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
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
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10 January 1918]

[SUPPLEMENT TO THE NEW EUROPE

THE NEW EUROPE

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THE NEW EUROPE

A Weekly Review
of Foreign Politics

VOL. V

18 October 1917—10 January 1918

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1918

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"The land is there, the men are there,
but the nation has been lost"

—Stanislas Wyspiański

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18 October 1917

German Policy in Poland

FOR a thousand years Eastern Europe has been considered by Germany as her *Hinterland*, its political arrangement as her most vital concern. The division of Poland as established in 1815 suited Prussia's own structure; the gaps and indentures of her eastern border were filled, yet the foreign element thus included in the Prussian State was too weak vitally to affect its character. Internationally, the line drawn across Poland at the Congress of Vienna, however arbitrary it was, proved the most stable of all the frontiers established by that Congress. It remained undisturbed for an entire century and has not given rise to a single war—because it suited Prussia. In time, a balance of interests and fears was established on this territorial basis, such as could not have been devised for Prussia even by her ablest statesmen; chance and time have to supply the warp for human ingenuity to weave on. In the course of the fifty years which followed the Congress of Vienna, the anti-Polish interest became a link between Berlin and St. Petersburg; but—what is more peculiar—even the favourable treatment accorded to the Poles in Austria since 1866 redounded to the benefit of Prussia. The Austrian Poles, to escape the fate of their countrymen in Russian Poland and in their desire to retain their dominion over the Little Russians of Eastern Galicia, had to mount guard for the Habsburg Monarchy, "Germany's heritage." The defection of the Poles, gained at the price of these concessions, paralysed the Slav cause in Austria-Hungary and enabled the German and the Magyar firmly to establish their dominion. This dominion, coupled with the Slav unrest which it was bound to produce, has rendered the Habsburg Monarchy dependent on Germany. The scheme on which Germany's preponderance in Eastern Europe rested had thus become so perfect and so intricate as to render her averse from change and from the risks which it was bound to entail.

When the present war broke out Germany had no

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war-aims with regard to Poland. In Poland she would have liked best to preserve the *status quo ante bellum*, both territorial and moral. Russia and Austria put forward their respective programmes—complete reunion under Russia *versus* a State formed out of Russian and Austrian Poland in connection with the Habsburg Monarchy. The Russian scheme threatened Prussia with the loss of strategically indispensable territory, the Austrian with a vast increase of Polish influence within Austria-Hungary, a settlement of the conflict between Russia and the Poles, and consequently a consolidation of Polish interests on an anti-German basis. When the German armies entered Warsaw on 5 August, 1915, it was still the intention of Berlin, for the price of immediate separate peace, to retrocede Poland to Russia; by renouncing territorial gains in Poland Germany yet hoped to recover the moral *status quo ante*. During the next half year, however, German statesmen seem to have recognised that changes in “imponderables” had been wrought by the war such as could not be obliterated any more, and that it was therefore unsafe to count on resuming pre-war relations with Petrograd. Strategical “securities” were now demanded—a short, straight front in the East, cutting off the enormous salient which Poland forms between East and West Prussia in the north, Posnanian and Silesia in the west, and Galicia in the south. But in the autumn of 1915 a partition of Russian Poland between the Central Powers was as yet generally considered the only alternative to the so-called Austrian Solution (assuming, of course, that Russian Poland was not recovered by or retroceded to Russia).

In December, 1915, the division of Poland into a German and an Austrian sphere of occupation, which had hitherto been covered by the conception of the spheres of the respective Army Commands, was put on a more regular, permanent basis. At the same time, however, Germany entered the first binding obligation with regard to the future of Poland. Answering a memorandum presented by Baron Burián, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg wrote as follows: “Your Excellency has brought forward a number of arguments which demonstrate that to partition Russian Poland between our States would be against their interests even during the continuance

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of the war, and after the war would give rise to constant trouble, and would involve a serious danger to our Eastern frontiers. I, therefore, waive that idea." (This interesting passage from a secret German document was first published in an article in the *New Statesman*, 18 November, 1916.) Yet no promise was given at that date not to retrocede Poland to Russia; that decision, though no doubt already maturing, was not put on record until in the German Chancellor's speech of 5 April, 1916. As the question of the retrocession of Poland vitally concerned Austrian war-aims, a public pronouncement of that kind constituted an obligation on the part of Germany. Her choice of schemes to be adopted for the Polish question was gradually narrowed down. Austria was exerting a growing pressure in favour of her own solution. Discussion on Poland and Central European Union was proceeding concurrently. So far all German promises with regard to Poland were made to Austria alone, none to the Poles.

