in the world. And in taking this step she will certainly include the Balkan Peninsula in her plans, which are, in truth, only a development on a large scale of previous policies. In the recent past Germany has operated in the Balkans, both politically and economically, largely through Austria, and even when German interests came temporarily into conflict with those of Austria she was wise enough to adopt the policy of supporting Austrian interests, realising that Austrian progress prepared the way for German triumphs. To-day it is a question of preparing the best conditions for the economic expansion of both partners, and the position was never more satisfactory. Roumania and Serbia are occupied by the Central Powers, and Bulgaria has entered into an alliance in which she must accept any economic arrangement proposed by the Central Powers. Of course, even these Powers have to build their plans on the basis of the idea that the present occupation of Roumania and Serbia is merely of a temporary nature. But

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their motive is to obtain, even after restitution has been demanded from them, such an economic condition of affairs as will secure for them economic domination in the Near East, and which will afford but limited political freedom to the occupied countries.

In *Roumania* this would involve the establishment of German and Austrian control over the principal banks and industries, which had already been effected to some degree before the present war. The wheat trade and the exploitation of the oil-fields were financed by German capital, and the chief German banks had branches in Roumania. In the future this scheme must be extended, so as to grant to Germany and Austria complete control over the general economic life of Roumania. In the Balkans proper, that is, in Serbia and the Serbian states hitherto under the domination of Austria, on the one hand, and in Bulgaria on the other, the economic domination of Germany will have to be achieved by different methods.

In the *Southern Slav countries* economic control will be secured through Austria, as a result of her political domination; or, if this be found impossible, then a limited political freedom will be granted to the Jugoslavs, from which Austrian economic domination will follow as a natural consequence. It is interesting to note in this connection that the German press has occasionally stated that the Yugoslav race is entitled to unity, because of the desire of her people, and the benefits they could obtain from such unity; further, it has been stated that the future development of the Yugoslav race must be towards the Adriatic coast. (Schmoller's *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft*, 1916, No. 4.) Of course, according to Germany, this economic development and unity of the Jugoslavs could only be admitted on condition that it was realised under Austrian control, which would provide the surest means for Austrian economic exploitation and eventual monopoly. The Jugoslavs, so runs this German argument, must be absorbed politically by the Habsburg Empire; their economic roads must be organised to suit Austro-Hungarian interests and to serve as a means of German economic expansion. "If absolute political domination of the Jugoslavs be impossible," say the Central Powers, "if restitution must be made, then let such restitution take the form of granting to Serbia a limited political freedom, for

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by so doing we risk nothing in our plan for ultimate economic domination."

The *restitution* of Serbia, therefore, becomes a very convenient figure of speech upon which the Central Powers can play, if necessary. Indeed, in the "no annexations" scheme, this "restitution" would prove most effective, and would present the appearance of a concession in the Balkans. But this is a most misleading expression, for *restitution* of Serbia would imply only apparent independence for that country. Before the present war there was a possibility for Serbia, with her old frontiers, to achieve political independence; but, in order to avoid as long as possible the impending conflict, many international questions were left open or undecided. As soon, however, as the situation becomes settled, Serbia, if she still retains her old frontiers, will be completely under the control and domination of Germany and Austria-Hungary. All Germany's calculations for future economic development in the Balkans are based on this assumption. If something must be given up, partial liberation of Serbia is considered as the lesser evil. It is presumed in Germany that, no matter how events turn out, no matter what form of Government is accepted by Serbia and Montenegro, Austria will still retain full control over the western portion of the Balkan Peninsula, where Germany hopes to secure an economic monopoly through Austrian control (see Arthur Dix, "Deutschland und der Balkanmarkt," in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 1916, Vol. 106, pp. 647-50).

German economic domination over *Bulgaria* must be carried out on quite different lines. Germany and Austria had temporarily to accept Bulgarian control over the Vardar Valley, because Bulgarian assistance was indispensable to their attack on Serbia. That is why the idea of a great Bulgaria is accepted by the Central Powers to-day. But it would be folly to imagine for a moment that this great Bulgaria, which would embrace one part of Macedonia, which would dominate the Vardar Valley and stretch as far as Ohrida and the Adriatic Sea, could enjoy economic independence. Indeed, the Vardar Valley, which is essential to Serbia, is, at the same time, necessary to the German and Austrian plans for economic expansion. Bulgaria, to-day, has but one policy: at all costs she desires to retain political control over her new conquests.

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Therefore she is bound to be the strongest supporter of German economic designs, and her territory must serve as the road for the material expansion of Germany towards the East. For this reason, Bulgaria accepts an economic alliance with the Central Powers, and it would therefore be absurd to consider the possibility of Bulgaria pursuing any policy independent of Germany; under such circumstances she would forfeit all her newly-acquired gains. All these facts render German economic aims in the east of the Balkan Peninsula easy of achievement. German economic conquest in Bulgaria must be based on an economic expansion which is furthered by Bulgaria herself. Secure in this knowledge, Germany lays her plans, and has already shown, in detail, how she means to proceed:—(a) by creating societies to carry out German propaganda for economic unity with Bulgaria; by inducing German traders to deal with Bulgaria; by teaching the Bulgarian language in Germany; (b) by promoting companies for the industrial exploitation of Bulgaria—the chairman of one of these companies is the chief representative of Krupp's, and the whole undertaking is financed by German banks, in particular the Disconto Bank; see *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 September, 1917); (c) by acquiring a controlling interest in the companies navigating the Danube; (d) by developing the business of the German and Austrian banks in Bulgaria (for example, the most important Bulgarian bank (20 million leva capital) is financed by the Austrian *Länderbank*; the *Wiener Bank-Verein* finances the bank second in importance in Bulgaria; and the foremost German bank, the *Deutsche Bank*, has just established a branch in Bulgaria (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 7 September, 1917).)

For Germany to put into operation any of the schemes outlined above for obtaining a monopoly in the Balkan Peninsula she will depend largely on the economic communications she is able to establish. These communications may be divided into two sections: those which Germany would wish the Balkan peoples to possess, and those which she will endeavour to establish in order to encourage her own expansion.

We will not consider at this point the communications which come in the first category. We have already stated that Austria and Germany will demand the establishment of

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such communications in the Balkans as to prevent the Jugoslav race from acquiring independent sea communications, *i.e.*, she will insist that the Jugoslav ports shall be in Hungarian and Austrian hands. In the case of the second category, besides exercising control over every Balkan port of which she can obtain command, Germany will devote special attention to the rapid development of railway, canal, and river communications. Great efforts have already been made in this direction. The Central Powers are agreed that the first development after the war must be the construction of canals to connect the German rivers with the Danube, thus creating a vast waterway from the North Sea, through Central Europe, right to the Black Sea. At a meeting of the German-Austro-Hungarian Economic Society at Hamburg on 16 November, 1917, after a consultation between the greatest authorities on river communications in Germany and Austria-Hungary, it was decided that of all future constructions, the most important will be those which will link the Elbe-Oder-Danube with the Rhein-Main-Danube (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 18 November, 1917).

These are the proposed German plans to obtain economic domination over the Balkan Peninsula. They represent a serious threat to any real freedom of European economic intercourse, but it would not be far from the truth to say that very little has been done so far by the Allies to circumvent this German plan. The Allies have realised the necessity of reorganising their commerce, their methods of foreign trade, of reorganising their consular service and sources of commercial information, and serious attempts are being made to-day to bring into operation new schemes in this direction. But something vital is lacking in the Allies' plans, and the whole of this reorganisation will, perhaps, fail to produce the desired results. Indeed, it cannot be questioned that the Allies, in order to compete with German trade, must first of all study more thoroughly the commercial conditions of those countries with whom they wish to develop trade relations, as a consequence of which they will be able to adapt their methods of production to the local needs of these countries. Such a thorough and systematic study is indispensable to any successful commercial expansion in countries where German trade hitherto held the field. Before such a state of affairs can be produced, however, a more important condition must be

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realised; the geographical monopoly, the special position that Germany is preparing for herself, must be overcome. The truth of this is shown by the fact that it has often been maintained in Great Britain and France, that whatever the Allies may do the Balkan people will, nevertheless, be induced to trade with Germany, because she is in a much better position, geographically, to do so than are the Allies. This statement is only part of the truth, and it is a great pity, nay more, it is an international danger for the future, to draw the above conclusion. It seems clear to us, that the conclusion for the future ought to be for a stronger economic activity among the Allied nations, who see the mutual benefits to be derived from it but take no steps to bring it into operation.

The first essential, then, is to translate the Paris formula: "*Active future economic relations between the Allied countries*" into a vitalising economic reality, and to bring those countries into such a position, geographically, with one another as to facilitate direct economic relations. This is possible only if the geographical and economic monopoly which Germany had in the past and is preparing for the future in the countries under review, is overcome.

For the present one need only indicate what is meant by this: (1) To promote active trade relations with the Balkans it will be necessary to grant an independent economic position, with sea communications, to the united and politically independent Jugoslav race. The political aspect of the question need not be emphasised here, for it is in concordance with the general war aims of the Allies, and has been often insisted on in THE NEW EUROPE. (2) It is necessary to establish economic unity, by means of proper economic communications between the Balkan Allies, so as to free them from depending solely upon the overland communications of Central Europe and bring them into direct touch with the Mediterranean and the Western Allies. This is possible only by carrying out economic organisation on the basis of the political understanding already existing between Roumania, Serbia, and Greece. There is no region in Europe where a rapid and natural economic development depends so completely upon a just peace.

G. DJURIĆ.

“The Future of Serbia”

THE collapse of Russia and the defeat of Italy have saved Austria-Hungary at the very moment when her own collapse seemed imminent. Now that her territory is once more intact, and her frontiers are no longer menaced by the enemy, her Foreign Minister is able to assume a very different language in his pronouncements upon foreign policy, and views are being expressed in many influential quarters which show that the old aggressive tendencies are still by no means dormant, despite the desperate economic, financial and political conditions. In any public discussion of those Balkan problems in which the Dual Monarchy is so vitally concerned it is but natural that the future fate of Serbia should figure prominently. Count Czernin has publicly endorsed the Russian formulæ of “no annexations” and “self-determination,” but both alike are capable of skilful interpretation. By applying the latter to States, not to nationalities, he seeks to exclude the subject races of Austria-Hungary, but to include the non-Russian peoples of what was once the Russian Empire : while the former is to be evaded by the creation of a new category of state, neither independent nor vassal, but revolving within the economic and political orbit of some more powerful neighbour * Such is the fate reserved for Poland, Lithuania and Lettonia (and if possible Belgium also) by Germany, for Roumania, Serbia and Albania by Austria-Hungary.

As regards Serbia in particular there has recently been a tendency in Vienna to adopt a more definite line of policy. On 5 December, during the debates of the Hungarian Delegation, Count Andrassy, while endorsing the main lines of Count Czernin's policy, argued that though wide annexations must be renounced, “certain frontier revisions will be necessary for military and strategic reasons.” Hence no peace could be acceptable which did not secure to Austria the mountain peak of Lovćen, which has long been regarded by military experts as the strategic key to the Eastern Adriatic, dominating, as it does, not only the interior of Montenegro with its miniature capital, but also the otherwise impregnable naval base of

* This idea has been worked out in considerable detail by the eminent jurist Professor von Gierke, the historian Professor Erich Brandenburg, and others. Their theories have been reviewed at some length in Nos. 47 and 59 of THE NEW EUROPE.

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Cattaro. The Hungarian Socialist organ, it is true, attacked Andrassy with great vehemence for putting forward this claim, and boldly affirmed that "no serious person imagines that Hungary has any serious interest in Lovćen, or that any country has any serious interest in any kind of Lovćen." But the unfortunate fact remains that Andrassy and Tisza are avowedly now working in complete harmony with Czernin, and that this harmony is an evil omen for his interpretation of "no annexations."

At a later stage in the debate Count Andrassy returned to the subject and insisted on the need for connecting Serbia and Montenegro with the Monarchy by close political and economic ties; such as would render any "repetition of previous events" impossible. Once, however, these ties had been imposed, he considered that it would be to the Monarchy's interest that the two Serb kingdoms should form a single State, with access to the sea. Count Tisza, for his part, declared that he saw no danger in a Serbia which had ceded to Bulgaria all the territory claimed by the latter. She might even be allowed to unite with Montenegro under certain conditions: but she must on no account be allowed to have a seaboard of her own upon the Adriatic. Such an access for Serbia would produce a situation even more intolerable for Austria-Hungary than that before the war. The chief essential is that Serbia's economic connections with the outer world should lie through Austria-Hungary.

This crude imperialistic doctrine, so worthy of a Magyar statesman, was endorsed by the influential and semi-official *Pester Lloyd*, which expressed the conviction that the majority of Hungarian public opinion was likely to follow Tisza rather than Andrassy in Balkan matters. It went on to ask why the two Serb States should be allowed to unite on the Monarchy's flank, and to assert that a common frontier between Hungary and Bulgaria is a *sine qua non* of the peace settlement.

Count Czernin's own contribution to the subject is distinctly significant. In his otherwise very perfunctory survey of the origins of the war he went so far as to accuse the Serbian Government of a direct share in the murder of the Archduke. This goes far beyond anything which was said by official Vienna during the fatal July of 1914, and there is not a shred of evidence in its favour: indeed, Serbia's eagerness to submit to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal is only one out of many

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available proofs of her Government's innocence. The obvious motive for Count Czernin's public adoption of such a charge is to stiffen public opinion in his own country against the Karageorgevitch dynasty and to prepare the way for an insistence upon their elimination.

Perhaps the most interesting of all the recent utterances on Serbia is an article contributed by the historian Dr. Friedjung to the *Vossische Zeitung* of 8 December. This article, without necessarily being inspired, may safely be regarded as a *ballon d'essai*. It deserves a certain attention as being the first public utterance of its author on the Southern Slav Question since the day when, as defendant in a political *cause célèbre* of European dimensions, he was proved to be the dupe of an elaborate plot, based on forgery and espionage, and concocted against Serbia by high Austrian diplomatic personages.

Dr. Friedjung starts from the assumption that as a result of the world-war "the Balkan Peninsula will remain in close union with the Central Powers. Any remaining doubt as to this has been washed away by the course of the Russian revolution. Thus, too, Serbia's connection with the Central European State system has been decided, whether the country continues as an independent State or not. The victor is bound in duty to consider the welfare of the Serbian nation also and not to let it suffer for the sins of the King and his councillors against Austria-Hungary. Moreover, by the attachment (*Anschluss*) of Serbia to the Danubian Monarchy the wish of the Serbo-Croat people for national unity (*Gemeinsamkeit*) draws near fulfilment. Even an independent Serbia will in future be bound by close political and economic ties to the Habsburg Monarchy, so that almost all Serbo-Croats will attain unity as against foreign countries (*nach aussen hin*). In this one point the Serbian nation, after all its heavy sufferings and losses, belongs to the winners of the war. The House of Habsburg can offer it quite other guarantees for intellectual and economic development than its baneful national dynasties. After the annexation of Bosnia, Austria-Hungary was satiated; only Pan-Serbian fantasies forced her to come to the table again. Aehrenthal, by voluntarily surrendering the Sandjak, proved that the Vienna Cabinet wished to renounce an extension of the empire beyond Mitrovica to Salonica. King Milan had the right political *flair* when he urged his people to link itself with the Danubian Monarchy, since otherwise Serbia would be crushed between it and the Bulgarian rival. King Peter, on the contrary, continues the adventures of his life in exile by allowing himself to be involved in a war of conquest, not only against Turkey and Bulgaria, but also Austria-Hungary. There is much talk of the intellectual liveliness, military capacity and other merits in the Serbian national character; and an enemy who has

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been thrown to the ground should not be abused or minimised. But one thing this people and its leaders lacked—an eye for what is geographically and politically possible. Politics cannot be made according to the style and pattern of the Serbian heroic poems of the Turkish era. The poet may give rein to his fantasy, the patriot and statesman must tame him. King Peter and his son Alexander, Pasić and Protić were the creators of their country's misfortunes. The Serbian people as such could be generously treated by the victor; but the House of Karageorge has dug its own grave, and it would be quixotic for the Vienna Cabinet to bid it rise again.

"If *only* the military security of the Danubian Monarchy be considered, Serbia's complete incorporation is desirable. If it retains not only its State but its army, the fanatics will seek to use this instrument and will be supported by English, Russian, and Italian money. If, on the other hand, it is incorporated, garrisons of no great strength would be sufficient; political robber bands can be exterminated. This would be the proper course if Germany and Austria-Hungary could dictate peace as they wish it: but they have to reckon with the will of the other great Powers, and in particular what Russia may propose.

"But there is a minimum from which the Central Powers cannot depart. Even a Serbia with her own administration must be linked as closely as possible with Austria-Hungary. Her State can be restored, but not her army. The complete dissolution of the Serbian army would put an end to militarism, at least in that part of the globe. Can the English and American pacifists imagine anything finer? The Serbian nation might, too, be given the choice of the abolition of a standing army or its subordination of the supreme command of the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. The popular representatives, if consulted on this point, would undoubtedly decide for the former. For the maintenance of order a *gendarmérie* would be sufficient. In return for this renunciation, the Monarchy would make Serbia a valuable present by setting free the export of its livestock northwards. Away with the folly of a tariff war against the small neighbour! Whether complete customs union or the establishment of moderate duties is best must be carefully considered; but the action of agrarian egoists in Austria and Hungary must not again interfere with statesmanship. If the Serbian peasant no longer has his son taken for military service, and may export the products of the soil to Austria-Hungary, he will find himself in an extraordinarily favourable position, and the false magic of Pan-Serbian policy will no longer attract him.

"If we hold to this train of thought the dispute as to whether Serbia should be incorporated or merely attached (*angegliedert*) assumes small proportions. It is always wrong to stick to stiff formulæ and get caught in a dilemma. The 'either-or' often contains a fallacy, since between contradictions which seem irreconcilable there are generally bridges of transition. And so a Serbian State can be built up again, without its being left the means for a struggle

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against the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, too, would be solved the question whether the Monarchy does not require the Belgrade-Semen-dria bridge-head—a claim resting on the fact that otherwise the crossings over the broad southern river frontiers would have to be won afresh each time. If Serbia is no longer a military State and has no batteries in the fortress of Belgrade and the hill of Avala which commands it, then Austria-Hungary requires no territory south of the Save. Certain garrison rights, at least for a number of years, could be reserved. The demilitarisation could also be adapted to Belgium. If Belgrade and Antwerp are no longer gates for hostile sallies into Central Europe, they could be left to independent organisms.

"If Serbia introduces a new dynasty we must not fall into the error of transplanting the master of the Black Mountain to Belgrade. The union of Serbia and Montenegro cannot be tolerated under any circumstances; otherwise the kernel of a hostile Great Serbia would be created. If the Petrović are allowed to rule on in Cetinje—under guarantees similar to those in Serbia—they must in any case be restricted to their mountains. It goes without saying that Lovćen cannot be given back to them, so that Cattaro should no longer be threatened from the mountains. It was always advisable to drive in a wedge between enemies, and it would be a sin against the holy ghost of sound policy if Serbia and Montenegro were to be united.

"Such would be the outlines of the future of Austria-Hungary's military, political, and commercial convention with Serbia. In these three respects unity would have to be established, otherwise Serbia would be self-governing, though under a new dynasty. She would then still enjoy greater independence than Hungary beside Austria, or Bavaria inside the German Empire. Her territory would, it is true, be diminished since the treaty which exists between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria is believed to have promised to King Ferdinand Macedonia and the territory east of the Morava. Among the fine phrases of enemy statesmen is the right of self-determination for the smaller peoples. But the world-war will in all probability lead to the opposite result; the great will use the small as objects of compensation. At the conference table the strong will decide upon the fate of the medium and small States. What Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria agree upon will happen in the Balkans. The details of the Balkan map will only be cleared up at the Peace Congress, but in broad lines there can be no more alteration. A Balkan League is already in process of formation, comprising the Danubian Monarchy, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Even without any documents or paragraphs these three Powers will have to stand together in order to defend, against all comers the glorious results of the struggle for the Dardanelles and the overwhelming of Serbia. But in any case the Serbian nation will belong to this south-eastern State system. If it submits, it is to be received as a comrade whose spiritual and political welfare and internal peace are best served by a connection with the Habsburg

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Monarchy. It is for its well-being to be ranked with the Germans of Austria, with the Magyars, the Poles, and the Croats. As enemies we have shown the Serbs the sharpness of our sword, as friends and brothers they are welcome to us."

Meanwhile official Austria has adopted still more definite tactics in Switzerland. A certain Austrian journalist called Slepanek was recently sent to Geneva with the object of winning over the Serbian and Jugoslav exiles in that city to an Austrophil policy. He appears to have produced an autograph letter of the former Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, to prove his seriousness, and to have offered, in the name of Count Czernin, in return for immediate peace, the following terms :—1. Reparation of material damage caused ; 2. Cession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with an outlet to the sea ; 3. No opposition to the union of Montenegro with Serbia ; 4. Austria's refusal to support Bulgaria's extreme demands, to which no treaty binds her. Obviously the basis of this would be some such economic and military arrangement with the Dual Monarchy as Dr. Friedjung has outlined. The Serbs declined to be seduced by such an offer and promptly scotched the intrigue by making it public.

Two further incidents deserve to be placed on record in this connection. On Christmas Day the *Neue Freie Presse* published as its first article an interview granted by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to Professor Adolf Straus, a recognised German authority on Bulgaria. Nothing could be more precise than the statement of policy ascribed to the king :—" To-day Bulgaria still places herself on the basis of the treaty which was signed and sworn to by her then allies " (*i.e.*, Serbia and Greece in 1912). In other words, the sovereign of an allied State appeared to be renouncing formally in one of the leading European journals the extreme annexationist claims to the Morava valley and a joint frontier with Hungary repeatedly put forward by the statesmen of Bulgaria : and the person of Herr Straus seemed to render a misunderstanding on so vital a point impossible. But the Bulgarian Premier promptly denied in Parliament the possibility of his master having made such a statement : and after an interval of some days Herr Straus supplied the Viennese journal with a bald announcement that the correct wording of his phrase was not " still places herself," but " no longer places herself " on the basis

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of the treaty of 1912. The inner history of this incident is still obscure; but it suggests that King Ferdinand may have yielded to strong pressure from his ally in Vienna, to whom the crude Bulgarian annexationist programme is a source of special embarrassment during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations; and that he found himself unable to prevent even his own special creature Radoslavov from repudiating such "moderation."

In any case, the facts can hardly be reconciled with the version current among sentimental Bulgarophiles in this country, according to which the treaty of 1912 represents the real aspiration of Bulgaria, while the demand for the annexation of the whole of Serbian and Greek Macedonia, the whole Morava valley, and the whole Dobrudja is merely the programme of a Chauvinistic king. As THE NEW EUROPE has often had occasion to demonstrate, king and people are united in an extreme national programme, which for greed and thoroughness throws the designs of Vienna or Berlin comparatively into the shade.

The latest exponent of these views is Mr. Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, who has recently summarised his country's territorial claims in their most uncompromising form in the *Vossische Zeitung*. Though in every other respect hostile to Serbia, he makes one curious admission. "Montenegro," he says, "must be united with Serbia, because it is a pure Serb country, because the whole Montenegrin people eagerly desires this union, because Montenegro lacks the necessary conditions for a modern independent state, and because for some years past the Montenegrins have felt such an organic hatred towards their dynasty, that, if their union with Serbia should prove impossible, they would even prefer Austria to an independent Montenegro under the dynasty of King Nikita." Here we see in yet another form the idea developed by Count Andrassy—that Serbia, robbed of the fruits of her Balkan victories and baulked of her hopes of national unity with her kinsmen in the Dual Monarchy, should be thrown the sop of barren Montenegro. It is a curious coincidence that our British Bulgarophiles should be advocating the very same programme as the Magyar reactionary statesman.

Forerunners of the Russian Revolution

(III) ČERNYŠEVSKI

[We are glad to be able to announce that an English translation of Professor Masaryk's epoch-making book on Russia is in preparation by Messrs. Allen and Unwin, and will be published in due course. For the moment the only available edition is in German, 2 vols., pp. 371 and 511. The third volume, which treats of Dostoevski as the key to Russian psychology and philosophy, was still in MS. when war broke out, and has probably been sequestered by the Austrian Government with the rest of the author's library in Prague. The Russian edition was not allowed to appear under the old régime.]

Černyševski, the third figure in this series, was originally intended for the priesthood, but owing to his literary promise was sent to Petrograd University and adopted the teaching profession. From 1854 to 1862 he was editor of Nekrasov's review *Sovremennik*. He was thrown into prison in 1863, and two years later was sent to Siberia. In 1883 he was released, and died in 1889. His critical work was saturated with revolutionary feeling, which also found expression in a social novel, "What is to be done?" in which he advocated a radical land programme for the Russian peasantry.

Černyševski's mental development early showed the influence of philosophical study: he parted company with Herzen and Bakunin in preferring Feuerbach to Hegel: but, like the two *émigrés*, he assimilated the teaching of Comte, Louis Blanc, Fourier and Proudhon.

In the philosophers, economists and socialists of England he found deep and welcome sources of instruction. Bentham and Mill strengthened him in Positivism, and brought him to Utilitarianism; he knew Owen and always recognised the authority of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Buckle. Thus his spiritual physiognomy was quite different from that of Herzen and Bakunin; the influence of native Russian literature (Byelinski, Herzen, Gogol), the English tinge and the fact that he derives less from Hegel than from Feuerbach, gave him a philosophical stamp of his own. He was far more of a positivist in the sense of Comte—a Realist, in the Russian phrase; he carried Herzen's theory of disillusionment to its logical conclusions and turned from German ideas to Russian facts. With Byelinski, he treated Realism as the opposite of Romanticism, and opposed

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sentimentality in all its forms, by pressing for a real interpretation of men's motives. Besides, he remained in Russia, and so had to deal with native friends and foes. Russian problems and conditions always had the first claim upon his mind.

Černyševski himself professed Materialism, and as such his outlook is regarded both by friend and foe. In his own words "philosophy sees in man what medicine, physiology and chemistry see in him; these sciences prove that no dualism is noticeable in man, but philosophy adds, that if man, outside his real nature, had a second nature, this latter would certainly manifest itself in something; and as it shows itself in nothing, and as all that happens and manifests itself in man takes place according to his real nature, there is no such thing as a second nature in him." He is a materialist *sans phrase*, and so above all, denies the immortality of the soul. . . . Psychology is for him a part of physiology. As a consequence of his materialism, he teaches egoism as the real motive of every action, however noble. . . . His outlook upon the world and upon life is the foundation of the Realism of the sixties, to which Turgenev gave the name of Nihilism, and which was opposed, not only by the Conservatives, but also by the Liberals.

Černyševski's philosophy and literary activity have altogether the character of the philosophy of enlightenment, in its aggressive form before the French Revolution. He knows that he is revolutionising his fellow men; for he wants to continue and deepen the revolution of Peter the Great. To him Peter is the ideal for Russia. If French enlightenment and its materialism offer him the philosophical and political example, he finds in Lessing his literary teacher.

It was his ambition to become a modern Aristotle, a teacher not only for Russia but for all mankind. He planned, quite in the sense of the French school, several encyclopædic works, intended to sum up the material and intellectual development of mankind as in a codex or bible. In his view enlightenment was above all necessary for Russia, who had, it is true, an army of a million and a half soldiers, and could some day conquer Europe like the Huns or Mongols, but could do nothing further. Thus, according to Peter's example, true patriotism consists in the task of enlightenment: and hence Černyševski called himself a publicist, for to him "a

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publicist is not a professor but a tribune or advocate." Enlightenment is in his view not the propagation of culture taken over from the West, but the abandonment of a false outlook on the world. It is a new civilisation based on materialism. The German, it is true (*i.e.*, Feuerbach), founded this materialism, but the Russian will be its universal Aristotle. In short, with all his realism, we find in him a kind of popularising Messianic vein, even though merely in the sense of Hegel or Feuerbach, each of whom proclaimed his philosophy as the last chapter of human thought.

The ethical consequences of his "Anthropological Principle" are firstly the recognition of determinism for the life of the individual, for society and for history, and secondly the proclamation of egoism as the foundation of ethics. Both doctrines were certainly nothing new in philosophy and ethics in 1860, but with them he none the less stirred up his Russian contemporaries. . . . His ethics are not only social, but socialistic: he conceives of practical, active love from a communistic point of view, because he starts from the natural equality of all men—that is, for him, of all human organisms. From its ethical and social-political side materialism is communism, the recognition of equal rights among men organised in society as the result of a natural law. The love of neighbour and of self, which is innate in man, leads, on a materialistic basis, to equality of rights: but Černyševski treats this equality logically and applies it in a socialistic and communistic sense to all spheres of social life. This communism does not even stop short of family life and marriage. "My clothes, thy clothes; my pipe stem, thy pipe stem; my wife, thy wife": says Rahmetov in "What is to be done?"

Černyševski's influence in the late fifties and early sixties was very great, and for this very reason the Government banished him. This influence was political, and hence his exile had powerful political effects. . . . The revolutionaries of those days held more closely to his example than to his teachings. Černyševski in Siberia was a living memory to them, but also to the Government and the reactionaries, who according to Bakunin's not inaccurate diagnosis had the privilege of political blindness. At any rate they failed to realise that, in the words of Poerio, the King of Sicily's persecuted minister, "*il patire è anche operare.*"

With his realistic tendencies Černyševski also prepared

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Marxism and Social Democracy, but it is a mistake for certain Marxists to claim him as a Russian Marx or semi-Marx. It is also wrong to describe him as the founder or even father of the Narodničestvo [revolutionary agrarian socialism]. He had a more realistic conception of the Mužik and the Mir than had Bakunin and Herzen, and thus strengthened the more political and practical tendency in the Narodničestvo. But he looked upon the Mir as an association in the sense of European socialism, and did not ascribe to it such exclusive importance as did the later National Radicals (Narodniki). Unlike the Slavophiles, he did not look upon Europe as rotten; in his opinion the European masses had still not come into action.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

* * * *The first two articles in the above series [(1) Bakunin, (11) Bakunin and Marx] appeared in Nos. 63 and 64 respectively.—EDITOR.*

The Germans of Austria

To students of Austrian affairs we recommend a specially enlightening article in the Socialist monthly, Der Kampf, for December, on "German Policy in Austria," by Herr Austerlitz, the well-known German-Jewish Socialist journalist, who for many years past has been one of the principal editors of the Arbeiter Zeitung. Space prevents us from giving more than a few extracts.

"All the nations of Austria have their distinct and positive national programme; the Germans (we are only speaking of the *bourgeoisie*) lack a programme to such a degree as to be unaware that it is missing. The Czechs want their independent state 'with every attribute of sovereignty'; the Poles want to get away from this state and to take Galicia with them, and regard the Personal Union merely as an inevitable transitional stage: the Ukrainians demand either independence within the Monarchy, or a return to the bosom of the Ukraine; the Southern Slavs, the union of all parts of their race, now cut up among four states, in a single state. But what do the Germans want and demand? Really nothing for its own sake; their demand is limited to the non-fulfilment of the ideals of the other nations. They oppose the foundation of the Czech state, the union of the Southern Slavs, and even where they appear to agree to the national claims of another people, in the 'Austro-Polish' solution of the Austria of to-day, and are not concerned for a national ideal of their own. 'For all this is negative with them; the Germans really want everything in Austria to remain as it was, and resist every demand of the other nations, because they themselves have none. . . .

"The result of their insistence upon worn-out ideas is that the German *bourgeoisie* cannot attain to a uniform point of view. In

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the North they are for separatism and national autonomy; only he is a good German who denies the historical and political individuality of the province (*i.e.*, Bohemia). In the South, on the other hand, they are enthusiastic about the inviolability of provincial boundaries, and he who attacks the unity of the province is threatening its most sacred possession. In the one case, local autonomy (*Kreisordnung*) is the highest aim; in the other it is treason. . . . They only think in provinces (*Kronländer*); what will happen to the Germans in Styria if the Slovenes are taken from them, or to the Germans in Tirol if the Italians are separated from them? But they do not think nationally; that the Germans of all Austria ought to be a free, solid nation with rights of its own. They see the province and the state, but not the nation—the nation which decides its own fate and so overcomes the restraint of the racial state. To the illusion that they are progressing through the favour of the state they sacrifice the possibility of making the German nation independent of the state. . . .

“The German *bourgeoisie* only sees the Czech “State,” fears and hates it, but does not see the *German state*, which achievement, as the expression of national independence in the racial state, ought to be the aim of any far-sighted national policy. The idea that every nation can deal with and dispose of its affairs freely and independently (*selbständig*) is really, after all, a natural idea; and if the racial state prevents the fulfilment, opposes to the living nation the abstract “state organism,” and seeks to restrict national forces within the narrow limits of provincial frontiers, then it merely proves that it is not the ‘supernational state’ which its admirers proclaim, but the *anti-national state whose existence rests on the denial of the Right of Self-determination for the peoples*. The Germans who reject the national state for themselves fancy, no doubt, that they are thus proving themselves to be better than the others. In reality they are thus merely choosing for themselves the position of a pariah; they, who belong to the most developed of civilized peoples (*Kulturvolk*), thereby place themselves among the small nations still struggling for their culture.

“The reconciliation of the nations by whom the desire for attaining full independence is innate with the racial state who denies it to them, can only be achieved by separation (*Sonderung*)—by that nation becoming independent of each other and by the racial state becoming a League of free peoples. People complain of the racial struggle as hindering creative work, paralysing action, distorting all questions. But even this is far from summing up the whole of its evil effects. The worst is that it poisons men, and breeds in all those who conduct public affairs or lead in politics, a spirit of meanness and shabbiness, and, at the same time, leads to their intellectual deterioration (*Verpöbelung*). . . .

“The Pangermanism of Herr Wolf is to-day a collection of contradictory crimes. Its exponents take from their Prussian models their enthusiasm for authority, and yet are specialists in Austrian muddling (*Schlamperei*). Economically, they represent the petty bourgeois clique at its narrowest, and yet pose as world-

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politicians with an exaggerated imperialism. They want to separate off whatever stands in the way of creating a German majority; and yet they are annexationists, although any annexation by Austria leads into Slav territory, and so increases Slav predominance.

“ By renouncing all idea of making the Germans of Austria into a nation independent alike of the racial state and of the other nations, by refusing to rally the nation and assert its right of self-determination, the German *bourgeoisie* have based their national cause upon Privilege. And now they have the feeling that every renunciation of privilege weakens their national position, that every step towards democracy leads to national misery. . . . They are continually holding up to us German Social Democrats, the noble example of the Czech Social Democrats, who loyally join their bourgeois conationals. But have they never noticed that the national development of the Czechs is taking place in the name of Democracy, while the national preservation of the Germans, so long as they do not form a separate nation, depends on the maintenance of privileges? It is not that the Czech *bourgeoisie* adopts democratic views in order to win the Czech workman, but that the Czechs, if they wish to develop, can only do so according to the laws of democracy—because their power tends to follow their numbers. But what does the German *bourgeoisie* want of us when they bid us support their national policy? They want us to renounce Democracy, to renounce Universal Suffrage in the country and in the commune, to rest satisfied with the ‘ Curia ’ because the German cause is so badly managed as to be incompatible with democracy! That is what made Victor Adler, at the Socialist Congress, sigh: ‘ We have a peasantry and a *bourgeoisie* with whom there is absolutely nothing to be done.’ ”

Herr Austerlitz concludes with the phrase: “ Only in the ‘ Federation of Nations ’ (*Völkerstaat*) can democracy be at home and victorious; the ‘ State of Nationalities ’ (*Nationalitätenstaat*), as we see it to-day, is condemned to barrenness and stagnation.”

Unhappily he gives no indication as to how the one is to be replaced by the other; in other words, how Federalism is to take the place of Dualism. Even the ablest political theorist of his own party, Dr. Carl Renner, stands committed to the futile and unsatisfying plan of national autonomy in each of the seventeen Austrian provinces, and this is the plan favoured by the present Austrian Government.

“ Flirting with Vienna ” : a Warning

In several recent issues of the Journal des Débats, M. Auguste Gauvain has subjected Mr. Lloyd George's speech to a careful examination in the light of Austro-Hungarian conditions. In view of M. Gauvain's authority in this matter we reproduce some of his more salient passages. On 8 January, under the title “ Government by consent of the governed,” he wrote :—

“ If the Emperor-King does not send troops to our front, it is because he cannot. . . . If he threatens us to-day in order to ensnare us,

“FLIRTING WITH VIENNA”: A WARNING

it is in order that we may commit a fresh mistake and an act of cowardice. He wishes us to abandon the cause of the peoples who have compromised themselves for us, so that he may say to them: ‘Look! The Allies, with whom you persist in sympathising, are sacrificing you to their convenience. You cannot count on them. Return to the Austro-Hungarian sphere, where I shall welcome you indulgently.’ How could the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs resist this appeal? Would they let themselves, without any hope of final success, be exterminated or imprisoned to the last man by their masters? They would bend before necessity; Charles I. and his ministers would say to us: ‘The peoples for whom you claim independence are perfectly satisfied with their lot; busy yourselves with what concerns you.’ And we should thus with our own hands have reconstituted the block of 120,000,000 Austro-Germans obedient to a single military order. Where would be the guarantees for maintaining peace and the independence of the peoples?”

On 14 January he continued as follows with reference to President Wilson’s message:—

“Point 10 of the Wilsonian programme is disturbing. He asks that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be granted ‘the first opportunity of autonomous development.’ He does not seem to realise that most of these peoples—for instance, those of Bohemia and Croatia—already enjoy a constitutional position superior to that which he is kind enough to design for them. What the Czechs and Croats complain of is not that they lack autonomy; they have a constitution, ministers, etc. *By law* the Crown of Bohemia is worth as much as that of Austria. Official texts assure to them solemn guarantees. But in point of fact, all this constitutional decoration covers a despotism *pur et simple*. The constitution is systematically violated. The nationalities most protected by parchments are treated as though no engagement had been made towards them. They are not consulted in the general direction of policy. They are made use of like a flock of sheep. In 1914 they were thrown, despite themselves, into a war contrary to their vital interests. Consequently new scraps of paper, new declarations, are of little value to them. They want a state of affairs which will assure their rights being respected. As, then, they have come to realise that they cannot obtain this inside the Dual Monarchy, they demand independence. This is indispensable to them, so that they may never again be subjected to a constraint equal to that of this abominable war.”

On 19 January M. Gauvain published an even more remarkable article entitled “Austria-Hungary and Peace,” devoted to the various Entente flirtations of last year with Vienna and to the absurd illusions on which they are based. “To-day the Austrian sirens are murmuring a new song in the ear of the West. They admit that for the moment the two Central Empires are inseparable. But they count upon peace dissolving the alliance and ask us to help them. Hence we are to favour Austria-Hungary’s aggrandisement against the southern and eastern Slavs, such as to make the Monarchy inevitably a Slav state opposed to Germany. Consequently it would be clumsy on our part

"FLIRTING WITH VIENNA:" A WARNING

to ask for the creation of the Serbo-Croato-Slovene Kingdom foreseen by the Declaration of Corfu, or even for the simple re-establishment of Serbia. How much cleverer to allow the formation of a great Jugoslavia inside the Monarchy! In the same way, why prevent the Ukraine from linking up federally with the Habsburg state? The greater and stronger this is, the better it will serve as a counterpoise to Germany. Thus will be realised the desire of the Western Powers to re-establish in Central Europe the balance destroyed by the Prussian victories.

"Perhaps some of those who sing this refrain act in good faith. Indeed, there is no lack of Austrians who deplore the German hegemony, and wish its disappearance. Unhappily they are absolutely incapable of carrying their wishes into effect. Their country is in German hands, which will not let go unless an outside force compels it. At each new subsidence of the Monarchy Germany will assert her influence still more. She will tolerate no change without having taken securities. This is what she is doing at this moment in the East. She is allowing the formation of a kingdom of Poland, but on condition that she remains its master economically and militarily. All the aggrandisements which Charles I. may be able to obtain will be of the same nature. He will, perhaps, place new crowns upon his head, but William II. will hold the sword and the purse. In the hypothesis foreseen by the "sirens," he would take care that Jugoslavia should be absorbed in *Mittel-europa* in such a way that it could not develop westwards.

"The more one considers the Austro-Hungarian problem under its various aspects the more one is driven to the view that the only way of regulating it, if not to our advantage, at any rate without fresh dangers to us, consists in conferring true independence upon the peoples of the Dual Monarchy, who, proud of their past and confident in their future, wish to shake off all community with the Germans and the Magyars."

The New Republic in Finland

[*The Manchester Guardian of 16 January published an interview with Dr. E. R. Holsti, former member of the Finnish Government and now President of the Finnish Delegation which is asking for formal recognition of the new Republic in Finland. Some account of Finnish events during the war will be found in THE NEW EUROPE, Nos. 30 and 43.*]

"Mr. Holsti recalled the high hopes created in Finland by the declaration of the Allies that they were fighting for the rights of the small nationalities. Finland thought that this would mean the end of Russian oppression, but, shortly after the Polish manifesto by the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Government published a programme aiming at the final destruction of Finnish autonomy and nationality. The Finnish nation then resolved to make a last effort to save the country, and it was decided that when the Peace Conference met the Diet would approach the foreign Powers with a

THE NEW REPUBLIC IN FINLAND

request for the establishment of full sovereign independence. There was no certainty that if they were left in association with the Russian Empire the old policy of Russification would not begin again.

"After the Revolution the first Government established in Russia promised to re-establish in Finland all the legal rights which had been taken away under the old *régime*. The intention in Finland then was to maintain conciliatory relations with Russia until the Peace Congress, when full separation would be asked for. The Finnish Government solemnly proclaimed in the Diet that full independence was the final aim. Difficulties arose between the Russian Government and the Finnish Diet last summer with regard to the meaning of this declaration. The Russian Government dissolved the Finnish Diet, and a new election took place last October. After the fall of Kerenski's Government, the Diet waited before further taking steps until an established Government had been created in Russia, but as no settled Government was established, the new Administration came into existence in Finland at the beginning of December and at once declared its intention of proclaiming the immediate independence of Finland. The Diet passed a resolution unanimously approving of this policy and empowering the Government to seek recognition by the leading States of the world and the establishment of full diplomatic relations with them.

"The Diet decided to approach the Constituent Assembly in Russia through a friendly manifesto, explaining that this assertion of complete independence was not a hostile act, and that the ultimate aim was to settle all the outstanding questions between Finland and Russia through a joint committee so that friendly relations could be established and Russia could proceed with her war without any fear of trouble from Finland. As the Constituent Assembly was not allowed to meet, the Finnish Government asked for recognition from the Russian political leaders, who immediately answered that the steps taken by the Finnish people were in uniformity with the policy and programme of the Bolševiks.

"Immediately afterwards the Swedish Government recognised the independence of Finland, and was followed by the other Scandinavian countries. Recognition by France preceded recognition by Germany.

"'We are now,' said Dr. Holsti, 'asking for full formal recognition by Great Britain. As there may be some question as to the extent of the demand for independence in Finland, it may be stated that everyone who voted in the last general election did so in full conviction that the Diet would do everything to obtain full independence. If the Great Powers were to ask for a referendum there would not be a single Finn who would vote for the maintenance of the connection between Finland and Russia. Our future attitude to Russia will be of the most friendly character, and from the standpoint of commercial intercourse there is every reason that this should be so . . . We are a small country, and we do not want to have to maintain any considerable army.

"'Before we left Helsingfors we insisted that we should have a definite assurance with regard to our future relations with the

THE NEW REPUBLIC IN FINLAND

Powers. We were informed that as soon as our Independence was recognised, our policy will be one of complete neutrality. After the war no foreign Powers will be permitted to interfere with our internal or external policy, either commercially or otherwise. There are at present serious internal difficulties in Finland, chiefly owing to the scarcity of food. Last year's harvest was extremely bad, and the importation of grain from Russia has been seriously diminished. I am convinced that these difficulties will be overcome as soon as the grain which our Government has bought in the United States can be imported into Finland, which may be expected to follow from the full recognition of our independence by the United States and Great Britain."

Review

La République et le Rhin: (1) par E. Driault. 3 fr. *La République et le Rhin: le problème économique*: (2) par E. Driault et Chr. Scheffer. 3 fr. (Paris: Recueil Sirey.) These two little volumes present, in a cogent and temperate manner, the case for a buffer State to be interposed between France and Germany in the region immediately north of Lorraine. In the form of an autonomous Rhenish province which, as M. Driault clearly believes, would look to France, this block of territory is designed to safeguard the Republic from the menace of sudden invasion, and, by special economic agreement, to enable France to withstand the onslaught of industrial Germany. Monsieur Driault and his colleague present their case so suavely and with such evident mastery of the historic origins of their subject that they almost persuade the reader to applaud their plan. They claim that they have avoided the fatal word annexation, but, if so, they contrive to violate the principle of self-determination by wresting a portion of Rhenish Prussia from Germany against what is plainly the will of the people concerned. In no sense could France be a gainer from such a transaction. She must look elsewhere for security.

A. F. W.

The *Arbeiter Zeitung* speaks out

The *Arbeiter Zeitung* published an article on 8 January in which the reception of Mr. Lloyd George's speech in Austria-Hungary was criticised in the following manner:—"All this patriotic drum fire against the English is of no use at all. Such principles as that the future of civilisation can no longer be left to the arbitrary decision of a few negotiators, and that the consent of the governed must be the basis of every regulation of territorial questions in this war—these are principles to which all nations alike will agree and for whose recognition they will all press most energetically—the nations of Austria-Hungary not the least of all." Recent events in Austria serve admirably to underline the significant words of the Austrian Socialist journal.

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Diary of Current Events.

- 1917, 27 Dec.—M. Pichon on the peace proposals.
- 28 Dec.—Labour Memorandum on war aims adopted by National Conference. Mr. Henderson's message to Russia. Premier meets Labour Leaders. Finnish deputation to King of Sweden.
- 30 Dec.—Bessarabia reported to have declared itself a Moldavian Republic.
- 1918, 1 Jan.—Premier's New Year Message to Allies.
- 2 Jan.—Trotsky denounces German peace proposals. Reported arrest of 300 Independent Socialists by German Government.
- 3 Jan.—Trotsky's letter to French Socialists.
- 5 Jan.—Premier's War Aims speech to Trade Unions.
- 6 Jan.—French Government recognises independence of Finnish Republic.
- 8 Jan.—Announcement of Lord Reading's appointment as British High Commissioner to America.
- 9 Jan.—President Wilson's "War Aims" message to Congress.
- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed.
- 14 Jan.—Sir A. Geddes introduces man-power Bill in House of Commons. M. Caillaux arrested. Italian gains near Monte Grappa.
- 15 Jan.—British Labour message to Russia, expressing agreement on war aims. Russian ultimatum to Roumania. Mr. Asquith's speech to London Liberal Federation.
- 16 Jan.—Reported Bolševik order for arrest of King of Roumania. Battle between Maximalists and Ukrainians in Odessa.
- 17 Jan.—Secret Session on man-power.
- 18 Jan.—Premier addresses final conference of trades unions on man-power proposals.

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“Soldiers and Politicians”

IN so far as the current dispute between “soldiers and politicians” relates to questions of military strategy or tactics, it is no concern of THE NEW EUROPE. Our object is, and has been, to help in winning the war by spreading knowledge of the essential conditions of integral victory, that is to say, of a lasting peace. We care nothing for persons, political or military; but we care much for principles and for their rightful application. We cannot therefore remain indifferent towards some of the tendencies underlying the present controversy. We propose to treat them without fear or favour and to place them in what we believe to be their true light.

The foremost principle under discussion is that of civil control of the Army and its chiefs. In Great Britain, of all countries, this principle ought not to be open to dispute. It is the very foundation of Constitutional democratic liberty. Since the execution of Charles I. it has not been seriously challenged, and even those who now assail it—by implication—recognise it in theory. It was rightly defined some weeks ago by the *Observer* and has since been stated forcibly and accurately by the *Manchester Guardian*. Ranged against it in effect, if not avowedly, we find militarist organs like the *Morning Post* and the *Globe*—supported indirectly by extreme Radical, not to say semi-pacifist, journals such as the *Star* and the *Daily News*.

The militarist thesis was put forward most tangibly by the *Globe* of 23 January, when it wrote: “If the politicians had a little more courage and a little more insight they would understand that what the nation is asking for, first and last and all the time, is that the war should be won, and that it knows full well that nothing else is now of the smallest consequence. . . . We should be very sorry to see the German system adopted over here, but all the same we should like to see Haig and Robertson given something of that freedom of movement and decision enjoyed by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and of which they are quite as capable as their German rivals of making the best and fullest use.” This

"SOLDIERS AND POLITICIANS"

passage was prefaced by the statement that "only the direst necessity would induce this country to accept a military dictatorship, such as that which, to all intents and purposes, now rules in Germany, and *as yet* the necessity has not arisen." (The italics are ours.) If these written words be read in the light of the verbal propaganda whispered in many quarters in favour of placing not only the Army, but the country, under the absolute control of a soldier, some notion may be gleaned of the anti-civil tendencies which undoubtedly exist.

We do not for an instant believe that the Radical-pacifist supporters of "the soldiers" aim consciously at the establishment of a military Premiership and Dictatorship. They may have recondite ends of their own in view. They may imagine that if, with the help of the militarist press, the present War Cabinet were once overthrown, the only practical alternative would be a Government pledged to the negotiation of a speedy peace. If this be their reckoning, we think it wrong. It leaves out of account the strength of public feeling throughout the country and, in particular, the sound determination of the great majority of working men that the war shall be won and peace ensured broadly on the lines of the recent Labour Message to Russia. But, to do them justice, the Radical allies of the *Morning Post* and of the *Globe* have not given any public hint that they are pursuing hidden ends. Their outcry during the past ten days has been rather in the nature of a revolt against what they assume to be the establishment of a dictatorship of public opinion by the Northcliffe press. There is humour in the spectacle of the Northcliffe organs, and Lord Northcliffe himself, being trounced by the *Star* and the *Daily News* for hostility to "the soldiers." If any man be responsible for having set the present Heads of the Army upon a high pinnacle of fame, that man is Lord Northcliffe; and if his bearing towards them be now changed, he may fairly be accused of inconsistency—provided that nothing has happened since the publication of his book "At the War" to justify a more critical attitude on his part.

We resent the suggestion that the public opinion of this country is or can be determined by a change in the mental processes of one man, no matter how influential he may be; and we should like to be quite sure that the outcry of last week was not in great measure due to a feeling of disappoint-

"SOLDIERS AND POLITICIANS"

ment among the opponents of the present Cabinet that the solid phalanx of press "opinion"—carefully built up and extending from Mr. Horatio Bottomley to the *Morning Post*—should be broken by criticisms of the Army Chiefs in a Northcliffe organ. We believe that, in the long run, public opinion is determined by facts. One of the main facts bearing upon the military position is now sufficiently known, despite the embarrassed reticence of the Government, for it to have had a very serious effect upon the public mind. That fact is what Mr. Bonar Law has called the "breakdown" at Cambrai. We may not agree with the *Manchester Guardian* that unless the Cambrai affair is probed to the bottom we shall not win the war; but, despite official euphemisms, the "breakdown" certainly indicates defects in the working of the military machine, or in the working of the controlling military minds, that call for thorough remedy. There is nothing impious in the suggestion that fresh minds might be better fitted than minds fatigued by unprecedented strain to deal with the new situation brought about by the collapse of Russia, and by the growing need for unification of military control in the West. Who now suggests that the appointment of the late General Maude to command in Mesopotamia, or of General Allenby to succeed Sir Archibald Murray in Palestine, was a sacrilege? There is no reason to regard any soldier or any politician as sacrosanct—though there are many reasons why military appointments should not be made the subject of heated public controversy. Those appointments should be exclusively the work of the responsible Civil Government. We should deplore any press campaign designed to drive the Government to dismiss or appoint any given soldier, but we should equally reprobate the organisation of a press campaign under military auspices with the object of intimidating the Government and of preventing it from making whatever changes it may believe to be conducive to national and Allied interests.

In the last resort, this "soldiers *versus* politicians" controversy turns upon the question whether the government is prepared fearlessly to do its duty. The Government stands towards the Heads of the Army in the same position as the Commander-in-Chief stands towards his subordinate commanders. It is the supreme Commander-in-Chief, and it is constitutionally responsible to the nation. Should it acquiesce

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in the possession or in the exercise by any soldier of powers incompatible with its constitutional supremacy, it would be unfit to hold office. It has but one master—the nation as a whole; and to that master it owes an honest and a continuous account of its stewardship. Should it allow itself to be intimidated by press campaigns, or to be deflected from the performance of its clear duty, by any form of open or secret pressure from any quarter, high or low, it would deserve to be hurled from power and to be impeached for high treason.

Austria in the Crucible

FOR many months past the Dual Monarchy has shown increasing signs of disintegration, alike in the political and economic sphere. It had become impossible to sum up the situation as a whole, since the very horizon was blocked by a long vista of complicated problems, each interacting upon the other in an incalculable way. Often enough the student of Austrian affairs feels the same bewilderment as the child that holds a kaleidoscope to the light.

One fundamental fact of the past year has, strangely enough, never been brought home to the British public—namely, that it is little more than an unhappy accident, determined very largely by reasons of geography and "interior lines," that Russia has collapsed sooner than Austria-Hungary. No fewer than six times has Austria-Hungary been saved from disaster and made the sharer of victory by the energy and military genius of her German allies. But for Germany the Russians would never have lost their Galician conquests; but for Germany neither Serbia nor Roumania would have been overrun; but for Germany the Italians would still be east of the Isonzo. The corroding influence of unsatisfied national claims has worked like a slow poison upon the Austro-Hungarian Army: and to-day these influences are supplemented by the acute distress of the civil population and by the silent tide of subversive doctrine which, intangible and irresistible, is moving westwards from the Russian lines and infecting alike the restless industrial worker and the land-hungry peasant. If to-day Austria-Hungary is no longer in imminent danger of destruction from without, it is only because the Allies are not at present in a position to threaten the besieged fortress of Central Europe on its weakest sectors.

AUSTRIA IN THE CRUCIBLE

But at the very moment when her territory has been freed from military menace, the Dual Monarchy finds herself confronted by no less grave internal dangers, of which the strike movements of the last week are a practical symptom. Quite apart from the already abundant evidence of impending trouble, Count Czernin's anxiety to come to an immediate agreement at Brest and the compliments lavished upon the Russian leaders by the Austrian official press (which slurred over the uncomfortable fact of General Duhonin's murder and seriously instituted a comparison between Czernin and Trotski), represent so complete a breach with all the traditions of the Ballplatz that they can hardly be explained by anything save dire need. With habitual perversity, a certain type of pacifist is hailing this as the right moment to come to terms with Count Czernin, not realising that they would thereby save a *régime* which is tottering to its fall and bolster up narrow dynastic and oligarchic interests against the twin forces of democracy and nationality.

The causes of the grave crisis in which the Habsburg Monarchy now finds itself are almost equally political and economic. A brief survey of the latter may make the reader more disposed to appreciate the extraordinary difficulty of simultaneously solving a dozen burning political questions at a moment when the struggle for bare existence is uppermost in men's minds.

The food problem has been acute in Austria for the last two years, though it has varied greatly according to districts. Last summer there was real famine in Istria, Bosnia, and the German districts of Bohemia, but comparative plenty among the Czech and Magyar peasantry. For many months past there have been *all-night* queues for the barest necessities of life, and the medical profession has been loud in its complaints of the fatal injury caused to the health and morals of women and children. Salt, butter, eggs, sugar, etc., have often been unobtainable. The milk supply of Vienna has dropped from 900,000 to 170,000 litres per day. Horseflesh has become a regular article of consumption for the middle classes. The output of beer is only 6 per cent. of the pre-war period. Fodder is hard to procure, and there has been a dangerous reduction of live-stock in consequence. As the *Neue Freie Presse* admitted last November, Vienna has been living from hand to mouth for almost two years, and this applies to

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other urban districts. Numerous diseases due to bad food or starvation are increasingly prevalent. The rise of mortality is only less alarming than the falling birth-rate. The reduced capacity for work caused by underfeeding is openly admitted. Tuberculosis is rampant at the front and in the rear.

Equally serious is the clothing crisis. By the end of September the stocks of clothing for the general public were running short, and the introduction of "clothes-cards" came too late to regulate the impossible prices. Thread is unobtainable and most tailors refuse to undertake repairs except for customers who bring their own thread. That the situation had become too desperate for any attempt at concealment is best shown by the appeal issued to the press by a high medical officer on the General Staff, announcing that the army authorities can no longer supply sufficient underclothing for the troops in the field, and would therefore welcome second-hand gifts from patriotic individuals.

Intimately connected with the food problem is the problem of distribution. As in Germany (and, of course, still more in Russia), the railways of Austria-Hungary are going to rack and ruin as the result of the stress of war. The permanent way is deteriorating, rolling-stock can neither be repaired nor replaced, labour has grown steadily scarcer. The army chiefs, it is now publicly admitted, took away far too many men from the mines, and only replaced them when it was already too late to make good the arrears. In October the Hungarian Premier had to admit in the House that the import of coal from Austria and Germany to Hungary was "subject to almost insuperable difficulties." Easy-going officialdom proved utterly unequal to the strain. Budapest found itself without street lighting, and in mid-December the whole gas supply of the city suddenly gave out. Graz, the second German city of Austria, though on the main line to the south, found itself plunged in darkness for lack of fuel. Difficulties of fuel and lighting have become chronic in the various towns and have been rendered more acute by phenomenal falls of snow. For many weeks past the Hungarian press has only had a paper reserve of two or three days—a fact which is doubtless less disturbing to the Government than its many other troubles. In a word, even before Christmas the outspoken *Arbeiter-Zeitung* was writing of "difficulties under which the whole economic system is threatening to

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collapse," and was freely comparing the "intolerable confusion" and miseries of the transport crisis with the situation which precipitated the memorable "March Days" of last year in Russia.

Meanwhile the financial situation is absolutely desperate. The gold reserve has sunk to £10,000,000. Heavy loans to German banks alone render it possible to make foreign purchases at all. All kinds of rumours are afloat as to the amount of paper money in circulation. There has been persistent over-speculation on the bourses of Vienna and Budapest.

Such is the gloomy economic background to a political situation of extraordinary complication. Readers of THE NEW EUROPE have been in a position to follow the course of events in Austria-Hungary since the Russian Revolution completed what Friedrich Adler's assassination of Count Stürgkh had begun and rendered inevitable the summons of the Reichsrat in Austria and the dismissal of the reactionary Tisza in Hungary.* The young Emperor—Charles the Sudden, as he is sarcastically called in Vienna—has sought to counterbalance his utter ignorance and inexperience in political matters by swift impulses and unexpected decisions. It was only with the greatest difficulty that Count Czernin induced him to abandon the so-called Octroi policy† which Count Clam-Martinić had been selected to carry through. It is significant that the German-Austrian leaders (including so moderate a man as Dr. Baernreither) protested against this abandonment and could only be persuaded to remain in the Cabinet by personal assurances from the Emperor that the interests of the Germans would not be betrayed. Even when Parliament met at the end of May, it was clear from the Emperor's action in postponing his oath to the Constitution that the mad idea of a "constitutional *coup d'état*" over the heads of all the races and parties had not wholly been abandoned.

Three years of absolutism and reaction had but served to deepen the profound gulf between the Germans and the other races of Austria, and the meeting of Parliament was made the occasion for memorable declarations of national policy by the

* For Rubicon's previous articles on Austria-Hungary, see Nos. 33, 34, 40 ("The Austrian Muddle"), 41 and 54.

† A revision of the Constitution by Imperial decree, without consulting Parliament.

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Czechs, Southern Slavs, Poles, and Ukrainians. Count Clam's futile phrase: "My programme is Austria," seems to have deluded those British journalists and politicians who fondly imagine that there is such a thing as an "Austrian" nation; but it was received with scarcely-veiled hostility by the Slav *bloc*. All the Premier's efforts to secure a working majority failed; and even the proclamation of a political amnesty did not render any of the Slav leaders more inclined to accept office or compromise. So complete was the deadlock that no attempt was made to replace the Clam-Martinic Cabinet, when it fell, by another Cabinet of political colour. An excellent, but almost unknown, official, Dr. von Seidler, became the head of an avowedly provisional administration, in which most of the portfolios were assigned to other still less known officials as stop-gaps. Yet week after week passed in overtures to the parties and in vague assurances of constitutional reform, and still the political machine refused to move. At last all efforts to produce a political or parliamentary government having failed, the Emperor resigned himself to accepting Dr. von Seidler and most of his official colleagues as no longer provisional but permanent, merely adding as a piece of mild *camouflage* two elderly professors of law and medicine, the one a Slovene and the other an Ukrainian, to cover up the resolute abstention of every *politician* of the Slav *bloc*. The appointment of a German professor, Baron Wieser, to the Ministry of Commerce, on the other hand, was a case of inverted *camouflage*; since he had for many years been one of the protagonists of German nationalism in Bohemia, and was loudly greeted as the sure guarantee of a German *régime*.

On 25 September Dr. von Seidler laid before Parliament a lengthy and elaborate programme which seemed specially designed to avoid all practical realities, and merely to run through the list of those countless social and economic reforms to which it is platonically desirable that Austria should devote herself in a still distant future. The reform of the Constitution, of which the Speech from the Throne and official utterances had made so much, now at last assumed the form of the *ridiculus mus*. As though incensed at the success with which the Slav Opposition had killed first the proposed extra-parliamentary constitutional commission and then the Reichsrat committee on reform, Dr. von Seidler announced his determination that any reform should respect the existing boun-

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daries of the seventeen provinces (*Kronländer*) of Austria. It should hardly be necessary to point out that this renders all reform entirely nugatory. There can be no solution of the various national and political problems of the Dual Monarchy without a re-grouping of the main racial units: and while the completion of this process involves the effacement of the southern frontiers of the Monarchy towards Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro (to say nothing of Italy, Poland, and the Ukraine), and of the frontier between Austria and Hungary—all of which cut right across the ethnographic divisions—it is not even possible to begin reform without sweeping away the still more artificial and minute provincial boundaries of Austria proper, which are survivals from the days of dynastic inheritance and purchase. Dr. von Seidler's attitude was very largely due to strong pressure from the Hungarian Government, which is furiously opposed to the programmes of Czecho-Slovak, Yugoslav and Ukrainian unity and independence, and which, despite the brave talk of its Jingo press, is increasingly alarmed at the rapid growth of national feeling around and inside its borders. The result was that the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers in their places in Parliament both solemnly announced, in the name of the Crown itself, that the Dual System would be maintained at all costs—a pledge which showed that the "all-highest" circles lack either the inclination or the power to repair the bulging and condemned political edifice in which the nations of the Monarchy are housed. The capitulation of the Crown only provoked from the Czech Club the significant warning to the two Governments, that their action in thus dragging the sovereign into political conflicts "could only have the practical result that the peoples whose interests and aspirations were affected would feel all the more keenly the difference between a nation possessing State-independence and sovereignty and one which has been robbed of its independence."

Thus by the autumn it was becoming increasingly evident that the emperor and his advisers were resolved to maintain the predominance of the Germans in Austria, and if possible to strengthen it still further by an arrangement with the new Poland, such as would remove Galicia, with its eight million Slavs, from the sphere of the Reichsrat, and thus alter the parliamentary balance of races definitely in favour of the Germans. That Seidler's tendencies were understood in this

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sense is shown by a statement given to the press by Dr. Denk, leader of the "*Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft*,"* after his interview with the Premier. He now felt convinced, he declared, that the course to be followed would be Austrian, "*and in this case Austrian is identical with German.*" This is only a cruder way of expressing what one of the acutest German students of Austria has recently admitted in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*: "Austria in its present form simply cannot be governed on constitutional and Parliamentary lines, and must be fundamentally transformed if this is to be made possible." The ruling castes in Austria and in Hungary are almost equally interested in preventing any such transformation; and it is a peculiar irony of fate (or may we say a sign of destiny?) that not even this community of interest can overcome acute conflicts between Vienna and Budapest on the no less burning problems of food distribution, the joint army and the new commercial *Ausgleich* with its corollaries, the treaties with Germany and Russia. The Mayor of Vienna's open denunciation of Magyar food hoarding was only one incident in a chain of events which has just led to the resignation of the Hungarian Food Minister.

The difficulties of the Seidler Cabinet have been materially increased by changes in the inter-party grouping in Parliament. At the very moment when it seemed most vital to preserve national unity, the German National Union has been dissolved by the secession of the Pangerman group under Wolf and Iro: and this collapse was immediately followed by a further split in the more moderate group led by Dr. Denk. All these parties are purely *bourgeois* in character, and the gulf which already separated them from the powerful and well-organised Social Democratic party has been widened still further by this acute divergence of views on problems of annexation and on the effects of the Russian Revolution. While, then, the German nation in Austria is irremediably divided, the various Slav nations have been actively engaged in closing their ranks. Among the Czechs in particular the tendency has been towards concentration and unity of action. Several important party groups have amalgamated, and all without exception are represented on the central national council and the Czech parlia-

* What may be called Left Centre in the now defunct German *bloc* (the Christian Socialists and Agrarians being Right, the Pangerman Right Centre, the Deutsch-Nationalen Centre, the Progressives Left, and the Socialists standing right outside on the Extreme Left.)

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mentary club. The Clericals and Socialists have sunk their internal differences for the sake of the national programme of Czecho-Slovak independence. The few Socialists who favoured a compromise have been driven from the party executive. The Agrarians—whose chief strength lies among the small and medium holders of land—have shaken off their conservative tendencies to the extent of adopting a programme of land for the peasantry. On 6 January a convention was held in Prague, at which all parties were present, and which unanimously reaffirmed the Czech claim of self-determination and independence, in terms so outspoken as to be suppressed in their entirety by the censor.

The Slav *bloc* of last summer has, it is true, broken down in so far as the Poles are playing for their own hand and resuming their habitual indifference to their Slav kinsmen: indeed, they already regard themselves as half out of the Monarchy. But this only serves to weld the other three Slav groups more firmly together, and they are at least strong enough to prevent the Polish question from being solved without the other questions being considered at the same time. The authorities have already committed themselves to submitting the fate of Galicia to the ratification of the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, and the Czechs, Southern Slavs, and Ukrainians can at any time prevent the necessary two-thirds majority being obtained in the former. The Southern Slavs have suffered a severe loss in the death of their talented leader, Monsignor Krek, but they remain more solid than ever. Bishop Jeglič of Laibach and the higher Catholic clergy on the one hand, and the Social Democrats of Croatia and Bosnia on the other, are united in regarding the programme of Jugoslav Unity, announced on 30 May, as an absolutely minimum demand. The Ukrainians protest vigorously against the incorporation of any of their national territory in the new Poland, and make it abundantly clear that any attempt in that direction would drive them into the arms of the Ukraine Republic.

Apart from the Prague Convention, the Slavs of Austria have taken another highly important step towards asserting their right of national self-determination. On 18 December their leaders introduced in the Reichsrat an urgent motion demanding that elected popular representatives of all the various nationalities should be allowed to take part in the Brest negotiations. The Premier denounced the bare idea as

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“contrary to the whole spirit of constitutional States,” the Foreign Minister definitely insisted that self-determination must only be applied to *States* rather than to *nations*, and the German parties ranged themselves against the representation of the other races, entrenching behind the exclusive right possessed by the Crown, under the existing constitution, to decide on all matters of peace and war. Thus more and more the lists are marshalled.

The Germans and Magyars rally in defence of the old diplomacy, of dynastic prerogative, of abstruse State-Right, of racial and class privilege; the Slavs stand for democracy and nationality, for the new doctrine of self-determination, which is but the reincarnation of Mazzinian principles. The one side seeks to maintain as much as can still be rescued of a vanishing political order, the other to establish satisfied nationalism as the only durable basis of internationalism in the New Europe of their dreams.

For months past, then, both Austria and Hungary have been in a state of chronic political crisis, each Government living from hand to mouth, without an assured position in Parliament, and faced by an array of thorny and hopelessly intertwined problems. The desperate economic situation, and the practical certainty that the true facts have been distorted and kept back by a bureaucracy which was never very efficient at the best of times, combined with political stagnation and disorganisation to produce an atmosphere surcharged with electricity. The explosion came as the result of two events—the “sabre-rattling” of the German General von Hoffmann at the Brest negotiations, and the announcement that the flour ration throughout Austria was about to be reduced by half. The idea that the prevailing misery might be needlessly extended still further for the sake of Pangerman annexationist designs was intolerable to the masses, and the strike spread with great rapidity through the industrial centres of Lower Austria. At first it undoubtedly suited the game of Vienna to impress upon Berlin the gravity of the internal situation and the consequent objections to the despatch of Austrian troops to France, while at the same time it clearly did not suit the game of the Socialist leaders to proceed to extremities against Count Czernin, who is known to be hard beset by the military party in Germany. But (despite the grim silence following upon the censor’s first burst of candour) there are already signs that the

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official Socialist leaders are not finding it easy to control their followers, and that something very like Bolševism is spreading through the masses. The most significant feature of all is that the movement centres among the German working classes and the Magyar proletariat of Budapest. In other words, it is not national, but economic and social, and it affects large sections of those very races which have hitherto been the mainstay of the war policy. The Austrian Government has shown really lamentable weakness in yielding to the mob, and indeed offered various concessions such as no one had ever thought of demanding. Whether this will only serve to whet unruly appetites or will produce a temporary lull in the situation, it is impossible to forecast on the basis of such news as has been allowed to run the gauntlet of the mid-European censors. But in Count Czernin's latest speech it is easy to detect a note of *malaise* and urgency such as might well be the prelude of fresh trouble. While it is for Mr. Trotski to exploit this situation by playing off the distress of Austria against the distress of Hungary, it is obvious that the Entente has every inducement to adopt a waiting attitude towards the Dual Monarchy, and to leave the poison already at work to take its natural course.

RUBICON.

Andrei Ivanovič Šingarev

[For Russia Šingarev and Kokoškin are an equally great loss. Kokoškin was a man of great qualities and extremely popular; but the author has devoted this article to Šingarev because he was better acquainted with him personally, and because among Russians generally the murder of Šingarev, who was more widely known, has created a more profound impression.]

THE death of Šingarev could not fail to be bitter pain for Russia, for she loved him. His murder under ordinary circumstances would have been for Russia a tragic puzzle, for he had no enemies. That he should have been killed as he was, by men of the people, as an enemy of the people, and in the name of the people, is for Russia a nightmare; for the whole life of Šingarev was one long service to the people, and all his activity was a fight for the welfare and freedom of the masses. To begin with, his choice of profession expressed his willingness to serve the masses of the people

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to which he was devoted. Having qualified as a doctor at the University he took up service under a Zemstvo. He thus chose a life of labour and small reward—small pay and exhausting work in the dreadful, uncivilized surroundings of Russian village life. It requires patience, love and pity to attend to people who frequently are unable to explain in a reasonable manner what is the matter with them. A doctor working under the Zemstvo, after having spent a long day's work at the laboratory, has frequently to drive some twenty or thirty miles to a patient in the middle of the night, on muddy and impassable roads, in a miserable country vehicle. Šingarev, a young and able doctor, instead of seeking a career in his profession in the town or at the University, gave up a life of wealth and comfort and went out into the hopeless solitude of a remote Russian village merely in order to give the peasant people medical help which they badly needed.

Yet in a short time he gained full recognition from the Government of Voronez in which he worked. The democratic circles of the Government elected him member to the Third Duma, where he joined the Constitutional Democrat (Cadet) party. This was a time when the Cadet party was fighting an uncompromising struggle against the *régime* of Stolypin, who distorted the constitution of 17 October, 1905, suppressed all freedom, ruled by "exceptional" legislation, favoured the privileges of the nobility and the big landowners, tried to crush the labour movement, and persecuted the Jews, Poles and Finns. At that time the Parliamentary group of the Cadets had in its ranks such leaders and speakers as Miljukov, Rodičev, Maklakov, Karaulov, Pergament, Kolumbakin; and outside Parliament it had men such as Muromtsev, Petrunkevič, Kokoškin, Vinaver and Vladimir Nabokov. Yet among them all there was still room for Šingarev, the simple village doctor; in the very first session he became prominent in the party and in the Duma, and within a short time stood in the very forefront. In the Fourth Duma Šingarev represented, not the Government of Voronež, but that of Petrograd, his name having come out at the polls even ahead of those of Miljukov and Rodičev. Within a few years Šingarev had become one of the most popular members of the Opposition and one of the favourites of the country.

Šingarev owed his popularity to the diverse forms of his

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immense activity in Parliament, which extended over ten years. By profession a doctor, he untiringly and conscientiously studied those questions which arose in the Duma and became the regular speaker of the Opposition on all the fundamental problems of the times—constitutional, financial, economic, agrarian and national; always displaying expert knowledge, common sense and uncompromising concern for the interests of the masses.

One of the chief characteristics and, at the same time, one of the most deplorable evils of the old *régime* was that all questions of State—whether administrative, economic, or agrarian—were considered and decided by the Government not on their merits, but in strict dependence upon the political interests of the *régime*. Everything was subordinated to one end: to bolster up the crumbling fabric of the Government and to save the rule of the bureaucracy. This tendency of the Government determined the peculiar character of the activities of the Opposition in the Duma. The fact was that the Duma at every step it took came up against a fundamental obstacle—the autocratic tendency of the Government—for in all questions, even those of a practical nature, it involuntarily got drawn into political criticism in its struggle with the very essence of the *régime*. Wide circles of the public naturally took more interest in the political aspect of the debates in the Duma. It is not surprising that Šingarev, who consistently took part in all the chief parliamentary debates, from the very beginning attracted attention to himself; later on, as his talents developed, he received recognition; and, finally, when in his activities he revealed his noble character and pure heart, he gained the affections of everybody.

In Russia there was not a single just cause which Šingarev did not defend with all possible sincerity, not a single unsavoury affair which he did not expose. He defended the interests of the poorer peasants against the well-to-do, the interests of the working classes against those who tried to exploit them, and the rights of oppressed peoples. He fought for just democratic taxation, for popular education, for equality and liberty. His speeches were followed by all who could read throughout Russia with genuine pleasure and produced a profound impression upon the whole country. Šingarev's speeches had a style of their own; clear, fresh, and full of common sense, they carried the day, owing to the extraordinary vitality of

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their rhythm and the sincerity of their feeling. Šingarev seldom made fun of his opponents, though at times he would make sarcastic replies. The stormy contempt of Rodičev was foreign to him; he did not possess in his arsenal the highly sharpened and destructive shafts of the indignation of Maklakov. Šingarev felt shame at the dishonesty and wickedness of the Government; he felt the shame with the fiery zeal of an honest and upright man in his clear and well-aimed phrases, the tempo of which he quickened the whole time and which came welling out of outraged conscience and grief. If Rodičev represented the pride of the people, humiliated by political slavery; if Maklakov personified the nation's outraged feeling of legality; then Šingarev expressed its troubled conscience. And when Russia heard and read his speeches she felt that in this man there was neither evil nor self-interest, that he was a man of a large heart, full of justice, that the source of his anger was pity, of his hatred love, and Russia loved him passionately.

The war still further widened the extent of his popularity. His fiery patriotism and his work in defence of his country as President of the Duma Defence Committee gained him the sympathy of the army and of the best elements of the Conservative camp in Russia. His journey to Europe as a member of the Duma Delegation, which visited England, France, and Italy, gave our Allies an opportunity of getting to know and appreciate this remarkable Russian, democrat, and patriot, with a pure heart and noble soul.

Šingarev fell a victim to an abominable and cruel murder, a prisoner and an invalid, just at the moment when he had fulfilled for the last time his mission as champion against evil. Without any feeling of fear he recoiled with shame before the bestial *canaille* which, before his eyes, had murdered his friend Kokoškin.

What a terrible symbol of the tragedy of Russia!

If Russia has not finally perished, if she has not lost all shame for ever, if honour has not vanished, and if reason has not been obscured without any hope of its return, the blood of tortured Šingarev cannot remain without redemption. This murder must become the last limit of madness, the first step on the way towards the recovery of reason. With these terrible examples before their eyes, the Russian masses must see whither they are being led.

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I know that some day the historian of the Russian Revolution, in the quiet of his study, after paying just tribute to Šingarev, will give this wicked murder its logical place in the chain of fatal events in the history of the world. He will draw a wise analogy from the history of other revolutions, comparing the 20th century in Russia to the 18th in France or the 17th in England, and will show us the passionless grandeur of the chariot of history blindly moving towards its mystical aims over the corpses, both good and evil, just and criminal, of contemporaries. But the living soul of a living people is neither a library nor archives. It must ask for an answer for this nightmare-crime from those who were directly guilty. The sailors? The soldiers? The Red Guardsmen? Oh! yes. They are cruel, they are bestial, without a God or conscience at this terrible moment. But are they guilty; they, blind in their ignorance and drunk with passion?

Russia cannot give two answers to this question. The criminals are those who poisoned the spirit of the *canaille* with the poison of dishonest demagogy, who inspired irresponsible and ignorant people with a hatred of the best representatives of cultured Russia, who proclaimed men like Šingarev and Kokoškin enemies of the people and insolently placed them "outside the law." The blood of Šingarev is on the heads of those who in the place of the State put class, in the place of the nation party, in the place of justice violence, in the place of law the knout and the rifle.

The blood of Šingarev falls on the new Russian tyranny—a hundred times worse than the old, for it is drunk and illiterate. Europe knows the enemy of this tyranny: Bolševism.

S. POLIAKOV LITOVZEV.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(III) EGYPT

My practical acquaintance with Egyptian affairs arises from, and is limited by, the fact that during a recent period of this war I served as the head of an important department under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt. In that capacity I was brought constantly into contact with the civil administration. I admired and wondered. I admired much

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the success of that administration; I wondered no less how success could be wrung from such a complicated system. For, considering how small Egypt is, its system is by far the most complex in the world. I counted five governments there, and I daresay there are others that escaped my notice. At any rate I encountered (1) a Native, (2) a British, (3) an International, (4) a Military, and (5) an Ecclesiastical Government. The fact is that throughout history every important visitor to Egypt has engaged his own government as he would engage his house, from Mahomet, who started the earliest in date, up to Generals Maxwell and Murray, who instituted the latest of the series. Add to this that Egypt is apparently so fond of governments that, whenever it obtains a new one, it will not willingly let it die. It collects and specialises in governments. Egypt is the stud farm of administrations.

Nevertheless, in spite of these pronounced proclivities, I would venture to hope that we abolish in due course the third and fourth of the above-mentioned five; I would in nowise meddle with the fifth; but would strengthen and re-organise the first of them, the Native Government, with a view to "self-determination," in close co-operation and combination with the second, our own.

Let us quickly unravel this tangled skein of governments, paying primary attention to the measure of freedom, to the amount of "self-determination," which Egypt enjoys under the first of them. Since December, 1914, Egypt has been ruled by a Sultan, a prince of the house of Mehemet Ali. It is administered by a council of eight ministers, all native Pashas, one of whom is Prime Minister, and, as it happens, Minister of the Interior. He is assisted by Ministers of Public Works, Education, Finance, Waqfs (*i.e.*, religious trusts), Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Agriculture. An up-to-date, well-chosen set of Ministries and Ministers. So far "self-determination" has clearly found a footing, for the Government is thus conducted by the best and most capable of the sons of Egypt.

But what of the direct electoral representation of the people, according to modern ideas and on progressive lines? Have we believed in freedom sufficiently to enable Egypt to walk on that road? Undoubtedly, to some degree. To forward this end of "self-determination" the British in Egypt have laboured

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from the start; at any rate, since 6 February, 1883, the date of the famous despatch of Lord Dufferin. That statesman then pressed upon Her Majesty's Government "the creation, within certain prudent limits, of representative institutions, of municipal and communal self-government, and of a political existence untrammelled by external importunity." For, in his lofty style, he considered that the Egyptian fellah "has, like his own Memnon, not remained irresponsive to the beams of the new dawn. His lips have trembled, if they have not articulated, and in many indirect and half-conscious ways he has shown himself not only equal to the discharge of some of those functions of which none but members of the most civilised communities were thought capable, but unexpectedly appreciative of his legitimate political interests and moral rights." Following on this despatch, action was taken at once. Popular institutions were established by the Organic Law of May, 1883. Provincial councils based ultimately on manhood suffrage, a legislative council of 26 members, and a general assembly of 80 members, *i.e.*, 8 ministers, the 26 members of the Legislative Council, and 46 other delegates elected on the basis of manhood suffrage—all this panoply of "self-determination" started into being forthwith.

The reader will naturally want to know how these various institutions have worked. As regards the General Assembly, the most democratic of these bodies, I am afraid that it did not do well. Writing in 1908 Lord Cromer said of it: "Of all the institutions created by Lord Dufferin the General Assembly has, in practice, turned out to be the least useful and efficient. It was, and still is, too much in advance of the requirements and political education of the country."*

The reasons of this failure were, I think, rooted in some deep considerations. England, prior to the Industrial Revolution, only needed a trifling amount of legislation, and almost all her legislative necessities have arisen from the impulse of that change. Agricultural Egypt stands in this respect where old England did, added to which in Egypt the Executive was modelled, before our coming, according to French conceptions, and had thus more power to do the needful than has been the case in our history. The next reason for the failure in question was that commerce and industry, so far as they existed, were mainly in the hands of Europeans. But over

* "Modern Egypt," Vol. II, p. 278.

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these latter the General Assembly could have little control, for those fatal Capitulations barred the way, as I will explain later. And lastly, there were the straight unwavering formulæ of Islam, excommunicating progress. Besides, close across the narrow sea was Mecca, always ready to tell the faithful that devotions are better than divisions and pilgrimages than Parliaments. Thus the General Assembly was let and hindered on all hands. Memnon did not altogether respond to the morning.

And now for the Legislative Council, the constitutional brother of the Assembly. I think it may be said that between 1883 and 1913 this Legislative Council passed through no less than five phases. In the first few years of our occupation it attracted but little notice. In its next phase, happily of short duration, it displayed a somewhat impracticable spirit. In its third phase, however, Lord Cromer could report of it, in 1906, that it was working well. "The members of the Legislative Council have evinced a hearty desire to co-operate with the Government in the cause of Egyptian reform . . . the sphere of action of the Legislative Council is greatly extending, and so far with the best possible results."*

The fourth phase occurred subsequent to 1906. In this period the Legislative Council again got into trouble. But, in the fifth and last phase, it again secured itself a place in public favour, so that Lord Kitchener, writing of 1913, could say that the Council had performed "useful work which has to be recorded with satisfaction."† Accordingly in 1913 the "self-determination" of Egypt had reached this point in respect of these two assemblies: an inefficient General Assembly and a useful Legislative Council. In 1913, therefore, the two were merged into one body termed the Legislative Assembly, which was endowed with the powers of both the old bodies together, with certain important extensions. No less than 2,000,000 electors in that small land were placed upon the register, and in the 66 constituencies the elections were held with complete success. The elected were mostly landowners with a sprinkling of lawyers. The Assembly was opened in January, 1914, and during that session passed several measures dealing with administrative reform and questions of economy. Whether it would have proved perma-

* "Report on Egypt for 1905," p. 12.

† "Report on Egypt of Lord Kitchener for 1913," p. 4.

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nently successful or not is doubtful, for in the convulsion of war its operations have been suspended and Egypt awaits a restored constitution.

Having thus indicated the history of the more important native institutions of the country, I must not fail to refer to the important extension of local government, a valuable branch of "self-determination." It has been the unanimous view, I think, of our representatives in Egypt, a view consistently entertained from the earliest days of our occupation, that local self-government should be developed as the true basis of "self-determination." Lord Dufferin in 1883 created the provincial councils, which are purely native bodies locally elected. "It is certain," he wrote, "that local self-government is the fittest preparation and most convenient stepping-stone for anything approaching a constitutional régime." For the towns mixed municipalities and local commissions were established in due course. In 1909 a law was passed re-organising and extending the provincial councils, and was advocated by our representative in words constituting a repetition of Lord Dufferin's dictum of old days. As a result of instituting the mixed municipalities and local commissions, 48 towns, representing a population of some 1,300,000 inhabitants, that is to say approximately one-tenth of the whole community, enjoy the benefits of a municipal organisation which is every year expanding more widely and is undertaking roads, promenades, water, electric light and drainage for old backward Egypt that knew not all these things. Further, for the country district the Provincial Councils, as Lord Kitchener wrote in 1914, "have continued their good work—large sums are spent on education—the interest of the Councils in works of public utility has in nowise abated—the improvement of sanitary conditions in the villages, and the welfare of the infant population have been the object of their special solicitude."*

Another main point in the "self-determination" of Egypt remains to be referred to, and is of considerable interest. Who are the administrators carrying on the Civil Service? What has been our policy as regards giving posts to our own people? Evidently, if Egypt is to receive European civilisation, we must supply it in some degree with European agency.

The general policy which has been pursued since the British occupation in 1882 has been to limit the number of

* "Report on Egypt for 1913," p. 13.

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Europeans in the employment of the Government as much as possible, to employ Egyptians in the very great majority of the subordinate and in a large number of the superior administrative posts, and gradually to prepare the ground for increasing the number of Egyptians in high employment. Europeans in some numbers have been found absolutely necessary, mainly in order to supply technical knowledge, and in order to furnish in a certain number of cases administrative example and principle. To summarise the facts, there were in 1896 only 286 British out of a total of 9,134 in the Civil Service, including the railways; and the corresponding figures in 1906, since which date there has been but little change, were 13,279 officials, of whom 662 were British. If we were to exclude from these British figures those of our men employed in purely technical work, it must be clear that a mere handful of British has recreated the dead land of the Pharaohs. Cordial indeed must be my respectful testimony to their supreme worth.

The next Government to be noticed in Egypt is the British. The British Cabinet in London is, on all really vital occasions and in all really momentous crises of policy, the tabernacle of Egyptian rule. As we read in Exodus that the tabernacle of the congregation was "pitched without the camp, afar off from the camp," so is the Egyptian tabernacle pitched afar off in London. The Cabinet imparts its instructions to the Foreign Office, which conveys them, or, on minor occasions and for less serious issues, delivers its own orders to Egypt *proprio motu*. These are communicated to the High Commissioner in Egypt, our representative having been clothed with that name and function since the early days of the war. The High Commissioner in his turn delivers or interprets these dispensations to the various Advisers. And fourthly, these Advisers, the chief of whom is the Financial Adviser with a seat at the Council of Native Ministers, impress upon the various ministers the advisability of executing the injunctions or intimations of Sinai.

Such is our Government *quâ* the Protectorate, as Egypt was proclaimed to be in December, 1914, when the old suzerainty of the Ottoman sultans was finally abolished. We may perhaps define its function and purpose as the direction of the foreign affairs, and as the supervision and stimulation of the internal affairs, of Egypt.

A criticism and a suggestion here occur to me in the interest

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of "self-determination." For all ordinary purposes it is the Foreign Office which acts, as defined in the preceding paragraph. But first, is it within the ordinary competence of that office to deal with purely internal domestic issues abroad? No. In these circumstances would it not be possible to form, under the auspices of the Foreign Office, an Egyptian Council in London, upon which eminent Egyptians should sit, as eminent Indians do on the India Council? In this way the Foreign Office would have at its disposal an advisory Egyptian Council composed, let us say, of leading officials who have served in Egypt, of eminent Egyptians, and of representatives of an Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office. This would secure more fixity of policy and more "self-determination."

The third factor in this cohort of administrations is the International Government of Egypt. This should be abolished. It is true that Egypt is international in population to a considerable degree. But the Capitulations, which give the Europeans protection from arrest and from taxation, inviolability of domicile, immunity from the jurisdiction of the local courts in criminal matters, and special courts to deal with civil cases in which Europeans are concerned—all this farrago of privilege renders "self-determination" utterly impossible. Egypt, once called by Nubar Pasha, a judicial Babel, is also a legislative Babel. The Capitulations doom it to legislative impotence. Where the European population is concerned legislation in Egypt has to be conducted by diplomacy. Fourteen or fifteen separate powers, scattered over the world, have to agree, not merely in principle but in detail, before any proposed measure, however unanimously desired in the Protectorate, can become law. From this monstrous state of affairs Egypt suffers severely in all her population, native and European alike.

The fourth Government is that by martial law, as proclaimed at the close of 1914. When this was to be announced in Egypt many experts, I understand, went about in grave fear of a serious outburst. But, in fact, it was hailed with satisfaction. As I have said, Egypt has a passion for governments. Here was yet another Government to add to the collection! True, it was a military one. But good or bad, it was a government, *quand même*, and therefore to be received as glad tidings of great joy. Nevertheless, this system must terminate with the war.

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The fifth and last Government, in some respects the most powerful and permanent of all, is the Ecclesiastical. In Christianity the dictates of religion are as brief as a Provisional Order; in Islam they are as long as a statute book. Hence, in countries of the latter faith, civil legislation finds that its field is very largely in prior occupation, and, in this case, all that we have to do is to let be.

Having now set forth very briefly how Egypt lives under five simultaneous Governments, I shall have the presumption to summarise the four lines upon which reform should proceed, in the general direction of "self-determination."

First, it is necessary to abolish the Capitulations, in order that the dwellers in Egypt may be fused into one commonwealth. As it is, they are so artificially divided by privilege that no real progress in local government and no genuine legal and constitutional development is practicable otherwise.

Secondly, in accordance with the consistent policy pursued since the despatch of Lord Dufferin in 1883, we must considerably extend local government. Here, however, two conditions are necessary. The Capitulations must evidently be abolished. Also, the system of Adviserships, which has worked so well in the Ministries, should be applied to the local administrations, thus extended in town and country. The association of British influence with local government will be the best guarantee of its continuous progress. Thirdly, the Legislative Assembly stands for renewal, unless, indeed, it is found that popular sentiment in Egypt would prefer reorganisation to take the direction of enlarged provincial councils and municipal bodies, coupled with a strengthened and popularised council of ministers. Be it remembered also that a place must be found in the Assembly or Council for the representatives of the European populations who, with the Capitulations abolished, will require entry.

Fourthly, the impact and influence of Egypt on British policy is too slight under our present arrangements. To-day she is too far off and too little understood and appreciated. To remedy this serious deficiency I would suggest the establishment of an Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office, supplemented by an Egyptian advisory council which should include eminent Egyptians among its members, as is the case with India. With such a body in existence I should feel a certainty that the constitutional development of Egypt

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would proceed smoothly and satisfactorily to its final consummation.

The theme is great and the issue momentous, needing all our wisdom and all our statesmanship. For on our conduct in Egypt hinges our reputation in Asia, Africa, and the whole Near East. The African, the Greek, the Italian, the Syrian, the Turk, the multiform and multitudinous Levant, all watch the course of our Egyptian rulership. They are more familiar than we with the characters and deeds of our statesmen and public servants: to them Cromer and Kitchener, Willcocks and Wingate are household words.

Enchanting land! Incomparable paradise! Victim of every tyrant! Survivor of every tyranny! The oldest of the nations, with yet a life to live!

GEORGE PEEL.

Italy and the Liberation of the Slavs

THE New Year speeches of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson were at first received in Italy with something like universal favour. As more concrete and detailed formulations of the Allies' peace terms, likely to have a useful effect on popular feeling both in Allied and enemy countries, they were welcomed by all shades of political opinion; as generally democratic and reasonable in tone Interventionists of the Left applauded them cordially. Inspired organs of the Centre and Right found their terms reconcilable with existing agreements and deprecated any attempt to reopen the question of Italy's claims which had been once for all guaranteed and countersigned by Allies whose good faith could not be doubted. Clerical journals were almost enthusiastic. President Wilson's formulations were, if not quite so complete as those of the Papal Note, entirely in harmony with that noble document and brought nearer the hope of peace. Giolittian organs likewise emphasised the contribution made towards the hastening of peace and specially approved of President Wilson's reference to Freedom of the Seas, which pointed to the internationalising of Gibraltar, Aden and the Suez Canal. Official Socialists were reminded of Zimmerwald.

Perhaps this marked enthusiasm shown by the Neutralist journals helped to quicken the critical faculty of Interventionists. At any rate a note of doubt and dissatisfaction soon

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made itself heard and presently discussion and criticism were in full blast. The net result of all the discussion and interpretation has been, it must be recognised, to create an atmosphere of doubt and tension which, in view of the complex internal conditions of Italy, may have its dangers. But the searchings of heart have had, as we shall presently show, one effect, the value of which can hardly be over-rated.

The points with which Italian politicians are most concerned are, of course, the references to Italy contained in the two speeches, and the attitude towards Austria-Hungary betrayed by them. The contrast between the unrelenting severity shown towards Germany and the lenient treatment of Austria-Hungary—the arch-sinner against liberty and democracy—the inconsistency between the marked respect for the principle of Nationality shown in the definition of Italy's claims and the absolute over-riding of the same principle implied in the curtailment of the equally valid claims of Austria's oppressed peoples ; these anomalies strike the Italian mind as only explicable on the assumption that the British and American Governments are trying to build a bridge of gold for Karl I. in the hope of detaching him from Germany. By an error of perspective, because their own material—as distinct from ideal—interests are more closely involved in the destruction of German ascendancy, these fill the foreground of their picture, with the result that the no less real and essential material interests of their eastern and southern allies, which require for their satisfaction a like treatment of Austria-Hungary, are left out of sight or inadequately appreciated. There is here a danger, it is urged, lest declarations intended to produce division in the enemies' camp should instead have the result of dividing the Allies. To meet this danger the Italian Government must make its voice heard in the Allied Councils, must see that, in the collective document, in which it is hoped the views of all the Allies will soon be formulated and harmonised, the interests of the eastern group receive the consideration which is due to them.

In enforcing this demand the *Corriere della Sera*, the most influential representative of Italian Liberalism, is led to review and restate the whole position in regard to the Dual Monarchy, and in so doing to take a further step along the path upon which it entered last August in defending the Corfu Pact against the attacks of the "Nationalists." The position

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which it finally reaches in its article of 16 January on "Italy and the Victims of Habsburg Oppression" is of such vast potential importance both for the future of Italy and of Europe generally that it deserves most careful attention. The gist of it is contained in the following summary.

* * * * *

President Wilson has in a full degree the American virtues of energy and rightmindedness; but America is a long way off from Europe and sees European problems much diminished and somewhat blurred by distance. Hence the President's lukewarm feelings about Austria-Hungary. The same is true in its degree of Great Britain and Mr. Lloyd George. The judgment of these Western Statesmen is probably affected by three things. The lingering disposition to see in Austria-Hungary a possible counterpoise to the German Empire. The liking for the Austrian temperament still very much alive in the upper classes of Great Britain. The idea that the Balkan nations are an unruly and quarrelsome set of half-civilised peoples who require a keeper of the peace to hold the rod over them; that this function so long exercised by Turkey may now, since the decline of Turkish power, most conveniently be exercised by the Dual Monarchy, and that it would be a pity to disturb the arrangement. But the half solution proposed by President Wilson is no solution and is quite inadmissible in face of the facts. It would constitute a disaster for Europe. Compromise with the Dual Monarchy would leave Germany and the Magyars masters of the Balkans, which would be exploited in the interests of Germany.

If this disaster is to be averted it is not sufficient merely to appeal to treaties. We have to convince President Wilson and the Western democracies that the preservation—or, rather, the aggrandisement—of Austria-Hungary would be the very crudest violation of the principles for which America has joined in the war.

The President must know that the nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary positively refuse to remain subject, that they desire complete independence, and are capable of attaining it and of using it wisely when attained.

To this end these peoples must act together, must form a single league.

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A grand opportunity is here offered to Italy to prove her genius for politics. It is for her to organise and put herself at the head of this league, to establish an accord between the nationalities concerned on all disputable points concerning their mutual relations and their future status, to obtain the sanction of the Allies for this agreed scheme of settlement, and, with them, to force its acceptance on the Central Empires. The Allies, least of all America, cannot withhold their sanction from such a solution without betraying their principles and putting Europe back—not into the *status quo*, but—into worse conditions than those of August, 1914, since there will be no Russian menace to keep the Central Empires in check.

This accord is by no means impossible of attainment. Between Italy and the Czechs, Poles and Roumanians no cause of division exists. With the Serbs and Jugoslavs accord will not be so easy, but is even more important. The differences which have so far estranged them from one another have been disastrous, and have merely served the interests of the enemy. But Italy's solidarity with the Balkan peoples is essential if the sanction of the Allies is to be obtained. Without it the case for independence would not, perhaps, carry conviction. There might be doubts as to the capacity of the peoples in question to develop a pacific and stable political existence and fears lest they might prove a storm centre for Europe. But a manifesto, backed by Italy and embodying an agreed and well-considered scheme of settlement on democratic lines could hardly be rejected.

The advantages resulting from such an accord are so immense that all sacrifices required sink into insignificance. What are a few square kilometres of territory to the prospect of a new and better order in Europe? To approach the problems of this war with the mentality belonging to the old wars of succession is unworthy of peoples who aspire to an honourable position in the world of to-morrow. Slavs understand what is indispensable for Italy; Italy must see that her future can only be secured if she holds out a generous and helping hand to the nascent neighbour state on the Adriatic. The sacrifices required of her do not involve renunciation of legitimate national aspirations or of military security. They must be freely and spontaneously made.

By adopting such a policy Italy will only be returning to her old and best political traditions and to the teachings of

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Mazzini. And it is a policy in which expediency coincides with principle. Political egoism would lead to isolation. By altruism alone can Italy hope, in the world of free peoples, either to enjoy the sympathy of her fellow nations or to assure the extension of her own moral and economic influence.

* * * * *

Thus this crucial issue has been clearly formulated and pressed upon the people and Government of Italy for acceptance or rejection. We have every confidence that they will choose the better part, and that Italy may shortly place herself once for all in the position which we should have liked to see her occupying from the beginning. If she had at once assumed the *rôle* now pressed upon her by the Liberal journals, instead of permitting the blatant and absurd Jingoism of a small minority posing as the opinion of Italy, to create estrangement and suspicion, she would have secured the full sympathy and confidence of Labour and Democracy generally in the Western nations; who would thus have had a better chance of coming to understand the essentially democratic case for Austria-Hungary's subject races, and would have been less indifferent to their appeal. The sham solution, which is really only a shelving, of the Austrian problems might, in that case, never have figured, as it appears to figure, in the official programme of the Western Allies. We hope sincerely that the Italian Press is right in believing that it is not too late, even now, to obtain a revision of that programme. But, whether or no, the true solution will eventually force itself upon Europe. And, meanwhile, much will have been gained both for Italy and for Europe by this correction in the orientation of Italy's policy—for Italy, because it will place her once for all among the forward-looking nations, to whom we believe the future is reserved, and save her from being manœuvred into any such "back-world" policy as that associated with a personage recently described in the Italian Chamber as "the French Giolitti"; for Europe, because any alienation from the cause of international justice and liberty of the splendid potentialities of Italian energy and genius would be nothing less than disastrous.

J. C. POWELL.

Who is "Parvus" of *Die Neue Zeit*?

[*Mr. Branting's organ, Social Demokraten, 20 December, reproduces from an article by Dr. Sigurd Hannson in Göteborgs Handels Tidning, the following characterisation of "the well-known Russian-German Social Democrat 'Parvus,' who now stands in the centre of the Bolševik 'secret diplomacy' in Stockholm."*]

"From the Danish press we learn that one of the persons who has played the leading rôle in bringing about both the Bolševik *coup d'état* and the Brest negotiations is a German Social Democrat, formerly settled in Copenhagen, who goes under the assumed name "Parvus," but whose real name is Alexander Helphand.

"Parvus-Helphand was born in Odessa, but is probably of German-Jewish descent. He studied in Germany and there gained the title of Doctor. From the beginning of the 90's he came forward as a politically scientific Social Democrat author; he also wrote essays in the Social Democrat paper *Neue Zeit* and himself published the correspondence *Weltpolitik*. He belonged to the extreme Left and took part on Kautsky's side in the fight against the moderate Revisionist wing under Bernstein. His coming out into the open had as result that he was banished from Prussia as "coming under accusation"; afterwards, he settled in Munich, and then in the autumn of 1905 he returned to Russia under the Tsar's amnesty to political offenders, to which category Helphand belonged. He betook himself to Petrograd, where he co-operated with the present Bolševik leaders, and became one of the chiefs of the armed proletariat riots which took such a bloody course and terminated in reaction. For all that, both Social Democrat and Liberal politicians (Tsereteli and Miljukov) attacked Parvus-Helphand with extraordinary bitterness. He was suspected of being an *agent provocateur*. He himself alleged that the Government had him arrested, an allegation which, however, does not find universal credence. A few years later he went to Constantinople where he had close relations with the Young Turk movement and worked as political correspondent. His stay there and in Sofia lasted till the spring of 1915, when he settled in Copenhagen.

"The poor Social Democrat writer had then become a rich man. He himself stated that he had made a fortune by speculations in corn in Constantinople. In the Danish capital he rented a villa and an automobile and quickly set up good relations even in financial circles and formed a Society for Social Investigation of the Consequences of the War. With this Society he associated as collaborators partly with Danes, but, especially, Russian emigrants, who were invited from Switzerland, and for whom he was able to procure a free passage through Germany. It was certainly not empty talk when he, a proletarian turned millionaire, prided himself on having relations with the foremost political personages in Germany. In Russia it was very soon noticed what a change he had undergone. Two such prominent Social Democrats as Plehanov and Alexinski branded him as an agent of the Central Powers and attacked the party-comrades from Switzerland who entered his service."

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Foreign Office Reform

On Wednesday, 23 January, replying to a member of Parliament who invited the Foreign Office to reform itself and to open the door of diplomacy to "young men of ability, energy, and character, inclined to sympathy with the forward movement of civilisation," Mr. Balfour said: "There seems to be much general misconception on this subject. The examination for entry into the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Services is, and has for many years been, competitive, and (with certain exceptions due to the necessity of a special knowledge of foreign languages) similar to that for the rest of the Civil Service. Candidates are nominated by the Secretary of State, on the recommendation of a Board of Selection, whose duty it is to advise whether the candidates possess the necessary qualities for these Services. The whole matter was very carefully examined in 1913 and 1914 by a Royal Commission. I hope that an improvement in the present very inadequate scale of pay of the Diplomatic Service will shortly remove the necessity for requiring of candidates for that Service a small private income, and will thus enlarge the field of selection. I know no method of securing the services of young men 'inclined' (in the hon. gentleman's words) 'to sympathy with the forward movement of civilisation' by the machinery of competitive examination."

It will not escape the notice of those interested in such matters that this announcement implies that the Foreign Office is preparing to reform itself from within, without giving the nation or Parliament an opportunity of expressing its will in this vital form of national service. The motive power of reform in this case is to be found in the Report of the Royal Commission, of which Mr. Balfour spoke. We hope that the House of Commons will insist on the publication of the draft proposals for reform of the Foreign Office and of the Diplomatic Service so that they may be discussed before they are finally adopted by the secret decision of the Foreign Office itself. Mr. Balfour's statement is a welcome indication that the Foreign Office is aware of the need of reform; but when the Foreign Office begins to reform itself that is the moment when public opinion should be most vigilant. The removal of the worst abuses is a well-known device for protecting privileges and institutions which really require more drastic surgery. The House of Commons must surely be aware of the insistent and growing demand throughout the country that the Foreign Office should be forced to acknowledge the arrival of a new era, both in international and domestic affairs.

Revolutionaries and Anti-Revolutionaries

The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* of 11 January contains the following passage which needs no comment:—"It seems to us time to give up the barren practice of cataloguing Mensheviks, Bolševiks, and a dozen other distinctions—all that belongs to the day before yesterday. To-day we have to distinguish between Revolutionaries and Anti-Revolutionaries; and what lies between is crushed to atoms. The

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day of opportunist wavering, of parliamentarism, of shilly-shallying (*Hangen und Bangen*) is past; at least for Russia."

The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, on the other hand, evidently thinks it worth while to catalogue the present political forces in Germany, for in its issue of 12 January it published the following summary of divergent German groups:—

"(a) Anti-annexationists: 1. The opponents of all annexation. 2. Opponents of Austrian annexation, who hope for Western aggrandisement, especially the National Liberals and Catholics. (b) Annexationists: The Austro-Polish solutionists (*i.e.*, Poland is to be converted either into an appanage of the Austrian Crown or the inheritance of a younger son; Courland and Lithuania to be annexed by Germany after a farcical application of the principle of self-determination based on the votes of non-representative bodies of German or Germanophil notables). (c) The military solutionists (*i.e.*, the abandonment without disguise by Germany of the principle of self-determination, the annexation by Prussia of such parts of Courland, Lithuania, and Poland as may appear militarily desirable (military considerations include some economic ones, such as coal) without consulting the native population, and the surrender of all the rest to Russia to do as she pleases.

"Gimcrack State Rights"

Long before the great strike the Viennese *Arbeiter Zeitung* had become one of the most interesting and outspoken papers in Europe. On 28 December it backed Count Czernin in his refusal to consider any *international* regulation of Austrian problems, but argued that this made their *internal* regulation all the more urgent and vital. "There must be no risk of Russia becoming a Federal Republic, while Austria-Hungary remains with its Bohemian and Hungarian Counts, its Regnicolar deputations, its Ausgleich Junctions and its reciprocities. All these gimcrack State Rights which have plagued us for 50 years and more, may become mere waste paper overnight." Truly the wind is blowing from the Russian steppes.

Montenegro and Austria

We are informed from a reliable source that *Glas Crnogorski*, the official organ of King Nicholas and his Government, and *Srpski List*, a newspaper published in Geneva on his behalf, are allowed by the Austrian Government to circulate freely in considerable numbers in occupied Montenegrin territory. We are entitled to enquire whether this fact is in any way connected with the presence of Prince Mirko of Montenegro in Vienna, and with his constant intrigues against Serbia and her Allies, both in the internment camps of Austria-Hungary and among his exiled countrymen in Switzerland. As King Nicholas and his officials at Neuilly are very liberally subsidised by the French and British Governments, it ought not to be possible for his official organs to be written in a manner acceptable to the Austrian censor.

Diary of Current Events

- 10 Dec.—Bolševik report of Cosack revolt. Revolutionary Committee set up in Portugal. Chinese troops reported to have entered Harbin, and Japanese Vladivostok. Mr. Churchill's speech at Bedford.
- 11 Dec.—Mr. Asquith's speech at Birmingham. Panama declares war against Austria-Hungary.
- 12 Dec.—Supplementary Vote of Credit debate in House of Commons. Text of General Dubail's accusations of M. Caillaux.
- 13 Dec.—Sir Eric Geddes on submarine menace. Maximalist Telegraph Agency announces defeat of Kornilov.
- 14 Dec.—Sir E. Carson on War Aims Committee. Mr. L. George's speech at Gray's Inn. Bolševiks report capture of Kaledin.
- 17 Dec.—Publication of British Labour Memorandum on war aims. Official Japanese contradiction of report of landing of Japanese troops at Vladivostok.
- 19 Dec.—Text of Russo-German armistice published in England. House of Commons war aims debate. Kerenski reported to be marching on Moscow.
- 20 Dec.—Premier on war aims in House of Commons.
- 21 Dec.—German peace proposal.
- 22 Dec.—Kaiser's speech to troops of Second Army.
- 25 Dec.—Czernin's speech on peace proposals.
- 26 Dec.—Admiral Wemyss becomes British First Sea Lord.
- 27 Dec.—M. Pichon on the peace proposals.
- 28 Dec.—Labour Memorandum on war aims adopted by National Conference. Mr. Henderson's message to Russia. Premier meets Labour Leaders. Finnish deputation to King of Sweden.
- 30 Dec.—Bessarabia reported to have declared itself a Moldavian Republic.
- 1918, 1 Jan.—Premier's New Year Message to Allies.
- 2 Jan.—Trotski denounces German peace proposals. Reported arrest of 300 Independent Socialists by German Government.
- 3 Jan.—Trotski's letter to French Socialists.
- 5 Jan.—Premier's War Aims speech to Trade Unions.
- 6 Jan.—French Government recognises independence of Finnish Republic.
- 8 Jan.—Announcement of Lord Reading's appointment as British High Commissioner to America.
- 9 Jan.—President Wilson's "War Aims" message to Congress.
- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed.
- 14 Jan.—Sir A. Geddes introduces man-power Bill in House of Commons. M. Caillaux arrested. Italian gains near Monte Grappa.
- 15 Jan.—British Labour message to Russia, expressing agreement on war aims. Russian ultimatum to Roumania. Mr. Asquith's speech to London Liberal Federation.
- 16 Jan.—Reported Bolševik order for arrest of King of Roumania. Battle between Maximalists and Ukrainians in Odessa.
- 17 Jan.—Secret Session on man-power.
- 18 Jan.—Premier addresses final conference of trades unions on man-power proposals. Russian Constituent Assembly opens: Mr. Cernov elected temporary president.
- 19 Jan.—Russian Assembly dissolved by Bolševiks.
- 20 Jan.—"Breslau" sunk; "Goeben" beached.
- 21 Jan.—Sir E. Carson resigns from War Cabinet. Austrian peace strikes.
- 23 Jan.—17th Annual Labour Conference opens at Nottingham; Chairman, Mr. W. F. Purdy.
- 24 Jan.—Count Hertling's statement to Main Committee of Reichstag: Count Czernin's speech.

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The New Europe

"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

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**"There are dreams in the heart of the Slav
which will set two continents ablaze"**

—Joseph de Maistre

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The New Europe

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7 February 1918

“Keep to the Left!”

WHEN the strike movement broke out in Germany credulous disbelievers, from mental habit and from fear of “being taken in again,” concluded that the German Government must have been pulling the strings—it is usual to credit one’s enemies not merely with sly perversity, but also with a reckless courage such as one does not expect to find in one’s friends. The suspicion of collusion has survived even subsequent events in the lingering belief that the German Government, though not directly instrumental, “was not at first altogether displeased with the strike movement,” hoping that it would impress and influence Labour in Western Europe. Of course, there was the example of Austria, where the Government had watched the incipient stages of the labour revolt with a feeling of irresponsible complacency. Absolutely dependent on Germany and incapable of concluding peace, it found a malicious pleasure in proving to its ally the danger of continuing the war, and mutely pleaded its unfree position to its own people. Circumstances and choice alike have outlined a very different part for the German Government. Through the mouth of Count Hertling, a scholarly Jesuit going down the grey slopes of seventy to second childishness, the military rulers of Germany have spoken to the world about her unbroken strength and her determination to conquer by force. The speech was meant to intimidate by its frigid defiance. The strike movement supplies, to say the least, a most embarrassing sequel to that impressive harangue, calculated to destroy its psychological effect. A strong voice has been raised in Germany in favour of a democratic peace and against military dominion.

When Hertling delivered his speech it was obvious what part the German Government had chosen for itself in the present crisis. The time of mild reforms and minor concessions, of deluding phrases and conciliatory talk, is past. The storm which advances from the East rends the world into two camps, of revolution and counter-revolution. No one can bridge the stormy waves in contest with each other. Then better be a rock to which the waters cry “Be thou our island.” Germany is to be the rock of reaction. In England even

"KEEP TO THE LEFT!"

lamp-posts warn the heedless—"Keep to the Left." The forces of counter-revolution are great indeed, even in Eastern Europe. Let them all rally round Germany, be they Polish, Ukrainian, or even Russian—they must. Not to gather them in would be as foolish for Germany as for Western Europe to support them. The Prussian State stands to win by firmly championing the cause which it is natural for its ruling classes to champion. When Trotski proved that they were reactionaries, they decided to be so with a vengeance.

Millions of German working men have now declared for the victory of the democratic idea, and for peace without annexations and on the basis of complete self-determination of nations—the only "*victoire intégrale*" which deserves that name. For when we put that legend at the head of our paper, we were thinking of the victory of ideas rather than of that of arms. The former alone can be our aim, the latter can merely supply the means. But if the present German Government remains, if the revolutionary storm in Germany proves powerless against the rock of reaction, if the war has to continue, the men beyond the front who share our ideas should understand that it is never against them that our arms are directed. Since the very beginning of the war it has been our lot to see and fight, in the ranks of the opposing armies, men at one with us in spirit.

One can hardly hope to see the German Labour movement succeed in its first attempt. The first waves must break. The lessons must be gathered of their failures. Their meaning must sink into the consciousness of the people. Their ideas have to spread through the armies. For it is with them that the final decision lies. But whatever may happen in the immediate future the Labour rising of these days will leave a very deep mark. It has shown the direction in which the spirit of the masses leads. It will have taught them for whom they are working, suffering, and forging arms. The revolt may be put down—driven underground. But it is not in the power of the German rulers to remove its causes, except by removing themselves. Nor is it in their power to re-establish the fictions on which they have fed the people.

For us if this movement fails, as is likely, and so long as it fails, nothing remains but to fight on and see to it that our own leaders remain true to the ideas of a democratic peace and self-determination.

The Need for Self-renunciation

MR. ČIČERIN has been telling the Congress of Soviets that the governing classes in England are the worst Imperialists in the world. Mr. Trotski said much the same to Mr. Arthur Ransome, with the difference that Mr. Trotski seems to have said it with a laugh, and added that we were unconscious of it ourselves. Only fuller accounts can inform us whether Mr. Čičerin also laughed, but his further statement that English Trade Unionists had sold themselves to the *bourgeoisie* renders it unlikely.

It is amazingly unfortunate that we should have personally offended the two men to whom the Bolševiks have especially entrusted the conduct of foreign affairs. We do not mean to imply that Mr. Trotski and Mr. Čičerin are actuated by personal spite. But they are human, and it would need considerable objectivity for either of them to regard his treatment by our Government as an accidental and negligible exception to an enlightened democratic policy. There is a curious irony in the fact that it was Mr. Čičerin who sent to Russia those bitter denunciations of Mr. Trotski's arrest by our agents at Halifax, and that although, in consequence, we released Mr. Trotski and recognised we had committed an indiscretion, we were soon guilty of a similar one in interning Mr. Čičerin.

We know ourselves that these indiscretions were not the result of a deliberate policy. They were natural and pardonable errors in tact, the same sort of errors that are associated with our treatment of Ireland. Mr. Trotski had been consistently preaching that he wished Russia defeated in the war. As we assumed, in the early summer, that Russia had become a second England, burning to overthrow German militarism, Mr. Trotski's return to Russia seemed to us just the one thing that would embarrass the new Liberal Government. Mr. Čičerin kept sending to the Russian papers accounts of our doings, which we considered unfair, and did all he could to hinder the arrangement we had just made with the new Russian Government for pooling resources in man-power. In interning him we were doing what we thought to be a kindly, helpful act to the new *régime* in Russia.

Where we were wrong was, first, in our information. We ought to have known that Mr. Trotski was already an important person before the revolution. He was the moving

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spirit in the Council of Workmen's Deputies at Petrograd in 1905, a leader whose personality and sufferings were bound to awake memories. No doubt he was a very humble person when in exile in America, and seemed the out-of-elbows desperado whom the police all the world over are accustomed to treat cavalierly. That we should be experts in the hierarchy of revolutionary organisations is of course asking a great deal of our official world.

More fatal was our want of sympathetic understanding of the Slav temperament. We knew that the Provisional Government and the Moderate Socialists differed in views from Mr. Trotski. We failed to realise that, at the moment of liberation, when "The senselessness of joy was nigh sublime," Russian Socialists of whatever shade of view were thinking of nothing at all except of relief from an intolerable burden, and of the joy of reunion. That we should, with the best intentions in the world, prevent tried revolutionaries from returning to Russia seemed to them a wanton act of interference. It is with just the same want of understanding that, having once persuaded ourselves that the bulk of Nationalist Ireland did not approve of Easter week, we felt surprised at its resenting what we considered our very moderate punishment of the ringleaders. Thucydides, who anticipated most things in this war, remarks that frank systematic brutality arouses less resentment than the occasional lapses of Governments that profess fair dealing. An imperial democracy is bound to be a creature of mixed motives, and the world judges it hypocrite when it is only inconsistent, either in policy or conduct. To the Sinn Feiner the blunder of Mr. Skeffington's death looms larger than the deliberate frightfulness of Germany in Belgium and the myriad outrages of her Allies in Serbia and Armenia. It is so, no doubt, with Mr. Trotski and Mr. Čičerin. It is not merely that men ignore what has not come within their own personal experience. The Bolševiks have direct knowledge of the asylum we have given to thousands of political exiles; but they ignore it, or assume that we have changed. They have never faced the record, present or past, of the Central Powers. The atrocities of the Central Powers are (with truth) represented by the Entente as on so colossal a scale that they do not enter consciousness, any more than a million pounds have a meaning

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to a peasant. It may be noticed that German propaganda, when countering, always confines itself to two cases, the *Baralong* and the *King Stephen*, with only an implication that there are more like them!

Grant, however, that the Russian extremists are unfair to England, it must be confessed that we—or rather our Government—have given them some excellent handles to take hold of. Our entry into the war was magnificent. As far as motives can be pure in this world, ours were pure. Not one man in ten thousand, rich or poor alike, had any thought except that of succouring France, and righting the wrong done to Belgium; yet, before a year was out, and without the nation having had a word to say in the matter, our Government had committed us to a programme of conquest.

Do we mean to imply that no conquests were legitimate for the Entente as a whole? By no means. Germany's unprovoked aggression gave France a reasonable opening for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Europe was in the melting pot, and it was natural for Italy to claim her kin, and for Russia to ask that we should no longer bar her from free access to warm-water seas. In all three cases an old-standing grievance was to be redressed. For both France and Italy the basis of the claim was moral as well as material. This was pre-eminently the case, too, with the small nationalities, with Poland and Bohemia, when they claimed state rights, and the Roumanians and Jugoslavs when they aspired to racial unity. We should have no ground for criticism of the British Government if it had informed the nation that our Allies expected certain desirable results from a victorious war. If America had been in our place, this is what President Wilson would have done. Can we imagine him making Secret Treaties with this Ally or that, pledging his country to fight on to the end for objects in which it took no interest, and of whose desirability it had no data for forming an opinion?

Even if he had consented to divide the bearskin before the hunt, would he have ignored the comparative importance of various objects, from the point of view of the future peace and happiness of the world? Would he have pledged America haphazard, as the convenience of the moment and the impertunity of a particular Chancellery seemed to demand? Would he, above all, have fallen so low as to consent to a give-and-

THE NEED FOR SELF-RENUNCIATION

take, in which America stood to gain something she had never expected and did not need, in return for helping to redress her Allies' grievances ?

Yet all this is what the British Government did, in the spring of 1915, when it signed the Secret Treaties with Russia and Italy (NEW EUROPE, Nos. 62 and 66). It committed the nation to fight *à outrance*, beyond all other objects, for a Russian Constantinople and an Italian Dalmatia. It made us a willing partner to the looting of Asiatic Turkey. And the Government, it must be remembered, which thus ignored the principles of popular control, and undermined our claim to be "Fighting for the Right," was not the present War Cabinet, nor the Coalition that preceded it, but the pure undiluted Liberal Cabinet. There is a pathetic irony in the fact that the responsibility for tarnishing our scutcheon rests pre-eminently on men whose motives were unselfish and sincere when first we entered the war. So fatal is lack of imagination, and the incapacity for realising that secret diplomacy is not an eternal law of God. A cynic, indeed, might argue that if Lord Grey's methods had been those of the German or Austrian Foreign Office, we might at least have obtained some compensation for the loss of our ideals. British Governments are just idealistic enough to get the worst of both worlds. They involve themselves in immoral treaties, and are too honourable to repudiate them.

Beyond our expectations or our deserts there is a chance that we may be freed from the worst of these complications. For good, as well as for evil, Russia has repudiated the obligations of the old *régime*. There is every hope, as was explained in last week's number of THE NEW EUROPE, that Italy will see that wisdom lies for her in not claiming the full treaty pound of flesh, but in restating her position in harmony with the Southern Slavs. If we are so fortunate, it is earnestly to be hoped that however great the temptation we shall never again entangle ourselves in a secret treaty. To put the objections to them on the lowest grounds, they are never secret. It may need Bolševiks to publish them *in extenso*, but in essence they are known within a month by the Chancelleries against which they are aimed. Everybody to whom it mattered has known about the treaty with Italy since first it was made.

Even, however, if all is open and above board in our

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Alliance, each member of it may differ in the comparative importance it attaches to particular objects. Can we rely on our Government using its influence to secure that in the determination of such claims by the General Council of the Allies, two criteria, and two only, shall be applied? First, those objects are most important which best ensure the future peace and happiness of Europe as a whole; and secondly, other things being equal, the stronger members of the alliance should postpone their claims to those of the weaker. If this principle applies to France and Italy, as compared with Belgium and Serbia, Roumania and Greece, it pre-eminently applies to us. We entered the war with no standing grievance, with no wrong to redress. We are the greatest Colonial Powers, and in the interests of our own reputation for efficient government should take on ourselves no further burdens. The reason that Germany has beaten us so hopelessly in propaganda in Russia is not superior cleverness or foresight, but simply that we have had to officer India and Egypt, and Germany has no such outlet for her surplus of University men. Realist as well as Idealist, Imperialist much more than Little Englander, should insist that, whatever happens to Mesopotamia and Palestine, whatever is decided about the German Colonies, one solution is barred out by deliberate self-renunciation. They must not be added to the British Empire.

For whose benefit, it may be asked? To gain the esteem of the Bolševiks, who will not give us credit for whatever we do?

The sneers of the Bolševiks are merely the occasion of our learning what half the world has begun to think of us. Whether we judge from the Allied and Neutral press, or from the personal impressions of our own propagandists in other countries, we shall find how widespread is the belief that the English Government is prolonging the war because it wishes to make something out of it. Above all, that belief is growing among our own working classes. It is vital that we should recover our reputation for disinterestedness. It is only thus that we shall hold the nation together, and win the peace as well as the war. It is only when Britain, without fear and without reproach, can take its stand by the United States, that there is a chance of the German people putting effective pressure on their own Government and throwing in their lot with a reconstituted world.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

The "Encircling" Myth once more

COUNT HERTLING's speech to the Reichstag on 24 January is remarkable in several ways. The use of the international plea for the purpose of despoiling Great Britain of her ports of call and coaling-stations, also for a general shuffling of the colonial possessions of the world (of course to the advantage of Germany) is a typical piece of up-to-date Machiavellism. Very characteristic, too, of Prussian policy are the references to Belgium, Poland, the evacuation of France, the retention of Alsace-Lorraine, and the insistence on the integrity of Turkey; while one cannot but admire the skill with which the Imperial Chancellor deprecated an "economic war," and was "gladly prepared to investigate" proposals for a League of Nations "after all the other questions in suspense have been settled." The last statement should open the eyes of benevolent constructors of International Leagues to the dangers underlying their occupation; for, well-meant efforts to bring about a speedy peace and to guarantee its conditions by the authority of all civilised States, may be so manipulated by our enemies as to clinch the world in a vice from which there is no escape.

But I wish to call attention to the Count's caricature of recent history. Referring to the Austro-German Alliance of 1879, he said: "In the course of decades never has the slightest thought of its misuse for aggressive purposes cropped up. . . . The danger of enemy coalitions which threatened the allied Central Powers often made an appearance. The dream of Coalitions became a reality, owing to the hemming-in policy of King Edward. The German Empire, struggling upward and increasing in strength, stood in the way of English Imperialism. This British Imperialism only too readily found support in the French longing for revenge and in the Russian struggle for expansion. And so plans for the future developed which were dangerous to us.

"Germany has always been faced with the danger of war on two fronts owing to her geographical position. It now became more and more visible. An alliance was concluded between Russia and France. . . ." (The reader will observe the skill with which the Chancellor inserted the words—"it now became, etc."—which leave the impression on ill-informed persons that somehow the Franco-Russian

THE "ENCIRCLING" MYTH ONCE MORE

alliance came after, or was even the result of, King Edward's policy.)

The shortest and most conclusive way of refuting this travesty of facts is to set them forth as they happened. Firstly, there was no sign of a definite alliance between France and Russia until Kaiser Wilhelm II. came to the throne of Germany in 1888. True, in the periods of sharp tension between Berlin and Paris in 1875 and 1887, when the German sword was fiercely rattled, both Petrograd, and, to a less extent, London, sounded forth warning notes that France was not to be "bled white"; but Bismarck's obsession by the "nightmare" of Coalitions, as also the pacific bent of Wilhelm I., averted war on those occasions. Their significance is that both Russia and England warned Germany against the assumption that she would have a free hand in crushing France. But the bellicose speeches of Wilhelm II. on his accession alarmed both French and Russians; and the enforced retirement of Bismarck in 1890 definitely ended his policy of astute balance between Russia and Austria which kept both of them on fairly friendly terms with Germany. "I am Russian in my sympathies but not blindly like the Emperor [Wilhelm I.]," said Bismarck in October, 1879, that is, *after* he had concluded the Austro-German alliance.* The dismissal of the Iron Chancellor in 1890 changed the whole situation. Wilhelm II. thenceforth drew nearer to Austria and cooled towards Russia. The natural result followed. Russia and France drew together in 1891 (when the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy was renewed and strengthened), but the definite Franco-Russian alliance was not proclaimed to the world until June, 1895. At that time it was believed to be directed against Great Britain no less than Germany; and the sharp friction between us and the French and Russians at the time of the Fashoda incident (1898) and during the Boer War gave colour to that supposition.

What, then, brought us into friendly relations with Paris and Petrograd? Was it the design of forming a league for the "encircling" of Germany? Nothing of the kind. Great Britain desired to escape from the perilous position to which her former policy of "splendid isolation" condemned her during the Boer War. But to whom did she make the first advances for friendship? *To Germany and Japan.* Our

* "Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History," Vol. II., p. 404.

THE "ENCIRCLING" MYTH ONCE MORE

primary motive was to arrange with their help a settlement of affairs in the Far East, then threatened by Russia's encroachments in that quarter; but an alliance with Germany of a more general character was hoped for. The Kaiser and his advisers repulsed our offers, why we cannot at present say with certainty. The significant fact, however, is that *we made the offer of alliance to Germany and that she refused it.* The German historians, Reventlow and Rachfahl, both record these affairs. The latter states that, as Great Britain could not draw closer to Kaiser Wilhelm in 1901, she effected a *rapprochement*, first to Japan (in January, 1902), later to France (in April, 1904), and gradually adopted the policy of "encircling" Germany. Reventlow admits the facts as just stated, and declares that it would have been bad policy for Germany to tie her hands by a compact with the British, which would have ended her *Flottentraum* (Navy-dreams).* Thus, the first notable effort of British diplomacy in the reign of Edward VII. was directed towards an alliance with Germany, not the isolation of Germany.

As Rachfahl admits, the repulse of our offers of friendship at Berlin led, naturally enough, to our turning towards Paris. At first our advances were received coolly enough. But events favoured an Entente. Arbitration was in the air; and England and France in 1903 signed a vague compact for that purpose. To reduce it to more definite form was eminently desirable, especially in view of two facts of sinister import for both States. These were (1) the near completion of the first part of the German Navy programme begun in 1898 and accelerated in 1900; (2) the commencement of the German-Turkish Bagdad Railway in 1903. The *Flottentraum* and the *Orienttraum* threatened the vital interests of both Great Britain and France, who therefore buried their former rivalries and formed a firm friendship, rendered firmer by the German bullying during the Moroccan crisis of 1905-6.

But the Bagdad scheme and the German Navy scheme menaced Russia, too. She saw herself imprisoned in the Baltic by the growth of Germany's overpowering Navy, the Russian fleet also having been destroyed in the Russo-Japanese War,

* Rachfahl, "Kaiser [und Reich," pp. 227-228; Reventlow, "Deutschlands auswärtige Politik," pp. 174-9. For further details see my "Development of the European Nations (1870-1914)." Sixth edit., pp. 593-8.

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for which Germany was believed to have intrigued. Further, the reconstruction of the Turkish Army under German tutelage promised to build up a formidable military Power on the frontiers of Russia's Caucasian Province; while, acting in concert with Roumania (then favourable to the Central Empires), the Turks could conceivably threaten the Ukraine. Such was the position of Russia after her defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5. Her sole Ally, France, was also in much confusion and was too far distant to help Russia in case of an attack from the Central Empires (probably backed up by Roumania and Turkey). Such, I repeat, was the plight of Russia after 1905. She saw with alarm the forward march of the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways, which were designed to facilitate the movements of Turkish troops in the Near East, and to bring Mesopotamia, Persia and Arabia under the influence of the Central Empires. Germany's pro-Moslem policy coincided with the growth of a Panislam propaganda which promised to unite all Moslems (including millions of Russia's subjects in Turkestan and the Caucasus) into close sympathy with Germany. To talk about "encircling" Germany at that time is absurd. It was she and her Allies and friends who were encircling Russia; and the course of events in this war has revealed the fact that, while repeating that parrot-cry so as to alarm the German Socialists, Germany had almost throttled Russia before this struggle began. Hertling referred to the construction of Russian strategic railways (with the help of French loans) as a menace to the Prussian frontier. But anyone who will glance at a complete railway map of that frontier will note that more than a dozen Prussian strategic lines converge on it, while there is a singular lack of Russian railways, except a few trunk lines in the Warsaw salient, the Tsar's Government knowing that that salient was untenable in face of a determined Austro-German offensive. The Turkish railways in Asia Minor, constructed mainly with German money, were also a threat to the Caucasus Province.

These developments were well marked even in the years 1906-8, which witnessed also the adoption by Austria-Hungary of Aehrenthal's aggressive policy in the Balkans, well known to readers of THE NEW EUROPE. It is also unnecessary here to describe the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9. Note, firstly, that the high-handed tone of Germany during the Moroccan

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crisis of 1905-6, reinforced as it was by her pro-Moslem policy and the Bagdad enterprise, helped to drive Russia and Great Britain into close union, the need of which was emphasised by the unbending hostility of the delegates of the Central Empires to the proposals of limitation of armaments so warmly advocated by the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry at the second Hague Conference of 1907. The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian Ententes (the latter of 31 August, 1907), served to group loosely together under purely defensive arrangements France, Russia and Great Britain. But it is childish to represent the diplomatic action of the ardently peace-loving Administration of Campbell-Bannerman as designed to "encircle" Germany with a view to her overthrow. After the virtual breakdown of the peace-programme at the Hague, common prudence prescribed a friendly though tentative union of the Powers which felt threatened by the system of the Central Empires. Secondly, the Entente Powers, far from overbearing Germany and Austria at the time of the Bosnian crisis of 1808-9, gave way before them and ceded to them the primacy in Balkan affairs—a primacy which the politicians of Vienna and Berlin sought to clinch by their aggression of July, 1914.

If Count Hertling's statements be examined by the cold light of reason and fact, they vanish like a will-o'-the-wisp. Yet by dint of much shouting to a world which is woefully ignorant about the facts, the German Foreign Office hopes to puzzle the public and to win over those curious persons in Allied lands whose bias is ever in favour of Berlin. The Count did little more than repeat what Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg said in the Reichstag on 19 August, 1916:—"King Edward saw his main task in personally promoting the English policy of isolation against Germany. . . . If Europe shall come to peace it can only be possible by the inviolable and strong position of Germany. The English policy of the balance of power must disappear, because it is, as the English poet Shaw has recently said, a hatching-oven for wars. . . . Germany must so consolidate, strengthen and secure her position that other Powers can never again think of a policy of isolation." There is here the same contempt for the proven facts of history as in Hertling's speech. Both Chancellors distorted the past so as to represent Germany as constantly menaced by superior forces or stifled by a balance of power.

THE "ENCIRCLING" MYTH ONCE MORE

The reverse is notoriously the case. It was Kaiser Wilhelm II. who set the pace in naval and military armaments, who virtually drove Russia into alliance with France, whose bluster and whose pro-Moslem policy alarmed France, Great Britain and Russia, thereby bringing about the Ententes of 1904 and 1907, whose forceful policy browbeat the Entente Powers on the Bosnian affair in 1909, despoiled France of 100,000 square miles of French Congoland in November, 1911, backed up Austria's attack on Serbia, and precipitated the conflict with Russia on 1 August, 1914, when even the statesmen of Vienna, for the moment, drew back. This is the Power which now poses as the victim of "encirclement," and trusts by falsification of facts to prepare the way for a "German" peace which would place the prize of world empire within easy reach.

J. HOLLAND ROSE.

The Russian Revolution and German Socialism

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THE Russian Revolution, like every other profound revolutionary crisis, is essentially a painful process, in which, as in the throes of child-birth or in a violent crisis of growth, the patient, whether an individual or a nation, has to pay the penalty of the sins and mistakes of its ancestors. This process, often accompanied by fits of violence, sometimes even a sort of delirium, excites the bewilderment of well-balanced nations, whose similar experiences, dating about two, or even three, centuries back, are well-nigh forgotten.

The nations of Europe which have enjoyed a long spell of moderate liberty are just as horror-struck with many details of the Russian Revolution of 1917 as all European Powers were horrified by its great predecessor of the eighteenth century—the French Revolution. Let me but recall Burke's sharp, brilliant and very severe criticism of the French Revolution, representing her merely as a Jacobin pretention at establishing liberty, equality and fraternity by means of crude legislation or atrocious violence.

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Like all European revolutions, the Russian Revolution of 1917 derives its course from two sources: psychological and economico-materialistic, which are mutually dependent. During the last hundred years the radical Russian "intelligentsia" was inspired by all the extreme Western doctrines, and now, after the fall of absolutism, is endeavouring to apply them to Russian life. Such a borrowing from foreign sources is not novel in the history of European revolutions: it is a feature of them all. Being the outcome of the discontent of backward nations under outworn forms of Government, all European revolutions of that type sought to sanction and justify their aspirations by foreign examples and foreign ideas, even going back into far-off antiquity. So did the English revolution of the seventeenth century receive its sanction from classical sources and even from the Old Testament. Still more did the French Revolution find its inspiration in the classical examples of Republican Greece and Rome; and, in spite of French Republican disdain of the English Constitution as being insufficiently radical, they owed much to the English Revolution and more to the American. The famous French philosophy of the eighteenth century is a simple paraphrase and brilliant popularisation of the English rationalist and individualistic philosophy of the period. The famous Declaration of the Rights of Man, issued by the French Constituent Assembly, is largely a repetition of the American Declaration of Rights. The very titles, "Convention" and "Comité du salut public," were borrowed by the French from English and American history. Even the idea of the execution of "Louis Capet" was partly inspired by the execution of "Charles Stuart."

The intellectual ballast of the Austro-German revolutions of 1848 has even less originality. The Germans of that period were literally seized with a mania to imitate the great French Revolution. This mania sometimes diverged into ridicule, and no wonder the two contemporary Hebrew men of genius—Karl Marx and Heinrich Heine—mocked the Germans parading in Phrygian caps, when their natural tastes inclined them towards nightcaps, and uttering terrible threats of armed insurrection against despotism, though, in their heart of hearts, entertaining a wholesome dread of the authorities.

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Thus all the European revolutions of that type were not only inspired by foreign examples, but in solving their special political and social problems justified their actions by ideals borrowed from foreign—generally more advanced—countries, or from antiquity. But such borrowing of revolutionary formulæ does not in any way encroach upon the fundamental originality of these historical earthquakes. Revolutionary peoples, though imitating foreign forms, realised them in accordance with their own national temperament, the particularities of the given historical epoch, and their national interest. They stamped upon foreign ideas, not only the impress of their own personality, but also of the historical epoch and of the existing international relations. The heroes of the English revolution, imbued with a puritanic and somewhat conventional spirit, went forth to overthrow despotism chanting psalms and carrying a Bible in one hand and a sword in the other. The French Revolution gave vent to an outburst of fiery imagination, a wonderful talent of propaganda, an unrestrained temperament and wild impetus, a true “*furia Franchesa*,” which resulted in terrible bloodshed. The Austro-German revolution manifested a certain dualism, a pure, high theoretical idealism combined with a practical fear of the authorities. No wonder Karl Marx called the Austro-German revolutions of 1848 a “*revolution without a tail*.”

The turn of the Russian people has now arrived. The Russian Revolution also adopts foreign examples, and is inspired by foreign theories, including German Socialism. Russian Liberals, in revolt against domestic despotism, always leaned towards Western culture and with special alacrity absorbed and embraced the extremest opinions. They were not content to solve their political problems by adopting the English Constitution, but they dreamed of a general upheaval, like the French revolutions of 1793 or 1848. All the latest expressions of European ideas found warm adherents in Russia. English moral theories, the utilitarian and evolutionary ethics of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Darwin; German philosophy and French positivism, Auguste Comte’s religion of humanity, and, lastly, the German scientific socialism of Karl Marx, coupled with Henry George’s doctrine of land-nationalisation

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—all these ideas were instilled into Russian minds, and were peculiarly refracted through the thorough-going fanaticism of the Russian temperament.

The essential trait of contemporary Russian character is its absolute scorn of compromise: on the one hand, total passivity; on the other, a reckless contempt of danger and death in defiance of authority. The extreme Maximalist motto—All or Nothing—is a true Russian cry.

The father of scientific Socialism, Karl Marx, hated the Russian nobleman and terrorist, Bakunin, for his dream of using Russian serfs to kindle a world's conflagration and entangle the present for the sake of an unknown future. This collision between the parent of German scientific Socialism and impetuous Russian Anarchism has a deep symbolical significance. It was the first shock of calm, methodical, scientific, firm and consequential German Socialism against the impatient, unsystematic, disorderly and violent Russian Anarchism. We must not forget that the fathers and apostles of Universal Anarchism were noble, clever Russian aristocrats, sometimes even men of genius. The terrorist—Bakunin; the Christian, passive Anarchist, anti-militarist and internationalist—Count Leo Tolstoy; and the patriotic syndicalist and scientific idealist—Prince Peter Krapotkin.

However, the Russian revolutionary ideas in the period between 1890–1917 revolved chiefly in the sphere of Marxism, and were almost entirely influenced by German Socialistic literature. But that influence did not long endure after the overthrow of absolutism in Russia. From the very beginning, unconscious Russian Maximalism listened impatiently to the warning voices of the clear-sighted Russian Marxists, namely the patriotic, world-famed Plehanov, and the idealistic member of the Second State Duma, Tseretelli, who had done ten years' penal servitude for his staunch adherence to Socialism. The Russian Socialists could not reconcile themselves to the scientific circumspection of Karl Marx or his German, Slavonic and Jewish commentators and critics—Engels, Kautski, Bernstein and Plehanov. Had Marx been alive now he certainly would have ridiculed Lenin as sharply as he had ridiculed the French Communists. In a country where only about 5 per cent. of the population belong to the working class or proletariat proper, and the

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other 95 per cent. are mostly peasants, nearly all land-owners, it is absurd to talk of Socialistic revolution. Russian Maximalists, styling themselves Socialists, desire to transform the Russian Revolution into an experiment of a universal social revolution in anarchistic style. They consider it scarcely worth while to repeat the years 1789, or even 1793; they wish to astound the world and to kindle universal conflagration with the help of an almost illiterate people, just as Bakunin threatened to incite the Russian serfs to set "old and tottering Europe alight." Kerenski, who branded the Russian Maximalist soldiers with the name of "revolted slaves," is reckoned now as a counter-revolutionist. What matter, according to Lenin, the sufferings of a Serbia, a Belgium, and a Roumania as compared to the great possibility of kindling a world's conflagration in the name of the universal proletariat, including Serbians, Belgians and Roumanians? Who cares for the Kaiser's speeches about "Almighty God," for the sinking of the *Lusitania*, for poison gas and for the petty details of the Great War, when the advent of the great social revolution is at hand? All these trifles, according to Lenin, will be swept away with the decaying *bourgeoisie* and flung into the abyss. The Russian Maximalists' imagination becomes more and more inflamed by the vision of this coming conflagration. Marx's theories transform themselves more and more into mere phraseology, and the Russian Socialists are now confronted with but two alternatives: they must either kindle a universal revolution, which will eclipse Belgium's devastation, or repeat the insane utopia of the French enthusiasts of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871.

Such is the psychological basis of the events which led to the Bolševik *coup d'état*. It is for the future impartial historian to decide how far the Bolševik adventure was influenced by German intrigue and German gold, but it is already clear that German influence played merely a subordinate part in Russia's dangerous and acute disease. Let Lenin and those of his comrades who crossed Germany, in German cars, during the world's war against German Militarism, be inspired by German literature; let them speak German infinitely better than French or English, and have a wider knowledge of German literature. All that is merely superficial; for it is obvious that the Russian Maximalists have much more in

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common with the English "levellers" of the seventeenth century and the French Communists and Italian Anarchists of the nineteenth century, than with the staid, well-balanced German Socialists, working a well-calculated sap, slowly but surely. It is true that Russian Maximalists, opening negotiations with the Germans, and welcoming German counts and barons at Smolny Institute, differ in one very important item from the French Communists of 1871 in their attitude towards the war. The Communists demanded "la guerre à outrance" against those with whom the Russian Maximalists fraternise at the front. That contrast, so unfavourable to the Russians, may be explained by the absence of political education among the Russian people, who have only just thrown off the fetters of political slavery. The very term "patriotism" had become unpopular in Radical Russian circles because the old *régime* used it to justify religious persecution and political constraint. It is also due to the influence of the new doctrine of Internationalism, the apostle of which, at the present time, is a remarkable, highly honourable Russian nobleman—George Čičerin—who was interned in Brixton gaol for his fanatical pacifist propaganda. Like Leo Tolstoy, Čičerin hopes to tear out the tusks and claws of Militarism by peaceful propaganda against conscription, and, like the German Socialists, he desires to strangle the "hydra" of imperialism by passive class-strife. The career of this rich Russian aristocrat and pacifist offers a peculiar interest for the future historian of the Russian Revolution.

The moral standard of the Russian Bolševiks, totally alien to scientific German Socialism, unfortunately is deeply rooted in Russian contemporary psychology. The Bolševiks, in anticipation of a universal social conflagration, stretch out their hand to the German proletariat in a very strange way. They have welcomed German generals, German admirals, Ministers, Herr Baron, Herr Graf, Herr Geheimrat, Herr Hofrat, and, last but not least, German spies, wearing Russian uniforms! Shame and disgrace! In spite of that, Russian Bolševiks have little in common with the Germans, for, while all Germans are very prudent, Russian Bolševiks legalise anarchy, incite anarchistic class-hatred, instead of Socialistic class-contest in the economic sphere. Those demagogues, though acting under the banner of German Socialism, are nearer akin to the Universal Anarchists—"les sanspatrie."

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The Bolševiks are but the froth upon the fermenting new wine of the Russian Revolution, and the great tragedy of the present day lies in the fact of this ferment breaking out in the midst of the Great War and thus disappointing the trust of the Allies.

But let us not lose hope. "Rira bien qui rira le dernier." We must not exaggerate the value of German influence in Russia. Though, economically, Russia has long been Germany's tributary, she never was, nor ever shall be, a German vassal in spiritual, intellectual, and moral relations. Besides, we must clearly understand that the Bolševiks' adventure is neither the first, nor the last, expression of the Russian Revolution. There exists in Russia a very serious Marxist or Social-Democratic, party, called "Menševiks," and also patriotic Marxists, whose leader—the profound thinker, Plehanov—preaches war against German imperialism and fidelity to the Allies. But Social-Democrats of different grades, influenced by German scientific Socialism, and sometimes turning out as Russian patriots, by no means exhaust the contents of the Russian Revolution. Apart from the non-socialistic Cadet party, which seems to have retired into oblivion, but is by no means dead, the greatest antagonists of German imperialism and German economic ascendancy also belong to a party of the Left, and that the most numerous—the Social Revolutionists. That party is quite free from German influence. Their spiritual fathers, Lavrov and Michailovski, always criticised Karl Marx's theories. All their programme is contained in Henry George's doctrine of land nationalisation. Those who think that the Russian Socialistic experiments are but the result of German intrigue and that the naïve Russian Socialists are the dupes of their German comrades, are vastly mistaken. Bolševism is one of the paroxysms of the Russian Revolution, beyond which it cannot go very far, for beyond lies the brink of an abyss, and there Russia will halt. . . . Russian Maximalists are not schoolboys, cheated by wily Germans, but maniacs, intoxicated by the surprisingly easy downfall of Russian autocracy, and wildly endeavouring to kindle a world revolution. Bolševist psychology was prophesied forty years ago by Dostoievski's genius, and strikingly expressed twenty years ago in Emile Zola's most remarkable novel. Clear-sighted British statesmen should fully realise that, how-

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ever terrible may be the present state of Russian affairs, and whatever the orientation of Russia's future economic development, Russia certainly never was and never can be either Germany's slave or the mere annexe of any other Power. Her future is her own.

ALEXANDER ONOU.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(IV) SOUTH AFRICA

"It is not repealing a piece of parchment that can restore America to our bosom; you must repeal her fears and her resentments and you may then hope for her love and gratitude." So spoke Lord Chatham to deaf ears in the course of that struggle, wherein we learned our bitterest lesson in colonial government. We lost America then, but the loss has taught us wisdom, not always in avoiding mistakes in our dealing with the colonies, but generally in retrieving them before it is too late. We have, indeed, aroused many fears and resentments in our colonies and dependencies since the latter half of the 18th century, when Chatham spoke those memorable words, but we have afterwards repealed them, and in so doing earned love and gratitude.

Our method of repealing them has been again the simple method advocated by the same great statesman; by "liberty . . . a plant that deserves to be cherished. . . . Like the vine in the Scriptures, it has spread from East to West and has embraced whole nations with its branches and sheltered them under its leaves." The conditions of society in South Africa, more than in any other colony or dependency, have tested our powers of government ever since the final annexation of Cape Colony in 1806. In Canada there has been the problem of conducting a government suitable to men of two European nationalities, the French and the English, and this problem still remains a test of the commonsense and adaptability of the Canadian nation, to whom the solution has wisely been left. But in South Africa, besides the two European races, Dutch and English, there is a native population outnumbering both Dutch and English together; and, to cap all, a body of Asiatic settlers, whose interests and manner of

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life differ from those of the other three races. Of these races the English have, taking South Africa as a whole, always been in the minority, relative not only to the whole population, but also to any one of the other races. The English Government, therefore, had a difficult task in attempting to reconcile interests and sentiments so divergent, to maintain its own supremacy and yet to be just. During the first half-century of our rule South Africa was actually governed from Downing Street. Governors were sent out to the Cape, and though these governors at that distance from England were naturally allowed considerable discretion and initiative, the ultimate responsibility rested with the British Government. After nearly fifty years, representative government was granted to the Cape, but under that system the governor and Home Government still had the last word, and it was not until 1872 that responsible government, on the British model, came to that colony, while Natal had to wait for it till 1893.

The delay in giving responsible government to the Cape was probably unavoidable before it had reached the stage of being able to protect itself, but it was in some respects unfortunate. A distant government, occupied with many other responsibilities besides those of one colony, is bound to make mistakes in dealing with such complicated problems as arose in South Africa. And many were the mistakes we made, generally from ignorance and from its consequence, a want of a consistent policy. Take, for instance, the case of the emancipation of the slaves: our genuinely disinterested motives were misunderstood and our action resented because of our mistakes and tactless methods of carrying out this policy. As a result the Dutch population were hopelessly estranged and a large body went off to seek freedom outside the limits of our rule. Most of the troubles which afterwards arose with the Dutch republics, established by these trekkers and others in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, had their origin in the vacillating policy of the Home Government, which sometimes was inclined to treat them as independent, and at other times as dependent on Great Britain. Again, British policy with regard to the natives was always shifting. To meet the danger of raids or invasions of wild native tribes on its borders, the limits of the colony were sometimes extended by vigorous governors and subsequently withdrawn in deference to apprehensions at home as to the extension of our

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rule. The proper treatment of natives within our borders was likewise subject to shifting aspects of policy, largely owing to the temporary pressure of some political party at home, not fully acquainted with South African conditions. Even after the grant of responsible government to the Cape, the important native states of Basutoland and Bechuanaland were bandied about between the colonial administration and the Home Government. By that time the latter had come to the determination to shift all possible responsibility for South African affairs to the local government, but had not sufficiently considered the difficulty found by a young community in dealing with large native states in addition to their own concerns; consequently, in both cases, the Home Government had to resume the responsibility. In this respect it showed wisdom, but meanwhile much needless irritation had been caused both to natives and to the Dutch and English concerned.

Thus, during the first three-quarters of a century and over that we had been responsible for South Africa, we had undoubtedly been making serious mistakes. But if we take a broad view of the matter, the mistakes were generally retrieved. They arose chiefly from ignorance, an excusable ignorance in view of the problems concerned; they were retrieved because by our very vacillations we showed that we were anxious to listen to the views of the community concerned, and because of our readiness to give self-government and full liberty of action to the Europeans on the spot, as soon as they showed a disposition to assume the responsibility. The Orange Free State we encouraged to assume independence in 1854 even against the desires of some of the population. In 1877, it is true, we took away the independence of the Transvaal, partly because our Government had good reason to believe that a majority of the inhabitants wished it, partly because of that State's difficulties in finance and with the natives. But four years later when it appeared that we had been mistaken as to the views of the inhabitants and after we had considerably strengthened the position of the State, we restored independence. Whether the time and method of restoring independence were well chosen is another question, but at least it cannot be denied that, had we been so minded, we could have enforced obedience on the Boers after Majuba.

So far we have been dealing with the period before the

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South African war of 1889-1902. The main interest to us to-day of South African history is the course of events that led up to that war and succeeded it. No war, probably, is inevitable, but the predisposing causes of that one were unusually strong. Neglecting the minor issues, which were rather symptoms than causes, the main reason for the war was the juxtaposition in South Africa of several states with similar populations but with utterly dissimilar forms of government. Had there been no large population of Britons in the Transvaal or of Dutchmen in the Cape the two States would probably be independent of one another to-day; but the British population in the Transvaal looked for their real allegiance to the British Government, while many of the Dutchmen throughout South Africa longed for a government entirely under their own race. It had come to this, that such disunion as there was in South Africa was bound to be solved by one united form of government. By the South African War it was decided that the one form of government for both British and Boers throughout should be the British form. But though the war had decided this point, it had left much still unsettled. Though the form of government for all four colonies of the Cape, Natal, the Orange River, and the Transvaal was British, they were still four separate governments and they were not of the same type. While the two old British colonies had self-government, the two conquered States were governed as Crown Colonies. This was in accordance with the treaty of peace, which, however, contemplated the grant of full self-government in due course. The only question was how soon would the period of self-government be reached, which would bring all the colonies on to an equal footing. That a short stage of Crown Colony government should succeed the war was admitted as reasonable even by the Boers. The country had to be re-settled, chiefly at the expense of the British Government, and order re-introduced before it was possible to think of free institutions.

It will be admitted that hardly any nation would have dreamed of giving self-government to colonies within a score of years from the time that their inhabitants had been fighting so obstinately and courageously against the victor. Immediate self-government would mean that in the Transvaal at least a majority, and in the Orange River Colony an overwhelming majority, of the voters would be drawn from

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the ranks of our recent enemies. To grant self-government at once seemed to many a mere abandonment of all the fruits of victory. Nevertheless, within four years of peace, under no external pressure or fear of revolt, this is exactly the course which we adopted. There was a risk, no doubt, as there is in all great experiments; but in spite of that risk we determined to repeal fears and resentments in the hope of love and gratitude. In 1906 the two new colonies were granted self-government as free and ample as that enjoyed by any of our over-seas dominions, with the expected result that administrations were formed in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, based on Boer majorities and composed of men who, four years before, had been fighting against us unceasingly. But the danger feared by many did not ensue. The Boers are a generous people, and they were impressed by such unexampled generosity and confidence in their loyalty. It would be idle, indeed, to pretend that there were not some among them still unreconciled, but their dissatisfaction lost all force while their leaders were so impressed by the strength and magnanimity of a nation that could be so boldly trustful, that they have ever since regarded the British Empire as an inheritance to be proud of.

By this stroke the last real obstacle to union in South Africa was removed. As Lord Selborne said in his famous minute on union: "No healthy movement towards federation can emanate from any authority other than the people of South Africa themselves"; and until the four governments were equally free they could not speak to one another on equal terms as the representatives of all the Dutch and English people. Barely two years after the grant of self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony delegates from the four colonies with delegates from Rhodesia met to discuss union, and within three months the form of union had been settled.

It is not necessary for our purpose to discuss the details of the form of union adopted. Sufficient to say here that it was a closer form of union than that adopted by either of the other two dominions, Canada and Australia. So close a form indeed is it, that everything in the constitution tends to merge the identity of the four constituent colonies into one comprehensive South African state, with this notable result that, so far as racial interests prevail, the Boers being in

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a majority, might have the control of every branch of administration in South Africa except over purely provincial concerns. This was, no doubt, foreseen by the British Government, and yet, so far from interfering with the delegates' discretion, it ostentatiously allowed them complete and untrammelled freedom of deliberation and decision. It felt that the only way of abolishing racialism, which has been the bane of South African politics, was by displaying equal confidence in the loyalty of both races, and by trusting to liberty rather than repression to abolish the dangers of one race taking an unfair advantage over the other. In one respect only was advice offered to the Convention by the Imperial Government: as to the terms on which Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland might be ultimately brought into the Union. But there were special reasons for this. In the first place, the advice was given on the direct request of the delegates, and, secondly, the Imperial Government felt itself under a peculiar responsibility for the welfare of the Native States, and would in no case have handed them over without full security for their well-being and just administration.

The grant of self-government to the Transvaal and her sister colony had alone made the convention possible; and the Convention, in its turn, with its successful result, has done more to remove the dangers of racialism than any other event could have done. When the leaders of both races, a distinguished band, including such famous men as Botha, Jameson, Smuts, Merriman, FitzPatrick and Steyn met together daily for months, to work out a common scheme, they learned to sympathise with and appreciate each other. The Englishmen were so moved by the Boers' affection for their language and their pride in it, hitherto never fully appreciated, that they made no opposition to their request for equality for the two languages. It was an Englishman, too, Jameson, who proposed that the Orange River Colony should resume its old name, the Orange Free State. "It is a small point," said a sturdy Boer a few weeks later, "but it was a very graceful act on the part of the mover; and, Sir, I regard it as a tribute to the British Empire that it can, without incongruity, have a free state within its borders. . . . and I will say," he concluded, "that in the event of an European war, which is not entirely improbable, an European race which might, perhaps, look for help to a portion of the

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people of this Colony, would, in that case, find itself very greatly mistaken. South Africans would stand as one man with the rest of the Empire." So, too, said that great South African, General Botha, and nobly has he kept his word for himself and for all but an inconsiderable part of his people.

One last word about the natives, who, after all, form the largest part of the population of South Africa. How far has British rule allowed self-determination for them? When the Cape was granted representative government, natives who could give proof of sufficient education and standing in the country were given an equal vote. Perhaps this proviso was premature and led to some abuse in practice; but, at least, the Cape has grown to be proud of the principle, and has refused to abandon it. The Cape itself, under the impulse of Cecil Rhodes, adopted a more effective and useful way of encouraging self-determination in the natives. By the Glen Grey Act those in the Native Territories, though not allowed the parliamentary franchise, are allowed to govern themselves locally; to tax themselves, to enact and administer municipal laws and to control their own education. This, too, has been the fixed policy of the Imperial Government in the native states which it administers. In Basutoland, in Bechuanaland, and in Swaziland the natives are, indeed, protected against special temptations, such as drink and the seduction of greedy land hunters, but they are encouraged in almost every other respect to assume full responsibility for their own government. It is recognised that the natives are not yet at the stage at which they could, with safety, exercise full sovereignty over their own and their white neighbours' affairs, but their interests are guarded, and they are being gradually led to safeguard them better for themselves.

BASIL WILLIAMS.

The Ballplatz and Prince Bülow

[Only a week before the great Austrian peace demonstrations the Viennese Fremdenblatt created a sensation by publishing the following outspoken onslaught upon Prince Bülow and the German extremists. This was almost universally accepted in Germany as written under the inspiration of the Ballplatz, and though it has since been announced that the Fremdenblatt ceased at the New Year to be an official organ, this is probably mere diplomatic camouflage. The article only serves as a fresh proof that Czernin and Kühlmann, while conducting their "peace

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offensive" in concert, are also engaged in defensive actions against the Jingoës, who would fain oust both them and Count Hertling.]

"A laborious and difficult task is being accomplished at Brest-Litovsk. It is perhaps not completely obvious from the public announcements and bulletins what endless difficulties stand in the way of building up again all that has been destroyed by three years of pitiless warfare.

"The conspicuous part played by the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Kühlmann, in these endeavours will only be adequately recognised at a later date. But it is already an acknowledged fact among all the Allies of Germany that if the difficult work of peace were accomplished, the lion's share of the credit would fall to Dr. Kühlmann. And yet in Germany itself, where the waves of political feeling have been running high of late, violent attacks are being launched against him. The Pangermans and annexationists of all shades of opinion do not approve of the manner in which the negotiations are being carried on, and a storm is gathering from many quarters.

"In so far as these attacks spring from the honest belief that the interests of the German Empire are not being sufficiently represented, one must respect them as genuine, though entirely mistaken. . . . We do not use the same weapons as the Pangermans and are not in the habit of throwing the ugly word 'treason' into the faces of all who differ from us.

"But tidings of a very different nature come from Berlin. The state of high nervous tension prevailing throughout the world, and not least in Germany, at the present moment, seems merely to present some statesmen with a favourable opportunity for cooking their own mess of pottage during the general conflagration. There are incessant rumours that the former Chancellor, Prince Bülow, is hard at work making difficulties for the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Kühlmann, evidently with the intention of replacing him and securing for himself the rôle of the chief negotiator of peace. In so far as this is a question of internal German politics, we have no right to express an opinion on it. We do not meddle with the affairs of other States, however close and friendly may be our relations with them, because we on our side are not willing to admit any foreign interference with our internal affairs. But *this is no exclusively German affair, for the two Empires are as closely connected as the Siamese twins*, and Germany's foremost peace negotiator is also a person of the greatest importance for Austria-Hungary. And therefore it must be said once and for all that in Austria-Hungary there can be no question of a comparison between Dr. v. Kühlmann and Prince Bülow. *Dr. v. Kühlmann enjoys the complete confidence not only of the Austro-Hungarian Government but also of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, who count it greatly to his credit that he steers so steady a course towards a speedy and honourable peace, under cover of the Majority in the Reichstag. Prince Bülow does not enjoy this confidence.* We do not wish to tear open old wounds, or to recall the period of acute diplomatic conflict with Italy which preceded that faithless ally's declaration of war. But that phase has never been forgotten in Austria-Hungary, and in

THE BALLPLATZ AND PRINCE BÜLOW

all grades of society throughout the Monarchy the feeling exists that *Prince Bülow* at that time, with his offers of Austro-Hungarian territory to the Italian Government, *did not play the part of a 'loyal second.'* [William II's phrase for Austria-Hungary after Algeciras.]

"When, therefore, one hears it said in this or that quarter in Germany that Prince Bülow would be welcomed by the allies of Germany as a peace negotiator, this suggestion must be regretfully but firmly contradicted. Prince Bülow may point to many valid reasons which would specially qualify him for this responsible post; but he must leave the goodwill of Viennese circles out of his reckoning."

Sidelights on America

The following extracts from a letter written by a well-informed correspondent, dated Chicago, 9 January, throw an interesting light upon American affairs. After expressing disappointment at the recent apparent willingness of the British Government to abandon Russia to German influence, the writer proceeds:—

"I was the more surprised and delighted, therefore, as were all liberals on this side, by Mr. Lloyd George's splendid statement of war aims last week to the Trade Union Congress. Now that President Wilson has stated to Congress yesterday an almost identical war and peace program, it seems to me that the diplomacy of the Allies is at last, after many delays and disappointments, becoming unified, efficient, and full of promise. Possibly, before this letter reaches you, Clemenceau will have admitted that the use to which victory is to be put is not less important than the winning of victory. I hope so . . . Your good impression of Colonel House's Commission naturally gives us much satisfaction. I think I may honestly reciprocate it with regard to most of your representatives over here. Dr. Kelman (of St. George's U.F. Church, Edinburgh) was in Chicago the week we declared war and did us a wonderful service. His Good Friday sermon in our own church, which was packed to the doors, will never be forgotten; and I happen to know that four leading Chicagoans, intimate friends of Mr. Wilson who had signed a joint appeal to him that week, not to involve us in the struggle, withdrew their signatures by telegraph after hearing Kelman at the Auditorium. Northcliffe has certainly driven home the urgency of our shipbuilding program, and has appealed strongly to our business men; 'forward-looking men' have, however, felt the limitations of his thinking about the war . . . F. E. Smith is now in Chicago, and I heard him give a brilliant and tremendously effective address before the lawyers of Illinois on Monday evening. Little as I share his social and political point of view, I was delighted that he showed so many signs of having been liberalised by the war, and, like everybody else, was captivated by his personal charm and eloquence. Perhaps the most useful man you have sent to Chicago is T. P. O'Connor, whose wit and geniality have made him very popular, and who has done great service in bringing about a better under-

SIDELIGHTS ON AMERICA

standing of the Irish tangle, thereby removing one of the chief obstacles to Anglo-American co-operation.

"As to our own situation, I rub my eyes daily and try to realise that the almost incredible things happening to us are really so. We are not the same nation that entered the war, and, needless to say, we shall be still more transformed both socially and spiritually when it is over. In spite of all our mistakes and inadequacies—particularly in organisation and administration—I did not hope in April that the country would rise to the situation as it has. Wilson's unquestioned leadership and the confidence of the nation in him are, I think, unparalleled in our history; indeed, the danger is that we shall leave everything too much to him and fail to keep within range of his constructive thinking. Congress is as so often sadly provincial and inadequate. I need not tell you how proud we are of the part he is playing in world statesmanship, or of the skill with which he is playing it. How shrewdly he is pushing a wedge between the German Socialists and Liberals, and the military clique. I have a suspicion that he is the one Allied statesman who understands how to handle the very difficult Russian situation. At the same time it must be confessed that his strength lies in diplomacy rather in administration. We shall probably have to have a good deal more centralised authority, and probably some Cabinet changes in Washington before our war machine is really efficient. This is the only thing which will interfere with our maximum contribution, for the spirit of the country is magnificent. We shall go on increasing our military force to the very limit until victory is won, no matter how long or how much it takes—meaning, of course, Wilson's clear definition of what he means by victory.

"The political situation is extraordinary. The bankruptcy of the Republican party is again shown by its failure as an opposition to press for administrative efficiency, and its petty nagging at real leaders like Hoover. The administration outside of the President, leaves a good deal to be desired, and the resulting 'one-man' leadership is a most unusual situation. Roosevelt has lost a great opportunity and a large following by his inability to rise above his personal opposition to Wilson. Taft, on the other hand, has greatly strengthened himself by his self-effacing and devoted service in rousing the nation. What the political future holds in store nobody can guess.

"One thing only is clear. Your country and mine are at last linked together, as by Anglo-Saxon heritage and democratic destiny they belong together, in playing for the greatest stakes in human welfare and world peace for which nations have ever striven or fought. I agree absolutely with you that world organisation and the world peace to which it ought to lead are, perhaps, nearer than we know, and are already present in germ in the Allied enterprise. May we have the wisdom to find and the patient courage to follow the rest of the way thither, however taxing it may prove."

To this we add the following passage taken from a special article entitled "The Central States," *Manchester Guardian*, 28 January:—"The most obvious fact emerging from perusal of hundreds of letters

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and newspapers from the great plain between Lake Michigan and the Gulf and the Alleghany and the Rocky Mountains is that the American Government is not given credit in the British press for the difficulties it has overcome and the way it has dealt with dissentient opinion in that vast area, whose nationalities resemble nothing so much as the racial network of the Balkans. President Wilson delayed bringing his country into the war until he could be sure that, left to itself, this mixed population of early Western pioneers and recent European immigrants would forge a common sentiment for the prosecution of the war while his Administration was forging the national instruments of it. To say that this has already been achieved would be too much; the process is still visibly, and in some localities spectacularly, taking place. Pacifism was not snuffed out by conscription. Could our fantastic Bolo-chasers know how much more of it there is than even they can imagine to be polluting England, it would take the heart out of their domestic rage. It is difficult to give figures, but I should say that for every pacifist household in England you could find a considerable village in America, including some dozens of small German communities where a silent pacifism seems to be the only conscientious alternative to active disloyalty."

Review

Races of Eastern Europe : " Daily Telegraph " Map, No. 25, by Alexander Gross, F.R.G.S. (Geographia). It is proverbially difficult to draw accurate racial maps; but in the present case, for all ordinary purposes of racial propoganda in this country, the map published by " Geographia " will serve. It presents a picture of Eastern Europe in its true racial features with the frontiers drawn according to nationality and with all the important debatable zones clearly marked in parti-coloured patches. The main criticism to which it is open is that, while it wrongly portrays the Slovenes as a different race from the Serbo-Croats and depicts them in a separate colour, it leaves the whole of Russia under one colour and thus fails to suggest the true racial basis for the present disintegration of that great country. To present the Ukraine and Northern Russia, for instance, in the same colour is to miss the whole significance of the strong centrifugal forces at present at work in Russia. And in giving the Ruthenians of Eastern Galicia a colour of their own, which in no way suggests their connection with the Ukraine itself, Mr. Gross misses a striking opportunity of showing how the artificial State-frontiers cleave whole races in two. We observe that, following certain authorities, Mr. Gross gives the Macedonian Slavs a separate existence and thus refuses to pronounce between the hotly-contested Serb and Bulgar claims. In this we think he does well. Macedonia is indeed a *Macédoine*. In conclusion, despite its blemishes, this map will serve the purpose of revealing to British students the fundamental racial causes of weakness in the Dual Monarchy, which is so largely composed of the Irredenta of other national States.

NOTES

Die Zeit changes Hands

Die Zeit, the well-known independent radical paper published in Vienna, has recently changed hands—to all appearance a change for the worse. It is now the property of a small syndicate in which the principals are Herr Meinel and Herr Frankfurter. The former is the well-known Viennese coffee king who played a prominent part in that futile organization “*Die politische Gesellschaft*” which aroused such lively hopes in certain circles in Great Britain. Herr Meinel is in touch with the highest circles in Germany. He frequently visits Berlin, and at a very recent date was engaged in important negotiations both in the German capital and in other parts of Germany. Herr Frankfurter is a Jew, best known for his connection with the Austrian Lloyd Steamship Company. *Die Zeit* in passing under the control of these persons will certainly lose its independent and outspoken tone; and though it is not probable that jingoism will find much expression in its columns, it will stand nearer to the official world in Vienna and Berlin than it has hitherto. In a word the change transfers *Die Zeit* from the Left to a Moderate Centre position, and the Austrian press loses one of its most distinctive organs.

Foreign Office Reform

On 30 January, in the House of Commons, Mr. A. F. Whyte asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he would lay upon the table of the House the draft proposals at present under contemplation for the reform of the conditions of entry into the Diplomatic Service. Mr. Balfour replied: “The proposed reforms which follow the general lines recommended by the Royal Commission are at present under consideration with the Treasury. It is, therefore, not possible to lay any papers at the present stage.”

We hope, however, that Parliament will insist on the publication and discussion of Mr. Balfour’s scheme of reform before and not after it is put into force.

Herr von Kühlmann’s Injured Innocence

Herr von Kühlmann, in his report to the Reichstag on the Brest negotiations, lamented the sudden change of tone that came over the Russian delegates after the arrival of Mr. Trotski on the scene. “It was as different as night from day. The Russian gentlemen remained hermetically sealed up in their houses, and only appeared in our circles for official negotiations.” It would be interesting to learn Mr. Trotski’s own explanation of the change. Can it have been in any way connected with an incident of which the British Press seems as yet to be unaware? One of the original Russian delegates at Brest was a certain Vladimir Schneeur, *ci-devant* officer and member of the Petrograd Soviet. During the period when the negotiations were interrupted, it became known that Schneeur was a former member of the Ohrana, or Tsarist secret police, and as the scandal could not be concealed, he was arrested and is now awaiting trial. From an agent of the Ohrana to an agent of the Germans is but a step; and this proof that their inner counsels are already honeycombed by traitors may well have imposed a certain reserve upon the Bolševik leaders.

NOTES

The Austrian Germans and Bohemia.

In No. 67 we quoted at some length from Herr Austerlitz's striking article on the Austrian Germans and their hopelessly local and *bourgeois* outlook. The Socialist editor's views find confirmation in the following extract from the *Prager Tagblatt* (23 December), the organ of the German Jewish Radicals of Bohemia, which incidentally bears hostile witness (to those who are reluctant to face patent facts) as to the unanimity of Czech national feeling.

"The sad fact must be admitted that the German progressive parties have lost contact with the German people (in Austria). Each group coquettes with another company of irresponsible and discontented persons, but none thinks of the broad masses of the people on which alone a strong German policy can be built up. Among the Slavs, whether it be a question of the Czechs, Poles, Southern Slavs, or Ukrainians, *the whole nation is rallied round and pledged to a definite idea*, a programme, however bizarre it may be. *For Czech policy there is in Vienna no difference between workmen and agrarians*, between protectionists and freetraders; no, they have become a *unified national mass, which has set its whole thought and effort upon the attainment of a definite aim*. Every parliamentary action is considered, adopted or abandoned, solely with a view to a nearer approach to this aim. On the German side national policy, though so strongly emphasised, has never been able to overcome the "Regionalism" of the Sudetian [Bohemia, Moravia] and the Alpine Germans."

President Wilson's "must" and "should"

We have received from Mr. A. F. Giles, Lecturer in Ancient History at Edinburgh University, the following comment on President Wilson's Message to Congress:—"Mr. Wilson's Message shows a curious variation of phrase in the statement of its various paragraphs: Nos. 1-6 give the aims as *substantives*—'open covenants,' 'freedom of navigation,' 'removal of economic barriers and establishment of equality of trade,' 'adequate guarantees' for limitation of armaments, 'free . . . adjustment of colonial claims,' and 'evacuation of all Russian territory'; Nos. 7 and 14 use the word 'must'—with reference to the restoration of Belgium and the formation of a general association of nations; and Nos. 8-13 use the word 'should' with reference to the restoration of invaded French territory and the righting of the wrong of 1871, to the readjustment of Italian frontiers, the autonomy of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the Balkan settlement, the Turkish settlement, and the erection of an independent Poland. Is this variation of phrase accidental, or does Mr. Wilson—who is usually able to say very precisely what he means—intend to suggest *degrees* of importance among the several aims proposed? One would be inclined to think so, were it not that the restoration of invaded French territory must obviously be an absolute condition, though it is stated as one of the 'should' items."

Diary of Current Events

- 14 Dec.—Sir E. Carson on War Aims Committee. Mr. L. George's speech at Gray's Inn. Bolševiks report capture of Kaledin.
- 17 Dec.—Publication of British Labour Memorandum on war aims. Official Japanese contradiction of report of landing of Japanese troops at Vladivostok.
- 19 Dec.—Text of Russo-German armistice published in England. House of Commons war aims debate. Kerenski reported to be marching on Moscow.
- 20 Dec.—Premier on war aims in House of Commons.
- 21 Dec.—German peace proposal.
- 22 Dec.—Kaiser's speech to troops of Second Army.
- 25 Dec.—Czernin's speech on peace proposals.
- 26 Dec.—Admiral Wemyss becomes British First Sea Lord.
- 27 Dec.—M. Pichon on the peace proposals.
- 28 Dec.—Labour Memorandum on war aims adopted by National Conference. Mr. Henderson's message to Russia. Premier meets Labour Leaders. Finnish deputation to King of Sweden.
- 30 Dec.—Bessarabia reported to have declared itself a Moldavian Republic.
- 1918, 1 Jan.—Premier's New Year Message to Allies.
- 2 Jan.—Trotski denounces German peace proposals. Reported arrest of 300 Independent Socialists by German Government.
- 3 Jan.—Trotski's letter to French Socialists.
- 5 Jan.—Premier's War Aims speech to Trade Unions.
- 6 Jan.—French Government recognises independence of Finnish Republic.
- 8 Jan.—Announcement of Lord Reading's appointment as British High Commissioner to America.
- 9 Jan.—President Wilson's "War Aims" message to Congress.
- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed.
- 14 Jan.—Sir A. Geddes introduces man-power Bill in House of Commons. M. Caillaux arrested. Italian gains near Monte Grappa.
- 15 Jan.—British Labour message to Russia, expressing agreement on war aims. Russian ultimatum to Roumania. Mr. Asquith's speech to London Liberal Federation.
- 16 Jan.—Reported Bolševik order for arrest of King of Roumania. Battle between Maximalists and Ukrainians in Odessa.
- 17 Jan.—Secret Session on man-power.
- 18 Jan.—Premier addresses final conference of trades unions on man-power proposals. Russian Constituent Assembly opens: Mr. Cernov elected temporary president.
- 19 Jan.—Russian Assembly dissolved by Bolševiks.
- 20 Jan.—"Breslau" sunk; "Goeben" beached.
- 21 Jan.—Sir E. Carson resigns from War Cabinet. Austrian peace strikes.
- 23 Jan.—17th Annual Labour Conference opens at Nottingham; Chairman, Mr. W. F. Purdy.
- 24 Jan.—Count Hertling's statement to Main Committee of Reichstag: Count Czernin's speech.
- 25 Jan.—Kühlmann on Brest negotiations.
- 28 Jan.—Gen. Smuts on German aims in Africa. Fighting reported at Lutsk between Ukrainian and Bolševik troops. Beginning of Berlin "peace and reform" strikes.
- 30 Jan.—Resumption of Brest negotiations.
- 31 Jan.—Lord Lansdowne on a clean peace.
- 1 Feb.—Mr. Henderson's manifesto on the Labour unrest.

ERRATA :

No. 68, p. 77, l. 19, for "Hungary" read "Russia."

p. 81, l. 30, for "enemy" read "name."

p. 94, l. 1 (title) and l. 16, for "Neue Zeit" read "Glocke."

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"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

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"Those warriors of the sighting brain
Give worn Humanity new youth"

—George Meredith

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From Lincoln to Wilson

“ Full lasting is the song, though he,
The singer, passes : lasting, too,
For souls not lent in usury,
The rapture of the forward view.”

THE great men of the past stand like giant figures on the horizon; and by comparison the men of to-day seem small in stature. When a crisis arises we say, with one accord: “Milton, thou shouldst be living at this hour”; and we busy ourselves idly with the unanswerable question: “What would this or that great man of past times have done?” Mere impotent speculation like this may be left to the valetudinarian partisans of “the good old days.” For us, in the greatest crisis of our European fortunes, the only profitable use of history is the endeavour to grasp the significance of the principles which guided the actions of those whom we revere and to apply them to our own circumstances. And in doing so we shall find that the giants of the past were compelled to undergo trials and submit to the same daily detractions which prevent us from gauging the true value of our own contemporaries. “For the statesman,” says Mr. Basil Williams in his preface to Lord Charnwood’s “Life of Lincoln,” “there is no exact measure of greatness”; and he rarely wins “the same unquestioning recognition that falls to the great warriors or those supreme in science, art, or literature.” Abraham Lincoln, the anniversary of whose birthday occurred last Tuesday, was no exception to the rule. There were many Americans of his own day, even in the North, who would have hotly denied him the proud title of “the preserver and regenerator of American liberty.” He had to face belittlement and misunderstanding and all those petty obstructions by which small men strive to thwart the purposes of the great. And but for an almost inexhaustible patience, fortified at once by a sense of humour and an inflexible will, he must have failed. To us the crowd of untoward events and niggardly men which sometimes threatened to

FROM LINCOLN TO WILSON

stifle his spirit are necessary features in the setting of his life. They are foils to his greatness. But they have a further meaning. They should enable us to take the true measure of those men and events of the same kind that tend to obscure the greater issues of our own day. In so doing we need not attempt to anticipate the judgment of history by placing any one man of to-day on too high a pedestal of fame. But, if we can discern in him the true descendant of some greater forerunner, we ought to pay heed to his message and rally to his call.

A few months ago (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 47), in an endeavour to expound the motto which is printed on the title-page of this review, I spoke of Abraham Lincoln in these words:—"If I wished to draw the picture of an ideal *Victoire Intégrale*, I should take Lincoln's policy in the American Civil War, for the victory of the North was a dearly-bought triumph of arms in which a whole nation was born again. All the evil wrought in that terrible episode called 'reconstruction' cannot detract one tittle from the essential justice of Federal policy in the Civil War, nor can it tarnish the ideal proclaimed at Gettysburg on which Lincoln afterwards set the seal of his life. To us Abraham Lincoln is the ideal victor." Pursuing a high purpose he was adamant in essentials and full of charity towards persons. In him conciliation was as active as vindication of principle was stern. Love of liberty was his strongest motive. To-day when liberty itself is once more at stake on a wider, bloodier field, the nation which he re-created is ruled by one who seems to have caught something of his spirit. Lincoln's message, at all events, has found an echo in many a speech delivered by President Wilson; and his purpose still survives in contemporary American policy. Lincoln established the Union within its own borders; Wilson has striven, with a large measure of success, to preserve and discipline American national unity as a creative force in world politics.

The new birth of freedom in the Civil War was Lincoln's gift to the American people. President Wilson dreams of another larger freedom for the whole civilised world. And such is the force of attraction which his personality and his policy possess that lovers of freedom all over the world have turned to him as to one who holds the secret of their desire. Through all his speeches there runs a current of constructive thought

FROM LINCOLN TO WILSON

which is too often lacking in the utterances of European statesmen, but without which all hope of an enduring peace is vain. At Gettysburg Lincoln told the American people that they were dedicated to an unfinished task. In his mind the Civil War was a great turning point in American history—and, indeed, in all our histories. Wilson's message is the same. America and the world are at the great cross-roads. The decisions taken to-day and the manner of their fulfilment will dictate the course of the world for generations to come. In urging the nations at war to lift their eyes to the vision of a new unity embracing all, he may well repeat the glowing words: "That we here highly resolve that those dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation—and all nations—under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

A. F. WHYTE.

Roumania in Extremis

It is distressing that the scene of the first armed clash between the doctrinaire champions of proletariat internationalism and a self-conscious, self-determined nationality should be Roumania. It is tragic, but it is not surprising. Bolševism is in essence, if not in fact, at war with all Governments of the world and, in so far as Governments and peoples are one, with all peoples. At Brest-Litovsk we see Trotski, armed with nothing but the dynamic force of explosive ideas, fearlessly confronting and denouncing the representatives of the most imposing militarist States of Europe. From Petrograd the same Trotski flings his defiances at the historic *bourgeois* republics of France and America, and that elusive and incomprehensible contradiction, the British Commonwealth. At all these States, based on history and a system of adjustments and compromises such as he abhors, Trotski can but strike indirectly. And all the time on Russia's south-west border lies a smaller, less-developed State, monarchical, non-socialist, on many grounds open to criticism; and further, a State isolated from its Allies, ringed round with mighty foes, dependent in part on Russia for its very food.

If Trotski desired a pretext for war on Roumania he has easily found it. If he wished a reason to justify his action

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that reason, he would say, exists. And, from the practical point of view, both pretext and reason matter less than the fact that he hopes to be successful. Pretext, reason, and expectation are closely interconnected. We can but try to set them forth as we understand them.

The Bolševiks' pretexts for their attack on Roumania are chiefly two: (1) The Roumanians have attacked, disarmed, and cut off from their food supplies Russian armies on Roumanian soil. (2) The Roumanians have allied themselves with parties and nationalities in Russia hostile to the People's Government of Petrograd, and in conjunction with these elements have occupied and planned to occupy Russian territory. Let us examine these charges in turn.

(1) Since the fall of Bucarest (6 December, 1916) the province of Moldavia, which in normal times just succeeds in feeding its native population of 2,300,000, has given hospitality to another two million persons—the Roumanian army, with a strength, all told, of some 600,000 men; some 400,000 Wallachian refugees, who have wisely preferred the hardships of exile to an intolerable existence under German military administration; and Russian troops to the number of 1,000,000, though withdrawals and desertions have during the past few months greatly reduced these numbers. Till December, 1916, Roumania had herself largely supplied these Russians with food. The new situation rendered this impossible. Russia assumed entire charge of their maintenance, and very properly returned to Roumania a part of the grain she had supplied. Further, during 1917 the Russian and Roumanian authorities concluded agreements for the import of food from Southern Russia into Moldavia, where large sections of the population were almost starving. Odessa, Kišinjov, and other towns—especially in Bessarabia—became depôts of supply for Roumania. Prospects became brighter, if not brilliant. In spite, too, of the old antagonisms between Russians and Roumanians—for which the criminal policy of Tsarist Russia was almost entirely to blame, whether in 1812, 1878, or 1916—relations improved, thanks to the tact of General Ščerbačev and the common sense of the hard-pressed Roumanians.

On this tolerably peaceful scene burst the tempest of Bolševism. Armies of occupation are rarely innocent of individual acts of outrage and injury to the native population. The Russians in Roumania had been very far from

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being an exception. But the Revolution of March began, and the Revolution of November completed, the disorganisation and demoralisation of an army which had at least been under discipline. Inaction at the front produced rioting in the rear. Food shortage suggested pillage and arbitrary confiscation. The Roumanian population witnessed with bitterness the spectacle of troops who left their places in the trenches—places that the Roumanians had to fill by depleting their reserves—to deliver themselves to looting, rioting, and outrages on civilians and women. Their one thought was to rid themselves of these “allies” who preached liberty and practised license. To disarm by persuasion and dismiss from the country those who were ruining it was sound ethics and sound sense. To disarm them and dismiss them by units was the only safe course, for to tolerate the passage of large revolutionary forces through the towns was to invite trouble. As for the Bolševik complaint that discrimination was exercised between Bolševik and non-Bolševik troops, the Roumanians might fairly answer: “Our only test is ‘friends or foes’: our foes are those who leave us on the field of battle and rob and outrage our families in the villages.” If certain Social-Revolutionary or Ukrainian or Cossack or Czechoslovak battalions remain, they remain because they behave as friends. The facts are so well known that one can hardly think Mr. Trotski serious when he plays the part of injured lamb to the Roumanian wolf. Not only observed fact, but the inherent logic of things, makes it clear that the Roumanians will willingly keep all allied troops who will behave as allied troops, but that they must needs try and rid themselves of those who persistently injure and embarrass them.

(2) But the Bolševiks put forward a further grievance. They accuse the Roumanian Government of interference in Russian internal affairs in the form of intrigues with the Ukrainian Rada and Cossack and monarchical elements against the People’s Government of Petrograd. These intrigues have culminated, they allege, in an attempt of the Roumanian Government to seize Bessarabia by a *coup de main* and thereby hook a valuable fish in the troubled waters of Russian civil war. The Bessarabian “incident” is still in progress and requires separate treatment. The first part of the charge may be answered at once. At what point

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did Roumania's action become anti-Russian, disloyal, or illogical? On what date should the Roumanian authorities have broken off relations with General Ščerbačev who, till a few days ago, was left by the Bolševiks themselves in formal command of the Russian forces on the Roumanian front? How have the Roumanians done wrong in maintaining friendly relations with those Russian forces—Ukrainian or Social Revolutionary—who have treated them with some of the respect due to allies, at a time when Bolševik troops were looting Moldavia? And how can Trotski complain of Roumanian interference when for a long while past Bolševik policy has frankly been declared to be the engineering of a revolution in Roumania? If Mr. Trotski complains that the Roumanian authorities hold up supplies for the Russian troops in Roumania, with what right does he attempt to cut the Roumanians off from their food depôts in Bessarabia and Southern Russia? How can he in the same breath preach revolution by violence in Moldavia, deport the Roumanian Legation from Petrograd, and declare war on Roumania, and denounce the Roumanians for associating with such Russian or Ukrainian troops as behave towards them as allies?