It is not known at what date the German Government first broached to Austria the ideas on the future of Poland, which were to find expression in the Act of 5 November, 1916. But there is reason to believe that Herr von Beseler, the German Governor-General of Warsaw, began to act on them as early as the spring of 1916, and that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, when making his speech of 5 April, 1916, already considered the possibility of forming Russian Poland into a semi-dependent State. If Germany was to retain her own Polish provinces, that scheme seemed preferable to the Austrian Solution, because it would leave Austria with an unredeemed, dissatisfied Polish population in Western Galicia, which would no longer be restrained by the fear of Russia; and the Habsburgs would be in the same boat with the Hohenzollerns. On the other hand, the union of Austrian and Russian Poland would accentuate the anomalous position of Prussian Poland, and, by preserving full concord between the Poles and Austria, would vastly enhance the influence of the Poles within the Habsburg Monarchy. But the crushing defeat which Austria suffered on the Russian front in the summer of 1916 rendered it impossible for her to press her own scheme on Germany effectively; and there is reason to believe that Berlin made Roumania's entry into the War an opportunity

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for blackmailing Vienna. After having stemmed the Russian advance in Volynia and Galicia, Germany sent to Transylvania an army of picked divisions under her best generals; and Austria had to give way to the Germans with regard to Poland.

There were obvious reasons both for and against Germany declaring her intentions with regard to Poland. She could not commit herself to any definite scheme without restricting still further her freedom of action—a great asset in peace intrigues and manœuvres. On the other hand, if she desired to exclude solutions of the Polish Question particularly obnoxious to her, she could do so best by laying the foundations of a more tolerable settlement whilst the war lasted. The idea of a Poland intimately connected with the Austrian State had never met with an enthusiastic response among the Poles outside Galicia, and whatever acceptance it had received was shaken by the truly monumental stupidity which the Austrian military and civilian authorities have displayed during the War. To give but one example: it was admitted by the Austrian Minister for War, in a letter to the President of the Supreme National Committee of Galicia, 4 March, 1915, No. 1436/2 (published in the "Documents of the Supreme National Committee," 1914-1917, p. 100, No. 66, Cracow, 1917), that Russian Poles serving in the Austrian-Polish Legions, who had been medically discharged from the Legions, were interned as alien enemies. Austria's defeats in the field, also, considerably lowered her prestige among the Poles. The Germans counted on it that the watchword of independence, if once thrown out, would finally kill in Russian Poland the idea of union with the Habsburg Monarchy. It was clearly the right time to deal this blow at the Austrian schemes, when Austria was unable to resist it.

But there was yet another reason for settling on some definite plan with regard to Poland at that time. By the autumn of 1916 man-power had become a most pressing problem for Germany. Once more she had been able to save Austria, but the prospects of the Central Powers in case of another joint Allied offensive, in the East as well as in the West, were by no means reassuring. The experiment of impressing labour from the occupied districts in Belgium, France, Lithuania and Poland had failed.

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Help on a voluntary basis could not be obtained, even from nationalities hostile to autocratic Russia, without definite obligations being accepted towards them. In the Polish Legions, which had volunteered for war against Russia, a serious crisis had broken out in August-September, 1916. Their creator, Brigadier Pilsudski, and his followers refused to continue their work any longer unless the ideal for which they had set out to fight was realised, that is, unless Poland was restored to the position of a State. At a moment when the need for recruits and labour was felt most severely in Germany, and when the wishes of Austria could most easily be disregarded, the German Government was forced to declare whether or not it was prepared to pay for Polish help and to adopt a definite policy with regard to Poland.