Take the concrete case of Bessarabia. Some weeks ago THE NEW EUROPE (No. 65) published an account of the origins and development of the Bessarabian movement for self-determination. Some more recent happenings may be noted. Chief among them is the opening at Kišinjov of the first Provisional Parliament of Bessarabia—*Sfatul Țării* ("The Council of the Land"). Under the presidency of a Moldavian, Professor Inculeț, of Petrograd, this Provisional Parliament of 150 members assembled at Kišinjov on 21 November/4 December to take measures to secure the country from internal and external foes. On 2/15 December it announced the formation of the "Moldavian Republic" as an independent State till such time as a Russian Federal Republic should come into existence. It pleases Bolševiks to describe this as a *bourgeois* assembly intended to protect the "reactionary landlords." It is curious surely, then, that it is constituted almost wholly of peasants and common soldiers—out of the 150 deputies elected 44 were common soldiers, 34 at least (perhaps over 40) peasants, and the bulk of the remainder representatives of non-Rouman nationalities

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(13 Jews, 15 Ukrainians, 5 Bulgars and Găgăuți, 2 Germans, a Greek, a Pole, an Armenian, and others).

Again, the first plank of the Council's platform is universal, equal, direct, secret, and proportional suffrage; the second is "the transfer of all the land to the hands of the peasants without compensation to the landlords." Equality of all races and creeds, the abolition of capital punishment, and "peace without annexations and indemnities on the principle of full self-determination of peoples in agreement with the Allies and all the peoples of the Russian Federal Republic" fill the rest of this thoroughly democratic programme. It is this "Council of the Land" which has extended a brotherly invitation and welcome to the Roumanian armies. Some days ago they entered Kișinjov and according to all reports they had an enthusiastic reception. It is hard to see how on the basis of the principle of self-determination the Bolševik Government can find fault either with the Moldavian Republican authorities or the Roumanians who accepted their invitation. The Bolševiks declare, however, that it is all a landlords' plot, that the Council is artificially chosen and does not reflect the real feeling of the people. Time will show whether Bessarabia, like the Ukraine, will "go Bolševik." We have not full evidence as to the strength or weakness of Bolševik forces there. But, as distinguished from the Ukraine, the Bolševiks have in Bessarabia come up against a wholly distinct nationality, and it may be that a national social revolution may prove more attractive than the Russian version of Marxism.

We have sketched at some length the two chief "causes" of the Bolševik war on Roumania. But behind these occasions of quarrel lie deeper-rooted reasons. The Bolševiks merely concede, they are not enthusiastic over, the principle of self-determination. For them nationality is a tiresome obstacle to the speedy realisation of internationalism. When nationality is beyond their reach they are willing to compromise with it, to win it by satisfying its—to their mind—irrelevant and absurd demands. But class is a greater bond to them than race, speech, or religion. They look for allies in all countries, and where they do not exist they must perforce invent them. Thus they attack Roumania in the name of Roumanian Social Democracy. But who represents this Roumanian Social Democracy? In Roumania there is practi-

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cally no native town proletariat, except for a small foreign element. The peasants, who form over 90 per cent. of the population, ask for land and better social and political conditions. But the pure gospel of Marxism and the Utopian doctrine of immediate Internationalism are to them unmeaning. Nor are they likely to imbibe this teaching from Russians of all people, for history, ancient and modern, has taught them to distrust the Muscovites *et dona ferentes*. Men who plunder their farms and seize their food and outrage their daughters, leaving Roumanian soldiers alone to fight the enemy, are hardly likely to be welcomed as brothers or as apostles. The worst advertisement for Bolševism in Roumania is that it is Russian. Reforms—political and agrarian—the Roumanian will have out of this war, and much is already assured to him by Act of Parliament (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 42), but he wishes them of his own particular brand, not of the Smolny Institute kind. Moreover, he looks in vain to Russia for any support for the great cause of Roumanian unity; and to him the satisfaction of Roumania's just national claims is a necessary preliminary to her acceptance of the new internationalism. Yet beyond a passing allusion to the Transylvanian question, Mr. Trotski has done nothing to show his sympathy with the wrongs of the Roumanian race at the hands of the Magyar *bourgeois*-capitalist Government.

Mr. Trotski obviously expects to win in Roumania by the methods he adopted in the Ukraine. Perhaps he will; but we hazard the conjecture he will not. In Roumania, as in Finland, he has come up against a strongly non-Russian and ^vanti-Russian nationality; no artificial State, such as in large part the Ukraine is, but a determined, historic, military State, where patriotism is merged in no vaguer feeling. If he counted on a spectacular victory over a "boyar oligarchy," Trotski may find himself instead hard put to it to crush the soul of a nation. His mentor, the Bulgarian Bolševik, Georgi Stančev (*alias* Ivan Rakovski), who poses as leader of the Roumanian Socialist party—honest, fanatical, conceited—may prove to have misled him. "War" can hardly be avoided. The Roumanians must defend their country and secure their food supplies both on Roumanian and Russian soil. Trotski, having put his hand to the Roumanian plough, can hardly turn back simply because he finds, like Jason, that it is dragon's teeth he has to sow. We regret,

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however, that Mr. Trotski is wasting on Roumanian soil, where for the present it can only be an exotic, the good Marxist seed which would, if tended, bear fruit a hundredfold in its native Germany. Every good internationalist—socialist or otherwise—wished Trotski success in his spar with the Prussian heavy-weights. No sane person could sympathise with his wanton, irrelevant assault on Roumania. In the interests of Internationalism we hope Trotski will find the Roumanian nut too hard to crack. In any case our sympathies cannot be in doubt. Come weal or woe, Roumania has linked her lot with ours: we are bound in honour to stand by her in war or peace.

“In war or peace.” Hard pressed as Roumania is, cut off from military assistance from her Western allies, she must take any chance that offers of saving herself from destruction. It may be that military necessities will compel her to negotiate with the enemy. It might even happen that such negotiations might end in a formal “peace” with the Central Powers. There are different sorts of “peace,” and it is hard to see how any sane partisan of the Allied cause could object to Roumania making any such necessary arrangements as would save her from destruction. But one fact is certain, for it is not subject to passing political currents or transitory military conditions. There can be no lasting peace between a high-souled, determined nation, such as their gallant struggle last summer proved the Roumanians to be, and the blood-stained, materialistic empires of Central Europe. By every tie of sympathy and interest Roumania is bound up in the future with France and Britain. If we do not neglect this fact we can be sure the Roumanians will not. Sympathy and moral support in such an hour mean more than at any other time. We can give it intelligently now, and it will be understood. For Roumania has still a future and a great one. *Românul nu piere.*

BELISARIUS.

The Fall of the *Lira*

THE fall in the value of the Italian *lira* is an economic event of great importance. British goods worth £100 sterling cost the Italian merchant 4,000 *lire*, which before the war cost him 2,500. This loss of 60 per cent. for the Italian consumer has a political significance which not only financiers, but

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British and Italian statesmen are bound to regard with interest and alarm.

Even in times of peace the economists have found a certain difficulty in explaining the phenomenon of exchange. Its fluctuations between one country and another are generally treated as due (1) to the relation between the gold reserves and the circulation of paper money, and (2) to the relation between imports and exports. Among the economic events of the world-war any estimate of the first factor is extremely uncertain. The French and Italian exchanges, for instance, differ enormously, although the proportion between paper issue and gold reserve has been for a long time almost equal in the two countries. Thus a more sure explanation seems to lie with the second factor in the case of Italy. The excess of imports over exports during the year 1917 was five times that of 1913, and ten times that of 1914. Moreover, the remittances of emigrants have fallen, and the tourist movement which brought into Italy large sums in foreign gold has completely ceased. But these two factors combined do not account for more than one-sixth of the present discrepancy. The remainder is a result of the war. But the Italian public asks itself: "Are we not the allies of Great Britain? Why, then, do the British make us pay 40 *lire* for what costs 25?" The answers usually given to this question are merely calculated to baffle the public, which does not sufficiently take into account the laws which govern the economic world. Evidently the public is not conversant with the financial agreements between Italy and Britain, which have hitherto, for some unknown reason, been kept as a jealous secret. But the question, even when put in its true terms, remains open; and the longer its solution is delayed, the graver may be its political consequences.

Italy has to buy from abroad half her consumption of grain, her coal and a very large quantity of metals, besides a large number of articles of prime necessity, such as meat, cotton, hides, manure, machinery, etc. How does Italy finance these purchases? She exports very little, her gold reserve is absurdly small in proportion to the amount of her purchases, while she does not possess foreign securities such as could be liquidated for the purpose of creating credit. Hence Italy was obliged to have recourse to her allies, and especially Britain, to finance her imports.

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Hitherto the British Government has advanced to Italy the most important sums. But these loans, which are about one-sixth of the war-liabilities of Italy, do not make good the deficit of her commercial balance for 1917. Hence Italy has had to find means, through private credit, of buying the remainder of what she required, on conditions more onerous than those imposed by the British Government, since the business man knows no political considerations but solely his own interests. Thus conditions became positively disastrous as the demand for foreign money rose steadily and produced a rapid fall in the exchange.

The two financial operations—loans from Government to Government and loans from foreign banks to the Italian Government—are analogous only in the sense that both have to be liquidated *after* the war; in every other respect the two cases differ widely. In the former, Italy obtains on special terms from the British Government the means of producing its armaments and continuing the struggle. In the latter case the Italian Government applies to the Italian, British, or American capitalist, who exacts higher terms. The two operations differ also in their final result, since that which took place between the two Governments is a political transaction, influenced by the need for maintaining amicable relations between the two countries, while the other transaction is left to the mercy of inexorable economic machinery which it is difficult for Governments to control, alike in peace and in war. The transaction between the two Governments puts a limit to the loss of exchange, and, as it does not depend upon the law of supply and demand, does not affect purchases in the open market. On the other hand, the greater the demand for private credits, and the more the drop of the exchange, the heavier is the burden on the Italian consumer, the more do the national riches find their way abroad, the more difficult do the future prospects of the Italian tax-payer become.

If, then, we attempt to consider so far as possible in detail these two kinds of transactions, the difference becomes still more marked. I say so far as possible, since the secrecy preserved as to the official agreements is still almost complete, while private concerns are not disposed to reveal the conditions on which they have transacted business. For instance, it is to be presumed that the debt contracted by the Italian Government towards Great Britain has been guaranteed only

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to a very small degree in gold and for the part most in Treasury bonds. In other words, it is an act of faith on the part of the British Government in the solvency and political constancy of Italy. On the other hand, in the case of private credit, the most frequent forms of guarantee are traders' bills of exchange, options on the joint ownership of Italian industries, mortgages on Italian property, &c. A great part of the capital thus introduced into Italy by private credit inevitably tends to be tied up in loans and property, with a view to serving as a guarantee. But at the end of the war, or a little later, the public will find out that during the war the Italian or foreign banks have acquired at 100 what was worth 160, and that the return on small capitals and upon labour will for an indefinite period of time be weighed down by the profits realised during the war by the big operations of Haute Finance.

There are some who do not believe in the tendency towards a permanent immobilising of capital after the war, and who hold that capital will be bound to remain fluid, in order to be free to turn in whatever direction the most profitable demands should arise. But, in this case, a fluctuating foreign credit which tends by every possible means, and as soon as possible to escape from the country may have the most disastrous effects upon the Italian economic situation while the exchange would be very seriously affected throughout the period of this difficult and troublesome liquidation.

Other economists, on the other hand, foresee a tendency of capital to become immobile in agricultural and industrial enterprises. They justify their theory by the ever-growing tendency towards the depreciation of money and the consequent rise in the cost of living, in salaries and in the cost of production in general. In that case the capital built up before the war and invested during the war has a better prospect of profit by sticking to the former investments than by seeking more costly ones.

The investment of capital in Italy seems bound up with this decision; it has the advantage that the Italian soil is capable of bringing in a far bigger return, its mineral wealth is virtually unexplored, its industries could be greatly developed owing to abundant and cheap labour, while its water power, though in certain instances exploited with very great skill, has as yet been employed to about an eighth of its capacity. Foreign capital will undoubtedly help on this

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development, but its value and productiveness will also be greatly increased; and those statesmen who desire the friendship of the Allies in the future would be well advised to prevent Italian public opinion from acquiring the impression that the foreign capital called in during times of stress had imposed unduly onerous conditions.

We have reviewed in summary the causes of the fall in international value of the Italian *lira*, and have seen what are its more remote results. Its immediate consequences are not less serious inasmuch as the necessities of life are becoming in Italy, not only scarce, but dear—in many cases dearer in an absolute sense than in the other Allied countries; dearer, in any case, in proportion to the average wealth of the Italian consumer. For Italy has to suffer not only from all the causes of dearness common to the other countries, but also from the increased freights due to the longer voyages required for the transport of raw materials from the markets of origin, to the scarcity of national tonnage which obliges her to have recourse, in larger measure, to the international shipping market, and, finally, has to support the high rate of exchange.

The question of transport is so grave and important that all objections on the score of price have willy-nilly by force of circumstances to take a secondary place. But the question of exchange is of such a nature that it is capable of being solved, as between the Allies, or at least so modified that the breaking-point shall not be reached before we come to an end of hostilities.

From what we have said it is clear that the loss in exchange would not have a serious reaction upon the effective purchasing power of the consumer, provided that everything which is essential to the life of the people were treated on the same footing as war material and the other goods covered by Government credits—if, that is, arrangements were made for their collective purchase on a basis of deferred payments on identical and friendly terms, whether as regards the rate of exchange, which would have to be fixed by common agreement, or as regards the time allowed for payment and guarantees.

The "pooling" of Allied resources from the military point of view is an ideal which, through sanguinary experiences, has gradually approached realisation. The same process is being,

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or ought to be, applied in the economic and financial sphere. Italian statesmen take full account of the difficulties which Great Britain has had and still has to confront in the financing of the war; they are well aware that the keeping up of the value of the pound sterling on neutral markets is of vital interest, not only for Britain but for Italy—nay, that Italy should regard that object as even more important than the rate of her own exchange on London. But, on the other hand, Great Britain ought to remember that to leave Italy to obtain for herself the credit she requires in the neutral markets means the imposing on the Alliance for the present, and eventually on Italian economy, a burden, which by adopting another course might be reduced by half. It is a familiar fact that a rich buyer buys better goods on better terms than a poor one. Now the pound sterling holds an international position infinitely superior to that of the Italian *lira*. The national wealth of Italy is, perhaps, equivalent when capitalised to the income produced in one year by the national wealth of Britain. The more extensively the British and American Governments consent to act as financial intermediaries for Italy, the less will be the net loss of the latter in the financial transactions necessary to the prosecution of the war, the more moderate her demands for money in the future, the more sincere and solid the economic and political relations after the war, and above all the greater will be her power of maintaining that economic resistance, without which successful prosecution of the war is impossible.

The reasons why this economic "pooling" was not completed and did not assume from the very beginning the greatly improved character which it has at present, are no less obscure than those which stood in the way of "pooling" in the other spheres of Allied activity. About the good will of the statesmen of Great Britain there seems to be no doubt whatever. Probably there was imperfect understanding of one another's resources and necessities, which created misunderstandings at the first economic conference of Paris. Probably Italy entered upon war in the idea that hostilities would not last nearly so long as they have lasted, and probably her statesmen thought it unnecessary to spoil a "*beau geste*" by an advantageous and necessary economic agreement. Later on Italian statesmen, it may be supposed, sinned in the direction of lack of boldness or clear statement. There were, perhaps, also on the British

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side corresponding deficiencies avoidable or unavoidable, of which we know nothing.

But, while it is useless to bandy recriminations, we are bound to draw such lessons from the past as may serve to obviate mistakes in the present and the future. Now, the continuous drop in the Italian rate of exchange cannot be regarded as a financial accident, due to the present economic organisation of markets, as merely a fact to be registered. We must consider it from the point of view of the loss it has caused and may continue to cause, regarding it as the index of an economic and political situation which has to be remedied.

The interest of the Allies is clear. Italy has an armed force of four million men, whose military efficiency may automatically crumble away under the pressure of economic conditions. Exchange constitutes one of the factors of this economic pressure—a factor not so important as that of transport, but one which can more easily be eliminated by means of concerted action on the part of the Allies. What they have to do is evident from the foregoing considerations—viz., to unify by means of State organisation the credits required by Italy from her purchases abroad, to stipulate conditions governing such credits on the basis of political accord, and not on that of so-called “economic laws,” which, if left to operate unrestrainedly under the emergency conditions created by the war, threaten to wreck the economic structure of the weaker nations.

Nor let it be imagined that Italy will stand by with folded hands. At the present moment there stands at the head of our financial administration a Minister whose clear views and courage as a reformer give great hopes for the future—Signor Francesco Saverio Nitti. He has already established a State monopoly of foreign securities (*dei Cambi*) in Italy, limiting itself so far to the modest task of hindering speculation which was exploiting too freely the irregular and feverish fluctuations of a weak and unhealthy market. But the work of this institution will, it may be hoped, be extended and attain exceptional importance. It already constitutes an additional guarantee for the Allies—who are already in control of the transports—that the credits granted to Italy, in one manner or the other, shall not be employed to import goods other than those of primary necessity and so to aggravate

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the crisis in freights. It contributes to limit severely unnecessary emigration of national wealth; and presently it may help in ascertaining the amount of wealth which has already left the country, thanks to the transient and fictitious factor of exchange, and, eventually, in agreement with the Allies and on the most favourable conditions possible, in recovering a large measure of that wealth.

ALDO CASSUTO.

The Czechs and Austria

THE principle of self-determination—which is simply the old Mazzinian doctrine of last century revived under a new name—has figured prominently during the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. But from the first it has been interpreted in two sharply divergent senses. While the Russians are ready to apply it to every national unit in Europe, irrespective of the artificial political frontiers of the old *régime*, the Central Powers insist upon restricting its application to *states*, not nations, and leaving existing frontiers unimpaired. Austria-Hungary in particular has the most obvious reasons for adopting such tactics, since self-determination, if applied within the Habsburg dominions, would automatically put an end to the present Dual System—resting, as it does, upon the enforced hegemony of two nations over six others. The official representatives of Vienna and Budapest, being invariably and exclusively drawn from the two ruling nations, are hardly likely to submit to a change which would undermine their own position. Their point of view is briefly summed up in the phrase which they incorporated in the Speech from the Throne last December—"We want to remain masters in our own house."

This phrase is, in itself, a proof that the household is not composed on a basis of equality, that among its members are servants as well as masters. The subject-races have voiced in recent years with ever-growing emphasis their dissatisfaction with the place which they occupy in the domestic economy of the Monarchy: and since the Russian Revolution they have openly claimed the same right of self-determination for themselves as was so freely conceded by the new *régime* in Petrograd to the non-Russian races of Russia. It was this claim which led the Czech, Southern Slav and

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Ukrainian deputies of the Austrian Parliament to demand that elected representatives of the various nationalities of the Monarchy should attend Count Czernin in a consultative capacity during the peace negotiations. This demand was, of course, refused by the Austrian premier, on the plausible ground that such a course would run counter "to the spirit of the constitution in all constitutional states." But the Slav deputies were strong enough to secure urgency for a discussion of the whole question; and the uncompromising spirit in which they have been met by the authorities only serves to strengthen the general discontent at a system which renders whole nations and their spokesmen powerless to control the most vital questions of policy upon which their very existence depends. The conflict between the German and Slav points of view in Austria has never been more acute, and the Czechs in particular are the subject of systematic attacks in the press and in Parliament for their whole attitude towards the war. The exploits of the Czecho-Slovak brigade under Brusilov, and, more recently, the official recognition of a Bohemian army on the Western front and the permission granted by the Consulta to raise a Czech legion among the prisoners in Italy, have made it impossible to overlook any longer the openly Austrophobe sentiments of the Czech masses. A whole series of interpellations in the Reichsrat—one signed by 90 German deputies and forming quite a bulky volume—deals with the "treasonable" practices of the Czechs, their propaganda in Russia, America and Western Europe, the wholesale surrenders of their troops and their repeated refusal to fight against the Entente, the passive resistance of the home population and its indifference to Austrian war-loans and "patriotic" appeals. Nothing, however, has availed to intimidate the Czechs, in whose eyes the virtue of patriotism and the crime of treason alike have no meaning save in respect to Bohemia, not Austria. The Slovene leader, Dr. Korošec, was speaking no less for the Czechs than for the Southern Slavs when he declared that "if our demand constitutes the crime of treason, there will never be enough scaffolds to hang all the criminals."

Perhaps the most remarkable feature in Austrian politics during the past six months has been the way in which the consolidation of the Czech parties has kept pace with the disintegration of the German parties. While the German

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National Union has dissolved into its component parts, the Czechs, whose tendency to split into rival factions was so marked before the war, have been steadily closing their ranks, until Clerical and Socialist, agrarian and townsman, stand united upon a common national platform. While the authorities, for purposes of foreign consumption, dilated in pathetic accents upon what an outspoken German newspaper calls "the legend of loyalty and love to Austria," Mr. Stanek, the leader of the Czech Parliamentary Club, was able to speak with the entire nation behind him. Even our inveterate Austrophils, who would fain throw doubt on the unanimity of a movement which does not fit into their calculations, must find it difficult to ignore the well-nigh unanimous testimony of German observers on the spot, that the whole Czech nation, without distinction of class or party, stands behind its present leaders. "Despite the censorship," writes the *Zeit*, "the whole world knows what the Czechs want."

For the Czechs the first two-and-a-half years of war were a period of unalloyed repression such as they had not known since the fifties of last century. Their leaders imprisoned or condemned for treason, their press muzzled, their institutions suppressed, parliamentary life at a standstill, denunciation and espionage rampant, their country garrisoned by hostile nationalities, the Czechs none the less maintained an attitude of stubborn defiance, and no amount of pressure could wrest from them any public profession of loyalty to a régime which had plunged them into war with their dearest kinsmen, in a quarrel not their own and by a decision over which they had no control, and on which they were not consulted. Nowhere did the Russian Revolution have a stronger repercussion than in Prague, and the effects were seen in the series of remarkable manifestoes issued during April and May by the leaders of Czech political and intellectual life. These culminated in the programme put forward at the meeting of the Reichsrat on 30 May by the Czech deputies, who declared their resolve to work, on the basis of self-determination, for the union of all Czechs and Slovaks in a single democratic state. Since that date the Czech leaders have again and again reaffirmed the nation's claim to unity and independence, and have denounced the Dual System and Magyar oppression of the Slovaks with a frankness which has roused the Magyar jingoes to frenzy, and has been officially repudiated by the

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Governments of Budapest and Vienna and even by the Crown itself. The political amnesty of last July was a belated attempt to revive for the young Emperor the sympathies which his granduncle's reactionary policy had effectually destroyed among the Czechs. But so far from winning them to a more moderate attitude, it merely served as an encouragement to further efforts in the national cause; and though Dr. Kramař and the other pardoned deputies lost their seats in Parliament, they were received in veritable triumph on their return from prison, and have ever since directed the inner counsels of the Parliamentary Club. Since the restoration of Parliament the Czechs have acted in the very closest accord with the Southern Slavs and Ukrainians, whose claims to unity and independence are of a similar character to their own, and who are no less uncompromising opponents of the Dual System. Like them, they have steadily resisted the blandishments of the Government, which has made more than one overture for their political support.

Last November the Austrian Government, which throughout the summer had played with the idea of constitutional reform, definitely declared its intention to uphold not only the Dual System, but also the artificial boundaries between the seventeen provinces of Austria, without the abolition of which there can, of course, be no reconstruction on a racial basis. The Czechs, realising that nothing more was to be gained in Vienna, and indignant at the possibility of their being ignored as completely at the conclusion of peace as they had been at the declaration of war, resorted to a new expedient for forcing their national claims upon the attention of the world. On 6 January, 1918, a meeting was convoked at Prague, which might fairly claim to be regarded as a Constituent Assembly of the Czech nation. It was attended by all the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat and in the Diets of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, by Dr. Kramař and the other deprived deputies, and by a number of the most prominent figures in the literary and commercial life of Bohemia. The resolutions passed by this representative assembly have been suppressed in their entirety by the Austrian Censor, but they are known to have reaffirmed in a much more outspoken form the programme of Czecho-Slovak independence proclaimed on 30 May, and to have expressed open disapproval of the principles upon which Count Czernin was conducting the peace

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negotiations. Not content with this, the Assembly appears to have declared that it no longer recognised the Reichsrat as the supreme political authority, but that until a general Czecho-Slovak parliament should be free to meet, only the Czech deputies as a whole were qualified to speak for the nation. The inaugural speech of Mr. Stanek protested against the very idea that "a civilised nation of ten millions, living in the heart of Europe" should be ignored at the future conference of peace, denied Count Czernin's authority to speak in the name of the nations of Austria, denounced the sham constitutions of Austria and Hungary, and culminated in the phrase: "Our Czecho-Slovak nation does not ask for anything save what every educated and civilised nation claims and defends with its blood. We ask for the union of the Czech nation with the Slovaks, in a state enjoying complete political, economic, and cultural independence, and possessing all the attributes of sovereignty. What is not a crime for others cannot be a crime for us."

The great Austrian strike diverted attention for the moment from events in Prague, but on 22 January Dr. von Seidler, whose Cabinet has been criticised with almost equal severity for its weak attitude towards the Czechs and towards the strikers, sought to regain the favour of the German parties by a violent denunciation of the Czechs and their whole policy. The Declaration of 30 May, he argued, though objectionable from a constitutional point of view, did none the less show some regard for the interests of the Empire as a whole, and was still reconcilable with "the dynastic and patriotic fundamental ideas of an Austrian." Hence much as he disagreed with its tendencies, he felt that there was still some common ground on which its supporters and the Government could work together.

"The Prague Resolution," he continued, "shows another face. One looks in vain in it for even a distant note of attachment to the dynasty and the State as a whole. The political thought which it expresses seems subject to the suggestion of a world of ideas which we are most successfully combating in a hitherto unparalleled struggle for existence. Our enemies may read in it an encouragement to persevere in the pursuit of principles which conflict with the existence of our State. It seeks to hamper the attitude of our negotiators, and is opposed to peace in so far as that does not bring self-determination of the nations, in a special sense forcibly interpreted for their own aims. For this right is to be invoked, in the teeth of the equal right

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of the German people, to dissolve the existing State and to secure the full independence and sovereignty of the Sudetian lands,* whether in Austria or not. Thus the Resolution takes stock of eventualities which have nothing in common with the Austrian idea. Thus it clearly enters upon an extremely dangerous sphere and is to be interpreted in a sense positively hostile to the State, such as must be rejected with indignation by every Austrian and resisted by every Austrian Government with all the means at its disposal."

After announcing that he was speaking with the express authorisation of the Crown, he concluded, amid prolonged interruption, with the assumption "that the noble and healthy kernel of the nation has not been infected by the poisonous seeds of a suicidal policy which ignores the clear course of historical development." Such tendencies he affected to regard as "a mere aberration, only explicable as a kind of war-psychosis," and as bound to yield to "a confession of faith which, however national, will still be Austrian."

Simultaneously with this uncompromising official pronouncement, the German parties of Bohemia issued a declaration denouncing the Czech national programme and demanding the erection of "Deutsch-Böhmen" into an autonomous Austrian province with its own Diet, and with German as the exclusive language of schools and administration. It is obvious that in the event of the Czechs attaining their dream of a restored Bohemian Kingdom, the German minority would be fully entitled to such an autonomy. But the manifesto ends with an ominous phrase which reveals the mind of its framers. "A state in whose preservation we are to collaborate must offer guarantees for the national existence and freedom of the German people." In the words of an acute German observer, "The burning question is, under what conditions Austria is still in any way possible as a state." Is the moment at hand when the Germans of Austria, realising that they can never again hope to assume the offensive against the Slavs, will prefer to abandon the rôle as outpost of Germany which Bismarck assigned to them, and to merge their identity in that of their kinsmen of the Empire? In any case it is abundantly clear that the Germans of Austria, on the day when their political hegemony over the other races can no longer be maintained, lose all real

* *i.e.*, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia.

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inducement to remain subjects of the Dual Monarchy. That it is increasingly difficult for them to do more than ward off the blows of their adversaries is apparent from the utter disintegration and paralysis of political and parliamentary life in Austria. The Government cannot secure a working majority without the Slavs, yet open political warfare prevails between it and the Slavs. The Emperor is quite unequal to the situation, and there is no sign of any statesman who could end the deadlock save by a radical change of policy such as would arouse the enmity of the Magyars and shake the whole Monarchy to its base. And meanwhile, in the words of the Socialist *Naše Doba*, "the whole Czech nation stands behind its deputies; and it must conquer, because it rests alike upon historic and upon natural right."

RUBICON.

The Outlook of a Patriotic Serb

SERBIA has suffered a terrible martyrdom in this war. Fire and sword, and the scourge of disease and famine, have swept away one-fourth of her people. Her enemies, especially the Bulgars, have waged a campaign of extermination and deportation in order to destroy her national life; and they have systematically pillaged the country of its industrial resources, its flocks and herds, and even of the domestic possessions in its private houses. The process has reached a horrible culmination in the deportation of a large number of Serbs to Asia Minor, where death is the kindest fate that can overtake them. In a word, Serbia is prostrate; and, though all the invaded countries in Europe have suffered grievously, none has undergone such a trial as our little kingdom. The treatment she has received from Austria-Hungary is witnessed by the fate of the Serbian prisoners of war, who have died in thousands by famine, disease, and cold in the Austrian concentration camps. The Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary, in Bosnia for instance, have undergone sufferings unknown even during the Turkish *régime*. They have been shot and hanged without trial, and their possessions have been confiscated, in over one hundred thousand authentic cases, by order of the Austrian Government. The action of Vienna in this matter has demonstrated the reality and vitality of the unity of all Southern Slavs, both in Serbia and in Austria-

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Hungary. The sufferings of the people set a seal upon their national desire.

Meanwhile, despite dreadful discouragements, the Serbian Army at Salonica, and the Serbian peoples in Serbia and throughout Southern Slav lands, have not lost heart. On the contrary, they are full of courage and a spirit of sacrifice and confidence.

What, then, is the Serbian hope? Assuredly something more than the prospect held out by the recent declarations of Allied Statesmen. "Restoration" is offered to the Serbs after a war which has proved that the true Serbian nation stretches far beyond the old artificial frontier which is to be "restored," a war in which our little Slav Commonwealth has been almost obliterated by savage foes, and a war which has elicited all the ancient valour of Serbian arms and set the seal of Serbian sacrifice upon an age-long dream of union between all Serb kinsmen. Restoration means an attempt to return to the *status quo* which has itself vanished before the panoplied onset of a new and grandiose Germanic conception, the politico-economic realm of *Mittel-Europa*. Restoration in a strict sense, therefore, is not possible; it would mean the engulfing of Serbia in the wide jaws of Austro-Magyar-German power, and the permanent possession by Germany of the most important gate on the Hamburg-Bagdad line. On this point Western Europe still nurses illusions. It is all too ready to listen to the gullible sentimental traveller who, like the brothers Buxton, have acquired an authority in Balkan affairs to which their first-hand knowledge does not entitle them. Further, there are many who still babble of the "Slav peril," that Bismarckian bogey which has served Germany so well and so long. What havoc that fable has played in Eastern Europe and especially in the Balkans! And how easily Europe could make the right decision if she would brush aside all these things and look squarely at the facts.

The Habsburg peoples know the facts. The Czechs and Southern Slavs, for instance, have tried many plans for making the Dual Monarchy a habitable place. They have given the dynasty the benefit of the doubt many a time. They have allowed themselves to believe in Habsburg goodwill, and, at the moment of testing trial, have found nothing but ingratitude. In their ears, therefore, there is a terrible

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ironic ring in some of the promises of Western Statesmen. Autonomy is a shirt of Nessus. It would be a new cloak of autocracy, a new fig-leaf for despotism; and, under it, the Hindenburg of to-morrow would command the massed armies of seven nations, bowed under a yoke of military rule disguised in the *camouflage* of democratic phrases.

With such a fate looming before her, Serbia raises her voice in protest against those who would have her submit. The Serbs know by bitter experience what even autonomy under the Habsburg sceptre can mean; and to-day they cry, No, a thousand times no! Never will we or our blood-brothers in Austria bow to that yoke. We demand the right for them and for ourselves to choose our own "way of obedience." In principle it has been granted by the declarations of all the Allied Governments and the countless assurances given by the Allied Nations. It is, indeed, the only honourable course open to the Allied democracies, for a refusal to adopt it means the victory of the German idea. We are to-day at a great turning-point for Europe. One finger-post points us along the road on which Prussia has led Germany for generations; the other bids us take the road planned for us by our own experience; the road indicated by President Wilson, by the Russian Revolution—a road which all readers of THE NEW EUROPE by this time know well. By it, and by it alone, can we reach a lasting peace. There is little room for compromise here; it is a plain, direct choice. When the life-blood of a nation is at stake, you cannot solve the problem of its existence by half-measures. Either the nation is, or it is not. The standard of "half-a-loaf-better-than-no-bread" cannot apply. National unity is one and indivisible. When it is won and made secure, there is ample room for the necessary accommodation with neighbours; but till then the word must be—No compromise.

Doubtless, this doughty spirit in a stricken ally is admired by some, censured by others as the megalomania of youth, and discounted as heroics by a cynical diplomacy. We appeal beyond the unimaginative official world to the peoples of Allied countries imploring them not to forget their lesser partners when the decisive moment arrives. There will come a time when the imperialists in all camps—allied and enemy—will endeavour to bargain with one another, using us as their pawns. Germany will give the British Empire all her

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African colonies in return for a free hand in the East—that vast region which lies between Riga and Salonica. An Imperialist peace like this would be no peace. It would whet old appetites and awake new ones. It would give the Habsburg dynasty a new lease of life and enthrone Germany in Europe and the Middle East. And the foundation of it all would be the base denial of freedom to all nations east of the Adriatic. It is towards such a result that Europe may drift unless the awakening sense of justice in the common people can stop her. And, meanwhile, we may remind her statesmen that the nations of the world desire a lasting peace founded on justice, and that the smaller peoples in the Balkans look to their powerful sisters in the West to establish the reign of liberty all over the troubled regions of the East.

JOVAN CVIJIĆ.

The Bolševiks and German Gold

THE documents published by the *Petit Parisien* and purporting to prove all the Bolševik leaders to have been in German pay, seem to have made a profound impression on the British public. From the very first the authenticity of these documents seems to have been accepted. Dates, registration numbers and names were given, and seem to have created an impression of reality which soon hardened into absolute conviction. I wish, therefore, to explain the reasons which make me doubt the authenticity of the most important of these documents. But, in order to prevent possible misunderstandings, allow me to state that the paper which I have the honour to represent in Great Britain—the *Russkoe Slovo* of Moscow—and I myself stand in the sharpest opposition to the Bolševiks. It is, therefore, not with a view to white-washing the Bolševiks that I ask you to allow me to examine the authenticity of the documents which have now been brought up against them. But at this moment, when the Western Powers are confronted by the fateful task of deciding on a line of policy towards Russia, it would be regrettable if even men who merely pretend to represent Russia were to be judged, not by their acts, but on the basis of documents whose authenticity is doubtful.

Let me analyse the two most important documents. The circular of 2 November, 1914, purports to be a money order,

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by nature a business document pure and simple. Absolute precision is its first requisite. It ought to name the sum which is to be paid, the person to whom the money is to be paid, and the conditions regulating such payment. There is no room in such a document for extraneous matter. Does the circular of 2 November comply with these simple and universal rules of business? Here is its text :—

The Circular of 2 November, 1914.

The Imperial Bank to the Representatives of the Nia-Banken at Stockholm, and to the Agents of the Diskonto Gesellschaft and the Deutsche Bank :—

At the present moment the pourparlers between agents authorised by the Imperial Bank and the Russian revolutionaries Zinoviev and Lunacharski have come to a conclusion. The aforesaid persons applied to certain financiers, who in their turn applied to our representatives. We consent to support the agitation and the propaganda which they propose to make in Russia on the one condition that this agitation and this propaganda directed by Messrs. Zinoviev and Lunacharski should be applied to the armies at the front. If the agents of the Imperial Bank apply to you we beg you to open for them the necessary credits which will be covered in Berlin at the first demand you make.

(Signed) RISSER.

Is this precise? Certainly not. Was the bank authorised to make money payments directly to Zinoviev and Lunacharski? One cannot tell, but it would seem very doubtful. The agents of the German Imperial Bank, not Zinoviev or Lunacharski, are to have accounts opened for them. But if this is so, what purpose is served by everything said in the first part of the circular down to the words "armies at the front"? It would have sufficed to order accounts to be opened at these banks for the agents of the Imperial Bank. Why should Herr Risser have felt such an irrepressible need for recounting in a strictly business document the story of secret negotiations and arrangements which in reality could not have been of any business concern to the people to whom these confidences were addressed, but might have embarrassed them by making them conscious accomplices in a bad breach of neutrality? It must, moreover, be remembered that the Nya-Banken (for this, and not Nia-Banken, as given in the document, is its real name) is the co-operative bank of the Swedish Socialists who follow Mr. Branting, and remains under the directorship of Mr. Aschberg, an intimate friend of Mr. Branting, who is the most prominent pro-Ally leader in

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Sweden. Are these the people to whom the German Government would be likely to confide secrets of State in writing, and that without any real need? It is not in that style that the despatches are written which form the ground for the accusation against Bolo and his associates. Still worse; Herr Risser is represented as having reached an agreement with Mr. Lunacharski, and as having, on 2 November, 1914, ordered money to be paid to him in Sweden, whilst in reality Mr. Lunacharski was then neither in Russia nor in Sweden, but in Paris, where he had lived up to the outbreak of the Russian revolution.

Here is another document :—

Order of 2 March, 1917.

The Imperial Bank to all Representatives of German Banks in Switzerland :—

By the present we inform you that demands for money for pacifist propaganda in Russia are about to be made from that country *viâ* Finland. These demands will be made by the following persons :— Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotski, Sumenson, Koslovski, Kolontai, Sivers, Mercain, whose accounts have been opened by our Order No. 2,754 in the agencies of the private German banking establishments in Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland.

All these demands must be confirmed by one of two signatures : Dirschau or Wolkenburg. At sight of these authorised signatures the demands of the above-mentioned propagandists in Russia will be considered as regular and immediately executed.

No. 7433, Imperial Bank.

The Russian Revolution broke out on 27 February (Old Style). The order of the Imperial Bank for money payments to Russian revolutionaries selected for "pacifist propaganda," is dated 2 March. Had the Imperial German Bank adopted the Russian Calendar, or had it the absolute certain foreknowledge that a revolution would break out in Russia on 11 March (New Style), that it would be successful, that it would be followed by a general amnesty, that Kamenev would return from Siberia, and Trotski from America, to make money "demands" from Russia "through Finland?" Further, is it not remarkable that all the people mentioned in Order No. 7433 should be lumped together and circularised in Switzerland, when some of them were resident in Russia, some in Scandinavia, some in America and some in Siberia?

The question now arises—why these documents were not given out when the Bolševiks went to Brest to negotiate for peace with the Germans, but should have appeared when a

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breaking-point seemed to have been reached between them? It seems most deplorable that the "Russian patriot," who supplied these documents, should have refrained from signing his name for fear of being killed by the Bolševiks in Paris. The knowledge of his person might reassure us as to the source from which these documents were derived and the purpose of their publication.

S. POLIAKOV-LITOVZEV.

The Indiscretions of "Achilleius"

FOR some months past a sinister campaign against Italy has been conducted in the *National News* by an anonymous military correspondent signing himself "Achilleius." On 3 February this writer excelled all previous records by openly declaring:—"We English do not want to fight Austria, which is an ancient Ally of ours, and we have regretted that our troops have had to go to Italy to fight with her." The publication of such views at such a time would constitute a very grave public scandal, even if their author were an insignificant Fleet Street scribe. But we have reason to believe that "Achilleius" is no other than Colonel Repington, who so recently transferred his services from *The Times* to the *Morning Post*, and who is now engaged in the columns of the latter newspaper in attacking the Inter-Allied Council of War and its policy in a manner calculated to promote serious discord among the Allies.

With Achilleius' motives for anonymity we are not concerned: that is a matter for his late and present employers. But we think it right to inform our readers that in Italian circles it is being freely asserted that his hostility to Italy is inspired by his well-known Ultramontane leanings.

There is yet another curious feature in the affair. The editor of the *National News*, Mr. A. M. de Beck, is, we are informed, of Hungarian origin, though he long ago acquired British citizenship in Canada. We do not for a moment challenge his good faith. But we frankly do not regard it as conducive to the public interest or to mutual confidence among Allies that an editor who hails originally from the Dual Monarchy should be free to open his columns to a systematic onslaught upon the latter's foremost enemy and our very good friend. Indeed, we are at a loss to understand why our military authorities, who are not always remiss

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in such matters, should so long have shut their eyes to the scandal. We have always upheld the view that the Governments of our Allies are, and must be, open to the same frank criticism as the British Government itself. But gratuitous and anonymous insults to a whole nation deserve summary treatment.

The *Arbeiter Zeitung* on "Moral Conquests"

[The following remarkable article was published on 4 January by the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, the organ of the German Social Democrats of Austria, under the title "Moral Conquests." The fact that its publication was allowed, no less than its contents, entitles us to look upon the article as a sign that public opinion in Vienna, if not in Berlin, is slowly becoming conscious of those moral issues which the Central Powers have so scornfully ignored in their conduct of the war. With those who are ready to translate such views from pleasing phrases into practical action, reconciliation is not impossible. But for the present we have to remember that the power is in other hands, and that its transference has scarcely even begun.]

The German people was once the people of poets and thinkers, the people of idealists. Germany has produced the most profound idealist philosophy; and till 1848 the political thought of the German people was dominated by the highest idealism. But what the German people before 1848 and in that hurricane itself sought in vain to attain through the highest idealistic enthusiasm, was given as a present to it, or rather to its *bourgeoisie*, by the diplomacy of Bismarck and the victories of Moltke. What idealism failed to achieve was achieved by a policy (*Staatskunst*) in whose reckoning there were no ideals but merely interests, no moral convictions but merely the real power of cannon and bayonets. Under the impression of this historic experience, the outlook (*Denkweise*) of the German *bourgeoisie* was completely reversed. He who speaks of ideals is to-day a Utopian; he who appeals to moral convictions is looked upon by it as an enthusiast. The sole aim which policy must set itself is the power and riches of one's own nation; he who speaks of the rights of other peoples is a fool. And power is nothing but bayonets and guns, riches are nothing but money and products of the soil; he who seeks to win the confidence of men and the recognition of peoples is an idiot. "Let them hate us if only they fear us!"—that is the watchword of this outlook in intercourse with other peoples. That is the real inner meaning of Pangermanism!

This point of view started from a very one-sided and superficial verdict on Bismarck's success. But even he himself warned us against merely seeing those means of power which can be counted and weighed, and overlooking those no less important spiritual ones, the imponderabilia which cannot be weighed. But the Pangermans have learnt

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nothing from this phrase of Bismarck. They never could understand that the confidence and respect of neighbouring peoples are also sources of strength. They know no other means of power save brute force, and no other means save those dictated by the naked self-interest of their own class and nation. "Let them hate us if only they fear us!"—this challenge they have held in the face of the whole world. And so they have really succeeded in turning not only the fear, but also the hatred, of the whole world not only upon themselves, but upon the whole German people, which has all too long permitted them to speak in its name. The world alliance against us could never have come about had not Pangerman rhetoric day by day raised all the peoples against us.

Nowhere has imperialism any aim save profits, any means save power. But how well has English imperialism always understood how to veil itself in the State robes of morality and to appear as the executor of moral conviction! It has never stolen a country save to free it; it has never conquered gold and ore mines, cotton, and rubber plantations save to spread freedom, Christianity, and civilisation throughout the earth. German imperialism is proud of having always despised such hypocrisy. It has daily shouted to all the world that it approves whatever increases Germany's power, and that it takes nothing into account save the world's fear of Germany's army and navy. It has utterly forgotten that there are other sources of power besides the military; that one cannot with impunity challenge the moral convictions which live in the nations, or proclaim with impunity the resolve to place the interest of one's own country above all human values. The same Pangermans who to-day rave against the self-determination of peoples, against understanding and conciliation, who even in this war against the whole world expect their sole salvation from the sword—it is they that have produced the hatred which has made possible a war of the whole world against the Central Powers.

The Pangermans represent the violation of Belgian neutrality as the most natural thing in the world. What folly to get excited over the infringement of a treaty between peoples, as though the sword was not strong enough, and therefore entitled, to tear up any scrap of paper! They have mocked the victims of the Zeppelin raid upon London, and made jokes over the unfortunate people who were drowned on the torpedoed passenger liners. They have defended every cruelty against the unarmed by the lying argument that the more cruelly war is waged the better, since it will end the sooner! And each of these provocative phrases has been scattered through the world by the English and French press, and given out everywhere as the opinion of the whole German people. And so hatred was fanned against us till one nation after the other was dragged into the war. They share the blame for our having to defend ourselves against the whole world, and now they come with their plans of conquest, with their mad dream of a "victorious peace" over all the great nations of the world, to kindle hatred anew. What we do need is not an extension of territory, but the confidence, respect, and sympathy of other nations, unless we are to live in permanent enmity

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with the whole world. And now is the most favourable time to make these moral conquests. Let us show the world that the Pangermans have no right to speak in the name of the German people in Germany and Austria: that we do not wish to overcome our opponents by blood or violence, but desire an honest understanding and lasting reconciliation; that we do not wish to build our future on the power of the sword, but on the common right of all peoples to prevent violence being done by one against the other.

The Pangermans promise the German people power; but no people's power is firmly based if all others are its enemies. The Pangermans have promised us economic welfare; but hatred is a bad customer, and even the most complete victory cannot force anyone to order German goods. The Pangerman greed of power and riches has attained the very opposite of what it sought. The dreadful experience of the war is forcing the German people on to new paths, and the peace negotiations are the best opportunity of proving to the world that we are resolved to tread them. Hence away with all talk of territorial conquests! We desire to conquer nothing save friendship and peace with all nations of the world.

Trotsky and Czernin

The contrast between two such negotiators as Mr. Trotsky and Count Czernin has acquired an added piquancy from a speech delivered on 17 January by the Austrian Minister of the Interior, Count Toggenburg (of whom the correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* wrote on 22 January that “ he of all ministers has played the most unfavourable rôle in these days, and that “ the contempt which greeted his speech shows that in so great a struggle of principle nothing can be attained by weak-kneedness and Jesuitical *allures* ”).

“ You may think,” he said, “ that there is a certain difficulty in the fact that at the peace negotiations at Brest an Excellency, who happens to be a Count, is opposed to a man of the people of the type of Trotsky. Unfortunately, I have not the honour to know Trotsky. I only know him by the accounts of the Social Democrats and descriptions in the press. On the other hand, I know Count Czernin fairly well, and though it may perhaps seem a paradox, I can tell you with full conviction that there are many resemblances between Count Czernin and Trotsky, and that this very accident, that two similar men confronted each other at Brest, offers a guarantee that the negotiations will go well. It is said that Trotsky would not hesitate a moment to go out into the world again as a cabin boy or to end as a convict, or perhaps even worse. Exactly the same is true of Count Czernin. He is a man who does not yield one step from his convictions, even if it should cost him all his position and make a beggar of him. That he does not care about: he follows his straight course, and is one of the stiffest and most logical natures that I have ever met. He is so little attached to traditional or feudal ideas or the like, that he stands in a quite vital conflict with many Excellencies and Counts. And so I believe that Czernin really has no

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aim save to attain a peace acceptable to Austria, and that he is just the man for our time, the man upon whom you can all rely. He will not on any account allow the peace negotiations to break down, unless quite impossible demands are made of him. . . ."

On 25 January, in the Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin himself made the following witty comment :—" Dr. Stransky, in his speech, expressed regret and sympathy for me at the comparison between me and Trotski. Now, I am convinced that Mr. Trotski, when he reads Mr. Stransky's speech, will be very disagreeably impressed, and I do not complain of this at all, because I am not so conceited as to think that any one must needs be pleased at being compared to me. I confess, however, that it is also not my ambition to resemble Mr. Trotski, and in one point there is certainly a difference between him and me. We both of us—and that is a remarkable coincidence—went back to our representative homes in order to obtain a vote of confidence from our respective constitutional bodies. Mr. Trotski failed to obtain this, and as a necessary result he collected machine guns and broke up the Constituent Assembly. If you do the same to me *I shall not fetch any sailors, I shall resign. I leave it to you to decide which course is more consistent with freedom and democracy.*"

No one with any democratic feeling will deny that Mr. Trotski richly merited this rebuke : but we cannot leave the subject without reminding our readers that Count Czernin knows better than most men how effectually the sham constitutional arrangements of Hungary, and to a lesser degree of Austria, prevent all possibility of self-determination on the part of the non-German and non-Magyar races.

We note that the *Nation* (9 February) quotes the former extract without the latter.

The Smuts Mission

On 7 February *Justice* published a note, entitled " Secret Diplomacy and Secret Betrayal," in which the writer revealed the fact of General Smuts' recent mission to Switzerland in the following sentence : " We have known for the past two weeks and more that General Smuts was engaged, as a member of our War Cabinet, in negotiations for peace with Austria, who was represented by Count Mensdorff." The result of these conversations must have been disconcerting to the Government. And we hope that Downing Street has now learned, what is evident to all well-informed people, that a separate peace with Austria is not only undesirable, but unobtainable except on impossible terms. Rumour has it that General Smuts offered inducements to Count Mensdorff which were a flagrant violation of German rights : and we are not surprised that, in consequence, Counts Hertling and Czernin addressed their subsequent speeches over the head of the British Government to President Wilson. The only result of the Smuts' mission has been to suggest to Germany that Great Britain is more ready to give up the struggle than she thought. Count Hertling's arrogant tone is the measure of the ineptitude of this latest adventure in secret diplomacy.

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- 26 Dec.—Admiral Wemyss becomes British First Sea Lord.
- 27 Dec.—M. Pichon on the peace proposals.
- 28 Dec.—Labour Memorandum on war aims adopted by National Conference. Mr. Henderson's message to Russia. Premier meets Labour Leaders. Finnish deputation to King of Sweden.
- 30 Dec.—Bessarabia reported to have declared itself a Moldavian Republic.
- 1918, 1 Jan.—Premier's New Year Message to Allies.
- 2 Jan.—Trotsky denounces German peace proposals. Reported arrest of 300 Independent Socialists by German Government.
- 3 Jan.—Trotsky's letter to French Socialists.
- 5 Jan.—Premier's War Aims speech to Trade Unions.
- 6 Jan.—French Government recognises independence of Finnish Republic.
- 8 Jan.—Announcement of Lord Reading's appointment as British High Commissioner to America.
- 9 Jan.—President Wilson's "War Aims" message to Congress.
- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed.
- 14 Jan.—Sir A. Geddes introduces man-power Bill in House of Commons. M. Caillaux arrested. Italian gains near Monte Grappa.
- 15 Jan.—British Labour message to Russia, expressing agreement on war aims. Russian ultimatum to Roumania. Mr. Asquith's speech to London Liberal Federation.
- 16 Jan.—Reported Bolshevik order for arrest of King of Roumania. Battle between Maximalists and Ukrainians in Odessa.
- 17 Jan.—Secret Session on man-power.
- 18 Jan.—Premier addresses final conference of trades unions on man-power proposals.
- Russian Constituent Assembly opens: Mr. Cernov elected temporary president.
- 19 Jan.—Russian Assembly dissolved by Bolsheviks.
- 20 Jan.—"Breslau" sunk; "Goeben" beached.
- 21 Jan.—Sir E. Carson resigns from War Cabinet. Austrian peace strikes.
- 23 Jan.—17th Annual Labour Conference opens at Nottingham; Chairman, Mr. W. F. Purdy.
- 24 Jan.—Count Hertling's statement to Main Committee of Reichstag: Count Czernin's speech.
- 25 Jan.—Kühlmann on Brest negotiations.
- 28 Jan.—Gen. Smuts on German aims in Africa. Fighting reported at Lutsk between Ukrainian and Bolshevik troops. Beginning of Berlin "peace and reform" strikes.
- 30 Jan.—Resumption of Brest negotiations. Third session of Supreme War Council opens at Versailles.
- 31 Jan.—Lord Lansdowne on a clean peace.
- 1 Feb.—Mr. Henderson's manifesto on the Labour unrest.
- 2 Feb.—Mr. Wilson reported to have agreed to plenary powers to be exercised by Supreme War Council. Government statement on A.S.E. dispute. Sir E. Carson's statement at Belfast. Kühlmann and Czernin leave Brest for Berlin.
- 3 Feb.—Supreme War Council replies to German Chancellor.
- 4 Feb.—Collapse of German strikes. Bolo trial opens.
- 5 Feb.—Berlin reports capture of Mohilev, including Krylenko and his staff, by Polish troops.
- 6 Feb.—Parliament prorogued.
- 7 Feb.—Vienna reports resignation of Seidler Cabinet.
- 9 Feb.—Peace signed between Germany and Ukraine.

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The New Europe

"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

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those opposite poles of society, which if they
embrace will crush all obstacles to culture—
that is my aim."**

—Lassale

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The New Europe

VOL. VI, No. 71 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 21 February 1918

An Open Letter to British Labour

["Peace will come when the working-class movement has discovered, by interchange of views, the conditions of an honourable and democratic peace worthy of the unimaginable sacrifices the peoples have made, and has pressed these terms upon the several Governments with the resolute declaration that peace must be made at once on these terms and no other."]
—ARTHUR HENDERSON, M.P., 1 February.]

FOUR years of war have destroyed many illusions; and not least among them the illusion that *Realpolitik* is founded on reality. In truth, Bismarck's legacy is the most vulnerable of all, because the foundation of force on which it rests is so easily undermined by the power of an idea. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have abundantly proved the truth of Joseph de Maistre's words: "Put a Slav aspiration under a fortress and it will blow it up"; and through them the Slav peril has become a grim reality to the German Government in a form which Bismarck never feared. Thus, in different ways, the unshackled militarism of the last four years has produced its own inevitable and healthy reaction, and has given a new orientation to the outlook not only of the democratic forces everywhere but even of the so-called ruling classes and of governments. And it may yet prove that the most decisive feature in this change is that British Labour is now aware of Europe. Every declaration made in the name of the British workman has been marked by a clear conception of the two indispensable functions of the Allies in this war; first, the defeat of German militarism in order to clear the ground for the second, a new Europe founded on freedom.

In the words quoted above Mr. Henderson makes a claim for British Labour and its European colleagues which, though ambitious, is not impertinent. The labour forces of Europe have the power, under statesmanlike leadership, to create a transformed world out of the chaos of war. No man doubts their good will, though some may with good reason doubt whether they possess a fund of political experience and sagacity large enough for the demand which such a Herculean purpose will make upon it. For our part, we hope that, having courageously taken the task in hand, they will seek assistance

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wherever it may be found; and therefore, even at the risk of being treated as Greeks bringing gifts, we feel bound to make some suggestions.

The agreement postulated by Mr. Henderson is the most desirable basis for peace; but, while it may be true that only a peace based on agreement can be a good peace, a *bad* peace by agreement is also conceivable, in which Imperialist Governments on both sides might mutually abandon the principles for which the peoples have fought, settle their own differences over their peoples' heads, and set up a new "Holy Alliance" of the governing classes of Europe, directed against European labour, the weaker European nationalities, the black races of Africa, and the civilised peoples of the East. It is our considered opinion that the risk of a so-called Imperialist peace is not negligible. The Smuts mission to Switzerland, for instance, proves that the British Government—or certain British Ministers—were and are prepared flagrantly to violate their most sacred professions for the sake of a momentary and illusory gain. We believe that British Labour is alive to the danger that, at the very moment when it is engaged in a wholehearted endeavour to lay the foundations of a world's peace, the agents of its own and other Governments may be compromising the future for the sake of a most transient profit. There are various ways by which these proceedings can be stopped. We recommend one of them to the immediate and serious consideration of the Labour Party. They should press—without delay and with all their force—for parliamentary control of foreign affairs, first of all in the shape of a Foreign Affairs Committee, and ultimately in the statutory recognition of the House of Commons as the only valid body for the ratification of treaties. The House must assert its right to control the treaty-making power of the Government. The participation of Labour in the settlement can do much to prevent an evil compromise, and to banish the menace of a repressive league of states by instituting a free fellowship of nations. This participation would, in itself, imply the emancipation of the labouring class; and British Labour has already shown its determination to safeguard the future of Africans and Orientals. We are confident that these three causes are safe in British Labour's hands; but there is one cause—that of the weaker nationalities of Europe—which cannot be safeguarded by direct action on the part of British Labour alone.

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A general solution of the problem of nationality, which is essential to permanent peace, depends upon the goodwill of the dominant elements in Central Europe—either of the present Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary, or else of the German, Austrian, and Magyar labouring classes, if they should succeed, as British Labour hopes to succeed, in controlling the peace settlement on their side. The essence of peace by agreement on common principles is reciprocity. Good faith on one side will be fruitless without good faith on the other, and a good settlement cannot be secured by an honest application of our principles to the cases of Ireland, Egypt, and India, Asiatic Turkey and Tropical Africa, unless they are applied as honestly to the nationalities of Central Europe now subject to the alien and oppressive rule of the German, Austrian, and Magyar Governments. These Governments still remain in power; their power rests as ever on the support of the reactionary parties, who in the determination of policy still have the last word. British Labour proposes to negotiate for peace on the basis of no annexations; but the German Chancellor, in his last speech in the Reichstag, did not accept this basis even in the flagrant case of Belgium and Northern France. The pressure of the Pangerman party forced him to equivocate; while in the case of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, annexation, in a veiled form, is not only tolerated but actively desired by the German Government itself. The Austrian Government betrays the same intentions in the case of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania; and the Bulgarian Government's territorial appetite is notorious.

The attitude of the hostile Governments to the policy of self-determination is even more intransigent. They reject in terms the "self-determination of peoples" and substitute for it the "self-determination of states," which means, in effect, that the dominant races in Central Europe assert their divine right to exploit for ever the peoples now subject to them. And the Austro-Hungarian Government, more conciliatory than the German on the question of no annexations, is the more stubborn of the two on the question of self-determination—for the reasons that the very structure of the Dual Monarchy under the *status quo* is a negation of this principle, and that the elements which profit by this anomaly refuse to relinquish their unjust privileges.

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The Austrian Premier refused to allow representatives of the nationalities in Austria to attend the peace conference at Brest-Litovsk, though the "self-determination of peoples" was one of the bases on which the Russians entered into negotiations. Since then he has solemnly repudiated this principle in the Reichsrat. As for the Hungarian Government, they are showing their policy not by declarations but by deeds. The present Minister of Education, Count Apponyi, has repressed more sweepingly than ever the educational institutions of the non-Magyar nationalities. The Roumanian population along the Eastern frontier is being expropriated in order that a cordon of Magyar settlers may be drawn between the subject Roumanians of Hungary and the free Roumanians of the independent kingdom; and the new franchise reforms, which are represented to the world as the democratisation of Hungary, are being so devised as to leave the Magyar element in the country—which amounts to no more than 50 per cent. of the population—with the same overwhelming electoral predominance as hitherto.

In face of this, Count Czernin, in his speech in answer to President Wilson's message, declares that "he must politely but categorically refuse advice as to the manner in which Austria and Hungary should manage their internal administration." He is reported to have added that "there is not a more democratic Parliament in the world than the Reichsrat, which, in agreement with the other authorised constitutional organs, alone has the right to decide the internal affairs of Austria." But he is silent about the Hungarian Parliament—as well he may be, for no one, before the war, was more alive than Count Czernin to the iniquities of the Hungarian Governmental system, to the exposure of which he himself contributed.

The programme sketched out for a Labour settlement by Mr. Henderson presupposes that the monopoly of the governing classes in all countries will be broken, and that British Labour will deliberate with Central European Labour on the terms of peace. We do not deny that this is a possibility—current events in Central Europe indicate that it may come to pass. And we believe that German, Austrian, and Magyar Labour would be incomparably more ready to accept our principles as a basis for peace by agreement than the German, Austrian and Magyar governing classes have shown themselves to be. In fact as regards the principle of "No forcible annexation," we

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are convinced that Scheidemann and Renner will accept it with the same good faith as Henderson and Renaudel. But on the question of "self-determination" they have not yet dissociated themselves from their Governments' point of view.

At Stockholm, and since then, the German Majority Socialists have used the same equivocal arguments for refusing to reopen the question of Alsace-Lorraine as the German Government are using for the forcible acquisition of Courland and Lithuania. They say that Alsace is no national entity but only a fragment of a nation with no voice of its own; and again, though inconsistently, that the Alsatians have already declared their desire to form part of the German Empire because, in the Reichstag elections of 1911, they voted for the most part, not for irredentist candidates, but on ordinary German party lines. Entrenching themselves behind these equivocations, the German Majority Socialists are still unwilling to allow the people of Alsace-Lorraine to decide their own destiny by a free democratic vote. In fact, they have adopted the formula of "territorial integrity" propounded by the German Government, and the Austrian and Magyar Majoritarian Social Democrats have taken up the same position as far as the integrity of the Dual Monarchy is concerned.

British Labour will not fail to observe that this formula of German, Austrian and Magyar Social Democracy implies the negation by force of the national will of one-third of the total population of the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies: of the Alsatians, the French-speaking population of Lorraine, the Danes of Northern Slesvig, the Poles in the Eastern provinces of Prussia; and in Austria-Hungary, of the Czechs and Slovaks, the Southern Slavs, the Italians, the Roumanians, and the Ukrainians. As far as, in their published declarations, the Social Democratic parties in question have touched on these nationality problems at all, they have confined themselves to "autonomy" in the vaguest terms. They leave it uncertain whether the autonomy is to be merely cultural, or political and administrative; and in the latter alternative, again, they leave open the all-important question of the area within which autonomy is to be granted. Are all the Southern Slavs in Austria-Hungary, for example, who are at present partitioned between eight administrative systems, to be allowed to come together into a single autonomous Yugoslav State? Or are the Yugoslavs of Austria to be kept apart from the Yugoslavs

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of Hungary, and those of Bosnia-Herzegovina from both? Or, finally, is the division between the Austrian Crown lands to be retained, and national autonomy to be granted only within the limits of each of them? The last is the present Austrian Government's programme, and Austrian Social Democracy betrays an inclination to be content with it. But this policy offers no solution; and even the most radical interpretation of autonomy within the monarchy as a whole would leave the Yugoslav nation partitioned permanently, against its will, between the Austrian Empire and the independent kingdom of Serbia. There would be the same result in the case of all the other nationalities in question, with the solitary exception of the Czechs and Slovaks. Could this conceivably be accepted by British Labour as an honourable or democratic condition of peace?

We do not wish to assume *à priori* that this standpoint will be maintained inflexibly by German, Austrian, and Magyar Labour. Their representatives may be moved by the good faith with which British Labour is prepared to carry out its principles in our own case, in so far as they are applicable to Ireland, Egypt, and India, Tropical Africa, and the Middle East; or, again, the Majoritarian leaders may be superseded by elements further to the Left with more radical views. But we wish to warn British Labour beforehand that, if they open negotiations with the present German, Austrian, and Magyar Labour leaders they may meet with strong opposition to their own point of view on the question of the self-determination of nationalities; and we appeal to them, when this difference arises, not to relax their principles in order to smooth the way towards peace. If they have accepted these principles in good faith themselves, they have the moral right to demand the same loyalty from the other side, and the example of the Russian negotiations at Brest-Litovsk has shown the moral potency of unimpeachable good faith in the application of principles, when it is accompanied by an unflinching determination to see them carried out.

We do not, for a moment, propose that British Labour should dictate the concrete terms in which these principles should be embodied in the case of the subject nationalities of the Central Empires. To lay down beforehand the "break-up" of Austria, for example, would be to prejudge a problem which, on the very principles advocated, can only be solved

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by the populations concerned. But we do urge that British Labour should use all its moral weight with its German, Austrian, and Magyar comrades—not shrinking, even, from the prospect of a break-down of negotiations on this point—to secure that the nationalities of Central Europe shall be given absolute freedom to determine their own political future. If the nationalities of the present Habsburg Monarchy chose, after their national independence was secured, to come together again in a free federation, as the nationalities of Russia show signs of doing already, we should welcome such a development. We have never advocated the “break-up” of Austria-Hungary as an end in itself, and we discountenance as emphatically as Labour does the imperialistic aim of weakening foreign empires in order to increase the relative power of our own. In south-eastern, as in eastern Europe, it is possible that large federal groups are more desirable in the general interests of Europe than a mosaic of small independent territories. The question, however, must not be prejudged in either sense, but must be settled by giving each people a free choice of its congenial “way of life and obedience.”

The Democratic Diplomacy of Russia

Can we do with it?

It was a diplomat of the old school who compared diplomacy to the buttons that kept on the garments of civilisation; and it was one of a still older school who likened it to the velvet surcoat of armorial bearings that covered the body-armor. The *mêlée* of the last four years has hacked to shreds diplomacy in this sense of the word; we are left, not so much with the loss of a button or so, as without the wherewithal for decency. Yet if diplomacy were no more than this we should soon again be clothed and in our right mind, though somewhat nervous perhaps about the effect of the staring new patch stuck by the Russians on our ancient garment.

But diplomacy is much more than this, as we have learnt to our cost. It is the death or the delivery from a living death of our brothers and sons. It is the ruin or the rebirth of every liberty that makes life worth living to a free people. It is the poisoning of the very air we breathe with “propaganda” or a breath of the fresh air now so severely rationed.

THE DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY OF RUSSIA

As for us in Britain, to whom the rarefied air of the heights of Russian revolution is as difficult to breathe as that of the stuffy *Stube* of Central Europe—what is our diplomacy? Can we, while forcing open the window of the “Black Hole” of Prussianism, at the same time close it against this blast of Bolševism? We have sown the wind, can we reap the whirlwind? Is the extraordinary performance of the Russian revolutionaries at Brest-Litovsk inspired by principles that have any practical value for us and for Europe? Is their point of view worth anything and will their policy work? These are the questions that we—not our Press, nor our Parliament, nor even our Principal Private Secretary to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—but we ourselves must answer.

Our first difficulty in answering is the general prejudice against present conditions in Russia, partly incited by press propaganda, partly inspired by our national character. The Russians have been forced to break the bargain our Government made with theirs, and to fight Prussianism in other ways and with other weapons than those we bargained for. We do not like repudiation even of a bargain, bad for us and for everyone, nor do we like revolution. We wanted a strong Russian Government; and now that we have got it, we do not like it—nor are we consoled that the Germans should have worked for a weak Russian Empire and like what they have got even less. But let us remember that in this prejudice “we” are no more than a club oracle, or at most a class opinion, and that “democratic diplomacy” in general and the Russian expression of it in particular have found so much general acceptance that, if we are wise, we shall try rather to do with it than to do away with it.

Now, the first point that emerges from a careful examination of the principles of the Russian diplomacy is one that will be an especial recommendation to us. It is that there is nothing revolutionary in the principles themselves, nor even anything very novel in them. It is only the extreme form in which they are expressed and the extraordinary force with which they are exploited that is unusual in diplomatic history. If we roughly classify the history of modern diplomacy into three periods we shall find a different principle predominant in each. In the eighteenth century up to the French Revolution, diplomacy was concerned chiefly with the relationships

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between peoples as expressed in certain public personalities, princes, premiers, or parvenus, and the only sanction it could contemplate was authority based on armed force. This primitive conception to which we have at times returned may be called "*ancien régime* diplomacy." During the nineteenth century diplomacy concerned itself principally with relations between more or less representative committees, such as congresses, cabinets, or combines of capitalists, and its sanction was the power of accumulations of wealth and their control of armed force. This period, from which we are just emerging, is that of "*Realpolitik* diplomacy." The period before us is already dedicated to what for want of a better term must be called "democratic diplomacy" in which the relationship is that between the peoples themselves, and the sanction is represented by the force of their aims and ambitions.

"Democratic diplomacy" is already no unfamiliar term to us and the thing itself is already an element, though an exotic one, in our diplomatic practice. For it is a peculiarity of the British people that we put a new proceeding into practice because it seems profitable without realising its novelty or recognising its principle. Then when some more logical nation proclaims the principle in its abstract form we as often as not obstinately oppose it. The German principles of *Realpolitik* which we are now combating are only the logical developments of our own *Realpolitik* forced by our resistance to take an extreme form. The Russian "democratic diplomacy" is only a formal and very forcible expression of principles that we have on occasions intuitively and instinctively followed.

It would not be difficult to draw from recent experience striking examples of the success of a democratic diplomatist, when the *Realpolitiker* and the *ancien régime* had failed. For example, after professional *ancien régime*ists and political *Realpolitik*ers had repeatedly failed in relieving our relations with the United States, Canada, and Newfoundland of the legacies of ancient wars—some of which failures severely strained our international, some our imperial relationships—a settlement satisfactory to all was effected by Lord Bryce's mission exercising, somewhat empirically I admit, a policy whose principles and procedure were essentially the same as that of the Russians to-day. Or, on the other hand, we failed finally and fatally in our relations with the Near

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Eastern peoples because we did not realise that each was, in its own way, a democracy ruled by public opinion; and because our policy had no basis in general principles and could make no appeal to that opinion.

To many of us, therefore, the principles of Bolševik diplomacy appear neither as revolutionary nor remote. To all of us it should be apparent that these principles are the same as those for which we went to war. "No-annexation" is the defeat of Prussian and all other militarism; "self-determination" is the liberty of the lesser nations: "no secret diplomacy" is a condition precedent for the sanctity of International Law and for setting up the League of Nations. The Russians have only formulated our principles after we had fallen away from practising them. It is not Russian diplomacy that has gone over to the enemy, but our diplomacy that in the hurly-burly of battle has blundered into the enemy camp and cannot find the way back. The "secret treaties" are in principle what we are fighting against—in practice we are fighting for them. The sentiments of Trotski are in principle what we are fighting for—in practice we are fighting against them. Who could win a world war in this way?

The next good point in this Russian diplomacy is its amazing strength. Here we have, in a country exhausted by war to the disintegration of its whole body politic and economic existence, a Government consisting of the most extravagant section of an extreme faction, composed of a few fanatics of a social philosophy alien to the national character of Russia and antagonistic to the social system of Europe, yet none the less imposing its will on enemies at home and abroad. And this is strong diplomacy. Compare it, for example, with our *Realpolitik* diplomacy forced to abandon its traditional policy and to cede Constantinople to a military Empire or partition Albania between other nationalities.

Diplomacy consists in getting your will accepted willingly by other wills. If you secure acceptance by sabre-rattlings and mailed-fist-raisings it is not diplomacy at all, or at best *ancien régime* diplomacy, because in getting what you want you also excite the will to get it back again. If, again, you get it by palm-oilings and profit-sharings it is *Realpolitik* diplomacy and a poor investment, because you cannot perpetuate property rights in international relationships by the

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most profitable partnerships between the few or the most prodigal propaganda among the many. You can best succeed now-a-days as a democratic diplomatist; that is, by making the majority of the other side want what you want, or by making the best of what they want. And if this has a sermonising sound about it, let me add there is nothing necessarily puritanical about this form of diplomacy and that its honesty is of the "best policy" order. For whereas the *ancien régime* can only appeal to primitive instincts of self-preservation—so to say to the extreme "Right" of the human mind; and the *Realpolitiker* relies on the middle "Block" of the mind—the mass and materialism of the man-in-the-street; the democratic diplomatist looks rather to the "Left"—the driving power of ideals and the directing power of intellectuals. The last has, therefore, this great advantage, that whereas the two former have to work with the qualities of mind that make for antagonism between communities, the democrat works with those that mostly make for association. Because obviously the man of privilege or of property wants to keep it to himself; equally obviously the man of principles wants most to give them to others. The democratic diplomatist working through principles has consequently always a foot in the other camp and a friend at Court. He needs no coercive authority, not even credentials; his only requisite is that he be recognised by the mass-mind to which he is accredited as representative of the element most sympathetic to it in the mass-mind of which he is an ambassador.

Here we have the secret of the strength of Russian diplomacy in a situation that seemed to leave no place for diplomacy at all; a nation, discredited, disarmed, destitute of every resource, penned between the Polar Seas and a triple barrier of enemies. Close round them a blazing circle of civil war with Finns, Letts, Poles, Ukrainians, Roumanians, Cossacks, Caucasians. Behind that, an *enceinte* of entrenched enemy Powers, Germany, Austria, Turkey; a smouldering waste of war-fronts ready to flame out into invasion. Outside this again the watch-fires and search-lights of alienated allies, Britain, France, and Italy, ready to blockade or barrage any move. So situated a *Realpolitiker* or an *ancien régime* could have done nothing but accept a peace dictated by German generals. From this calamity Russian diplomacy saved Europe. They knew that if they could no longer raise

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a Russian army to fight Prussianism they must rouse the German army to do it—that if they lost the alliance of the Entente Powers they could find even more valuable allies in the enemy proletariats. The same forces that had exalted the humble Bolševist might put down the mighty from their seat.

Not that there is anything meek about the Bolševist. That is where we first went wrong about them. We supposed they were pacifists who would appear before the Prussians *in formâ pauperis* like “conchies” before a tribunal. Then when Trotski opened negotiations by proclaiming principles of public right and defying Prussianism to oppose them we treated him as a crank stump orator. As the proceedings went on and he half drove, half drew the issues on to ground that developed to the full his own strength and his opponent’s weakness, a few of the diplomatically minded of us began to see the game. When Kühlmann in the course of long abstract arguments was brought to direct or indirect admission of the principles and procedure pressed by the Russians, while the bewildered Generals glowered behind their useless war maps, those of us with business or forensic training could scarce forbear to cheer. And when finally after much hurrying to and from Berlin the front line trenches were abandoned and the Germans revealed their true position, we breathed again and felt the first move in this mate in three had been rightly played. Yet still our *ancien régime*, *Realpolitik* press showed us nothing more than a braggart bluffing a bully.

The next move followed of itself from the forces disengaged by the first. The resonances of Hoffmann’s sabre-rattlings were still in our ears, when there came rumours of mutinies on the Eastern fronts, strikes first in Austria, and finally in Germany, and later, even deputations to Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, most of our press see nothing more in a strike at Krupp’s than a peace-trap and nothing more in the recalcitrants of British labour than a traitorous pacifism; and equally, of course, these movements are all being, or have all been, satisfactorily and suitably dealt with. The Austrian Government has compromised with, one might almost say capitulated to their movement—the German Government have coerced, perhaps even crushed, theirs—our Government have conciliated, or shall we say cajoled, ours. But all the same it moves. What comes next? The third move—by which

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Russian diplomacy will checkmate Prussianism and end this war by exciting a war against the Prussianisms of property: a war in which our Government will be allied with that of Germany in fighting British, Germans, and Russians, and will be beaten, but only after a struggle that will waste what remains of our ancient European civilisation. A new Europe will in time emerge, but it will be a new Europe such as the Russian revolutionaries are fighting for, not we.

How can we escape on the one hand a checkmate of Prussianism at such a cost, and on the other a stalemate due to the defeat of Russian democratic diplomacy? The answer is easy. By simply returning to the traditional liberal principles of British foreign policy—for sound principles need never be changed; and by adopting the Russian procedure for peace by public discussion—for procedure on the other hand must always be changing. If we can re-assimilate and re-apply the principles of Gladstone, Cobden, and Canning we shall find no difficulty in entering into a partnership with Young Russia that will keep its militancy within bounds. If we can trust representative delegates of the people to discuss publicly with friend and foe alike the bases of the new settlement we may yet get that settlement without waging another war for it. We might at once make a beginning by appointing to Petrograd an "envoy extraordinary" whose personality expressed those principles of a settlement on which all peoples alike, though not all governments, are now generally agreed.

But let us make no mistake about this. The question is not whether we can do with Russian diplomacy but whether Russian diplomacy has not already done with us.

GEORGE YOUNG.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(V) EQUATORIAL AFRICA

THE last three months have witnessed a veritable "strife of tongues"—eminent, well-informed, and otherwise—upon Colonial questions as affected by the war. The one pronouncement which remains unassailable from every standpoint is the declaration of the Prime Minister that the wishes and interests of the inhabitants must be the "dominant factor" in deciding the

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political destiny of "exchangeable" colonies. There has been the Labour Party's first proposal for "International *Administration*" of Central Africa, somewhat hastily launched, and happily now radically modified. There have been ill-informed proposals for "developing the resources" of the British Dependencies to liquidate the war debt, opposed as vigorously by organised labour as by philanthropic bodies and commercial interests. There has been widespread arming of the natives of one territory in Africa, whilst forbidding in future the arming of natives in adjacent territories. One tribe of British protected Africans is permitted to fight with white forces of the Crown, whilst the neighbouring and closely related tribes who are British subjects are given a flat refusal. It must all seem very bewildering and inconsistent to those countless thousands of Africans who are primarily affected, and who greedily absorb every scrap of printed newspaper upon which they can lay their hands. But happily this public discussion is clearing the air, with the result that certain broad principles are emerging which in courageous hands will lead to a "New Colonial Era."

" NO ANNEXATIONS."

The principle of "no annexations" is declared to be fundamental to a return of peace. However difficult it may be to apply this principle to Europe and Asia, its application, if desirable, is relatively simple in the tropical and semi-tropical regions of the world. The popular conception which assumes that wheresoever the national flag flies the territory has been "annexed" is, of course, quite erroneous. In British Gambia the colony measures four square miles, and the Protectorate 4,500 square miles. The Sierra Leone Colony measures 4,000 square miles, and the Protectorate 27,000 square miles. Neither of the Rhodesias are British territory, and, like several other areas in Africa, are only Protectorates whose political status is technically that of friendly foreign States, and whose subjects, therefore, are not subjects of the British Crown. This points the way to one possible solution. There are areas in the South Seas and the African continent which demonstrably may be labelled "exchangeable." Let the first condition of exchange be that of Protectorate control and not annexation. Article XXXIV of the Berlin Act of 1885 stipulates that any Power which in future annexes or proclaims a Protectorate over new territory shall notify all Powers signatory to the Act "so as to

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enable them to protest" if any grounds for protest exist. It may be argued that this does not preclude annexation of African territory, but it cannot be denied that it established the principle that annexation cannot take place without referring the proposal to the fourteen European signatories. It should not be difficult for the European and American Powers now to agree to the Protectorate principle in connection with territories whose status will change as a result of the war, with a view to ultimate international consent to annexation subject always to adherence to certain conditions of administration. There is a subsidiary but important advantage in this course—protectorate and not annexation—in that it permits of American co-operation. The United States Government was party to the preparation of the 1885 Berlin Act, but refrained from ratifying it because it included territorial annexations which appeared to violate the principles of the Monroe doctrine.

Annexation presumes "possession," which, in practice, spells national barriers to commercial and scientific enterprise. It will not be denied that every "exchangeable" territory is capable of great development providing "money-power" and "man-power" is forthcoming. Exclusive national possession of any given territory must mean limited resources for development; the open door for undeveloped territories invites the entry of universal energies. Protectorate should mean, and it is the duty of the Peace Congress to see that it does mean, the adoption of the British position that the Protectorate Power is there primarily as trustee for the territories and their inhabitants. Protection and trusteeship carry the duty of seeking first the welfare of the inhabitants, which in turn should throw the territories widely open to all that is best in the industrial, commercial, scientific, and religious agencies of the world. No annexations—protectorate and trusteeship—the open door for service and sacrifice—are the chief corner-stones of a sound political and economic edifice in all dependencies. Upon these alone can be built ultimate political freedom for the inhabitants, industrial and commercial progress and amity amongst the Colonial nations of Europe and America.

"SELF-DETERMINATION."

The declaration of the Prime Minister that a measure of self-determination must be the "dominant factor" in deciding

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the political future of "exchangeable" Colonial territories has been attacked, but only by those who know neither the countries nor the native tribes affected. It has been attacked as being impracticable for some perfectly inscrutable reason only by those who are the most eloquent in support of the principle for Europe and Asia. Self-determination for native tribes is not impracticable if carried out with sympathy, common-sense, and knowledge; moreover, the principle is in accord with native customary law, is equitable, and in this particular case the supremely vital factor to peace and progress. Without self-determination in some form there will be disaster.

There need be little difficulty. Let the Peace Congress lay down general principles governing the future development of given areas; then let there be appointed agreed "mandatories" including men with local knowledge; let these mandatories be given clearly-defined terms of reference with the instruction to submit within three months the question of self-determination to the local councils of the tribes sitting under the presidency of the paramount chiefs and their advisers. Within another three months, making six months in all, the conferring Powers would be in possession of a clear, authoritative, and intelligible report from each territory whose political destiny it may be proposed to change.

The equity of some form of self-determination cannot be denied; its practicability is acknowledged; but what is not so generally recognised is that it is a supremely vital issue. It is notorious that in the conquered territories the native inhabitants welcomed the British, French, and Belgian troops as "liberators"; it is not necessary to analyse the motives of the native tribes, the fact is well known and therefore sufficient that everywhere the Allies were welcomed with open arms and supplied with carriers—spies, in fact—provisions and contributions to war funds by local chiefs and councils. Is it conceivable for one moment that in the event of restoration under pre-war conditions German administrators would refrain from visiting upon these people their "just" wrath for both "treason" and "treachery"? It is argued that, in the event of restoration, the European Powers would secure an armistice for all crimes alleged against native chiefs and councils. Let it be granted that such an armistice could be secured and that it would be so complete and under such

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solemn guarantees that it would satisfy Europe and America—would it satisfy the native inhabitants? Can anyone who knows the Cameroon, Togoland, or Herero people imagine that they would trust to such a scrap of paper? Of course they would not, and the certainty is that there would be a wholesale trek of thousands upon thousands of natives across the border into neighbouring territories.

This conjures up at once the nightmare of a colossal disaster. Five hundred thousand immigrants crossing from Togoland into the Gold Coast, for instance, spells war—war with the Ashantis, war with the Dagomi, war with the Gold Coast, and for Britain such internecine warfare that the splendid romance of the last thirty years in the Gold Coast would within six months end in unutterable carnage and devastation. The same would happen in the Cameroons and probably East Africa. For France another Fan war, for Britain an Ashanti war, a Dagomi war, a Bornu war, and probably a Uganda–Ruanda war. In fact, Heaven alone knows where the conflagration would stop when once the flame started. We are not without an historic parallel here; the facts are written indelibly in African tradition, the period only is difficult to control. Early in the nineteenth century a big migration started somewhere in the north—according to tradition somewhere in the Sudan. Southward the tribes moved and fought as they trekked. In the course of months and years the movement gathered ever-increasing momentum south, west, and east, until the whole of Central Africa was ablaze. How often sitting round the log fires at night have I listened to that dreadful story. To this day the chief shudders as he passes on the story of that terrible woe: “White man! the very rivers were tinged with blood.” “There was disease everywhere.” “There was no food and our fathers sold their very children, a child for a basket of manioca” (worth sixpence). Every student of African history knows that all the great treks in Africa have led, and must always lead, to conflagration.

If the Powers of Europe now force upon the African tribes a political overlordship which drives the natives to extensive migrations, they may easily kindle in Africa a flame which none will be able to stop, for it will mean the most bloody revolutionary and extensive land-war in all the terrible history of the continent. In some form or other self-determination, or in the

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Prime Minister's words, the wishes and interests of the people must be maintained as the guiding principle to any political change.

THE INHABITANTS THE VITAL FACTOR.

If trusteeship and protectorate control are to be the relationships between the white and coloured races, and "self-determination" a practical proposal and the legitimate prerogative of the inhabitants, there is a still further problem which must be solved—inhabitants! Territorial changes can only take place in the tropical and semi-tropical regions of the world where white colonisation is impossible; thus development is only possible by the aid of an adequate native population. At a meeting held last month in East Africa the settlers passed a resolution declaring that "the crying need is population," and that wail is heard in every tropical and semi-tropical territory but in an intensified degree; it is heard in Togoland with twenty-five persons per square mile, in Cameroons with eleven, and in German South West with one person per three square miles! Thus the restoration of the German colonial territories to the Fatherland without making provision for conserving and increasing the population or the supply of suitable labour forces is to inflict heavy colonial punishment upon Germany and condemn the colonial territories to permanent bankruptcy—a situation which would be gravely accentuated by the denial of any measure of "self-determination" to the native tribes because large areas already sparsely populated would become completely depopulated.

This is really the crux of the colonial question: No territory whose political change is contemplated is of any use either to Germany, France, Britain, Portugal or Belgium unless steps are taken to stop the appalling and growing decrease of indigenous population, and to encourage suitable immigrants capable of garnering the harvests of raw material. White immigration is impossible, for less than 15,000 German civilians, including migratory industrial classes, occupied the 1,200,000 square miles of the German colonies on the outbreak of war! The preservation and increase of the existing population and the encouragement of immigration can only be secured, no matter by whom the territories are controlled, by international agreement.

Thus everything points away from national annexations and

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towards placing backward territories under the Protectorate administration of a single Power working out the economic and political salvation of the Dependencies along lines internationally agreed upon and with the help of all nations signatory to the new order which must surely follow this devastating war.

JOHN H. HARRIS.

Poland and Brest-Litovsk

WHEN negotiations opened at Brest-Litovsk, the Polish Government asked the Central Powers to admit its representatives. A visit of the Polish Premier to Berlin at Christmas and further discussions with Herr von Kühlmann yielded no clear result and early in January the Regents themselves set out for Berlin and Vienna. They were received with high honours, delivered obsequious speeches, and achieved nothing. "In view of the weighty declarations made by both sides," wrote a Cracow daily which habitually cringes to the Central Powers, "the reception of the Regency Council by the Kaiser is an event of high import." Yet the article concluded on an anxious note: "The negotiations conducted with the Ukrainians in our absence arouse legitimate apprehensions. . . . The frontier between Poland and the Ukraine is being discussed. . . . One must pray that their outcome may not eclipse the Berlin Declarations." Polish Imperialists aspiring to conquests at the expense of their neighbours feared lest the Ukrainians should come into their own; but the treaty of 9 February goes farther and actually concedes to the Ukraine a strip of Polish country, in Western Cholm and in the district of Biala.

A deliberate act of injustice has been committed against the Polish nation. It marks more than a mere loss of territory—it means that in the scales of European *Realpolitik* the Poles are once more considered a negligible quantity. They have been courted a good deal, they have bragged still more about their own importance, they finished by imagining themselves a Great Power. When the Russian Revolution acknowledged Poland's independence and held out to her the hand of friendship, the Warsaw Council of State replied that "the ancient contest between Poland and Russia for the vast lands which intervene between their several territories, and which for centuries belonged to Poland has not

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been closed" and hinted that the fate of the Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians would have to be settled "in accordance with the State interests of independent Poland." Polish *émigré* leaders, though otherwise opposed to the Warsaw Council, concurred in its aggressive claims. When reactionary Russia oppressed Poland, the Polish reactionaries who call themselves National Democrats, professed Pan-slavism and devotion to Russia; when revolutionary Russia set Poland free, they declared her dead and lodged a claim to her inheritance. They now pleaded for Poland's independence and the annexation of Lithuania by Poland, for Poland's reunion and the partitioning of White Russia and the Ukraine. They planned violence without having force at their disposal, and declared schemes practical which were merely sordid. "E cosa veramente molto naturale e ordinaria desiderare di acquistare," wrote Machiavelli four hundred years ago, "e sempre quando gli uomini lo fanno che possono, ne sarano laudati, e non biasimati; ma quando non possono, e vogliono farlo ad ogni modo, qui e il biasimo e l'errore."*

Tales were spread in Western Europe of a powerful Poland which would replace Russia in the balance of Europe, whereas in reality, if Russia ceases to count as a Great Power, Poland is at the mercy of the Germans—as has been proved at Brest-Litovsk. Any aggrandisement at the expense of Lithuania, White Russia or the Ukraine would render Poland merely still more dependent on Teutonic support; she would then rule over unwilling subjects and face injured, hostile neighbours in the East. Poland's position is such that, as long as international politics are discussed in terms of power and not of law, she cannot be truly independent. Where the independence of a nation is not secured by its own strength, it needs to be safeguarded by a favourable geographical position. Switzerland is unconquerable; Spain and Norway secluded by land, accessible by sea. Also Holland, if attacked by her overwhelmingly powerful neighbour, could appeal for help to the entire world. The Poles inhabit the centre of a vast, open plain; in contiguous settlement number less than 20 millions;

* "It is in truth a very natural and ordinary thing that men should desire to gain possessions, and when those do this who have the power, they shall be praised and not blamed for it; but when they have not the power and yet desire by all means to do it, then ariseth blame and misprision."

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have for neighbours the two most numerous nations of Europe—the Germans and the Russians—and are strategically a landlocked nation. In time of war the Baltic is closed to all Great Powers except the two which also by land border on Poland, and outside help could, therefore, reach her practically by no other way than through Germany or through Russia. In the days of *Realpolitik* Poland must, therefore, move either in the Russian or in the German orbit. Nor can Poland create her own political system by attracting the more backward nations on her eastern border. Should Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine ultimately split off from Russia, then opposite social interests, apart from conflicting national claims, will continue to separate them from Poland. They are peasant nations, and almost half the land in their countries is owned by a small group of Polish nobles. A Poland ruled by her privileged and propertied classes is therefore at the mercy of the Central Powers, has to rely on them for protection against the revolutionary forces in Poland itself, and begs them to save the Polish nobility in the eastern borderlands. At Brest-Litovsk Count Czernin repeatedly interceded with the Ukrainians in favour of “the Polish minority,” a euphemistic name for the Polish big landed estates—and this was all that the Central Powers have done for their titled dependents.

Poland was excluded from Brest-Litovsk by the decision of the Central Powers; the Polish Government remained mute from its own choice. The Poles had to choose between scheming aggrandisement under the wings of the Central Powers and fighting for principles at the side of the Russian Revolution. About Christmas Polish delegations went to Vienna clamouring for Lithuania and Volhynia. In Russia the Polish army, which had been formed under the auspices of the National Democrats, attacked Russian Main Headquarters, “annexed” the White Russian Government of Mohilev, where the Poles form *one* per cent. of the population, and now is reported to have sent delegates to Warsaw—to whom? Meantime, at Brest-Litovsk, Trotski insisted on the German and Austrian armies immediately evacuating the occupied territories and allowing their peoples to determine their own fate. The Polish Socialist, Bobinski, who came with the Russian delegation, endorsed these demands. But could this be done by any Polish non-Socialist party? A withdrawal of the Germanic armies would be followed by a peasant revolution throughout Lithuania, Volhynia and Poland.

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Self-determination would mark the end of Polish Imperialism. The Central Powers and German militarism stand between the Polish upper classes and social revolution, and can treat their State as a negligible quantity.

It is thus obvious why the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk could disregard the feelings of the Poles and violate their rights. But what is their aim in doing so? Why should they cede a strip of Polish country to the Ukraine? The Germans wish to render the feud between the two nations permanent. With a similar purpose in view they have handed over White Russian land to Lithuania (round Vilna) and to the Ukraine (in southern Grodno), and will probably give some Polish territory to Lithuania (in southern Suwalki), and White Russian territory to the Poles (in the Governments of Vilna and Grodno). If the Ukrainian treaty causes a break between the Poles and the Habsburgs, Germany will not be the loser.

More difficult is it to explain why Austria should have agreed to such a settlement, to say nothing of wishing it. If the Galician Poles join the Czechs and Jugoslavs in their permanent opposition to the Austrian State, Parliamentary government will become practically impossible. Perhaps the explanation was true which has been given out in Vienna, and which stated that Cholm and Biala were the only price at which peace could be obtained from the Ukraine—especially if Germany encouraged these demands; and Count Czernin did not dare to return home *re infecta*. Or was their cession, perhaps, the only alternative to handing over Eastern Galicia to the Ukraine? To renounce a province in accordance with the principle of nationality would be a dangerous precedent in Austria-Hungary, whose garment is all made up of cloth torn from the backs of its neighbours. Eastern Galicia remains, then, with the Habsburgs; but it is clear that it can no longer remain subjected to the rule of its Polish landowning gentry. The Polish peasant in an Ukrainian Cholm will receive the land which would be withheld from him in a non-revolutionary Poland; the Ukrainian peasant in Eastern Galicia, if subject to Polish rule, will be refused the land which he would receive were his country included in the Ukraine. But even an autonomous Ukrainian Eastern Galicia, side by side with an independent Ukraine, cannot be considered a stable settlement. The question, therefore, suggests itself whether at all it is meant to be permanent? Some, though not the writer, see in it an intricate and clumsy, typically Austrian, scheme

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for clinching a bargain with the Poles: if these agree to a union with Austria, Eastern Galicia will be exchanged against Cholm and Biala, and things will be set right again. But then the conservative, Roman Catholic Polish gentry and *bourgeoisie* were anyhow inclining towards conservative, Roman Catholic Austria; the anti-clerical Polish republicans and revolutionaries will not be rendered more amenable by means of an exasperating injury. It seems more likely that, if Austria agreed of her own free will to the terms of the Ukrainian treaty she means to exchange her Polish schemes for wider Ukrainian ambitions. At the price of East Galicia she, perhaps, hopes to get the Ukraine to accept a Habsburg ruler—an arrangement which would much sooner meet with Germany's approval than the so-called Austrian Solution of the Polish Question. Germany is determined never to surrender her part of Poland, and therefore can never trust the Poles; if Poland became part of the Habsburg Monarchy, her anti-German interest might at some crisis determine Austria's policy. The Ukraine has an anti-Polish interest; its inclusion in the Habsburg Monarchy would therefore suit Germany. Thus compensated Austria might declare her *désintéressement* in Poland and abandon it to the Germans. This is a possible, but so far purely hypothetical, explanation.

Whatever the ideas may be which prompted the Central Powers in drafting the peace treaty with the Ukraine, its conclusion opens up a new chapter in the history of the Polish Question. It marks the utter bankruptcy of the *Realpolitik* of the Polish upper classes, which meant compromise with the strong and menace to the weak; its exponents, both in Poland and abroad, are men with a brilliant future behind them. The Polish cause has once more become linked with the cause of revolution. Only those who have nothing to lose and nothing to fear, or who fear no personal loss, can now truly speak and fight for Poland. For it requires now elemental forces, which are not respecters of men, to free Poland from her grave clothes. A mighty wind has risen out of the north; it has put out small lights, but fans big flames into a conflagration. The Poles must go whither it leads.

But the Western Powers also can help Poland. By upholding the rights of nations and by fighting the forces of German militarism they can hasten revolution in Central and East-Central Europe.

“ N ”

Sweden and the Åland Islands

THE question of the Åland Islands seems to have become a kind of King Charles' head in Swedish political discussion. It crops up everywhere and appears to be unavoidable. This is not to be taken as if the Swedish nation should be a political Mr. Dick. It is, on the contrary, a very sane and level-headed nation, quite able to take care of itself. As this question, however, appears to become again one of absorbing interest both to Sweden and others, it may perhaps not be considered altogether inopportune to give a short *resumé* of the history of these islands as far as it bears upon the problem that arises out of their position to-day. To allay the possible fears of the reader let me state at once that for this purpose it is not necessary to go back to the Stone Age or to any other less remote period, but that history in this case only means practically our own times.

To begin with, however, a few words about the islands themselves. Situated in the Baltic, on about the same latitude as Stockholm, this group of numerous islands (if all the small uninhabited shoals are counted they amount to about 200) stretches across from the Swedish towards the Finnish side for about 70 miles, forming a kind of natural barrier to the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia. The biggest of them, and the only one which boasts of a town, is simply called Åland. The whole group counts a population of about 27,000, practically all of whom are of Swedish race and speak the Swedish language.

The majority of them get their principal living from the sea, being fishermen and sailors, but, like their neighbours and relatives on the Swedish east coast, they combine their maritime pursuits with agriculture. They are a sturdy and hardworking race, with all the characteristics of those who live on and by the sea. That they are not blind to the importance of the demands of culture is clearly shown by the excellent and well supported schools on the islands, the principal seat of learning being a secondary school in the town of Mariehamn on Åland where pupils matriculate for the universities.

Considering the latitude, nature has not been unkind to the islanders; the climate is not hard, and the scenery, especially towards the Swedish side, rather attractive, in some parts really fine. The population as a whole is comparatively

SWEDEN AND THE ÅLAND ISLANDS

well off, and up to the beginning of the war seems to have been well contented with its lot, probably not least because the tentacles of the Tsaristic polypus, while trying to crush Finland in their slimy embrace, did not seem to have directed their attention to the Åland archipelago in any apparent degree, as far as the civil liberties of the population were concerned. This does not, however, mean that the Tsarist Government did not pay any attention to the islands; on the contrary, the interest shown was intense, and had been so for a considerable period: and that brings us to their history.

That the Åland Islands originally were considered part of Sweden is undoubted, and they continued to be so up to 1809, when in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, which concluded the disastrous Swedish-Russian War, they were ceded to Russia, together with Finland. It is stated that the inclusion of the islands in the territorial cessions originated in an error on the part of one of the Swedish negotiators. Be that as it may, ceded they were, and Russia incorporated them in Finland, which then became a Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire, retaining her old Swedish constitution. It did not, however, take very long for Russia to grasp the importance of the Åland Islands as a strategic point for the maintenance of her supremacy in the Baltic. Forts were planned and built on the main island comparatively early, but representations having been made by Great Britain about the undesirability of such fortifications, Russia undertook to discontinue them. These undertakings seem, however, to have been "scraps of paper," and when the Crimean War broke out there stood the, for those days, formidable fortress Bomarsund on the main island. Napier sailed into the Baltic with his fleet, bombarded Bomarsund and razed it to the ground. The importance attached by Great Britain to these islands was further emphasised by a special clause in the Treaty of Paris, 1856, in which the Tsar of all Russias solemnly undertook, in a special agreement with Great Britain and France, never to fortify any of the Åland Islands or to employ them as military depôts or naval bases. By force of circumstances this undertaking was kept up to the eventful year 1907, when the Alliance between Great Britain and Russia was formed. Russia then almost immediately approached the signatories of that special clause in the Paris Treaty, viz., Great Britain and France, for the purpose of getting this limitation to her sovereignty

SWEDEN AND THE ÅLAND ISLANDS

removed. She desired the abrogation of the clause not because she had any intention of erecting forts on the Åland Islands, but because she felt that this limitation on her freedom as a Sovereign Power should not be maintained by her present allies.

It is not too much to say that this move on the part of Russia created the greatest sensation in Sweden. It needs only a glance at the map to understand what a fortified naval base within such a short distance of the Swedish capital would mean. To employ an expression used at that time, it would have been "a pistol held at the heart of Sweden"; it would result in the bottling up of the Gulf of Bothnia, and to quote again a saying from those days: "It might turn desires expressed by a Russian Minister in Sweden into commands." It did not take long for the Swedish nation to discover the sinister possibilities of the Russian *démarche*, and the whole nation united in one strong protest against it. In the beginning of 1908 this took the shape of a unanimous declaration of the Swedish Parliament. Simultaneously the press in Great Britain took the matter up, and with almost unanimous voice expressed its sympathy with Sweden and its hope that the British Government would resist the demands of Russia. The question was also ventilated in the House of Commons, and finally Sir Edward Grey declared that the Government had decided that the clause should stand. Sweden breathed freely once more, and her gratitude towards Great Britain found a vivid expression in the almost unequalled and entirely spontaneous welcome that the population of Stockholm extended to King Edward and Queen Alexandra on their arrival in the Swedish capital shortly afterwards.

In this connection it may not be altogether without interest to note that though in 1907 and 1908 there was not the faintest whisper that could lead one to suppose that Germany was willing to support Russia in her desire, Trotski has since revealed the fact that in 1907 Germany gave Russia a free hand with regard to the Åland Islands.

A little later came the Baltic Treaty—a kind of corollary to the North Sea Treaty—in which the Baltic Powers, viz., Russia, Sweden and Germany, undertook to maintain the *status quo* in the Baltic. There seems, however, to be some ambiguity in one of the clauses in this treaty, where it is maintained that the sovereignty which each Power has over

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its own territory should remain unimpaired. The signatories seem, however, to have been in agreement that this would not concern the continued unfortified state of the Åland Islands.

But treaties are treaties. A few years passed, and rumours became current in Sweden that in spite of every promise to the contrary, fortifications of some kind were being begun on the Åland Islands. What foundation these rumours had at the time is difficult to say, but there is no doubt that when the present war broke out the Åland Islands were fortified. What representations were made by Sweden to the Great Powers in this connection still belong to the secret diplomacy, but according to the public utterances of Swedish Ministers it seems likely that assurances were given both by Russia and her allies that any fortifications made necessary by the state of war would be demolished when peace was concluded. The "activist" group in Swedish politics grasped this opportunity to fan the fear of Russian aggression into flame; but, thanks to the united efforts of the saner Swedish politicians, this attempt failed utterly, and thus for a time the Åland Islands disappeared from the Swedish political horizon. The majority of the Swedish nation seemed content that this question should be satisfactorily settled in the interest of Sweden when the general peace negotiations took place.

Then came the Russian Revolution, followed by the declaration of independence of Finland, and the future position of these islands became again a matter of intense interest. With the Russian Revolution disappeared to a great extent the apprehension of a Russian aggression against Sweden. But Swedish interest in the islands becomes not less in face of the possibility of any other Great Power in the Baltic controlling them. The present Russian Government seems not to have any further interest in possessing the Åland Islands, and as, according to the arrangement made after the Treaty of 1809, they belong to the new republic of Finland, their future rests with that country. The insecure and turbulent state of affairs both in Russia and in Finland appears, however, to have roused the Ålanders themselves to take some steps with regard to their future, and the result has been that these islanders have recently presented a petition to the Swedish Government expressing their desire to be united with Sweden. What result this will have is not easily foreseen.

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Opinions in Sweden are very much divided with regard to the desirability of the Åland Islands becoming Swedish territory. They might be a danger to Sweden if in the possession of any Great Power in the Baltic; but they might also be a danger to Sweden if in her own possession, and she should be called upon to defend their neutrality against any aggressor. The sentimental reasons for their reincorporation into the Swedish kingdom are, of course, easily understood, but sentimental reasons are not always those which weigh heaviest. Whatever may be the result, it may be taken as a *sine quâ non* that no reunion with Sweden will be taken into consideration by the Swedish nation and her Government, which is not a result of a friendly agreement with the present possessor of the Åland Islands, viz., Finland.

HUGO VALLENTIN.

Trotsky in 1914

In October 1914 Trotsky published a pamphlet entitled "War and the International," in which he gave expression to opinions which have a significant—if somewhat ironic—bearing on his present policy. We take from *L'Humanité*, 3 February, the following extracts:—

"Austria-Hungary is indispensable to Germany, the reigning Germany, as we know it. In forcing France into the arms of Tsarism by the violent annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; in systematically aggravating the relations with England by rapid naval armaments; in rejecting all attempts at rapprochement and understanding with the two Western democracies, because this understanding implied the democratisation of Germany as a preliminary condition, the dominant squirearchy was compelled to seek a support in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and to find there a reserve of military forces against its enemies of the West and East. From the German point of view, the mission of Austria-Hungary consisted in putting supplementary corps of Hungarians, Poles, Roumanians, Czechs, Ruthenes, Serbs, and Italians at the service of the policy of the militarist squirearchy of Germany. . . .

"The ultimatum to Serbia was expressly inspired by the reigning Germany. There is enough clearly said about it in that same White Book which the diplomats by profession and accident have tried to present as a document to demonstrate the love of the Hohenzollerns for peace. . . .

"The decomposition of Austrian Social-Democracy into national parties which contend against each other is one of the ways in which is expressed the inadequate objective of Austria as a State organisation. At the same time the attitude of the Austrian-German Social-Democracy proves that it has itself fallen a lamentable victim to this

TROTSKI IN 1914

inadequacy, in face of which it has capitulated intellectually. . . . But when we listen more attentively to the music of this hysterical nationalism, it is impossible to avoid hearing a more important note, the note of history which tells us that the road along which will come the political progress of Central and South-Eastern Europe lies across the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."

In another passage he censures severely those Austrophil Poles who look for favours to the Habsburg dynasty; and even includes the Socialist leader Daszynski in his condemnation. "The Socialist proletariat of Europe places a united and independent Poland on the same plane as a united and independent Serbia." Trotski's policy in 1914 suggests that the mantle of Mazzini had fallen on his shoulders; and history alone can show whether his diplomacy at Brest has brought the Mazzinian dream nearer realisation.

Sir Mark Sykes, M.P., on Syria and the Arabs

[We take the following translation of a speech made by Sir Mark Sykes to the Central Syrian Committee in Paris, on 23 December, 1917, from Palestine, the organ of the British Palestine Committee, 16 February.]

"I want to put before you the good and the bad in the present situation.

"Let me begin with the good. In the first place, Great Britain and France are in complete agreement with regard to the policy which concerns the non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire. In the second place, there is no divergence or dispute between the two countries. In the third place, Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Bassorah have been delivered from the Turks, and if they cannot reconquer them by force, they will certainly never obtain them by means of Treaties. In the fourth place, the Arabs have brought to a successful achievement the independence of the Hedjaz, and they are in a position to maintain this. All this is of great importance to the Syrians. The first and second points make clear that the Anglophils and Franco-phils are in agreement with each other. The third point is of vital importance, because, if we have guarantees that there will be a progressive and settled Government in Palestine and Mesopotamia, we have reason to hope for a better state of things in Syria. I cannot believe that Aleppo, Damascus, and Beyrut will lag far behind Jerusalem and Bagdad. The fourth point, the independence of the Hedjaz, is also of very real importance; the fact that this independence is an actually accomplished thing will make it easier for Syria to attain to a real autonomy. Taken thus as a whole the present state of affairs is propitious to the aspirations of the Syrians, who, and I do not hesitate to say so, are about to possess in Syria a *régime* which will allow the people to develop the country in peace and to establish their own civilisation without becoming the prey of tyrants, either economically or militarily.

"And now I must say a few words about the unpleasant side of

SYRIA AND THE ARABS

the situation. In the first place, the Turks are as yet masters of Syria, and in the second place, the Syrians are not united amongst themselves. Do not cherish any illusions. Europe will not continue this war one moment just to secure the independence of Syria. By this I mean to say that if, at the termination of the war, the Turks are still in possession of Damascus and Beyrut, and you are still divided amongst yourselves according to your ancient races and religions, I should despair of ever obtaining for you reforms other than paper ones.

“ M. Gout, M. Picot, and I will plead for you and will do everything in our power for you, but you know as well as I do that that will have little effect; we may get reforms, but we both know what reforms of that sort are worth. The reforms in the Lebanon did not prevent the Turks from doing as they wished when the occasion presented itself; the reforms in Armenia resulted in the death of thousands of Armenians. The history of Turkey during the last century has been the history of reform written in letters of blood. Now suppose, on the other hand, that the Turks are ejected from Syria, suppose that the Allies have saved Syria, but that the people are not united (I mean the intellectual leaders of the people), what will happen then? If you are not united some sort of a Government will have to be imposed upon you, and a Government which is imposed has neither the strength nor the stability of a Government which is desired by the people. I see Syria starting on life with a Government which is not congenial, with agitation and discontent at the root of everything. It is therefore of the greatest importance that there should be a firm will and a policy for unity among Syrians. You are dispersed among the nations, many of you live in Paris, others at Marseilles, yet others in London and others in Manchester. Many of you have made your homes in the towns of America, and there is a large Syrian colony in Egypt. Unite yourselves and you will become a powerful political force, and if you want a programme I will dictate one to you. In the first place, you must do away with the negative policy of the Turks; that which is intolerable in Armenia is equally intolerable in Syria. In the second place, you must look to France for her indispensable aid, that aid which a people which has for so long been oppressed needs before it is capable of standing alone. You must also demand the guarantees of the powerful countries of the world, so that you may not again be subjected to the tyranny of the Turks, which has reduced you to poverty and to discord. I imagine that all the religions and all the races of Syria can unite on such a programme. As to you Syrians who have your full liberty, I assure you that you have an enormous responsibility with regard to those of your compatriots, Moslems, Christians, or Druses, who are still in Syria, for these latter are unable to express themselves or to organise.

“ Under present circumstances, it is up to you to do all you can. If all the Syrians of Paris, of Cairo, of London, and of Chicago speak as with one voice the matter will be a simple one; but if you are not united, without organisation, without cohesion, then the future is black. We are living in troubled and dangerous times; these are not

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days for pleasant platitudes. Let the dead bury the dead, but you look to the future which is opening out before you. When your fields are cultivated, when the canals of Mesopotamia are reconstructed, when the intellectual forces of Syrian and Arab again play their part in the affairs of the world, there is no limit to the possibilities of the future if you act with reflection, with firmness at the present moment."

M. Gout, representing the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, on behalf of the French Government :—

"After having listened to the excellent advice which has just been given you by the representative of our ally, Sir Mark Sykes, with which I am in full sympathy, it gives me great pleasure to be able to say, with the permission of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that there is complete agreement between France and Great Britain on the matter. The non-Turkish populations of Asia Minor, whatever their race or races, may rest assured that they will be helped to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke and to prepare a better future for themselves. With no ideas of Colonial expansion, the two Allies are determined, each one in his own sphere of action, to guide the Arab-speaking people, and those people speaking any other language who live in the parts stretching from Anatolia to the Indian Ocean to a state of autonomy and to a developed civilisation. The parts which France and Great Britain hope to play are those of guide to a better future, of arbitrator between religious and ethnical groups, of friendly counsellor, the one in the North and the other in the South. We desire that this example of unanimity of purpose between two great Powers be known and followed by all your compatriots. Only by means of unity, by abolishing the discords which have been engendered by the Turkish *régime* can the inhabitants of Syria realise that splendid future to which their past sufferings and their obstinate confidence in the destiny of their country gives them a right."

Review

Spain : David Hannay (Jack, 3s. 6d. net). To give a clear summary of the history of Spain in 300 pages is by no means an easy task. We fear that Mr. Hannay has added to the inherent difficulties of the subject by approaching it in a somewhat moralising mood. Good history may be written by attempting a scientific analysis of the flow of causes and effects which we call evolution ; or, again, by aiming at a vivid picture of men and things so as to give the reader the impression that he is living the events of the past. Mr. Hannay, though he approaches here and there the one or the other of these two ways, seems to prefer an exposition of facts followed, preceded or accompanied by an estimate of their moral value according to a Puritan criterion modified by historical impartiality and breadth of mind. It must be owned that Mr. Hannay's awards are on the whole fair, sometimes to the point of originality, as when he rightly considers Philip II. as a better moral type and even a more public-spirited sovereign than Queen Elizabeth, or when he clears the Spanish colonial empire from the exaggerated reputation for cruelty which several centuries of

REVIEW

biased historians had given it. Yet, starting as he does from a settled criterion, instead of approaching facts with an open mind, the author is sometimes drawn to lecture historical events; thus we find him on page 134 condemning Spain for having discovered America while, he claims, "the legitimate cause for Spain was to carry the Cross against the Turk on the waters of the Mediterranean and to regain Northern Africa for Europe." That may or may not be so, but the study of events which did not occur is not the business of the historian.

The plan of the book is clear, but the inner development of the chapters is not always free from a certain degree of confusion, sometimes, it is true, hardly avoidable from the very nature of the subject, as in the chapter on Medieval Spain. Not infrequently, however, the confusion is due to a certain looseness of style, particularly in the use of pronouns. This is not the only trace of hurriedness which can be observed in the book. There are several date misprints, as on page 158, where Isabel, the Catholic, is made to plan a campaign in 1594, 90 years after her death, and again on page 159, where the fall of Granada is shifted by 100 years to 1592. Spanish names are very often misprinted, and Spanish sentences misquoted; thus, *Gracia* instead of *Garcia*, *Remiro* instead of *Ramiro* (both page 53), *Raymond Tully* instead of *Raymond Lully* (footnote, page 120). The history of Spanish literature, art, and, in general, Spanish mental life, is completely lacking.

Though from the nature of criticism this note deals mostly with the shortcomings of the book, Mr. Hannay's history of Spain is a welcome and much-needed contribution to English literature on the Peninsula, and should help to propagate in England the knowledge of Spain, her past, and her possibilities. S. M.

Mr. Noel Buxton and THE NEW EUROPE

Some time ago Mr. Noel Buxton, M.P., put forward the allegation that, in our supplement to No. 59 we had suppressed a material passage in Mr. Stanek's speech in the Reichsrat of 9 November. We have verified the passage and we find that the words quoted by Mr. Buxton in his letter of complaint do occur, not in Stanek's speech, but in the Czech interpellation, as follows:—"We would congratulate our kinsmen, the Poles, all the more gladly even on the partial attainment of the end for which they have striven, because we see in the proposed solution of the Polish question at least the recognition in principle of that fundamental necessity on which we have always insisted, namely, the transformation of the Monarchy into a Confederation of States" (*in einen Staatenbund umzugestalten*, see *Neue Freie Presse*, 9 and 10 November, 1917). Mr. Buxton is entitled to claim satisfaction over this correction, for what it is worth. To our mind, its worth may be gauged by the difference between *Staatenbund* (league of states) and *Bundesstaat* (federal state). If he thinks these words synonymous, he is entitled to chide us for our "unfairness" in suppressing the passage quoted above, but then he must not assume that competent judges will agree with him.

Diary of Current Events

- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed. Manifesto of Reichstag Independent Socialists appealing to working classes to protest against German annexationist aims as revealed at Brest.
- 20 Jan.—"Breslau" sunk; "Goeben" beached. "Council of Flanders" unanimously declares for complete independence of Flanders.
- 6 Feb.—Parliament prorogued. German ultimatum to Roumania demanding peace negotiations within 4 days.
- 7 Feb.—Vienna reports resignation of Seidler Cabinet.
- 9 Feb.—Ukraine signs peace with Germany.
- 10 Feb.—Embargo on Dutch commercial cables provisionally raised. Lord Beaverbrook appointed Minister in Charge of Propaganda. Bolševiks declare state of war at end, order demobilisation, but refuse to sign peace.
- 11 Feb.—Death of Abdul Hamid, ex-Sultan of Turkey, reported. President Wilson's answer to Count Hertling. Col. Repington's article in *Morning Post*.
- 12 Feb.—Reopening of Parliament: Mr. Asquith and Premier on functions of Supreme War Council. Reuter informed that Great Britain does not recognise Germano-Ukrainian peace.
- 13 Feb.—Announcement that Col. Repington and editor of *Morning Post* to be prosecuted under D.O.R.A. Mr. Balfour on Versailles Council.
- 14 Feb.—Reported resignation of Polish Regency Cabinet. Bolo and Cavallini condemned to death.
- 16 Feb.—Repington trial opens.
- 17 Feb.—General Sir W. Robertson's resignation of post of Chief of I.G.S. announced.

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“Is peace so easy? Nay, the names
That are most dear and most divine
To men are like the heavenly flames
That farthest from possession shine.
Peace, love, truth, freedom, unto these
The way is through the storming seas”

—*Laurence Binyon (1901)*

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The Versailles Mustard Seed

THE revolution which began at Rapallo and came further to light in the Salle de l'Horloge in Paris last December has now found its first organ in the War Council of Versailles. And when the dust of the controversy raised by it has subsided we may perhaps see more clearly than we do now that the Versailles Council is something more than a mere war measure. It is the beginning of a new departure—a mustard seed sown in the European garden of which we hope that men hereafter will say that "it grew and waxed a great tree." In principle, at all events, it is a departure from the traditional habit of an alliance in war so striking as to wear the aspect of a revolution. In past times the conduct of war by nations forming an alliance has always failed of the full effect which the sum of the allied forces ought to have produced, because the obstinate pride of national sovereignty in each partner stood in the way of complete co-operation. We have ourselves witnessed the well-nigh disastrous results of conflicting counsels in more than one crisis of the war, and we have experienced all the qualms and obstructions which beset the path of him who would merge the narrower national patriotism in a new and wider devotion. But we are now becoming dimly aware of the magnitude of our own cause, whose success demands some sacrifice of a hitherto sacred sovereign right. Sheer necessity has driven us not merely to close our ranks in the face of the enemy, but to make of our ranks one army obedient to a single design. The doctrine of the Single Front is accepted at last. But even if we are victorious we shall achieve nothing lasting in this "war to end war" unless and until we understand the parent cause of all war: namely, the existence of independent untrammelled national sovereignties, each acting as an end in itself, and recognising no bounds to its ambition except those imposed by the limits of its own military power. No mere restoration of the old Concert of Europe can avail to control the conflicts which thus arise, for the decisions of such a body are mere compromise born of the needs of a moment and swept away by the first breath of change. The new Concert

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must be founded upon principles of public right which stand above all veering winds of opinion, and it must take its decisions not as a diplomatic transaction between competitors, but as the expression of the recognised public law of Europe.

We are to-day far from this ideal. But the war has so ruthlessly laid bare the fundamental evil of the old European system that all nations are now reluctant to return to it. They will seek a new way. A better way is, indeed, in their offer; but they stand irresolute before its novelty. Like Pygmalion, they stand before an ideal praying heaven to give it life. But to-day no Aphrodite will come with divine magic to give breath and being to their dream; if a new world is to take the place of the old, it must find its creators and upholders among the peoples and the armies now in conflict; and it can only survive by the conscious and deliberate will of the common people in all lands. In that sense this is a war of democracy by democracy, for democracy; and, taking the good will of the peoples for granted (a large assumption, perhaps), we may enquire by what process the new international system will be created and what steps can be taken now to prepare the way.

A detached spectator of recent events, taking note of the dominant currents of thought during the war, could not fail to observe in all countries a tendency to give political action a supra-national orientation. The old antithesis between national and international is no longer so sharp because we are growing accustomed to the idea of a kind of European—or even world-wide—statehood, which shall embrace, without stifling, the old national states. The three great doctrines of the war—The League of Nations, *Mittel-Europa*, and the Bolševik idea—are different expressions of this feeling. Each of them presupposes a spiritual condition of Europe to which old frontiers no longer correspond. Each is, of course, so different from the other two that in purpose and effect they come into irreconcilable conflict: but all three have the same birthplace—in that uneasy world-wide sense of discontent with the purely national basis of the old European system. They are symptoms of a state of mind of which we ourselves are perhaps hardly aware, but which the historian hereafter will describe as the characteristic feature of the political thought of to-day. That being so, it is not surprising that wherever nations meet for co-operation—especially under the educating pressure of the war—this

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prevailing principle of our time should emerge in their discussions and dominate their policies. In our own case we can see the process at work in two profoundly interesting and sharply contrasted ways. At one end of the scale the Allies have laboriously reached certain conclusions which, on being translated into the concrete form of the Versailles Council, turn out to be a local and partial expression of the universal and general principle expounded by President Wilson in his League of Nations. In the military sphere—and to a certain extent in the economic sphere also—Versailles is the first embodiment of the idea of a supra-national authority controlling the actions of hitherto sovereign peoples in alliance. Thus the Allies in Europe, driven by bitter experience, have painfully and haltingly reached the conclusion at which the American President arrived by a process of political deduction. Being a historian, Mr. Wilson may have recalled the condition of the American continent before the union: and he probably argued that the process by which the thirteen jarring States became the United States could be applied to the world at large, provided the world itself had a great incentive forcing it to relinquish its former habits. The experience of war has provided the incentive: and the world is willing to exchange old methods for new.

No one will miss the significance of the coincidence between the local and particular act at Versailles, and the general principle evolved at Washington. But unless the vital connection between these two policies is used to link the purely war measures of the Alliance with the whole task of European reconstruction the lessons of Rapallo and Versailles may be lost. A great transformation of international relations has already taken place under the pressure of war. By creating unity of military action the first step has been taken on a road which leads to a new world order; and since it is precisely in the military sphere that the idea of unrestricted national sovereignty is most tenacious of life, we are justified in hoping that in other spheres the same process may be set in motion with even larger results. In an article entitled, "The Revolution of the Salle de l'Horloge" (*THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 60), the matter was stated thus: "Each national group in the Conference of Paris represented a sovereign power; but, by its very presence there, it denoted a growing sense in every nation that only a certain voluntary curtailment of the sovereign right of each nation

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can avail to equip the common cause with the means of victory. We have already 'pooled our honour.' The Pact of London was the first of a series of acts by which the voluntary surrender of sovereignty began. We are now pooling our resources . . . and their magnitude is impressive. It suggests to the imaginative mind the true equipment of a League of Peace, and will probably be found to supersede the idea of making military force the chief weapon of such a body. The Paris Conference of to-day commands nearly all the great food-growing areas of the world: it controls the whole supply of vital raw materials from the tropics: it holds the submarine cable communications of the world: its greatest cities are the financial capitals of the world: and it commands the sea. The body of a League of Nations is there: but it still lacks the breath of life which only the moral resolve of its constituent nations can give."

The next step is clear. The statesmen of the Entente should make plain their intention to develop the Versailles policy until it embraces all the functions which the League itself will discharge when it comes into being. And, in particular, the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Rome must show that they are now conscious of the significance of their own action at Versailles and are prepared to go forward with the enterprise thus begun. There are three ways in which they can prove that, in Mr. Balfour's words, they mean to take up the policy of a League of Peace "and see it through." First, by proving that the military action of the Alliance springs from real co-ordination and not compromise: second, by employing their economic resources in such a manner as to show that they are not merely a powerful weapon against present enemies, but an indispensable part of the equipment of a League: third, by making their whole diplomatic action conform to the fundamental principles of the new international system. An adequate exposition of this threefold policy lies beyond the scope of the present brief argument. But, even without any examination in detail, it is tolerably clear that the lessons of the war can be turned both to immediate advantage and to permanent effect upon the fortunes of the world by any statesman who will make this cause his own. I can imagine no more powerful plea in favour of the League of Peace than one which draws its strength from the combination of European experience with the ideal of the American President.

A. F. WHYTE.

Hungary's Internal Policy

THE Western democracies lay stress on the rights of the peoples and aspire to a new order in Europe, resting upon peace and reconciliation among the nations. Unhappily, there are grave obstacles to the realisation of this noble idea, and notably a misapprehension of certain cardinal facts which have determined in the past and must still determine in the future the relations between the European nations.

In their recent speeches Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson stated that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was not one of the war aims of the Entente. This statement implies that no radical change in the Dual Monarchy is necessary, and that some democratic reform would suffice to appease its oppressed peoples and thus lay the foundation of a durable peace. Recent events and tendencies in Austria-Hungary, however, reveal a very different prospect; and close observers cannot fail to see that the relations between the subject peoples and their masters have evoked such bitterness as to render a constitutional settlement altogether chimerical. The oppressed races have given repeated proof of their resolve to persist in the struggle for complete independence; and those of our readers who know something of the war of extermination and enslavement waged, in particular, by Hungary against her non-Magyar citizens, cannot fail to ask themselves whether a continuation of the struggle is likely to be conducive to future peace in Europe.

In his famous book on *Mittel-Europa*, Herr Naumann, whom no one could accuse of hostility to the Magyars, wrote as follows:—

“The Magyars are conscious that their State is based on an agglomeration of nationalities. They know that they are outnumbered, and form less than half the population, and that, under an equal and impartial law and a just distribution of electoral constituencies, they might be speedily driven from power by the union of the others. This situation imposes upon the Magyars, whose will to rule has created the State, the double duty of countering openly or secretly the equalising tendencies of democracy, and of increasing the numbers of the Magyar population.” (P. 89.)

In point of fact, the Magyars have throughout this war striven, with feverish haste, to convert polyglot Hungary into a uniform State imbued with Magyar mentality. In this effort Magyar policy has shown two faces, one for home opinion and one for abroad. At home the policy of Magyari-

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sation is pursued with open violence, while abroad lip service is paid to new ideas which serve as a convenient screen for ulterior ends. Thus since President Wilson's democratic programme, and the march of the Russian Revolution, the Magyars have assured the whole world, through their official agencies and their agents in every country, that the heritage of the reactionary Count Tisza has descended to a democratic government which will act in the spirit of Western democracy. It is, however, only necessary to pass in review the various reforms introduced by Tisza's successors, in order to realise how little prospect there is of racial reconciliation. No sooner had Count Apponyi re-entered the Ministry of Education than he forbade the reopening of the Roumanian teachers' training colleges—the Serbian schools were closed during the crisis of July 1914—on the ground "that during the occupation of Transylvania by the Roumanian troops the attitude of the Roumanian teachers was unpatriotic." Apponyi himself, during a visit to Transylvania, explained his programme very clearly.

"I visited the frontier districts," he said, "in order to get a personal impression of the measures needed for the cultural defence of the country. I had conversations with the high sheriffs, school inspectors and schoolmasters. As regards the training schools, I shall not modify my point of view. My aim is to strengthen everywhere the national Magyar State. I have begun by multiplying the State schools in order to place a barrier along the frontier and ensure the safety of the Magyar racial islets by linking them up with one another. This whole policy follows a definite plan which, if not completed by myself, will, I hope, be adopted by all my successors in office." (*Az Ujság*, 12 December, 1917.)

He recently set up a special Cultural Committee, whose duties were defined by one of his subordinates in a recent interview:—

"The duty of the Government Committee consists in establishing a so-called cultural zone—in other words, according to the Minister's far-reaching ideas, that in all the frontier counties instruction must be based on a Magyar education, beyond reproach from the point of view of loyalty to the State. The reorganised schools will be State schools, and their teachers appointed by the State. If we succeed in our programme, the frontier district will serve as an example to the rest of the country as to *the manner in which public instruction should be organised in a modern State*. It would be premature to give a fixed number, but I am free to reveal the fact that the Minister aims at 1,600 elementary schools and 800 crèches." (*Pesti Hírlap*, 27 December, 1917.)

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This vast programme, cynically presented as a model of modern education, will completely destroy the already feeble instruction of the non-Magyar peoples in their mother-tongue. The school question has always been one of the most burning in Hungarian internal policy, the non-Magyars seeing in their schools the last hope of preserving their race. While preparing the total suppression of non-Magyar education in Hungary, Count Apponyi seeks to promote Magyarisation by other means. As Minister of Public Instruction he is the supreme authority in certain ecclesiastical questions. Knowing that the nationalities of Hungary, excluded from all share in politics, rely upon their religious institutions as a last stronghold of national tradition, the Magyars have set themselves to gain control of the Churches and to Magyarise the faithful from the pulpit through the medium of Magyar priests. The first attempt in this direction was directed against the Greek Catholic or Uniate Church, to which a large number of Roumanians and Ukrainians belong; their Orthodox ancestors having yielded to the pressure of Leopold I and Maria Theresa and recognised the Pope as head of their Church, while preserving the old Slavonic liturgy. The Magyars, in order to obtain control over the Ukrainian and Roumanian clergy, hit upon the idea of creating a Magyar Greek Catholic bishopric, which would compete with the Ruthene and Roumanian bishoprics, and, seconded by the authority of the State, would gradually Magyarise their flocks. In 1912 such a bishopric was created at Hajdudorog, with Magyar as its official language. This step evoked lively protests among the Roumanians, who saw in it a grave menace to their national existence. Subsequent events have amply justified their anxiety.

The following summary of the situation is from Count Károlyi's organ, *Magyarország*, of 26 August:—

"After the retreat of the hostile armies, when regular work was resumed in the villages with Wallach-speaking* inhabitants, thousands of the latter, inspired by patriotic sentiments, and belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church, begged to be admitted to the Greek Catholic Church. They no longer wish to be under the jurisdiction of Wallach priests and bishops, but, as loyal Hungarian subjects, seek to belong to the Greek Catholic See of Hajdudorog. These Wallach villages have no priests, for some of them proved disloyal to the Magyar State and withdrew with the enemy, while the stern hand of Magyar justice fell

* "Wallach" is the common Magyar term for "Roumanian."

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upon the other traitors. Thus all the villages of Wallach language and Orthodox religion whose priests became traitors have remained without spiritual leaders. It is both characteristic and encouraging for us that the members of these ecclesiastical communities, though speaking Wallach, did not apply for their new priests to the Wallach bishops, but to the Transylvanian Vicars of the Magyar bishopric of Hajdudorog. The transference of many thousands of Orthodox Wallachs to the Magyar Church is on such a scale that the Vicar and his priests can no longer cope with the situation."

A wide extension of the crude proselytism which this passage reveals is demanded by the reactionary press, which is in close touch with the present Government. Magyar Orthodox bishoprics are to be created even where the number of persons of Magyar nationality and Orthodox faith does not amount to 5,000. Backed by all the forces of the State, they hope gradually to permeate the Churches with their own priests, who would preach the Word of God in Magyar, and thus Magyarise the Serbs, Ukrainians, and Roumanians, whose religion preserves the national tradition.

Among these "national reforms" is also included agrarian reform. Baron Ghillány, Minister of Agriculture in the Tisza Cabinet, foreshadowed a land reform in which the sale and transfer of property would be regulated according to national principles. His successor, Mr. Mezössy, tried to carry out this idea in a spirit worthy of the Magyar State. On 1 November, 1917, he issued a decree which he had already explained in Parliament on 23 October:—

"This decree will strengthen the Magyar land policy. During the first half of the war it was recognised with regret that, in the most fertile districts of south Hungary, the land was in the hands of a population which is by no means reliable. The soil of these threatened districts must be in the hands of those who deserve confidence. With this in view any transfer of land will be made subject to the consent of the authorities. Not only this but leases also will depend on the authorities. The length of a lease cannot exceed ten years. I can assure everyone that I shall employ this right exclusively and solely in the service of Magyar national land policy."

This decree is an open avowal that the Magyars are about to carry out forcible expropriation, and this is admitted in the Budapest press. When the Czechs protested in the Parliament of Vienna against Mezössy's decree, the *Pesti Hirlap*, in an editorial of 28 November, defined the Magyar attitude as follows:—

"This decree, which the Czechs attack, merely constitutes a partial experiment in a systematic Magyar land policy. It only deals with a

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small part of the land. The Magyar State has the right to decide what elements shall possess the soil. It has the right to assure its territory against suspect elements. Hence the Mezössy decree is both wise and necessary. The intervention of the Czechs only serves to remind us that this decree must be extended to the whole territory of Hungary.

"The State must have an unlimited right of expropriation in order to be able to parcel out and colonise the land. It must carry out a healthy distribution of land to the Magyar race, which alone is a support of the State. To the south it is the Serbs who hold the best land; in Transylvania it is the Roumanians. That is why the Mezössy decree is only a beginning. We demand that this policy should be continued on a large scale. The attacks from Vienna cannot shake the Hungarian Government, which must finally convince itself that it is useless to stop half-way. As long as the government remains in power it must employ that power to make the Magyars masters of Magyar land."

Parallel with this decree, the Magyars are preparing a regular plan of colonisation on a large scale, according to which the non-Magyar populations are to be removed *en masse* and replaced by Magyars. They propose to draw a continuous Magyar cordon right round Hungary, in the hope of thus destroying the geographical continuity between the non-Magyar races and their kinsmen beyond the Hungarian frontiers. On this subject the deputy Haller, a member of the People's Party (one of the groups supporting the present government), said in Parliament, on 22 February, 1917:—

"There must be colonisation on a grand scale in the districts inhabited by the nationalities, for it is inadmissible that the party of the State should have no say in questions of property in these frontier districts. Where the nationalities live we must create new, modern marches, and the representatives of these Magyar marches must be not only small, but medium holders of land."

An administrative reform conceived in the same spirit has been prepared by the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Ugron. Scenting traitors everywhere, the Magyars no longer trust even the officials of the communal local government, whom they suspect of offering a refuge for the separatist tendencies of the non-Magyar races. Hence they are planning the abolition of communal autonomy and the substitution of State functionaries, who could be trusted to defend "the idea of the unitary and millenary Magyar State," and, at the same time, to purge the frontier districts of all foreign influence. We leave the Minister to speak for himself:—

"The administration of the frontier districts needs radical reform. The tendencies which threaten the idea of our State find their most fertile soil in the frontier districts of Hungary. That is why the

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Government's main task will consist in establishing a frontier administration inspired solely by certain aims. These reforms necessitate certain centralising measures, until we are sure that the frontier districts will be strong enough to resist. . . . This reform, then, will extend from the Theiss to the south-eastern frontier of Transylvania. Its fundamental principle will consist in the choice of absolutely reliable officials to whom the administration will be entrusted."

Finally, a crown has been set upon Magyar policy by the Franchise Bill recently introduced in the Hungarian Parliament. Long before its details were made public the Magyars boasted loudly of their "universal suffrage." To-day we see that this universal suffrage actually reduces the relative representation of the non-Magyar peoples in Parliament. The new Bill assures to the Magyars 62·6 per cent., to the Germans 12·5 per cent., and to the other nationalities together only 24·9 per cent. of the total electorate; while a skilful project of electoral "geometry" is in preparation. The best indication of the new Bill's tendency is the excuse by which the Suffrage Minister, Mr. Vázsonyi—leader of the "democratic" party—defended himself against the attacks of the jingoes (*Neue Freie Presse*, 16 September) :—

"I can demonstrate that, even in the event of the vote being granted to all literates above the age of twenty-four, there would only be four out of the sixty-four constituencies of Transylvania where the Roumanian element would have a majority. In these four there are two where the majority is so insignificant as to make it impossible to speak of its Roumanian character. Surely it is grotesque to hear the opponents of electoral reform describing these four Roumanian mandates as a danger to Magyardom. Is Magyardom so feeble? My reform will prove the contrary. The basis of the franchise reform of the former Premier, Mr. Lukács, was to increase the number of constituencies by twenty-two—all pure Magyar free towns—as a counterpoise to dangers from the nationalities. I propose to augment still further the number of seats among the towns where the Magyar element predominates."

To this statement it must be added that in eight out of the fifteen counties of Transylvania the Roumanians are in an overwhelming majority. The total Roumanian population of Transylvania—according to Magyar statistics which favour the Magyar element—is 55 per cent. as against 34·3 Magyar and 8·7 per cent. German. Thus Magyar democracy proposes to allow to the 1,472,021 Roumanians of Transylvania a total of four seats, of which two are doubtful.

I have contented myself with a brief summary of the

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principal "reforms" contemplated by the Hungarian government. Our survey proves that the Magyars, feeling themselves free of immediate military danger, are trying to settle the racial question without regard for right or liberty. The only goal which they see is that of completely Magyarising Hungary and rendering it loyal to the idea of the Magyar State. But their victims are very numerous, and it is certain that they will not submit to being deprived of their national traditions and individuality. Persecution has already bred a desperate hatred which foreshadows new dangers for the future peace. To leave the oppressed peoples of Hungary in the clutches of their present masters would merely be to sow the seeds of fresh conflicts in the Dual Monarchy. Their situation is aggravated by the knowledge that while Western Europe and America are talking of the liberty of nations and their right to live as free members in the human commonwealth, they are deaf to the groans and sufferings of the non-Magyars. Have not, then, the Serbs, Croats, Roumanians, Ukrainians and Slovaks of Hungary the right to share in the free Society of Nations? Must they perforce submit to the brutal suppression of their mother-tongue, to the destruction of their national consciousness, to proselytism and expropriation, to exclusion from all political rights and from any influence upon the destiny of their native land?

DR. P.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(VI) THE NEXT STEP IN INDIA

[The author of the following article is a Scottish Missionary whose experience of India covers more than twenty years. He is joint editor of the "Indian Interpreter," the valuable quarterly review published by the Christian Literature Society for India.]

MR. BEVAN'S article on the above subject in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 67) contained a moderate statement of some general aspects of the problem of the Government of India as it presents itself at the present hour. The general principles that he there lays down will be accepted by most thoughtful people who are acquainted with the Indian situation. Lord Curzon declared in the House of Lords some months ago that

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the war had "unchained forces" that "compelled" the Government to grant concessions to India. It is unfortunate that he should have used language that seemed to imply that he regarded those forces as evil and that the grant of greater responsibility for their own government to the Indian people was to be bestowed only under compulsion. Lord Morley in his "Recollections," rightly protests against the use of the word "concessions" in reference to advances made towards fuller self-government in India. For our honour as a nation and for the vindication of our sincerity we have to make it plain by our acts as well as by our words that no responsibility will be refused to India that she can use justly and wisely, and that everything will be done to hasten the time when such responsibilities can be fully entrusted to her. The moral justification for our entrance into India at first lies solely in the claim that we went there, among other less worthy reasons, to deliver the land from anarchy. We are morally justified in remaining there as the Government of the country only so long as our presence is necessary to prevent anarchy and to maintain order and justice between the various races and classes of its population. With that view Mr. Bevan is in substantial agreement, and the only criticism that may be made of his statement of it is that some of his points need, perhaps, to be set in sharper relief.

For example, he admits that British rule in India has not been entirely unselfish, but claims that it has not been selfish in the sense that advantage has been given by customs tariffs to British trade. In this connection there is a danger that has to be noted. At the present moment a certain measure of protection is being given to Indian cotton as against that of Lancashire. This was granted as a gift to India in view of her generous help in the war, and it was expressly declared by Mr. Asquith that the matter would be re-considered when peace came. At the time the opposition of Lancashire was very strong, and recently in the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce the protests of the "interests" in Britain that have suffered have again been heard. We may be sure that strong pressure to have this "protection" removed will be brought to bear upon the Government, and if this is done it will certainly be interpreted in India as an act of commercial selfishness. It is, indeed, demanded by the Indo-British Association as a reward for Britain's guardianship of the

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country. Apart altogether from the rights or wrongs of free trade or protection, we shall have here a conflict between the two countries in the decision of which Great Britain can hardly be said to be wholly disinterested. It may be true that the "gift" to India is really a gift, not to the body of the people, but to a few Bombay millionaire millowners, and that this protection, if it was to be fully justified, should have been granted years ago in order to preserve village industries that have now largely disappeared. But what is important in the present connection is that India has a right to claim that the decision should be left to her own representatives and not to Great Britain, which is an interested outsider. A statement that has been presented to Mr. Montagu by the Congress leaders gives prominence among its conclusions to the charge that "the British mercantile and monied interests . . . have operated upon India in their own interests without due regard to the interests of the people." A considerable amount of disquietude has been caused by the claim that is being made by the English commercial community that the fact that British capital has been invested in the country should give them a determining voice in regard to the character of the Government. The Home Member of the Government of India, Sir William Vincent, appears to have publicly endorsed this view.

It is certainly true, as Mr. Bevan says, that any proposal to withdraw immediately from India "would encounter the opposition of all that is best and most idealist in British feeling." That is because we have a duty, of which we cannot divest ourselves, towards the millions who have been oppressed for centuries by their own countrymen, and we have to make sure that with our withdrawal such oppression will not be renewed. At the same time, surely a century of our just rule and of contact with our ideals has given a new sense of justice and of social duty to the classes that have hitherto been the oppressors. It has also to be admitted that our Government is no longer able to claim to possess the intimate knowledge of the common people and the close sympathy with them that perhaps they formerly possessed. In the agitation produced in recent years by the wrongs done to Indian immigrants in the Dominions, and especially by the gross evils connected with the Indian indentured labour system, all classes of the Indian community, high and low,

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were united in an intense indignation. It was a remarkable indication of the growth of a social conscience to find this unity displayed in the cause of members of the despised "coolie" classes. This movement gave evidence that India is discovering her "self" and approaching towards a real unity.

Again, it is undoubtedly the case that the very machinery of self-government is likely to be one of the most effective instruments in creating unity and breaking down the divisions of caste that do so much to retard Indian progress. The methods of election to be followed in the administration should not follow lines of religious and caste distinction. It is true that, unfortunately, the distinction of Hindu and Mohammedan has been accepted by the Morley-Minto reforms. It may not be possible to alter that in the meantime, but the election of Hindu members of the Councils by constituencies, arranged with no reference to caste differences, should hasten the creation of a civic and political consciousness that will supersede the divisions of sect and caste which at present so hinder unity. To produce those who shall have the "will and intelligence" to govern, it is not enough to wait for these qualities to grow spontaneously. The whole process of working out a nation's destiny and achieving her self-government welds her people into unity and creates in them fitness. The foreign guardians have to see that they do not interfere with this development, but rather that their presence hastens it. In the provision of education, for example, it is admitted (*e.g.*, by the Governor of Bombay) that we have not done as much as we ought. But no education for self-government can take the place of the actual exercise of responsibility by the people. We have to remain "as it were an handbreadth off," giving them room to live and grow, as we have not given them room hitherto. We have to let them enter the water that they may learn to swim.

What is now required is that the Government of India be so re-modelled as to provide full opportunity for the people to acquire real political training. It was his sense of the urgent need of such training that caused Mr. G. K. Gokhale to establish his "Servants of India" Society. But nothing can take the place of the actual experience of administration with its risks and responsibilities, with its occasions of making mistakes and of suffering the consequences. Mr. Lionel

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Curtis, who has been giving himself with much assiduity and liberality of outlook to the task of helping in the solution of this problem, declares frankly: "You will not evoke and develop whatever latent capacity for self-government there is in India until you have imposed on electorates the burden of deciding such issues as are now decided, and can only be decided, by Provincial Government. . . . The mere administration of education and municipal laws, made over their heads, will never afford this training." He has been promoting an effort to bring about a *rapprochement* between the Indian and European communities and the result is seen in what is called the "Indo-European Scheme." This plan has been denounced by Mrs. Besant and the Home Rule for India League on the one hand, and by the European Association on the other, but it represents a mediating attitude which deserves and is obtaining respectful consideration, especially in view of the weight that attaches to Mr. Curtis's knowledge and experience. This scheme and that which has been prepared jointly by the Congress and the Moslem League are attracting most attention in India, and it is satisfactory to find that their points of view are not widely separated.

Some of the features of the re-organisation of the Government that is likely to take shape may be indicated. If we begin at the top we note that there is a general demand that the position of the Secretary of State for India should approximate to that of the Secretary for the Colonies, the India Council being abolished. Further, the Government of India will probably have to be invested with full fiscal autonomy. At the same time it is desirable and necessary that, until full self-government is granted, Parliament should be kept in close touch with the administration in India, so as to be able to judge of its success. This may be secured if a provision suggested in the Indo-European scheme is adopted and a report is made by Commissioners directly to Parliament on the Indian Government at intervals of seven years. At these intervals (which might be shorter) the question of increasing the powers of the elected administrations, or, in case of abuse, of recalling them would be considered, and the relation of Parliament to the Indian situation would be kept intimate and vital.

Both the "joint scheme" and the congress scheme agree in proposing to grant large authority to the Provincial Govern-

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ments, which may require to be increased in number and diminished in size, so as to be less unwieldy and to correspond, perhaps, more closely to the language areas. Some, at present, have populations of over 40 millions. There is, however, a difference here between the proposals suggested in these two schemes. The congress view, which probably is the prevailing view in India, would give to the elected council full authority over all departments of the administration along with certain limited powers of taxation. Mr. Curtis's scheme, on the other hand, would maintain two types of Government simultaneously in each Province—"one responsible to electorates for certain functions, the other to the Secretary of State for all other functions." The control of the police, for example, would be retained in the hands of the latter type of Government. "The transfer of police to executives responsible to electorates is tantamount to the consummation of responsible government." That consummation is not yet, but would come when the capacity of the electorates has been fully gauged.

It will be seen that these differences, while important, relate to what is immediately practicable and wise rather than to the constitution and character of the new government. There are many details in regard to which the difficulties of adjustment will be great. There is, for example, the question of the constitution of electorates. Mr. Montagu is being snowed under with petitions and claims and representations from a multitude of sects and sections. The fissiparous tendency of Indian society is revealing itself in a fashion that might well fill an observer with despair. Mr. Montagu will be wise, however, to pay little attention to these clamours. No greater injury can be done to India's progress than to recognise and help to perpetuate these divisions, that have been so great a source of weakness in the past. "The Government," says an experienced Indian gentleman, who has been at the head of the administration of three Indian States, "will be laying up a store of future trouble if in the coming reforms they do not devise a scheme of representation to ignore caste and creed altogether. It is only then that the process of unification and the creation of a sense of nationality will be maintained and the British Government will be justified of its mission."

N. MACNICOL.

Italy's Future in Suspense

THOSE who have followed the course of Italian politics during the last three years know that the movement of public opinion, to which the attitude and composition of the Government has roughly corresponded, has been steadily from Right to Left.

At the beginning "Sacro egoismo" was the rallying cry, chosen by Salandra, and it was on old-fashioned patriotism and new-fangled nationalism that the Government chiefly relied for support against the neutralist majority, and to which it showed most favour. Of course, sympathy with Belgium and enthusiasm for liberty and nationality were not absent, and one wing of the Interventionist phalanx which carried the day against the Neutralists in May, 1915, consisted of the democratic groups for which the traditions of the Risorgimento—of Mazzini and Cavour—are still living sources of inspiration. But it must never be forgotten that it was a minority which determined Italy's choice for war, and from the first that minority had a difficult task to maintain the *fronte interno*. It was an unfortunate but a natural mistake, that in order to keep the neutralists in abeyance a free hand should have been given to the most extreme representatives of Imperialism, who, having set up their antiquated image of bellicose patriotism, decked out with all sorts of extravagant ambitions and promise of aggrandisement, were privileged to browbeat and vilify all who seemed reluctant to prostrate themselves before it. But that these braggadocio methods were not the best fitted to maintain even a decent *façade* of National Unity soon became plain, and the formation of the Ministry of National Unity under Boselli was an attempt to save the situation by yielding a little ground to the recalcitrants. A safe cleric and a safe Giolittian were admitted to the Cabinet. But still the leading part was left to the Jingoës, and the Opposition instead of being placated became more and more exasperated, while every month that the war was prolonged added numbers to its ranks and force to its arguments. Then the whole complexion of the war was altered by two great determining events—the Russian Revolution and the intervention of the United States. In every country, and very decidedly in Italy, these events at once brought up the scale of Democracy and lowered that of Imperialism. One symptom of this was seen in the permission

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tardily accorded by the Censorship about midsummer of last year to the democratic journals to express their views on Italian war aims, and notably on the question of Dalmatia—up till that time it might almost have been supposed that 99 out of every 100 Italians approved the programme advertised so loudly by *L'Idée Nazionale*. Now it was revealed that a very considerable and influential section of Italian public opinion disapproved utterly the claim to possession of the Dalmatian mainland, maintaining in the teeth of the Imperialist propaganda that such possession is not only not necessary to Italy's security on the Adriatic, but would be a positive burden and danger to her, and is utterly incompatible with that respect for the rights of nationality which is in the best political traditions of Italy, and on which her own unity is founded.

At the end of July, 1917, the terms of the pact signed at Corfu between representatives of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Committee were made known, and the *Corriere della Sera*, representing a large body of moderate and practical Liberal opinion, stood forth to advocate the cordial acceptance and promotion by Italians of the projected Slav unification, as being a step towards the only solution of Balkan problems capable of assuring to Italy security on the Adriatic and economic expansion eastwards, and to the Entente generally a solid barrier against the Germanic *Drang nach Osten*.

The centre of gravity was thus shifted a point further towards the Left.

In August came Baron Sonnino's visit to London, the results of which appeared in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies in October. The Italian Government, it appeared, did not desire "the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary" and repudiated all Imperialistic aspirations; it demanded only what was necessary to her security, to the completion of her national unity, and to the maintenance of a just balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The leftward movement had reached the Consulta.

The sudden *débâcle* of a section of the Isonzo front in October, disastrous in its consequences and deplorable as it was, had at least some good effects. For a time it almost united the Italian people in a sudden resurgence of patriotic feeling. The rapid and admirable moral recovery of the army, while it proved to the Allies and to the world the

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stalwart stuff in the Italian character, brought back a sense of security which favoured the reappearance of the old divisions and intrigues. But the replacement of Signor Boselli in the Presidency of Council by Signor Orlando, the Minister who had all along stood for mutual toleration and political amnesty, and even more the entry into the ministry of Signor Nitti, marked a further stage in this movement of opinion away from imperialism and *sacro egoismo* and towards a complete harmonisation of Italy's war aims with the increasingly democratic outlook and temper of the Allies.

The last two months of the year saw an attempt made by a coalition of Neutralist forces, under cover of the demand for parliamentary control of foreign and military policy, to get rid of Sonnino and Cadorna, the men who most unmistakably represented loyalty to the cause of the Allies and resolute prosecution of the war, and so to pave the way for a Giolittian resurrection. The collapse of this attempt is proof that the majority of the Chamber, and probably of the country also, had faced the facts and recognised that that way lay disaster in the present and worse disaster in the future. But the mere fact that the attempt could be made revealed the growing strength of the opposition and of the longing for peace, and made it clear that the day of the big drums of a pseudo-patriotism were gone for ever. The future might now have seemed assured in Italy for those who had from the beginning been in true sympathy with the principles professed by the Entente, and had struggled so persistently and so courageously on the one hand against the intrigues of the neutralists of all colours—friends of Austria, friends of Germany, enemies of Great Britain—on the other, against the suffocating embraces of their Jingo Allies in interventionism. They seemed now to have finally beaten down the one and freed themselves from the other peril.

It was at this juncture that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson gave to the world their respective formulations of what the British and American Governments presumably regard as reasonable peace-terms in harmony with and likely to satisfy the insistent demands of the democratic majorities, that now at last the old diplomacy of force shall be finally banished from international relations. That declarations of this kind, proclaiming the democratic character of the Allies' demands and making it clear that their single aim is

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such a settlement of international differences as seems most likely to ensure the peace of the world, were at least not premature, and were intended and well calculated to strengthen the moral position of the Entente, both externally and internally, was fully recognised by Italian democrats. But at the same time it could not be concealed that certain passages in the speeches threatened to undermine their whole position.

Mr. Lloyd George's reference to Austria and to Italy ran as follows: "Though we agree with President Wilson *that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war-aims*, we feel that, unless *genuine self-government on true democratic principles* is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace.

"On the same ground we regard as vital the *satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue*. We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled, *Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe. . .*" (*Times*, 7 Jan.)

President Wilson's views on the same questions are contained in the 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of his programme:—

"IX. *A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.*

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded *the first opportunity of autonomous development.*

"XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into."—(*Times*, 9 Jan.)

The natural interpretation of these utterances—in fact, the only possible interpretation—is: (1) that the south-western boundaries of Austria-Hungary should be left intact, except for the cession to Italy of the border territories occupied by a clear majority of Italian inhabitants, which

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M Pichon's speech in January appeared to limit to the Trentino and Trieste; (2) that the other subject-peoples (except the Poles) of Austria-Hungary should be left under the sovereignty of the Habsburg dynasty, provided it consents to guarantee their autonomy or genuine self-government "at the first opportunity."

It is hardly surprising that the passages we have quoted, and in particular the phrases we have italicised above, should have caused serious perturbation to those parties and public men in Italy who bear the main responsibility for Italy's intervention in the war on the side of the Entente. And it is the democratic "interventionists," whose point of view is now in the ascendant both in the country and in Parliament, and who throughout have been in truest and closest sympathy with the Entente and its ideals, who are hardest hit. They have fought a hard fight, needing extraordinary moral courage and persistence, against the combined forces of Neutralism; and just as victory seemed all but ensured, they saw, as it seemed, their whole position suddenly undermined by the ignorance or inadvertence of those whom they believed to be their firmest friends. The future of their party and the principles with which the future of Italy is bound up—all their hopes of seeing her, in firm alliance with the nations that stand for liberty, returning after her long wandering in the wilderness to the path of her true destiny and the hopeful traditions of her youth—all this they saw threatened with destruction. And they were guilty of no imperialist ambitions. They have all along struggled to the best of their ability, under peculiarly difficult and complex conditions, against the jingo spirit which is now happily repudiated and silenced. That there has been so far no outspoken repudiation on the part of the Government of certain unjustifiable claims is one of the chief charges brought by the Radical press against Baron Sonnino. He persists in sticking to the letter of the agreement, not apparently because the Government has not accepted the limitations, but because he is under the ban of the "old dispensation" and exaggerates the value of caution in diplomacy.

It is the conviction of all informed Italians, even the most democratic and open-minded, that if Austria-Hungary comes out of the war still practically intact, and if Italy fails to get possession of Pola and Western Istria, the latter will be in a

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worse position than if she had never incurred all the horrors and sacrifices of war. Better far have accepted the *parecchio* and have avoided incurring the vindictive hostility of Germany. It can hardly be urged that the Italians should rely blindly upon any sudden "change of heart" in the Dual Monarchy. They have known it too long and too intimately. Nor can they be expected to put their trust in the immediate effectiveness, as a shield, of a League of Nations which no Government has so far made any serious attempt to realise, and of which too many leading statesmen of the Entente have spoken in terms of disparaging scepticism. The party which stood for alliance with the Entente will be discredited for ever—Giolitti will return justified and triumphant to lead his country back once for all to the German camp, a disgraced and chastened renegade. This is the vision of the future which rises before the eyes of Italian democrats. Meanwhile, the secret friends of Germany and Austria hardly conceal their joy and renew their disruptive intrigues.

The official *communiqué* on the results of Signor Orlando's visit to London, and Signor Orlando's own declarations in interviews with the press no doubt brought some degree of reassurance, and this has been strengthened by the explanations as to the scope of his New Year speech given by President Wilson in his latest message to Congress. Since then the Italian Premier has made his anxiously awaited declaration in the form of a speech in the Chamber. But, though he expressed his strong sympathy with the oppressed peoples of Austria and declared that complete agreement had been reached at Versailles, he avoided any specific statement in regard to Italy's claims or the Austrian policy of the Entente. Thus the public mind is still in doubt. Only a quite plain statement, telling the people of Italy exactly what they may hope for as the fruit of successful resistance and assuring to them the indispensable conditions of military security can really clear up the situation. "Cards on the table" is President Wilson's own "*mot d'ordre*."

These doubts and misunderstandings would never have arisen if only there had been fuller sympathy and understanding between the *peoples* of Italy and Great Britain. A large part of the blame for them no doubt rests with the jingoes of Italy, whose blatancy led Labour and Democracy generally in this country to overrate their importance. Thus

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a prejudice arose which has outlived the state of things which gave rise to it. We hope we have made it clear that Jingoism is now at a discount in Italy, and that the great democracies of the West are no longer justified in withholding from democracy in Italy the sympathy and support which it needs, and to which it has so splendidly proved its right.

War Aims of the Allied Socialists

[*"Let me say emphatically that, though we are not seeking exclusively a French peace, an Italian peace, or a British peace, we are all of us much more strongly opposed to a German peace. We do not want 'peace at any price.'*"—ARTHUR HENDERSON, 23 February.]

THE war aims of the Allied Socialists were made known to the world last Saturday in a document which, in its own way, is a triumph of democratic diplomacy. The Labour parties of the Alliance have succeeded in achieving unity of purpose in an elaborate policy which shows no mark of compromise in any vital point. They may thus claim that their title to take part both in the much needed political offensive of 1918 and also in the ultimate settlement rests upon their proved ability to surmount those very obstacles which the official diplomacy of the Allies has hitherto found insurmountable. Their success is the result of facing and exploring all difficulties with candour. "We have been able," said M. Albert Thomas, "to tell each other plain truths. We have been able to advise national sections against their own national demands." It is true, of course, that the Conference did not meet under that weight of executive responsibility which renders official progress so slow; and, in that sense, the Socialists of the Alliance can act and speak with a freedom denied to their Governments. But, after the necessary allowance has been made for this factor, the Governments have much to learn from the method by which the Socialist "Memorandum on War Aims" was produced. Last summer the divisions of opinion on certain questions between different wings of the French, British, and Italian Socialists were more acute than those between the three Governments; but they have been bridged by patient and sincere diplomacy in a manner which should convey a broad hint to the Foreign Offices concerned. The Socialists have succeeded because

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they knew that an admission of failure would react heavily against their claim to control foreign policy and against their hope of bringing any influence to bear upon the Socialists of enemy countries. Driven by the same need for unity of action which has forced their Governments to create the War Council of Versailles they have, so to speak, melted down their different policies, blended them, and worked them together into a new and effective political weapon.

The details of the programme are full of interest. Each vital point receives an unmistakable emphasis. Restitution, reparation, guarantees—for each of these there is a minimum below which Labour will not consent to reduce its demands. Belgium stands in the forefront; close behind it, though with a difference in treatment, comes Alsace-Lorraine, in which the fundamental fact is the annulment of the Treaty of Frankfort followed by a consultation of the population to which “France can properly agree” because it will take place under the guarantee of the League of Nations. The Balkan settlement is based upon the doctrine of Balkan solidarity, and presupposes the release of that unhappy peninsula from “the Imperialist pretensions” of the great Powers. An Italo-Jugoslav agreement is the postulate of Adriatic peace; Poland is to be reconstituted in unity and independence; and the principle of self-determination is brought in to liberate the people of the Near East from the Turk. The more complicated question of the future of Austria-Hungary is treated in a manner which shows that Allied Labour, while refusing to pronounce the word “dismemberment,” is prepared to stand by the subject peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy in their just demands. In Colonial policy the Socialist memorandum is a marked improvement on all its predecessors, for it shows a true perception of the fundamental requirement, namely, that while international agreement must be the basis of all colonial action, the actual administration of colonial territories cannot be placed at the hazard of a divided control. Finally, the proposal to establish a League of Nations receives an explicit and reasoned endorsement which shows that the authors of the memorandum have thought out its immediate possibilities. Indeed, the conception of an international rationing system for the food supplies and raw materials of the world during the first years of reconstruction after the war is an integral

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part of the functions of a League. And when it is introduced we shall find that we have embarked—almost unconsciously—upon an international regulation of economic forces which is nothing less than the League in being. Provided the Governments understand that this regulation of supplies, to which necessity will drive them, implies that very revolution in international relations upon which some of them still pour scorn, they can rapidly overcome all prejudice which springs from fear of the unknown. For then the League will be no longer a dazzling castle in the air but a practical engine for overcoming the difficulties of the first years of peace.

Such is the policy of the Labour forces of the Allied nations. If it were put into force to-morrow a new Europe would come into being. The cynic will retort that while amiable Western Europeans are dreaming of a world to come, the enemy is harvesting a rich spoil of conquest in the East. To all appearance militarism and *Realpolitik* have triumphed. But, in reality, east of Berlin, the war has been transformed into the struggle of revolution and counter-revolution—a titanic contest—which even German power may not survive. Unrest in Germany may be allayed for the moment; the Austrian ferment may simmer down once more; but the root of it cannot be destroyed. Four years of war have prepared the soil for the seed which the Allied Socialists are sowing. And though it would be rash to assume that the Socialists of Germany and Austria will accept the London proposals, it would be wider of the mark to conclude that these proposals will not awake resounding echoes in Central Europe. They constitute a shrewdly-designed offensive which will deeply influence the future course of the war. Closely resembling the aims of the Independent German Socialists and expressing the dearest hopes of an actual majority of the peoples of Austria-Hungary they can count on many friends in enemy countries. The forces working for their acceptance are therefore not to be despised. But even if they should fail to elicit a response which would justify a new Stockholm Conference, they have the supreme merit of uniting the Socialists of the Allied Democracies as the spokesmen and partisans of that *Victoire Intégrale* which alone can give us lasting peace.

Poland's Appeal to Europe

[The discreditable bargain concluded between the Central Powers and the fugitive Ukraine Government at the expense of Poland has kindled the most intense indignation throughout all sections of the Polish nation. The Kucharzewski Cabinet has resigned in protest, and the Regency Council in Warsaw—at present the only legal representative body of Polish opinion—has issued the following dignified and effective manifesto. Coming as it does from three of the most Conservative of Polish leaders, its outspoken language carries all the greater weight.]

To the Polish Nation!

When the armies of the Central Powers entered the Polish kingdom we heard from under their victorious flags the solemn assurances that they brought Poland liberation from a long and heavy yoke. Later came the patents that guaranteed to our country her independence. Lastly, a few months ago, the existence of a sovereign authority of the Polish State was recognised, and it was promised help, friendship and collaboration.

But when the Tsar's reign in Russia came to an end and Russia's new rulers began peace negotiations with the Central Powers, Poland was not admitted to these negotiations. We demanded our participation in these negotiations earnestly and incessantly. We were promised this participation. Then the answer was delayed, and we were deluded until the plenipotentiaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary decided alone about our frontiers, contrary to our rights.

We were excluded in order that peace might be made at our cost; and in order that the desired safety in the east might be obtained at the price of our nation's living body, a piece of Polish land was carved out and given to the Ukraine.

The wrong of the Tsar's Government has been repeated. The non-existent Government of Cholm, which, for a time, was formed by the extreme Russian nationalists, has been re-established and enlarged, aggravating the wrong that was done at that time to the Polish nation.

This land, transferred to the Ukraine, is for the most part Polish and Catholic. Its population proved with its own blood during the infamous religious persecution of 1884 its right to belong to Poland. The population has not been asked to which State it wants to belong. With one stroke of the pen its lot has been decided, and so the self-determination of the nations, so often and solemnly proclaimed by the German and Austrian diplomatists, has been in Poland's case violated. Thereby the real significance has been taken from the independent patents of the two Emperors and from their promises of friendship.

Poland's independence, her political and economic existence as a State, have become an empty word, for not only are the interests and rights of Poland overlooked, but her national territory is not respected.

We have taken the oath before God to guard Poland's happiness, liberty and strength, and to-day, remembering our oath, we raise our voices before God and the world, before the face of men and the judgment of history, before the German nation and the nations of Austria-Hungary, in protest against this partition, refusing it our acknowledgment, branding it as an act of brute force.

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Declaring once more the violation of the spirit and the real meaning of the independence patents, we will crave the right of exercising the highest authority from the will of the nation, believing that the nation desires to own a symbol of its independence, and wants to stand by this symbol. On this will of the nation we want to base our mission and our efforts. We will preserve what has been obtained. We will guard our courts of justice that render their sentence in the name of the Polish Crown, our schools that are beginning a new life in a Polish spirit, and if we do not obtain the whole of the nation's aspirations, we will hand down to our descendants what we have taken from the blood of our forefathers, and we will not acknowledge the diminution of our own country.

Given at Warsaw, 14 February 1918.

(Signed by) ALEXANDER KAKOWSKI, Archbishop of Warsaw.
PRINCE ZDISLAW LUBOMIRSKI.
JOSEPH OSTROWSKI.

Text of the Ukraine Treaty

[We print below the main treaty between the Central Powers and the Ukraine Central Rada signed at Brest-Litovsk on Saturday, 9 February.]

A treaty of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one part, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other part. The Ukraine people having, in the course of the present world-war, declared itself independent and expressed the wish to restore peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Powers at war with Russia, the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have resolved to agree on a peace treaty with the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic. They thereby desire to take the first step towards a lasting world-peace, honourable for all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but shall also lead to the restoration of friendly relations between the peoples in the political, legal, economic and intellectual realms. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned Governments, namely, for the Imperial German Government, the Foreign Secretary, Baron von Kühlmann; for the Joint Austro-Hungarian Government, the Foreign Minister, Count Czernin; for the Bulgarian Government, the Premier, Mr. Radoslavov, and the envoys, Mr. Andrea Toshev, Mr. Ivan Staia Stoyanovitch, the military plenipotentiary, Colonel Peter Gantchev, and Doctor Theodor Anastassov; for the Imperial Ottoman Government, the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, Nessimi Bey, Hakki Pasha, and General Izzet Pasha; for the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Messrs. Alexander Ssewrjuk, Mykola Ljubynsjkyj, and Mykola Lewytsjkyj, members of the Central Rada, have met together at Brest-Litovsk for the inauguration of peace negotiations, and, after submitting their credentials, which were found to be in good and proper form, they have reached agreement on the following conditions:—

ARTICLE I.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on

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the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

ARTICLE II.—(a) Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, in so far as these two Powers border upon one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the present war between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia; (b) farther north, the frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic commencing at Tarnegrad, will, in general, follow the line Bilgoraj, Szozebrzszyn Krasnostas, Pugaszw, Radin, Meshiretschie, Sarnaki, Melnik, Wyscolitowsk, Kamenietz-litowsk, Pruschany, Wydonowskojcsce. These frontiers will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to the ethnographical conditions and with regard to the desires of the population; (c) should the Ukrainian People's Republic still have common frontiers with another of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance special agreements will be made thereupon.

ARTICLE III.—The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present peace treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and the transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.

ARTICLE IV.—Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties' consuls is to be reserved for special agreements.

ARTICLE V.—The contracting parties mutually renounce reimbursement of their war costs (that is to say, the State expenditure for carrying on the war), as well as indemnification for war damages (that is to say, those damages which have been suffered by them and their subjects in the war areas through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country).

ARTICLE VI.—The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, in so far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of questions connected herewith will follow by means of the separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.

[ARTICLE VII. is a long clause covering the economic agreements made between the Ukraine and the four enemy Powers. *Inter alia*, it provides for "a reciprocal exchange, until 31 July of the current year, of the surplus of the most important agricultural and industrial products . . . for the purpose of meeting current requirements," and it revives the Russo-German Commercial Treaty of 1894-1904.]

ARTICLE VIII.—The restoration of public and private legal relations (*Rechtsbeziehungen*), the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the question of the treatment of merchantmen in the enemy's hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

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ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine, the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Austria-Hungary and the Ukraine, the Bulgarian and Ukrainian text for the relations between Bulgaria and the Ukraine, the Turkish and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. [Here follow the signatures.]

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of "treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war," exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, etc.

The Czech Declaration of 6 January

[The following declaration, adopted unanimously by the Congress of Czech deputies held in Prague on 6 January, was at first suppressed by the Austrian Censor, but has now been passed for publication. The Austrian Government, however, has not allowed any of the journals in which it appeared to leave Austria. We are indebted to the Czecho-Slovak National Council for the text of the declaration which it was able to secure despite the prohibition of the Austrian Government.]

In the fourth year of this terrible war, which has already cost the nations numberless sacrifices in blood and treasure, the first peace efforts have been inaugurated. We, the Czech members of the Austrian Reichsrat, which, through the verdicts of incompetent military tribunals, has been deprived of a number of its Slav deputies, and Czech deputies to the dissolved and as yet unsummoned Diet of the Kingdom of Bohemia, and to the equally unsummoned Diets of Moravia and Silesia, recognise the declarations of the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat, and deem it our duty emphatically to declare, in the name of the Czech nation and of its oppressed and forcibly-silenced Slovak branch of Hungary, our attitude towards the reconstruction of international relations.

When the Czech deputies of our regenerated nation expressed themselves, during the Franco-Prussian War, on the international European problems, they solemnly declared in their memorandum of 8 December, 1870, that "all nations, great or small, have an equal right to self-determination, and their complete equality should always be respected. Only from the recognition of the equality of all nations and from mutual respect of the right of self-determination can come true equality and fraternity, a general peace and true humanity."

We, deputies of the Czech nation, true even to-day to these principles of our ancestors, have therefore greeted with joy the fact that

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all States, based upon democratic principles, whether they are belligerent or neutral, now accept with us the right of nations to free self-determination as a guarantee of a general and lasting peace.

Also the new Russia accepted the principle of self-determination of nations during its attempts for a general peace, as a fundamental condition of peace. The nations were freely to determine their fate and decide whether they want to live in an independent State of their own or whether they chose to form one State in common with other nations.

On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian delegate declared, in the name of the Quadruple Alliance, that the question of the self-determination of those nations which have not hitherto enjoyed political independence, should be solved in a constitutional manner within the existing State. In view of this declaration we deem it our duty to declare, in the name of the Czecho-Slovak nation, that this point of view of the Austro-Hungarian representative is not our point of view. On the contrary, we have in all our declarations and proposals opposed this solution, because we know, from our own numberless bitter experiences, that it means nothing but the negation of the principle of self-determination. We indignantly express our regret that our nation was deprived of its political independence and of the right of self-determination, and that, by means of artificial electoral statutes, we were left to the mercy of the German minority and of the Government of the centralised German bureaucracy.

Our brother Slovaks became the victims of Magyar brutality and of unspeakable violence in a State which, notwithstanding all its apparent constitutional liberties, remains the darkest corner of Europe, and in which the non-Magyars, who form the majority of the population, are ruthlessly oppressed by the ruling minority, extirpated, denationalised from childhood, unrepresented in Parliament and Civil Service, deprived of public schools, as well as of all private educational institutions.

The Constitution, to which the Austro-Hungarian representative refers, falsified even the justice of the general suffrage by an artificial creation of an over-representation of the German minority in the Reichsrat, and its utter uselessness for the liberty of nations was clearly demonstrated during the three years of unscrupulous military absolutism during this war. Every reference to this Constitution, therefore, means, in reality, only a repudiation of the right of self-determination for the non-German nations of Austria who are at the mercy of the Germans; and it means an especially cruel insult and injury to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, where the Constitution is nothing but a means of shameful domination by the oligarchy of a few Magyar aristocratic families, as was again proved by the recent electoral reform proposal.

Our nation longs with all the democracies of the world for a general and lasting peace. But our nation is fully aware that no peace can be permanent except a peace which will abolish old injustice, brutal force and the predominance of arms, as well as the predominance of States and nations over other nations, and which will assure a free development to all nations, great or small, and which will liberate

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especially those nations which still are suffering under foreign domination. That is why it is necessary that this right of free national development and to self-determination of nations, great or small, to whatever State they may belong, should become the foundation of future international right, a guarantee of peace, and of a friendly co-operation of nations, as well as a great ideal which will liberate humanity from the terrible horrors of a world war.

We, deputies of the Czech nation, declare that a peace which would not bring our nation full liberty, could not be and would not mean a peace to us, but only a beginning of a new, desperate, and continuous struggle for our political independence, in which our nation would strain to the utmost its material and moral forces. And in that uncompromising struggle it would never relax until its aim had been achieved. Our nation asks for independence on the ground of its historic rights, and is imbued with the fervent desire to contribute towards the new development of humanity on the basis of liberty and fraternity in a free competition with other free nations which our nation hopes to accomplish in a sovereign, equal, democratic and socially just State of its own, built upon the equality of all its citizens within the historic boundaries of the Bohemian lands and of Slovakia, guaranteeing full and equal national rights to all minorities.

Guided by these principles, we solemnly protest against the rejection of the right of self-determination at the peace negotiations, and demand that, in the sense of this right, all nations, including, therefore, also the Czecho-Slovaks, be guaranteed participation and full freedom of defending their rights at the Peace Conference.

The Finance of the Anatolian Railway

Sir William Ramsay, in a letter to us from Edinburgh, makes the following comment on Professor Holland Rose's article, "The Encircling Myth once more" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 69) :—

"On p. 107 Professor Holland Rose speaks about the Turkish railways in Asia Minor as 'constructed mainly with German money.' They were constructed almost entirely with French money, which was obtained through the Swiss banks, as the French Government did not allow direct dealings on the Bourse. This fact, I thought, was well known. It has often been published, and I have it on the authority of von Gwinner himself in the year 1910, when he was discussing the situation very openly, and stating his plans and views about the past and the present. I had come into relations with him, as I was writing a series of papers on the economic results attained by the German Anatolian Railway, and I wanted to get official statistics to bring out the facts. I went direct to von Gwinner in Berlin, and told him what I wished to do, and how I proposed to do it. It caused him a good deal of trouble to get statistics collected from different Turkish official documents, and he remarked that the plan which I was carrying out of arranging a series of statistics year by year, so that they told their own story without any comment, had not occurred to him, and seemed to him extremely useful. He declared that his desire was to get this money not only from France, but also from London."

NOTES

Krupp and the Austrian Press

We have had occasion more than once to refer to the systematic designs of the great German armament firms upon the German-Swiss and Austrian Press; and since the exposures of the Bolo affair such attempts to manipulate public opinion have acquired an added interest. The case of the Viennese *Fremdenblatt* is especially interesting. During the last two months this paper, hitherto the official organ of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, has taken to running amuck in matters of international and internal policy; and no sooner had the sensation produced by its onslaught upon Prince Bülow died away than it indulged in so scathing an attack upon the Seidler Cabinet that the Ballplatz found it necessary to disclaim all responsibility for the *Fremdenblatt's* views on Austrian home politics.

It now appears that the changed attitude of the *Fremdenblatt* is due to the influence of the German armament firms. The *Arbeiter Zeitung* of 6 February boldly denounces the efforts of Herr Prinzhorn, the general manager of the four so-called Elbemühl papers (*i.e.*, a group of papers owned by one of the big Austrian paper trusts—the *Fremdenblatt*, the *Wiener Mittagszeitung*, the *Extrablatt* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung*), to acquire control of various provincial papers, and, in particular, of one of the German papers in Prague. "He will then," the *Arbeiter Zeitung* goes on, "conduct these papers, or some of them, in the service of the German heavy industries, especially the armament industries; and as Herr von Schoeller continues to be one of the chief shareholders, also in the service of the sugar industry." He has selected as business manager ("as national overseer on the coolie ink plantations of Herr Prinzhorn") the former vice-mayor of Graz, Dr. Bercht, while the editor of the *Mittagszeitung*, Dr. Salkind, was charged with purging the editorial staffs. "It is alleged that this job was too dirty for Dr. Salkind, and that he threw over the whole affair; and this does not strike us as quite impossible. The tendency of these papers is in future, in all matters of war and peace, to be fixed by Germany, while the extreme German national tendency in Austria is to be catered for by the Prague paper which they acquire." The Socialist organ then suggests that questions should be asked in Parliament regarding this *volte face* and the *Fremdenblatt* and "the plan for forging public opinion on a grand scale." "To our knowledge the *Fremdenblatt* still draws money from the Treasury, and this would give an excuse for inquiries. Above all, a straight question must be put to Count Czernin as to whether, in view of these dirty affairs, he still intends to maintain the connection with the *Fremdenblatt*."

Parallel with these intrigues the German armament firms and the German banks have been devoting themselves to financing more than one very prominent newspaper in Budapest, where the over-production of newspapers exceeds anything known in other parts of Europe, with the result that opportunities for press corruption are specially favourable. The attitude of Count Czernin to these demands for cleansing the Augean stable of the Viennese and Budapest press provides a simple test for the independent character of his relations with Germany.

Diary of Current Events

- 10 Jan.—Mr. Balfour's speech on War Aims at Edinburgh. New Admiralty Board formed. Manifesto of Reichstag Independent Socialists appealing to working classes to protest against German annexationist aims as revealed at Brest.
- 20 Jan.—"Breslau" sunk; "Goeben" beached. "Council of Flanders" unanimously declares for complete independence of Flanders.
- 3 Feb.—Supreme War Council replies to German Chancellor.
- 4 Feb.—Collapse of German strikes. Bolo trial opens.
- 5 Feb.—Berlin reports capture of Mohilev, including Krylenko and his staff, by Polish troops.
- 6 Feb.—Parliament prorogued. German ultimatum to Roumania demanding peace negotiations within 4 days.
- 7 Feb.—Vienna reports resignation of Seidler Cabinet.
- 9 Feb.—Ukraine signs peace with Germany.
- 10 Feb.—Embargo on Dutch commercial cables provisionally raised. Lord Beaverbrook appointed Minister in Charge of Propaganda. Bolševiks declare state of war at end, order demobilisation, but refuse to sign peace.
- 11 Feb.—Death of Abdul Hamid, ex-Sultan of Turkey, reported. President Wilson's answer to Count Hertling. Col. Repington's article in *Morning Post*.
- 12 Feb.—Reopening of Parliament: Mr. Asquith and Premier on functions of Supreme War Council. Reuter informed that Great Britain does not recognise Germano-Ukrainian peace.
- 13 Feb.—Announcement that Col. Repington and editor of *Morning Post* to be prosecuted under D.O.R.A. Mr. Balfour on Versailles Council.
- 14 Feb.—Reported resignation of Polish Regency Cabinet. Bolo and Cavallini condemned to death. Russia adopts Gregorian calendar, "the first day after 31 Jan. being reckoned as 14 Feb."
- 15 Feb.—German Commission leaves Petrograd.
- 16 Feb.—Repington trial opens. General Sir H. Wilson made C.I.G.S. General Sir W. Robertson denies "resignation."
- 17 Feb.—General Sir W. Robertson's resignation of post of Chief of I.G.S. announced. General Kaledin commits suicide.
- 18 Feb.—Noon; Russo-German armistice declared at an end by Germany: war resumed. Lord R. Cecil's statement to Reuter on difficulties of League of Peace. Lord Northcliffe becomes Director of Propaganda in Enemy countries. Sir W. Robertson accepts Eastern Command. Serbian Industrial Mission received by King at Buckingham Palace.
- 19 Feb.—Premier's statement on General Sir W. Robertson and Versailles. Germans take Dvinsk and Lutsk. Russia announces willingness to sign, under protest, peace terms dictated by enemy at Brest. Vice-President of Reichstag on peace with Ukraine. Vienna reports that Roumania has expressed wish to begin preliminary peace negotiations. Sir H. Rawlinson becomes British representative at Versailles. A.S.E. rejects Government's man-power proposals.
- 20 Feb.—Kühlmann in Reichstag on new situation. Mr. Balfour informs Polish National Committee that Great Britain does not accept peace treaty between Ukraine and Central Powers. Lord Jellicoe at Aldwich Club on submarine war. Inter-Allied Social and Labour Conference opens in London.
- 21 Feb.—*Morning Post* case ends: editor and Col. Repington fined. Jericho captured.

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Italy and the Liberation of the Slavs. By J. C. POWELL.

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—*Baron von Freitag-Loringhoven*

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The Economic Weapon and Imperial Unity

"The great difficulty of all schemes for Leagues of Nations and the like has been to find an effective sanction against nations determined to break the peace. It may be that a League of Nations, properly furnished with machinery to enforce the financial, commercial, and economic isolation of a nation determined to force its will upon the world by mere violence, would be a real safeguard for the peace of the world."

(LORD ROBERT CECIL, 31 August, 1917.)

"We would not have any more standing armies—or allow the young manhood of the nations to be sacrificed to the Moloch of war. We did not want standing armies to weigh as a heavy incubus, through taxation or otherwise, on the economic resources of the nations."

(GENERAL SMUTS, Tonypany, 29 October, 1917.)

THE idea of the economic weapon has made rapid progress in this country since the outbreak of war. Indeed, it may now be said to have secured the advocacy of practically all sections of opinion, from the extreme Left to the extreme Right. It commends itself for a number of different, but not incompatible, reasons. Those who were impressed, even in pre-war days, with the need for State action to counteract unscrupulous German trade-methods were naturally predisposed to welcome it. But the larger body of opinion which shrank from State interference in this field before the war, preferring to cling to the traditional British policy of *laissez-faire*, has now altered its attitude. Partly, no doubt, this is because the war has disclosed the full extent and character of the economic aggression to which we were exposed: the German control over the Australian metal trade is only one of many instances which could be cited. But there is a more far-reaching consideration in men's minds, to which reference has been made in recent statements by Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts. It is that the experience of the blockade, reinforced now by the collaboration of nearly all the great producing countries of the world, has taught us to look to economic armaments as a practicable substitute for armed force in dealing with future offenders against the world's peace. Quite apart from the immediate issues of

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post-war policy, the economic boycott is likely to become a permanent part of the machinery of organised mankind.

The object of this article is not to discuss the nature and development of this new weapon of civilisation, or to enquire in what way it can be connected with the organisation of the League of Nations which, it is to be hoped, will spring out of the co-operation of the Allies in the present war. The weapon itself is now being shaped and tempered in the various inter-ally committees and controls which have recently been set up; and it will doubtless pass through many forms of increasing effectiveness before the war is ended and the problem of its use in peace-time arises. What it seems more profitable to discuss at the moment in THE NEW EUROPE, since it affects not only ourselves but our relations with our Allies, is the reaction of this new aspect of the problem of national and international defence upon some of the outstanding questions of British commercial and constitutional policy.

Let us first consider what new light has been thrown by recent events on what used to be called in pre-war days "the fiscal problem"—the well-worn issue "Free Trade *versus* Protection" and "Imperial Preference" which occupied so much of the political stage between 1903 and 1914.

It is sometimes said that the war has killed Free Trade. In a certain sense, no doubt, this is true. The private trader whose goods enter or leave this country will never again be so unhampered in his activities, or so free from the prospect of State control and restriction, as he was in the days before the war, when key industries, export licences, priority certificates and all the rest had never been heard of. But it is often overlooked that if the war has given Free Trade, in this strict sense, its deathblow, Protection or Tariff Reform, as we knew it before the war, has been laid low by the same stroke. The old Free Trade *v.* Protection campaign was fought out partly on the issue of direct *v.* indirect taxation and partly on the question of support for British industries. So far as taxation is concerned, the issue still remains open. Those who want to raise revenue out of customs duties can plead, as is being pleaded in most European countries, that the state of the national finances demands it. But Free Traders are justified in retorting that Free Trade finance has so far served us far better in wartime than its supporters ever dreamed, and that,

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compared with the sums now required, the paltry ten or twenty millions which a moderate general tariff would bring in are hardly worth considering. Moreover, it is quite clear from the state of public feeling among the working class and elsewhere (as the debate at the last Trade Union Congress showed), that no party could hope to carry a tariff policy with success at a general election unless it were linked with proposals on the Australian model, securing the fruits of the proposed change, not simply to the capitalists in the industries concerned, but also to the workers and to the community. Under these circumstances it is very much open to doubt whether proposals for a general tariff, or any thing resembling it, will be put forward at all in any authoritative quarter. Certainly the vital differences between the commercial position of the United Kingdom and that of Australia are not likely to make the Australian policy commend itself on closer examination either to employers or workmen in the great industries, such as textiles and shipbuilding, which rely for their success in foreign markets upon cheap raw material and low cost of production.

The United Kingdom will, therefore, in all probability, continue to maintain after the war her traditional policy of a narrow range of customs duties. No doubt State action will be taken, and of a vigorous kind, to safeguard us from the dangers to which our *laissez-faire* tradition has been found to have exposed us. But with the immense experience of State control of trade and industry which the war has provided we are hardly likely, even in this restricted field, to have recourse to the antiquated toll-bar methods of a tariff. Both the judgment of officials who have experience of the working of our wartime arrangements and the opinion of the general public are likely to incline toward a system of State encouragement and control (safeguarded, if necessary, by prohibitions rather than duties) in the case of "key industries" and other forms of production held to be necessary for the welfare of the State.

But, it may be said, unless we adopt a protective tariff we shall be acting contrary to the policy of imperial preference agreed upon at the recent Imperial Conference, and to the pledges of support given by the present Government and its predecessor to the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference.

Both these arguments are based, as can easily be shown,

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on a complete misapprehension of the facts. Since they have obtained widespread currency and have caused legitimate anxiety to our Allies and to friendly neutrals, it may be desirable to examine them more closely.