The German Government decided to act. During October, 1916, discussions took place at Berlin between Polish notables and German statesmen. Germany admitted, for the first time, that the Poles should be heard in their own affairs, and that Poland should be treated as something more than a mere object of negotiations. By the end of the month prominent Warsaw politicians were invited to present the wishes of the Poles in a formal manner to the Central Powers. On 28 October they were received by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin, on the 30th by Baron Burián in Vienna. They demanded that an Act of State "be published whereby the monarchs of the Central Powers would recognise, proclaim and guarantee an independent Poland." Then immediate steps would have to be taken to put the Act into practice :—

(1) A Regent to be appointed, exercising full Government power on the territory of the Polish State.

(2) The frontier between the two spheres of occupation to be abolished.

(3) A Provisional Council of State, consisting of Poles, to be formed, entrusted with (a) preparing the draft of the constitution and of laws; and (b) with organising a Polish administration.

(4) A Military Department to be formed in connection with the Council of State, which would organise the future Polish army; the Polish Legions to serve as its cadres.

(5) The proclamation of a Polish king would form the last step in the creation of a Polish State; and the final stage in the re-constitution of Poland would be to define its frontiers at the conclusion of peace.

Answering this address, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg

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read out the Manifesto which was subsequently published in Warsaw and Lublin on 5 November. It contained the promise of forming the Polish territories conquered from Russia into "an independent State with an hereditary monarch and a constitutional form of government." "The exact definition of the frontiers of the Kingdom of Poland," it went on to say, "is reserved to the future. In the union with the two Allied Powers the new kingdom will find the guarantees which it needs for the free development of its forces. The glorious traditions of the old Polish armies and the memory of the brave Polish comrades of the great war are to be continued in a Polish army. Its organisation, development and leadership will be settled by a common understanding."

Baron Burián's answer was more explicit. "The future Kingdom of Poland," he said, "will, of course, not be able to begin its full existence as a State until after the conclusion of peace, and it will find the guarantees of its existence in a close union, political as well as military, with the two Central Powers. You have expressed in your Memorandum a series of requests which cannot be discussed as yet. You may, however, rest assured that in an understanding with our German allies I shall try as far as possible to meet your wishes at the right time."

The divergencies between the Polish claims and the answers given by the Central Powers are obvious. The Poles had demanded that a complete Polish State should be created, with an army to support it and a government to direct that army. The Central Powers were prepared to enter into the question of the army alone. The events of the ten months which followed on the Act of 5 November read like comment on the original fundamental disagreement with which the scheme of an independent Polish State under the auspices of the Central Powers was ushered in.

The German official view of the Act of 5 November may be summed up as follows. The main limitations which this Act imposed on German policy were in reality already contained in her promises to Austria, namely, that Poland should be neither partitioned between the two Powers nor retroceded to Russia. As an inclusion of the whole of Russian Poland in Prussia was out of the question, and as the Austrian Solution was considered inadmissible by

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Germany, nothing remained but to form Russian Poland into a separate State. But whilst promises given to Austria could still have been changed by agreement (supported by blackmail), the public Act addressed to the Poles materially altered the situation. Yet the idea underlying the new scheme—which, whilst excluding Russia from Poland, upheld the main frontiers as established by the Congress of Vienna—did not seem unfavourable to Germany, provided always that the Poles were not allowed to develop uncontrolled into a new Power which might affect unfavourably the further diplomatic and military developments on the eastern front. What, therefore, the Germans could never have admitted was that a Polish army within the camp of the Central Powers should be controlled by a Polish Government, capable of pursuing a policy of its own. As Austria could not be relied upon in the Polish question, a real consolidation of the Polish State might have opened up numerous possibilities for intrigues highly inconvenient to Germany. For Austria even now did not abandon the hope of realising her own plans with regard to Poland. It signified by the “exclusion” of Galicia from Austria, that this province might yet form part of Poland, provided the latter in one form or another became part of the Habsburg dominions. Henceforth Austria supported the Polish demands for a Government and a Regency, on the understanding that the Regent should be an Austrian Archduke. The Germans intended to make some immediate concessions to the Poles, but of a non-political nature. Since the spring of 1916 they had allowed Polish schools to be founded in Russian Poland and municipal and district councils to be set up. The new State which they proclaimed on 5 November was to mark, so long as the war lasted, merely a further and important step in the same direction. It was not to be a real State but a glorified County Council—and even that without any central executive save the German Governor-General, for there was to be not even the shadow of a Polish Government. An army was to be raised immediately, but for the duration of the war Germany was to retain a “life-interest” in it; it was to remain entirely and exclusively under her control.