It is quite true that the Imperial Conference passed, under the heading "Imperial Preference," a resolution recommending that "all possible encouragement should be given to the development of Imperial resources, and especially to making the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials and essential industries," and urging that, "having due regard to the interests of our Allies," each part of the Empire should "give specially favourable treatment and facilities to the produce and manufactures of other parts." The resolution itself was framed in vague terms; but a few moments' reflection is enough to make it clear that, unless it were meant to be a pious opinion and nothing more, it could not be interpreted in the sense of the Chamberlain policy of preferential customs duties as a first step towards an Imperial Zollverein or Customs Union.

In the first place, the old policy of Imperial Preference necessarily involves a tariff on raw materials and foodstuffs entering the United Kingdom. As was argued *ad nauseam* during the fiscal controversy, the overwhelming bulk of our imports from other parts of the Empire consists of foodstuffs and raw materials, and we can only give them preferential customs treatment by putting duties on foodstuffs and raw materials from elsewhere. But at the present moment all our efforts are directed to securing the maximum transportation and importation of foodstuffs and raw materials for ourselves and our European allies; and, in the unprecedented world-shortage of supplies with which we are faced, it is quite certain that we shall continue these efforts for some considerable time. A Bill has already been introduced into Parliament to prolong for three years after the war the organisation which directs these efforts. At the same time, we have subsidised the loaf at the estimated cost of £40,000,000 a year. Is there anyone outside a madhouse who will argue, in the face of these facts, that it will be possible to adopt a policy of Imperial Preference in the old sense in the immediate post-war period? Preferential duties on imperial produce entering the United Kingdom are likely, then, to remain an academic question, at least until food prices have sunk to

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something approaching the 1914 level. How soon that will be the most sanguine economist would not venture to prophesy. The Greek Kalends would seem to be quite a likely date.

In the second place, the resolution differs from the old Chamberlain policy in referring, not to the self-governing Dominions and the Mother-country alone, but to the whole Empire. This is an extension—and a welcome extension—of the meaning of Imperial Preference. When Mr. Chamberlain urged the desirability of linking together the Mother-country and the Colonies (as they were then called) by a system of reciprocal customs duties, he was not thinking of the Dependencies. He was not asking the British electorate to go back upon the traditional British policy of the Open Door and to turn the British Commonwealth into an estate reserved for the exploitation of the Mother-country. No doubt his campaign was so interpreted by the German government to suit its own ends, and the general acceptance of this view by German writers, Socialist and non-Socialist alike, is a significant indication of the policy which Germany would undoubtedly pursue were she in our place. But this was not Mr. Chamberlain's policy, nor has it been the policy of any British Government since the loss of the American Colonies. That it is not the policy of the present Government is sufficiently shown by their action in allowing the Government of India, in response to Indian opinion, to levy a protective duty on cotton goods, which operated mainly against British traders. Whether the action thus taken was wise or unwise, it certainly did not betoken a monopolistic imperialism.

Apart, however, from these arguments, the true meaning of the resolution has been clearly explained in public speeches by the present Prime Minister and Sir Robert Borden. The Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall on 27 April, 1917, said :—

" We believe that a system of preference can be established which will not involve the imposition of burdens of food. . . . Of course, with food at its scarcest and dearest this is not a time to talk about putting additional burdens on food. But for purposes of preference that would not be essential. You can secure that by other means, and *more particularly by taking measures which other lands have taken for improving the communications between one part of their Dominions and another.*"

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And Sir Robert Borden, speaking in the Dominion House of Commons on 18 May, 1917, said, of the Resolution :—

“ What this proposal looks to, as I understand it, is this : we can, within this Empire have better and cheaper facilities of communication than we have enjoyed up to the present time. That, I believe, is the line along which the change indicated will proceed.”

These utterances should make it absolutely clear that the preferential measures which the Imperial Conference had immediately in view are not fiscal in character but lie in the much less debatable and, it may be added, much more useful sphere of transport and communications.

But whatever may happen to food prices and supplies in the future, there is a further and more convincing reason why the new policy of Imperial preference is certain to develop on different lines from its predecessor. It reveals itself on a closer inspection of the nature of the proposed economic weapon. We shall see that what is required to make this weapon effective is an Imperial policy, in the strict sense of the word. But the old Chamberlain fiscal programme did not look to Imperial action. It looked to local action. Its aim was not to arm the Imperial Government with new powers to extend the Empire's trade or counteract aggressive action by its competitors, but to persuade the various legislatures in the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions to adopt a fiscal programme on substantially similar lines. It aimed, in other words, not at unity but at co-operation. Nor was any other policy possible in the circumstances. Fiscal policy is and must always remain a matter of Dominion rather than of Imperial concern : for it is necessarily, first and foremost, a question of taxation, and, through taxation, of social policy. No one who has any acquaintance with Dominion feeling can have the hardihood to anticipate that the self-governing Dominions will ever allow the Imperial Parliament, whether with or without Dominion representation, to assume the right of determining the incidence of their taxation as between class and class, and with it the power to shape the form and development of their social system.

But the matter assumes a very different aspect when we consider what sort of organisation will be required to put the economic weapon in motion. For that weapon to be successfully exercised against a foreign Power two things are necessary : adequate defensive preparation in time of

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peace and adequate machinery for instant and decisive action in the event of war. As regards the first, much might be said. It will be sufficient to recall here the following passages from the recently issued Report of the Dominions Royal Commission :—

“ In our opinion it is vital that the Empire should, so far as possible, be placed in a position which would enable it to resist any pressure which a foreign Power or group of Powers could exercise in time of peace or during war in virtue of a control of raw materials and commodities essential for the safety and well-being of the Empire, and it is towards the attainment of this object that co-ordinated effort should be directed.” (“ Dominions Royal Commission, Final Report,” p. 328.)

A few pages later on, in a passage which it is worth while quoting at some length, the Commissioners indicate in greater detail the nature of the economic weapons which they have in view :—

“ We doubt whether it was realised before the war that the Empire had substantially a monopoly of the world’s production or distribution of certain most valuable commodities of commerce. Even if the fact were dimly recognised, no effort had been made by the Governments of the Empire individually, or in co-operation, to use these commodities to their commercial advantage.

“ Canada produces much the largest proportion of nickel, cobalt, and asbestos, and, in conjunction with India, of mica.

“ New Zealand produces practically the only supply of kauri gum and phormium fibre.

“ The Union of South Africa has the virtual monopoly of diamonds and ostrich feathers.

“ India has a monopoly of jute, whilst the West African Colonies yield the major portion of the world’s supply of palm nuts and palm kernels, and the Eastern Colonies of plantation rubber.

“ The British Empire produces about 40 to 45 per cent. of the world’s total supply of wool. If merino wool only is taken, the proportion is much higher. The Empire also produces over 60 per cent. of the world’s output of gold.

“ It is not difficult to imagine conditions, even in times of peace, in which it might become desirable to use the possession of these assets as an instrument of commercial negotiation. The practical monopoly of potash which Germany possesses has enabled her to exert pressure on other countries in the past, and the controversy between Germany and the United States in 1911 may be mentioned as an example of the influence which the possession of a raw material monopoly gives in commercial negotiations between two Powers. The possession of assets such as the Canadian asbestos and nickel supplies could be used by the British Empire as a powerful means of economic defence.” (“ Dominions Royal Commission, Final Report,” pp. 334, 335.)

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Defensive machinery of the kind here suggested cannot be improvised. It requires careful and concerted action on a pre-arranged plan. Such arrangements, however, are not necessarily incompatible with the existing relationship between the Dominions and the Imperial Government. What is described in the Report as "co-ordinated effort"—that is, separate action on similar lines by all the various Dominion, Colonial, and other Governments concerned—may be sufficient for the purpose, provided that the various Governments are regularly and adequately advised by some body of experts corresponding to the Imperial Development Board recommended by the Dominions Commission. When, however, we pass from the sphere of preparation to that of execution something more than "co-ordination" or "co-operation" would seem to be required.

This can be best seen by taking a concrete case. Let us imagine the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia being delivered at a time when the existing alliance of liberal Powers was in being, but relied for its defence of public right upon the weapon of the economic boycott. If the British Government is to throw its weight into the scale in such an emergency it must not only demand the submission of the matters at issue to an international body for consideration, but must be able to back up the demand by the threat of immediate action in the event of a refusal. What form would such action take? Nothing less, surely, than a control over the movements of all the supplies of the vital commodities mentioned above and of British shipping of every kind in every quarter of the Commonwealth. The Government must, in other words, be ready to assume the functions of an economic dictator. Unless it is in a position, and is known to be in a position, to do this, if, instead of issuing mobilisation orders prepared beforehand, it is forced, after war has been declared, to enter upon long and laborious negotiations and explanations with the Dominion, Indian, and other Governments, and with private interests, its economic armament will be a mere *brutum fulmen*, and will be treated as such by would-be transgressors of Public Right.

The powers required for this purpose are emergency powers and would, of course, be used with full regard for the public opinion of all the various parts of the Commonwealth. But

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if they are seriously intended to take the place of the military and naval forces which have hitherto safeguarded our treaty obligations, they must be more than advisory. They must be executive. If they are less than that they will be relatively useless, both for the purpose of threatening penalties and of enforcing them, and, so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, the idea of disarmament and of the economic weapon as an alternative to armed force is likely to remain an academic speculation.

It is clear from this that, unless the idea of the economic weapon is to be dropped, it must be carefully considered at the Imperial Conference which will be held at the close of the war; and appropriate machinery, representative not of the United Kingdom alone but of the whole Empire, must be framed to meet the necessities of the case.

To sum up, the conclusions which have been reached may be stated as follows:—

1. That the adoption of the economic weapon does not involve any alteration in the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom.

2. That the wartime experiments in the State control of trade and industry have shown tariffs to be a clumsy and obsolete device for safeguarding and encouraging vital industries.

3. That the policy of reciprocal customs duties between the Mother-country and the Dominions has been indefinitely shelved.

4. That the adoption of the economic weapon necessitates—

- (a) a co-ordinated policy for the development of the Empire's resources;
- (b) the working out of a concerted system of imperial economic defence and mobilisation;
- (c) the arming of the Central Government with emergency powers of command and control over the shipping, trade, and supplies of the whole Empire, so as to be able to put this system into instant and effective operation for the upholding of Public Right.

ATTICUS.

The Case of Leon Kamenev

MR. LEON KAMENEV was recently appointed Delegate of the Russian People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs—*i.e.*, Bolševik Envoy—to Paris. On receiving his credentials from Mr. Trotski he presented himself at the French Embassy in Petrograd, where his passport was stamped with the special diplomatic *visa*. Thus at the outset of his journey his mission received a certain measure of official recognition from the Embassy of the Government to which he was accredited. He proceeded on his journey. At the Norwegian port from which he embarked no hint was given to him, either by the British or French Consuls, that he would not be received in Paris; and it was not until he arrived at a northern British port that he became aware of the hostility which his mission aroused. On landing he was treated by British officials in a manner which left no doubt in his mind that powerful forces were at work against him. He was searched and deprived of most of his possessions, including his diplomatic bag and a cheque for £5,000; and his claim to be regarded as the diplomatic agent of a foreign State was ignored. He was allowed to proceed to London, where he learned, by an announcement in the House of Commons, that the French Government would not permit him to land in France. He had therefore no choice but to return to Russia; he has actually been summarily sent back to Russia, where he will report his experiences to Mr. Trotski in terms which can easily be imagined.

Before I discuss the consequences which may flow from our treatment of Mr. Kamenev I must go back to the parent error in the attitude of the British Government. And let it be noted that the merits or follies of Bolševik policy are not the real subject-matter in dispute in this particular instance. The refusal to recognise the Bolševiks as the *de facto* Government of Russia or to have any *direct* dealings with their envoy in London is due to the assumption that Bolševism is merely one phase of the revolutionary movement which will pass away and give place to something more permanent. That assumption may be well founded; but it offers no excuse for allowing our relations with Russia to drift into the present *impasse*. I do not suggest that the Foreign Secretary should accord to Mr. Litvinov or to any other Bolševik envoy the dignified status and special privileges of an Ambassador. But

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clearly the Government cannot accuse the Russian envoy of abusing his diplomatic office and, in the same breath, declare that he has no diplomatic status. They must choose their course; and there seems to be no valid reason why Russian diplomatic business should not be conducted on the same footing in London as British diplomatic business in Petrograd. There is, of course, no precedent governing the present case; and since the etiquette of diplomacy is the slave of precedent, the Foreign Office can find no way out, and perhaps desires none. But those who see our good name in Russia being thrown away cannot remain silent. We are not thinking of gaining or losing favour with the Bolševik party, which may or may not vanish from the scene to-morrow; we are thinking of the impression which our recent acts have made upon the peasants and workmen in Russia—the impression that Great Britain, once the home of political freedom, is now its enemy. True or false, the impression is there, and will not easily be removed.

Now, if the official reason for thus refusing to have any but indirect relations with the Russian envoy is the belief that Bolševism will soon pass away from the Russian scene, the real motive of the treatment of Mr. Kamenev is the fear that it may spread to Great Britain. This chimerical danger haunts the mind of the Home Secretary and prompts him to take precautions betimes against those who may carry the infection across the North Sea. It does not seem to occur to the official mind that if the tinder of revolutionary feeling exists in Great Britain it betokens a state of affairs upon which the entry of one Russian Bolševik or a hundred can have but little effect. Indeed, if the danger of social upheaval is real it will not be lessened by official actions which prove the nervousness of what is called the governing class. In such circumstances the expulsion of Mr. Kamenev must be grist to the mill of the British revolutionary far more valuable than any assistance he could hope for from the alleged dissemination of seditious literature coming from Russia. But the truth is that the only British revolution which is in prospect—and even that is still conjectural—is the political change heralded by the new programme of the Labour Party. The word revolution has been much abused in recent political discussions; it has indeed been applied to each European country in succession to describe the most diverse

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social conditions, but to most British minds it conveys nothing but a picture of disorder and bloodshed, of chaos and terror, which is exploited by reactionaries everywhere in order to instil in the public mind a wholesome fear of political change. Political change is in the very air we breathe; but it will not come in the guise of "the red fool-fury of the Seine," and those who betray fear of it merely reveal their own misapprehension of the national character. The Home Office is the custodian of public order under the Defence of the Realm Act, and is entitled to take the necessary measures for its preservation; but it is clearly acting beyond its powers when it treats even so unconventional an envoy as Mr. Kamenev in the manner of which I complain. And it would never have dared to act thus if the Foreign Office had not abdicated its own functions by leaving our Russian relations to drift at large amid the conflicting winds of reactionary factions.

The Foreign Office may reply that, since the Bolševik Government is not one which it cares to recognise, Mr. Kamenev is merely a private person whose movements are a fit subject for Home Office control. But even the Foreign Office must be aware that Mr. Kamenev does not lose his representative character merely because he is not officially received in this country. It is true that any Government may refuse to acknowledge a foreign ambassador if it chooses to take the consequences; but in the present case the British Government cannot adopt that attitude, for Mr. Kamenev is not accredited to London, and has not yet received any intimation from the French Government that he will not be received in Paris. And even if the British Government knew privately that M. Clemenceau would refuse to acknowledge him, there are good reasons why it should have permitted him to remain in London for the moment. Mr. Kamenev is the most representative Russian who has yet come to Great Britain since the Bolševik party came into power; he was one of the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk; he can speak with authority on the negotiations which took place there. And since those negotiations were one of the most important diplomatic events of the war, it is strange that the British Foreign Office should not welcome the opportunity of meeting one of the negotiators. The proceeding would have been unconventional, perhaps. It would probably have entailed an expression of regret by the Government to Mr. Kamenev for the treatment he had

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received; for without some such expression he could hardly consent to meet those who had treated him so badly. By whatever means, the meeting ought to have been arranged; and it could have been conducted without either upsetting the French people, who are more incensed against the Bolševiks than we are, or committing the British Government to anything more than a legitimate desire for information.

There is a further consideration which may carry weight. The British Embassy in Petrograd and British residents in Russia may yet find themselves held as hostages for the good behaviour of their own Government. Is it in their interest or in the interest of the good name of Great Britain to compel Mr. Trotski to take reprisals upon them for the treatment of his envoys in London?

A. F. WHYTE.

The Russian Church since the Revolution

THE Orthodox Russian Church is now probably passing through the most crucial period of its history. For 200 years, since the institution of the Holy Synod by Peter the Great, the Church has been placed in a position of absolute dependence upon the Government, and was gradually being transformed into the "Department of Orthodox Confession." The Procurator, representing "the eye of the sovereign," kept a vigilant watch over the clergy, making them an instrument for the support of autocracy. The Synod itself, although nominally a council of the clergy, was composed of bishops and priests, not freely elected, but appointed by the Tsar upon the recommendation of the Procurator, who was thus always able to constitute a majority according to his own political views. The ecclesiastical autocracy of the Patriarchate was superseded by the arbitrary despotism of the Procurator, and the Church was transformed into a bureaucratic institution with "departments," promotions, decorations, and other graver evils of bureaucracy.

Representatives of the "black" clergy, *i.e.*, the bishops who, in the Eastern Church, are unmarried and must be monks, predominated in the Synod over the "white," *i.e.*, the married clergy, of whom only two or three were admitted as a special favour; so that the inner life of the Church, its spiritual welfare and aspirations were governed by men whose life had been passed within monastic walls, and who had,

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as a rule, little understanding of the trials and interests of the outside world.

This naturally created an atmosphere of estrangement between the higher and lower clergy. The parish priests, especially those of the villages, were usually left to themselves, receiving neither guidance nor moral support from their bishop. Depending entirely upon their parishioners for their material existence, working the "Church field" like ordinary peasants, often burdened with numerous families—the life of the average village priest was usually one of severe struggle against want and poverty. Added to that was a constant fear of being reported as "troublesome" by the police, which would entail an invitation from the diocesan bishop for "explanation." What wonder that the average Russian priest often gave up "things spiritual" and devoted his time and energy to "things temporal"! Many a young enthusiast, after a few years' living amid the sordid and miserable surroundings of a Russian village, cut off from nearly all intercourse with civilised people, receiving no moral support from his bishop, succumbed to the temptation to drown his broken aspirations and shattered hopes in what was and is the curse of the Russian people. To prevent "dangerous popularity" it became the Procurator's policy in latter years never to allow a popular bishop to remain long in the same diocese. They were shifted from one see to another like pawns, often barely having had time to become acquainted with their flock. Braver and more independent bishops were even obliged to "retire for reasons of health" into remote monasteries, while the lower clergy sought refuge in Catholicism or in renouncing the orders. Little wonder that bishops and priests became mere officials, trembling at the very name of the "Ober"-procurator and not daring to raise their voice in protest. Little wonder, too, that the official Church ceased to exercise any influence upon the mass of the people, having in their minds become blended with all other "authorities."

Of course there were exceptions—pure, high-minded men, whose names are known and revered throughout Russia, to whom thousands flocked bringing their troubles, doubts, and sorrows, and whose wise counsel and Christian charity brought comfort and cheer. But these were mostly men who had retired from the world, who had never tried to influence the social life of the people: their message had

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nearly always been to the individual, and they could not alter or reform the official church. The first impulse to the movement for the regeneration of the Church was given by the Revolution of 1905. Progressive members of the clergy and laity proclaimed the vital necessity of Church reform and the convocation of a Church Assembly. The Government, pretending to sympathise with the movement, appointed a pre-Assembly Council to debate questions of Church reform and draw up a programme for the All-Russia Assembly. This still-born institution, periodically meeting or dissolving according to the general orientation of the Government's policy, lingered on and died a natural death at the Revolution. The State Duma also raised the problem of Church reform, and a special commission drafted several Bills concerning vital reforms of church and parish organisation. But these drafts were either never examined by the Government or were returned by the pre-Assembly Council with such alterations as entirely annulled the significance of the reform.

The Revolution of 1917 liberated the Church from a two centuries' oppression and suppression. The Provisional Government, granting freedom of conscience and of worship, announced the convocation of the All-Russia Church Assembly. A great wave of revival swept through the Church. It was like a breath of fresh air in the close atmosphere of church life. Local church councils met in nearly all dioceses, and clergy and laymen for the first time after many years discussed in common questions of church and parish reform, and drew up instructions for their delegates to the All-Russia Assembly.

The metropolitans of Petrograd and Moscow and several diocesan bishops were elected by suffrage, laymen taking part in the polling, thus opening a new era in Russian Church life. All the newly-elected were already ordained bishops, but in Moscow a strong current had manifested itself for the election of a well-known and popular lay church-worker, and only his repeated and decided refusal prevented his becoming metropolitan.

At last the All-Russia Church Assembly was opened with great solemnity on 15/28 August, in the ancient historical Uspenski Cathedral in the Kremlin. A special service was celebrated, at the end of which the Creed was chanted by all the members. Deeply impressed by the great task that

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lay before them, the members of the Assembly, gathered from all parts of Russia, before settling down to work, undertook a solemn pilgrimage to the famous Troitsa Monastery, near Moscow, to invoke the blessing of Saint Sergius, "the great interceder for the Russian land." After the preliminary stage of organisation was passed, three distinct currents became manifest throughout the debates.

The first, which might be termed the "Extreme Left," was represented by the most progressive members of the clergy and laity. Their programme was a complete separation of Church and State, the Church remaining absolutely independent as "a state within a state," with radical reforms of church organisation and almost complete control of the clergy by the laity.

Their opponents—the conservative elements of the Assembly—although fully realising the vital necessity of reforms, were unable to renounce the old principle of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality," and secretly hoped to use the Patriarchate as an instrument of political propaganda for the restoration of the Monarchy.

The third current naturally flowed between the other two, and assimilated all the moderate liberal members of the Assembly. While contemplating the ultimate separation of Church and State they pointed out that the former, only just emerging from semi-paralysis, was too weak materially and perhaps morally to stand alone without support from the State. But such material support from the Government was in no way to encroach upon the right of the Church to complete autonomy, nor was the Church to take part in political life, its aims and activity being solely confined to the spiritual and moral sphere.

The restoration of the Patriarchate was advocated as a return to the early traditions of the Eastern Church, which always admitted of a spiritual head of the Church, though by no means in the Roman Catholic sense. The danger of the Patriarchate becoming a source of ecclesiastical despotism and reaction should be averted by the creation of a permanent Church Council, elected by suffrage from among both clergy and laity. Periodical assemblies should be convoked to discuss important problems and vital needs of church life. Fundamental reforms and reorganisation of the parish were included in the programme, giving full scope for public initia-

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tive and self-government. What would have been the development of these reforms under normal conditions of social life it is difficult to say. But time and tide wait for no man, nor does a revolution. The relentless tide of events rolled on, sweeping away old forms and institutions.

The heavy guns boomed out the proclamation of civil war in Moscow during the election of the Patriarch. All lands belonging to the churches and monasteries were confiscated shortly after, and the publication of the decree for the separation of Church and State is probably a matter of the immediate future.

Thus has the Church passed without transition from the sheltered harbour of Government protection straight into the very heart of the storm. For the revolution has brought not only emancipation but also persecution. The ignorant masses, in whose uncultivated minds the Church, the Tsar, and the police were indissolubly blended together, turned at once against the priests. The demagogic propaganda, that "God had been invented by the popes and landowners for the exploitation of the people," found ready listeners among the poor bewildered peasants, whose worst instincts were being systematically aroused and encouraged by conscious or unconscious leaders. The newly-acquired freedom was understood by them not as freedom *of*, but *from* conscience, worship, or any organisation. Many churches were closed, priests insulted and expelled from their parishes.

This anti-Church movement became manifest from the very beginning of the revolution though on a moderate scale. Now, with the universal spread of anarchy throughout Russia, it has increased a thousandfold. Churches are being closed and plundered; hundreds of priests are wandering homeless and destitute, or hiding with their families in hovels, trembling for their very lives. Many of them have been foully murdered; others are seeking safety in denying their priesthood and exhibiting the wildest demagogy. Open scuffles frequently occur in the villages and towns between the supporters of the Church and the rabble, for it is impossible to define as atheists or freethinkers men whose sole religious, moral and political code is "down with everything." Men who had nominally belonged to the Church either from mere force of habit or from political motives have naturally turned away from it in its hour of trial; while others again, seeing

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everything crumbling around them are returning to the well-nigh forgotten beliefs of their childhood.

In the terrible turmoil of conflicting forces, destructive and creative, which are seething in Russia, will the Russian Church perish? Or will it emerge weakened numerically and materially but purified and regenerated by the fiery trial, and strong with "the strength of ten, because its heart is pure"?

C. ZVEGINTSOV.

Caporetto and the Piave

Now that all has been made secure upon the new Italian front on the Piave, it may be well to consider what really befel and what has been achieved in this most critical section of what we now at last may call the single allied front that stretches from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

The Austro-German attack upon the second Italian army, and first, and especially, upon that part of it which held the lines between the Conca di Plezzo and the bridge-head of Tolmino, was begun on the morning of 24 October last. It was prepared by a bombardment of seven hours and extensive use during two hours of asphyxiating gas. The bombardment ceased about five, as though suffocated by the fog that filled towards dawn the valley of the Isonzo. At eight o'clock, unexpectedly, the first waves of enemy infantry began to advance, surging out of the fog upon the Latin lines. Unfortunately, a few units in those lines to whom had been confided the defence of the most vulnerable point showed that failure of discipline and force to which as every soldier knows the best armies may suddenly become subject. The most terrible disaster of the war, at any rate upon the West, was the result—as little expected by the troops who were the cause of it as by the command which had entrusted the honour of the defence to them. We know this defeat as the disaster of Caporetto.

It was a defeat of the first magnitude, due to many causes which cannot yet be spoken of, involving not only an enormous loss of guns and a very great loss of men, but the immediate peril of two great armies. It was followed by one of the most heroic fighting retreats of the whole war, and by a resistance which should for ever wipe out the memory of Caporetto, and establish the fighting quality of the armies of modern Italy in the annals of Europe.

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The Austro-German advance into Italy was finally arrested on the line of the Piave. This great operation, wholly Italian as it was in all its parts, and involving as it did the salvation of two armies and a portion of the broken third, deserves the most complete military examination, and will doubtless receive it one of these days. Here I intend only to emphasize, because in my opinion it has not received a tenth part of the consideration and recognition among the allies which is its due, the great and heroic significance of the halt, imposed by the armies of General Diaz upon the enemy, at last upon the Piave.

We speak of the retreat from Mons, of the Battle of the Marne, and already regard them as almost fabulous; we think of Verdun almost as a classic action, a long-drawn-out defensive utterly heroic from beginning to end; the war one might think has nothing which for any of us can ever be named beside these vast and sacramental actions. We do not realise that the retreat to the Piave and the defence there established were and will ever remain in the same category: only neither the French nor ourselves in the retreat to the Marne or the defence of Verdun had lost 2,500 guns, almost half of the guns anywhere in action.

It was after such a disaster, the disintegration of one army and the loss of a quarter of a million men, that Italy began that fighting retreat and the heroic defence of the Piave which will more and more come to be named with the retreat to the Marne and the defence of Verdun—things half divine, heroic in the original sense of the word.

For, indeed, where else does military history record an awakening so swift and so glorious as that of the Italian armies wholly recovering, and for themselves, on Italian territory the power of resistance after a tragedy of apathy and miserable discussion? In the face of bad tactical conditions, awful depression and shame, the Italians reacted and willed and obtained that which it was difficult even to hope for in the first moments. From day to day astonishingly the hardness and consistence of the defence grew. Without defences, hopelessly inferior in artillery and against new and ever fresh enemy troops, the soldiers of Italy knew how to resist the hurricane of enemy fire, and with the bayonet to fling back the infantry of their secular enemy. The Melette, the Castelgomberto, Monte Solarolo, the Asolone, Monte Tomba, Monfenera, Monte Val Bella, Sasso

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Rosso were lost only to be regained; and if they were obliged to abandon any one of them at last, they faced and outfaced the enemy on new lines. Every stone became a fortress, every slope a bulwark, and to the enemy they presented ever new barriers to throw down and to pass. There was not a battle in the great style, but a complex of combats, in which the soldier offered his breast as a defence, and only the bayonet for weapon. There was no man there who did not show the genial Latin astuteness in utilising every obstacle, every defence, every contrivance, together with a new-found tenacity to which the tragedy of Caporetto had steeled his soul.

For three months the Latin line held Italy alone against the barbarian—Italy, with the major treasures of the world in her breast. Till, with what joy, down the long Roman roads from the mountain, thundered the artillery of Britain and of Gaul. And all that Europe is now stands together for the defence of the cradle and the home of our civilisation.

The defence of the Piave was due, first to the marvellous retreat of the third army commanded by the Duca d'Aosta; that army, which had written so many pages of glory at Gorizia and on the Carso. Secondly, to the action of the Fourth Army which, after a difficult retreat from Cadore and from Carnia, showed so much ability and so much valour between the Brenta and the Piave. And, lastly, to the First Army, which on the Alto Piana di Asiago, knew how first to throw back and then to bar the pass to the fresh and chosen troops of Conrad.

To conclude, I must say that the factors of the resistance on the Piave were neither tactical nor the reaching of an equilibrium with the forces of the enemy; but they were the valour, the tenacity, the heroism of the troops and their officers, the lively sentiment of their native Italy, which had to be saved, and the resentment that every soldier and every Italian has for the sad page of Caporetto.

EDWARD HUTTON.

The Musings of a Slavophile

"LET us observe them at this decisive moment," writes Taine in his memorable description of the Terror. "I do not believe that any country or century has witnessed such a contrast between a nation and its rulers. By a series of inverted purges the best, not the worst, has been eliminated, and faction has

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been reduced to its dregs. Of the vast wave set in motion in 1789 nothing remains but the foam and the scum. All else has been rejected or has dropped out—first the upper class, clergy, nobility and parliamentarians; then the middle class, industrialists, merchants and bourgeois; then the *élite* of the lower class, small proprietors, farmers and artisans; in short, all the notables of every profession, condition or trade, all that possessed capital, income, position, esteem, education, a mental and moral culture. To make up the picture, there was in June, 1793, hardly anything left save the shifting workmen, the vagabonds of town and country, a degraded and dangerous mob, the outcasts, the depraved, the abnormal, and in Paris, from whence they gave orders to the whole of France, their group—a tiny minority—found its recruits even in that human refuse which infests every capital.”

The great past of France seems to be throwing its shadows upon the moving screen of Russia. And yet we do not need to be reminded that no historical parallel is ever exact. If, alas! Lenin and his comrades have insanely thrown away the weapons which lay to their hand, they have directly reversed the methods of Danton or of Carnot. But there is at least one reproach of which the new Russia is free. The Grand Duke of Hesse is marching upon Petrograd, but in his army there are no *émigrés* such as crowded the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters in Coblenz. The heart of Russia is sound, but her body has succumbed to the asphyxiating gas generated in the unhealthy atmosphere of Tsarism, by foreign intrigue and by internal corruption and unrest. But the plain man in the West knows but little of causes and judges by results. To a few fantastic demagogues the action of the Bolševiks in destroying the Russian army and making the Germans a present of its equipment is a superb gesture inaugurating a new era; to the plain man it is simply translated into fresh bloodshed and suffering for his own kith and kin. In his anger and disappointment he only sees the prostrate body of his former ally; he forgets the superhuman efforts to which Russia's exhaustion and in large part his own safety are due.

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The ideas which underlie the new dispensation in Russia are neither new nor Russian. As in the case of the doctrine of self-determination, they often contain a sound kernel, borrowed as they are from the greatest progressive thinkers of modern

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times. The fault lies not with them but with their latest exponents, and consists in a crude attempt to blend elements which nature has resolved to keep apart. The militant idealism of Mazzini does not accord with the semi-Christian nihilism of Tolstoi, and both alike are fermented by an admixture of Marx, Proudhon and Nietzsche. Spiritual ideas cannot be promoted on a materialist basis. From the alliance of Russian atheist and cosmopolitan Jew there is bred a mere spirit of negation—*der Geist der stets verneint*. In the history of ideas, as in workaday politics, extremes tend to meet, and birds of a feather are found in seemingly opposite camps. It is no accident that the wheel which turned full circle from brutal absolutism to social iconoclasm often swings back to its starting point. Mars has assuredly reduced the philosophers to silence, or we might long ere this have been reminded of the natural affinity between the Superman of Power and the Superman of Anarchy, between the essential dogmas of Nietzsche and of Bakunin.

The moral degeneracy of the Tsarist system, the foul corruption of the bureaucracy, the deplorable weakness of the middle class, had led to a progressive paralysis of the State. Deeds were replaced by an endless stream of words until the seething cauldron overflowed. Lenin and Trotski have been brought to the surface by the Titanic conflict of Tsardom and Junkerdom, of which the more efficient has triumphed, and is now marshalling its last forces against what still stands between it and world dominion. But the Bolševist Revolution has thrown to the winds the ideals which inspired all previous democratic revolutions. It derides the representative principle, it cares nothing for equality or fraternity. Instead of challenging monopoly and privilege wherever it can be assailed, enforcing equality of opportunity for all and paying tribute to the power that rests with knowledge, it has deliberately inverted the foul principle of autocracy, against which its leaders had fought so long and gallant a fight. Instead of the abolition of class and caste, we are merely to have one corrupt class domination substituted for another. The autocracy, the aristocracy, the *bourgeoisie* are to be rooted out, there is to be a merciless war upon culture in all its prevailing forms, and all power is to be concentrated in the hands of the proletariat. The class war, that most accursed of all doctrines, is proclaimed as the ideal of society. Thus Lenin and his followers seek to

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apply to the struggle of the classes the very methods which the Germans employ in the struggle of the nations. The question of power, *die Machtfrage*, resolves itself into the elemental threat of red-clawed Nature, *Ich fresse dich oder du frisst mich*. The true ideals of the social revolution are equality and co-operation, the effacement of all social distinctions save those of inborn merit. Those who act upon the rival principle of *ôte-toi que je m'y mette* in its extreme Russian form, would have us revert to a state of nature where every man's hand is against his neighbour's; and there is no escape from the conclusion that the active promoters of such theories are enemies of the human race.

That certain of the general principles proclaimed by the Bolševiks at Brest command the sympathy of all true democrats is simply another way of saying that, in theory, it is possible to combine sound principles in foreign policy with a supremely mischievous policy at home—though recent events have shown how rapidly the one reacts upon the other in practice. But public opinion in a rash outburst of sentiment has assigned to Lenin and Trotski the credit for principles which they have merely taken over from their predecessors. The doctrine of self-determination is essentially that of Mazzini under a newer name, and rests upon Rousseau and other forerunners; every student of Austrian, Hungarian and Balkan affairs knows that, in its German garb of *Selbstbestimmungsrecht*, it has lain at the root of national claims in Central Europe for two generations past.

Their calculations are essentially those of *va banque*. As the German authorities were quick to realise, the Bolševiks staked everything upon a sympathetic movement in Germany, but, as a German Socialist organ bitterly reminds them, their intimate knowledge of German internal conditions has not saved them from the most absurd delusions. In Austria, it is quite true, Russian revolutionary doctrine has spread far and wide, but this is in part the result of Slavonic telepathy, and in part of the logical position adopted by the Russian delegates in the initial stages of the Brest negotiations. But the contrast presented by their subsequent moral collapse is not calculated to enhance their prestige in the eyes of the central proletariats, who well know how formidable are the defences which have to be stormed before a *German* revolution can be effective.

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To western opinion the inconsistencies of the Bolševiks are even less likely to appeal. After deliberately destroying a splendid fighting machine, they scream when they find the enemy's "knees upon their chest." After addressing the Germans in the menacing language of a conqueror: "You will not dare to send your army against the Russian Working Men's Revolution, the standard bearer of the international proletariat"—they abjectly consent to sign whatever is laid before them. One day sees the impregnable fortress of Dvinsk surrendered without a blow, the next a summons to every man to entrench the capital. But, after all, if this were the only indictment against the Bolševiks, it would still be possible to find some material for an apology in the disintegration, exhaustion and famine which already prevailed when they seized the reins of power. What no amount of phrases can palliate is the manner in which, since their accession to power, they have set every democratic principle at defiance. In their violation of press freedom they merely use the assault upon the *bourgeoisie* as a convenient pretext. In reality their factional hate is turned no less against such tried revolutionaries as Maxim Gorki, Burtsev and Plehanov than against the reactionaries of the old *régime*. If freedom of opinion is hampered, the representative principle is openly defied. The Constituent Assembly, the most representative body which Russia has ever seen, was brutally sent about its business as soon as it became clear that not all the control and pressure of the Bolševik Government could secure it a majority. Freedom was proclaimed as the goal of all nations, but it must be the *Freiheit die ICH meine* pilloried by the once radical *Simplicissimus*.

Even the principle of self-determination, seemingly the central dogma of the Bolševik creed, has been interpreted in the same arbitrary fashion. The Ukrainian Rada was recognised by Trotski as an independent government; but, as soon as it dared to act upon those independent rights and to follow Trotski's example in negotiating with the Germans, he withdrew his recognition and set up a sham counter-government at Harkov. The Ukraine, then, is free, but only free to act according to the Smolny Institute's good pleasure. Roumania, too, is entitled to self-determination; but if her people decline to eject the dynasty and to recognise as its lawful government Trotski's creation, the so-called "High Colle-

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gium" (not one member of which bears a Roumanian name) war is declared upon her by the new despots of Petrograd, and her government, like the Rada, is placed at the mercy of the Central Powers. Bessarabia, too, is to determine its own fate, but when the ultra democratic Assembly of Kisinjov invites the assistance of the Roumanian Army its wishes and decisions are not listened to by the Bolševiks. Finally, Finland is to enjoy self-determination, but when it declares itself an independent republic the Bolševiks decline to recognise it. Not merely are its requests for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Finnish territory evaded or refused, but these troops are encouraged to take part in a civil war whose ferocity recalls the evil days of La Vendée.

The Bolševist campaign against secret treaties and partitions, against all that "the Old Diplomacy" denotes, belongs to quite another category; indeed, it is this which has won sympathy for Trotski among many who are keenly conscious of the irreparable harm he is dealing to the cause of democracy in other directions. But there is one capital point on which criticism has rarely passed beyond the stage of generalities. That the Bolševiks, in repudiating the Treaty of London, have done deadly injury to the western peoples (to their proletariats no less than to their *bourgeoisies*) is cruelly patent to all; but its consequences are only slowly dawning upon us. As a writer in the *Round Table* has pointed out, there never was a treaty which ought to have been more secure against repudiation than that by which the Entente Powers in September, 1914, closed the door to the idea of separate peace. And yet it was not the military despotism of Prussia which converted it into a mere scrap of paper, but the first government of modern times which claimed to speak exclusively in the interests of the proletariat. To those of us who cling to the distant ideal of a League of Nations as *politically* the one hope of salvation from a future of gloom and terror, this is the most disturbing fact in all recent developments. For if Bolševism were really free to extend its principles of repudiation to the world at large, we should be driven to despair of harmony and mutual faith among the nations, as of an impossible ideal.

Under stress of war and invasion Russia has reached that gloomy period which, in France, followed the collapse of the Terror. Earlier in the great revolution men had rallied to the ideas of freedom and the constitution; then, as the tide rose,

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to the doctrine of equality, fraternity and the republic. "But at the beginning of the Directory," writes Mignet, "there was belief in nothing. In the great shipwreck of parties all had been lost, both the virtue of the *bourgeoisie* and the virtue of the people." Two centuries of autocracy and corruption have deprived the Russian middle class as a class of all true sense of civic responsibility and sapped its moral stamina. With a few noble exceptions it shrunk back at the moment of supreme crisis, and the decision passed to men lacking in every quality of constructive statesmanship, and not even capable of upholding the principles which they so loudly profess. With Victor Hugo, who provides a phrase for every turn of the revolutionary wheel, we may fairly ask:—

"Offre-t-on au progrès, toujours trop a l'étroit,
 Quelque élargissement d'horizon et de route?
 Non; des ruines; rien. Soit. Quant à moi, je doute
 Qu'on soit quitte pour dire au peuple murmurant:
 'Ce qu'on fait est petit, mais ce qu'on brise est grand.'"

* * * * *

In repudiating the Bolševiks and their disintegrating doctrine, we are less than ever tempted to repudiate Russia and the Slavonic spirit. It was Dostoievski who placed on the title-page of his literary masterpiece the words: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." We cannot see the harvest, but we know that it will surely ripen, and that Russia, though for a passing moment inarticulate, still has a message for the world. *Ex Oriente Lux*—the old saying seems of late to have exercised a strange fascination on German statesmen and journalists. Can it be that they are dimly conscious of its inward meaning, that they realise the tremendous impact of ideas surging westwards over the frontiers which legitimacy and reaction once proudly erected, but which their own watchdogs, the Hindenburgs and the Linsingens, have finally overthrown in something far more than a mere military sense? They have destroyed their old enemy Tsarism, knowing in their heart of hearts that it was—outside their own borders—the one sure bulwark of the old order. To-day their triumph pales before the white light of the Russian revolutionary dawn. They may restore the broken image to its throne, and for a time they may drive unwilling worshippers to the temple; but morally they are already

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vanquished, however long the end may be delayed. While Tsardom survived it was always possible to confuse the true issues of the war by balancing rival designs of Imperialistic conquest. But the New Russia, giving to her allies a lead which none of them dare decline to follow, has actually applied to the victims of the Old Russia that principle of self-determination which is becoming more and more the charter of free humanity. Henceforth Germany has the choice between that principle and the rival principle of conquest—that fatal lodestone whose reefs are strewn with the wreckage of history.

The Russian Revolution is one of the greatest events in human history; and just as we do not idly curse the ocean because it destroys a breakwater, so we need not confuse the revolution with the froth upon its waves. France came to her senses after the orgies of the Terror. Even Germany will some day reject her false gods and return to the traditions of the splendid past. And are we to despair of Russia? The convulsions through which she is passing are not the death agony but the first physical reactions from the elixir of life. The Slavonic spirit will come to its own. Set free from the triple plagues of Tsarism, Prussianism and Bolševism, it will teach the world the Slav lessons of justice, humility and compassion.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Why the German Strike Failed

[*The Arbeiter Zeitung of 5 February contains a highly instructive article on the German strike, from which we extract the following.*]

“ The delight of the Jingoës must not lead us astray as to the true causes of the undeniably unsatisfactory issue of the great movement. Dissolving the Strikers' Committee and forbidding meetings does not bring one workman back to his work. The state of siege threatens those who indulge in street excesses, but is quite ineffective against strikers who sit at home with folded arms. Even the threat of militarisation could not have forced the German workmen to give up the struggle, if their millions had unanimously resolved to hold out. If, none the less, the strike had to be ended without concrete results, this was due to quite other reasons than the violent measures of the Prusso-German Government.

“ The most important reason is undoubtedly the lack of unity among the German working classes. Even in Berlin the strike was not general; in many factories only part of the workmen went out, while the rest continued their work. In many cities, such as Munich, the workmen divided according to party; the Independent Socialists

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struck, members of the old party went on with their work. The most important industrial districts were only slightly affected. On the Rhine, in Westphalia, in Upper Silesia, even in Saxony, where lie the chief fortresses of Independent Socialism, only a small section struck. And even where they struck, there was no kind of uniform action; in many towns, like Nürnberg for instance, only a demonstrative strike of limited duration was decided upon, while elsewhere the intention was to hold out until the demands were obtained. In Berlin the printers struck, but not the compositors; one newspaper could appear, another not. Those are incidents which reveal little of the unity and discipline displayed by the German workman in former struggles. And to these new drawbacks of the German workers' movement must be added the old. It was always the weakness of German Social Democracy that it had least influence on the very sections of the working class whose strike would involve the greatest economic danger. The railway men now take the first place in the movement in England, America, France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and now in Russia too; only in Germany have they always stood outside the ranks of the class-conscious workmen. Of the miners and iron-founders, too, only part is Socialist; a very considerable part follows the Centre and the Polish Nationalists. These facts explain the weakness of the movement, and also the energy of the Prussian authorities. The German Government would have hesitated to take violent measures if it had had reason to fear that such measures would provoke an extension of the movement to the railways, mines, and foundries. *The weakness of the movement is not a result of the energy of the authorities; on the contrary, only its weakness made that energy possible.*

"How is it, then, that the German working classes, after three and a half years of unheard-of sacrifice and deprivation, is not capable of carrying through a struggle for peace with the same unanimity and clearness of aim as in many former struggles? This is, at least, partially due to the unfortunate development of German Social Democracy during the war. It has united with the Centre and the Liberals in the Reichstag *Bloc*. It has thus scored various successes—the inclusion of progressive parliamentarians in the Government; the Reichstag resolution in favour of peace by understanding; the Reform Bill in the Prussian Parliament. But this policy, which made Social Democracy the ally of bourgeois parties and the support of the Government, was fiercely attacked by the Opposition, which finally constituted itself as a separate party. The old party saw itself forced to defend its policy against attacks from the Left; hence it had to represent its successes as greater than they really were. For instance, it had to over-emphasise the importance of the Reichstag Peace Resolution, to smooth over its ambiguities, to exaggerate the influence of the Reichstag majority upon the policy of the Government. But if the workmen are told day by day that the Reichstag is working for the most beautiful peace by understanding, and that the Government is acting according to the decision of the Reichstag majority, then the workman is scarcely being educated to take up the struggle against the

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Government. The *Bloc* policy and action of the masses are mutually exclusive policies; those who themselves belong in the Reichstag to the majority which supports the Government, cannot create the atmosphere in which alone an united action of the masses is possible. Nor, indeed, was that the intention of the German Social Democratic majority; *the mass-strike came without any act on its part and against its will*. When the strike was there, the leaders (of the majority) none the less placed themselves at its head; but the masses, having been educated for three and a half years to trust the Government's intentions, were naturally not willing to make heavy sacrifices in a struggle against this very Government.

" In other democratic lands such a situation can hardly arise. There the parliamentary majority decides the policy of the Government, and if the Socialists form part of that majority, they can effectively influence policy, and so there can be no idea of the working classes having to conduct a political mass-strike against this Government. In Germany it is different. Here the voting of the Imperial Budget and of the war credits is not much more than a theoretical confession of faith in the fatherland; to belong to the Reichstag majority is not a guarantee of real political power. A few generals, a few influential bank directors and big manufacturers can, under given circumstances, influence policy more effectually than the whole Reichstag majority. Thus, indeed, it can happen that the Government's policy seems very little influenced by Socialism, though this latter supports the Government; that, consequently, a considerable part of the working classes decides upon a political strike against the Government which for three and a half years has enjoyed the support of the majority of working class deputies in the Reichstag. And only thus can we explain the strange spectacle, inexplicable to any other country, that a Government in whose formation Social Democracy has had a share, and which at every division is supported by the Socialists, knows no other means of meeting a strike save by forbidding meetings, introducing a state of siege and militarising! The *Bloc* policy is dangerous everywhere; but these dangers are incomparably greater in the classic land of government by authority (*Obrigkeitsregierung*) than in the democratic countries. The unedifying picture which German Social Democracy presents to-day, is at bottom the result of German sham-democracy, of the poverty and backwardness of German political life.

" But, in spite of all, we hope that even the German strike will not have an unfavourable effect on future development. Many a struggle which had to end without tangible success, has, later on, proved fruitful after all! So it will be this time. The German Government did not have to give the workmen any definite assurances; but it has learnt that every extension of the war provokes the gravest social dangers; and if this time it still found it easy to dispose of the strike, because a large section of the working classes still trusts in it, all its force (*Machtmittel*) would avail it nothing, if the whole German working class once acquired the conviction that the Government is prolonging the war for the sake of Pangerman lust of conquest. This lesson cannot escape the German Government, and so the experience of

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this strike will bring the cause of peace a stage further! But, on the other hand, the German working class will also learn by this experience; and, if so, it will overcome its internal difficulties. After all, it was this working class which upset the Socialist Laws, which built up the largest Labour party and the most powerful trade union organisations in the world, and which has set the proletariats of all countries the most brilliant example of stubborn and clear-sighted proletarian struggle."

This article provides poor comfort for the optimists who are banking on an immediate Bolševist Revolution in Germany.

Transylvania and Macedonia

[For years past the most inveterate opponent of all Governments in Roumania, and, indeed, of the whole Roumanian social order, has been the Socialist leader M. Rakovski, by birth a Bulgarian of the Dobrudja, but a Roumanian citizen by law and by choice. His close friendship with the Extreme Left in Petrograd after the March Revolution was a serious embarrassment to the Bratianu Cabinet in its relations with the Provisional Government; and the Bulgarian press found it convenient to advertise his activity, until his public insistence upon the Dobrudja as a Roumanian province earned him the nickname of a renegade in Sofia. Mr. Rakovski is the last man in the Balkans who could be accused of racial Chauvinism, and therefore the protest which he has addressed to the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee carries all the greater weight. The following are its essential passages, translated from the Swiss Socialist Berner Tagwacht of 26 January.]

" . . . I will confine myself to the proposals dealing with the problem of the nationalities and more especially with those which more directly concern us Socialists of Roumania and the Balkans.

"We all know only too well how the nationalist *bourgeoisies* have seized upon these problems, and have promoted conflicts and wars in their own class interests in the name of national unity. It is also well known that one of the chief pretexts upon which Roumania was dragged into the war by her rulers was the question of Transylvania, where three and a half million Roumanians have hitherto been abandoned to the tender mercies of the Magyar agrarian oligarchy. *But in your peace proposals not a word is said on this question.*

"It is true that you speak of the necessity of forming the mainly Czech districts into a federal State in conjunction with Austria and Hungary. You also speak of the reunion of the Southern Slav peoples into one administrative unit. But the national problem of Roumania you pass over in complete silence. For the Roumanians of Transylvania you contemplate neither a federal state nor a special self-governing area. You do not even contemplate the cultural independence which you would grant to the unrelinquished Italian districts of Austria. The Roumanians are to remain in future as in the past entirely in the power of the jingo Junkers of Budapest.

"In the discussion which I had with Huysman on the subject he explained this omission on the ground that the Roumanian Social-Democratic party had submitted no memorandum to the International

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Bureau. Nevertheless the question of Transylvania is the crux of the racial question in Hungary and the cause of so many past—and possibly future—conflicts, and of such great importance that it cannot possibly be ignored in any proposals for a 'lasting' peace. . . .

"With regard to the Macedonian question, the solution proposed by the Committee is nothing more nor less than the partition of this area between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.

"North and central Macedonia is to be divided between Bulgaria and Serbia, with the Vardar as the dividing line. Southern Macedonia, that is to say, the Salonica district, is to be placed under the joint suzerainty of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. This solution has the disadvantage of altering nothing in the pre-war conditions; therefore it will be no safeguard against future wars. The provocation to Bulgarian nationalists to conduct propaganda on foreign soil will never be removed so long as the greater part of Macedonia and the majority of those Macedonian towns which the Bulgars regard as inhabited by their co-nationals, remain under Serbian rule. In the same way Greece will only consent under armed compulsion to the conversion of the Salonica district, that is to say, an area of 20,000 square kilometres, into the joint possession of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. Such a solution, which would have to be forced upon the population against their will, cannot claim to be lasting.

"But there is an even more weighty objection to this proposal: *it is that it is based upon a complete misconception of the wishes of the Macedonian population.*

"Whereas the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee contemplates a referendum in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, as also in that of Slesvig-Holstein, where it lays down the principle that a referendum must be the preliminary to any change, it mentions neither a plebiscite nor a referendum of any kind whatsoever in connection with Macedonia. Thus the right of self-determination is refused to the Macedonians. Moreover, a policy of partition has always been most energetically opposed by the Socialist parties of the Balkan States.

"This opposition has come, in the first instance, from the Bulgarian Socialists. Thus, already in 1913, we find the following passage in the report of the 'Narrow' party to the International Bureau: 'There is no longer any doubt that Macedonia is to be divided up among the Balkan States. This will create an even more impossible situation than before from the point of view of the national development of the Balkan peoples.' But the partition of Macedonia was also opposed by the Serbs. In May, 1913, comrade Lapčević made the following declaration in the Skupština:—'The Balkan Peninsula contains a mixture of peoples and its partition between several states cannot create a single national unit. On the contrary, each of these states would subject to itself a good many co-nationals of other peoples. Hence the Social Democratic Party of Serbia is opposed to any policy which aims at a partition of the Balkans.'

"That was why the same party protested against the Treaty of Bucarest. 'If this treaty is signed,' the party declared in its report to the International Bureau, 'this peace will only be a sham peace.'

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Unless closer relations are created, unless the Republican Balkan League is realised, we are marching towards fresh wars. All dynasties, all bureaucratic and military cliques desire to dominate, and these struggles and wars will completely exhaust us and plunge us in such ruin that we shall finally be partitioned by the Great Powers.'

"If, then, the Balkan Socialists opposed all idea of partition, this does not mean that they were not prepared with a satisfactory solution. At all their Inter-Balkan congresses they have favoured Macedonian autonomy within the framework of a Republican Federation of all the Balkan States. This proposal is known to all the Socialists of Europe. It was accepted at the Congress of Basel in a resolution which said: 'The Balkan Socialists have with admirable courage put forward the demand for the creation of a democratic Balkan League. The Congress begs them to maintain their splendid attitude.'"

Germany and the New Russia

[*German publicists are already alive to the infinite possibilities of the new Russian situation. The warning sounded by Herr Georg Bernhard in the Vossische Zeitung of 25 February provides British statesmen with most serious food for reflection.*]

"We still hold to the view," he writes, "that there can be no question of permanent chaos and dissolution in Russia. The correctness of this view finds support in the fact that the Ukrainians also do not believe in such a development. Despite all the recent rumours spread in Germany, the Ukrainians are still firm in their resolve to form a Federal Republic with the rest of Russia after the fall of the Bolševik régime. If this hope is fulfilled, then all the other Russian republics which have been formed during the Bolševik era will crystallise round this kernel. Thus there will be a large and powerful Russia for all time. Those who accept this view must reach the logical conclusion not to impose any conditions for future peace such as might permanently cloud the relation between the New Russia and Germany. One may submit to the necessity of military guarantees, but one must unhesitatingly reject any forcible accession of territory in excess of this.

"It is of course quite another matter if we adopt the view of many people in Germany, who believe in the permanent break-up of Russia. Then arises the danger of independent frontier States, with which Germany must establish close contact, especially if one believes in the possibility of their being influenced by England. In all this, it is true, one must never overlook the fact that the future fate of Russia and also the relation of Japan to Russia and Germany lie in our hands. This becomes very clear when we consider the general Peace Congress and the rôle which England will play there. Germany may find very considerable surprises there, unless she secures the alliance of the future Russian Government at the green table against England. What enters the Congress Hall we shall know, but who shall prophesy what will finally come out of it? Let us remember France after the Congress of Paris!"

Diary of Current Events

- 20 Feb.—Kühlmann in Reichstag on new situation. Mr. Balfour informs Polish National Committee that Great Britain does not accept peace treaty between Ukraine and Central Powers. Lord Jellicoe at Aldwich Club on submarine war. Inter-Allied Social and Labour Conference opens in London.
- 21 Feb.—*Morning Post* case ends: editor and Col. Repington fined. Jericho captured. Germany announces her terms to Russia.
- 23 Feb.—Informal peace negotiations begun between Germany and Roumania.
- 24 Feb.—Russia decides to accept German terms and sends delegation to Brest.
- 25 Feb.—Publication of Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Memorandum on War Aims. Count Hertling's speech in Reichstag on President Wilson's four principles. Reval and Pskov taken by Germans.
- 26 Feb.—New constitution of British Labour Party formed.
- 27 Feb.—Mr. Balfour answers Count Hertling in House of Commons.

Articles Recommended

- Quarterly Review.* (Jan.) ITALY AND THE SOUTHERN SLAVS. By Prof. Gaetano Salvemini. THE TURKISH PEASANTRY OF ANATOLIA. By Sir W. Ramsay.
- Round Table.* (March.) THE VICTORY THAT WILL END WAR. AMERICA'S WAR AIMS. THREE DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT. THE PEOPLES OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES AND LITHUANIA. PALESTINE AND JEWISH NATIONALISM.
- Contemporary Review.* (March.) SUPER-NATIONALISM. By Sir John Macdonnell. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE FEDERAL SOLUTION. By R. W. Seton-Watson. IS PEACE IN SIGHT? By Diplomatist. HOLLAND AND THE WAR. By P. Geyl. IN THE HEART OF RUSSIA. By R. R. Tatlock.
- Nineteenth Century.* (March.) BRITISH POLICY IN RUSSIA. By Leslie Urquhart. HOW GERMANY MAKES PEACE. By W. H. Dawson.
- Fortnightly Review.* (March.) LENIN AND BOLŠEVISM. By E. H. Wilcox. ALSACE-LORRAINE. By Politicus.
- Blackwood.* (March.) THE DOBRUDJA RETREAT. By a Member of the Scottish Women's Hospital.
- Polish Review.* (January.) PRESENT CONDITIONS IN POLAND. By Varsoviensis. THE BOLŠEVIKS AND POLAND. By a Polish Socialist.
- Revue de Paris.* (1 Feb.) L'ITALIE ET LA GUERRE. By Auguste Gauvain.
- Le Monde Slave.* (March.) LA RÉVOLUTION RUSSE ET LA FRANCE. By E. Denis. L'INTERVENTION ROUMAINE. By Draghicesco. LES ORGANISATIONS POLITIQUES POLONAISES. By H. Grappin. LE MONTENÉGRIO ET SES TENDANCES NATIONALES. By A. Radovitch.
- La Vita Italiana.* (Feb.) SOCIALISMO, PANGERMANESIMO E PACE TEDESCA. By Matteo Pantaleoni.
- La Riforma Sociale.* (Feb.) 'CIÒ CHE NON SI VEDE' DEL COSTO DELLA GUERRA. By Giuseppe Prato. L'IDEA DEL WELTREICH NEGLI SCRITTI DEGLI ECONOMISTI TEDESCHI. By C. B. Tuironi.

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The Russian Revolution and German Socialism. By ALEXANDER ONOU (late Russian Consul-General in London).

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth: (IV) South Africa. By BASIL WILLIAMS.

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**"Le vainqueur est toujours trainé par sa
victoire**

Au delà de son but et de sa volonté"

—Victor Hugo

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Mittel-Europa again

IT is inevitable that in a war which, as does this, extends literally from China to Peru, which involves all the continents and every sea, attention should from time to time be directed now to one sphere, now to another. But if there ever had been any doubt as to the real and essential issue, surely it must now be removed. The war arose on the continent of Europe, and it is on the continent of Europe that it will be decided; it is ultimately, as the Germans themselves have always been the first to recognise, a struggle between two great alternatives, the alternative whether Europe shall in the future, as in the past, consist of a number of independent national states, or whether the achievement of Charlemagne and the dreams of so many kings and statesmen from the time of Philippe le Bel to Napoleon shall at last be realised and the whole of the troubled continent find rest under the shadow of one great Empire. The Germans, who know what they are about and see these things clearer than we do, recognise and constantly proclaim this; statesmen and historians alike are never tired of telling us that that for which their people are fighting is a Europe which shall be free from the English doctrines of the balance of power, a Europe that is in which one state shall become so powerful as, under whatever form it may be, to dominate and control the whole. For this they require a formula; all men require formulas, none so much as the Germans, and their formula is *Mittel-Europa*.

This is the doctrine which in its full significance was first proclaimed by Naumann; we have a later discussion on the same theme from Professor Oncken, which deserves a moment's consideration. For vigour of presentation, for interest, for attractiveness of style, Professor Oncken will not for a moment stand comparison with Naumann, but in many ways his book is even more significant, and he himself is of greater importance. Naumann is one of those men on whom we cannot entirely depend for an interpretation of German thought just because of his very high qualities; he has an originality, a freshness of presentation, which is not common among modern

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German publicists; he is unconventional, often critical, and in some points—for instance, his frank repudiation of the national idea—his work is in distinct opposition to the dominant forces in Germany. Professor Oncken is free from all such defects. He is very well informed, he has very great historical knowledge, especially of the last century, and he can always be trusted to say precisely what he ought to say. One may be quite sure that when one opens any book that he has written that it will be devoted to a careful explanation that whatever the Prussian Government does is of *weltgeschichtliche Notwendigkeit*. If the Prussian Government changes its policy, then the necessity of world history will change. He shows in a very remarkable manner the extent to which modern German thought is controlled by catchwords and formulas; they may from time to time change, but they will always be there, and no one has done more useful work than he in training the German to take what in Germany is the orthodox view as to the origin and issue of the war. To him we must go if we wish to find the full and complete doctrine of the *Einkreisung*, and with peculiar unction he expatiates on the conception of Germany, the land of the Centre, which was to be crushed between the pincers moved with such admirable skill by King Edward VII., and shows how this having failed, “the centre or kernel of Europe” having established itself, the strength having shown itself to be irresistible, must now expand.

This is the thesis of his new book “*Das Alte und das Neue Mittel-Europa*.” It is divided into two portions, the first a review of the position of Germany from the foundation of the Empire, a discussion of Bismarck’s policy which established the security of Germany on the Triple Alliance, and a revision of the traditional view of this policy in the light of more recent events. We need not trouble ourselves at this moment about the earlier part; it is not the old *Mittel-Europa*, but the new *Mittel-Europa* which is now in the process of being founded, with which we are concerned, for of this he explains the future as he conceives that it will be, and it is very important for us to know how the future shapes itself in the mind of one who so well represents contemporary German thought. The change, as he sees it, is one rather of geography than of principle. *Mittel-Europa* as created by Bismarck depended on the alliance of Germany,

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Austria, and Italy. Italy has fallen out and Bulgaria and Turkey have stepped into the place which it left vacant; therefore we have a shifting of what in geological language we can call the "line of strike"; it is diverted from the South to the South-East; it runs no longer from Berlin to Vienna, Venice, and Rome, but from Berlin through Vienna and Budapest to Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople. This, of course, is a commonplace. What interests us particularly is the aspect which he throws upon the changes which this involves.

We must note before considering this the date at which the book was written. It belongs to the late summer or early autumn of last year. It was written, that is, after the Russian Revolution, after the intervention of America, when Kerenski was in power in Petrograd, but apparently before the great offensive in Italy, to which there is no reference. It was written when the danger of a great Russian offensive was passed, but before the complete collapse of Russia could be anticipated; when the German troops were already in Riga, but before it had become evident that Russia would be forced to surrender authority over all the Western districts. For this reason, while there is talk of the Baltic Provinces and of Poland, comparatively little is said of the Ukraine and the re-establishment of Turkish power; the events by which the Black Sea would be converted into a German lake could not be fully anticipated. We must remember this because writing as he did before these great German successes, he paints his picture in lower tones than he probably would now. It makes it all the more valuable to us. What, then, is his prognostication? First, he writes in "the confidence that we with our Allies will come out of this war strengthened," and as a consequence of this:—

"After we have looked in the face the danger of being completely crushed, we have the moral right to improve our position in so far as it was liable to attack, and we hope that we shall be in a position to do so by strengthening and expanding our alliances and—apart from individual improvements of the frontier—by new creations in the East and South-East."

Germany, that is, is to come out of the war in a stronger position than that in which she entered it and is so to use the opportunity as to make permanent the additional strength which she has secured and render herself for all future time

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secure against attack. This is to be done of course first of all by the necessary alterations in the alliance with Austria, which still remains in the future, as in the past, the keynote of her position. But next to Austria comes Bulgaria, and the treatment of the Bulgarian problem is very interesting not only for its intrinsic importance but for the light which it throws on German psychology. The formula which is so useful for dealing with Germany itself is applied at once to Bulgaria. Bulgaria, like Germany, is a land of the "Centre"; Bulgaria was to have been crushed between the pincers of a greater Serbia and an expanding Russia; it has withstood the assault and therefore has to secure its position for the future. The position of Bulgaria in the Balkans is to be similar to that of Prussia in Germany; the Bulgarian part in the war is therefore represented as a Bulgarian war of liberation, which is to be carried on to its victorious end; this conclusion was brought about when by the conquest of old Serbia they attained a "firm territorial bridge to their allies." "In this way they have won in the Balkans a real position, strong enough to guard against a new breach of the peace and satisfied enough not to be subjected to any temptation for a new interference with peace." This is clear enough; Bulgaria is to be a dominant power in the Balkans and as a consequence the other Balkan States will group themselves in proper subservience round Bulgaria and her allies as the German States grouped themselves round Prussia. It is a war of liberation, but this war of liberation has curious results, for instance, for Serbia, which apparently is not allowed to have its own war of liberation; Serbia has opposed herself to the Central Powers, and therefore her future existence is to be dependent on her good behaviour.

"The future rulers of these States, Roumania as well as Serbia-Montenegro (the union of these two is, for various reasons, to be recommended), will only regain the confidence they have lost by an unconditionally loyal attitude—Roumania and Serbia-Montenegro must be prepared to fit themselves into the group which is led by the Central Powers; only on this hypothesis will they be allowed to take part in the new commercial tasks of the combination, and hope to heal again the terrible wounds which a mistaken policy has brought upon their countries."

Roumania, that is, has to lose the Dobrudja; Serbia has to surrender Macedonia and the Morava Valley, and she will fall

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into her proper position as a small, almost negligible, vassal State, completely dependent, commercially as well as politically, on her greater neighbours. This is the position which also is assigned to Greece. This, of course, is all the natural application to the weaker and defeated States of those principles which are for the advantage of the victors. It is important that English readers should understand the clearness with which these principles are envisaged by German writers. It is interesting, moreover, to show the curious faculty of self-deception which enables a writer like Professor Oncken to put a peculiar glow of morality and unction over this work. This is necessary for his object, because the crude doctrines of *Realpolitik* require painting over to make them fully acceptable to the German *bourgeoisie*, of whom, above all, Professor Oncken is the organ. And so they are told that this new combination represents really the results to which the Balkan nations would come if they were freed from the selfish intrigues of the Great Powers. What it means is that, for instance, Greece will be completely subjected to the German power—Austria and Bulgaria supported by German strength. This, however, does not sound well, so we are told that Greece in this way will be able to overcome the stain of dependence, and carry through the last stage of a war of liberation, which is not yet completed. A strange war of liberation! In some curious way, Germany, at the very moment when Roumania, Serbia and Greece are to be finally and completely put into the second rank, and subordinated to a great Bulgaria, is told that now, for the first time, the Balkans are being able to settle their own affairs, freed from the rival intrigues of the Great Powers. An admirable exposition of what is to be meant when the "balance of power" ceases to exist! All other States are to have just that precise amount of liberty and power which it may be convenient to their conquerors to extend to them.

As for the South-East, so for the North-East. What is the position of Poland in the new system? It is, of course, to be a "liberated" Poland. Germany is occupied, as we all know, with the "liberation" of smaller States; the Central Powers are carrying out "a world historical mission," and, as a consequence of that, they will be enabled

"by re-creating a Polish State, in whatever form it may be carried out, positively to strengthen the circle of those States which are

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interested, both politically and from the point of view of *Kultur*, in maintaining a strong centre. . . . It is a matter of world historical importance that this branch of Western Slavs should develop under the leadership of the Central Powers and not under a dangerous opposition to them."

Poland, therefore, is to be freed; but in the very moment of its freedom it is to be brought under German domination. But as we read further we get to understand that the same fate is designed for Poland as for Serbia. She must completely give over all those greater hopes which might be inconvenient to Germany. The future existence of Serbia is to depend on her acceptance of the principle that she will give up dreams of a complete Serbian nationality; national feeling is a luxury which can be allowed only to the victors. Poland, therefore, has also to accept the position that it shall have precisely that extension, and no greater, which is convenient. And here we have a phrase which seems to me to represent the *ne plus ultra* of historical falsification. It is required "that the Poles shall for ever bury all great Polish aspirations—so far as they might extend over the frontier of the Prussian State—with the same honesty with which the Germans and the Empire adapted themselves, after the decision of 1866, to the *klein-deutsche* solution." There is to be open to Poland the prospect, that is, of extension towards the East (this, of course, was written long before the last decisions), but for all time the acquisition of territory inhabited by Poles in the West and the North is to be excluded. And this conception is strengthened by a reference to the decision of 1866. The Poles in their relations to the German Poles are to regard themselves as in the same position that the Germans took towards the Austrian Germans. Is it really worth while that a man of Professor Oncken's abilities and reputation should descend to this sort of thing? Does he really think that there is any resemblance between the position of the Poles in the German Empire and the Germans in the Austrian Empire? The Poles, a subject minority, deprived of all political power and enjoying even the use of their own language and customs only by the condescension of their conquerors, and the Austrian Germans forming nearly a third of the population in the Monarchy, deliberately used by Germany as a lever to force the whole weight of Austria-

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Hungary on to the side of Germany and maintain German predominance over their Slavonic co-subjects? It is this sort of thing which makes one feel that whatever truth there may be in the foreign criticism of English "hypocrisy" nothing ever said or done in England can approach the intellectual hypocrisy of a German historian.

We have, then, a settlement in the East prognosticated which assures German predominance over all the Western Slavs. And what about the West? Here Professor Oncken is a useful guide. He sees things as they really are. Germany by the conquest of Northern France and of Belgium has now certain pledges; England, after putting out all her power, has been unable to re-conquer them; she is, however, very anxious to do so, so he sees the situation, because she knows that it is only by re-conquering them that she will be able to retain the German Colonies she has herself taken. She cannot leave Germany in possession of this territory. It may be anticipated that she cannot drive back the Germans by force of arms; she will have to have recourse to other means; she will have no alternative but to buy out the Germans by restoring her Colonies. But the Germans do not wish their Colonies back in precisely the same form as they had them before; they are too scattered, and being too scattered they are not capable of resistance against English sea-power. Therefore they must have instead a large and coherent colonial empire which, if properly organised, will be capable of self-defence. In this again he agrees with the best modern German thought as represented especially by Professor Delbrück and Dr. Solf. German preponderance over Eastern Europe and German alliance with Turkey requires supplementing by a large African Empire.

We have, then, something of a picture of the condition of things when the war is over; a Europe in which Germany, by reason of her great strength, will be entirely secure, in which she has subservient to her her present Allies and a control over a large portion of Africa, and then, according to the characteristic view, Germany will be able to hold her own in the great rivalry of Empires which he foresees in the future; the balance of power in Europe will be gone; there will be substituted for it the balance of power in the world.

J. W. HEADLAM.

Maxims for Diplomats

[In the year 1716 there was published at the sign of the Mercure Galant in Paris a little volume entitled "De la Manière de Négociier avec les Souverains." The author, François de Callières, one of Louis XIV.'s Ambassadors, devotes a chapter to "the personal qualities and conduct of a negotiator," in which he gives advice which has lost none of its aptness across two centuries. At a moment when the diplomatic service is about to undergo certain reforms this old Frenchman's sage reflections will not come amiss. The following paragraphs are taken from his third chapter.]

"GOD having endowed men with diverse talents, the best advice that one can give is to take counsel with themselves before choosing their profession. Thus he who would enter the profession of diplomacy must examine himself to see whether he was born with the qualities necessary for success. These qualities are an observant mind, a spirit of application which refuses to be distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements, a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as they are, and which goes straight to its goal by the shortest and most natural paths without wandering into useless refinements and subtleties, which, as a rule, only succeed in repelling those with whom one is dealing. The negotiator must further possess that penetration which enables him to discover the thoughts of men and to know by the least movement of their countenances what passions are stirring within, for such movements are often betrayed even by the most practised negotiator. He must also have a mind so fertile in expedients as easily to smooth away the difficulties which he meets in the course of his duty; he must have presence of mind to find a quick and pregnant reply even to unforeseen surprises, and by such judicious replies he must be able to recover himself when his foot has slipped. An equable humour, a tranquil and patient nature, always ready to listen with attention to those whom he meets; an address always open, genial, civil, agreeable, with easy and ingratiating manners which assist largely in making a favourable impression upon those around him—these things are the indispensable adjuncts to the negotiator's profession. Their opposite, the grave and cold air, a melancholy or rough exterior, may create a first impression which is not easily removed. Above all, the good negotiator must have sufficient control over himself to resist the longing to speak before he has really thought what he shall say. He should not endeavour to gain the reputation of being able to

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reply immediately and without premeditation to every proposition which is made, and he should take a special care not to fall into the error of one famous foreign ambassador of our time, who so loved an argument that each time he warmed up in controversy with those around him he revealed important secrets in order to support his opinion.

“ But, indeed, there is another fault of which the negotiator must beware : he must not fall into the error of supposing that an air of mystery, in which secrets are made out of nothing and in which the merest bagatelle is exalted into a great matter of State, is anything but a mark of smallness of mind and betokens an incapacity to take the true measure, either of men or of things. Indeed, the more the negotiator clothes himself in mystery, the less he will have means of discovering what is happening and of acquiring the confidence of those with whom he deals. A continual reserve is like the lock on a door which is never turned and becomes so rusty that, in the end, no man can open it. The able negotiator will, of course, not permit his secret to be drawn from him except at his own time, and he should be able to disguise from his competitor the fact that he has any secret to reveal ; but in all other matters he must remember that open dealing is the foundation of confidence, and that everything which he is not compelled by duty to withhold ought to be freely shared with those around him. He will thus gradually establish terms of confidence with his neighbours, from which he may draw immense profit, for it may not infrequently happen that in exchange for some trivial information given by himself, the negotiator may, as it were, by accident, receive important news from his colleague in another embassy. The practised negotiator will know how to employ the circumstances of his life and of the lives of those around him in such a manner as to lead them naturally and without restraint to talk of the conditions and affairs of their own country, and the more extended his view and the wider his knowledge the more surely will he thus gather important news every day of his life.

* * * * *

“ Let it not be supposed, however, that the good negotiator requires only the light of a high intellect, dexterity, and other fine qualities of the mind. He must show that the ordinary sentiments of the human heart move in him, for there is no

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kind of employment in which at the same time elevation and nobility of spirit and a kindly courtesy in little things are more necessary. An ambassador indeed resembles in a certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the ordinary condition of mankind and makes him in some sort the equal of the masters of the earth by that right of representation which attaches to his service, and by the special relations which his office gives him with the mighty ones of the earth. He must, therefore, be able to simulate a dignity even if he possess it not; but this obligation is the rock upon which many an astute negotiator has perished because he did not know in what dignity consisted. No negotiation was ever assisted by open or veiled menaces merely for their own sake, and negotiators too often confuse a proud and arrogant bearing with that careful dignity which ought to clothe their office. To advance pretensions or to demand excessive privileges is merely the sign of pride and of a desire to extract from the privileged position of an ambassador a personal and unworthy advantage, in the doing of which an ambitious negotiator may easily and utterly compromise the whole authority of his master. No man who enters diplomacy in a spirit of avarice or with a desire to seek interests other than those of his service, or merely with the desire to earn the applause of the crowd, or to attract esteem and recompense from his master, will ever make success in negotiation. And even if some important duty may be well discharged in his hands it is only to be attributed to some happy conjuncture of events which in itself smoothed away all difficulties.

“To maintain the dignity of diplomacy the negotiator must clothe himself in liberality and generosity of heart, even in magnificence, but all with care and a frugality of design so that the trappings of his office do not by their display outshine the sterling merits of his own character and person. Let clean linen and appointments and delicacy reign at his table. Let him frequently give banquets and diversions in honour of the principal persons of the Court in which he lives, and even in the honour of the prince himself if he so cares to take part. Let him also enter into the spirit of the same diversions offered by others, but always in a light, unconstrained, and agreeable manner and always with an open, good-

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natured, straightforward air, and with a continual desire to give pleasure to others. If the custom of the country in which he serves permits freedom of conversation with the ladies of the Court he must on no account neglect any opportunity of placing himself and his master in a favourable light in the eyes of these ladies, for it is well known that the power of feminine charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state and that the greatest events have followed the toss of a fan or the nod of a head. But let him beware ! Let him do all things in his power, by the magnificence of his display, by the polish and attraction and gallantry of his person, to engage their pleasure, but let him beware lest he engage his own heart. He must never forget that Love's companions are indiscretion and imprudence, and that the moment he becomes pledged to the whim of a favoured woman, no matter how wise he may be, he runs a grave risk of being no longer master of his own secrets. We have often seen terrible results follow from this kind of weakness into which even the greatest ministers are liable to fall, and we need go no further than our own time for remarkable examples and warnings.

“ Now, as the surest way of gaining the good will of a prince is to gain the good graces of those who have most influence upon his mind, a good negotiator must reinforce his own good manners, his insight of character, and attraction of person by certain expenses which will largely assist in opening his road before him. But these expenses must be laid out in the proper measure. They must be made by a careful design ; and wherever large gifts are offered, the giver must take care beforehand to know that they will be received in the right spirit and above all that they will not be refused. I do not mean that there are not countries where no great art is needed in the matter of giving gifts. In such a country they are no longer gifts but bribes ; but it is always to be remembered that there is a certain delicacy to be observed in all commerce of this kind and that a gift presented in the right spirit, at the right moment, by the right person, may act with tenfold power upon him who receives it. There are various established customs in different countries by which occasion arises for making small presents. This kind of expense, though it occasions but a small outlay of money, may contribute largely to the esteem in which an ambassador

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is held and acquire for him friends at the Court to which he is accredited. And, indeed, the manner in which this little custom is carried out may have an important bearing upon high policy. And, of course, in such a matter the practised negotiator will soon be aware that at every Court there are certain persons of greater wit than fortune to whom a small gratification or secret subsidy may bring in large results, for the wit of these persons enables them to maintain their position at Court without that personal splendour which the rich nobleman can display. Such persons I say may be of great use to the clever negotiator. Among amusements, for instance, the dancers, who by the fact of their profession have an *entrée* less formal and in some degree more intimate with the prince than any ambassador can perhaps possess, are often to be found valuable agents in negotiation. Or, again, it happens that a monarch has around him certain officers of low rank entrusted with duties which bring them in close contact both with their master and even with his ministers. Such men have means of knowing what is passing in their master's mind, and a timely present aptly given may reveal important secrets. And, finally, even great ministers of state themselves may be not inaccessible by the same means.

* * * * *

“ It frequently happens in negotiation as in war, that well-chosen spies contribute more than any other agency to the success of great plans, and, indeed, it is clear that there is nothing so well adapted to upset the best design as the sudden and premature revelation of an important secret upon which it depends. And as there is no expense better designed nor more necessary than that which is laid out upon a secret service it would be inexcusable for a minister of state to neglect it. The General will say with truth that he would sooner have one regiment the less than a poorly-equipped system of espionage, and that he would certainly forego reinforcements if he could be accurately informed of the disposition and numbers of the enemy armies. Similarly, let an ambassador retrench all superfluous expense in order that he may have the funds at his disposal to maintain a secret service which will inform him of all that happens in the foreign country of his service. Yet despite the universally acknowledged truth of what I say most negotiators will more

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readily spend vast sums on a great show of horses and carriages, on rows of useless flunkies, than on the payment of a few well-chosen agents who could keep them supplied with news. In this matter we should learn a lesson from the Spaniards, who never neglect their secret agents—a fact which I am sure has contributed largely to the success of their ministers in so many important negotiations. It is doubtless the success of Spanish agents which has led to the establishment of the wise custom of the Spanish Court to give Spanish ambassadors an extraordinary fund called *Gastos Secretos*. The ambassador has sometimes been called an honourable spy because one of his principal occupations is to discover great secrets, and he fails in the discharge of his duty if he does not know how to lay out the necessary sums for this purpose. Therefore an ambassador should be a man born with a liberal hand ready to undertake willingly large expenses of this kind; and he must be even ready to do it at his own charges when the emoluments of his master are insufficient. For as his principal aim must be to succeed, that interest should eclipse all others in any man truly devoted to his profession and capable of succeeding in it. But, on the other hand, the sagacious prince will not neglect the equipment of his negotiators with every possible means for acquiring friends and secret agents in all countries where his interests are at stake, for these expenses well laid out bring back a large return with usury to the prince who makes them and so much to smooth away the difficulties which lie in the path of his designs. And he will soon be aware that if he does not employ this expedient his ministers can indeed make but little progress in their negotiations. He will win no new allies, but risks losing old ones."

[*To be continued.*]

The Italo-Slav Agreement

LATE last week it was briefly announced that an agreement had been reached between the Italians and Jugoslavs as to the future policy of the two nations. The negotiations were conducted in London between Signor Andrea Torre, a well-known member of the Italian Chamber, on the one hand, and Mr. Trumbić, President of the Jugoslav Committee (who, it

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will be remembered, was, with the Serbian Premier, Mr. Pašić, one of the two signatories of the Declaration of Corfu of 26 July, 1917), on the other. Signor Torre came to London in the name of a representative Italian committee recently formed in Rome for the purpose of joint political action among all the nationalities subject to Austro-Hungarian rule, and he is understood to have spoken in the name of an actual majority of the Italian Senate and a very large section of the Chamber. Our readers are already acquainted with the remarkable change of opinion in the Italian press during the last six months and do not therefore need to be reminded that such representative organs as the *Corriere della Sera*, the *Secolo*, and the *Messaggero* have contributed very materially to the success of the movement.

The somewhat bald announcement given to the press covers negotiations whose true importance for the Allied cause as a whole will only gradually become apparent. Those who remember the attitude of Italian public opinion to Slavonic questions even as recently as October, 1916, when THE NEW EUROPE was founded, and the abuse which was levelled at our heads for advocating the very policy which is now coming to fruition, will be able to realise the extent of the ground which has been covered in the interval. This agreement is the first step towards the abandonment of the policy adopted by the Entente Powers in April, 1915, and stereotyped in the secret convention then concluded as the basis for Italy's entry into the war. If pursued to its logical conclusion, the new agreement should mean the reversion by official Italy to those generous Mazzinian principles upon which her own liberty and regeneration rest. But as Italy merely shares with Britain, France, and Russia the blame for the original false step committed in the secret and reactionary convention of April, 1915, so she is entitled to special credit as the first active initiator of the new policy. Indeed, we are already in sight of the very position which many of her friends had long desired to see her assume—a position in which she will throw to the winds the narrow imperialistic conceptions which she had learnt from her former Prussian allies and with them the suspicions which they not unnaturally aroused against her among the Western and American democracies, and will assert her moral supremacy in the Western

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Alliance as the foremost champion of the principle of nationality in Europe.

Meanwhile the Southern Slavs have been rescued by this happy initiative—towards which their British friends may claim to have contributed in some small measure—from that attitude of mere negation and distrust into which they seemed in danger of sinking. The agreement opens out for them a prospect of positive and constructive political work in the cause of national unity and independence—work whose importance for the general cause of European reconstruction can hardly be exaggerated. We have always upheld the view that the interests of the Italians and the Jugoslavs are identical, alike from the political, the economic and the intellectual point of view, and that the fomenting of misunderstanding between them was essentially work *pour le Roi de Prusse*. It is therefore with peculiar satisfaction that we welcome the new agreement as a practical proof that the two nations recognise their common interests and are firmly resolved to be friends in the future.

The part to be played by Britain in strengthening this friendship is very far from negligible, and we, for our part, shall continue our efforts to promote it. But if the new policy is to become effective there must be a clear perception on the part of our statesmen of the issues at stake and of the distinction between friends and enemies: and this perception is at present lacking. The mission of General Smuts to Switzerland—which the *Globe* of 11 March ascribes to the direct initiative of the Prime Minister himself—and the subterranean intrigues with Austro-Hungarian agents in Switzerland which are still being persisted in, unhappily serve to remind us that those responsible for British policy are either lamentably ignorant of the fundamental facts of the Central European situation or are allowing themselves to be influenced by the forces working for a compromise with the old order. It is high time that the present duality of control—or to be more exact, the present complete irresponsibility—in foreign policy should come to an end, and that the Foreign Office should at once reform itself and—assert itself.

Germany and Her Vassals

IN the international politics of modern Europe a frontier between two nations usually means strife. A central position implies the need for alliances and a difficulty in obtaining them. Germany, the most central among the dominant nations of Europe, has to face that inherent contradiction. But the solution of the problem has been supplied to her by history, and has been developed by her into a system. Before the war her national conflicts in the east and south did not find direct expression in international politics. Between the Baltic Sea and Switzerland the Germans have the Lithuanians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Magyars, Jugoslavs and Italians for their neighbours, but on the map of 1914 Germany bordered on Russia and Austria. The frontier was thus neutralised by the suppression of nationality, silenced by violence. The burden of the Lithuanian and Polish questions weighed primarily on Russia, Germany choosing to play in appearance the modest part of a loyal second and partner. On the remaining part of the frontier Germany's conflicts were disguised as internal problems of the Habsburg Monarchy. The contest which arises where the Germans meet the Czechs and Jugoslavs did not disturb Germany's internal life or affect adversely her foreign policy. The conflict with Italy in the Trentino and the Adriatic, and with Russia in Galicia, did not enter into the direct sphere of her State interests.

Similarly for the Magyars, Austria has neutralised more than two-thirds of their frontier. From the Bukovina to Dalmatia Hungary borders not on a Ukraine, a Bohemia or a Jugoslavia claiming unredeemed provinces, but on "Austria"; with Austria's two dominant nationalities—the Germans and the Poles—the Magyars had partitioned Ukrainian, Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav territory. Frontier conflicts of nationality had thus been converted into interests common to imperialist State formations. In Transylvania and in the Jugoslav provinces the Magyars directly oppose the national rights of the Roumanian and Serbian nations and face their hostility, just as Germany encounters France in Alsace-Lorraine and Denmark in Slesvig. But in Central Europe the Germans and Magyars stand back to back with Austria as a cushion between them.

Austria's continued existence is a pledge of peace and

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friendship between Germany and Hungary. At present German Imperialism never approaches Hungary otherwise than in the garb of Habsburg ambitions and Viennese centralist tendencies, and it is essential for the relations between the German Empire and the Magyars that it should not assume any other form. It is to the interest of the Magyars that Austria should be German, and yet that it should not form part of Germany. As long as Austria is German and keeps down her Slav nationalities, she cannot play off these same nationalities against the Magyars in Hungary. But as long as the Austrian Germans do not form part of the German Empire they are neighbours too weak by themselves to be a danger to the Magyars. The Dual Monarchy in which the Magyars are the predominant factor enables them to hold a stronger position with regard to Germany than that to which they could aspire were Hungary isolated.

The Habsburg State must rest on a German basis—its political gravity must be fixed in Vienna and cannot move into the Slav periphery. Cracow, Lemberg, Laibach, and Prague would be merely stations on roads which lead to Warsaw, Kiev, and Belgrade, and perhaps in the last resort to Moscow. For Germany the Habsburg Monarchy forms the pivot of her *Weltpolitik*. It disguises and stultifies Germany's conflicts with neighbouring nations, puts at her disposal the military and economic strength of 50,000,000 men, and keeps open for her the shortest road into the Balkans and Asia. Austria-Hungary's integrity is therefore a primary concern of Germany. Yet it is essential for German policy that this State, which embodies the national conflicts of the German nation, should itself remain in conflict with its neighbours. This deprives Austria-Hungary of all possibility of developing a life of its own and of acquiring independence in international relations.

In 1910 Austria, Hungary, Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey were all Germany's friends, allies or dependents, while even Russia, despite the resentment aroused by the issue of the Bosnian crisis, and despite strong Panslav influence at Petrograd, remained in a certain sense within the German sphere. None had any quarrel with Germany, but hardly any two among them were on cordial terms with each other. All the wires led to Berlin and through Berlin only. Germany was the mediator and arbiter between her friends,

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ever mindful that their quarrels should continue. She safeguarded most of them against each other, and Russia, who did not require any such guarantees, against revolution from within.

The basis of the German system in Eastern Europe was thus threefold :—

(1) None of these States was national in the sense of enclosing an entire nation or one nation only.

(2) They could never effectively unite against Germany.

(3) Germany acted as guardian of reaction throughout Eastern Europe.

That a break should have occurred in this system when the Austro-Hungarian Government took upon itself to disturb the balance in the Balkans, and that Russia, Italy, and Roumania should have finally found themselves united against the Central Powers, is less surprising than the strength which the system has been shown to possess. But the Central Powers had overrated the patience of Russia, Tsardom its own forces. The system broke down, and with it Russian autocracy.

In 1916 there seemed to be some possibility in Eastern Europe of a resettlement which though a victory for the Central Powers and unsatisfactory from the Polish point of view might yet have proved a serious obstacle to the re-establishing of the German system. It seemed on the cards that Austria might exchange Eastern Galicia against Russian Poland. A Poland consisting of none but genuinely Polish territories, but not including German Poland, would have had no interests contrary to those of Russia, but a claim against Germany. Relations between Austria and Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other would have improved very considerably, those with Germany could not have remained unaffected by the inclusion of Poland in the Habsburg Monarchy and by the disappearance of the anti-Polish interest which Russia had had in common with Prussia. The conflicting interests of the Austrian Germans and the Magyars on the one hand and of the Czechs and Jugoslavs on the other might still have barred the road to an alliance between the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia, but confusion of issues would have prevailed where Germany's subtle system requires clearness. Therefore the German Government and the cleverest exponent of Magyar imperialism, Count Tisza, have both steadily vetoed the Austrian solution of the Polish question. In November,

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1917, rumours were current that Berlin had at last given in and agreed to Poland being united to Austria, whilst Lithuania and Courland were to be joined in a similar manner to Germany. Of recent weeks, however, Germany has developed most far-reaching schemes of her own, and the entire German press emphatically asserts that the Austrian solution of the Polish question has been abandoned.

* * * * *

Russia's military collapse and her social revolution have completely transformed the political situation in Eastern Europe. Yet the foundations of the German Empire, its interests and policy, have remained unchanged. It continues to stand for social reaction, for aggressive nationalism and for *Realpolitik* in international relations. We can watch the German Government at work, trying to re-establish its system on a very much enlarged scale, but on the old lines—States carved out wherever possible in defiance of nationality, separated by feuds from each other, each of them hoping for or depending upon Germany's help, and all alike united to Germany by a reactionary interest.

In Finland the Germans aim at establishing a counter-revolutionary government such as would be dependent on them. In the Baltic Provinces the German scheme seems to be to set up three separate states, each defying the principle of nationality. Courland, to which Riga and the islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga are to be added, is to come under almost direct German dominion, Livonia and Esthonia are to be put in some more remote connection with the German Empire. In each of them the Germans would support the big landowning interests (mainly German by nationality) and the *bourgeoisie* against the Socialist peasantry and workmen. If the German territorial scheme is as outlined above, the Esths who inhabit Esthonia, the islands, and northern Livonia would find themselves partitioned between three States. The Letts who inhabit Courland, southern Livonia and Lattgalia (the north-western part of the Government of Vitebsk, which seems to have been left to Russia) would thus also find themselves divided into three parts.

The outlines of the German scheme with regard to Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine were published in the *New Statesman* of 9 March. Lithuania is to consist of the genuinely Lithuanian Government of Kovno and the northern part of

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Suvalki, but is, moreover, to include the predominantly White Russian Government of Vilna and the north-eastern part of the White Russian Government of Grodno. The southern part of that Government has been assigned by the treaty of 9 February to the Ukraine. The western part is to be handed over to Poland. Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine are thus to partition between them western White Russia. Lithuania and the Ukraine are to obtain a common frontier. A *rap-prochement* between the two would be probable and would suit German interests because it would establish a continuous line from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but neither with Lithuania nor with the Ukraine is Poland likely to form an alliance or connection. Cholm and East Galicia stand between Poland and the Ukraine, Suvalki and Vilna between Poland and Lithuania. In each of these provinces the Poles inhabit certain portions of the territory, and in each they raise claims far in excess of anything which can be justified on grounds of nationality. Lastly, most of the big landed estates throughout Lithuania and the Ukraine are owned by Polish nobles. Germany will protect the conservative social interest of the Poles and stimulate the nationalism of the Lithuanians and Ukrainians.