Whatever were its limitations, and whatever the use, or rather the abuse, which the Germans intended to make of

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it, the Act of 5 November, 1916, was of capital importance to the Poles. The Polish question had now attained a plane from which it could never again be relegated either by ill-will or bad faith on the part of Germany or by the changing phases of the war. To reap and multiply the advantages of the Act and to avoid its pitfalls was henceforward the task of responsible Polish leaders. It is the merit of Brigadier Joseph Pilsudski, the leader of the revolutionary Socialists, Poland's most prominent statesman and soldier, that these pitfalls have been avoided. He was prepared to raise a Polish army and to continue to fight Russia, should Russia try to re-impose by force her dominion on Poland. But under no circumstances would he admit such an army to be formed without a Polish national Government having first been set up to direct it. A national Polish army was not to be a tool in the hands of a foreign and even hostile Power, nor was it to be at the service of any self-appointed political adventurers; it had to be an integral part of a sovereign Polish State, or it was not to be at all.

Of the demands made by the Polish notables on 28 October, only one was realised—a Polish Provisional Council of State was allowed to assemble at Warsaw on 14 January, 1917. But even this was merely a preparatory measure, the starting-point for further negotiations and controversies concerning the really material problems, the transfer of legislative and executive power in Poland to the Poles and the creation of a Polish army. Meanwhile, however, a change seems to have come over the attitude of the German Government. Originally it had been so keen on raising that army that its first recruiting appeal to the Poles was issued within a week of 5 November: but since about New Year, 1917, the Germans seem to have been losing interest in the Polish army. Was it because they recognised that they could not have it except at a price which they were not prepared to pay? Or were they, perhaps, once more influenced by peace negotiations with the reactionary clique at Petrograd?

The acknowledgment of Polish independence by revolutionary Russia on 30 March, 1917, destroyed the main premisses of the Act of 5 November. After Russia had renounced her claim on Poland, the promise of the Central

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Powers to re-establish a Polish State lost most of its significance, whilst the limitations attached to that promise by the terms of the Act of 5 November, and still more by the practice of the occupying authorities, gained in prominence. The occupying Powers were now the obstacle, not merely to Poland's national reunion, but also to the building of a Polish State within the borders of Russian Poland. As to the Polish army, there was no longer any reason why the Poles should raise it for war against Russia; but if the Polish army could not be absolutely relied upon to fight against Russia, Germany had no longer any reason to allow it to be formed at all. The most the Germans could henceforth expect from the Poles was that they should remain neutral, and most certain of all is the neutrality of a State which has no army. Further, the disorganisation of the Russian army has very much reduced Germany's need for help on the Eastern front.

About May, 1917, the German authorities, to whom the Polish Legions had been handed over by Austria as cadres for the future Polish army, began to apply to them a system of petty *sabotage*, probably with the deliberate purpose of destroying them. Attempts were made to introduce the German language in the training camps, uniforms of a German cut were handed out, invidious distinctions were drawn between Russian and Austrian Poles, and so on. Finally, the makers of the Legions had themselves to break the sword which they had forged. By the middle of July, 1917, the cadres of the future Polish army had practically disappeared, and with them the possibility of forming a Polish army.

Thus the only line of development indicated in the Act of 5 November could be pursued no longer. But the idea of raising a Polish army having been shelved, the problem of the Polish Government was simplified for Germany. Previously the Germans could not have allowed it to be formed because, whatever limitations they might have tried to impose on it, it had merely to exist to become the supreme authority for the Polish army. What the Poles desired was a national Government in Warsaw, formed by the choice of the nation, controlling the administration of the country, disposing of its resources, directing its army, and in turn supported by it. All that Germany could offer

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them, with proper regard to her own interests, was either an army without a Government, or a Government without an army—so that in neither case should Poland become an independent factor in the war. And this Poland can only be, provided that her Government truly represents the country and has its roots in the native soil, and that its army is part of a sovereign national State.

The question of a Polish Government, about which the Act of 5 November had preserved complete silence, now moved into the foreground. Germany could no longer think of making the Polish Council of State play for ever the part of the "homunculus" in the mediæval German legend, who counted the number of poppy seeds in a bushel. The drafting of unavailing memoranda by the Council, and the sterile discussions which were for Germany a new way of marking time in the Polish question, had to come to an end. The German Government had once more to make its choice—either to scrap the policy which it had pursued in Poland since the spring of 1916, or to make some further concessions to the Poles. But it is always advisable to keep a policy "going," for it is like a bicycle in motion; however difficult the road over which it runs, there is, so long as it is moving, always a chance of keeping the balance and a hope of reaching more even ground. Moreover, to scrap a policy of conciliation is the worst of diplomatic defeats; it is contrary to the principle *de ne jamais prononcer de mots sur lesquels on ne revient pas*. By destroying what had been done in Poland during the past year Germany would not have done away with the Polish question, but cleared the ground for other rival solutions. Hence Germany had to "carry on."

The Patent published by the Central Powers on 12 September, 1917, sets up a Polish Government which consists of a Regency Council of three members; of a Premier and a Cabinet; and of a Council of State. The Premier and the Council of State are to be chosen by the Regency Council, subject to the approval of the Central Powers. The functions of the Polish authorities are limited to what may be described as the peace branches of administration—education, justice, public welfare, agriculture, and finance as far as it concerns the departments assigned to their care; their authority does not extend to military and foreign affairs,

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trade and inner political administration. The Polish authorities may legislate on matters handed over to them, but the German and Austrian Governor-Generals have the right to veto even these bills within a fortnight of their having been completed. Matters not handed over to the Polish authorities can be discussed by them only with the consent of the occupying Powers; but the latter may legislate on them and have merely to consult the Polish authorities first, without however being bound by their opinion. Moreover, for the maintenance of important war interests, the Governor-Generals may issue binding regulations which the Polish authorities are bound to execute. Lastly, even the work of the Polish executive authorities within the province conceded to them remains subject to a certain amount of control on the part of the Austrian and German authorities.

As it is essential to the Poles that the Peace Congress should not find them without some kind of a regular government and an administration, they had to agree to work even under the limitations imposed on them by the Patent of 12 September, 1917. It must now be their chief concern to render the new Government at Warsaw representative, and to place it on the firmest foundations both at home and abroad. That it should not gain strength and recognition either at home or abroad, is the concern of the Germans. It is for that reason that they deny the Warsaw Government the right to have diplomatic intercourse with other nations. At home the Germans mean to weaken the Polish Government by depriving it of such support as it might find in a King or Regent of royal blood—a support which, it is true, might easily be paid for at an excessive price. They also intend—and this is infinitely more important—to prevent the summoning of a Polish Diet or Constituent Assembly. “The hard conditions of war,” writes the German Emperor in a letter covering the Patent of 12 September, “do not admit, unfortunately, that a King should revive the splendour of the old Polish Crown, and that an Assembly elected by universal and direct suffrage should start its deliberations for the good of the country.” William II. has thereby underlined the contrast between the German attitude towards Poland and that of Revolutionary Russia. Germany refuses to Poland that “Constituent

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Assembly at Warsaw" which was postulated by the Russian proclamation of 30 March.

Germany has been able to veto Austria's proposal to set up a Habsburg as Regent of Poland; she will find it very much more difficult to veto Poland's demand for a Diet. Here she will have to contend against the will of the whole Polish nation and against "the great wind which has risen out of the north." Either there will be a democratic Polish Diet or the new Polish Government will be a sham.

A Defence of Diplomats

THE indictment of our diplomatic service by your correspondent "Diplomaticus," founded, as it evidently is, on a long and intimate experience of the service from outside, calls for some reply. Members of the service, especially in war time, cannot defend themselves, so may I, as a diplomat who has only recently exchanged diplomacy for "Intelligence," be admitted as the "*advocatus diaboli*."

The difficulty of a defence is that, judged by results, no defence is possible. The defenders of our diplomacy and of the system that produces it—and it has defenders in high places—have to face the fact that it has already been convicted of culpable incompetence by public opinion and condemned. But they deny the competence of the court and rely on the improbability of its sentence being executed. The writ of the people does not as a rule run in Whitehall.