Lithuania, a peasant State of about 13,000 square miles, with a population of roughly five millions, undeveloped both economically and intellectually, is to be kept by Germany under her direct tutelage. Through Lithuania she is to obtain access to the Ukraine. The Poles, who of all the nations in Eastern Europe have the strongest upper classes, are to be kept dependent on Germany through the interests which these upper classes possess in Poland as well as in Lithuania and the Ukraine. Germany offers to protect them against social revolution. In the Ukraine the Rada, which owes its survival exclusively to German and Austrian intervention, will live in constant fear of the revolutionary peasant movement which would sweep away the extreme Ukrainian separatism and reunite the Ukraine to the Russian Federal Republic. Meantime, as the Ukrainian nationalists have interests contrary to Austria in East Galicia and the Bukovina, and to the Magyars in north-eastern Hungary, Germany would be their more natural protector.

The Germans have tempted Roumania to seize Bessarabia by force. They do not want her to obtain Bessarabia by the

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free choice of its inhabitants and a friendly arrangement with Russia. At the same time they try to force her to abandon the Dobrudja for them to hold as a pawn. They want Roumania to quarrel with all her neighbours alike. A surrender of the mountain passes to Hungary, as demanded by the Central Powers, would place Roumania at the mercy of her hereditary enemies, the Magyars, and make her dependent on Germany's protection. It has been further contemplated by the Germans that Bulgaria should hand back to Serbia part of Macedonia, which is the bone of contention between the two, but that the Serbs should cede to Bulgaria territory in north-eastern Serbia to which Bulgaria has no right whatever. Such a cession would establish direct contact between Bulgaria and Hungary but, if possible, render still worse the hopeless national confusion of the Balkans

From the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Ægean a series of small States would extend, nationalist though not national, conservative and in constant fear of revolution, each of them involved in feuds with its neighbours, and every one dependent on Germany.

In the centre would remain Austria-Hungary "without annexations or indemnities," in such perfectly balanced integrity as only the most fervent British pacifists or Magyar imperialists can desire. Surrounded more than ever by States which would claim unredeemed provinces, she would yet fear no one, but put her trust in the "big brother" in Berlin.

Then only one thing would be needed to render the German system and settlement complete—that monarchy should be re-established in Russia. Events would have taught all Grand Dukes alike how indispensable it is for reactionaries to exercise forbearance towards each other. With terrifying reminiscences haunting the Court, monarchical Russia would be Germany's most faithful ally and dependent.

The nature of the German system indicates the means for combatting it. It rests on violence against nationality, on feuds engendered by it and on social reaction. National self-determination and social justice are the only weapons which can break it.

"N."

A New Russo-Roumanian Alliance ?

[The following article is based upon the meagre information available at the moment of writing. Necessarily based upon conjecture, it is none the less a sufficiently intelligent anticipation of events to justify publication.—THE EDITOR.]

OF all the sensational events of the war none has had such inadequate notice in the press of this country as the conclusion of peace and practical alliance between Russia and Roumania, transmitted here through the Russian wireless stations on Saturday last (March 9). The Saturday evening press headed the announcement "Mysterious Treaty," or "Bessarabia Lost," or in other ways showed that they were indeed mystified. The Sunday press was equally puzzled, and this morning (Monday) not a single London paper devotes more than a few lines to what may prove one of the most important announcements of the war; for the importance of the new Treaty, if our reading of it is right, will be great, not only from the point of view of an immediate change in the military situation on the Russian front, but also as the first step towards the eventual reconciliation of the two mightiest forces determining the future of European democracy, socialism and nationality.

Before examining the terms of the new Treaty readers of THE NEW EUROPE may be referred to what was written a month ago in an article called "Roumania *in extremis*." It was there maintained that from the real internationalist point of view, alike in principle and in practice, the Bolševik Government had got itself into a false position by its declaration of war on Roumania. This attack on Roumania we there called "wanton and irrelevant," "wanton," because with more patience and tact it might have been avoided; "irrelevant," because it was, after all, but a side issue, and was calculated to weaken any real Bolševik offensive against the Central Powers. The "war" then declared has fortunately found little practical expression; events elsewhere have naturally pushed it into the shade. German *intransigence* at Brest-Litovsk and bad faith after it have made any prospect of real peace between Russia and Germany, if it ever existed, quite out of the question. The Pangermans have dropped the mask and Germany now appears what she always was—determined to be the conqueror and exploiter of the Russian Empire. All democratic Russians—Bolševik or non-Bolševik—are being driven to the conclusion that they must fight,

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and fight soon, against the menace from Potsdam—*how soon* is the sole matter of dispute even between Lenin and Trotski. Practical experience is teaching the Bolševik leaders that while war against the whole bourgeois world at once may be, in principle, 'logical, and, in theory, attractive, in practice it is unworkable. In theory all European Governments may be equally criminal to the Bolševik mind; in practice it is clear that there are degrees of "criminality" among them; that is to say, while under no circumstances could Trotski and his supporters co-operate with Potsdam, circumstances may have arisen under which co-operation with London, Paris, and especially Washington, may seem to them not only correct but desirable. The imminence of Japanese intervention with all its incalculable consequences has rudely awakened the Bolševik Government of Russia to the fact that the critical moment has arrived when they must choose whether or not there is to be a complete breach with the democracies of the world, placing Russia finally at the mercy of Germany and any other Power which might have aggressive designs on Russian territory. Russia must either break with the Western Powers, or regain their respect and confidence. This respect and confidence, rightly or wrongly, will only be given by the best public opinion of the Western Powers to a Russia which shows she is prepared to continue the struggle, even under the most unfavourable conditions, against the Central Empires. While this article is in the press the decision will be taken at Moscow by the assembled Soviets of Russia, and to that Congress Trotski goes as a new and stranger Peter the Hermit. It is not our intention to prophesy the result, but appreciation of the situation at Petrograd and Moscow is one key to the interpretation of the new Treaty with Roumania.

In the article on Roumania quoted above the reasons were set forth why Roumania would be forced to negotiate with the Central Powers. To put it shortly, war on two fronts was for Roumania impossible, and if the Bolševiks were determined to fight Roumania their challenge had a prior claim simply for the reason that they controlled the import of foodstuffs and material of war into Moldavia, and so could completely prevent Roumanian military activities against the Central Powers. The Roumanian army to-day is stronger and better than it ever was in personnel; it com-

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prises over half a million men equal in training and *moral* to that of any in Europe. For a war of a few weeks it might be relied on to face any army of equal numbers that could be put against it and far more than face the always disunited and now disheartened Austrian forces who are likely to be its chief opponents. But adequate supplies are sadly lacking ; a successful offensive could not be continued if the transport of war material from Russia were cut off by the Bolševiks. Faced by these facts, Roumania had nothing for it but to negotiate with the Central Powers—at first unofficially on general lines, later on formally and in detail. As in their preliminary conversation with the Russians at Brest-Litovsk, the Germans in their offers to Roumania were at first conciliatory, even benevolent. Roumania would lose no territory at all except, possibly, a slight rectification of the Dobrudjan frontier, more than compensated for by the recognition of her right to Bessarabia. Her dynasty would be allowed to remain on the throne ; her army not demobilised, though withdrawn from the Hungarian front ; her economic needs met by the most favourable of treaties. Such appear to have been the terms, and Roumania was well advised to consider them. Subsequent discussion, however, soon put the German demands in a less favourable light. Their requirements advanced by leaps and bounds. Territorially Roumania was to lose the whole of Dobrudja to the Central Alliance, to see her frontier with Hungary “rectified” in accordance with the latter’s fancied strategical and economic requirements, while the prospect of securing Bessarabia soon proved a mirage created by the wonder-workers of Berlin. Roumania’s whole corn and oil production would pass under the permanent control of the Central Powers. Most serious of all, eight Roumanian divisions were at once to be demobilised, and so far as the army remained in being it was to be put at the disposal of the German and Austrian authorities for use against Russia. The Roumanians were further to open Moldavia and Bessarabia to the passage of the Austro-German armies in their march to Odessa. The terms were terms imposed frankly on the German principle of *vae victis* ; probably they were, however, merely the preliminary to still more excessive demands. To accept them meant complete capitulation, and yet how could Roumania refuse ? In their last perplexity it appears they have bethought them of an accommodation with the Russians, their self-styled “enemies.”

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Hitherto, as we have shown, a *rapprochement* between Roumania and the Bolševiks had proved impossible owing to the hopes and fears of both parties, but alike for Russia and for Roumania the situation has greatly changed. If the Bolševiks are really now turning to the Western Powers for help and encouragement in their struggle with Germany, there is no reason why they should not at the same moment patch up their quarrel with Roumania and seek Roumanian co-operation. Roumania has still less reason to fight the Bolševiks, provided only her two vital needs—food and munitions—are secured her. We are told that the treaty was signed in Odessa, where for some time past energetic attempts have been made by friends of both parties to smooth over their bitter differences. Whoever drew up the terms, they are a masterpiece of diplomacy, for both sides get all they want. The Bolševiks secure the satisfaction of their grievances, the release of Russians arrested in Roumania, and the promise of the Roumanian authorities to evacuate Bessarabia. In return Roumania can rely on the support she required from Russia. The promise to evacuate Bessarabia is not intended to hamper her military movements, for she is given "two months" to do so, and has "the right to leave her detachments in Bessarabia for the defence of Roumanian property and inhabitants who are residing there."

Apparently full agreement has been reached, and the only added clause which the Roumanian Government may find it uncongenial to accept is the complete amnesty for Roumanian deserters and political offenders, which would pave the way for the return of Rakovski and other Roumanian Bolševiks to the country. The Roumanian Government may feel that the acceptance even of this condition entails little risk, for events have shown—what ought always to have been obvious—that the danger of a Bolševik anti-war revolution in Roumania is a mere bogey. A common misfortune and a common foe have again, in a moment, united Russia and Roumania. Possibly acute differences of principle may be softened by comradeship on the field of battle. It should at least be the part of the British, French and American democracies to see that no action of theirs hampers such an unexpected and desirable consummation. A real focus for military resistance can be thereby created in Eastern Europe; a practical fighting force immediately thrown against the Central Powers. Here is no question of 500,000 troops of an Allied nation being landed in

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a corner of the Russian Empire 5,000 miles away. It is a question of giving 500,000 Roumanian soldiers a chance we should otherwise deny them of defending their country and defending our own cause. If by our policy we should hamper the possibility of such an achievement we should ourselves be primarily responsible for the surrender not only of Russia, but of Roumania to the Central Powers. In the eyes of history we should, perhaps, be unconsciously guilty of a greater offence. For the first time International Socialism and a National State have joined hands for a definite purpose; let us not seek to prevent an understanding which can be the only foundation on which an international Europe, constituted of self-determined national units, must be based.

11 March, 1918.

BELISARIUS.

“*Fas est et ab hoste doceri*”

AN old diplomatist once put on record his reflection that the most trying moments of his life were those in which he felt that he was being made the instrument of a false policy dictated neither by reason nor by interest, but by passion. The same thought must have oppressed many minds at many times during the war. Hatred of the enemy is supposed to be so useful an ingredient in the fighting spirit that we seem to be afraid of admitting even his proved efficiency in certain things as a motive for understanding how the efficiency itself was gained. The deep loathing of German conduct in the war justifies us in shunning his methods in so far as they are immoral or repugnant to humane feeling; it cannot stand as a plea for shutting ourselves off from contact with all German things. When it is used as an excuse for the suppression of the teaching of German in our educational institutions it cannot pass unchallenged.

The recent controversy in the *Observer* and in the Scottish press over this question illustrates clearly what I mean. On one side of the dispute are ranged the full-blooded but misguided anti-German party, who denounce the teaching of German on the irrelevant ground that Germans violated Belgium and sank the *Lusitania*. On the other side—to which we unhesitatingly adhere—are those who declare that a knowledge of the German language is a necessary part of the equipment of any nation which hopes to compete with Ger-

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many in the field of commerce, science and world-politics. The latter party desires to see Great Britain re-enter the competition with Germany, which will be not less, but more acute, after the war than before, equipped to the fullest possible extent for the struggle, and declines to yield to the clamour of the moment, which violent patriots have raised against the teaching of German. In some unexplained fashion these people think that the reading of a German book brings pollution to the reader, or that the brutal murder of Edith Cavell somehow robs the achievements of German science of their permanent value. I doubt whether they are aware how largely we have to rely, even at this moment, upon German spade-work in science, or how much our own scientific work during the war has suffered from the stupid restrictions placed upon the importation of contemporary scientific periodicals. I do not think that I should lose money if I were to bet that there are a dozen German books, say, on chemistry alone, at present in constant use in the laboratories of our munition works, and that the information they contain is hardly to be found in any work published in English. And I know that the Government's embargo on German books has hampered even Government departments themselves in war-work. No one who knows the facts has ever suggested that the Germans are a more original people than we are, but it is equally undeniable that they have made such good use of their opportunities that the volume of research which they have turned out contains a far greater aggregate of the raw material of scientific production than is to be found in Great Britain. Given equal opportunity, the British student is more than a match for his German competitor; and part of that equality of opportunity in present circumstances lies in providing our own men with the abundant raw material of scientific thought which has been produced in Germany.

There is no better way of worsting a competitor than to know what is in his mind; and there is no worse way of studying his mind than in translation. No translation can convey the real sense of the original; and even if it could, the training of the translator himself implies the teaching of German in this country; while the delay entailed in getting good translations made, and, still more, the difficulty of persuading publishers to undertake the responsibility of issuing them, would greatly lessen their value. We must go

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direct to the source. It may be true that in pure literature no German has recently excelled, but the countrymen of Shakespeare and Milton cannot plead that as their excuse for refusing to learn the native language of Goethe and Kant; our own modern literature is not so rich in genius as to justify contempt of Germany on that ground. Nor does the argument in favour of the teaching of German rest upon any literary ground; its strength lies in the intrinsic value which German possesses as a vehicle of contemporary thought of many kinds, economic, political, scientific and military. Should we decide to discourage the teaching of German we should be the only losers; for other nations will take the opposite course, and thus enter the field of competition with a better equipment than ours. And we need have no doubt that the sentiment of *Gott strafe England* will not prevent Germans from making the study of English part of the preparation for their great economic offensive after the war!

BOREAS.

The Yugoslav Movement in Austria

The national movement among the Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary grows steadily stronger despite the unfavourable military situation. The attitude of their leaders is reflected in a number of very outspoken parliamentary speeches, and in the telegram sent by Father Korošec, President of the Southern Slav Club, to the Czech Constituent at Prague. “ In its struggle,” he said, “ for the right of self-determination and for its own state the Czecho-Slovak nation will find allies in the Yugoslavs, who will fight shoulder to shoulder with it. The Yugoslavs also do not recognise Count Czernin's right to speak in the name of the Austrian Slav nations, for he only represents a privileged minority.” Meanwhile the attitude of the rank and file is shown by the fact that, in practically every town and village of the Southern Slav districts of Austria-Hungary, the Slovene and Croat women are collecting signatures for the programme of Yugoslav Unity proclaimed on 30 May, 1917, and publishing the results of this informal plebiscite.

Dr. Tresić-Pavičić, the Croat poet, whose courageous exposure of Austrian persecution of the Yugoslavs was reproduced in No. 57 of THE NEW EUROPE, received some weeks later a triumphal reception in the Croatian capital. The stormy demonstrations of sympathy with Serbia which took place on this occasion caused great scandal in Vienna and Budapest. Osijek (Essegg), the second town of Croatia, in order not to be behind Zagreb (Agram), arranged early in February a reception for his fellow-poet, Count Lujo Vojnović. For what followed we rely upon the narrative of the Magyar Jingo-Liberal organ, *Pesti Hirlep* (6 February). “ It needs to be known that Yugoslav ideas are spreading

THE JUGOSLAV MOVEMENT IN AUSTRIA

enormously throughout Croatia. In three weeks three new propagandist papers have seen the light at Zagreb and Osijek, and, with the censor's connivance, are agitating boundlessly for the realisation of Jugoslavia." Vojnović, "who was interned for two years and has been accused of high treason, is wandering through Croatia as the apostle of Yugoslav dreams." He was met at the station by various high officials, but "the interesting thing is that the applause was not in honour of the poet, but took the form of 'Long live' Serbia, King Peter, Bohemia, Italy, Russia. . . . If a few months ago anyone had worn a Serbian cockade on the street and cheered King Peter, the court would certainly have sentenced him to several months of prison, and a little earlier he would have gone to the gallows. It was with consternation that we saw to-day such incidents under the eyes of the police. Serious Croats were alarmed when they saw public schoolboys (gymnasiasts) wearing Serbian emblems and shouting, 'Long live Greater Serbia and King Peter!' " None the less, next day the High Sheriff and other notables formally received the poet at a gala performance, and "during the banquet the Yugoslavs would not allow the Coalition deputy Kraus to speak, because he began by saying that the members of the Coalition could not yet speak openly."

One tiny group, the so-called Frank party, has stood aloof from the Yugoslav movement, though claiming the union of Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Slovenia. The disgusted comment of its party organ, *Hrvatska* (1 February) on recent events is the best testimony that can be adduced. "The Yugoslav movement," it writes, "has spread everywhere with such force that there is no longer anything to be seen or heard outside Jugoslavism and yet again Jugoslavism. The Yugoslav wave rolls on like the tide, and carries before it all it meets."

The most audacious comment on the situation comes from the organ of the Zagreb Catholics, *Novine*, which describes the struggle against the two national enemies, the Germans and the Magyars, and declares that "the Gordian knot will be cut by the sword of Alexander, namely, by national unity and our right of self-determination." The allusion to the Serbian Prince-Regent is too obvious to require any commentary.

Prince Kropotkin on Russia

[Through the courtesy of Mr. S. P. Turin, Assistant Professor of National Economy at Moscow University, we are enabled to publish the following extracts from a letter of Prince Kropotkin's, written in the last days of 1917.]

"There is no doubt that the belligerent nations long for peace. Exhaustion, after three years of strife, is beginning to make itself felt among all nations of Europe. But, for the conclusion of peace, the agreement of both sides is necessary. At the same time all classes in Germany are strong in the belief that it is still possible to retain all the territory occupied by her armies. So sure are they that their country will be enriched by these conquests that the majority of German people do not feel at all inclined to take any steps to offer to the Allies accept-

PRINCE KROPOTKIN ON RUSSIA

able peace terms. On the contrary, the greater the demoralisation of the Russian army and Russian life the more cynical become the German demands. Seeing the weakness of Russia and the inability of its army to offer any serious resistance, the majority of the German people believe their Government and Hindenburg when they claim that they will succeed in concluding separate peace on terms most disastrous for Russia. For that purpose they think it will be quite sufficient to begin an offensive on Petrograd and Odessa.

“ With every retreat of the Russian army before small German detachments the demands of Germany grow bigger. If another retreat like that of Tarnopol or Riga occurs we shall be expected to surrender not only Poland, Lithuania and Courland, but also the coast of Finland and the whole of Bessarabia. Germany will want the ‘ Asiatic ’ Russians to retire to the east of Moscow, thus carrying out a doctrine which Germans have been seriously taught in their schools and universities for over 40 years.

“ What the Germans will do in Petrograd if they ever reach it is perfectly clear. First of all, they will not occupy Petrograd unless they are sure of getting supplies from the interior of Russia. In this case they will obviously endeavour to occupy the line Pskov-Bologoye-Ribinsk, in order to get access to the Volga and the central Russian provinces. At the same time, they will try to combine their gains in the north with the use of the railway lines in the south of Russia. Secondly, to prevent a rising in the conquered Russian provinces, they will treat the population as they have treated the people of Belgium. So they behaved in Malines, Aerschott and in other Belgian towns, strictly following the instructions of the German General Staff. Then, they will take the able-bodied men and send them into slavery to Livonia, Courland and Lithuania or to Prussia, making them work for the war and against their own brethren.

“ Our ‘ Zimmerwaldians ’ and their friends keep silence about the German terror in Belgium, but all of it has been proved by various commissions whose testimony cannot be doubted. It is not only destruction we have to face, if we accept the German-Hindenburg peace as our ‘ Zimmerwaldians ’ and pseudo-internationalists wish us to do—we should be faced with ruin for many years to come. Russia will be forced to pay huge contributions or, which comes to the same thing, immense taxes imposed by commercial treaties favourable to Germany.

“ We have people who tell the poverty-stricken masses that contributions to Germany will be paid by the rich class. But it is hard for us to listen to this teaching—for us, who have seen the working people of France, peasants and artisans, paying, during many years, the contribution to Germany after 1871. I am not speaking here of the conditions which Germany will certainly impose on us in our industrial and economic life. A German peace will inevitably bring us to economic slavery.

“ But there is yet another consequence of a separate peace, more terrible than contributions and the ruin of the country—that is, the psychology of a conquered nation. I know this psychology well.

PRINCE KROPOTKIN ON RUSSIA

France suffered from it for 30 years. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century did I notice the first signs of the rising of spirits in France after the military defeat of 1871, the loss of two rich provinces, payment of huge contributions and humiliating conditions of the peace of Frankfurt. During the whole of those 30 years France lived in terror of new German aggression should her democratic internal policy displease the Court of Berlin, or should the democracy of France annoy the Russian Tsar, her only ally at that time.

"It is so terrible to go through this trial. Terror grips me when I think of the precipice to which the advocates of a Hindenburg peace are leading the simple, illiterate, childish-credulous Russian people."

Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons

We learn from announcements in the press the welcome news that a Foreign Affairs Group has been formed in the House of Commons. The work which awaits such a body is both far-reaching and important. There never was a time in the history of Parliament when it was more vital to the good government of the realm that the representatives of the people should have an organ of their own for the study of foreign problems, nor has there ever been so widespread a desire for knowledge and guidance in foreign affairs. The new Group will not be able to rely on the Foreign Office for the light it seeks; it must organise its own sources of information which, fortunately, are to be found in abundance in London, and it will probably be well-advised not to attempt at the outset any too definite formulation of policy. Indeed, its success will depend upon the pertinacity and patience with which it is prepared to take up knotty problems in the light of clear principles and pursue their investigation in a scientific spirit. This is no easy task, but, provided the group can find its own leaders, who must combine zeal and sagacity in equal degrees, it can look forward to a career of great usefulness.

We predict with confidence that before this Group is many weeks old it will find that the most urgent question in the whole field of its operations is the reform of the Foreign Office. In this respect it comes into existence not one moment too soon, for the Foreign Office has already divulged its intention to reform itself. To make this self-reform effective the House of Commons must keep a vigilant eye upon the process. It is to be hoped that the Foreign Affairs Group will delegate this subject to a special committee, composed of those Members of Parliament—of whom there are quite a useful number—who have had the experience of a diplomatic career or of working contact with Foreign Office methods in recent years. Such a committee should get to work at once. There is a prospect of a debate in the House on this subject in the early summer, which, if properly organised beforehand and kept free from the blighting influence of cranks, might have a serious influence upon the attitude of the Foreign Secretary. We commend the idea to the founders of the Foreign Affairs Group. And, in conclusion, we give the Group itself a warm welcome.

NOTES

Maxim Gorki on Lenin

Maxim Gorki, whose whole life has been a struggle for the Russian Revolution, finds himself disillusioned at the tyranny of the Bolševik chiefs. Early in February his quarrel with Lenin reached a head, as the result of an article containing the following home truths:—"Lenin," he wrote, "seeks to introduce in Russia the Socialist *régime à la Nécaïev*" [the famous Nihilist conspirator of the seventies]—"in other words, to let the train run at full steam through the marshes. Fancying themselves to be veritable Napoleons, the Lenins, great and small, are going mad and completing the process of the destruction of Russia. Certainly Lenin is a man of extraordinary force. For 25 years on end he has kept in the front ranks of those struggling for the triumph of the Socialist idea. He is a man of genius, possessing all the qualities of a leader, and he does not know the meaning of morality. Certainly, like a real *grand seigneur*, Lenin despises the complicated life of the masses, of which he knows nothing at all. He has never lived in close contact with the people; and through books he has not succeeded in understanding the masses. But it is just this fact that makes him capable of rousing into fury the lowest instincts of the working classes. I believe it to be absolutely impossible, with present conditions and the material which we have, to create a Socialist State. But why not try? What does the *grand seigneur* Lenin risk, by forcing the people to make this experiment? The risk only exists for these masses whom Lenin despises. . . ."

"Those who live in glass houses . . ."

The recently founded London organ of the Polish National Democrats, *Tygodnik Polski*, in its issue of 11 March, has contrived to combine its attacks upon rival Polish groups with a peculiarly gross insinuation against THE NEW EUROPE and our collaborator "N," who, we are informed, is "a kindred spirit of Bronstein (*i.e.*, Trotski), Rosenfeld, Apfelbaum and Sobelson of the Russian Revolution. 'N' is expressing the same ideas as Vigo in *Le Bonnet Rouge* and Laudau in *La Tranchée Républicaine*." The best answer to this stupid charge is "N's" exposure of German Eastern policy in our present number. As for THE NEW EUROPE itself, we are really not afraid of our readers suspecting us of Germanophil tendencies. Nor are we disposed to accept correction at the hands of the individuals whose chief military supporters in Russia, after loud professions of loyalty to the Allied cause and violent denunciation of all who dared to disagree with them, have, not many weeks ago, joined hands with the advancing German armies. We would merely remind Messrs. Dmowski, Kozicki, Sobanski, and their friends of the "Polish National Committee," that if they wish to impress public opinion in this country they will do well to avoid methods of political controversy and political tactics which savour all too strongly of Warsaw at the height of the Tsarist *régime*.

Diary of Current Events

- 15 Feb.—German Commission leaves Petrograd.
- 16 Feb.—Repington trial opens. General Sir H. Wilson made C.I.G.S. General Sir W. Robertson denies "resignation."
- 17 Feb.—General Sir W. Robertson's resignation of post of Chief of I.G.S. announced. General Kaledin commits suicide.
- 18 Feb.—Noon; Russo-German armistice declared at an end by Germany; war resumed. Lord R. Cecil's statement to Reuter on difficulties of League of Peace. Lord Northcliffe becomes Director of Propaganda in Enemy countries. Sir W. Robertson accepts Eastern Command. Serbian Industrial Mission received by King at Buckingham Palace.
- 19 Feb.—Premier's statement on General Sir W. Robertson and Versailles. Germans take Dvinsk and Lutsk. Russia announces willingness to sign, under protest, peace terms dictated by enemy at Brest. Vice-President of Reichstag on peace with Ukraine. Vienna reports that Roumania has expressed wish to begin preliminary peace negotiations. Sir H. Rawlinson becomes British representative at Versailles. A.S.E. rejects Government's man-power proposals.
- 20 Feb.—Kühlmann in Reichstag on new situation. Mr. Balfour informs Polish National Committee that Great Britain does not accept peace treaty between Ukraine and Central Powers. Lord Jellicoe at Aldwich Club on submarine war. Inter-Allied Social and Labour Conference opens in London.
- 21 Feb.—*Morning Post* case ends: editor and Col. Repington fined. Jericho captured. Germany announces her terms to Russia.
- 23 Feb.—Informal peace negotiations begun between Germany and Roumania. Sonnino makes important speech in Chamber, sympathetic towards Jugoslavs.
- 24 Feb.—Russia decides to accept German terms and sends delegation to Brest.
- 25 Feb.—Publication of Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Memorandum on War Aims. Count Hertling's speech in Reichstag on President Wilson's four principles. Reval and Pskov taken by Germans.
- 26 Feb.—New constitution of British Labour Party formed.
- 27 Feb.—Mr. Balfour answers Count Hertling in House of Commons.
- 2 March.—Armistice between Roumania and Central Powers expires. Roumania announces decision to accept terms (including cession of Dobrudja).
- 3 March.—Sweden protests against Germany's projected landing on Åland Islands "as a necessary halting-place for the military expedition" to Finland. Russian Delegation signs peace with Germany, to be ratified on 17 March.
- 4 March.—M. Albert Thomas at Mansion House (Anglo-French Society). Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch on Cambrai published.
- 5 March.—Sir E. Geddes on naval situation. Lord Lansdowne's second letter in *Daily Telegraph*.
- 6 March.—Death of Mr. Redmond.
- 7 March.—Mr. Bonar Law's review of the war in the House of Commons.
- 8 March.—Reported resignation of Krylenko.
- 9 March.—Announcement of unofficial Italo-Jugoslav agreement concluded in London between Dr. Andrea Torre and Dr. Trumbić.
- 12 March.—Date fixed for Soviet Congress in Moscow to decide on ratification of peace signed with Germany.

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"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

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"To compare Russia of to-day with the
Russia that is to come is to compare chaos
to the universe"

—Sir Charles Dilke (1878)

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The New Europe

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Playing with Austria

WHILE in each of the two belligerent groups the Governments still cling desperately to the discredited methods of the Old Diplomacy, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that secrecy which is so essential a part of the system. Even before the present war the revelations which followed the Balkan wars had made it evident that a new era was dawning in diplomatic history and procedure; and they have long since been thrown into the shade by the far more sensational revelations of the great war itself. But while this applies even to the most jealously guarded state documents, it applies no less to secret negotiations and even to surreptitious meetings between statesmen. A recent example of this is the fact that the encounter between General Smuts and Count Mensdorff, the late Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, became known to the general public within a few weeks of its actually taking place in Switzerland, and that it has proved equally impossible to conceal the resumption of the intrigue early in March.

If on the Entente side it was merely intended to engage upon informal discussions with a view to obtaining a clue to the inward mentality of the enemy, we should not be justified in condemning the step without further enquiry.* But rumour has credited the Entente representative with accepting as a basis of discussion conditions such as would not only render any reconstruction of Europe impossible, but would strike at the root of existing engagements, and even with offering to one of our enemies territorial concessions such as could not be reconciled with the principles so solemnly proclaimed by Entente statesmen. We therefore cannot help feeling that Lord Curzon, instead of contemptuously dismissing Lord Willoughby de Broke's very natural enquiry in the House of Lords, would have done well to reassure the nation by a formal refutation of such very persistent and concrete reports. Lord Curzon might, it is true, have had to face the question why the Foreign Office—always assuming that it was consulted in the matter, which is not a small

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assumption in these strange times—selected as its emissary a man whose high qualities are universally recognised, but who has only the most elementary knowledge of the country whose trained diplomatic representatives he was to meet. This is the more regrettable, since there is no European country which contains so many pitfalls for the amateur diplomatist as Austria-Hungary. Not only are its political problems far more numerous and far more complex than those of its neighbours, but they have gradually become obscured and complicated by a political terminology which cannot be learned in a day. Words have not the same value nor ideas the same content in Austria or in Hungary as farther west; and only personal experience can supply the key. Count Mensdorff is no genius, but anyone who negotiates with him is at a hopeless disadvantage unless he has at least a working knowledge of the internal conditions in the Dual Monarchy, and their essential bearing upon its relations with neighbouring countries in each of the two warring groups.

In its Austrian policy the Entente is faced by one of two alternatives, and any approach must be made in one of two directions: towards those who actually control the destinies of the two states, or towards those nations or national groups which desire to emancipate themselves from their present yoke—in other words, towards the faithful allies of our principal enemy, Germany, or towards his openly declared opponents among the subjects of *his* chief ally, Austria. Until we make this fundamental choice we are only toying with the subject, and negotiations conducted by persons whose mind is irresolute and who are still balancing the rival advantages not merely offer no serious prospect of success, but are calculated to do grave injury to the Allied cause.

Mr. Seton-Watson, in his article in the *March Contemporary Review*, has brought forward detailed arguments to prove that even if the young Emperor seriously desired to reconstruct his dominions on a genuine federal basis, not one of those factors upon which the existence of the State has hitherto rested—the aristocracy, the army, the Church, the bureaucracy, the German *bourgeoisie* and the Magyars—could be relied upon to support him in such a policy. If this contention be true—and we believe it to be unanswerable—then it follows that the Entente can only come to terms with the ruling powers in Austria-Hungary on conditions which involve accept-

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ance of the territorial *status quo* and a negation of the principle of nationality.

Under such circumstances the only effect of proposals from our side (and this holds good even if, as seems probable, the first overture came from bankrupt Vienna) must inevitably be to convince Austrian statesmen that all the public professions of the Entente during the past three years are mere hypocritical phrases. It has probably encouraged them to believe that our situation is far less favourable than we would have the outside world believe, and must in any case have betrayed the fact that in 1918, as in 1914, British statesmen have little or no grasp of the fundamental facts of the Austrian situation, and consequently of Central European policy. Moreover, the more uncertain the basis of discussion, the better the opportunity for Vienna, on the one hand, to prove its loyalty to Berlin by promptly handing on the information, and on the other, to discourage the various Slav elements in Austria which rely upon the Entente, by demonstrating to them how little ground they have for such reliance.

The idea of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary is a fatal illusion. The Germans of the Empire are, it is quite true, cordially detested throughout Austria and Hungary—by the Austrian Germans and the Magyars, no less than by the Slavs. It is even safe to speak of acute friction in their personal and social relations. But this does not affect the Alliance, for the very simple reason that the more Vienna and Budapest find themselves dependent upon Berlin, the more obvious it becomes to them that only Berlin can save the German hegemony in Austria and the Magyar hegemony in Hungary. During the war Austria-Hungary has cracked no less than six times; and each time it has only been saved from disaster and disintegration by German military intervention. To-day it is only the German Army which stands between Austria-Hungary and complete collapse; and in a certain sense it is a mere unlucky accident that Russia has collapsed first.

Austria-Hungary's dependence upon Germany is not merely political, but above all military. For a long time it has been obvious that as the result of a very definite policy from Berlin the Austro-Hungarian and German armies are inextricably dovetailed into each other—just as inside the former the various racial units have been set to watch and counteract

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each other, and even individual regiments have been blended racially for purposes of more effective control. Indeed, Germany had special reasons of her own for extending her military influence, through the autumn offensive against Italy, on the one front from which it had hitherto been excluded.

But, quite apart from this conclusive military reason, there are strong financial and economic factors which militate against all idea of a separate peace. Austria-Hungary is virtually bankrupt, its gold reserve has almost vanished, and it is tied hand and foot by financial commitments to the big Berlin banks. The financial prosperity of Vienna and Budapest has been artificially puffed beyond its natural limits at the expense of the subject nationalities, and would suffer from any restoration of the balance in favour of, say, Prague or Agram. The big Jewish banking interests of both capitals are hopelessly anti-Slav and hopelessly tied up with the old political order, with the German alliance, and with the trade and finance which follow the German flag. Meanwhile the press of Vienna and Budapest, which was always more or less controlled by the various industrial Cartells and trusts, has during the war fallen to an alarming degree under the influence of the Berlin banks and the Westphalian armament firms, with disastrous effects upon what is the Austrian equivalent of public opinion.

The young emperor and his entourage undoubtedly resent their dependence upon Berlin and the Hohenzollern. Even the Austrian military chiefs have had enough of the game, and are disturbed at the decline of discipline and the spread of subversive revolutionary ideas from Russia. But there is no serious evidence that they really contemplate a separate peace or regard it as practicable. On the contrary, everything goes to suggest that they regard separate negotiations as a mere trap to ensnare the unwary and commit the Entente to "negotiations all round." Moreover, however low our opinion of the Habsburgs may be, we are not entitled to believe them to be capable of such unparalleled treachery towards an ally as their abandonment of Germany under present circumstances would involve. The Habsburgs have displayed on more than one occasion the basest ingratitude and intolerance and have exploited without scruple the devotion of their adherents or their allies. But they are not dead to all sense of *noblesse oblige* and cannot be treated like Oriental desperadoes of the stamp of Talaat and Enver. Moreover, as the world is con-

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stituted to-day, their betrayal of Germany would bring down the whole fabric of the already tottering dynastic principle about their ears, and they are too essentially dynasts not to realise this to the full. Finally, mere common sense must warn them that if the impossible could be accomplished and the alliance with Germany could be repudiated, Berlin's prompt answer would be the occupation of Prague and Cracow. In short, we are driven back to the conclusion that in making overtures to the Entente, Vienna has been simply laying a trap, designed to compromise us in the eyes of our friends and to provide Berlin with the means of testing our spirit and *moral*.

The persistence of the Austrian intrigue in Western Europe is a curious phenomenon which it would not be difficult to trace to certain definite sources—social, financial, international, ecclesiastical, *défaitiste*—often mutually antagonistic, sometimes strangely intertwined. But if we exclude those who are manifestly either tools or dupes, we shall find that those who are actively working for the preservation of Austria are invariably—however divergent their spheres of action may be—at heart reactionaries and adherents of the old order. On the Austrian side are arrayed the dynastic principle (which is poles apart from the British conception of limited monarchy), the conception of a hereditary military caste bound by no ties save loyalty to the Imperial House, the cults of ascendancy and racial hegemony, the fear of a sluggish and unreformed Church for changes which must affect its inordinate temporal riches, the alarm of a nerveless aristocracy at the growing land-hunger of the peasantry, the infinite blocking capacity of a bureaucracy which is impervious to the ferment of nationality around it and owes its influence to a genius for petty espionage and to its skill in erecting “*Divide et Impera*” into a complete system of government. Behind all this stand the cryptic figures of international finance and the landed interest, urging a cessation of the struggle while each can still hope to maintain some remnant of its old power.

These intrigues will not succeed; events are far too strong, far too inexorable. But they sap the *moral* of the nations, undermine confidence between allies, and drive us to despair of the irresponsible levity and cynicism with which we are governed. When a stranger in the street quotes the peace rumours of which London is full, we can afford to dismiss them as old wives' tales. But when a banker of standing like

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Mr. Franklin, the leading partner in Samuel Montagu and Company, publicly asserts that constant peace negotiations are going on by wireless between this country and Germany, we are forced to take the assertion seriously. What, then, is the policy of the War Cabinet? Are those whom we regarded as real "war minds"—men like Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Milner, General Smuts—losing their nerve and preparing secretly for a patched-up peace? We could have peace tomorrow with Germany, but only on the basis of an unholy bargain between two Imperialistic policies. Africa and the Arab world might be bartered for Central and Eastern Europe, and Germany would transfer her colonising and Germanising designs to the scene of her mediæval triumphs. The *status quo* would thus be accepted for the territory of our enemies and reversed for the territory of our friends. We do not deny that "enquiries" must take place before the true negotiations for peace can begin. But, to judge from the statement issued by the Allied Premiers after the recent London Conference, the time is not ripe either for the "enquiries" or for the negotiations themselves. And if simultaneously with declarations of that kind this hole-and-corner diplomacy continues the Western Alliance may begin to crumble. If General Smuts visits Count Mensdorff, why should not Signor Tittoni meet Prince Bülow, or Mr. Pašić parley with Dr. Baernreither, or Mr. Politis with Mr. Gešov? Why should not France even send M. Briand to accept the very favourable offer which Germany is alleged to have made in the present month? Why not, indeed: except that a general *sauve qui peut* cannot lead to peace and security. Whatever governments may think or do, the democratic peoples of the West are not prepared to sell their birthright for an empty peace which gives no security.

Russia out of Focus

THE Russian scene is badly out of focus. The confusion in the foreground is so conspicuous to our Western eye that the main landscape escapes us. In a word, the Russian people are lost to sight for the moment behind the dust-cloud of revolutionary disturbance; and "out of sight is out of mind." The "fog of revolution" has taken the place of

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“ the fog of war ” and has made the task of framing a Russian policy peculiarly difficult for the Western Powers. There is no doubt that the peoples of Great Britain, France, Italy, and America desire to maintain close contact with Russia; and they realise that, in Sir Charles Dilke’s words, which are more poignantly true to-day than they were when he uttered them in 1878, “ To compare Russia of to-day with the Russia that is to come is to compare chaos to the universe.” Being convinced that the spiritual forces of the Russian temperament, no less than the vast material resources of the Russian soil, will ultimately restore the prestige of Russia in the world, the Western democracies anxiously scan events for an opportunity to resume their co-operation with her. When the Russian Revolution broke out a year ago it seemed as if the principal obstacle (*i.e.*, Tsarism) to harmonious co-operation for common democratic aims in Europe had been removed, and we looked forward to a new comradeship-in-arms which would give us victory and peace. The revolution was read as proof that all the liberal forces in Russia had united to give Russian patriotism a new and nobler meaning and to rally the Russian people to the allied standard in a war of liberation. The event has belied our hopes; and to-day we must take stock of the position by an estimate of all the factors that have combined so deeply to disappoint us.

In the first place we were probably misled by a false analogy between the French and Russian revolutions. The French revolution broke out in time of peace and led to war. The Russian revolution broke out in the third year of an exhausting war and has led to an ignominious peace. The causes of this striking contrast are to be found in the great historical differences between France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. In France a well-knit national unity had been created by the consistent policy of successive monarchs who had gradually centralised the instruments of power in their own hands and, despite the existence of a provincial particularism in the 13 *parlements*, had contrived to suppress all centrifugal tendencies. Exploiting the geographical situation of the country and relying, perhaps, on the power of a common language the French Monarchy had made the French people one nation. And when subsequently the revolution was attacked from without, its leaders were able to appeal to a powerful sentiment of patriotism as well as to the revolu-

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tionary ardour of their followers. This combination of loyalty to *la Patrie* and to the revolution made the French soldier of that day a matchless fighter. Each man in the revolutionary army knew what he was fighting for and knew that he must fight. The case of the Russian soldier last year was very different. He lacked nearly everything that his French prototype possessed. His patriotism was inchoate and inarticulate. Russia was too vast to be his *patrie*; and if asked what country he belonged to he would give the name of the "Government" he lived in, and beyond which his eye could hardly penetrate. Politically immature, uneducated, devoid of that fiery national feeling which made the French armies irresistible, weary and disheartened by defeats, he was not the material of which a militant revolutionary army could be made. Mr. Kerenski was warned by a Polish General last summer that if the Russian army were ordered to take the offensive it would break up. Under pressure from the Allies, the warning was disregarded; the offensive took place, and the Polish General's fear was realised. The failure of the offensive was primarily due to the relaxation of discipline after the revolution, but its true causes lay in the corruption and incapacity of the old *régime* which in three years of war had sapped the energy of the whole army. We lay some stress upon this offensive because, in our view, it was the turning point from which a progressive demoralisation has spread throughout Russia. It revealed the fact that the *damnosa hereditas* of the old *régime* had well-nigh destroyed Russia's power to wage war.

This profound difference between the Frenchman of 1789 and the Russian of 1917 in itself offers an explanation of much that has happened. But there are two aspects in which the contrast is deeper and even more illuminating. Centrifugal forces, which had no counterpart in the French Revolution, are at work in Russia. The Ukraine, Finland, Siberia, and the Cossacks have each played their part in the present result: for, in the absence of a firm national government in Petrograd, the particularist claims of each region in turn have been forced to the front by the instinct of self-preservation. Russian power is thus, as it were, hamstrung by the demands of her own nationalities, at a moment when it is the clear and common interest of all to unite against the Central Empires. The fact that they have failed to unite seems to indicate the

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absence of a magnetic centre in Russia, while the powerlessness of the moderate elements in the face of the Bolševiks almost drives us to the conclusion that Bolševism has a greater hold on the Russian masses than any other doctrine. This can be due to nothing else than the political inexperience of the people and that state of subjection and tutelage in which the autocracy kept Russia for its own ends: otherwise the Constituent Assembly—the only truly democratic and representative organ that the Revolution has produced—would have stood its ground against the Bolševiks.

The second aspect of the contrast between France and Russia lies in the outlook upon Europe and the means to be employed against foreign enemies. Both revolutions were driven by zeal to convert the peoples of the world to their principles, but the Frenchmen of 1789, unlike some of their successors in Paris in 1870, and in Petrograd to-day, never made the mistake of supposing that Jericho would fall merely at the trumpet call of their new war cry. They fought the invader by arms and thrust him back. The Bolševiks met a more formidable foe with bare hands: like the workmen of the Commune in 1870, they cried, "The Germans will never attack us now that we are a republic"; and although their diplomacy at Brest-Litovsk may yet serve as a model for international dealings when democracy prevails throughout Europe, they failed utterly because their pleas lacked the backing of military power. Whether, even with the best will in the world, they could have re-created the Russian army after they came into power is doubtful; but the fact is that they entirely dissipated it at a moment when the Germans had most to fear from its revival, and thus wrecked their own hopes and ours. The ratification of the Treaty of Brest—given by a large majority at the Moscow Congress of Soviets last week—marks the last stage in the process which began, as we have seen, with the Kerenski offensive last August; and the state of Russia may have to grow worse before it can improve. Meanwhile, our chagrin at losing a powerful eastern ally leads us to place an excessive responsibility upon those who appear to be the visible and immediate authors of Russian disorder, namely, the Bolševiks. But history will declare that these men are merely the exploiters of that radical weakness in Russia which is the chief and most evil legacy of the Tsar's *régime*. For its own purposes, the autocracy held the populace in subjection

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and in ignorance, denying them education and all opportunity of ordered political action. It thus prepared a fruitful soil for Bolševik seed which otherwise would have fallen harmless by the wayside.

The nations of the West will not fail to draw a double moral. Russia will remain after the Bolševiks and the German generals have passed from the scene. She will arise once more in greater and more beneficent power than ever before, to take her place in the Europe of the future. The Russian nation is there to-day, awaiting its opportunity, behind the smoke and dust of war and revolution. Russia has cast off for ever the chains of autocracy: she is even now making successive experiments in the resultant liberty and licence. She has for the moment lost her political centre and upset her own equilibrium; but she will regain a true equipoise, and will evolve her own appropriate method of combining liberty and order. When the process is complete we may be sure that the Russians will remember those who were their friends in need and will the more readily co-operate with those who had the vision to see that, even when they seemed to go a-whoring after false gods, they would return to political sanity and to the task of building a great Socialist republic upon a new liberty, equality, and fraternity. It is our duty to act upon that knowledge, to remember that harsh words—which, as the American saying has it, “cut no ice, but may wound a friend”—may live in the memory of many a friendly Russian when those who now deserve them lie in oblivion. Russia is greater than any of her factions and will outlive them all. It is with her that we are concerned; and, whoever she chooses as her spokesman, we must bear in mind the great nation behind him. For the moment, it is not easy to say who really speaks for Russia; but that is no reason why those who speak to Russia, in the press and in Parliament, should use nothing but insults. The sympathy of to-day prepares for co-operation to-morrow in the vast enterprise of rebuilding Russia. The Russian people will look to the more highly-organised peoples of the West for assistance in every department of reconstruction. And, unless we are prepared to take our full share in the work, we shall lose touch with them and they will inevitably fall back into association with Germany.

These are the considerations which impel us to protest

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against the stupidity which dictates the attitude of the press and the public towards Russia at the present moment. If we wished to indicate the difference between sheer prejudice and vision in this matter we could do no better than place Mr. Lloyd George's reference to the Bolševik attitude to the League of Nations beside President Wilson's telegram to the Moscow Congress. All Mr. Lloyd George can do—and it was so complete a misreading of the facts that we must call it a slip of the tongue in an *impromptu* speech—is to sneer at Lenin for holding an opinion which he is known to despise; while Mr. Wilson, addressing the Russian people on the occasion of the Moscow Congress of Soviets, pledges the good faith of the American people to “avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.” The emphasis on “complete sovereignty” has a significance for the Brest negotiations which no one will miss; and it was exactly the word which the situation and our friendship for Russia demanded. Nor will its relevance to the ultimate possibilities of Japanese action escape the notice of unprejudiced eyes.

Throughout its career since the autumn of 1916 THE NEW EUROPE has endeavoured to interpret the mind of Russia to the British people. At first the task was comparatively simple, despite the blinding suddenness with which the revolution broke upon us. In the earlier phases of the new movement there were certain clear factors which our own public soon grasped, though few were aware of the inner complexity of the situation. But as the summer passed into autumn the Revolution revealed its own confusion, and there were times when even the best-informed were at fault in their judgment of events. We have all known what it is to put our money on the wrong horse, and in the Russian field there were many favourites and many “dark horses.” Miljukov, Kerenski, Kornilov, Lenin, and a host of other names have appeared, disappeared, reappeared, each giving way to another so rapidly that we had no sooner grown accustomed to the features and policy of one of them than he was displaced by a rival. But, in taking the measure of each successive figure we have been guided by two principles: first, to give as faithful an account as we could of his career,

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his policy, and his place on the Russian stage: second, to maintain the closest possible contact with the Russian people regardless of the hopes and prejudices of the moment. In recent months this task has been peculiarly difficult for reasons well known to our readers. But we are convinced that we should have failed in our true function if we had not pursued unflinching our endeavour to interpret Russia to Great Britain, even when Russian events and Russian leaders seemed to play false to the cause of European freedom.

Japanese Intervention

(I) A CRITICAL MOMENT

THE situation in the Far East is still obscure. The task of translating the undefined proposal of Japanese intervention in Siberia into the terms of an agreed plan of action has created something like a domestic crisis in Japan. This result is hardly surprising, for the magnitude of the operation which Japan is supposed to be contemplating may well have given her elder statesmen food for thought. If they take long views, as they must, they will ask themselves how far their liability can be limited once they have embarked upon an enterprise which presupposes, at the least, the employment of large military forces at a long distance from their base of supplies, and, at the most, a campaign on the borders of Europe and Asia in which they will be fighting on territory which is completely disorganised by the Russian Revolution. These are considerations on which the Japanese General Staff will pronounce judgment for the benefit of their own Government; but, at the same time, they should be carefully weighed by all advocates of intervention, both here and in Japan, for they govern the whole situation. In our view it would be premature to build hopes on Japanese co-operation in Siberia and farther west until the Japanese themselves have declared their readiness, after examining the whole position, to undertake the necessary operations.

Meanwhile, on the supposition that the elder statesmen agree to intervene on a large scale, the Allied Governments must define their own expectations. They are looking for some means whereby the balance of military power in Europe can be restored in Russia, and a strong bulwark set up against

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the flood-tide of German aggression. In that search they carry with them the anxious hopes of the western allied nations, who are prepared to take great risks if only the desired end can be secured without too heavy a mortgage on the future. The undeniable anxiety aroused by the present proposal is due, not so much to the fear of what Japan may do if she gets a free hand, as to a doubt whether Japan can intervene in such a way as to carry the best Russian opinion with her. If that doubt can be removed, Japan would act both as the mandatory of the Allies and as the avowed and accepted friend of large sections of the Russian people. She would then be able to co-operate with all those elements in Russia which ardently desire to thrust the Germans out of their country, and which might then be able to gain control of their own Government in order to carry on the war. In that case Russo-Japanese co-operation would form the counterpart in the east of Franco-British co-operation in the west. The hinge upon which the whole design must turn is the attitude of the Bolševiks. If they were hostile, Japan might find herself embroiled in a bitter civil war which would utterly defeat the whole purpose of her intervention, and might lead to an even worse disintegration of Russia.

In the following article Mr. Cheng points out that, whether Japanese action be restricted to Eastern Siberia or not, the co-operation of China is indispensable. The Vladivostok-Harbin line which joins the Trans-Siberian Railway at Tchita runs on Chinese territory, and the consent of China is necessary before it can be used for military operations. We may take it for granted that China will not withhold her consent, and will, indeed, co-operate in maintaining order as far as her means permit. She would then have a pledge that her own rights would be respected, for if she stood aside her position at the end of the war might be seriously impaired.

All these considerations make it clear that the decision which now, in the main, rests with the Government of Japan is peculiarly onerous and complicated. We may be sure that, when it is taken, the Japanese will keep faith with us as they have done in the past, and that, whatever action they may contemplate for the protection of their own interests in the Far East, will be designed, at the same time, to serve the main purpose of the whole Alliance.

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(II) A CHINESE COMMENT

IN discussing the relation of Japan with Siberia, it will perhaps be interesting to recall that in 1895, at the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the Trans-Siberian railway had been nearly completed and Russia's Far Eastern province had been put in direct communication with Petrograd. The intention of the Russian Government at that time was to get ice-free ports in the Pacific Ocean by making Manchuria and Korea her own possessions. China's lack of military strength prevented her from offering any serious resistance to Russian expansion, but a Japanese foothold on the Asiatic Continent was regarded as a hindrance to the Imperialistic scheme of the Tsar. In consequence, Russia, in co-operation with Germany and France, compelled Japan to renounce the cession of the Liaoting peninsula which was a condition of peace between China and Japan. Under the overwhelming pressure Japan yielded; but in the following year, the same peninsula was leased by China to Russia. Her military defeat made China feel very uneasy towards Japan, and her foreign policy at that time was to utilize the influence of one power against that of another. Li Hung Chang, the chief advocate of this policy, signed a secret agreement with Count Cassini, the Russian Minister in Peking, whereby Russia should, in addition to the lease, have the right to build the Central Manchurian railway to connect Port Arthur with the Trans-Siberian line and to check the ambition of victorious Japan. Japan, in view of her territorial propinquity to Manchuria, was resolved to oust Russian influence; and her war with Russia in 1904-05 ended with the result that Russia transferred to Japan her leased territory in South Manchuria and the railway line from Port Arthur to Changchun. But the line from Changchun to the frontier of North Manchuria was left in Russian hands.

Now the proposed Japanese intervention in Siberia has several objects to fulfil. The first object, it is said, is the capture of this railway line, which, in the interests of the Allies, should not fall into the hands of the Bolševiks. *But this object has been long fulfilled by the Chinese.* Early in last November, when the Maximalist influence penetrated into Manchuria and riots broke out along the railway line, the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Allies, sent five divisions of the new Chinese army to Harbin to maintain order. The Russian garrison was disbanded and the railway line is now

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under the control of the Chinese, though the Russian director retains his nominal position. The director was a Cossack, and recently the Bolševiks threatened an attack on him and his followers. But the Chinese Government has warned the Bolševiks that any attempt to cross the frontier with arms will be considered as an act of war. China cannot allow her territory to be the scene of Russian political strife, and the situation so far has proved that she is able to exercise her right in her own household.

The second object of the Japanese intervention is said to be the protection of the munition stores in Vladivostok. This, however, does not warrant an intervention in the proper sense of the word. The Bolševiks have so far exercised no effective control in that port and a Japanese cruiser, by landing an armed crew, can easily remove the munitions.

The real object is, perhaps, the protection of Siberia. Siberia is a food-producing country, and its mineral resources are rich. Should it come under German rule, these resources would probably be organised by the Germans for their own advantage. Moreover, the rolling stock of the Siberian railway, if it is captured by the Germans, will reinforce the German command over the means of communication. These dangers, though not imminent, are not non-existent, and it is essential that provision should be made to meet them in time. The German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia who are now set free by the Bolševik Government may also turn out to be a source of serious disturbance if precaution is not taken.

All these arguments are sound and may one day be substantiated by facts. But to meet these dangers the army of intervention should, perhaps, always be on the defensive and should take no step to provoke an attack from the Bolševiks. Whether in practice such an attitude can be maintained only circumstances can tell. The intention of the army of intervention is, however, to protect Siberia from the German menace, and its function is that of a police force. Emergency may require that it should assume an offensive attitude to protect the regions to which it is assigned to patrol. But the offensive should only be taken to maintain order in Siberia. The more ambitious and enthusiastic supporters of Japanese intervention, however, think it possible and desirable that a Japanese army should march across Siberia over a distance of 6,000 miles to check the German advance and to recon-

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stitute the Eastern front. I doubt the practicability of the idea. During the Russo-Japanese War the Russian army suffered much from the distance of the field of operation and the insufficient means of transport. This was at a time when the Russian Government had the resources of "all the Russias" at their command. It is true that since then certain sections of the Siberian Railway have been doubled, but the rolling stock has been depleted since the Russian revolution. With the energy and skill and the organising power of the Japanese, the deficiency can be made good, and the difficulty is enormous for an army, however efficient it may be, to march through a country full of spies but maraudic resistance.

So far I have examined the arguments in favour of the Japanese intervention. Events may so develop that the intervention may become necessary. Lord Robert Cecil has already confirmed the report of the arming of enemy prisoners in Siberia, and disturbance may therefore arise. Under such circumstances it will of course be most desirable that a *joint* intervention should be undertaken by all the Allies to protect Russia and the Far East from further enemy designs. The Russian problem is too serious for a single ally to solve, and misunderstandings can be easily created with the Russian people by single-handed military intervention. Joint operations, however, are said to be impracticable in view of the fact that the Allies have their hands full. Therefore, it is argued, Japan should be made the mandatory of the Allies.

Japan with her efficient army and her organising skill is no doubt worthy of the mandate. But another ally in the Far East, whose hands are not elsewhere occupied and whose interests are closely connected with the security of Siberia, should not be overlooked. In fact, "if the German advance towards the East is a menace to Japan, it is a menace ten times as real and as great to China, for Chinese territory is co-terminous with that of Siberia, and, unlike that of Japan, is separated from it by no gulf of sea." China is now at war with Germany and is fully prepared to render assistance to the Allied cause. Her internal disturbance and her military weakness may not enable her to play a leading *rôle* in any military enterprise, but she has already shown her ability to maintain order on the Russo-Manchurian frontier. Moreover, a joint operation by two Far-Eastern Allies in the

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interest of the common cause would probably put an end to the unreasonable suspicion that the Japanese army enters Siberia with an imperialist and selfish motive. A joint operation by two allies would not be permitted by circumstances to result in territorial gain to one of them; and China, with her territory already too vast to control, has no desire for territorial expansion.

Moral considerations apart, geography makes it inevitable that China should co-operate. Vladivostok, though it is connected with the Siberian Railway by the Amur line, is also connected with it by the shorter and more direct line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This railway, though it was till quite recently held in lease by the Russian Government, has now been taken over by the Chinese Government by virtue of the doctrine that when the lessee fails to perform his covenants, the lessor may put an end to the lease, and it is now certain that the passage of Japanese troops by the Chinese Eastern Railway cannot be effected without the consent of the Chinese Government. If and when this consent has been given, the railway zone in the Chinese province of Manchuria will probably be made an area of military operation. Should China not be invited to co-operate, the outrage of the Russo-Japanese War, which was waged on Chinese soil, would be repeated, which would be an intolerable situation at a time when China is a participant in the war. That this outrage is not likely to be repeated may be proved by the report that China is prepared to send a few divisions of her new army to Siberia with the Japanese troops.

A Sino-Japanese intervention, if carried out, would have a far-reaching effect on world politics. In the first place, it would raise many questions which the coming Peace Conference will have to settle. Would China be handed back her own property in South and North Manchuria? Or would Japan always keep herself in communication with Siberia through Manchuria? Would Mongolia cancel its internal autonomy and remain a province of the Chinese Republic, or would the Russo-Chino-Mongolian Treaty of 1915, which recognised its autonomy, remain still binding? Further, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was originally made to check Russian influence in the Far East and the Russian menace to India. For the present the German menace tends to replace the Russian, and Russian influence may not be felt again for the next few years. But, whatever

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may be the case with other Powers, Japan will always have a dominant voice in the Far East. Will the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which should have been terminated in 1915 but for the war, be renewed? If so, towards which Power will its aims be directed? The future alone can show. But no country is so interested in the Far East as China herself, and only a stable and strong China can resist the disintegrating pressure of the other great Powers. It is our confident hope that she will gain strength and stability; and her co-operation with Japan would prove her readiness and ability to discharge her full share of international obligation.

S. G. CHENG.

The Danger of Militarism in Spain

THE crisis through which the Spanish monarchy has been passing since that fateful day, 1 June, 1917, when the Officers' Committees suddenly stepped out into the bright light of politics, shows no signs of abatement. It will be remembered that a set of three simultaneous yet unconnected movements—a general strike, a Parliamentary Assembly which met in Barcelona, in spite of the prohibition of the Government, and last, but not least, the threat of an ultimatum to the King from the Army Committees—brought about the collapse of the Dato Cabinet, and along with it the whole system of rotating administrations which had been the very working principle of the Restoration. As a result of the crisis, a Coalition Cabinet was formed under the premiership of Señor Garcia Prieto with a view to holding a general election free from all Government interference. This Cabinet included members of all the monarchical parties except the Conservative Datists—a point which is not without significance. In order to emphasize its political neutrality, the office of Home Secretary, which is by tradition a kind of general managership of electioneering, was entrusted to a judge who had no political connections. Yet, in spite of all these precautions, the general election did not fulfil the expectations of those who saw in it the beginning of a new era for Spain. It is true that the electorate exhibited signs of greater vitality than in preceding elections; also, that the number of uncontested seats (in which, in Spanish law, actual polling is unnecessary) was considerably less than usual, and that candidates who, in past times, trusting the all-power-

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ful Home Secretary, quietly remained in Madrid all through the electoral campaign, had this time to take the trouble to inquire whereabouts their constituencies lay, pay them a visit and nurse them, by means lawful or otherwise. But the neutrality of the Government only resulted in giving a freer field to the influence of the local boss, corruption and fraud were rampant everywhere, and in gerrymandered constituencies the free poll of the towns was still drowned in a sea of blind peasant votes.

There were many parties afield. Both Liberals and Conservatives split in three different branches, known by the name of their respective leaders for lack of more substantial differences. Republicans of many shades and denominations, Reformists, Socialists, Regionalists, Carlists, and Independents completed the picture. But if there was a superabundance of parties, there was a great scarcity of programmes and platforms. The orthodox Conservatives of Señor Dato, and the Liberals of all descriptions went to the polls on the strength of their local organisations, and without condescending to impart to their electors the smallest hint of what they meant to do with their mandate. Only three parties or sets of parties may be said to have fought their election on a political programme: the Maurists, the Alliance of Socialists, Republicans and Reformists, and the Regionalists. The Maurists claim to represent political morality (though if we are to believe what is said of their methods of electoral persuasion, the claim would appear to be but poorly founded). They stood as a protest against the policy of political jobbery and time-serving which Señor Maura so eloquently stigmatised ever since he was prevented from participating in it by a wave of popular opinion in 1909. The Alliance of Republicans and Socialists brought forward a programme of irreconcilable hostility to the *régime*, powerfully backed by an appeal to popular sentiment embodied in the nomination of the four members of the strike committee, now in prison for life, as candidates respectively for Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Oviedo. The Regionalists stood for the Reform of the Constitution in order to grant a certain measure of devolution to the old regions or "kingdoms," and for the extension of the movement from Catalonia, its place of origin, to the other regions of Spain, notably the Basque provinces and Galicia.

The results of the general election were remarkable in

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many ways. They have been interpreted in many quarters as a pro-German victory on account of the defeat of Señor Lerroux and Señor Alvarez, the two prominent chiefs of pro-Ally opinion in the Spanish Left. The facts of the case do not justify such a conclusion. Both Señor Alvarez and Señor Lerroux figured in the list of candidates run in Madrid by the Republican-Socialist Alliance. Madrid elects its members by a *scrutin de liste*. The votes polled by the members elected vary between 27,000 and 31,000. Señor Alvarez and Señor Lerroux both counted between 26,000 and 27,000. It is obvious that such a result cannot be counted as a defeat, especially if one bears in mind the very powerful elements of electoral persuasion at the disposal of the Liberal and the two Maurists heading the list. It is true that Señor Lerroux was also defeated in Barcelona, but there the same argument applies, and, moreover, both in Barcelona and in Madrid, the candidates of the Left which did triumph are by no means less emphatic in their pro-Ally pronouncement than the two defeated leaders. Yet this double defeat, though meaningless from the point of view of foreign policy, is not without significance from the internal point of view, for it reveals a shifting of the Left vote from the Republican and moderate to the Socialist and extreme sector. The four "glorious convicts" of the strike committee were elected. Madrid gave also its representation to Pablo Iglesias, the veteran founder of the Socialist Party in Spain, while Barcelona gave a seat to Marcelino Domingo, a young Republican leader who played a conspicuous rôle during the general strike, and a sixth Socialist, also an active agitator during last summer's events, was elected in Bilbao. Thus, the voice of the people clearly pronounced itself in favour of active militancy.

Another important feature of the new House is its Regionalist membership. The Regionalist minority will number 35 members, of whom 25 are Catalans, 7 Basques, 2 Asturians, and 1 Andalusian. The Regionalist effort failed to conquer the strong local organisation by means of which several political bosses dominate in Galicia. But in spite of this failure, Regionalism shows a distinct progress outside Catalonia. Its success, however, is smaller than it expected, and in particular, leaves it too weak to impose on the other parties its scheme of constitutional reform. The

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Regionalist leader, Señor Cambo, is a Realist, and he will no doubt try to make the best of the material in his hands. The situation is full of possibilities for an expert parliamentarian, for no party will have a sufficient following at its disposal to hold undisputed sway in the new House. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, no party will have a majority at all. It is true that the three Liberal fractions put together would command 165 votes, but the possibility of their working together is, to say the least, problematic. The three Conservative fractions represent a total voting power of 146 votes, but here co-operation is beyond the range of possibility. It is difficult to foresee how out of this galaxy of small groups a majority sufficiently solid to provide a sound basis for a Government could be formed. Apart from the differences due to internal questions, the situation is complicated by the aptitude of the respective political chiefs towards the war and its influence on Spain.

But all speculation as to the working of the new Parliament must count with the most important element of all: namely, the military crisis. The trouble came from the War Office. When the Coalition Cabinet was formed the War Office was entrusted to Señor La Cierva, but by whom? Theoretically, of course, by the Prime Minister, but Señor La Cierva would not submit to this theory even officially, and on taking office he made it clear by means of a note communicated to the press that he owed his appointment to the personal insistence of the King. His task, as everybody understood it when he took office, was to bring the army back to its normal and constitutional functions by a direct and sincere study of the causes of discontent and by a careful handling of things and persons. No task could be more welcome to a loyal monarchist, for the Army committees, both directly and by the effect of their example on other institutions and on the masses at large, were endangering the stability of the Crown. *Through work towards reconciliation* might have been the motto of the new War Minister. In reality, and whether intentionally or not, he seems to have acted under a contrary inspiration; *through words towards strife*.

Señor La Cierva is an old political hand. A small provincial barrister, with little or no practice, poor powers of speech, and no particular abilities, he rose to Cabinet rank, thanks to one conspicuous quality, namely, a remarkable

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will-power. His steadiness and his extraordinary capacity for hard-sustained work won him the protection of Señor Maura, who gave him the Home Secretaryship in his 1917 Cabinet. Both the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister of that Cabinet went into political ostracism in 1909, as a sequel to their ruthless handling of the Barcelona riots. Señor Maura waited in silence and solitude until his countrymen, unused to silent men, mistook him for a prophet, a delusion which he fostered by delivering himself now and then of a political message wrapped in eloquent and amphibological style. Meanwhile, Señor La Cierva, whose professional talents, as is wont with politicians, had grown apace with the progress of his political power, speedy as this progress had been, devoted himself to the Bar, but closely followed the events of political life, more directly involved in its daily incidents than his former chief, Señor Maura, yet skilfully keeping an independent line and cutting in the parliamentary world a figure which is best described by that mysterious expression—a dark horse.

His conception of political life is far removed from all democratic ideas. He was shown to be honest and hard-working when in office, and his reform of the Spanish police is still remembered as an achievement of good workmanlike administration. But even in the choice of subject for his ministerial work he revealed the main tendency of his mind. His ideal of Government is that of a well-regulated police. State for him means authority. When he was Home Secretary he devoted much well-meaning effort to making Madrid go to bed early, honestly thinking that he was thereby improving the life of the country. His political philosophy is at its best that of an enlightened despot, at its worst that of a modern Machiavelli.

To such a man the situation which brought him back to power after nine years of exile was bound to be full of temptation. Here he was at the head of *power*, of the only real power left in Spain after the collapse of the general strike. The old parties, hopelessly divided, at the mercy of an election and discredited. Their leaders vetoed by the Officers' Committees. The committees themselves, politically inexperienced, perhaps a little nervous at their own success and responsibility, and in that receptive state of mind into which people are apt to fall when they find themselves with more power than vision.

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Señor La Cierva, whether deliberately or not, seems to have manoeuvred so as to give a purpose to the officers while seeming to receive it from them. Coming forward at every step as the instrument of the committees, he seems to have been in reality their guiding spirit and their master. For how are we to explain otherwise the change which gradually set in the committees' policy since Señor La Cierva took office? In all the literature of the first days of their movement, the committees emphasised that they desired nothing but the good of the nation as a whole. They repudiated with noble indignation all suggestion of selfish professional aims and they set as the supreme object of their effort—the abnormal character of which they recognised and apologised for—the formation of an impartial Cabinet which would summon a genuine Cortes. Yet to-day, after having obtained their impartial Cabinet and their free elections, on the very eve of the opening of the new Parliament, these very committees impose upon a reluctant Cabinet a set of military reforms implying an expenditure of nearly sixty million pounds, to be approved merely by royal decree and before Parliament meets.

Whether the reforms are necessary or not is irrelevant. What matters is the way in which they have been imposed on the Government by a War Minister backed by a body of officers who will recognise no bounds to the use of power. It reveals on the side of authority the same tendency towards militarism which is also to be noticed at the other end of the political scale. Once again, through the unwise action of an ambitious and undemocratic politician, the nation which might have set to work in an atmosphere of mutual trust, is rent asunder into two irreconcilable camps. On the eve of the opening of the new Parliament which was to be the organ of Spain's "renovation," no one can predict whether one or the other of the extreme forces will prevail, or—a more fortunate though less likely alternative—whether the country will settle down at last to work in peace and set its house in order.

S. DE MADARIAGA.

Mr. Dmowski's Army joins the Germans

It will be remembered that last autumn the British and French Governments formally recognised the representatives of a single Polish party, the National Democrats, as a "Polish

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National Committee," qualified to speak and act in the name of Poland; and that they were very largely influenced in this action by the undertaking of the National Democratic leaders to raise a Polish army on the Entente side. From the very first the scheme was opposed by a majority of Poles alike in Poland, in Russia, and in the West, as likely either to prove ineffective or to reproduce the conditions of the earlier stages of the war, when Poles fought against each other in the rival armies. Polish democrats and socialists also opposed the scheme, because it was in the hands of the only Polish party which had sided with Tsardom, and because they feared that it would become an instrument of the reactionaries and so in the long run of the Germans. That their fears were not groundless is shown by the fact that the leader of the National Democrat army, General Dowbor Musnicki, has now concluded a formal treaty with the German Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern front (*Oberbefehlshaber-Ost*). In view of its importance, we give the full text, which is translated from the *National Democrats' own organ, Kurjer Posnanski*, of 8 March.

While the army upon which the Western Powers were fondly relying has joined the enemy, the Polish Legionaries, with Brigadier Pilsudski at their head—whom the National Democrats and their dupes in England were long in the habit of denouncing as "pro-Germans"—have for months past been confined in German internment camps. Those of them who were Austrian subjects were allowed to withdraw into Austria and be re-organised as legionaries in the Austrian army. Now almost simultaneously with the news of Musnicki's pact with the Germans, we learn that the legionaries have mutinied out of protest at the cession of Cholm to the Ukraine, and while attempting to cut their way into Russian territory have come into violent conflict with Austrian regulars.

We trust that this fiasco of the Polish army will teach our Government due caution in its dealings with the rival Polish parties.

THE TEXT OF THE TREATY CONCLUDED AT BOBRUISK.

(1) The Polish Army Corps is a neutral army to which the district between the Dnieper from Mohilev to the mouth of the Beresina and the railway Slutsk-Osipoviče-Lapisče-Grodziniets has been assigned for re-victualling and with a view to defending it against the Bolseviki. The

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method of administering this district will be fixed shortly. Meantime, the administration remains in the hands of the Polish Army Corps.

(2) The Polish Army Corps fights only if attacked in this district, and is subject to German command in case German troops take part in resisting the attack. On the battlefield the command rests with the senior German or Polish officer.

The German armies are free any time to march across the territory. The Polish Army Corps is bound, as far as possible, to supply provisions to the German troops fighting, but only within the frontiers of its district; the provisions will either be returned to it in kind or its district will be extended. The provisioning of the German troops by the Polish Army Corps means that provisions contained in stores, depôts, etc., should be yielded up, and those available in the country delivered at the railway station. Requisitions undertaken by the German Army must not meet with any difficulties from the Polish troops, authorities or the local population.

(3) The Polish troops are to evacuate Minsk by 27 February, 1918, 6 p.m. By that time all the depôts and stores are to be delivered to the Germans. A mixed committee, consisting of two members from each side under a German head, will determine what is the property of the Polish Army Corps.

(4) The Polish Army Corps protects the railway worked by the Germans from Talki to Żlobin, as well as the railway leading to Slutsk and the railway which leads by Lapiče to Grodziniets and Zavišin, as well as all depôts; the German troops guard the railway from Talki to Minsk.

The district west and north of the railway Slutsk-Lapiče-Grodziniets is not to be used for provisioning the Polish Army Corps, but the Polish Army Corps is bound to guard the depôts, stores, etc., situated east and north of the railway. The bridge across the Dnieper near Żlobin is to be secured from destruction. The railway from that place to the east is [to be?] destroyed.

(5) The Polish Army Corps occupies in necessary strength the railway junction of Żlobin, and opposes by force all export of provisions either by railway or by cars to the south and north; it is to despatch a mobile provisioning column to Minsk.

The same will be done after the capture of Mohilev, which is expected soon. If these places are captured by the German troops the latter should be immediately relieved by Polish troops, in understanding with the German Supreme Command at Minsk.

(6) All depôts and stores in Żlobin and the surrounding country, as well as on the railway to Orša, are German property, even if captured and registered by the Polish Army. The Germans will compensate the Polish Army Corps by ceding to it part of the stores. In exchange the Polish Army Corps will feel bound to hire storing accommodation and to post guards for securing the stores from destruction or plundering by the Bolševiks or the local population. The registered contents of the stores ought to be immediately reported to the German Supreme Command at Minsk. The Polish troops may obtain supplies from these stores exclusively against a formal receipt from the commander of the regiment and for satisfying immediate needs.

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(7) The northern frontier of the district indicated in paragraph (1) is the line Mohilev-Male-Bieleviče-Motsieviče-Jakšitse-Grodziniets, the terminus of the railway from Lapiče; the southern frontier follows a line from the junction of the Beresina and the Dnieper by Ščatsilka, Luban (on the Orša), Sakoviče, Starobin, Vizna to Siemieževo. The northern and eastern (western?) frontier follows the road Siemieževo to Slutsk (included) and then the railway Slutsk-Lapiče-Grodziniets.

(8) By the name of Polish Army Corps are understood the First Polish Army Corps and all Polish detachments which will put themselves under the commander of the First Polish Army Corps.

(9) The return of German prisoners of war to Germany is to be assisted by every means.

(10) The above treaty comes into force immediately.

Bobruisk, 25 February, 1918.

Commander of the First Polish Army Corps,
JOSEPH DOWBOR-MUSNICKI, Lieutenant-General.
The representative of the Oberbefehlshaber-Ost,
VON WULFFEN, Major of the General Staff.

Behind the Scenes at Brest-Litovsk

[We take from the Manchester Guardian, 13 March, the following account of the lighter side of the Conference at Brest.]

"How little the Germans, with all their cleverness and knowledge of Russian affairs and character, knew the men with whom they were dealing was shown on the first day of the Conference, when Baron von Kühlmann and his friends came to the conference-room dressed in black coats, with all their decorations pinned on their breasts—to find the Russians awaiting them in the same clothes in which they had travelled. A Turkish delegate even attempted to address some of the Russians as 'Excellencies,' and only desisted when he noticed the broad smile on the face of one of the Russians who had been sitting nonchalantly in his chair, smoking a huge pipe. When M. Trotski joined the party some of the Germans, though they had learnt enough by that time of the character of the Russians, could not prevail upon themselves to address him simply as Herr Trotski, but persisted in dubbing him 'Von Trotski'—no doubt from sheer inability to conceive that a Minister could be anything but a 'von.' The particle even appeared in the first protocols of the sittings which were attended by Trotski, and only when he struck it out with his own hand was it dropped.

"Politeness was, indeed, a feature of the German delegates, and, above all, of Kühlmann himself. He makes, no doubt, the impression of a very clever man with charming manners and a worldly knowledge of things. On the other hand, Count Czernin was apparently regarded by the Russians as honest and amiable but weak. It is characteristic that the Germans used him for all sorts of diplomatic fool's errands, which he had to execute in private. One day, conversing with one

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of the leaders of the Russian Delegation, he accidentally, as it were, broached the subject of the Tsar's fate. 'Was it true, he asked, that the Bolševik Government was about to allow him to proceed to England? The reply was in the negative. 'Why not?' he asked. He was told that the Tsar, if allowed to leave Russia and settle abroad would at once become the centre of a counter-revolutionary intrigue. The cloven foot clumsily protruded at once. 'But supposing,' Czernin asked, 'Germany were to give a guarantee against such intrigues—would the Bolševik Government permit him to settle in Germany?' Obviously he was executing a commission of Kühlmann's, who had been charged with the duty of feeling the ground by the Kaiser. But the 'feeling' was done so artlessly that it was never repeated afterwards; the reply came sufficiently straight and prompt to quench all further hopes on the subject.

"Another time Count Czernin raised the subject of the future German Ambassador at Petrograd. The very act of mentioning it shows how little the Germans expected that eventually the negotiations would break down. They, indeed, thought that all the opposition shown by the Russians to their proposals was merely a game of make-believe, intended to save their faces in the eyes of the Russian people. It was in this belief that Count Czernin once mysteriously asked a Russian delegate whether the presentation of an ultimatum would not be of assistance to them. When the reply came that he should rather address an ultimatum to his own Germanic friends he was much surprised. In connection with the ambassadorial question, he ventured upon the suggestion that perhaps Dr. Helfferich would be acceptable at Petrograd as the representative of Germany. On receiving a negative reply he asked whether in that case Dr. Walter Rathenau, the well-known electricity 'king' would not do. This time the answer was that the best Ambassador to Russia would be Liebknecht. Again Count Czernin was obviously much surprised. These candidatures show what importance the German Government attaches to the future commercial and financial relations with Russia.

"One of the most interesting figures among the German delegates was the notorious General Hoffmann. He spoke Russian like a native, and knew even the private relationship of the Russian delegates among themselves. Contrary to what people would expect, the face of this Prussian 'jack-boot' is the most amiable one—round, plump, rosy, smiling, almost boyish in its innocence. His manners, lively and courteous, are on a par with his face. But when he plays the Prussian general and makes a pronouncement in the approved style of a conqueror his face suddenly becomes red—'like a beet-root,'—his eyebrows swell enormously and overhang his eyes, and the latter glow like those of an animal in rage.

"It is to be noted that while the Russians brought with them only a couple of specialists to act as advisers, the Germans came to Brest with a large retinue of various Geheimräte and Ministerialdirektoren, one of whom was the Ministerialdirektor, K., an old professor and high official in the Foreign Ministry, who had two pairs of glasses on

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his nose. Catching one of the Russian delegates by the button-hole and dragging him into a corner, he one day revealed to him the fact that he had attended in an official capacity almost every international conference or congress at which Germany had been represented in the course of the last generation, and knew, therefore, better than any man alive, what an international treaty, and, more particularly, a peace treaty, was and ought to be. In his opinion, he continued, taking out from his side pocket a thick parcel of papers and putting down one of his pairs of glasses, no peace treaty, if it was to fulfil its object, ought to contain less than 14 sections dealing with as many aspects of peace. And he unfolded his papers and proceeded to deliver to the unfortunate Russians a lecture on the nature of those 14 sections which were indispensable in a proper treaty of peace.

"The proceedings at Brest were conducted by each side in its own language, and the speeches were translated sentence by sentence as they were delivered into Russian or German, as the case might be. In private conversation, however, French was frequently employed as a 'neutral' tongue."

The Russian Peace Treaty

[The Treaty concluded at Brest on 3 March between Russia and the Central Powers, will well repay close study—both because it is wellnigh unprecedented in history, and, above all, because it reveals the German ideal in all its nakedness. As Mr. Asquith justly remarks, "it bears none of the marks of the genuine, binding, or enduring compact," and "violates both in its letter and spirit every ideal for which everyone of the Powers of one side or the other has ever professed to entertain or pursue." Never in modern times has a Great Power surrendered such vast territories by a single stroke of the pen. The Treaty reduces Russia on the West once more to the boundaries laid down in the Treaty of Perejaslavl concluded in 1667 with the Ukrainian Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki. Russia loses (1) her acquisitions under the Treaty of Andrusov (1667) with Poland; (2) the conquests of Peter the Great, as confirmed by the Peace of Nystadt (1721); (3) The conquests of Catherine the Great, as confirmed by the Treaties of Kütschük-Kainardji (1774) and Jassy (1791) with Turkey; (4) the Russian share of the three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1796); (5) Courland, which was finally incorporated in 1795; (6) Finland, acquired by the Treaty of Tilsit (1809); (7) Bessarabia, acquired by the Treaty of Bucarest (1812), partially lost in the Crimean War and restored by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), and (8) the Transcaucasian territories acquired from Turkey during the 19th century.

In round figures, these losses amount to 1,400,000 sq. kilometres with a population of 66,000,000.]

I. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other hand declare that the state of war between them is at an end. They are resolved to live in peace and friendship with one another.

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II. The contracting parties will abandon all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the State or military institutions of the other party. This pledge holds good, as regards Russia, also for the territories occupied by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

III. The territories which lie to the west of the line settled between the contracting parties and which belonged to Russia will no longer be subject of the sovereignty of the Russian State. The line agreed upon is indicated on the map appended to this treaty as an essential part of it. The detailed demarcation of this line will be carried out by a German-Russian Commission. The territories in question will not have any obligations as the result of their former connection with Russia. Russia renounces all interference in the internal affairs of these territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to decide the future fate of these territories by agreement with their population.

IV. Germany is ready, as soon as general peace is concluded and the Russian demobilisation completely carried out, to evacuate the territory east of the line indicated in Article III. in so far as Article VI. does not modify this.

Russia will do all in her power to ensure the speedy evacuation of the East Anatolian provinces and their orderly restoration to Turkey. The districts of Ardehan, Kars and Batum will also be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops. Russia will not interfere with the revision of the constitutional and international conditions of these districts, but leaves it to the population of these districts to carry this out in agreement with the neighbouring States, especially Turkey.

V. Russia will, without delay, carry out the complete demobilisation of her army, including the army units reformed by the present Government.

Russia will also either transfer her warships to Russian harbours and leave them there till the conclusion of general peace, or will at once disarm them.

Warships of the States remaining at war with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, will, in so far as they are within the Russian sphere, be treated as Russian warships.

The blockaded area in the White Sea remains till the conclusion of general peace.

In the Baltic and as far as Russian power reaches in the Black Sea the removal of mines will at once be proceeded with.

Mercantile navigation is free in these waters and will be at once resumed.

A mixed Commission will be appointed to fix further details, and especially to announce dangerous routes for mercantile shipping.

The sea routes are to be kept permanently free from floating mines.

VI. Russia pledges herself to declare immediate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognise the peace treaty concluded between this State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The territory of the Ukraine will be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops and the Russian Red Guards. Russia abandons all

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agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Esthonia and Livonia will likewise be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops and Red Guard. The eastern frontier of Esthonia runs in the main along the River Narva. The eastern frontier of Livonia runs in the main through the Peipus and Pskov Lakes to the latter's S.W. corner, and then through the Luban Lake in the direction of Livenhof on the Duna.

Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German police force, until public safety is ensured by native institutions and State order is restored.

Russia will at once set free all inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia who have been arrested or carried away, and guarantees their safe return.

Also Finland and the Åland Islands will be promptly evacuated by the Russian troops and Red Guard, and the Finnish harbours by the Russian fleet and naval forces. As long as the ice prevents the transfer of Russian warships to Russian harbours, only weak crews will be left on board the warships.

Russia abandons all agitation or propaganda against the Government or public institutions of Finland. The fortifications on the Åland Islands are to be destroyed as soon as possible. A special treaty is to be concluded between Germany, Russia, Finland and Sweden regarding the duration of the non-fortification of these islands, as also regarding their position in military and shipping matters. It is agreed that if Germany should desire it, other States bordering on the Baltic Sea may also take part in this treaty.

VII. Starting from the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties pledge themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of those States.

VIII. The prisoners-of-war on both sides shall be sent home. The regulation of the questions connected therewith is to take place according to the special treaties referred to in Article XII.

IX. The Contracting Parties mutually renounce any compensation for their war expenses, that is, for their expenditure on the conduct of the war, as also for war damage, that is, for such damage as has been caused by them and their subjects in the districts at war, owing to military measures, including all requisitions in enemy country.

X. The diplomatic and consular relations between the Contracting Parties shall be at once resumed after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. Special arrangements are to be concluded as to the admission of consuls on both sides.

XI. For the economic relations between the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia the special provisions in Annexes 2-5 hold good (2 for German-Russian, 3 for Austro-Hungarian-Russian, 4 for Bulgarian-Russian, 5 for Turkish-Russian relations).

XII. The restoration of public and private legal relations, the exchange of prisoners-of-war and interned civilians, the amnesty question, and the question of the treatment of enemy ships which have

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fallen into the power of an opponent, shall be regulated in special treaties with Russia. These treaties form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as possible, come into force simultaneously with it.

XIII. Is merely technical (ratification of texts).

XIV. The present Peace Treaty shall be ratified. The documents of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as convenient in Berlin. The Russian Government pledges itself to exchange these documents within two weeks, at the wish of one of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

The Peace Treaty comes into force with its ratification, in so far as its articles or annexes do not lay down otherwise.

The Roumanian Peace Treaty

(Signed 5 March at Buften, near Bucarest.)

[The treaty imposed by the Central Powers on Roumania is a striking example of what a "German peace" means. In an article in THE NEW EUROPE last week (No. 74) Roumania's difficulties were discussed, and the alternatives before her were considered. Our contributor there expressed the hope that at the last minute a possibility for resistance to the Central Powers might be opened up through the conclusion of a defensive Russo-Roumanian agreement such as was reported by the Russian wireless. Unfortunately, events in Russia and elsewhere have moved too fast for this result. But the desirability of such an agreement still holds, and Roumanian opinion recognised it and attempted, at the eleventh hour, to find common ground even with the Bolševiks. The attempt itself is a valuable proof of Roumania's desire to continue the struggle so long as there was the faintest possibility of doing so effectively. In yielding now to the demands of the Central Powers, Roumania has merely accepted, under force majeure, a peace which she wholeheartedly detests.]

1. Roumania cedes to the Allied Powers the Dobrudja as far as the Danube.
2. The Powers of the Quadruple Alliance will take steps to maintain a commercial route for Roumania *viâ* Constanza to the Black Sea.
3. The frontier rectification demanded by Austria-Hungary on the Austro-Hungarian-Roumanian frontier are accepted in principle on the part of Roumania.
4. In the same way economic measures suited to the situation are conceded in principle.
5. The Roumanian Government binds itself to demobilise at once at least eight divisions of the Roumanian Army. The conduct of the demobilisation will be jointly carried out by the Supreme Command of the Mackensen Army group and by the Roumanian Supreme Command. As soon as peace is restored between Russia and Roumania, the remainder of the Roumanian Army is also to be demobilised, in so far as it is not required for the maintenance of order on the Russo-Roumanian frontier.

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6. The Roumanian troops are at once to evacuate the Austro-Hungarian territory occupied by them.

7. The Roumanian Government pledges itself to support with all its power the railway transport of the troops of the Allied Powers through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa.

8. Roumania pledges itself to dismiss immediately such officers of Powers at war with the Quadruple Alliance as are still in Roumanian service; a safe conduct is assured to these officers by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

9. This treaty comes into force at once.

Codlin's the Friend

As was only to be expected, the growing movement in favour of Italo-Slav friendship is causing serious alarm in Vienna. Even before the announcement of the Torre-Trumbić agreement, the *Neue Freie Presse* of 23 February devoted its front page to an article upon the secret Italian treaty of April, 1915, under the heading, "A Warning for our Southern Slavs." For a column and a half it pours out the vials of its wrath upon the Convention, or, as it delicately describes it, "Sonnino's 30 pieces of silver, for which he bartered the honour of his country." But it only really gets to business when it asserts *orbi et urbi* that Italy's "mortal enmity towards the Southern Slavs cannot cease," and that Signor Orlando's "infamous invitation" to them does not alter the true intentions of Italy and her allies. The treaty is to be upheld, and with it "the subjection of Southern Slav tribes and the misuse of popular rights." And yet, alas! "the Southern Slav deputies in the Reichsrat are helping the enemy who threatens the life of their race. If they prevent even the formal business of Parliament from being transacted, accept in effect the leadership of the pardoned Kramář (the Czech leader condemned to death in 1916 but amnestied in 1917) and weaken Austria, to whom they have belonged for centuries past, then they are increasing the danger which threatens them from the secret treaty. It is true that Italy is beaten, but it would be foolish to overlook the fact that England and France have not yet been completely defeated, and that the treaty bears the signatures of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador, Cambon. The responsible framers of our policy must not forget, even to the most distant times, that England and France solemnly promised to cut down the monarchy in such a way as to leave her a mere shapeless stump. The Southern Slavs, too, will be forced to remember who was able to save them from a miserable fate. Why do they torture this Austria, why do they allow Parliament to decay in this shameful crisis? The Adriatic coasts, Istria, Dalmatia, and the islands of the Quarnero, need the protection of a Great Power. They will either be Austrian or Italian. The Southern Slav deputies must, as representatives of their nation, hurl away the fool's chain of Kramář and adopt a policy which will make it possible for these territories to remain Austrian."

Even our Austrophiles will hardly interpret this article as a sign of strength or a guarantee of good faith.

Diary of Current Events

- 20 Feb.—Kühlmann in Reichstag on new situation. Mr. Balfour informs Polish National Committee that Great Britain does not accept peace treaty between Ukraine and Central Powers. Lord Jellicoe at Aldwich Club on submarine war. Inter-Allied Social and Labour Conference opens in London.
- 21 Feb.—*Morning Post* case ends: editor and Col. Repington fined. Jericho captured. Germany announces her terms to Russia.
- 23 Feb.—Informal peace negotiations begun between Germany and Roumania. Sonnino makes important speech in Chamber, sympathetic towards Jugoslavs.
- 24 Feb.—Russia decides to accept German terms and sends delegation to Brest.
- 25 Feb.—Publication of Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Memorandum on War Aims. Count Hertling's speech in Reichstag on President Wilson's four principles. Reval and Pskov taken by Germans.
- 26 Feb.—New constitution of British Labour Party formed.
- 27 Feb.—Mr. Balfour answers Count Hertling in House of Commons.
- 2 March.—Armistice between Roumania and Central Powers expires. Roumania announces decision to accept terms (including cession of Dobrudja).
- 3 March.—Sweden protests against Germany's projected landing on Åland Islands "as a necessary halting-place for the military expedition" to Finland. Russian Delegation signs peace with Germany, to be ratified on 17 March.
- 4 March.—M. Albert Thomas at Mansion House (Anglo-French Society). Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch on Cambrai published.
- 5 March.—Sir E. Geddes on naval situation. Lord Lansdowne's second letter in *Daily Telegraph*.
- 6 March.—Death of Mr. Redmond.
- 7 March.—Mr. Bonar Law's review of the war in the House of Commons.
- 8 March.—Reported resignation of Krylenko.
- 9 March.—Announcement of unofficial Italo-Jugoslav agreement concluded in London between Dr. Andrea Torre and Dr. Trumbić. *Pravda* reports new Russian Government set up by Prince Lvov in Far East. People's Commissaries leave Petrograd for Moscow. Čičerin reported to have succeeded Trotski as Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Redmond's funeral.
- 10 March.—Reuter telegram from Petrograd reports that foreign consuls at Vladivostok have sent to Smolny Institute protest against Bolševik political and economic measures.
- 11 March.—Premier on Government's relations with press. Mr. Wilson's message to Congress of Soviets at Moscow.
- 12 March.—Date fixed for Soviet Congress in Moscow to decide on ratification of peace signed with Germany.
- 13 March.—Bolševik Plenipotentiary in Great Britain protests against action of Allied Consuls at Vladivostok. *Politiken* (Stockholm) begins publication of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum on German policy, 1912-1914.
- 14 March.—Mr. Balfour on Japanese intervention. Germans occupy Odessa. Bolševiks at Moscow decide to ratify German treaty. Trotski appointed Commissary for Military Affairs.
- 15 March.—Soviet Congress at Moscow confirms ratification of Brest Treaty.