As a democrat, however, I anticipate that on the removal of the "lighting restrictions" the Whitehall lamp-posts may be restored to their national as well as to their municipal functions; and as a diplomat I intend to show that there is no true bill against my former colleagues. It is more important to hang the guilty than to hang someone, and even more important to set free the good men than to hang anyone. If the object is to extirpate the evil responsible for our failures, cut it off root and branch, if you will; but do not lop the branches and leave the root.

The root of the evil does not, in fact, lie in any peculiar point of view of the diplomatic service nor in that of the Foreign Office as a whole, nor is it even in that of

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the class from which both are recruited, though there your correspondent is getting very warm. What has happened is this. The Foreign Office, following a general constitutional tendency, has developed its functions in such a way as to distort the normal growth of our governmental system in respect of foreign affairs and defer the introduction of democratic ideas and institutions in our foreign relations. It would take too long to trace the course of this development and explain all its consequences. The result, crudely and concisely put, is that whereas, theoretically, the Foreign Office is merely a connecting link between the people's representatives in Parliament and the Empire's representatives abroad, practically it has made itself the sole organ, not only for the conduct of foreign affairs, but for the control of foreign policy. If this only meant that in foreign affairs our Government was a good deal more bureaucratic and less democratic than in home affairs, the consequences, though they would probably have been distressing in some respects, would not have been generally so disastrous as they have been. But it is a fact that you cannot have a sound and efficient bureaucracy except in conjunction with democracy. Left to itself and freed from the restraint and stimulus of the democratic partnership, bureaucracy runs to seed and suckers. Now the Foreign Office bureaucracy has not only succeeded in reducing democracy on the one side and diplomacy on the other to complete dependence on itself, but certain esoteric and exotic elements of the bureaucracy have in turn subjected it to the control of a small clique. Thus, while Parliament has delegated foreign affairs to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet to the Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Secretary depends not on the departmental heads, still less on the diplomatic chiefs, but on a personal entourage or clique that I shall, for convenience, call the "camarilla." This camarilla is centred in, but not confined to, the private secretaries—the principal private secretary being, not as elsewhere a junior, who after a few years "behind the throne" emerges with a well-earned C.B. into the obscurity of departmental work—but a personage—a K.C.B. at least—whose term of power is limited only by the frailty of mortal man and is based on two or three main points:—first, the complete command of all access to the Foreign Secretary, whether by officials or outsiders; second,

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complete control of the appointments to the service as of the promotion, transfer and reward of all members of it; and thirdly, the outside support of certain cliques that are almost all-powerful in the official world.

Let us see how this works. The first object of the camarilla is, of course, the maintenance of its system. This requires the elimination of all individual independence from the departments and the diplomatic service and the establishment of the "esoteric" standards of elegant incompetence denounced by "Diplomaticus." For this reason diplomats are discouraged in a variety of ways from achievements and accomplishments likely to strengthen their personal position. For example, and examples could be multiplied *ad nauseam*, the first candidate that took up Russian for his examination has never been sent to Russia; the diplomat who made himself an international authority on Turkey, found it impossible, to get reappointed to Constantinople; the Foreign Office clerk who made himself an expert in Spanish commerce was brought home to edit Blue Books; and all three eventually left the public service in middle life. Diplomats at present serve for their first twenty years at a pecuniary cost to themselves of £400 to £500 per annum; they do so not with the object, but with the prospect of receiving thereafter salaries of from £2,000 to £10,000. The work they do, often of the most responsible and difficult character, is known to the camarilla alone. They consequently depend on this camarilla for their recompense in the form of deferred pay, for the recognition of their public service, and even for their private happiness. For transfers may mean the break up of family life, or a load of private debt for public expenditure, or waste of tedious labour on languages or other local studies just as such labour is bearing fruit. I have known a man who had been doing eight hours extra work a day for eighteen months, refused the few weeks he asked for to complete his enterprise before being transferred to the other side of the world. For even under these conditions Englishmen refuse to look on the service as a sinecure and succeed in getting hold of and putting through first-class work. Nor are arbitrary transfers the only difficulty they have to deal with. Denial of all access to the home authorities is one of their worst disadvantages. There has been more than one diplomatist who has suc-

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cessfully negotiated intricate matters of the first importance not only without any opportunity being allowed him of direct discussion with the competent persons at home, but even without ever having made the personal acquaintance of his own Secretary of State. As to recognitions and promotions, they are only of public importance in so far as they increase the opportunities for work of the right man. If the right men are those recommended by the diplomatic chiefs then these recognitions do not go to the right men. It has actually been given out as a reason for not giving a C.B. to a diplomat recommended by his ambassador that he had "asked for it."

On the other hand, the worst disasters of our diplomacy in recent years have, without exception, been due to the promotion of men who were known in the services to be "wrong 'uns" who should have been got rid of. It is discouraging to any expert service if special work is deliberately withheld from those recognised by the service as being personally or professionally qualified, but it is utterly demoralising if it is reserved for those who cannot even conform to the conventional standards of their class in conduct or capacity. But diplomacy has not let itself be demoralised without some effort in its own interest and in that of the public. Dissatisfaction has even reached such a point that, impatient of the impotence of its critics to realise and remove the evil, the service has tried to do so itself. I remember especially two such movements in the last twenty years and will report them for the first time, as they show the progress already made from inside towards finding a cure and the vantage points already gained. For probably it is on these lines and starting from these points that any real reforms must be pursued.

The first of these movements, early in the century, concerned the Foreign Office, which in those days was still, thanks to the contemporary camarilla, as to its administration and methods, much as it had been half a century earlier. The results of the workings of its mediæval machinery from the point of view of the public interest would have been ludicrous if they had not been lamentable. The waste of time and trouble in its rococo routine was the least of the evils, though one recalled with regret the comparatively simple "*Zweckmässigkeit*" of the Sublime

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Porte where you scribbled on a scrap of paper in the palm of your hand and then stuffed it into a sack in the corner. It was not only that a highly-educated and not under-paid young graduate spent his whole time in such occupations as copying despatches in long hand and drying them before the fire because blotting paper and typewriters were not received at court, nor even that the evenings he might have spent at least less stupidly were often occupied with waiting about until he had tied up with red tape, labelled and sealed some messenger bag to a foreign mission by a method which would allow of its being opened and reclosed by an "unauthorised person" *en route* in just seven and a half minutes; but mostly in the general "esoteric" effluvium remarked by "Diplomaticus" as still to-day permeating diplomacy. The atmosphere of the Foreign Office at this time was that of the Court of Pumpnickel, and if by the outbreak of war it had advanced to that of the Court of Potsdam it achieved this improvement through its own initiative and ideals.

Dissatisfaction with the Pumpnickel *chinoiseries* came to a head about 1904 when a diplomat employed in the Foreign Office sacrificed himself by appealing to Cæsar in the name of common sense. The only immediate result was, of course, that the forlorn hope lost its leader who found scope for his courage and capacity on a larger stage. But the forts of folly had been shaken, and though the camarilla fought hard for the ritual of its "Egyptian Temple," as Bright used to call it, yet on the appointment of a diplomat as Permanent Secretary, the whole departmental machinery and method of the office was remodelled on modern lines. Since then the Foreign Office has been in administrative method the equal of any department and the superior of most.

This, however, was only a matter of departmental administration; the methods of diplomatists remained unchanged and the esoteric traditions of "good form" and *fainéantise* were even more strongly enforced than ever. Energetic diplomats succeeded under favourable conditions in bringing the methods of certain Missions up to date; but the impossibility of any concerted action and the insecurity of tenure nullified many such efforts. What mattered more was that a realisation of the root of the evil and an

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agreement as to the remedy became pretty general in the Service. The demand for amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office that had been growing for a quarter of a century became so strong that some concession had to be made. The individual and temporary exchanges recommended in the 'sixties were introduced about 1907. But the only result of this was that diplomats abroad often found themselves working under officials whose knowledge of diplomacy was a minus quantity, while in the office they were on principle excluded from all real work, especially that for which they had qualified themselves abroad. A diplomat who, as the trusted delegate of his chief, had been carrying on first class negotiations abroad, would find in the office that he had to draft letters for clerks many years his junior, and that any such letters that concerned matters he had dealt with abroad were carefully given to someone else. Foreign Office clerks, on the other hand, found their very limited prospects of promotion still further restricted. This superficial remedy, therefore, if anything, only accentuated the evil.