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"The Peace Resolution of 19 July is to-day only fit to be made into a paper boat which we can watch floating cheerfully down stream"—*Hermann Wendel, in the*

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Disarmament according to Delbrück

GERMANY before the war was the chief opponent of disarmament. Not only the Imperial Government but all her principal political writers poured scorn on the proposal, and treated it as the Utopia of fools and the refuge of cowards. The literature which grew up around the idea was "so poor and lacking in substance" that the practical statesman and the scientific historian alike were wont to dismiss it in a few ironical phrases. Such is Professor Delbrück's account of the movement before 1914 (*Preussische Jahrbücher*, November, 1917); and he fortifies his argument by showing that the pacifist conception—that plaything of the ideologue—had no influence on world-policy. International arbitration and disarmament could have no place in the world of reality which was the statesman's arena. But a change has come over the scene; and now Professor Delbrück asks himself the question: "Can one really believe that these derided notions, hitherto entertained only by persons of no account, are to be raised to the position of the ruling principle of our time?" Cautiously, and with reservations, he answers his question in the affirmative, on the ground that the Imperial Chancellor has spoken in favourable terms of an International Court of Arbitration. Thus the word of a statesman transforms "conceptions which hitherto were mere foolishness (*Albernheiten*) into truths before which, whether we like it or not, we must bow." In reality, however, the cause of the Professor's conversion is to be sought, not in any speech, but in his own reading of Germany's situation in the world as the result of the war. Professor Delbrück himself is one of the ablest, as he is one of the shrewdest, of German pleaders. Confining himself to the essential factors in German policy, he has often rebuked the extravagance of Pangerman propaganda and has thus earned the hatred of all German Jingoës. His sense of reality gives his writing a much higher place in the war-literature of Germany than is commonly accorded to it by the British press which, in its appetite for the sensation of the moment, tends to give undue prominence to less repre-

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sentative figures. His articles are often the shadow of coming events.

In the present argument Professor Delbrück sets out upon the assumption that the ring of hostile powers—Russia, Great Britain, and France, with Italy as a possible ally—was an instrument deliberately forged for the destruction of Germany. Taking each of the “encircling” Powers in turn, and examining their achievement and experiences in the war, he concludes that they will all be prepared to accept the pacifist ideal because their appeal to force has failed. Germany has proved her power to break the chain that King Edward’s *Einkreisungspolitik* drew around her. The European balance of power which, but for the inexhaustible might of Germany herself, would have tilted permanently against her, is now restored; German power and German rights are henceforth sure of the respect they deserve, German security (after sundry “rectifications” in the East) is finally assured. Herein lies the justification and, indeed, the motive for German approval of disarmament. And Professor Delbrück quotes with unctuous approval Herr Haussmann’s words in the Reichstag last autumn:—“A nation which has astounded the world by its vast power, as we have done, can only reconcile the peoples to German might by showing that the motive and guide behind it all comes from conscience.”

Let us put aside this decorative rhetoric and see how the professor’s mind has travelled to its present conclusion. Russia is his real starting point. The fall of the Tsar had more to do with Professor Delbrück’s conversion to disarmament than any other factor, for “as long as Tsarism controlled the giant power of Russia, neither disarmament nor arbitration was practical politics. The mainspring of Tsarism was its lust of conquest, which ever threatened Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and ourselves with the massive and crushing force of Russian numbers. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that this *Eroberungsdrang* is merely an imperialist phenomenon due to the ambitions of Russian statesmen: it is also to be regarded as a result of the domestic structure of the Russian Empire. Autocracy can never bring domestic peace”: and whenever domestic tension comes near the breaking point it can only be relieved by a foreign diversion. The foreign policy of autocratic Russia was, therefore, in mathematical terms, a function of its domestic equation. But

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the fatality in this process was soon revealed. You cannot seek permanent relief from domestic evils by foreign adventure which, by its very nature, is short-lived; whatever skies be over your head, you cannot suppress a bad conscience. "The Russians consented to autocracy as long as it was successful abroad: but military failure brought forth the republic." Professor Delbrück then asks whether the Russian Republic will be less grasping than the Tsar. He dismisses Paul Rohrbach's contention that the land-hunger of the Russian peasant must find expression in an expansionist foreign policy, and he points to the centrifugal influence of Poland, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia as a guarantee against the re-assembling of any effective military power in Russia. Hence the "Slav peril" is no longer in being, and Germany may on that account consent to discuss disarmament.

In the west "France has displayed an efficiency and a tenacity in this war which no one could have expected from a country so undisciplined and so sunk in stagnation. But as we pay our tribute to her, we can read in her war-effort nothing but a forlorn hope and a gesture of despair. Frenchmen know that, if they are defeated, they have absolutely no national future. *La grande nation* will sink to a second-rate power. Never again can she hope to summon to the standard of *la Revanche* such a formidable coalition of allies: if she fails now her life-blood will have flowed in vain and her light will be extinguished." Professor Delbrück then concludes that "after the war no nation will be so receptive to the doctrines of pacifism as the French."

Turning to Great Britain the Professor pays an unfeigned tribute to the political capacity which built the British Empire and acknowledges the tremendous achievements of the British race in the war itself. But he cannot resist a sneer at the confession of weakness implied in summoning the United States to help in the destruction of Germany, and he gloats over the probable transfer of the London money market to New York. "Even British sea-power, too, is threatened as much by the new maritime enterprise of America as by the German U boats." In her own domestic future trouble looms on every hand. "Universal suffrage, female suffrage, Ireland, the break-up of the party system, the autonomy of the Dominions and the divergence of their interests from those of the Mother-country:

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these vast problems are now interwoven with England's fate : and no man can descry the future. And when we remember that Englishmen must reckon that in ten years' time the German submarines will be ten times as powerful as they are to-day, we may be sure that they would fain turn to pacifism as offering them the only safe conditions in which to solve their vast imperial and domestic problems." But they will take grave risks thereby : for their position in the world rests upon armed sea-power and upon their Indian Empire, both of which would be threatened by any measure of disarmament. For instance, will England dare to disarm in the face of Japan ? and if she remains armed as against Japan she remains armed against Germany too. Therefore German naval disarmament depends upon the Anglo-Japanese situation ; and if Great Britain and Japan can settle their account on a friendly basis which will permit both nations to disarm, or at least to limit their armaments, then German disarmament will be attended with little risk. It is clear, from the nature of Professor Delbrück's argument that he is sceptical of this result ; but even his own doubts do not disturb him, for he regards Far Eastern politics as mainly an Anglo-Saxon concern which only affect Germany by their reaction upon British policy, especially in the naval sphere.

This examination of Germany's enemies is used by Professor Delbrück to throw into high relief the position of Germany herself as the result of the war. Judged in terms of power Germany is invincible : and if *Machtpolitik* continues to rule the world, "the giant coalition for the encirclement of the German Empire must remain in being, for no single Power could hope to set limits to German expansion." The war has removed the only serious flaw in the German situation, viz., the unpatriotic sentiments of the Social Democrats ; and thus the German people has achieved that national unity which was lacking before the war. "Germany is the only one of all the great Powers which, both in domestic solidarity and in military power, has little or no reason to seek relief in pacifism, and for that very reason she has least to fear from disarmament and arbitration." For if the Delbrück reading of the world situation be correct, the other Powers will be unable or unwilling for various reasons to maintain their combined *Machtpolitik* against her. Russia is transformed and weakened by revolution, France is in a "hopeless" situation, and "though

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England is threatened neither with stagnation nor upheaval and must benefit by the present organic development of her constitution " she will have little time for foreign adventure, and, indeed, in such circumstances who will wish to attack her? Germany has, therefore, every reason to look forward with hope to the policy of international *apaisement* by disarmament, for even if new storms were to loom on the horizon after she had disarmed, her marvellous organisation would enable her to meet all dangers, for she could certainly re-arm herself quicker than any of her opponents.

Professor Delbrück then takes up two common pacifist arguments for disarmament: (a) the financial burden of armaments, (b) the suggestion that their existence leads inevitably to their use. Before the war the first argument had little weight, for the increasing wealth of all countries was fully able to meet all obligations of national defence; whereas now the situation is so changed that the argument possesses real force for the first time. The second argument is as valid, or invalid, as before; and on the whole it must be regarded as invalid because armaments, in the long run, are the instruments of policy. It is of course neither negligible nor irrational, but it does not really correspond with the facts. The origins of the war are to be found in the policy pursued by those who are now ranged against Germany; in Serbian propaganda against Austria, in Russian Imperialism, and in the French longing for revenge. These facts created the armaments and were only superficially affected by them. Indeed, it is probably true to say that the neglect of armaments—and not their efficient maintenance—may create a situation out of which war may arise. And the Professor proceeds to argue that the comparative unreadiness of Austria-Hungary led Russia to believe that a war with her offered good chances of success, and that therefore, if Austrian armaments had been commensurate with the requirements of Austrian policy, the danger of war would have been sensibly diminished. This portion of the argument is altogether too slight to be worthy of Professor Delbrück's reputation as a historian; and it is evident from his hasty passage over thin ice that his hands are tied by the official version of the origins of the war. If the recent Lichnowsky disclosures had been on this desk as he wrote he might have found his task well-nigh impossible. As it is, he has the candour to confess

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that trade jealousy, at all events, was not one of the motives that made Great Britain declare war; and in this, as in other respects, he reveals the gulf between his own instructed opinion and the deliberately-fostered misconceptions of Great Britain which are current coin in Germany to-day.

On the obstacles to disarmament Professor Delbrück lays considerable stress, and he reminds his readers of the difficulties encountered during the discussion of the proposed "naval holiday" before the war. The development of technique in all directions—submarines and aeroplanes, for instance—has introduced new complications; while undefined factors, such as the naval resources of the British Dominions, will not lose their importance. Indeed, the task of defining the precise meaning of armaments will tax the ingenuity and goodwill of the nations to a much greater degree after the war than before. Is the Kiel Canal a German armament; likewise the Panama Canal for America? If Germany collects a great reserve of raw materials, or England a reserve of foodstuffs; are these to be reckoned as sinews of war? The experience of to-day would seem to answer in the affirmative. In the last resort Professor Delbrück declares that these obstacles are not insuperable; and he lays down the general principle that finance must be taken as the true measure of military power and that if each Power restricted its armament expenditure to a definite percentage of its annual budget a great step towards a final solution would be taken. He even suggests that a central bureau of control in Berne should be empowered to audit the armament expenditure thus authorised, though the free choice of the armaments themselves, thus limited, should be left to each government. A plan of this kind, limited to a period of five or ten years, would at least provide a hopeful basis for those new international relations which, in Professor Delbrück's expectation, will emerge from the war.

Professor Delbrück concludes in favour of arbitration and disarmament on three grounds: first, because without them the world will stagger under a vast load of debt and taxation to an even worse disaster than the present war; second, because he believes that "the war will create conditions in peace which will make peace itself worth preserving and easier to preserve"; third, because "Germany has less to fear from a simultaneous limitation of armed force by land and sea

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than any other nation, and consequently dare not withhold the boon from the rest of the world."

I will not waste time by making certain obvious comments upon the premisses and the conclusions of this argument. There is, however, one important factor in the debate which deserves attention. Professor Delbrück clearly understands that armaments follow policy; but in pronouncing judgment in favour of disarmament he uses nothing but negative pleas, and though he hints at "new international conditions after the war," he studiously refrains from defining any policy for Europe as a whole which will make competitive armaments obsolete. In a single sentence, and nowhere else throughout this article, he points to a supernational authority for the auditing of national budgets under a scheme of limitation of armaments, though even here he safeguards his own Government (and others) by declaring that the final interpretation of the armament percentage of national expenditure must be reserved to the Finance Minister himself. He seems to be aware that his proposal touches the very nerve of the whole European system, namely, the existence of unbridled national sovereignties, each recognising no bounds to its ambition, except those imposed by the limits of its own military power. The shyness of his approach suggests, either, that in spite of all his acumen he has not yet pierced to the heart of the present European anarchy, or, that he shrinks from telling his fellow-countrymen the unpalatable truth that until Germany, in common with all the great Powers, consents to limit her sovereign claim in foreign affairs there can be neither disarmament nor peace.

A. F. WHYTE.

The Annexation of the Dobrudja

ONE of the many outrageous demands in the treaty of peace which the Central Powers have imposed on Roumania is that for the cession of the Dobrudja.* The enemy alliance has at last exacted brazenly what Bulgaria has long been clamouring for without definite assurance of receiving it. At the time of the attack upon Serbia Roumania was still neutral, and it may therefore be surmised that Berlin had not yet

* This, or Dobrudža, is the Bulgarian form: *Roumanian*, Dobrogea. The word is said to be Turkish in origin—*dubr-ja* ("the little rump").

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connived at this particular point of Bulgarian ambitions, and this view seems to be supported by the very energetic propaganda carried on by the Bulgarian Government in the countries of their Allies since Roumanian intervention, with a view to proving that the Dobrudja was a purely Bulgarian land and as such should be attributed to Bulgaria whatever the principles which will preside at the final settlement. It would be futile to attempt to discover any principle of justice in the settlement which the Central Powers are now imposing upon the helpless peoples of the East. The two motives which prompt their attitude are, first, the anxiety to secure supplies of food-stuffs, oil, and various raw materials, and secondly to leave behind them a situation allowing room for the disintegrating activities of the Ballplatz and of the Wilhelmstrasse.

This is not the place to attempt to refute in detail the Bulgarian claim that the Dobrudja is a Bulgarian land. As an original Roman province, Scythia Minor, whose native population was Daco-Thracian and whose civilisers were Greek colonists and Roman governors, modern Roumania can put forward older title-deeds to it than any other claimant. During the many centuries before it became a battle ground for the feuds between Russians and Turks, the region was indeed overrun by Bulgar, as by Kuman and Tatar, hordes; but it was also on several occasions under the lawful rule of the Wallachian princes. Ethnologically it has generally been a no-man's land or every-man's land (with its mixed Roumanian, Tatar, Turk, Jewish, German, Russian, Greek, and gypsy population). But what is more important than the facts of ancient history is the character of the province at the time when the political situation which prevailed in the European Near East at the outbreak of the present war was established. One of the writers best acquainted with Balkan affairs, Lejean, stated in his "Ethnography" that "the Bulgarian race only counts for a small minority in the Dobrudja." Similarly the geologist Peters, referring to the period 1865-1867 only admitted 25,000 Bulgarians for the whole of the Dobrudja and these often formed mere quasi-nomad agricultural communities. When the Dobrudja was handed over to Roumania, a census of the population established 3,446 Bulgarian families in the district of Tulcea, and about 8,000 families in the district of Constanța (5,000 of them round about Silistra, the product of a recent colonisation). While the Bulgarian population has

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since remained stationary, and the Turkish population was greatly diminished by emigration, the Roumanian population increased very considerably, both by individual immigration and by systematic colonisation which the Roumanian authorities carried out, not to speak of the large class of Roumanian officials and members of the liberal professions which filled the towns of the Dobrudja with the coming of the new administration. The Bulgarian professor Iširkov in a study on the "Roumanian Dobrudja," candidly admitted that "to believe that there are more than 50,000 Bulgarians in the Dobrudja (out of a total population of nearly 350,000), as one often does, would mean very seriously to mislead ourselves." It might be pointed out in addition that the transference of Dobrudja to Roumania was provided for already in the preliminary treaty which the Russians forced upon Turkey at San Stefano in 1878. The treaty of Berlin made it a fact and regarded it as some compensation to Roumania for the theft of Southern Bessarabia. Now it is well known that, short of gaining Constantinople, the chief aim of Russia in the war of 1877-78 was to strengthen the position of the Slavs in the Balkans, and especially to create a strong and independent Bulgaria—an intention which was subsequently thwarted by the opposition of the Powers at the Congress of Berlin. But it is difficult to conceive that with such aims in view Russia would of her own initiative have decided that Dobrudja should have become Roumanian had that province been Bulgarian in character, the more so since she could not have desired to place of her own will an obstacle on the road to Constantinople.

What induced the Great Powers to subscribe to the Russian intentions on that point was, no doubt, mainly the desire to obstruct the path of Russian expansion to the south. But the diplomatic documents of the time clearly indicate that there was a sincere desire to provide the new independent State of Roumania with access to the sea which would enable it adequately to develop the rich lands of which it was composed. That decision was in accordance with the geographical and economic facts of the situation; for the Dobrudja, in general, and Constanța, in particular, have always been the natural outlet for the rich plains between the Danube and the Carpathians. That is indicated by the course of the waters, and is proved by the fact that the roads and railways, old and new, converging upon Constanța, do not

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run from south northwards, but all run from west to east, linking up the Dobrudja with the regions to the left of the Danube. On the other hand, the course of the rivers watering the regions south of the Dobrudja show that their natural outlet is at Varna and Burgas, and by the Bulgarian ports on the Aegean. Given the appalling state in which Dobrudja found itself at the time, the transference also had the character of a trust, and the province was to be indeed a test case for the civilising powers of the new Roumanian State. The success of the Roumanian administration in the Dobrudja from its beginnings in November, 1878, can hardly be over-estimated. Since 1880, its population has increased by more than 120 per cent., and the new civilising element of what was till then practically a wilderness has been, of course, the Roumanian. In 1909, the Roumanian proportion of the population was 55 per cent. (168,145), while Bulgarian propagandists cannot claim more for their co-racials than a most 18 per cent. While Roumanian colonists were introduced to bring new life into the deserted villages, there never was any attempt to dislodge the existing foreign population. On the contrary, they were given full opportunity to maintain their national character, full freedom being allowed to Turkish and Bulgarian educational institutions; a Turkish theological seminary was working in Megidia; and the late King Charles, in order to emphasise this liberal attitude of the Government, never failed to attend service in one of the Turkish mosques on his occasional visits to Dobrudja. Agriculture, cattle-breeding, and fishing have taken an enormous development in this short space of time, and an extensive system of roads and railways provided the province with the requirements of modern economic life. In 1895 Dobrudja was linked up with the rest of the kingdom by means of a magnificent bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda; and Roumanian capital and energy have transformed Constanța from an insignificant townlet into one of the chief, and probably the best equipped, ports on the Black Sea. So far as the Dobrudja is civilised to-day, it is Roumania's work. As Professor Iorga finely said some 15 months ago: "This corner of Asia we have made a pearl of Europe."

Readers of THE NEW EUROPE are already familiar with the methods by which the Bulgarian authorities have attempted for a year or more past to "Bulgarise" the pro-

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vince and pretend to Europe that it is in truth ethnologically Bulgar (THE NEW EUROPE, Nos. 40, 54). Imitating the German example in Courland and Lithuania, the Bulgarian Government summoned in December last a "Constituent Assembly" at Baba Dagh in order that the fate of the province should be "self-determined." This Assembly was composed of local Bulgarian representatives; the strip of land from Tulcea to Baba Dagh is in truth populated by Bulgars and is the only really Bulgarian part of the province; we must, of course, except the two new departments of Silistra and Dobrič—mistakenly annexed by Roumania for reasons of strategy and in the interests of Balkan balance of power in 1913. These two departments are quite distinct in character from the Dobrudja we are discussing and where the population* is mainly Turco-Tatar and Bulgar, and their fate is not *necessarily* connected with that of the rest of the Dobrudja. The Assembly hastened to pass, amidst the enthusiastic applause of the Bulgars and "tame" Turks present, a demand for union with the Bulgarian "fatherland," and Mr. Radoslavov's Government has since then welcomed a Dobrudjan delegation in Sofia with a view to exerting pressure on the Central Powers, who were anxious to make the Dobrudja an apple of discord between Roumania and Bulgaria, a prize reserved for either in the event of "good behaviour." This pretended voice of the people is not likely to deceive us. Even Bulgarian propagandists like Messrs. Iširkov and Mavrodijev do not pretend that there are more than 60,000 Bulgars (if so many) in the Dobrudja out of a population of nearly 350,000. But, in fact, Bulgarian jingoes are thinking of other things than ethnology. Fancied strategic reasons are pleaded by them as an excuse for demanding a complete Danube frontier. Mr. Gešov's organ, the *Mir*, has, however, frankly admitted that one main reason for demanding the Dobrudja is to secure territorial contact with Russian territory, and so continue to play German against Slav and Slav against German. Bulgaria would then be united to *Mittel-Europa* by the Morava valley and apparently also through Little Wallachia, now claimed

* According to the Bulgarian census of 1905, the population of the districts (annexed by Roumania at the Peace of Bucarest) amounted to 269,693: Bulgars, 116,856; Turks, 106,608; Tatars, 11,739; Roumanians, 6,259.

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by Hungary. In fact the more we look into this affair—whether from the German or Bulgarian point of view—the more the naked jingoism of the Germano-Bulgarian demand becomes obvious.

To take the Dobrudja away from Roumania and give it to Bulgaria, which already possesses a long stretch of coast on the Black Sea as well as a direct outlet to the Aegean, means seriously to cripple the economic life of Roumania, and there must be reasons deeper than a mere sentiment of vengeance which prompt the Central Powers to adopt a policy which must inevitably make friendly relations between them and Roumania impossible. The motive is suggested by the terms of the Treaty with Roumania. The Dobrudja is ceded to the Quadruple Alliance, and the Central Powers obviously intend to use it as a lever for the purpose of extorting economic and political concessions from Bulgaria, as well as, it is said, certain territorial concessions for Turkey.

Moreover, Roumania will naturally endeavour to make good the wrong at the first opportunity, and this state of enmity between the two neighbours will inevitably make Bulgaria still more dependent on the Central Powers. Roumanian foreign policy will be, in addition, burdened with another problem, and thus unable to devote full attention and energy to the solution of the problem of the Roumanians in Hungary. This policy is only a repetition of that pursued by Austria in 1913, when by insisting upon the creation of Albania she brought Serbia and Bulgaria into conflict. For the same reason the Central Powers are very anxious to induce Roumania to occupy parts of Bessarabia forcibly (instead of achieving its union with the mother-country by common consent), thus laying the seeds of a probable conflict with a reorganised Russia. To maintain a state of feud in the Balkans is essential for the Central Powers; a Balkan League would cut them off from the East, and concentrate the national forces against Austria-Hungary.

Germany needs Roumania economically, to secure corn and oil, and politically, to avoid the Roumanian group becoming an obstruction in the path of her Eastern policy. But on account of the political situation created by the war, and Roumania's anxiety to rid herself of German economic domination, Roumanian products would normally take even more than before the war the direction of the West, by way of the

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Black Sea. If she is practically shut off from the open sea Roumania will be forced to make use of the traffic facilities offered by Central Europe—upon certain conditions—and such economic dependence will soon extend to the political sphere. Such a situation has a striking parallel to that which preceded the formation of the *Zollverein*. By acquiring certain provinces Prussia succeeded in cutting off the southern German States from outlet to the northern seas, and, unwilling though they were, they had to submit to the will of Berlin as the only means to avoid economic suffocation.

The Macedonian Question

THE NEW EUROPE recently (No. 73) reprinted an article by Mr. K. Rakovski on "Transylvania and Macedonia." In so far as Macedonia is concerned this controversy is not only with the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialistic Bureau but also with the Delegates of the Serbian Socialist Party, who proposed to the Dutch-Scandinavian Bureau a solution of the Macedonian question. As Deputy Katslerovitch and I were members of this Delegation, perhaps I might be allowed to say a few words relating to that controversy, not by way of answer to Mr. Rakovski but merely for the benefit of the British public—to throw a little more light on a question which will prove to be one of the most thorny of all the problems connected with the peace settlement. At the same time may I be permitted to point out that the Social Democratic Party to which I belong is as far removed from any kind of Chauvinism as is Mr. Rakovski himself; on the contrary, it was our party which was so often blamed by Serbian bureaucrats, sometimes as agents of Austria, sometimes as agents of Bulgaria.

Mr. Rakovski thinks that the best solution of the Macedonian question will be an *autonomous Macedonia forming part of the Republican federation of all the Balkan States*. We are of exactly the same opinion. The first inter-Balkan Socialist Conference, held on the initiative of the Serbian Social Democratic Party in Belgrade on the 7-9 January, 1910, brought forward this demand as the common programme of all Socialist parties in the Balkans.

And this is quite easy to understand. It has been the

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destiny of the Balkan Peninsula to be the meeting point of great universal cross-roads, along which have passed, leaving their ethnographical and historical traces, countless migrations of peoples, from the Roman conquests and the barbarian invasions down to the Turkish irruptions of the Middle Ages. To the old aboriginal inhabitants and the Slavonic intruders who came later, the Turks added their own special colours in succeeding ages. Not only were the existing Balkan States destroyed, but a period of endless migration and constant internal motion was introduced. As a result, the Balkan Peninsula to-day represents a kaleidoscope of nations. It is very difficult, therefore, to trace any Balkan frontier which shall be both national and political. Indeed, who is capable of tracing a clearly-defined frontier between Serbians, Bulgarians, and Macedonians, or between Montenegrins and Albanians, or between Albanians, Macedonians and Greeks, or between Greeks and Thracians, or between Thracians and Bulgarians? Moreover, sometimes in the very heart of a Balkan nation there are oases of quite a different race or nation.

This applies in a peculiar degree to Macedonia, which is the central focal point of the Balkans. Ethnographically every Balkan people has its tail in Macedonia. The Serbians, for instance, extend deep below Uskub (Skoplje) to east and west. The Albanians stretch out in many corridor-like tracts, sometimes very deep, into Macedonia. In Southern Macedonia ramify the Greeks, almost dominating in Monastir and the vicinity. The Turks extend in one broad tract from Thrace up to the Gulf of Orfano, then along the River Vardar due north as far as Ovtché Polje. The Bulgarian ethnographical and cultural influence is almost predominant beyond Struma and the Rhodope in the eastern part of Macedonia, and sometimes to the west of the River Vardar. In the light of such facts, to speak of Macedonia as the particular "national sanctuary" of any one race is absurd.

Strategically, Macedonia is the most important part of the Balkans and all State organisations in the Balkans in the Middle Ages had their starting point and nucleus in Macedonia.

¶The economic significance of Macedonia is enormous. The valley of the Vardar is a natural extension of the Morava Valley, and the only natural artery of Serbia. Salonica is one of the best natural ports in Europe and every Balkan

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State gravitates to it. In view of all this, Macedonia, as the natural economic and ethnographical complement of every part of the Balkans, ought to be for the common good of the Balkan peoples; and this will be possible only if it becomes an equal member in a democratic federation of all the Balkan nations—a federation which will form one big State, with cultural and national autonomies for its constituent parts. That is the common goal of all Balkan Socialists; it is not a matter of dispute.

But the question is: Can this ideal be realised at the conclusion of peace?

As long as monarchies continue to exist in the Balkans, it is impossible, in the opinion of Serbian Socialists, to discuss the question of *federation*; so long as monarchies exist the unification of the Balkans will only be possible in the form of a hegemony by one of the dynasties. Instead of having an American "United States" we might see a unification of monarchies under a Prussian hegemony—whether that Prussia was represented by Bulgaria, Serbia, or Greece, matters little for real democrats. All we Social Democrats of the Balkan lands have to concentrate all our forces after a general peace on the creation of a political basis for the Balkan Federation. Meanwhile, it is necessary to find an immediate provisional solution of the Macedonian question. Mr. Rakovski shuts his eyes to this pressing problem of the moment, and leaves the Bulgarian Chauvinists to draw European opinion to their side in the interim. If we set aside the best solution of this question, which at this moment is unfortunately impossible, viz., the Balkan Federation with Macedonia as an autonomous member, then there are practically only three solutions to this problem:—

1. The annexation of the whole of Macedonia by one of the Balkan States;
2. The creation of an autonomous Macedonian State;
3. A provisional division of Macedonia in such a way as to give partial satisfaction to Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and at the same time afford the best basis for work on the lines of a Balkanic Federation.

Let us very briefly examine these three solutions:

1. *Annexation of Macedonia.*—When reference is made nowadays to this proposal, everybody thinks of Bulgarian

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aspirations in this direction. It is probable that there are also in Serbia and in Greece such Chauvinists, but they are very few and without political influence. Meanwhile, in Bulgaria such aspirations are found in much larger measure.

From the ethnographical and economic points of view, as well as from the point of view of communication, Macedonia is the common good of all the Balkan peoples, and it would be a most disastrous solution that it should become the monopoly of any one Balkan State. The Bulgarians bring up with an almost desperate monotony the testimony of old travellers and geographers as to the Bulgarian character of Macedonia, the Treaty of S. Stefano, the Exarchate and its statistics, the Treaty of 1912, &c. These arguments, however, are without any force, and are refuted again and again by competent and objective persons. We have in mind the political and scientific essays of Mr. Yovan Čvijić, one of the ablest authorities on Balkan questions, and one of the very few objective thinkers in the Balkans who has succeeded in raising himself above national prejudices and passions and in grasping the realities of the whole situation.

In Western Europe there has been, and still is in many quarters, the impression that Macedonia belongs to the Bulgarians. In the beginning of the 19th century the Greeks were *à la mode* in Western Europe, especially in France and England; but their place was taken later on by the Bulgarians, first in England and afterwards in France. The cult of the beautiful made the French enthusiastic on behalf of the Greeks, in whom they saw the heirs of ancient Hellenism. And the cult of freedom has made the British not less enthusiastic on behalf of the Bulgarians, in whom they have seen the representatives of the martyrs to Turkish oppression and cruelty—the Serbians in Serbia having achieved their own liberation much earlier. Gladstone was right when he raised his clarion voice on behalf of the Bulgarians, and from this time the Macedonian question, following as it did upon the Bulgarian *mode*, came to be identified with the Bulgarian question. Bulgarian statesmen improved the occasion very cleverly, availing themselves of this sympathy of Western Europe, and especially of England, to further their own plans for imperialistic aggrandisement. They exploited the moral and political aid of England, offered in the cause of freedom, to establish a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans. Even at the eleventh

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hour it is to be hoped that British public opinion will discriminate between the lawful aspirations of an oppressed people towards liberty and the designs of "grab" put forward by adroit politicians.

2. *Macedonia as an autonomous State.*—Macedonia as an equal member of the Balkan Federation has its full right and significance, because this would mean its local, cultural and national autonomy in the frame of a great democratic federation of nations. At the same time Macedonia as a new independent State is an absurdity. The Balkan peoples have suffered and still suffer from disunion. By the creation of a Macedonian State yet another step deeper into this medieval particularism would be taken in complete antagonism to the longings and the needs of modern times. It would mean not progress but reaction. Moreover, the necessary and essential conditions for the constitution of a separate and individual Macedonian State do not exist. In Macedonia there is no single nation or race which has predominance over any other. Heinrich Cunow, a distinguished theoretical German Social Democrat, is an untiring preacher of the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria, although he has been obliged to confirm the accuracy of the following figures. Of the 2,275,000 inhabitants in Macedonia, 1,200,000 are Slav peoples, the remainder being of different non-Slav races. So far as the Slavonic half is concerned, this half is not compact, but is scattered over territories claimed by Bulgaria, Serbia, and even Greece. Generally speaking, Macedonia represents a chaos, for we have there the following groups:—1. Slavs, *i.e.*, Bulgarian Slavs, Serbians, Greek Slavs, Turkish Slavs and Albanian Slavs; 2. Albanians, *i.e.*, Greek, Turkish and Albanian Albanians; 3. Vlachs ("Kutso-Vlachs"), Greek, Albanian and Roumanian; 4. Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Jews and Gypsies. Here we have altogether 16 racial groups.

A referendum, even if it could be arranged, would not change the proportions of this mosaic of nationalities; it would only be its reflex. And under such conditions, Macedonia has even less prospect of existence as an independent State than, say, Albania, which is nationally homogeneous. A plebiscite—yes. But not a plebiscite for one district of the Balkans only, but for the whole of South Eastern Europe; that is the only right and democratic solution of the question. Let the nationalities in S.E. Europe decide their own destiny.

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3. *The Partition of Macedonia with mutual Concessions.*— Only this third solution is now left to be considered. To such solution we give our support, and in this form; the Treaty of Bucharest, which gave to Serbia and Greece a predominant position in the Balkans, ought to be annulled. We Socialists always were the bitter opponents of that Treaty, seeing that after the defeat of Bulgaria in 1913 our statesmen did not profit by the experience they had had of Bismarck's policy after the defeat of Austria at Königgrätz. But as we are the bitter opponents of that Treaty we are also not less opponents of Bulgarian greed in her determination to swallow Macedonia. What Bulgaria desires is nothing less (as Mr. Camille Huysmann bitterly said) than a new Treaty of Bucharest, only in a reversed form. Most decidedly I am for Serbia having all the region on the right bank of the Vardar, so that she may have communication with Salonica, which ought to be made the common property of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and a starting point for the future Balkan Federation. There is no existence for Serbia without communication with Salonica. I think that the British public is very well versed in this question, and that the point need not be laboured here. I need only point out that if Bulgaria were permitted to have territories upon the right bank of the Vardar and Austria-Hungary should remain as before the war, then Serbia would entirely lose her *raison d'être* as an independent State.

I quite agree that this solution has its drawbacks, because Greece would be compelled to cede to Bulgaria regions around Drama, Seres, and Kavalla, which are, without doubt, preponderantly Greek. Some Bulgarian partisans, too, would thus remain under Serbian rule in Western Macedonia; but, under the rival solution, a number of Serbians would be left under the rule of the Bulgarians, while Serbia, besides, would give up her richest regions to Bulgaria. But without liberal concessions on all sides there cannot be lasting settlements. The rights of national minorities can be fully preserved by granting to them national and cultural autonomy on the basis proposed by Dr. Otto Bauer and Dr. Karl Renner for the Austrian nationalities.

This principle ought to be enshrined in a special clause in the treaty of peace.

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The Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee have accepted our view on the Macedonian question. Will not the British public also give it the weight of their support?

DUŠAN POPOVIĆ.

A Plea for Siberia

THE Siberian question is now occupying a great deal of public attention, and there is no doubt that if its importance and urgency were fully realised, a still greater share of active interest would be focussed upon it. Speaking in general terms, public opinion in this country is ranged in two camps: there are those who foresee the necessity of some military action in that part of the world, but would like to feel that it was fully justified, and there are those who are guided merely by their feeling of reluctance to interfere with an organism in such a state of convulsion as Russia now is for fear of aggravating the evil or of laying themselves open to criticism. Both sides treat the Siberian question rather like a shell found behind the lines whose composition is as disquieting as it is unknown. There is truth in what the opponents of interference say, that no immediate strategic danger is to be faced in that quarter, but there are economic, political, and national questions which cannot be ignored.

The economic problem may be stated as follows: A country unsurpassed for its grain, butter, cattle and mineral supplies, all of which will prove invaluable to Europe in the next few years, is now faced with the alternative of either falling into complete anarchy, involving the cessation of both production and export, or of being organised by the enemy for their own advantage. Enemy influence is acting upon it through two channels: one direct, Petrograd-Kiev; the other indirect, *viâ* Persia and Turkestan.

Politically, the Allies are confronted with a problem not unlike that which arose in Salonica and Greece, only on a much larger scale. Their interests do not lie in Siberia itself, but by refraining from political activity there they will, in the end, find themselves deprived of the valuable ally that Siberia may eventually become. Fortunately, here, as in Greece, interference would mean the strengthening of the democratic Siberian nation against any possible re-estab-

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lishment of the old *régime*, as well as against those extremists who do not belong to Siberia and whose activity on Siberian soil is against all principles of self-determination. But, of course, in the present confusion, orientation is very difficult, especially as it is easy for any highwayman out for plunder to pose as belonging to the Bolševiks, the Social Revolutionaries, or any other party, so that almost our only guide in this chaos is to watch and follow leaders whose past and present views and actions are known, and whose influence is not transitory. If we search the length and breadth of Siberia, throughout the last fifty years of its history, we shall not find a man who answers to this description better than does Gregory Potanin, of Tomsk, the Venizelos of Siberia. This great Siberian patriot, a world-famous traveller, once persecuted as a revolutionary under the old *régime*, is surrounded and supported by people of equal weight, such as Adrianov, social worker, archæologist, and now also editor of *Sibirskaya Jisn*, Mme. Brheshko-Brheshkovskaya, "the grandmother of the Russian Revolution," and many others of the Siberian "intelligentsia" (if this term, which carries with it a sharp class distinction, can be applied to them), of the old colonists, and of the Turco-Mongolic natives.

But the question has also its moral aspect, not entirely separated from the political problem. Now that, following upon the first Russian Revolution, all the officials have departed from Siberia, the country is in the hands of its own nation—the Sibriaks—akin to, but different from, the Russians. It does not seem to be realised that the Sibriaks have the right to express their opinion, and as this opinion, in the present crisis, is known to be in accordance with the interests of Russia as a whole, the recognition of the Sibriaks' national claims is in no sense directed against European Russia.

The Sibriaks, or colonists of Siberia, have a longer history than the Canadians or the Americans, but not possessing the cultural advantages which the Anglo-Saxons brought with them to America, and depending on a metropolis from which they had nothing to learn, the Sibriaks have lagged behind all other colonial nations. Besides, it must be remembered that nowhere has there been such a fusion of various racial stocks as is taking place in Siberia, and this, however successful, has necessarily lowered the level of general culture, though not of national unity. If, as some people say, Russia is suffering

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now for her old sins—and those who are fatalists may believe it—this cannot hold good of the Sibriaks, whose only drawback is that they are so little known to the world outside Siberia and the Sibriak colonies in European Russia. They have not yet had a chance to make themselves heard, and it is time that such a strong and vital nation which, though small in numbers (about eight millions), controls an immense area, should emerge from obscurity.

The Sibriaks can trace their history in Western Siberia vaguely to the twelfth century or the time of the Great Novgorod, but more certainly to the time of the Duchy of Moscow. The Cossack conquest of Siberia and the forcible colonisation of the land by the Government, "po ukazu" (by order), did not play such an important rôle as voluntary colonisation, "po volye." Thus, for instance, if we examine the origin of some 776 settlements in the four best populated districts in the Yeniseisk Government, we see that only 102 of them have arisen "po ukazu" and 674 "po volye." The people who can trace their genealogy for some generations back are called "starojili" (old settlers), as against the new colonists, "novosioli." Between the "starojili" and the "novosioli" there is a class of so-called "starosioli"—people who have lived in Siberia for one or two generations only, and are not yet accepted by the "starojili" as true Sibriaks. They live especially in the Far-East, in the Steppe country, and in Northern Turkestan, while the "starojili" live chiefly in Siberia proper, especially the Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk and Transbaikal Governments. While class distinction existed among the Russian officials sent to Siberia, it practically never established itself among the Sibriaks, which is perhaps natural if we consider that the institution of serfdom has never been known among them. There is no doubt that moral more than economic reasons impelled these voluntary colonists, who would rather migrate than submit to the Moscow and Petrograd régime. Hence a Sibriak writer describes Siberia as "the country of the unhumiliated."

Racially, Siberia, more than any other part of the world, proves how unjustified are the shouts of "White Peril" or "Yellow Peril." There is no part of the Russian Empire which has not contributed its blood to the formation of the Sibriak type; even the people who, in European Russia, have preserved their national integrity, such as the Finns and

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the Poles, have had their share in it. On the other hand, all the North and Central Siberian aborigines intermarried with these Europeans, especially within the last few generations. The originally small number of Russian women necessitated such unions, and by a "ukaze" of 11 February, 1825, the local Russian administration was even ordered to buy female children from the aborigines. Thus in physique the Sibriaks have more Asiatic traits than the Russians in Europe, though in *morale* they have the tolerance and broadmindedness to find a parallel to which we have to leave Europe and look in new countries of similar origin to Siberia, such as the United States or Canada. And again, as among all really free communities, on the sea of this Eurasian fusion we have the islets of pure Great Russian colonists, such as the "Old Believers," who, owing to their allegiance to their sect, remain now as they were when they left Russia some two or three centuries ago. To speak of a "Yellow Peril" or a racial question in the Sibriakland is to ignore the difference between the Russian officials who brought about the massacres of Blagovyeshchensk in 1900 or of Turkestan in 1916, and the Sibriaks, who have always been opposed to such a policy. In fact, the attitude of the Sibriaks is so far from aggressive that even the Russian economic penetration into the Uriankhai country was repudiated by them, as is well seen in their Press (*e.g.*, Adrianov's article in *Sibirskaya Jisn*, 3 May, 1917).

The cultural influence of the thousands of political exiles has not failed to produce its effect, and, in fact, all the great men of whom Siberia is proud, such as Yadrintsev, Shashkov, Vyagin, Potanin, have been, at one time or another, persecuted by the old Government. Anyone who has had the opportunity of seeing the Sibriaks at home knows how progressive they are in their agricultural and other industries, how self-reliant and resourceful in their co-operative association (the Butter Co-operative with its 550 societies, is a striking testimony to this), and how ready to supply funds for the furtherance of education. That is why it seems strange that even that measure of self-government which the *zemstvo* has given to the provinces of European Russia was denied to Siberia. The question of the Siberian *zemstvo* has probably been a means of hastening the demands of the Sibriaks for autonomy and for a territorial (*Oblastnaya*) Duma, federated to the Russian Duma. Although the Imperial "ukaze" of 1905 to the

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Irkutsk Governor-General promised a zemstvo in Siberia, it was passed only by the Third Duma in January, 1912, but not by the Imperial Council in May, 1912. The Duma proposal known as the "programme of 101 members of the Duma" differed to a great extent from the drafts for Siberian zemstvos as worked out by the Sibiriaks themselves (see the confiscated pamphlet by Bielousov "On the Zemstvos in Siberia"); but even the Duma proposal has never been put into practice. The last Russian scheme for zemstvos for all Siberia and the Far East was not completed till summer, 1917 (published in the Bulletin of the Provisional Government, No. 117). Meanwhile the second revolution brought the necessity for autonomous action in Siberia.

Accused of following the Ukrainians in their separatist tendencies, the Sibiriaks know how to emphasise the necessity for united action in defence of the economic and cultural interests of their country, though they do not seek to break off such relations with Russia as are founded on the basis of Federalism. (See the article of G. Potanin in *Sibirskaya Jisn*, 13 June, 1917.) There are some local reforms needed in Siberia, the chief of which concern the agrarian question, the arrangements for trade control, and the taxing of capital; but the problems are far less acute than in European Russia, and the people are eminently less divided in their national aspirations. At their Territorial Congresses (*Oblastniye Syezdy*) the Sibiriaks remained faithful to their allegiance to the Provisional Government, and the few centres where the Bolševiks have had the upper hand, such as Blagovyeshchensk, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tashkent, are those which, being on the line of communication with European Russia, are under the direct control of the Bolševik Government as they were once under the control of the Tsar.

If Siberia is to be saved from anarchy and from enemy interference the Allies must help the Sibiriaks to take the affairs of the country into their own hands by immediate economic arrangements with such allied neighbours as Canada, the United States, China and Japan. The Sibiriaks were, and are, the most stable element of the Russian Empire, and the most practical in political affairs. When approached directly they cannot fail to appreciate economic and possibly strategic help, which is the only way of saving and assuring the further

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development of their new nation, and possibly of redeeming their kindred in European Russia from entire disintegration. It is for the "unhumiliated" democracies of Canada and the United States, for the new Republic of China, and for the democratic elements in the modern power of Japan to hold out a helping hand to the so far "unhumiliated" nation of this "Canada of the East."

M. A. CZAPLIĆKA.

The Lichnowsky Memorandum

[We print below the full text of the famous memorandum written by Prince Lichnowsky, former German Ambassador in London, in August, 1916, and first published in recent issues of the Stockholm Socialist newspaper Politiken. According to the Berliner Tageblatt, "it was an officer, a member of an old family, decorated with the Iron Cross of the first class, who had become a pacifist in the course of his war experiences, who first circulated Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum without the Prince's knowledge, labouring under the delusion that he was doing something useful and necessary."—The Volksstimme (Mannheim: Socialist) says of it: "Whilst it cannot be regarded as a final judgment, it is an important testimony accusing German and acquitting English policy. The Prince's testimony with regard to the former is based on the merest hearsay, while that in favour of English policy is the result of the Prince's own knowledge. Of two theories only one is possible: either Prince Lichnowsky is the most incurable idiot who ever sat in the Ambassador's chair, or else not a shred remains of the fiction that the outbreak of war was due to English intrigues."]

" Kuchelna, 16 August.

" Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

THE LONDON EMBASSY.

" To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and

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thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to His Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favourable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

MOROCCO.

“ Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me, ‘ The French had begun to forget *la revanche*. You have regularly reminded them of it by tramping on their toes.’ After we had declined Delcassé’s offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world-war. The pitiable conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé’s fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British *rapprochement*. In face of ‘ the German peril ’ all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

“ The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras, and, immediately afterwards, the equal worthlessness of the agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under ‘ encirclement,’ and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a

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statement of our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbours and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

HALDANE AND GREY : ENGLISH CHAUVINISM.

" When I came to London in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would ensure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt firstly on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councillor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war.

" This was Sir Edward Grey's programme in his own words, ' Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England, to seek to achieve a more friendly *rapprochement* with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together.'

" In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as the *Westminster Gazette*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Daily Chronicle*. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me, leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on ' the writing on the wall,' and, further, the Northcliffe Press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin, of the *Observer*. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the

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former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, whilst the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

BALKAN QUESTIONS.

" The first Balkan War led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salvation of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our Allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the *rôle* of mediator.

" I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our Allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favoured Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilised Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the Conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

ALBANIA.

" In Greece to-day whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, therefore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favour of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the Monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the South and the Austro-Magyars in the North; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously, was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world-war.

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TURKEY AND RUSSIA : ITALY.

“ Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia—our natural friend and best neighbour—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

“ As to the value of the Alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our Alliance. That our Alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The Alliance consequently was worthless.”

AUSTRIA.

“ Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other *point d'appui*. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aerenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

“ I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Habsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian Federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of realisation within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and *Kultur*, and they know that Austria can never be a leading Power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the Empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

“ Since the 'seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also perhaps in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pangerman particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be

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feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our interests would suffer; whilst, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest, we should have *épouser les querelles de l'Autriche.*"

BALKAN QUARRELS.

"We therefore had no need to heed the desires of our Allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our Alliance with its single original purpose into a complete Alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and, under those conditions, he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where, against our own economic interests, we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

"We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold."

SIR E. GREY IN 1912.

"Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan War, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the Powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of 'honest broker,' he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good will and powerful influence towards the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London, and I was his second.

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" My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was '*Casus fœderis*,' and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase, I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbours, in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, whilst Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterwards brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask 'our Allies' to make concessions.

" Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives."

AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA.

" Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterising our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

" As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian programme without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimise the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

" The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian Press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

" His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself, were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many of the qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

" I once said, 'The feeling in Russia is very anti-German.' He replied, 'There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian.'

" It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests."

The Caucasus through German Eyes

[*The Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5 March, published the following account of Caucasian events in the form of a dispatch from Constantinople, dated 23 February.]

"The general public hears but little of the process of dissolution which is now taking place in the Caucasus. It is there that Russia has probably received her worst blow; the Caucasus has broken away from Russia, and declared its independence. The great routes, which carried Russian influence and power into Persia, and to the eastern borders of Anatolia, as far as the Persian Gulf, which led to the most important intercourse with other countries, comprising territory inconceivably rich in natural resources of every kind, are now closed to the Russian armies. We cannot yet formulate what the results of an independent Caucasus will be so far as European and Asiatic relations are concerned. As far back as last November a separate Government was declared at Tiflis. The repeated attempts of Kaledin to get into touch with this Government met with no success. About this time the Trans-Caucasian front was already in complete dissolution. The retreating Russian troops laid waste the country with incredible frightfulness. They behaved as mercilessly as if they were harrying an enemy's country. The Persian races of the Shahsevenes, the Alars and Kharmadalines in Trans-Caucasia were the first to give the signal for a rising. The cutting of the railway line from Baku to Tiflis was done by them. Their acknowledged aim was to render the retreat of the Russians through Muslim territory as difficult as possible, and in this they were entirely successful. Four regiments of the so-called "savage division" formed the nucleus of the Muslim Caucasian Army, which declared its independence towards the end of 1917. Their number has now increased to eight divisions. The Mohammedan Commander-in-Chief, formerly a General in the Russian Army, has his headquarters in Baku. Independent Armenian formations equipped with English and American money and material have arisen alongside this army. The numbers vary between 20,000 and 50,000 men. There is also a Georgian formation, principally cavalry. The Georgians, however, unlike the Armenians, have refused to enter into any relations with the Entente. Both Mohammedans and Georgians have the same aim in view, the founding of a federated State of Trans-Caucasia. The Armenians are doing all in their power to prevent this aim being fulfilled. After the disasters at Trebizond, Erzerum, and Erzinjan, where the Turkish troops forced the strong bands of Armenians back uninterruptedly, they realise that even under the most auspicious circumstances they will be limited to a very small strip of territory, in addition to losing their influence in the Caucasus. The powerful Armenian capitalism, however, is endeavouring to hold its ground everywhere, and will continue in this endeavour the more tenaciously the more their plan of including Turkish Eastern Anatolia in the sphere of influences recedes to an unattainable distance. The whole Mohammedan civil population in the Caucasus is provided with arms like the Armenians. The Armenians are supporting Russia, and are

THE CAUCASUS THROUGH GERMAN EYES

endeavouring to hinder the development of the Federated State which has been planned. According to reliable reports from the Caucasus they will hardly be successful in their endeavours.

"The relations between an independent Caucasus and its nearest neighbour, Turkey, will of course be of the greatest importance. In his speech on the 21st in the Chamber, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that the newly-formed Caucasian State has asked Turkey to send representatives to Tiflis to negotiate. This announcement was received in the Turkish Parliament with great applause. There are countless bonds uniting Turkey and the Caucasus. In the Turkish Chamber and in the Senate there are many members who originally came from the latter country. Up to now no representatives have been appointed. They are probably waiting in Constantinople for the results of the peace terms at Brest-Litovsk and Bucarest. It would be a fatal mistake to suppose that the Mohammedans in the Caucasus are desirous of being absorbed by the Turkish element, although closely united to the latter by race and by religion. Their aim is to enter into a friendly political and economic relationship with Turkey. The latter is to become the guarantor of the independence of the Caucasus. In connection with this the newly-founded State at the foot of the Kasbek Range expresses a decided leaning to the Central Powers. After the complete break-up of the Russian fronts in the Caucasus, in Armenia, and in Persia, certain sections of the population are anxious lest Turkey should secretly cherish designs upon the Caucasus. There is not the slightest ground for such suspicions. Turkish statesmen like Talaat and Enver Pasha will certainly never lay hands on the young States. By so doing they would only be playing into Russia's hands. So far as the political programme of Turkey is concerned, there is no intention of anything more than the restoration of the boundary as it existed previous to the Russian war of 1878."

"Those who live in glass houses"

With reference to our note under the above title (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 74), the editor of *Tygodnik Polski* writes to us to explain that his journal is not an organ of the National Democratic Party nor of the Polish National Committee, though it supports the policy of the latter; that he had no intention of attacking THE NEW EUROPE in recent articles; that his strictures were confined to our brilliant correspondent who signs himself "N." on the ground that "N." had demanded "the recognition of the German solution of the Polish Question." This statement is an entire perversion of "N.'s" argument. The articles in the *Tygodnik Polski*, in which the original attack on "N." and on THE NEW EUROPE was made, are before us. Having read them with care we see little reason to withdraw our original comment. It is true that *Tygodnik Polski* does not specifically attack THE NEW EUROPE as pro-German or *défaitiste*, but it classes one of our most constant contributors with the *Bonnet Rouge* and *Landau*, and leaves the reader to make the obvious inference. Against that insinuation we uttered an emphatic protest which we now repeat.

Diary of Current Events

- 25 Feb.—Publication of Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Memorandum on War Aims. Count Hertling's speech in Reichstag on President Wilson's four principles. Reval and Pskov taken by Germans.
- 26 Feb.—New constitution of British Labour Party formed.
- 27 Feb.—Mr. Balfour answers Count Hertling in House of Commons.
- 2 March.—Armistice between Roumania and Central Powers expires. Roumania announces decision to accept terms (including cession of Dobrudja).
- 3 March.—Sweden protests against Germany's projected landing on Åland Islands "as a necessary halting-place for the military expedition" to Finland. Russian Delegation signs peace with Germany, to be ratified on 17 March.
- 4 March.—M. Albert Thomas at Mansion House (Anglo-French Society). Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch on Cambrai published.
- 5 March.—Sir E. Geddes on naval situation. Lord Lansdowne's second letter in *Daily Telegraph*.
- 6 March.—Death of Mr. Redmond.
- 7 March.—Mr. Bonar Law's review of the war in the House of Commons.
- 8 March.—Reported resignation of Krylenko.
- 9 March.—Announcement of unofficial Italo-Yugoslav agreement concluded in London between Dr. Andrea Torre and Dr. Trumbić. *Pravda* reports new Russian Government set up by Prince Lvov in Far East. People's Commissaries leave Petrograd for Moscow. Čičerin reported to have succeeded Trotski as Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Redmond's funeral.
- 10 March.—Reuter telegram from Petrograd reports that foreign consuls at Vladivostok have sent to Smolny Institute protest against Bolševik political and economic measures.
- 11 March.—Premier on Government's relations with press. Mr. Wilson's message to Congress of Soviets at Moscow.
- 12 March.—Date fixed for Soviet Congress in Moscow to decide on ratification of peace signed with Germany.
- 13 March.—Bolševik Plenipotentiary in Great Britain protests against action of Allied Consuls at Vladivostok. *Politiken* (Stockholm) begins publication of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum on German policy, 1912-1914.
- 14 March.—Mr. Balfour on Japanese intervention. Germans occupy Odessa. Bolševiks at Moscow decide to ratify German treaty. Trotski appointed Commissary for Military Affairs.
- 15 March.—Soviet Congress at Moscow confirms ratification of Brest Treaty.
- 18 March.—Hertling's defence of Brest Treaty in Reichstag. Mannheim raided.
- 19 March.—Mr. Balfour on Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.
- 20 March.—Sir E. Geddes on Allied tonnage losses. New Roumanian Cabinet; Mr. Marghiloman Premier.
- 21 March.—Great German offensive on Western Front. Lord R. Cecil on Dutch crisis. Franco-British success in destroyer action off Dunkirk.
- 22 March.—New Spanish Cabinet: Señor Maura returns to power, Señor Dato Foreign Minister. Opposition to intervention gains ground in Japan.
- 23 March.—Germans claim 25,000 prisoners. Paris bombarded at long range (60-80 miles) from enemy lines. Nationalist victory in Waterford.

ERRATA.—No. 74, p. 269, line 26, for "so" read "do."
No. 75, p. 304, line 30, for "occupied" read "occupied."

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"A day may come when if ever war breaks out in Europe between any two countries the other countries will rush to stamp out that war with as little suspicion of each other's motives as neighbours rush to put out a fire."

—Viscount (then Sir Edward) Grey, 3 Feb. 1914

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The League of Nations

(I) THE OBSTACLE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

THE longer the war lasts the deeper becomes the horror of the civilised world and the more ardent its desire to find the way to peace. But no one has yet shown on what foundation we can re-establish a durable peace which will not be a mere preparation for an even more horrible war in the future. The solutions proposed have varied with the course of events in an evolution of which there stand out four distinct phases :

(1) In the early part of the war public opinion followed obediently the statements and prophecies of the professional soldiers, who, being steeped in the doctrine of the offensive, reckoned that a decision could be obtained by large strategic manœuvres and therefore calculated that the war would be short. "In a few months we shall be in Paris," said the German; "Six weeks and it will all be over," said a former French Under Secretary for War; and both sides scoffed at Great Britain for enlisting her volunteers "for three years or the duration of the War." This was the period when a French military critic conjured up the figure of the "Russian Steam-roller." The decision thus obtained on the field of battle was to compel the enemy to sue for peace and the victor would be able to impose his own conditions on the principle of *vis victis*, which has been the time-honoured device of the conqueror from the days of the Romans, when it was first used, until yesterday, when it was revived as the watchword of a Prussian General at Brest-Litovsk. Following the lead of the professional soldier, the diplomatist set about remaking a map of Europe. Europe, be it remembered, was still living in the atmosphere of *Realpolitik*, and even as late as 1915 it was on a basis of naked *Realpolitik* that the Italian Government entered the war with the proclamation "*Urbi et Orbi*" of its *sacro egoismo*.

(2) Two years of war produced no result; and the world began to see that its strategists, misled by their studies of Napoleonic operations, had ignored the effect of two novel

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military conditions introduced by the present war, namely, the enormous effectives on both sides which, by rendering trench warfare throughout the length of the frontier a possibility, had practically rendered impossible the favourite enveloping strategy of Germany; and, secondly, the development of rapid gun-fire of all kinds which had so increased the power of the defensive as practically to paralyse the tactical offensive. On this basis opinion began to crystallise around the theory that there can be no final military decision, and here and there people began to talk of "peace without victory." The idea was given definite form in the phrase "peace without annexations or indemnities," a formula originally of German origin and advantageous to Germany, for it would permit her to retain the full advantage of her methodical pillage in all invaded countries and of the influence which her invasions have established over countries which were either previously neutral or else attached to Germany by an undefined vassalage. In these conditions each of the two parties would renounce the endeavour to impose its will on the other and be prepared to return to the European *status quo*. It soon became obvious, however, that this very *status quo* itself was impossible even if the invaded territories were completely evacuated and restored. Without considering the dead, whom no peace can bring to life, the war has irreparably destroyed all previous conditions of international life in Europe. How, for instance, can we re-establish the neutrality of Belgium on the collective guarantee of the Allies who have defended it and of the Central Empires who destroyed it; or, to turn to the Balkans, can we after the last three years of war return to the conditions of the Peace of Bucarest; or, in Northern Europe, how can we translate the *status quo* in terms of the present Polish situation? But, beyond these lies the major question, how can we give the peoples of Europe a real sense of security, or even that partial sense of security which existed before the war, when not one man in a thousand dreamed that even Prussian militarism could act as it has in this war?

(3) It soon became evident, therefore, that a return to the *status quo* would merely be an avowal of military impotence and could not be regarded as a firm political foundation for the future. Doubtless it was attractive to neutral countries in their impatient desire to have the blockade lifted, and also

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to certain groups of continental socialists whose interests in class war overshadowed their patriotic sentiments. But the Allies as a whole could not bring themselves to accept it as a secure foundation for peace; for not only would it strike a damaging blow at the whole conception of international justice, inasmuch as the aggressor and his victim would then stand on an equal basis of right, but it would leave the enemies of peace in Europe still masters of the situation and able to plunge Europe into war at their pleasure. Pacific peoples would live under the permanent menace of invasion, organised and directed henceforth under the Prussian form of pillage and personal slavery. The manufacturers in the north of France have been heard to say that unless they are ensured against this danger they are not prepared to resume their manufacturing operations; and indeed this sense of insecurity could not be limited to the frontier districts, for the progress of aviation and of submarine warfare compels us to look forward to a time, perhaps not very far away, when no one, no matter where he lives, will be immune from destruction or famine. In these conditions human life becomes intolerable.

The Allies, therefore, cannot consent to a peace which would be hardly more than a truce. Against the longing for an *immediate* peace they have set up the greater need for a *lasting* peace, and they have summed it up in the formula, "Restitution, Reparation, Guarantees." Their examination of the causes of war and unrest in Europe leads them to add the liberation of all nationalities oppressed by alien governments. For the first time in diplomatic history the unwonted name of the Czecho-Slovaks appears beside the ancient and venerable name of Poland. By that act—for that declaration itself was indeed an act—the diplomacy of the Allies took a decisive step away from *Realpolitik* on the road which leads to ideal justice. But even at the moment when they were insisting upon a durable peace founded on justice the Allies gave no indication of the method by which peace should be maintained, and it is revealing no secret to say that there were in the Allied Camp two governments at least who were not ready to take up the task. Even in the matter of their own formula—in appearance so simple, in reality so elastic—there was room for too great a variety of interpretation. Reparation, for instance; what did it imply? Guarantees, in what should they consist? The soldiers, for instance, naturally took

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guarantees to mean secure strategic frontiers, and they asked with some sarcasm how such frontiers could be secured by any country without the annexation of territory. Even to-day, after three and a half years of war we are still in the midst of this confusion.

(4) The year 1917 will be marked in history as the turning point in this matter, for its two outstanding events—the Russian revolution and America's declaration of war—have done much to clear the air. In the first place, the Russian Revolution removed from the Allied camp one of the most tenacious upholders of *Realpolitik*, namely, Tsarism, and thus has reinforced the partisans of a peace based on justice. And it is no mere accident that it was about the time of the Tsar's fall that there appeared in the official declarations of the Allies for the first time a conception based on the solidarity of the human race which must ultimately displace other and less coherent expedients founded on the mere *raison d'état* of individual states. This sentiment of solidarity has received a political form in the League of Nations which, from the moment of its appearance as a definite political idea, rapidly gained an almost irresistible popularity which has forced even its real enemies, the Central Empires, to pay lip service to the doctrine on which it is based.

We must not forget, however, that the League of Nations is nothing more than a very old formula restored to circulation under a new name. Neither is it an original idea, for it is to be found in many works of political speculation and is, indeed, a translation in international terms of the doctrine of the social contract. It is certainly true that the League would come into being the moment the nations of the world consented to govern their relations by the same principles of law and justice which govern those of individual citizens; and the evolution of those principles, which now govern individual relationships, particularly in the matter of a conflict of rights, suggests the same development in the international sphere. Internecine conflicts, family vendettas, and all the feuds of the Middle Ages, have gradually been superseded and suppressed by the superior authority of national tribunals set up as the expression of a sovereignty which overrules all lesser powers. What are the obstacles to the establishment of such a supreme authority in European affairs? The analogy is so seductive that it has led to a vast

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amount of speculation, which has, however, not always taken adequate account of certain obstacles. The scientific historian cannot fail to pay heed to the warnings with which his research supplies him. Domestic peace, by which private vendettas and feuds have been abolished, was imposed by the superior forces of the State, which is simply a social expression of the voluntary co-operation of individuals in imposing restraints upon themselves for certain common ends. But wherever the same endeavour has been made between States, it has not, as a rule, taken the form of contract between equals. The Greek States which successively endeavoured to establish peace in the Hellenic world, *i.e.*, Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Macedonia, each in turn claimed to subject its confederates to its own hegemony. And if Rome realised the idea of the *Pax Romana*, it was only by imposing her sovereignty upon the other peoples in an unequal contract based frankly upon a recognition of her superior power. It is precisely in this spirit that the Prussian Government conceives the idea of a German peace and proposes to place itself at the head of a league of nations. It was by an application of the theory of sovereign power that "John Company" in India established its sovereignty over the private rights of the natives and succeeded in the end in laying the foundations of the *Pax Britannica* and the British Empire in India. And if the Church in the Middle Ages never succeeded in obtaining universal respect for the idea of the *Pax Christiana*, it was precisely because she lacked the power to enforce it. We cannot, therefore, go to past history for any precedent for a peace founded on the free will of the contracting parties.

We are, however, bound to ask why a system so manifestly beneficent has encountered such resistance. The reason is to be found in the fact that modern civilised States are founded on the idea of national sovereignty, which, in naked terms, is simply the legalisation of the force possessed by their respective Governments. Even in the 16th century Bodin defined sovereignty as "the absolute power of the republic." This doctrine confers an absolute power, because in the normal condition of society all authority is undefined and unlimited in so far as the State itself possesses power to make its will effective. This sovereignty has two sides, one domestic, and the other external. In the domestic sphere it reveals itself as absolutism, which places all its subjects at

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the disposal of the sovereign and preserves peace among them by means of the police. In foreign affairs the expression of it is militarism, which maintains the world in a state of war by permanent armies, and in diplomacy we can see it in that Machiavellism which recognises no rules of international ethics and considers no treaty a binding contract, but regards all treaties as mere statements of the conditions out of which they arose with the proviso *rebus sic stantibus*. All political life, domestic and external, is governed by one single rule, namely, the interest of the State interpreted by the Government, that is to say, interpreted according to the arbitrary will of powerful individuals. At all times and in all countries, civilised humanity has lived under this *régime* which reposes on the two normal conditions of social life, namely, the pride of power with which persons in authority become inspired by the mere exercise of it, and on the other hand the powerlessness of the isolated individual against organised authority.

Now a quite exceptional series of happy accidents has led the three most advanced and democratic peoples in the world, namely, the British, the American, and the French, to conduct great revolutions by which in all three countries domestic absolutism was shaken and destroyed. From their experience there has emerged a new political form, namely, the representative *régime*, and also a new political ethic, founded on the sovereignty of the people, which has gradually, slowly, and as yet incompletely, permeated other civilised States. But we must remark that in this operation of domestic liberation the passion for political liberty at home was accompanied by an almost fanatical nationalist passion against the foreigner. These two features are prominent in English history in the 17th century. We see them also in the American struggle against the foreign domination of a European monarchy, while the French revolution is, perhaps, the most striking example of an almost fanatical passion for domestic liberty accompanied by heroic defence against foreign invasion. But let me repeat, these three revolutions which broke the *ancien régime* of domestic absolutism in Western Europe left the international *ancien régime* practically untouched. The peoples who then became sovereign in domestic affairs have been accustomed to leave their Governments to exercise sovereignty abroad on the principle of the *raison d'état*, and never shrank from supporting their Governments in con-

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flicts with other States. The same sentiment which leads the people to defend its own domestic sovereignty, often against its own Government, excites it to demand respect for that very Government when challenged by others. This Nationalist-Liberalism has become a normal form of opinion, and democratic politicians have constantly been exposed to the temptation of seeking popularity by fanning the flames of popular opinion against the foreigner. Thus absolutism driven out of domestic politics has maintained itself in the region of foreign policy.

International relations still remain the province of Machiavellism and force. It is true that with the passage of time diplomatic discussion has somewhat changed its form and even its content. The modern diplomatist in laying claim to territory never puts forward a mere naked demand, for he has at hand a choice of varied arguments, ethnographical, linguistic, strategic, economic, geographical, and even, for want of a better, historical, without counting the argument of *sang versé* which was so often invoked during the Balkan wars. But, despite this variation from the old diplomatic form, all these arguments are a mere *façade* to cover the old *raison d'état* which, in the cynical words of Frederick the Great, still remains the guiding principle: "I first take what I want, and afterwards I can always find a pedant who will invent reasons for my action." Even those Governments who favour a better system by accepting the principle of arbitration have not dared to disavow this ancient practice: nay, more, they have deliberately withdrawn from the procedure of peace by arbitration those conflicts which touch the honour or interest of the State, that is to say, precisely those questions which most easily and frequently lead to war. Arbitration is still a mere superficial homage paid to the principle of international justice. But membership of a league of nations, either on a universal basis or in the reduced form of a league between the present Allies, implies a renunciation of the unrestricted use of force, a submission of the individual will to the collective judgment of the league, and a readiness to rely on the good faith of all the associated peoples. In a word, it would be the abandonment of sovereignty. Now such a sacrifice has been offered before on the altar of a great ideal even by independent units. The Swiss Cantons, the United Provinces of the Low Countries, and the United States

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of America have all entered their different federations on the basis of a perpetual limitation of their original sovereignty. We must observe, however, that the motive in each case was supplied by a pressing and formidable foreign menace presented respectively by Austria, the King of Spain, and George III., that the original units concerned were small in extent, and that all of them were republican in character.

We must, therefore, seriously ask ourselves what chance there is of obtaining a like renunciation of sovereignty from the great States of the world. It seems clear to me that it would be mere waste of time to ask this sacrifice from the personal sovereigns of great military empires, for they have not even renounced their absolute domestic power, though they have contrived to disguise it under a constitutional cloak. I do not even know what kind of welcome it would receive from the veterans of British politics; and, in the case of the heads of the Allied Governments on the Continent, I cannot help remembering that their political training was received in a state of complete international chaos, and that their hands bear the mark of their training. Those who have known at first hand the era represented for us by the names of Sonnino and Clemenceau will understand my meaning.

A league of nations is a revolution comparable to the great political revolutions of the past, for it would signify the fall of a sovereignty. That is not, of course, a reason for renouncing the project; the very reverse! But it is a warning that we shall find vast obstacles in our path. If the readers of THE NEW EUROPE will permit me, I hope in a subsequent article to examine the means by which the project of the League of Nations may succeed. Meanwhile, I offer the foregoing paragraphs as an introduction to the main argument.

CHARLES SEIGNOBOS.

The Bolševiks

(I) BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

ORGANISED Socialism in Russia is of comparatively recent growth; it has nevertheless been the first to seize power and to attempt to govern a European country on the most extreme Socialist principles. In the early nineties small Socialist circles, known as *Soyuzы borbi* (fighting unions),

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began to form themselves in the chief Russian cities. They were composed almost wholly of students and intellectuals, the working classes at that time having no knowledge or understanding of Socialism. Their first task, therefore, was to instruct the workmen, and attract them by championing them in those conflicts which interested them most closely, such as in the struggle for higher wages. Thus the early activities of the *Soyuzy* were mainly economic, though the leaders kept their ultimate political goal clearly in view.

It was not until 1900 that the first fighting Socialist organisation was formed. In that year Lenin and Martov founded their paper *Iskra* (Spark) in Switzerland with the object of teaching the Russian proletariat that their main object must be to seize the reins of Government. Round the *Iskra* were grouped a number of daring revolutionaries who made it their business to smuggle the paper into Russia and build up a fighting organisation there with definite political ends. From its earliest days the new organisation abandoned all pretence at democracy in the popular sense. All power was concentrated in the hands of the leaders of the local committees in different parts of Russia, the motto being not the democratic control of the committees by the majority of the workmen that had joined the party, but the dictatorship of the secret committees over the masses. The same character of government is being maintained by the Bolševiks at the present time with their open repudiation of the Constituent Assembly and their assertion of the dictatorship of the proletariat over other classes.

The autocratic character of the early secret organisation was not maintained without a struggle, which in 1903 at the Party Conference in London led to a split. The Bolševiks, who were in a majority, stood for the dictatorship of the party organisation; the Menševiks for a more democratic organisation that would admit the workmen to an equality with the intellectual leaders in the party. The Bolševiks were opposed to such reforms, preferring to sacrifice democracy for the sake of preserving the extreme revolutionary character of the party.

During the revolution of 1905 the tactics of both parties became apparent. The Menševiks sought to support and strengthen the liberal *bourgeoisie*, while the Bolševiks, who relied entirely upon exciting the revolutionary instincts of

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the proletariat, opposed all co-operation with the moderates. The Menševiks in 1905 held the same views as they set forth again in 1917, that Russia, being a backward country, cannot advance at one bound from a feudal autocracy to a Socialist Republic, but must pass through the intermediate stage of a *bourgeois* revolution. By their support of the *bourgeoisie* they hoped to strengthen the liberal elements in it, and complained bitterly of the hostility of the Bolševiks, who by their actions had driven the *bourgeoisie* into the arms of reaction. The Bolševiks were not content with the idea of putting Russia on an equality with the rest of Europe by means of a political revolution; they wished to lead the way to a general social revolution throughout Europe. Thus when the revolution of 1905 had ended in failure, they, unlike the Menševiks, refused to engage in the slow work of constitutional development, but laid their plans in secret for a new rising of the proletariat.

The Bolševik wing of the Social Democratic party being an illegal organisation, had to carry on its work in Russia in secret, while its leaders wrote and organised abroad. The leading spirit was Lenin. It was he who had founded the party, and his word was law. From the beginning he has stood out head and shoulders above any other members of his party, and in the long run his opinion always prevails.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 witnessed the immediate collapse of the international upon which such high hopes had been placed. At the International Conferences at Stuttgart in 1907 and at Basel in 1912 a general plan of action had been agreed upon in case of a European war, but the details had not been elaborated. The Conference that was to have met in Vienna in 1914 might have witnessed further progress, but it is doubtful whether for some years to come a common programme of campaign, that would have commanded universal observance, could have been elaborated. The Bolševiks maintain that the previous Conferences had outlined a sufficiently clear policy for the various Socialist parties to have followed at the outbreak of the war, and bitterly attack the treachery of their comrades in England, France, Germany, and Russia, but in other countries the issues in this war did not present themselves in so cut-and-dried a form as they did to the Bolševiks.

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The Bolševik theories as to the origin of the war are too clear cut to be convincing. Out of the infinitely complex situation which led up to the war they see certain concrete facts, and beyond these facts they refuse to go. To them the period of national wars is a thing of the past; at present we are living in an age of imperialism, and this war is nothing else but a struggle between two rapacious imperialisms. Lenin refuses to compare the present war with the earlier wars of the 19th century. "Those former wars," he writes, "were a continuation of the policy of long national movements of the *bourgeoisie*, movements against a foreign yoke and against absolutism. There was no other question at that time save whether you preferred the success of one *bourgeoisie* or the other. One cannot be a Marxist without admiring the great *bourgeois* revolutionaries who had a historic right to speak in the name of *bourgeois* fatherlands, and who raised new nations to a civilised life in the struggle with feudalism. At the same time one cannot be a Marxist without despising those Socialists who speak of the defence of their countries in connection with the stifling of Belgium by German Imperialists and the plundering of Austria and Turkey by the Imperialists of England, France, Russia, and Italy."

The Bolševiks can admit none but sordid motives to any *bourgeois* Government in an age of imperialism. Believing as they do in hard-and-fast historical laws based entirely on material considerations, they refuse to believe in any professions of sincerity or any disinterested motives on the part of British statesmen.

This division into national and imperialist wars raises the question of the defence of one's country. Zinoviev, one of Lenin's closest associates, has stated the views of his party very clearly on this question. "We do not reject," he says, "the defence of our country in general. We reject the defence of our country in imperialist, *i.e.*, in reactionary capitalist wars. But we do not confine ourselves to pointing out the indisputable fact that the present war is an imperialist one; we also maintain that in the present imperialist epoch wars between great Powers cannot be anything else. This does not mean that in any circumstances we reject the defence of one's country in an imperialist epoch. Could there be just wars in an epoch of national wars? Yes, there could be. The

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wars of the great French Revolution were for the most part just wars, as also were the Italian wars. But can there be just wars now in an imperialist epoch? Yes, there can be; but only under two conditions: (1) The war of a triumphant proletariat in any country, defending the Socialism it has conquered against other States that defend a capitalist régime; (2) The war of China, India, or other countries oppressed by imperialism in the cause of their independence against European imperialist Governments."

These are the ideas which have determined the attitude of the Bolševiks towards the war since its outbreak. Soon after the war broke out Lenin founded his paper *Social Demokrat* in Switzerland, assisted by Zinoviev. Meanwhile, in Russia, the five members of the Duma who belonged to the Bolševik wing of the Social Democratic party were exiled to Siberia. They not only refused to vote the war credits in 1914—as also did Kerenski and his party—but they were unwilling to acquiesce silently in a war which they abominated. Even with their leaders in exile, either abroad or in Siberia, the Bolševiks made their influence felt at various periods of the war. One of the most critical moments was the autumn of 1915 after the great retreat from Poland. It was the time of the formation of the Progressive Bloc in the Duma and the establishment of the War Industrial Committees to organise a better output of munitions. Even the moderate Socialists refused to join the Progressive Bloc, which was mainly a Cadet-Octoberist Coalition; with regard to the War Industrial Committees, presided over by Gučkov, there was a sharp dispute before Labour representatives were elected. The Bolševiks, as was to be expected, refused to have anything to do with it, and at the first vote carried the day. The Government, however, was not content with this decision, and, after many arrests had been made, a new vote was taken, which decided in favour of sending Labour representatives under Gvozdev, a Menševik, and later a member of Kerenski's Government in the autumn of 1917. This incident is but typical of the uncompromising attitude adopted by the Bolševiks throughout the earlier part of the war.

The Bolševiks themselves before the revolution only recognised two main Socialist parties in Russia—the Bolševiks or Revolutionary Marxists and the Menševiks, whom they

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branded as Opportunists or Liquidators. They denied the existence of a Centre as in Germany on the ground that in Russia the revolutionary, social, and political conditions made any vague conciliatory line impossible. At the same time they admitted that attempts had been made to form such a Centre, but had never received any real backing. The Bolševiks only recognise Revolutionaries and Opportunists; to them no *via media* is possible; those who are not for them are against them. Writing in 1915, Zinoviev even scorned Trotski's attitude on the ground that he had not thrown himself whole-heartedly with the Bolševiks: "Trotski's political interest, his political line is summed up in an effort not to allow a complete rupture between the Social Chauvinists and the Opportunists. In this respect the lessons of the war have taught him nothing." It was not until after his return to Russia in 1917 that Trotski joined the Bolševiks. In 1915 Trotski's paper, *Naše Slovo*, which was published in Paris, could write as follows: "In Russia there is no *bourgeois* democracy, the peasantry cannot play a revolutionary rôle, and the Russian proletariat must wait until, together with the proletariat of other countries, it can carry out a revolution on an international scale." To the Bolševik such reasoning is mere Opportunism, and Opportunism is half-brother to Chauvinism. Lenin, in one of his most uncompromising articles in the *Social Demokrat*, lashes them all as traitors to revolutionary Marxism:—"By Social Chauvinists we mean those who recognise the defence of their country in the present imperialist war, who justify the union of Socialists with the *bourgeoisie* and the Governments of their countries in this war, who refuse to preach and support the revolutionary activities of the proletariat against their own *bourgeoisie*. It is clear that the fundamental political idea at the back of Social Chauvinism is exactly the same as that on which Opportunism is based. Opportunism is the sacrifice of the interests of the masses for the sake of the temporary interests of a small minority of the working men, or rather the union of part of the working men with the *bourgeoisie* against the mass of the proletariat. Opportunism came into existence during the last few decades, owing to peculiarities in the development of capital, a class of privileged working men being made *bourgeois* and being cut adrift from the sufferings

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and revolutionary temperament of the masses. The imperialist war is the direct continuation and completion of this state of affairs, for it is a war for the privileges of the great nations, for the partition of colonies among them and for their supremacy over other nations."

Given the existence of the war, the main object of the Bolševiks was to work for peace and revolution. Though admitting that the war might hasten social revolution in Europe, they were not willing to buy revolution at so great a price. In October, 1914, Trotski published a pamphlet in Zürich on "The War and the International," in which he alludes to the possibility of a revolution in Russia as a result of the war, but adds: "We Russian Social Democrats hold firmly enough to the international position in order once for all to refuse to purchase the possible liberation of Russia at the price of the certain destruction of the freedom of France and Belgium, and—what is still more important—the poisoning of the German and Austrian proletariat with imperialism."

The Bolševiks prayed for the defeat of the Tsar's Government, as they knew that such a defeat would lead to a revolution still more violent than that of 1905. This they maintained would put them in power and enable them to stop the war by rousing the European proletariat against their Governments. As early as October, 1915, they formulated their plans in case of a Russian revolution. "To the question what the party of the proletariat would do, if a revolution placed it in power in the present war, we reply: 'We should offer peace to all the belligerents on condition that the colonies and all dependent oppressed peoples were set free. Neither Germany, England, nor France would accept these conditions under their present Governments. We should, therefore, have to prepare and conduct a revolutionary war, not only so as to carry out our minimum programme, but to cause a rising in all colonies and dependent countries in Asia, and, above all, to incite the Socialist proletariat of Europe to revolution.'"

A further analysis of Bolševik policy since the revolution of 1917 will show how far they have modified their original position when brought face to face with the realities of the war and of revolution.

RURIK.

Self-determination and the British Commonwealth

(VII) NIGERIA

IN the British dependencies of the Western Sudan, particularly in the Hausa States of Nigeria, the excellent fiscal and legal systems and the high level of industrialism and craftsmanship prevailing there have in course of centuries slowly filtered in from the direction of Egypt. By the same road and by the same process it is quite reasonable to assume that the impulse towards political institutions now quickening in Egypt may also filter in to vivify the spade-work of British Administrators. Complementary to the consideration of the subject of self-determination in the British Commonwealth some remarks may not be out of place on the administration of a region where the task of helping indigenous peoples to work out their own salvation is proceeding *ab initio* and is based on existing institutions which are to a great extent in harmony with the object in view.

It is true that the dominating influence of the Hausa people is to be found in the sphere of commercial development rather than in that of administration. But material progress precedes moral progress and in negroid communities the influences of economic advance are far more profound and wide-reaching than the influences of a dominant caste. More especially is this so in the case of the people under consideration over whom the dominant caste is alien in nationality and had attained its domination by conquest; its rule was the sterilising rule of spiritual leaders forming an exclusive aristocracy rather than that of political leaders rallying a nation. Class privilege and dynastic prerogative stifled the voice of the people until British suzerainty gave it a chance of becoming articulate.

The writer's connections with Moslem and negro Africa go back to the days when there was some foundation for the quizzical gibe that the real extent of national ambition in Africa could be summed up in the expression "a demand for British textiles"; when what was euphemistically called "the white man's burden" meant exploitation of the African races solely for the advantage of the European immigrant. In the case of one European nation, exploitation was accomplished to a great extent through the medium of gin; in

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another, by enslaving the inhabitants under conditions of barbarity that destroyed countless human lives and eliminated valuable economic products. In those days humanity in Western Africa would have been no loser if European civilisation had never become predominant. Exploitation of the first kind was the key-note of German administration in the African domains until recently under her control. Nowadays we have changed all that in our own spheres of operation for the policy that the protectorate over a country inhabited by coloured races is a trust held for the benefit of the races themselves. Happily now we are also sincere in our desire to retain all that is useful in native customs; to view violent changes with the same abhorrence as the natives themselves; to develop scientifically natural resources primarily that the natives may benefit; to give political stability to the machinery at hand; to uphold native law, refining it of all that is repugnant to humanity; and to regulate the revenue on just and equitable lines. Thus we have reached the first stage towards just administration and the recognition of the rights of free peoples.

But self-determination presupposes a people capable of self-government and of forming a public opinion having sufficient impelling power behind it to keep its government in order. It presupposes some national life of wider purview than mere tribal existence. Nevertheless, among people in the tribal state the rudimentary processes of self-determination are actively in operation through their system of communal government. Herein is illustrated the *sensus communis*: that feeling for others that lies at the root of the aphorism "for the public weal." Thus the communal land system, the communal condemnation of a nuisance troublesome to the whole community, the communal isolation of infectious diseases, the communal liability for the offences of one of its members outside, and so on, even to the communal control of thoughts and emotions by the tribal medicine man. The ideal is already there, although in practice—an experience common in history—the machinery for carrying it out has often a suspicious bias. So long as the machinery for expressing the collective will is controlled by an oligarchy imbued with the *sensus communis*, government in accord with the will of the governed is attained. When this machinery is in the hands of rogues or despots, selfish and superstitious

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aims displace the aims of those who wish to reach conditions out of which equality of welfare can best be attained. It is the task of the British adviser behind the powers who rule these native States to keep this machinery under proper control and to enlarge its functions so that it becomes an expression of a genuine national feeling.

There are still to be found people, especially among the genus "Governor," who, in face of strong evidence to the contrary, deny that these races are capable of self-government. *Il est rare que la tête des rois soit faite à la mesure de leur couronne*, and this cranial misfit is too often applicable to the average colonial governor. He argues in this short-sighted fashion from the example of the pagan negro formerly of the slave caste, whose education is the product of the mission school which admittedly turns out men lacking in discipline and too often in honesty. Of the capacity for government of the inhabitants of the Moslem Emirates as illustrated in their municipal institutions he has small practical knowledge. Building upon the integral foundation of communal control a wide form of municipal self-government has been erected through the medium of native treasuries, whereby the people manage their own affairs through finance and in so doing acquire sound views of public policy. To these treasuries a proportion of the revenue from taxation, up to a maximum of 50 per cent., has been assigned for expenditure on public services under the ægis of the British advisers.

Thus the public are encouraged to take an active interest in what they have to pay for, such as the maintenance of roads, provision of decent water-supply, public sanitation, and infant welfare—that important subject in a country where infant mortality is sometimes 50 per cent. of the birth-rate. Again, native education is another branch of the public service in which natives are being trained for the subordinate ranks of the Civil Service, not only for clerical work but for such higher grade work as land surveying, &c. A generation subjected to this training in the simple principles of self-government will be ready for manhood suffrage and there is no reason why the present reformed Emirs' Councils, purged of their former tyranny and corruption, should not develop into Provincial Councils elected by popular vote with ability to face more complex principles of self-government.

And this is the limit of advance that practical politics

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render expedient for the present. The most sanguine can look forward no further than to the day when Provincial Councils thus modelled will send their own elected representatives to a National Council. What is to be emphasised is that the right alignment of the completed structure is being well and truly laid among African peoples, who have under British suzerainty merged their turbulent past into a prosperous present.

Shortly before the outbreak of war a German administrator of wider mental vision than the ordinary Teutonic outlook surveys came to study British methods of native administration, and I well remember his regretful sigh that a model he would like to copy was out of harmony with the sledge-hammer dogmas of *Kultur*. The German process of washing out with Prussian blue the native institutions of coloured races under their control reminds one of the schoolboy's definition of water as a colourless liquid which turned black when he put his hands in it.

J. WITHERS-GILL.

Guide to the Foreign Press**(I) THE GERMAN PRESS**

THERE is no sphere of German organization upon which more ingenuity has been expended than in the forging and tempering of the press as a weapon in the conflicts of home and foreign politics. Bismarck well knew the value of that weapon, as the pages of Busch abundantly show, but his methods were rudimentary compared with those of his successors. He drew a sharp line between newspapers and periodicals which he could directly or indirectly influence or inspire for his purposes and those which, on one side of politics or the other, were the expression of political opinions or causes over which he could not hope to exercise any control. The one set of publications were officially described as more or less *staatserhaltend*, (supporters of the State), the other as *reichsfeindlich* (enemies of the Empire). It was thus impossible in Bismarck's day for the Government to make any very effective use of journals with a large circulation among what we should call the educated middle class or among the proletariat. It would,

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for example, have been impossible to conceive of Bismarck making the *Frankfurter Zeitung* or the *Vorwärts* serve the ends of his policy, while the *Cologne Gazette*, being *staatserhaltend*, the organ of his National Liberal supporters, and open to his daily inspiration, was described by him as "worth an Army Corps on the Rhine."

All this was changed as a result mainly of two developments.

(1) When Bismarck departed and Count Caprivi succeeded him with Baron Marschall von Bieberstein as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, it was announced by the new Chancellor that he would "take what was good wherever he found it." This meant in practice that, in exchange for certain concessions to Liberalism and Radicalism, like the reduction of the period of service with the colours and the diminution of the corn duties, an important section of the democratic press came into the Government fold, and that, for example, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* began to be as "well-informed" as the *Cologne Gazette* or even better informed. These new relationships were continued even in periods of reaction at home or of aggressiveness in foreign affairs; and Prince Bülow, in particular, displayed great skill in conducting a provocative foreign policy while retaining the support of that section of the Liberal press which was regarded both in Germany and abroad as more or less pacific.

(2) There had arisen in Germany a new kind of press of which the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* in its original form was the first and the most successful example. These newspapers laid themselves out for a large circulation by the quickness of their news from all parts of the world, by their fresh and interesting treatment of local matters and by the practical arrangement of their advertisement columns. At the same time they cast a wide net for readers by professing to be non-party journals. In Germany as elsewhere the profession of non-party principles is generally a cloak for the advancement of one-sided views or interests, and so it turned out with the *Lokal-Anzeiger* type of newspaper. It multiplied marvellously, so that there are now no less than 1,450 journals of that type in Germany. The Government saw the value of this kind of newspaper, and the "non-party" press began to share largely in Government information and inspiration. The great industrial interests, especially the

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manufacturers of war-material, also saw their opportunity, and a great many of these papers, including the *Lokal-Anzeiger*, have now been acquired by industrialist syndicates. The effect of the influence of these "non-party" journals has been described as "narcotic" and "*entpolitisiert*." That is to say, they blunt the political intelligence of their readers, and, under the mantle of an indiscriminating patriotism, wean them from an effective interest in vital matters of political controversy.

The following statistics may be of interest:—

The total number of German newspapers is now (1917) 2,938 (before the war, 3,500). Of these, 1,561 appear at least once a day, 109 twice a day, 8 thrice a day, and one four times a day. The largest circulation is 270,000. Nineteen papers have a circulation over 100,000. The political colour of these papers is as follows:—Conservative, 214; "National," 214; National Liberal, 216; Social Democratic, 79; Catholic Centre, 400; Radical (*Volksparteilich*), 277; Polish, 23; Danish, 4; and, as already stated, "non-party," 1,450! Among the press that is described as "Pangerman" the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* is said to have a circulation of 270,000; the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, 140,000; and the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*, 137,000.

The variety of shades of political opinion in Germany often makes press controversy a Babel of confusion, into which the inspired Government press, Conservative, Liberal, Catholic, or even Social Democratic, intervenes at the right moment with superior information and guidance, greatly facilitating the conduct of official policy. At times, of course, the tendencies of the Government are too pronounced even for this press, and we have a spectacle of disarray such as was presented during the brief episode of the Michaelis Chancellorship. There have been occasions on which the Directors of the Press Bureau have had to declare to their masters: "Wir können die Presse nicht mehr halten"—"We cannot keep the press in hand."

* * * The above introductory article is to be followed by a detailed guide to the important German papers; the press of other countries will then be dealt with in turn.—EDITOR.

Towards a New Central Europe

THE Rome Conference marks a new period in the movement for the emancipation of the Slavs and Latins of Central Europe. The common action of the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians, Jugoslavs, and Italians, is bound to be ultimately crowned with success, however great the obstacles and difficulties may at this moment appear. The agreement between the subject races of Central Europe means the death warrant to the Dual Monarchy, and the guarantee of a better Europe, assuring freedom and justice to all peoples, and safeguarding the rights of humanity.

The agreement arrived at in Rome is the more important because it is accompanied by a similar movement within Central Europe itself. On Sunday, 11 March, a great manifestation took place in Prague attended by several Czech deputies, and representatives of all Czech parties as well as of Poles and Jugoslavs. The subject of the Conference was the recent peace in the East and the necessity of all Slav nations obtaining independence. The spokesman of the Jugoslavs, Mr. Palavicini, declared that the Jugoslavs would in all circumstances go hand in hand with the Czechs. A declaration of the students of Cracow was then read by two Polish delegates, saying that the Czechs and Jugoslavs were the natural allies of the Poles against the Germans. Speaking in the name of the Czech Club, Deputy Viškovský declared that all the Western Slavs, numbering over 50 millions, desired national unity and independence. He expressed the hope that the manifestation would be the first step towards the formation of a united Slav block in the Reichsrat. The following resolution was then unanimously passed:—

“Relying upon the Czech declaration of 6 January in favour of Czecho-Slovak independence, we claim the right of self-determination for all the nations, including also the Western Slavs, because only thus can an honourable and lasting peace be established. Let this demand induce the Czecho-Slovak, Jugoslav, and Polish nations to come to a common action.”

In the Austrian Reichsrat the Poles were for some time past contemplating common action with the other parties. It is true that at the last moment the Polish leaders again let themselves be bribed by empty promises and abstained from voting against the Budget, which led to the split of the Polish Club. Some Conservative organs like the *Czas* and

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Glos Narodu still advocate the *Realpolitik* of neutrality. Yet there is no doubt that the bulk of Polish public opinion is against any further compromise with either of the Central Powers and sincerely desires co-operation with the other Slavs. So, for instance, the *Lemberg Courier* wrote on 4 March :—

“ There is an urgent need of a close union with Bohemia. This union with the Czechs must be concluded as soon as possible by our Parliamentary representatives at the price of our formal recognition of the Czecho-Slovak demand for sovereignty. By a common and solid action the Poles and Czechs will create a force which no Power will be able to crush.”

The greatest Czech journal, *Narodni Listy*, discussed the necessity of co-operation among Slavs in its issue of 6 March as follows :—

“ The Czecho-Slovak nation would greet with joy the victory of the Slav idea in Polish politics, and the united front of the three Western Slav nations. We would greet it as a guarantee of a better future if the ‘ Union of the Western Slav nations ’ proposed by the Polish National Democrats were accepted by the Polish Club. For the Western Slavs, the Poles, Czechs, and Jugoslavs, the only real policy is to form a united opposition *bloc* against Vienna. All these three nations have the same ideal: national unity and independence on the basis of self-determination. And as we have a common aim, we ought to have a common way to it; all nations longing for liberty will obtain it if they will support each other.”

This movement towards co-operation among the subject peoples of the Germanic Alliance may prove a formidable menace to the Central Powers. It is clear that it has the same aim in view as the League of Subject Peoples of Austria-Hungary, which is being formed in the Western countries, namely, the replacement of Pangerman Central Europe by a new international order, based upon the complete freedom, national unity, and alliance of Poland, Bohemia, Greater Roumania, Jugoslavia, and Italy, by which the Allied principles of justice and national self-determination would be vindicated and Germany prevented from repeating her present exploits.

The first condition of the proposed solution is the disappearance of the present Dual Monarchy. The realisation of the national unity and independence of the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians, Jugoslavs, and Italians, would reduce Austria and Hungary to their proper racial boundaries. Austria and Hungary would then be States of not more than

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about 8 million inhabitants each, and would be without any political, military, or economic value to Germany. A close alliance between united Poland and Bohemia would mean an economically and politically strong anti-German block of 40 million people. Incidentally it would provide Bohemia with a sea-port (Danzig). Germany would be barred from expansion in the Adriatic, in the Balkans and in the Near East by an Alliance between the two Adriatic nations, the Italians and Jugoslavs. The encirclement of Germany would be completed by the establishment of a united Roumania which would border both on the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugoslav State. Roumania and Jugoslavia would together number some 25 millions, while the Polish-Czecho-Slovak-Roumanian combination would mean a solid block of over 50 millions which would definitely prevent Germany's expansion to the East and assure the nations of Russia a peaceful development. No third solution is possible: either Germany will succeed in preserving the Habsburg Monarchy and creating the Pangerman *Mittel-Europa*, or the Slavs and Latins of Central Europe will, with the help of the Allies, obtain national unity and independence. The growing courage and co-operation on the part of the subject peoples of Austria and the approaching Allied victory lead us to believe that the latter alternative will triumph.

V. NOSEK,

Annexation Debate in the Austrian Herrenhaus

In the Austrian House of Lords on 27 February Barons von Czeditz and von Plener—on behalf of the Middle and Constitutional Parties—proposed a vote of confidence in Count Czernin for his achievements at Brest Litovsk and in the Ukraine, which called for “the energetic pursuit of an honourable and lasting peace in faithful and well-tryed accord with the German Empire and our other Allies.” In the ensuing debate, which largely turned on the attitude of the Poles to the Ukraine treaty and to the Budget, von Czeditz declared that “‘no annexations’ did not exclude frontier rectifications. Peace was unthinkable without Lovcen, Belgrade and direct frontier contact with Bulgaria.” After a speech from Ritter von Bilinski, which censured the Ukraine Treaty for its anti-Polish character, Dr. Pattai struck the prevailing jingo note of the debate. “We are now,” he said, “long past the words ‘no annexations’; it would be sheer madness to say we will never take anything no matter how many years we fight nor how victorious we may be.” Professor Lammasch (interrupting): “What does one gain by annexations? A war of *revanche*!” Dr. Pattai: “The

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victor can insist on the price of victory. *We are the victors and we demand the palm.*" (Uproarious applause.) Prince Auersperg, speaking as a German Austrian, declared that the Germans in Austria were fighting a life-and-death battle. "We, the Germans, have to provide a future for Austria. We have gained a military triumph. We must not let the Entente deprive us of its advantages. As for our relations with Germany, we give fidelity for fidelity." Baron von Plener delivered a eulogy of Count Czernin, warned the Poles not to be too clever or too grasping, and demanded "the hard hand" against Roumania. Dr. Dumba also warned the Poles that if they persisted in their hostile attitude they would precipitate a solution of the Polish question in a sense most unfavourable to themselves. Prince Clary disapproved of the exclusion of the Poles from the peace negotiations, and Dr. Baernreither said that the Russian peace was only made possible by the marvellous German advance which was not only a feat of arms but a moral act. It was true courage in a State to say "I stand for social order." Archbishop Count Szepticki (Right) regretted that the Ukrainians had only three members in the Herrenhaus. He thought that the Ukraine peace would have been impossible without the cession of Cholm, which was ethnographically and politically Ukrainian territory. The justice of the Emperor towards all peoples offered a guarantee that the Ukrainian demands would be fulfilled. He supported the Foreign Minister.

PROFESSOR LAMMASCH CAUSES AN UPROAR.

Dr. Lammasch [Middle Party: holds a big place in jurisprudence and international law, having been president of the Hague Tribunal, now associated with the group who founded the *Neue Politische Gesellschaft* in order to convert Austria to Liberalism; not a great political force, but has influential relations with the "highest circles"] expressed his astonishment that the resolution before the House which he had expected would be passed without opposition, had been made the occasion of a long debate, in which the most important questions of foreign and domestic policy had been dealt with—sometimes in a way not calculated to further the end in view—the attainment of peace. (Exclamations of "Oh! Oh!") With Dr. Pattai especially he was in total disagreement. (Oh! Oh!) His was the speech of counsel for the Rhenish and Westphalian coal and iron industries. (Uproar. The members of Dr. Pattai's party sprang up in excitement and gesticulated against the speaker.) "The Austrian people is not in agreement with a speech of this kind. (Renewed interruptions.) Gentlemen, you represent what is known as society, but you do not represent the Austrian people. (Exclamations of "Neither do you.") I have a fellow feeling with the people. Dr. Pattai is a representative of the Austrian section of the German Fatherland Party, which has been trying to institute a series of meetings in Vienna." Dr. Pattai: "They have been a magnificent success." Dr. Lammasch: ". They had very soon to be abandoned on account of the strong opposition manifested by the people of Vienna." Dr. Pattai: "No objections by the people—only the press refused to report them!" Dr. Lammasch:

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"If Dr. Pattai would take a fairly long tramway journey he would perceive that the views he advocates are not the views of the Austrian people and certainly not the views of the populace in Vienna." (Interruption.)

Returning to the subject under discussion, the speaker stated that he had had pleasure in affixing his signature to the resolution, for he was in complete agreement with its three main items. He agreed with the wish for a lasting, honourable, guaranteed and speedy peace, with the expression of thanks to and confidence in Count Czernin, and with the declaration that they should adhere to the alliance with the German Empire. "We have never been so near a peace favourable to Austria as at the present moment. There are no special difficulties in the way of peace with Russia, for we do not want to make conquests. Only one of the dangers touched on by previous speakers threatens us from the East, the danger that the spirit of disorder and anarchy may pass to our side of the frontier. But this is not a danger which can be arrested either in Russia or the Ukraine. We can only contend with it in our own country by fulfilling the justifiable wishes of the people in general and by giving the awakened nationalities their right to self-government. We owe it to Count Czernin that America seems clearly to be holding out her hand to us. There is nothing to prevent our grasping it. The best thing to do is just what the Imperial Chancellor lately suggested, not to aim at a negotiation of all the belligerents but rather at a *Petit Comité*, where people could speak frankly and clearly to each other. As a matter of course in these negotiations, as throughout the war, we will maintain fidelity to our ally."

TRIESTE AND STRASSBURG.

Count Czernin (he continued) defined our relationship to our allies, and especially to the German Empire, in two clearly-cut sentences about the pre-war possessions of the German Empire and the parallel position of Trieste and Strassburg. He could not accept this parallel. Trieste was a vital necessity to Austria, while Strassburg was an extremely valuable and beautiful city like so many other cities of Germany. He might even venture to say that Trieste in Austrian possession was more important to Germany than Strassburg in German possession. "However that may be, we are bound to defend Strassburg and to maintain the territorial position of the German Empire. *But it does not follow that we are obliged to make further demands on our strength in order to perpetuate the pre-war constitutional conditions in Alsace-Lorraine.* (Dissent.) If a peace were possible on condition that Alsace-Lorraine became an independent Federal State, with all the rights appertaining to such a State, and with a constitution freely decided by the people, *there would be no reason for us to continue the war in order that Alsace-Lorraine should remain a Reichsland with a preponderating Prussian administration.* (Lively dissent.) There are signs abroad that our opponents would be satisfied with such concessions, and taking all our circumstances into consideration, the solution of transforming Alsace-Lorraine into an independent Federal State would be congenial to Austrian ideas. For it is likewise our duty to give to the individual nations of Austria a fuller measure of self-government. The

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first speaker to-day—and the same note was struck in other speeches—wanted conquests. But this is expressly negatived by the declared policy of our Foreign Office. It has solemnly identified itself with the policy of ‘no annexations.’ And this policy implies that we do not force other peoples into a military, political, or economic dependence upon us.

THE DANGER OF A JINGO PEACE.

“The so-called peace of victory about which Dr. Pattai is so enthusiastic would be an evil peace. (Dissent.) It would be a mere armistice prior to a more violent and horrible clash of arms. (Dissent and interruptions.) It is the great merit of our Emperor that he was the first to accept the principle of peace by agreement proposed by the Pope—the principle of peace with institutions for securing a lasting peace and general reduction of armaments. Thereby the Emperor has won sympathy and esteem in all countries, in neutral countries and even, as there is evidence to show, in enemy countries. The latest messages of President Wilson suggest this, especially the last of all, which never mentions the territorial questions, but only lays down general principles, on the basis of which, even for us, the concrete questions may find an entirely satisfactory solution. It is peculiarly significant that America took no part in the political negotiations at Versailles; thus it may clearly be recognised that she does not support Imperialistic tendencies, especially those of Italy. But England, too, has lately been getting on to the right track. Wilson’s fourteen points were also recognised by Count Czernin as lending themselves to discussion, certain of them being quite acceptable. In return for this recognition within limits, Wilson expressly declared that these fourteen points were no unalterable canon, but merely a preliminary outline. It is regrettable that, albeit the exchange of views between Austria and America was instituted by Austria, it was not continued by Austria but by the German Empire. The last speech of Hertling certainly indicates a great advance in the direction of peace as does the last message from Wilson.” In conclusion, the speaker said that “amidst the general unrest we must listen to the voice of humanity, the voice of reason, the voice of Christianity, the voice of the Pope, the voice of the peoples, who had given their lives for the defence of their Fatherland, but not for aims of conquest, either for themselves or other nations. On the other side, it is only America that can make peace, and on this side it is only Austria-Hungary, under the leadership of the emperor, who is trusted and esteemed by all the peoples.”

FRIEDJUNG’S COUNTER-ATTACK.

This speech was denounced by several subsequent speakers and provoked Dr. Friedjung, the well-known Austrian historian and the notorious figure of the Friedjung trial, to write as follows in the *Vossische Zeitung*, 8 March:—

“It is well known in the Upper House that the views of Professor Lammasch have many supporters even in the highest circles. One need only recall the two Bourbon princes, nearly related to the Imperial House, who joined the French Red Cross instead of dedicating their services to Austria, their second home. Reports of individual members

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of the high nobility who share the feelings of the Czechs, sound still less edifying. Once before Lammasch attempted to detach Austria from her Ally. In a memorial to the Emperor he developed the view that if for no other reason the Entente must continue the war because of the seeming danger from the mid-European Block. We should, therefore, come nearer peace if our Government declared its intention on conclusion of peace of dissolving the alliance with Germany. A trustworthy informant states that Lammasch recommended not only sending this announcement to London and Paris, but also informing Kaiser Wilhelm, so as to avoid the accusation of duplicity.

"This attack in the Herrenhaus, which is not merely naïve, but positively dangerous, broke down on the loyalty of the Emperor. Czernin met this anti-German conspiracy by offering his resignation. The emperor assured him of his confidence, and he received permission to make his splendid speech on Strassburg and Trieste, in which he said that Austrian soldiers would lay down their lives in defence of Alsace as joyfully as the Germans had done in the defence of Trieste. The after-effects of this rebuff can be seen in Lammasch's present speech, objecting to equalising Strassburg and Trieste. These aims were known in the Upper House, and a long restrained indignation broke out during and after his speech. His merits as a lawyer and his high services as president at The Hague do not justify his present attacks upon the Monarchy, which, coinciding in date with the wild Polish resolution, which represents the German Government as the enemy of liberty and reproaches it with hypocrisy, has received from all good friends of Germany in the Upper House the repulse which it deserved.

"This incident shows how deep anti-German manœuvres in Austria can penetrate. It was an unfortunate idea to declare that it was left to Germany to go to war anew with Russia, it was fatal for Austrian troops not immediately to have joined the German advance into the Ukraine. These declarations did not exactly arise from an intention of moving away from Germany, but were rather a concession to the Socialists who opposed the advance. But it is instructive to see how the anti-Germans, by backstairs work at the Hofburg, pull together with the Radicals, who are fooled by Wilson's war-cries. The policy of the Alliance possesses strong Austrian support in the German and Magyars, not merely from sentimental reasons, which are decisive with the Germans, but also from the conviction that the welfare of the Danube Monarchy cannot otherwise be secured."

The Secolo on "British Love for Austria"

[The Secolo recently published under the above title an important despatch from its London correspondent. We reproduce certain portions of it in order to show how British ideas may be reflected in the mind of an Ally.]

"For the great working class masses in England, Austria merely represents an empty name, and, in fact, a sort of gelatinous appendix to the German Empire; for the middle classes, Austria is a geographical

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political entity given in fee to the paternal dynasty of the Habsburgs in the best interests of the subject peoples, who are, according to the general persuasion, admirably governed on a basis of order and peace! As to the rich classes, those who travel and amuse themselves, and who, with Edward VII., have learnt to go to Marienbad and Carlsbad, they know that the Dual Monarchy, besides its very beautiful capitals of Vienna and Budapest, includes a number of other gracious cities, bathing stations, spas, where one may become intimate with the most beautiful women of the world, and pass a deliciously mundane season. . . . The existence of the Southern Slavs is a recent discovery, due for the most part to a brilliant and cultivated journalist, H. Wickham Steed, and to the European crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Czechs and Slovaks came to light for many Englishmen at the outbreak of war, and the Roumanians of Transylvania were born yesterday!

"True, before August, 1914, the English did not know Germany much better than they to-day know Austria, but on that side their education has made fairly rapid progress, and men like the mellifluous Lord Robert Cecil, the vacillating Balfour, and the impulsive Lloyd George, would never permit themselves to express in public, when speaking of Germany, any of those inexactitudes of fact or of those strange evaluations in judgment, into which they fall when they turn to talk of the second empire in the enemy league. And no one is more surprised than these gentlemen when they remark the effects which certain of their assertions produce on Italian public opinion, as also on those people leagued to throw off the Habsburg yoke. One of the English fads is to believe that Austria is something substantially different from Germany, and that her 'standard' is much nearer to that of the Western democracies; the other illusion is that Austria has long wanted to throw off the yoke of Berlin and aims at winning the good graces of the Entente with a separate peace.

"By whom are these fallacious ideas cultivated? By a small but extremely influential group of ultramontane-Clericals and clericalising Catholics, who are really and truly the only people who know Austria as she really is and not merely as she appears; and they use their knowledge and the ignorance of their compatriots to create a false atmosphere which deceives and turns public opinion adrift. . . . They know that Austria is the one great State in Europe where the Papacy can still in normal times find a prop for its own temporal and spiritual policy. . . . Austria once destroyed, the prestige and the moral influence of the Vatican would by it (they say) be diminished, and the cause of militant and political Catholicism would lose ground everywhere. Thus to maintain their own prestige and influence in England, by way of the Vatican, they see nothing better than keeping Austria intact, not only in her geographical limits, but also in her present divisions, divisions which, by a diabolical contradiction, give cohesion to her institutions. . . . From the Episcopal Curia of Westminster, Austrophil suggestions have penetrated into the Foreign Office and even into the War Office; from these two Ministries they have spread to certain parts of the press. And who has snapped them up? Who has espoused the cause of Austria with the greatest enthusiasm? The Puritan and Non-

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conformist Radicalism of papers like the *Daily News* and *Nation*, which, in their neo-pacifist fervour and in their profound ignorance, see, in the elimination of Austria from the war, a way of getting swiftly into touch with Germany. . . .

" It is unnecessary to say that Austria from afar laughs at so much ingenuousness, but neglects nothing to encourage her old and tried friends, the Ultramontanes, and to dupe her new friends, the Puritans. And it is in this light that the speeches of Czernin inviting Wilson to ' conversations ' ought to be read, while the ex-ambassador Mensdorff meets General Smuts at Zürich and tries to temporise with a little light conversation, without realising that the Boer General is not a fish to be caught in such a net.

" It is to be hoped that after this vain attempt the idea of paying court to Austria, in order to separate her from Germany, will be abandoned by all the Entente Governments, and that they will all be convinced that the one policy possible is war *à outrance* with equal intensity against both Central Empires, war until is reached that victory which will make possible the realisation of the promises given to the divided and subjected nationalities of complete unity and independence. If the Entente went back on this its moral undertaking, so loudly proclaimed at the beginning of the war, in order to conclude a premature peace, which, even if satisfying wholly or in part, Italian aims, left Czechs, Jugoslavs, Roumanians, and Poles oppressed and divided, it would commit little less than a betrayal of the principles which its war has sanctified."

The Treaty between Germany and Finland

[*The text of the peace treaty between Germany and Finland is given by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 March, as follows :*]

" Inspired by the wish to establish a condition of peace and friendship between the two countries, after the announcement of the independence of Finland and its recognition by Germany, the Imperial German Government and the Finnish Government have resolved to conclude a peace treaty, and for this purpose they have appointed as plenipotentiaries the following :—

" For the Imperial German Government, the Chancellor of the German Empire, Dr. Count von Hertling; the Finnish Government, Dr. of Philosophy, Eduard Immanuel Hjelt, State Councillor, and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Helsingfors, and Dr. Rafael Woldeman Erich, Professor of State and International Law at the University of Helsingfors, who, after reciprocal notification that their plenipotentiary credentials were found to be correct and in due form, agreed on the following provisions :—

CHAPTER I.—RATIFICATION OF THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GERMANY AND FINLAND, AND GUARANTEE OF FINLAND'S INDEPENDENCE.

" *Article 1.*—The contracting parties declare that no state of war exists between Germany and Finland, and that they are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another. Germany

THE TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND FINLAND

will do what she can to bring about the recognition of the independence of Finland by all the Powers. On the other hand, Finland will not cede any part of her possessions to any foreign Power or grant a servitude on her sovereign territory to any such Power without first having come to an understanding with Germany on the matter.

" *Article 2.*—Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. Provision for the most far-reaching admission possible of consuls on both sides will be reserved for special agreements.

" *Article 3.*—Each party shall make good the damages done in its territory by its public bodies or population to the life, liberty, health or property of consular officials of the other party on account of the war, by actions contrary to international law or damage done to the consular buildings of such party or to their fixtures.

CHAPTER II.—WAR INDEMNITIES.

" *Article 4.*—The contracting parties mutually renounce indemnification for their war costs, that is to say, the State expenditure for the conduct of the war, as also compensation for damage done by the war, that is to say, those damages done to them and to their subjects in the war zones by military measures, including all requisitions made in enemy country.

CHAPTER III.—RESTORATION OF STATE TREATIES.

" *Article 5.*—The treaties which lapsed as a consequence of the war between Germany and Russia shall be replaced as soon as possible by new treaties for relations between the contracting parties, which shall correspond to the fresh views and conditions. In particular the contracting parties shall at once enter into negotiations in order to draw up a commercial and shipping treaty. In the meantime the trade relations between the two countries shall be regulated by a commercial and shipping agreement to be signed at the same time as the peace treaty.

" *Article 6.*—Treaties to which, in addition to Germany and Russia, third Powers are parties, and in which Finland appears together with Russia, or in the place of the latter, shall come into force between the contracting parties on the ratification of the peace treaty, or, in so far as the entry takes place later, at that time. As regards collective treaties of a political nature to which other belligerent Powers are parties, both parties reserve their attitude until after the conclusion of a general peace.

Chapters IV.—IX (inclusive) deal with "restoration of private rights," "confiscated properties," "compensation for civil damages," "exchange of prisoners," "amnesty," and "merchant shipping."

CHAPTER X.—SETTLEMENT OF THE ÅLAND QUESTION.

"The contracting parties are agreed that the fortifications erected on the Åland Islands shall be done away with as soon as possible, and the permanent non-fortification of these islands, and their other management from a military and shipping technical point of view, shall be regulated by a special agreement between Germany, Finland, Russia, and Sweden; other States situated on the Baltic shall also be parties to the agreement if desired by Germany.

THE TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND FINLAND

CHAPTER XI.—FINAL PROVISIONS.

" This peace treaty shall be ratified. The ratifying documents shall be exchanged as soon as practicable in Berlin. So far as is not otherwise stipulated, it shall come into force with its ratification. Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet in Berlin within four months of the ratification, to make supplementary additions to the treaty, in witness whereof the plenipotentiaries on both sides have signed and sealed the present treaty. (7 March 1918.) "

Reviews

Italy, Mediæval and Modern: A history by E. M. Jamison, C. M. Ady, K. D. Vernon and C. Sanford Terry. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 6s. 6d. net.) This one-volume history of Italy from the 4th century up to the present day is quite competently done and will be quite useful as an aid to rapid revision and refreshment of knowledge already acquired. But we can hardly accept the suggestion made in the Preface or recommend it as an introduction to Italian history. In a work of introduction—especially in the case of so tangled a web as is presented by Italian history—it is necessary to sacrifice much that is in certain relations important for the sake of unity and simplicity. What the historical catechumen requires is above all a framework, not too elaborate to be retained in the memory, about which he may in the course of further study gradually erect the edifice of his completer knowledge. In order to provide this framework, dominant tendencies must be emphasised and never lost sight of; the chronological divisions and subdivisions must be used to mark turning-points and breaks—stages in a process; the determining forces at work within each period, and the significance of each period in relation to the whole must be brought into relief. Of course, this method may be carried too far and will then end in a dry and too artificial schematism. But a happy mean is possible. A handbook can hardly be literature, but it need not therefore be either dry bones or " pemmican." The volume under review approximates dangerously to the latter category. The authors seem to have aimed rather at completeness, in the sense of omitting nothing of importance, than at simplicity of design. This is particularly the case with the opening section and with that which deals with the struggle between France and the Habsburgs and the rise of Savoy. An immense amount of information has been here given in little space. We cannot but admire the skill with which the work of compression is done, but we doubt its utility. Other sections, notably that of the Normans in the south—more easy to deal with as being a comparatively detached episode—come as a pleasant relief.

The book is provided with a useful bibliography, tables of popes, emperors and ruling families, and an index. The list of emperors stops short at Frederick II. but might usefully have been completed. We notice two rather important slips. On page 93, line 15, " Seven centuries " should obviously read " five centuries." On page 357, " Pyrenees " has been written by mistake for " Apennines."—J. C. P.

Deutschlands letzte und grösste Not: von Adolf Bolliger (Basle: Ernst Finckli) is one of the most entertaining war books we have

REVIEWS

ever read. Its author, a German-Swiss Protestant pastor, notorious for his extravagant pro-German activities during the war, was reported some time ago to have been given a regular position in the German propaganda service in Switzerland. We can only hope the report is true. No propaganda from his pen or produced under his direction could, we think, do the cause of the Entente much harm. On the contrary, if we may judge from the book under review, which *Vorwärts* a week or two ago reported as having been distributed in the German Army, we should say that the pastor's propaganda is calculated to disgust not only the Swiss, but also all liberal-minded Germans to whose notice it may be brought.

The "letzte und grösste Not" which Germany must overcome is the Reichstag Resolution of July, 1917. Closely allied with this in a deep-laid scheme for robbing Germany of the fruits of her victories is the Pope's Peace Note of August. The hand of England is plainly to be seen in this. "Ignatius Loyola and John Bull united to checkmate Germany diplomatically. The Vatican, from its love for or hopes from the Anglican Church, is doing its best to save England from the fate which the U-boat is slowly but surely bringing upon her, and the Austrian and German Catholics, by their renunciation of annexations, West and East, necessary for the proper development of the German Empire, are unconsciously assisting in this vile scheme." Recent events in Russia may have somewhat assuaged Pastor Bolliger's prophetic wrath, but we fear he will not be entirely satisfied until those "divine gifts," Hindenburg, Tirpitz, and Ludendorff, are in full control of the political affairs of the Central Empires. An enlivening half-hour can be promised to anyone who manages to obtain this book. We should like to hear comments on it by the German soldiers in the trenches.

A. W. G. R.

A German Officer's Tribute to the Serbo-Croats

On 27 February, at the close of the Reichsrat sitting, a lieutenant in uniform succeeded in delivering a short speech from one of the strangers' galleries. "Would it be possible for once," he asked, "for a soldier to speak here? I have come from the Piave front. I have been fighting now for over three years in a Serbo-Croat regiment. I am proud to be a German, and I am full of concern for the future of my race. But I feel bound to declare that, in the Serbo-Croats, I have learnt to know a race full of the most splendid qualities in the truest sense of the word. For many a day the attitude of my own people towards them has pained me, and I have long waited for a chance of saying to the Germans that this race deserves a very special consideration—this race, which has been worst treated of all the Austrian races. Gentlemen, you are laughing at me; that I expected. (Cries of 'No.') I am not prompted by conceit. My uniform shuts me off from all public action. But I say that it is now high time to make *Realpolitik*. Let us at last stop abusing each other! . . ." At this stage the officer was removed by the officials of the House.

We think it only right to record an incident which may perhaps indicate the first signs of returning sanity amid the frenzy of racial bigotry.

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ERRATUM.—No. 76, p. 350, at end of "The Lichnowsky Memorandum" insert words "(to be continued)."

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11 April 1918

The Bolševiks

(II) MARCH—NOVEMBER, 1917

THE revolution of March, 1917, saved Russia at the time from a shameful peace, but it removed any hope of victory over Germany on the old basis. The summer and autumn of 1917 witnessed a series of attempts by Kerenski and Kornilov to obtain military victory in spite of the revolution; the Bolševiks, on the other hand, preached victory of a different kind by means of the revolution. It was no longer the victory of Russia over Germany, but the victory of the revolutionary proletariat throughout Europe.

When the revolution broke out in March, 1917, the Bolševik leaders were in exile, either abroad or in Siberia. Had they been on the spot from the beginning it may be that events would have taken a different course. But it was not till 16 April, just a month after the revolution, that Lenin, accompanied by Zinoviev and other faithful followers, arrived in Petrograd, having travelled through Germany by permission of the German Government. As a destructive force, which would render the victory of Russia on the old basis impossible, they were a welcome influence to the German Government; as a constructive force that would arouse the European proletariat to a new victory they were anathema. But in those days such a victory was remote, and Germany could afford to dismiss it as unlikely. If the Bolševiks could destroy Russia as a great Power, surely Germany could destroy the Bolševiks in her own time, if ever they dared to lift their heads. So argued the military minds of Germany in 1917, and so they still argue to-day after the experience of Brest-Litovsk.

No sooner had Lenin set foot on Russian soil than he set forth his programme for the revolution. This he did in a series of articles in *Pravda* and in a pamphlet, published at the end of April, under the title: "The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution." On 20 April he stated in *Pravda* the policy to be followed by his party. The war as conducted

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by Prince Lvov's Government, he said, was still an imperialist war, and, as such, no support could be given to it. A revolutionary war was only possible when the proletariat and the poorer class of the peasantry had taken power into their own hands, had renounced all annexations and had broken completely with the interests of capital. On the other hand, there were many who, in perfect good faith, as representatives of the masses, urged the continuation of the war purely as a war of defence. It was the duty of the party, therefore, said Lenin, "to explain to them patiently their mistake and to expose to them the connection of capital with an imperialist war, proving that the only way to end the war by a really democratic peace was to overthrow capital."

This was Lenin's general thesis about the war. With regard to tactics he went into fuller details. The first stage of the revolution gave the power to the *bourgeoisie*, owing to lack of organisation on the part of the proletariat; but the second stage must hand over the whole power to the workmen and peasants. We must, therefore, give no support, says Lenin, to the Provisional Government, but must expose the falseness of their promises. We must also recognise the fact that in most of the Soviets our party is at present in a minority, and that so long as we are in a minority we must confine our work to criticising and denouncing mistakes.

The new Government that Lenin was working for was not a Parliamentary Republic. To return to Parliamentary Government after the creation of the Soviets would, in his opinion, be a step backwards. What he demanded—this was as far back as April—was a Republic of Workmen's and Peasants' Soviets. Unlike the moderate Socialists, he was entirely opposed to the dual authority of the Provisional Government and the Soviets. The control of the Soviets over the Provisional Government would, he foresaw, become intolerable to the *bourgeoisie*, and the latter would make a desperate attempt to get rid of the Soviets altogether. The only alternative was the dictatorship of the Soviets on the model of the Paris Commune. "The most perfect type of a *bourgeois* State is a parliamentary democratic republic, but revolutionary epochs, beginning from the end of the 18th century, have brought to light the highest type of a democratic State. The Paris Commune is the type of this State, which

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substitutes for an army and police apart from the people the direct arming of the whole people. From a parliamentary *bourgeois* republic it is easy to return to a monarchy, as history has shown, for the whole machine of oppression remains untouched, viz., the army, police, and bureaucracy. The Commune and Soviets break up and remove this machine."

Lenin's far-sweeping programme of reform commanded little support in the early months of the revolution. The Soviets were mostly composed of Menševiks and moderate Social Revolutionaries who favoured Kerenski's policy of coalition. Their hopes were based on an International Socialist Conference and pressure brought to bear on the Allies in the direction of peace. It was on these points that they differed fundamentally from the Bolševiks. "It is impossible to finish the war," wrote Lenin, "by an agreement between the Socialists of different countries, by the will of the peoples. All these phrases are nothing but the empty, innocent wishes of the *petite bourgeoisie*. The war was caused by half a century's development of world capital with its millions of ramifications. It is impossible to pass at one bound from an imperialist war and obtain a democratic peace without overthrowing the power of capital and transferring the Government to the people."

It was not until the failure of the July offensive that the influence of the Bolševiks began to make itself felt. The Bolševiks had opposed the offensive from the beginning, and had remained deaf to Kerenski's patriotic appeals. They refused to believe that the army could fight, exhausted as it was by nearly three years of war, while on the other hand they pointed out that even if Kerenski succeeded he would simply be playing into the hands of his political opponents on the Right.

The riots in Petrograd on 14-16 July were not the work of the Bolševiks so much as the result of the general discontent following on the military failures. It is true that the Bolševik leaders joined in and tried to give the riots a definite political character, but the movement was not organised in advance as was the November revolution. The action of the Bolševiks called down a torrent of abuse on their heads, Kerenski describing their conduct as a "stab in the back to the army defending the country." It also gave rise to the publication of a series of documents—not to

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be the last—which claimed to prove that the Bolševik leaders were in German pay. The fact that they had travelled through Germany on their way to Russia lent credence to the story, but even the Provisional Government—however much Kerenski desired to do so—found itself incapable of prosecuting Lenin and the others on the basis of this evidence. The charges were emphatically denied by Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, while Trotski protested that during the riots he and his colleagues had urged the troops to abandon the armed character of the demonstration.

The continued state of discontent and disorder at the front during July and August, so far from discrediting the Bolševiks, gained for them increased popularity among the working classes. At various elections in factories and works in Petrograd Bolševik delegates headed the polls; at municipal elections in September the Bolševiks were beaten by the Social Revolutionaries only by very small majorities. The constant difficulties Kerenski met with, both in the formation of his Cabinets and in his relations with Kornilov, steadily weakened the prestige of the Government. It was obvious that matters were coming to a head, and that the only solution of Russia's difficulties would be some form of dictatorship. The high-water mark of the *bourgeoisie* was reached at the Moscow Conference at the end of August, and it was clear that the movement in favour of a military dictatorship would not be delayed much longer. In face of such a movement Kerenski's position became well-nigh impossible. He faced the prospect of a dictatorship, though he feared it, and it is difficult to see how the final misunderstanding with Kornilov could have been avoided. When it came, Kerenski was of necessity driven into the arms of the Left, and the Bolševik leaders, who had been in prison since July, were released. But those days of anxiety were the decisive days in Kerenski's career. After the Kornilov rebellion Kerenski's former policy of conciliation was bankrupt. He could not take sides with the counter-revolution, nor could he throw in his lot wholeheartedly with the forces of the revolution. The last two months of his Government were an uphill struggle against ever-increasing odds. They were also the decisive months in the history of the revolution. The counter-revolution had been defeated, but could the revolution triumph? Now was the moment for the Bolševiks. In their opinion there was

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no longer any security for the revolution in the hands of Kerenski, for against a weak Government the counter-revolution would again raise its head. The Bolševik leaders were now at large, and the history of September and October shows the steady growth of their ideas both in Petrograd and Moscow. *Dielo Naroda*, the organ of the Social Revolutionaries, writing on 25 September, two days before the Democratic Conference in Petrograd, gave expression to the growing anxiety: "Everywhere the Bolševiks are having the most unexpected successes. This is all the more remarkable as the Bolševiks, who hitherto have had no support among the peasantry, have now succeeded in gaining one-third of the seats at the Zemstvo elections. It is time to say frankly that their success has been assisted by the anti-democratic policy of the Government during the last few weeks."

Kerenski's final expedient to cope with the situation created by Kornilov's rebellion in September was to adopt the advice of the Soviet and summon a Democratic Conference in Petrograd. Though he secured the presence in this Assembly of a large number of Moderates, it was clear that the opposition to his policy of coalition had greatly increased during the last few weeks. The Democratic Conference, which finally met on 27 September, was in itself a compromise. The Menševik Executive Committee of the Soviet wanted it not only as a counterblast to the Moscow Conference in August, in which the *bourgeoisie* had taken so prominent a part, but as a means of frustrating the Bolševik scheme of summoning an All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Kerenski probably hoped that the Conference would vote in favour of his policy; if so, he was disappointed. The vote was a confused one, as was to be expected from so mixed an assembly, and Kerenski decided to ignore it. After negotiating with Tsereteli, he resolved to proceed with his own ideas in forming a Government and in setting up a Provisional Parliament which would be purely consultative.

In the light of subsequent events it is clear that this step was fatal. It was a direct challenge to the Soviets, and it was accepted in that sense by the Bolševiks, who were by this time the only driving force in them. Trotski now became more and more the spokesman of the Bolševiks. On 8 October the elections to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Bolševiks,

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and at the same time Trotski was elected President. There could no longer be any doubt that the Bolševiks were making a bid for power. The Provisional Parliament opened on 20 October. It contained a large number of Bolševiks, but, after a speech of protest by Trotski on the opening day, the whole party boycotted the proceedings. They had made up their minds that in Kerenski's hands the revolution was failing, that, if they delayed, the counter-revolution would again raise its head. "Never was the danger to the revolution so great as it is now," wrote *Raboči Put* (the new organ of the Bolševiks) on 13 October. "Without Bonapartist methods not only Kerenski's Government, but even the so-called revolutionary democracy led by the Social Revolutionaries and Menševiks, is unable to govern. The policy of compromise is everywhere collapsing in disgrace. At a time when it was necessary to transform the entire order in the country from top to bottom and to establish a popular Government, a Coalition was formed that could not possibly solve the problems of the revolution. That Coalition led to the unfortunate offensive of 1 July, the order for which was signed by the Menševiks and the Social Revolutionaries. It was a trump card of Wilhelm and led to the Kornilov rebellion. After the Kornilov rebellion the Bolševiks should have seized the reins of power and transferred them to the Soviets."

A few weeks later the Bolševiks acted on this advice. Their increasing propaganda among the Petrograd garrison led to the formation of the Military Revolutionary Committee on 25 October. The meeting of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets was announced for 3 November. This was to have been the signal for the revolution, but at the last moment the Congress was postponed. The Bolševiks now decided to act. Their preparations were carefully laid. On the night of 5 November they seized important posts in Petrograd, and in a few days were complete masters of the capital.

The Bolševik Government has already enjoyed the longest life of any Government since the revolution. It, too, has attempted to tackle the different problems of the war and of the revolution which the Provisional Government had failed to solve, but the result has been the temporary collapse of Russia as a great Power and its rapid disintegration. How far the sufferings of Russia and the desertion of the Allies

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at the most critical period of the war can be placed to the account of the Bolševiks both before and since their accession to power a further article will attempt to explain.

RURIK.

Lincoln's Political Message for the Present Time

ENGLISHMEN are constantly reminded to-day of the American Civil War, in which a people as unmilitary as ourselves became for a while a people of soldiers in the cause of a country which they regarded as the citadel of human freedom. Without seeking for precedents, such as history seldom affords, we may yet learn something from the political history of that struggle.

We take a side without hesitation—not the side which polite circles in England took at the time. No Southerner can fail to be proud of the South, but not one regrets that the Union remains united or that slavery perished. The highest admiration—and it cannot be too high—for the proud independence of the Southern temper, the largest charity—and it cannot be too large—for its blindness to the vision of a greater country and to the claims of a more widespread liberty, make the right and wrong of the contest look more clear, and the triumph of the right better worth its desolating and agonising cost.

The United States united reluctantly. A new patriotism slowly attached itself to a new political unity. Loyalty to each State survived. There was one enduring cause that worked against growing loyalty to the Union, the retention of negro slavery by the Southern States. Within its own borders each State was free to keep this institution or not. But there was a large dominion out of which from time to time new States were created and admitted to the Union, and whether slavery should be allowed in it was a question for the whole Union. It was bound at first to be dealt with by compromises. Economic causes and the growth of a definite philosophic approval of slavery made Southern statesmen press for the further extension of slavery, and the white masses of the South were, against their own interest, captivated by their leaders. Save for a few earnest "Abolitionists," the North was divided between wearied indifference and the desire to take a definite stand somewhere. In 1854, Senator Douglas, of

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Illinois, embodied in law the principle that slavery was a matter of indifference to be settled by the local option of the territories concerned. Thereupon the Republican party sprang into being, founded on the principle that, though slavery must by the Constitution be tolerated in existing slave States, it was wrong and must not be extended over another yard of American territory. In four years' time the new party had the chance of power and of excluding slavery from the only area where for the moment it was in question, but at the price of coalition with Douglas and acquiescence in the principle that slavery was a matter of indifference. This was the precise crisis which called forth the powers of Abraham Lincoln, a self-taught Illinois attorney in decent practice, who, for some years before 1854, had abandoned in disappointment his earlier ambitions as a politician.

Born in poverty and schooled in adversity, this singular man had tempered his mind by varied studies (the Bible, Shakespeare, Euclid), by intense melancholy brooding, and by humorous discussion with any sort of company. He had acquired that rare faculty (to which, perhaps, the platonic fancy of a philosopher-king points) which sees both the exact facts of the shifting present problem and the true bearing of immutable principles. He chose this moment for contesting the re-election of Douglas to the Senate. He lost; but he had nailed a reluctant party to its principles and prevented a whole people from evading the question whether slavery was right or wrong. He knew that by doing so he might precipitate an appalling conflict. He had been rigid, indeed excessive, in his respect for the existing rights of slave-owners. His attitude to them was free from rancour or the slightest censoriousness. But, as he read the situation, fanatic leaders in the South were playing for something more than the introduction of slave-labour in one particular district—the abandonment by the North of the position that slavery was intrinsically bad. They were on the point of accomplishing this aim, and their victory would mean the final surrender of that regard for liberty which was the salt that savoured the great Republic and endeared it to its best sons. And their failure would mean that some day—probably distant, but certain—opinion in the South itself would turn against slavery. A fuller study would prove that he calculated wisely.

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There was nothing to show immediately how momentous his individual action had been. But political accidents before long made Lincoln President, and Southern leaders concluded that now or never was the time to use what they thought their right of seceding, and to form a new Confederacy, based, as they avowed, upon slavery. A new dispute then blazed up in which for the moment the issue about slavery passed from sight. Might any State separate itself from the Union for slavery or any other cause? An unanimous North answered "No." Each side to this dispute was honest; Southerners who deplored slavery fought for the independence of their States; Northerners who were indifferent about the negro fought to preserve their nation. The President, whose sole duty at the outset was to uphold the law, against which, in his view, the South was rebelling, stands out in history as the chief who persisted in that endeavour when success had become doubtful to many, and the cost of it terrifying to all. What upheld him, and what upheld that solid though often silent mass of public opinion of which, at times when all men seemed against him, he remained the interpreter?

People, who would have coerced the South while secession seemed a petty insurrection, reasoned, long before the full tale of a million lives had been told, that union through bloodshed was a chimæra. Humanitarians who hated slavery were sometimes among them. To Lincoln, a man of infinite compassion, who in the time of his hardest strain could be dragged from his bed at night to listen to some plea for clemency to a mutinous private, the fallacy which tolerates much bloodshed but not a little more made no appeal; pity for those young lives sacrificed meant "increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion." And that cause had never lain for him in any empty pride of country such as greatly prefers a wider to a narrower area of sovereignty. A great Republic committed to slavery was not a thing for which he would have taken life—or saved it. But the great Republic, not so committed, still tended towards the goal of human freedom; there was that in its yet unforfeited charter "which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men." Popular government was the guarantee in the long run of the good of the common people. Popular government everywhere was being tested by the

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question whether the American Republic was strong enough to maintain itself.

Almost every department of Lincoln's administration bore evidence of sagacity, patience, and personal generosity; not least his military administration, on which the severest criticisms have been passed by censors who were unaware of the circumstances in which he acted. But, apart from his tenacity in a high purpose once highly resolved upon, his skill lay in holding the North together in an enterprise which, unlike our present struggle, was undertaken by different sections with a certain diversity of aim. For there were crusaders against slavery who cared for no other subject, and there were devotees of the Union to whom any attack on slavery seemed wanton aggression; and the President, in whose finely-balanced mind upholding the Union was a primary duty and ultimate emancipation a clear desire, had an evil time between the two parties. Till the war had gone a certain length the "Proclamation of Emancipation" would have been an unwarranted stretch of his authority; it would also have fallen flat and powerless. But there is little relevance for us in the tale of how he watched his opportunity in silence and struck the blow which (subject to what might happen in a restored German dominion in Africa) may be taken to have killed slavery. Nor ought we to linger on his far-sighted but frustrated effort not to emancipate suddenly, but to free with the least uprooting of the negro and society.

There is, however, a curious parallelism between the elements of opposition then and certain phenomena which the emotional strain of the war produces now. There was, of course, the same tendency to impute the difficulty of a stupendous task to the incompetence of government; the same tendency at times to an unhallowed combination between those who thought they could wage the war better, and those who did not want to wage it at all; the same graduation between almost avowed treason and loyal but unstable support.

Compulsory service, and all that exceptional rigour of government which a free people during great public danger not merely tolerates but demands, were represented by well-meaning statesmen as the permanent subversion of freedom. Many expressed the same fear of that sanguinary despot "King Abraham I.," which some entertain of Ministers who passed our Representation of the People Act. But militar-

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ism in America proved an idle terror, and the vast armies which the Civil War called into being returned as it were in a moment to the ways and thoughts of free citizens.

Towards the end of the war, and especially when certain stunning reverses to the North disguised the fact that the South was approaching exhaustion, able men, unlikely to harbour delusions, proclaimed that the war could be shortened by a conciliatory disposition on the part of the "homicidal" President; people in the South were eager for peace, why not negotiate with them? Now, many people in the South did want peace; but no person having control of the Southern armies had, till those armies were crushed, the slightest idea of accepting the supremacy of the Union—the one point for which the North was, or could rightly have been, at war. There is, of course, a real distinction between Lincoln's case and our own. His object was literally the conquest of the South; what he had to seek from the Southern Government, was no change in its aims or character or relation to its people, but the end of its existence; moreover, there was an insuperable objection, if the right of secession was to be heard of no more, to any negotiation with the Southern rulers which recognised them as a Government at all. Nevertheless, the gentle firmness of Lincoln remains a pattern. He omitted nothing which might conciliate the people of the South; he gave strange facilities to honest doubters for convincing themselves how matters stood; but against negotiation which could entangle him or delay the Northern arms he set his face like flint. And this was the more marked, because in all that concerned the approaching settlement after the war he stood for a patience, a charity, a superiority to pedantry or to haste, which were dismally missed when, with the words of pardon still almost upon his tongue, he fell. Of the temper which judges others he had a fear equal to his "firmness in the right as God gave him to see the right." Against measures of vindictiveness he was eagerly on guard. In the reconstruction of the South, he dreaded premature planning, which could shut out the hope that the South would reconstruct itself.

The message of Lincoln is that of a man who was utterly brave and utterly gentle; equally tenacious of his sternest and his mildest purposes, because both were needed in his abounding love for men; incapable, therefore, of those vacil-

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lations and illusions, for which clever people can always give reasons, but which are caused by the weariness of protracted pain. We need neither labour after a close analogy, nor miss an obvious example. The South was deluded and heroically persistent in delusion, but it was not corrupted, and the faults even of its misleaders were passionate rather than sophisticated; emphatically the South was not Germany, nor South Carolina Prussia. Yet Lincoln's treasured precept "Judge not" may now, as then, have a true as well as a false application. The German revival of the ancient cult of cruelty is an uglier enemy than was the combination of Disunionism and Slavery. Yet it is the product of a hot-house, and may perish even from the German mind on the one condition that it is beaten. In any case, now, as then, inconclusive war would be the worst offence against that charity which was in Lincoln.

It needed no intellectual penetration to show us when the issue had to be joined with Germany: the test of modern statesmanship will arise when war is over and the new-born League of Nations demands a lasting constitution. Yet here, too, the patient watchfulness of the great American, and the gift he showed from the outset of his career of facing present fact without loss of far-off hope, is the pattern to statesmen of a wisdom which common people will follow.

Then, one word more. Except in a superficial sense, Abraham Lincoln was no plain man. The world does not often see the equal of his mental power, and his character had a subtlety as fascinating as Hamlet's. Yet it is to such men's voices that the ordinary heart and head respond. "To me," said the historian Motley, who knew many men and many lands, "Abraham Lincoln is the American Demos." He might have gone further and said, "the Demos of the English-speaking race."

CHARWOOD.

"The Macedonian Question"

My comrade, Dušan Popović, secretary of the Serbian Socialist Party, lately published in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 76) an article in which he expressed the view of the Serbian Socialist Party on the Macedonian question as submitted by them to the Dutch Scandinavian Socialist Bureau. After examining three suggested solutions of the Macedonian question—(1) The autonomy

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of Macedonia ; (2) The annexation of the whole of Macedonia to one of the Balkan States ; and (3) A new partition of Macedonia between the Balkan States—he decides for the third solution, and proposes that Serbia should make certain sacrifices to Bulgaria, and Greece to Bulgaria and Serbia. It is proposed, in short, that Eastern Macedonia should be ceded to Bulgaria, Central and Western Macedonia to Serbia, with the Valley of the Vardar as access to the sea, and a joint sovereignty of the three Balkan States over Salonica and its environs ; Greece being thus reduced almost to the frontiers which it held before the Balkan wars. This solution, which Mr. Popović proposes as a practical solution of the Macedonian question, involves sacrifices for both Serbia and Greece, but much greater, as Mr. Popović admits, for Greece. It is most favourable to the claims of Bulgaria by reason of the territories she now occupies and of the sympathies she has acquired in Europe by long-continued propaganda.

Both as a Greek belonging to a nation vitally interested in the Macedonian Question and as a Socialist, I am called upon shortly to examine this solution and to give my opinion so that the British public, which my comrade Popović desires to enlighten, may learn the state of affairs not only from one aspect, but from the point of view of all the peoples interested, and may thus be in a position to judge impartially. If the proposed solution at which the Serbian Socialist Party has arrived under the pressure of Bulgarian claims, which cover the whole of Macedonia without qualification, is not a solution dictated by the Bulgarian sword—and I do not think we have yet arrived at such a condition—I confess that I cannot understand on what principles, socialist or other, this resolution is based. How can the Serbian Socialist Party, which has always been the enemy of every form of Chauvinism and equally an enemy of the idea that it is possible to settle the Macedonian Question by war or by forcible partition, now undertake to propose a solution which is not based on the will of the peoples concerned, and is consequently unjust, which is certainly not practical, and which constitutes a violation of the Balkan policy to which we have long devoted ourselves—the policy of the Balkan Federation? Why is this policy now declared to be Utopian? This ideal we Balkan Socialists were the first to proclaim at our conference held at Belgrade in 1910 as the common policy of our parties ; after examination and discussion

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it was recommended to us by the International Conference held at Basle in 1912, and restated by us in common not only after the Balkan Wars but also at the Socialist Conference held at Bucarest in 1915; this ideal up to the present day we have never ceased to support and to demand. After eight years of propaganda and joint effort on behalf of the idea of a Balkan Federation the present proposal of my Serbian colleague is very hard to understand.

It should be noted that the Serbian Socialist Party is alone in this violation of our common agreement, for the Bulgarian Socialist Party which is referred to by Mr. Popović is not, as we all know, the genuine Socialist party (the "Narrows"), but the party well known for its Chauvinism. On the other hand, the party of the "Narrows"—Bulgarian Socialists with whom, together with the Roumanians, we (that is both the Greek and the Serbian Socialists) are in agreement—are faithfully following the policy we have laid down, and these Bulgarian Socialists have been among the first to oppose the pretensions of Bulgaria and of Bulgarian Imperialism in Macedonia. We have never regarded the idea of the Balkan Federation as Utopian or incapable of realisation. We always supported this policy independently of the territorial claims of each country concerned, both before and after the Balkan Wars. Even in 1910, when Macedonia was still under Turkish sovereignty and the Balkan Powers were arranging for its partition, we opposed the provisional solution to which their plans were directed by suggesting a Balkan Federation, and we maintained the same policy at the time of the Balkan Wars. I may refer here to the article by our comrade Rakovski published in the Socialist paper the *Berner Tagwacht* of 26 January, 1918, and reproduced in THE NEW EUROPE, No. 73:—

"This opposition [to the policy of partition] has come, in the first instance, from the Bulgarian Socialists. Thus already, in 1913, we find the following passage in the report of the 'Narrow' party to the International Bureau: 'There is no longer any doubt that Macedonia is to be divided up among the Balkan States. This will create an even more impossible situation than before from the point of view of the national development of the Balkan peoples.' But the partition of Macedonia was also opposed by the Serbs. In May, 1913, comrade Lapčević made the following declaration in the Skupština:—'The Balkan Peninsular contains a mixture of peoples and its partition between several States cannot create a single national unit. On the contrary, each of these States would subject to itself a good many

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co-nationals of other peoples. Hence the Social Democratic Party is opposed to any policy which aims at a partition of the Balkans."

At the Congress of Bucarest in 1915, at which I represented the Greek Socialist Party, while the European War was raging and Serbia was in part occupied by the enemy, we proclaimed our adherence to the same policy, and no alternative suggestion was made from any quarter. We certainly never imagined or flattered ourselves with the belief that this Federation would one day suddenly and completely prevail, nor did we make this solution depend on any change in the constitution of the Balkan States or on the previous accomplishment of any territorial or other changes. For the success of this policy we laid it down as a primary condition that we should oppose every suggested arrangement of frontiers or of territory and every form of provisional solution. In proposing this policy of federation we were declaring to the Balkan Socialist Parties and to their representatives in the Chambers: "This is the propaganda which you must maintain among your peoples; you must insist that this principle must guide the Balkan States in their attitude to foreign affairs." We prepared the realisation of our ideal by directing towards it all the political influences which could bring the Balkan peoples to co-operation and understanding. The reasons for supporting such a policy it is not, I think, necessary for me to expound, for not even the Serbian Socialist Party denies them. Not only the ethnological condition of Macedonia, but its economic position in the Balkan Peninsula, and the political importance of a union of the Balkan States in Europe, and the peculiar significance of the Balkan Peninsula in the Eastern Question, absolutely impose this policy.

It cannot be denied that the tracing of an ethnological frontier in Macedonia is almost impossible, that the appetites of the Balkan States are insatiable, and that any partition of Macedonia, whether peaceable or compulsory, not only does not satisfy the will of the Macedonian population, but prepares new hatreds, new sufferings, and new wars. There is a further fact that must not be forgotten. The partition of Macedonia which took place after the Balkan Wars involved compulsory migrations of the population, so that it would be inhuman in the last degree, even if it would not entirely annihilate the Macedonian peasantry, if these methods were repeated. Yet a

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fresh partition would certainly require them, and it is doubtful if we Socialists would have it in our power to avert them.

For these reasons our policy of a Balkan Federation is wholly opposed to the policy of provisional solutions and of such compensations as can be negotiated and arranged by a plutocracy which is prepared to bargain away populations. The experience which we have gained in the Balkan Wars only confirms us in our support of this policy. The partition in the first Balkan War brought on the second, and the partition contrived by the second Baltic War—the Treaty of Bucarest—led up to the third war which was begun by Bulgaria. Can a third partition of Macedonia avert further wars? Is the policy of Bulgaria, seeking always to establish a hegemony in Macedonia, to be justified by us Socialists in the first, the second, nor even in the present war? We have good reason for saying that the policy proposed by the Serbian Socialist Party constitutes an absolute contradiction of the policy of a Balkan Federation, and is as unjust as it is far from being practical. But even if we were to allow that this was a felicitous policy, how could we ever recognise the territorial changes of the present war—the pretensions of Bulgarian Imperialism—and how could we ignore the wishes of the population concerned? The formula "peace without annexations or indemnities, freedom of peoples to dispose of themselves" is to-day a formula which is not only proclaimed by all socialist parties, but has been accepted even by the *bourgeois*. President Wilson recently said that it is not possible in future for the fate of peoples to be settled as if they were chattels to be transferred arbitrarily from the possession of one Power to that of another, but only on the basis of their own wishes. How, then, are Serbian people to be subjected to Bulgarians, or how shall we oblige Greek people, in whose case the sacrifice would be much more severe, as comrade Popović admits, to submit to Bulgaria or to Serbia in order to satisfy the economic interests of these Powers? The plutocracies in power are well able at the last minute to patch up a provisional solution which requires greater or less sacrifices; but how are we Socialists to say to the peoples: "You must sacrifice yourselves to the political needs of the moment," especially considering that for the Greek people which it is proposed to sacrifice such a political necessity is non-existent?

But even if it were possible to accept this surprising policy, how can it ever be realised? How can Greece and the Greek

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people ever be compelled to accept the murderous concessions proposed? It is the task of us Socialists to prevent wars, not to prepare fresh ones. For these and many other reasons one policy alone is indicated for us as Socialists—the return to the *status quo ante bellum* and unceasing work in order that we may prepare for the realisation of a Balkan Confederacy. In the meanwhile both the recent Inter-Allied Conference in London as well as the Serbian and the Greek Socialist parties have accepted the policy of a Customs and Postal Union of the Balkan States, which will bring the Balkan peoples into closer harmony and will further the economic interests of all the States concerned.

A. D. SIDERIS

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Italian Public Opinion and the Southern Slav Problem

AN important and significant change has lately taken place in Italian public opinion regarding the Yugoslav problem. Until a very short time ago few people in Italy would have been willing to admit the force and spontaneity of the movement tending to draw the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to unite in a free national State; few would have openly proclaimed the advisability and necessity of an anti-Austrian, anti-German understanding between Italy and the Southern Slavs. Supporters of this idea were confronted by a dense and bellicose crowd of opponents armed with a long series of objections: that the Yugoslav movement is an Austrian manœuvre; that the differences of language, religion, and tradition constitute insuperable obstacles to a union between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; that if this union were to be realised the Croat and Slovene element with anti-Italian traditions would prevail over the Serb; that, in short, if anything, it would be in Italy's interests to create two States—a Croat and a Serb—and to fan the rivalry between them. Various causes have contributed to form and strengthen this Yugoslavophobe feeling: the memory of the violent rivalry between Italians and Slavs on the Adriatic coast, fomented in every possible way by the Governments of Vienna and Budapest; the clever manœuvres of Germanophil propaganda in Italy designed to stir up the Italians and Slavs against

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one another, to the sole advantage of the King of Prussia, the efforts of Italian Imperialists who, aspiring to obtain the whole of Dalmatia for Italy, thought to succeed in their object by opposing the Yugoslav unitarian movement; and, lastly, the natural reaction against the excesses of the Yugoslav Imperialists, who offend just Italian susceptibilities by their pretensions to the possession of Gorizia and its surroundings—Istria, and even a part of Friuli.

A change in public opinion began to make itself felt in the summer of 1917, after the American intervention, the Russian revolution and the pact of Corfu. In July and August, two of the leading Italian papers, the *Corriere della Sera* and the *Secolo* published a series of articles on the question of the relations between Italians and Yugoslavs, the object of which was to prove that Italy has every interest in favouring and supporting a Yugoslav movement, inasmuch as this movement is inevitably anti-Habsburg. Those articles raised a storm of discussion, but at the same time received approval from many quarters, which showed that truth was at last on the way. And the inevitably forward motion of truth was further accelerated by the closing events of 1917 and those of the beginning of 1918: the disaster of Caporetto, the dissolution and complete disappearance of Russia from the battlefields of the world, the declarations of Lloyd George and Wilson, in which there rang a new note of democratic ideals. In consequence of the dissolution of Russia, the Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy were abandoned to themselves, having heretofore always looked to Russia for help and salvation, and the Austrians were able to concentrate the bulk of their military forces in the Trentino and on the Isonzo, with dire results for Italy. These events forced Italy and the Slavs of the Monarchy to come to an understanding, in virtue of which Italy might become the upholder of the right of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and the Slavs of the Monarchy might be induced to initiate an anti-Habsburg movement in the interior of that country, supported by the action of the Italian army from without. Such an understanding seemed all the more necessary after the declarations of Lloyd George and Wilson: firstly, from the fact that, by openly respecting the rights of the people and the principle of nationality, they seemed to invite oppressed nations to come forward and announce their claims; secondly, because their conciliatory attitude towards the

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Habsburg Monarchy seemed to foreshadow the possibility of saving that Monarchy, if the nationalities oppressed by her failed to effect an anti-Habsburg concentration.

The campaign in favour of an agreement between Italy and the peoples of Slav and Latin race in Austria-Hungary was intensified in January and February of this year. And in the midst of this agitation for a general understanding grew the campaign in favour of a more special agreement between Italians and Jugoslavs, inasmuch as this last seemed to offer greater difficulties because of ancient and recent feuds, and because of their rival claims to certain Adriatic territory. The goodwill which both sides displayed in the effort to clear away misunderstandings was greatly assisted by new and important developments, such as the energetic anti-Habsburg agitation promoted by the Yugoslav Club under the Presidency of Korošec, the declarations of the Yugoslav refugees, the popular movements in Croatia and Slovenia, all of which facts were an eloquent proof to Italian public opinion that the Jugoslavs had taken their stand against the Dynasty in the same uncompromising manner as the Czecho-Slovaks.

These facts accelerated the course of events. Even before Caporetto in the autumn of 1917 a group of Yugoslav refugees together with Italians of democratic tendencies, had formed the nucleus of a committee in Switzerland for a closer understanding and common action. Some months later, in Rome, a group of politicians started something of the same kind on a larger scale, with the object of encouraging an understanding not only between Italy and the Jugoslavs, but between us and all the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and a committee was quickly formed to promote anti-Austrian agitation, in the name of which the Onorevole Andrea della Torre went recently to London and Paris to establish an agreement between the Slav and Latin refugees of the Danubian Monarchy. In the midst of all this preparatory work of committees and agreements there came the symptomatic fact of the meeting in London between Signor Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy, and Dr. Ante Trumbić, President of the Yugoslav Committee.

The substance of the matter is that Italy is veering towards the policy outlined by Mazzini in 1871 :—

“ The true aim of Italian international existence, the most direct path to her future greatness, lies higher up, there where the most

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vital European problem is fermenting to-day; in brotherhood with that vast element whose mission is to infuse a new spirit in the community of nations, or, if allowed by an improvident diffidence to go astray, to trouble it with long wars and grave dangers; it lies in an Alliance with the family of Slavs. The Eastern limits of Italy were laid down in Dante's words:—

'. . . a Pola dentro del Quarnero
che Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna'

('to Pola in the Quarnero, which encloses Italy and washes her confines').

"Istria is ours. But from Fiume onward down the eastern coast of the Adriatic to the River Boiano on the borders of Albania there stretches a zone in which, amid the relics of our colonies, the Slav element predominates. This zone of the Adriatic shore includes Cattaro, Dalmatia, and the Montenegrin region. In conquering for the Slavs of Montenegro the outlet which they need at Cattaro, and for the Slavs of Dalmatia the principal towns of the eastern shore, thus assisting the resuscitation of the Illyrian Slavs, Italy would be the first among nations to acquire the right of affection, of inspiration, and of economic advantages with the entire Slav family."

But the programme laid down in the inspired words of the apostle does not specify the solutions to the various questions which interest us, and which have caused such sharp dissension in the past between Italians and Jugoslavs. This vagueness is to-day an obstacle to those politicians and journalists who have advocated an understanding with the Jugoslavs since the beginning of the war. In view of the violent disputes in the past, and of the delicacy of the questions under discussion, they consider it necessary that the Italo-Jugoslav agreement should henceforward have its foundations laid in a clear definition of the solutions to the questions at issue which would clear the way to efficacious concerted action and destroy the possibility of future controversies. This group, which in a certain way can be said to carry on the work which was started in Switzerland in the autumn of 1917, has constituted itself promoter of an Italo-Jugoslav Committee which has for its object the study of territorial and national questions, pending between our two peoples, with a view to solving them. This committee naturally does not intend to rival the committee of the anti-Austrian movement in any way. For whereas this last is concerned with the question of all the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the Italo-Jugoslav Committee is particularly concerned with forming the possible basis for an

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understanding with the Southern Slavs. As there exist already, beside the committee for the anti-Austrian movement, Italo-Czech and Italo-Polish committees, without their work being considered an encumbrance or superfluous in regard to the first, the existence of an Italo-Jugoslav Committee will be equally possible.

According to the organisers of this committee, in whose ranks are some of our foremost politicians, scientists, and journalists, the basis of an understanding can be established as follows :—

1. An engagement on the part of the Italians and of the Jugoslavs to fight unremittingly in concert for the liberation of the Latin and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary from the German-Magyar domination and from subjection to the house of Habsburg.

2. Italians engage to support the movement of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes for the constitution of a united and independent national State.

3. Recognition on the part of the Italians of the right of Jugoslavia to Dalmatia, and recognition on the part of the Jugoslavs of the right of Italy to union with Gorizia (il Goriziano), Trieste, and Istria to Monte Maggiore, and such of the Foranean Isles of the Dalmatian archipelago as are indispensable for the defence of the Italian coast.

4. Reciprocal guarantees assuring freedom of culture and judicial equality to the Italian or Slav minorities remaining in the Italian or Jugoslav territories; the towns of Fiume and Zara to be constituted free cities with their own statutes.

5. Integrity of Albania.

6. All technical questions relating to territorial delimitations, judicial guarantees, and railroad and customs stipulations which cannot be settled directly by treaty between the two Governments concerned to be taken to arbitration.

This programme for an Italo-Jugoslav agreement is expounded in the most useful manner in a volume published in Italy in the month of March which we owe to the pen of two of our most celebrated students of the Adriatic question : C. Maranelli and G. Savelmini, " La Questione dell' Adriatico," which appeared in the *Giovino Europa*, a collection of works dealing with the problem of nationalities, at the Libreria della Voce, Florence. This is the very same book which was suppressed by the censor two years ago. A significant sign of changed times !

Will an agreement be possible? We devoutly hope so. The meetings which took place in Rome at the beginning of this week between Italians and representatives of the oppressed nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy—with certain British

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friends of Italo-Slav amity as interested and welcome spectators—should lead to the desired solution of the problem of Italo-Jugoslav relations, so as to create the possibility of an intensified, united campaign against the Danubian Monarchy. When the Yugoslav people are freed from German-Magyar domination, and constitute a strong independent State, it will form, together with the Italian and Czech nations, the most effectual dam against the onward march of German Imperialism towards the East, where England more than any other has such vital interests to defend. The political offensive which the Central Powers have so often conducted against the Entente—unfortunately only too often with success—ought not to fail of its effect if conducted by the Entente against a State like that of the Habsburgs, already weakened and undermined by the struggle of nationalities, which daily becomes more acute. The results for which we hope, and which are necessary for a victory against German militarism, ought not be long delayed, even if at this present moment the Central Powers can spread before us a war-map which is certainly favourable to them.

But now, at last, the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary have woken up, and are struggling to shake themselves free of their yoke and to vindicate their rights. And we know full well that the vicissitudes of war may perhaps delay, but they certainly cannot arrest, that fateful forward movement of peoples and ideas which Macaulay describes in a splendid passage in his famous essay on "Ranke's History of the Popes," when he outlines the alternations of the two great movements of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation: "During the first half century after the commencement of the Reformation, the current of feeling on this side of the Alps and of the Pyrenees, ran impetuously towards the new doctrines. Then the tide turned, and rushed fiercely in the opposite direction. Neither during the one period, nor during the other, did much depend on the issue of battles or sieges. The Protestant movement was hardly checked for an instant by the defeat of Mühlberg. The Catholic reaction went on at full speed in spite of the destruction of the Armada." This fact, as stated by the great historian regarding the religious movements of the sixteenth century, can equally be applied to the movements of nationalities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And the Entente is on the side of these

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movements, whereas the Central Empires are opposed to them ; the Entente is moving in the direction of a future which will be realised in spite of everything because it lies in the destiny of nations ; the Central Empires are striving to preserve past conditions which have now lost all *raison d'être*.

Even if, by some unfortunate chance, the peace should be one of compromise, and leave unfinished the movement of the nationalities whose state of revolt has now become acute in the Danubian Monarchy, these movements would inevitably continue afterwards, until the day when they attained their object. Just as, after the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, and in spite of its terms and of the efforts of the there assembled plenipotentiaries to ignore and even combat the national movements in Italy and Germany, these great tides swept forward through many decades of strife to the ultimate triumph of their cause. In openly espousing the cause of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and in befriending their movement, we can rest assured that we are best defending the present and providing for the future. Herein lies our greatest strength and one of the most profound reasons for our faith.

PIETRO SILVA.

The Defeat of Militarism in Spain

No better proof could be given of the gravity of the situation to which the Spanish Monarchy had been reduced by the short-lived militaristic attempt of Señor La Cierva, than the composition of the Cabinet which took office on 23 March. For the first time in Spain, the list of ministers includes men who had previously occupied public offices of higher rank, namely, three ex-prime ministers, apart from Sr. Maura, and one ex-president of the Chamber. Moreover, in spite of keen political and personal antagonism, old political opponents like Sr. Maura and Sr. Dato, and, what is worse still, men like Count Romanones and Sr. Alba, divided by a quite recent rivalry, sit together round the Council table, while Sr. Cambó, the Catalan John Redmond, accepts office apparently without conditions. In fact the new Cabinet includes all the heads of the dynastic parties in the House with the only exception of Sr. La Cierva. In order to bring about this coalition, the King called together at the Palace his four ex-prime ministers,

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three at least of whom were reluctant to any but a single party solution, and in forcible terms put to them the gravity of the hour, threatening them, if we are to believe a version published by several Madrid papers and as yet not denied, with his abdication. The situation, as was explained in THE NEW EUROPE (21 March), bad as it had been since 1 June, 1917, had rapidly grown worse since Sr. La Cierva, imposed by the Army Committees as a War Minister, had sought to use his position and power in order to set up a half-political, half-military dictatorship. His failure is only a fresh proof that justice and not mere authority is the basis of the State. After Sr. La Cierva had forced the Government to capitulate and to grant the military reforms by Royal Decree within a week of the meeting of Parliament, the employees of the Posts and Telegraphs addressed a demand for immediate reforms to the Government, backed by a threat of a general strike of the two services. Sr. La Cierva advised a strong hand, and the strike broke out. The Government then, under the thumb of their War Minister, handed over to the War Office the postal and telegraphic services, and Sr. La Cierva signed a decree dismissing all the employees *en masse*, mobilising those of them who were of military age, and putting both services under military command. At this juncture, Sr. Garcia Prieto, who, as a merely nominal Prime Minister had reluctantly acquiesced in this policy, at last struck and resigned. And the King found himself without a Government in the midst of anarchy, with no other force left in the State than the Army, and that in open conflict with the nation and at the disposal of a political maniac.

Well may it be said that the new Cabinet represents the body-guard of the King. But it really means more. The wave of popular enthusiasm which greeted the formation of the new Ministry, none of the members of which can be said to be really and generally popular, meant that the people saw in it the fall of Sr. La Cierva, and, with him, of the audacious militarism which he personified. The new Cabinet is backed by the people with a unanimity unknown to previous Cabinets, merely because it is believed to represent the vindication of civil power.

The resulting parliamentary situation is not without originality. All the parties in the Chamber are, as it were, decapitated, and there is no opposition. The first steps of

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the Government have been towards pacification. The La Cierva decrees on the post and telegraphic services have been withdrawn, and an ample measure of amnesty has been approved, in virtue of which the four convicts of the strike committee will pass from their cells in prison to their seats in the Chamber. As long as the Government devotes itself to this task its union is likely to remain unimpaired. It is, however, only too natural that, as soon as the acuteness of the crisis is over, the heads of the parties will reclaim their liberty. Indeed, Sr. Dato, who entered the Cabinet most reluctantly of all, has already hinted at this possibility with a haste which suggests a certain uneasiness lest in the present fluid state of politics Sr. Maura should recover his former position at the head of the Conservative party.

From the foreign affairs point of view, the Government represents neutrality "with a difference" favourable to the Allies. Sr. Dato takes the Foreign Office; Count Romanones, who takes over the Ministry of Justice, is more than a match for the pro-German leanings of Sr. Gonzalez Besada, the new Finance Minister, who, moreover, as a political follower of Sr. Dato, may be trusted to back the foreign policy of his chief; and, though Sr. Maura is the head of a pro-German party, he is not a pro-German, and is credited with a keen sense of national dignity. It may be assumed that the present Government has more power and more will to deal with German attacks on Spanish rights than any other past or possible Government in Spain. Its unity will last as long as things hang in the balance on the Western front.

S. DE MADARIAGA.

Guide to the Foreign Press

(I) THE GERMAN PRESS (*continued*)

OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL.

Reichsanzeiger is the German London Gazette.

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung contains full reports of Ministerial speeches in the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag, official *démentis*, and articles directly inspired. Besides this, its chief function is the manufacture and distribution of propaganda. It circulates chiefly among the newspaper editors. Its selected quotations from the German press afford a useful indication of Government policy.

Kölnische Zeitung is semiofficial in its utterances upon foreign affairs; the messages of its Berlin correspondent are seldom devoid

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of a touch of inspiration. In other matters it is a National Liberal organ which never fails in the last resort to support the Chancellor. Its foreign correspondence is deservedly famous. From the Russian Revolution up to the July crisis the *Kölnische Zeitung* passed through a democratic phase, during which it advocated the equal franchise for Prussia. After the accession of Michaelis its anti-democratic colour was for a time equally pronounced, in particular its opposition to the policy of the Reichstag majority. It has now adopted the policy of the Government with regard to the equal suffrage in Prussia and has warned the National Liberals who oppose it of the inevitable necessity for them to adopt the Government's suffrage policy in accordance with the Emperor's two edicts. In general it represents the solid industrialist classes in Western Germany and is opposed to democracy in the sense of the Entente countries as it advocates the interests of the employers against the employed.

Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger was purchased after the retirement of Scherl, who founded it in 1885, by a syndicate in which Krupps was represented, on the understanding that its columns should always be at the disposal of the Government. It is difficult to say whether the *Lokal-Anzeiger* is still in any sense inspired, and it is included here only because of its old reputation. It has in the last few months become considerably more jingo and reactionary, and a credible report was circulated in September, 1917 (and not denied), that it had been acquired by a syndicate which included von Heydebrand and von Schorlemer (the reactionary Prussian Minister of Agriculture who retired after the July crisis). Its political anticipations, which obviously emanate from Junker circles, are generally unreliable; and it now belongs to the extreme section of the jingo and reactionary press. It publishes a kind of critical supplement on six days in the week called *Der Tag*, which is an open platform for opinions ranging from Free Conservative (von Zedlitz) to Majority Socialist (Lensch). How little even *Der Tag* admits of the free expression of opinion which it professes is shown by the fact that during the July crisis Professor Hans Delbrück sent in a reply to a particularly virulent attack made by Eugen Zimmermann upon Bethmann Hollweg. The reply was completely suppressed (see *Preussische Jahrbücher*, August, 1917). The *Lokal-Anzeiger* in the days of Scherl professed to be a non-political or at any rate a non-party paper. It was the prototype of the great multitude of "non-party" papers which have sprung up all over Germany. Their influence upon public opinion is that of a political narcotic, inducing apathetic acceptance of *autoritaire* and bureaucratic methods of government (*Obrigkeitsregierung*).

CONSERVATIVE ORGANS.

Kreuz Zeitung (*Neue Preussische Zeitung*) is the most typical and famous Junker organ. It is honest and in its way very ably written, and it always preserves a certain dignity in controversy. Otto Hoetsch's weekly articles upon foreign policy are extremely able. Hoetsch was successor to Professor Schiemann when the latter left the *Kreuz Zeitung*. It is strongly Lutheran and anti-Catholic; the organ of aristocratic and would-be aristocratic society in Prussia and in its social paragraphs and its advertisements of births, marriages, and

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deaths fulfils the same kind of office as was formerly fulfilled by the *Morning Post* in England.

Deutsche Tageszeitung is chiefly famous for Reventlow's diatribes. It makes a speciality of attacks upon Austria for its moderation. Apart from this it is important for the agricultural news with which, as the organ of the Conservative-agrarian *Bund der Landwirte*, it is generally filled. It was originally founded as the declared organ of the Agrarian League. It is strongly reactionary in home politics.

Reichsbote.—The evangelical organ. Not indisposed to a certain show of compromise. Fertile in suggestion for the sham reform of the Prussian franchise. Violently opposed to the repeal of the Jesuit law. It is the newspaper of pious German Protestants, particularly the Evangelical clergy. It is understood to be read by the Empress.

Schlesische Zeitung.—Organ of Silesian agrarians. One of the oldest newspapers in Germany.

Die Post is, to all intents and purposes, the organ of Baron von Zedlitz, the Free Conservative Leader, for whose signed articles, "*von Parlamentarische Seite*," it is chiefly famed. The chief shareholders are believed to be certain territorial magnates of the higher nobility and some of the great ironmasters. Among these were Prince Hatzfeldt, Duke of Trachenberg, Prince Max Hohenlohe and the late Baron von Stumm. For many years before the war the *Post* was one of the most bitterly anti-British journals in Germany. Its circulation is very small—some 5,000 or 6,000. In addition there are several hundreds on its free list.

NATIONAL LIBERAL ORGANS (RIGHT).

National Liberal Korrespondenz, the organ of the Central Committee of the party and the medium by which the official policy of the party is communicated to the press.

Deutscher Kurier is, to all intents, the official organ of the *Schwere Industrie* section, and thoroughly jingo. It was in financial difficulties at the end of last year, but has lately been bought by Hirsch (Essen), an agent of Krupps.

Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung is Krupps' Essen organ; the news it contains is often highly tendencious.

Berliner Neueste Nachrichten is Krupps' Berlin organ, and even more deliberately violent than the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*. This was the first newspaper that the late Frederick Krupp acquired. He used to say that the proprietorship cost him more trouble than the rest of his enormous business.

Hamburger Nachrichten was the receptacle of Bismarck's confidences under the editorship of Hermann Hoffman (who died in January, 1916). Extreme, but with a preposterously Conservative touch of dignity. Very Anglophobe.

Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten is the chief National Liberal paper of the Right of Saxony. More violent than the *Hamburger*. Said to express the temperament of the Crown Prince, owing to the fact that the late Herr Liman, its Berlin correspondent, published a sketch of him and was supposed to enjoy his confidence.

Tägliche Rundschau rather affects to be aloof from party politics as a nationalist organ. Pangerman.

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NATIONAL LIBERAL ORGANS (CENTRE AND LEFT).

Düsseldorfer General-Anzeiger is the furthest to the Right and the most jingo of the National-Liberal centre organs.

Münchener Neueste Nachrichten is the principal paper in Bavaria, and is non-Catholic, *i.e.*, it supports the towns against the Agrarian Catholic Centrum. Recently it was an advocate of a conciliatory policy towards the strikers, such as was pursued by the Bavarian Government. It condemned the Berlin policy of military repression. Further, it considers that the Prussian Franchise question is a matter of Imperial interest and deprecates Conservative opposition and obstruction. Though not "Particularist," it maintains Bavarian rights against Prussian encroachments. Has recently been opposed to Pangerman annexationism in all its forms. The resignation of its editor, Alexander Skuhra, which has been just announced, is declared by the paper, in contradiction of current rumours, not to signify any change in its attitude. Skuhra's resignation was attributed to representations from Pangermans and adherents of the Fatherland Party.

The Magdeburgische Zeitung used to support Bethmann. It is, nevertheless, on the whole less Liberal in domestic politics than the preceding journal. It is generally said to be the property of Schiffer. It used to represent the National Liberal Right Wing. Enjoys fairly frequent inspiration from Berlin.

Leipziger Tageblatt is thoroughly moderate in internal politics, but certainly less pacific than the *Börsen Zeitung* in questions of the war. Out-and-out supporter of Bethmann Hollweg. It is edited by Junck.

Berliner Börsen Zeitung is von Richthofen's organ. Thoroughly moderate, was discreetly but definitely opposed to a breach with America. Champions radical reform at all times. In touch with some of the big Berlin financiers, such as the firm of Bleichröder. Might be said to represent a *rapprochement* between the National Liberal Left Wing and the Right Wing of the Radicals (*Fortschrittspartei*).

Börsen Courier is a Berlin Radical organ, mainly read in Jewish financial circles. Was ably edited by Landauer for many years.

THE CENTRUM (CATHOLIC) ORGANS.

Germania is the Berlin organ of the Centrum, is now in touch with Hertling, and is studiously moderate. It was a loyal supporter of Bethmann. During the July crisis (1917) it supported Erzberger, and since that date claims to be an exponent of a moderate policy of peace by understanding. In reality all Catholic organs in Germany have at heart the extension of German political influence and are supporters of a strong colonial policy. They know that, owing to the balance of parties in the Reichstag, the Imperial Government cannot dispense with the support of the Catholic Centre and that the Catholic Party may therefore hope to enlist German foreign and colonial policy in the interests of the Church.

Kölnische Volkszeitung is the historic organ of the party. It now represents the Chauvinist elements in it, and only with difficulty conceals its opposition to the Reichstag resolution. Strongly anti-

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democratic; but this is only recent. There have been times when it represented the democratic wing of the Centre Party, while the *Germania* represented the cautious Conservatism of the Silesian Catholic nobility and landowners.

Bayerischer Kurier is the organ of the Bavarian Centrum. Jingo, practically controlled by Schlittenbauer, Held and Heim. Opposed to Erzberger, but supported the Papal Note.

Augsburger Post Zeitung is a paper of real importance, which does its best to represent Christian ethics (e.g., it recently opposed annexations on the ground that they were un-Christian, and was violently attacked by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* for its pains).

Weser Zeitung, formerly Radical, was distinguished by the enthusiasm of its support of Bethmann, and after July took the peculiar line of being opposed to Michaelis because he was too pacific. At present it is bitterly critical of the Reichstag majority, and has probably passed under the financial control of the Pangermans, who have made great efforts to secure a controlling influence in many progressive organs of the German press.

THE RADICAL ORGANS (PROGRESSIVES).

Frankfurter Zeitung represents Central and Southern German Radicalism. As many of the strongest supporters of this particular brand of Liberalism are Jewish financiers in Frankfurt, Berlin and other German cities, and, as the financial news of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* is the best in the German press, the paper has often, in too sweeping terms, been described as representing Jewish financial interests. Its Liberalism is of a sounder brand than that, but its Radicalism has been greatly watered since the death of the old proprietor, Adolf Sonnemann, who sat as an Advanced Radical for many years in the Reichstag, and was one of Bismarck's bitterest opponents. Is anxious for an arrangement in the West. Strongly supported Bethmann, and now gives a vigorous backing to the Reichstag majority. Openly advocates the complete Parliamentary system. A moderate paper. The *Frankfurter* has peculiarities, however, e.g., its Vienna correspondent is violently anti-Slav and almost Pangerman. Its former Anglo-philism yielded to the mode of modern Germany, especially since its veteran and able correspondent, August Stein, yielded in the early nineties to the blandishments of the Foreign Secretary, Baron von Marschall, and subsequently became an instrument of Prince Bülow during his Chancellorship. Stein thus ceased to be "*eine gefürchtete Feder*" for the Government, especially in the realm of foreign policy. He was admitted to official intimacy which flattered his boundless personal vanity, and he became a frequent mouthpiece of the Berlin Foreign Office when it wanted to affect moderation. For this rôle he was the better suited, in that he is himself entirely ignorant of foreign countries, their ideals and their interests. The Young Simons, the grandchildren and heirs of Sonnemann, were brought up in the atmosphere of modern Berlin and take entirely different views of foreign affairs from those which the paper formerly advocated.

Vossische Zeitung is edited by Georg Bernhard. It used to be violently Jingo, but its present policy is that of "the continual understanding"; and in order that this policy may be imposed on the

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Chancellor it has become one of the most outspoken advocates of Reichstag control. Very suspicious of von Kühlmann's "Anglo-philism." It has two famous correspondents, Behrmann (who writes on Russian affairs from Stockholm) and Ludwig in Vienna. Owned by Ullsteins, the publishers of cheap reprints, who also publish the cheap and popular *Morgenpost*.

Berliner Tageblatt is an extremely popular paper, edited by Theodor Wolff, whose pacifistic moderation has come under the ban of the censorship. Thoroughly Radical and with marked Francophil tendencies, anxious for a close alliance with the Socialists, and is a great deal more moderate in its attitude towards the Minority than *Vorwärts* itself. Its articles are generally signed, and its chief contributors, besides T. W. himself, are Erich Dombrowski, Hans Vorst, Hans Sivkovich, Gothein, and Wolfgang Heine (a Majority Socialist). Theodor Wolff, a relation of the wealthy proprietor and founder Rudolf Mosse, served right up the ladder from reporter, *feuilletoniste* and dramatic critic until he was appointed Paris correspondent some twenty years ago. In Paris he affected Parisian sympathies after the example of Heinrich Heine and showed himself ambitious of a literary and political reputation among French journalists, who are inclined greatly to exaggerate his importance and that of the *Tageblatt* in Berlin and Germany. He and his paper are really *au fond* anti-British. They represent a peculiar German-Jewish type of Francophilism, which is not of very much use to France, but is at any rate much better than the crass Prussianism of most North German journals, including some that call themselves Liberal. Some Socialist writers are more "Prussian" than they know. Heine, unworthy of his great namesake, is one of these.

Freisinnige Zeitung is as nearly as possible the official organ of the Progressive Party.

Morgenpost was much more pacific under the Bethmann régime than the *Vossische Zeitung*, though published by the same firm, and using the same news service. A cheap and popular paper with a large circulation.

Hamburger Fremdenblatt has a curiously erratic attitude on peace questions. It is in the main anti-British (though in 1917 an extremely well-informed correspondent contributed sympathetic accounts of the English political situation), but it is inconsistent. It supported Bethmann at the time of the German peace offer and was not anxious for a breach with America. It has, however, very bellicose moods. Strongly Radical in internal politics. For local reasons opposed to the annexation of Antwerp.

SOCIALIST ORGANS.

Chemnitzer Volksstimme is a Majority organ with a pronounced tendency to the Right. It is not, however, as extreme as Lensch and Haenisch.

Hamburger Echo.—As Jingo as the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*.

Karlsruhe Volksfreund.—Jingo, in close touch with the General Federation of Trade Unions, led by Legien. Kolb, the editor, is a strong partisan of close alliance with the Progressives.

Vorwärts, converted by a Majority *coup de main* from a strong

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Minority organ to the organ of the Majority. The change was defended on the ground that *Vorwärts* has always been the Central organ of the party. Owing, however, to the dual control exercised over it by the Party Direction and the Berlin Committee, the Minority, who are in a strong majority in Berlin, have managed to control it during the war.

Bremer Bürger Zeitung was converted by a similar process from a yet more extreme Minority policy a month later.

Frankfurter Volksstimme is, on the whole, the least partisan of the Majority organs. Its editor at least dallies with the idea that the Majority ought occasionally to refuse the credits to show that the Socialists mean business, although they are patriotic.

Braunschweiger Volksfreund, also converted a few months ago from an extreme Minority to an orthodox Majority organ.

Frankische Tagespost.—A Nuremberg paper; takes no side in the dispute between the Majority and the Minority. Is primarily concerned with the party unity. Really moderate, and sometimes valuable for news.

Leipziger Volkszeitung.—The leading Minority paper and the Socialist journal next in importance to the *Vorwärts*. Thoroughly pacifist, because it does not believe that the war is a war of defence for Germany. Bitterly critical (in so far as it dare) of the "emptiness" of the German peace offers. It used to be opposed to a definite split in the party, hoping that the Minority would gain control by constitutional means. Since the "conversion" of *Vorwärts* it has tended to become the principal mouthpiece of the Minority.

WEEKLIES.

Das Grössere Deutschland represents Pangerman views. Edited by Bacmeister, National Liberal Deputy, who writes in the interest of the great industrialists.

Deutsche Politik.—Founded in beginning of 1916 by Röhrbach and others who had been operating in *Das Grössere Deutschland*. They split off because they could not accept the Pangerman schemes of annexations in the West. The cardinal principle of *Deutsche Politik* is hostility to Russia. It advocated very strongly the encouragement of the Ukrainians and other nationalities to break away from Russia. Also lays great stress on Berlin-Bagdad and Germany's control of the Ottoman Empire. Is in favour of internal democratic reform and the Reichstag Resolution of 19 July, 1917. Its formula is that if Germany does not lose the war she will have won it. Röhrbach insists that even a *status quo* peace which left Germany's compact with Turkey unbroken would give Germany the whip-hand over England.

Europäische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung, edited by Alfred Jaffé. Is in favour of internal democratic reform. In foreign politics, in so far as its policy is determined by Jaffé, it is always changing from week to week. Jaffé is full of new ideas and his paper constantly dashes off in new lines. But it is definitely opposed to the Pangermans.

Die Hilfe, organ of Friedrich Naumann, the author of *Mittel-Europa*, and also the ex-leader of the Nationalist-Socialist Party, which came to nothing. That Party was founded upon the idea of a combination of a strong Monarchy and Socialism; Naumann is now a leading

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member of the Left Wing of the Radical (Progressive) Party and contrives to take a strong interest in all social movements. Its attitude towards foreign policy and peace aims is very much that of the Majority Socialists.

Sozialistische Monatshefte (fortnightly), organ of a group of Imperialist Social Democrats, Cohen, Quessel, Kloth, &c. Its speciality is the continental idea, *i.e.*, the union of the whole European continent, including Russia, against the Anglo-Saxons. Was therefore very much opposed to the policy of breaking off any parts of the old Russian Empire. It is also a strong advocate of German colonial claims.

Die Glocke.—Weekly organ of another group of Imperialist Social Democrats. Founded in 1915, and is financed by the shady Russian Socialist Parvus (whose real name is Helphand). He made a fortune in Turkey and lives *en prince* in Copenhagen. It is edited by Konrad Haenisch. Regular contributors are Janssen, Lensch and Winnig. Janssen and Winnig are prominent Trade Unionist leaders. Lensch is a real Jingo and *Die Glocke* is aggressively Imperialist.

Neue Zeit.—Former organ of the Social Democrat Minority, edited by Kautsky. Since, however, it was partly financed by the party, the Majority leaders were able to eject Kautsky last October and to change it into a Majority organ. It is now edited by Heinrich Cunow. Takes a more moderate line than the other two Socialist periodicals.

Internationale Korrespondenz appears every two or three days. Is an organ of the extreme Right of the Social Democratic Party. Is edited by Heilman, who is opposed to parliamentary government, and would like to see the State governed by a bureaucracy, only the bureaucrats must be Socialists. The *Internationale Korrespondenz* is largely occupied with accounts of the doings of foreign Socialists.

Mr. Franklin and the Peace Negotiations

We have received the following communication from Mr. Ernest L. Franklin with reference to the article in No. 75 of the NEW EUROPE:—

“My attention has just been drawn to a reference to myself in the article entitled ‘Playing with Austria,’ which appears in your issue of 21 March. It is there suggested that a letter of mine, read at a recent meeting at Essex Hall, stated that I was aware that secret negotiations were proceeding between the Allies and the enemy. I should be obliged if you would allow me to correct that entirely erroneous interpretation. The negotiations to which I referred, as the context of my letter clearly showed, were the speeches made by our statesmen and those of the enemy countries in the Parliaments and elsewhere which were transmitted by ‘wireless.’ I knew and know nothing whatsoever of any private negotiations.”

The Lichnowsky Memorandum

Owing to the pressure on our space and to the fact that, as we have just heard, Messrs. Cassell are about to publish the full text of the Lichnowsky Memorandum, we do not propose ourselves to continue the publication, which we started in No 76.

35.114

THE NEW EUROPE, Vol. VI.

Volume VI. is complete with the present number. Binding cases may be obtained from Messrs. Constable, price 2/- or 2/3 post paid. The complete bound volume is also to be obtained from Messrs. Constable, price 10/6 net.

Index to Vol. VI.

In order to save paper we are not including the index in each copy of the present number, which completes the volume. The index will be sent only to (a) all subscribers, (b) any other readers who care to apply for it.

Diary of Current Events

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| <p>7 March.—Treaty between Germany and Finland.</p> <p>21 March.—Destroyer action off Dunkirk. Mühlton's memorandum published in <i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>.</p> <p>22 March.—British Minister at The Hague informs Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs of decision to requisition Dutch ships.</p> <p>23 March.—Mr. Baker, American Secretary for War, arrives in London.</p> <p>24 March.—Fall of Péronne.</p> <p>25 March.—Fall of Bapaume. Dutch ships allowed to sail up Rhine to Germany. Kaiser's benevolent message to Åland Islands. Kamenev arrested by Finnish White Guards on Åland Islands.</p> <p>26 March.—Fall of Roye. Suppressed portions of Lichnowsky's memorandum begin to appear in <i>Politiken</i> (Stockholm.) Enemy force destroyed on Euphrates.</p> | <p>27 March.—Pope's Easter message to Britain. Fall of Albert.</p> <p>28 March.—Viscount Motono, Japanese Foreign Minister, resigns.</p> <p>30 March.—Lloyd George announces appointment of Gen. Foch as Generalissimo of Allied Forces. Report of stubborn resistance on part of Bolshéviki against German division in Ukraine.</p> <p>31 March.—Annual Conference of British Socialist Party at Leeds. Bolshéviki reported to have recaptured Odessa from Germans.</p> <p>1 April.—I.L.P. Conference opens at Leicester.</p> <p>2 April.—Quebec under military control: casualties from anti-conscriptionist rioting. Formal Dutch protest at Washington against requisitioning of ships. Count Czernin on alleged peace feelers with M. Clemenceau.</p> |
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ERRATA: p. 376, l. 1, for "lictors" read "victors."
p. 379, l. 22, for "attacks" read "attack."

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
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
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
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