At last a leading foreign mission, in an exceptionally strong position as to personnel and prestige, plucked up courage to present privately a round robin with a "petition of rights" on behalf of the service. The immediate results were of course nil, or rather annihilation. The mission was dispersed as soon as might be and the moving spirit, after various vicissitudes, successfully eliminated. But though the frontal demonstration failed, the flank attack that followed had better success. Influential personages in London were convinced of the necessity of reform and converted to the proposals of the petition. The final result was the report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service dealing with the Foreign Office Diplomatic and Consular Services, published shortly after the outbreak of war.* The recommendations of this report constitute a definite public record of the reforms required in the opinion of competent public men after careful public enquiry. The whole is very well worth reading, and I will only reproduce here the leading recommendations.

The Commission recommended—

(a) The reconstruction of the Board of Selection for

* Fifth Report of the Commissioners. [C.D. 7748.] Price 5½d.

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candidates in such a way as would prevent the control of entry hitherto exercised by the camarilla; as well as the complete assimilation of the examination to that for the rest of the Civil Service and the abolition on the income qualification.

(b) The amalgamation of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. This indispensable condition for a "united *esprit de corps*" (I quote the report) had already been urged by the Ridley Commission in 1890. The natural reluctance of the camarilla to give effect to this reasoned recommendation is mainly responsible for the subsequent deficiencies in our diplomacy.

(c) The payment of a living wage and the assignment of promotions and transfers to a properly constituted departmental body; as also the lengthening of the periods of employment at any post. This would improve the capacity of diplomatists and the conditions under which they work.

(d) The relegation of routine work to the second division and a reduction in the numbers. This would increase efficiency and reduce expenditure.

"If our proposals are adopted," says the report, "the diplomatic service will be made more attractive to men of ability and high academic training, while its members will have greater opportunity of studying subjects of value to them in their profession. Charges have been made before us of defects of knowledge and narrowness of outlook in members of the diplomatic service and, without admitting the justice of such general criticisms, we consider that in many cases there is room for improvement."

It will be seen that the point of view and the proposals are the same as those arrived at by "Diplomaticus" as a result of his independent outside observation. They had already been reached by members of the service as the result of long and often bitter inside experience. If we allow them to be pigeon-holed as were the proposals of the Ridley Commission of 1890 we have no one but ourselves to blame for the inevitable consequences. It will be our democracy that is at fault, not our diplomacy.

There remains, however, one indispensable reform that did not come within the scope of the Royal Commission, being a matter of constitutional rather than of civil service reform. As has been pointed out, the evil lies not only

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in the demoralisation of our diplomatic institutions by a camarilla in the Foreign Office, but in their usurpation of the functions of Parliament. Restoration of the parliamentary control of foreign policy is even more important than a restoration of efficiency in the conduct of foreign affairs. For we have learnt that there can be no progress, international or internal, without peace, and there can be no peace without some measure of democratic control in foreign affairs. As a result of this war we shall no doubt in common with the other Powers set up a standing Parliamentary Committee with definite responsibilities. The general advantage of such a Committee to the control of our foreign policy represents too large a subject to be dealt with here. But the advantage to the conduct of foreign affairs must be pointed out, if only because it is argued that such a Committee would result in a weakly and leaky diplomacy. As a result of many hard-fought battles with foreign negotiators having such a Committee behind them, I am convinced that it not only strengthens foreign policy but stimulates diplomacy, and that the risk of any indiscretion is negligible. Moreover, though it is very doubtful whether the Bureaucracy can now appreciate this, yet once the innovation is instituted they will soon learn to use it; and will find that just as the press was at one time treated as an antagonist in foreign affairs and has now become an agent, so Parliament, which diplomacy now looks on as a useless impediment, can become an instrument of immense power.

So much for the programme. The procedure is simple enough and there is no reason why it should not be carried out at once, though probably it will have to wait till after the war. Parliament has only got to set up its permanent Committee on foreign affairs and make it responsible, among other functions, for realising the recommendations of the Royal Commission. There will be some bureaucratic resistance, but not much: for the war has already done something towards letting some light into its lower stories and clearing some lumber out of the upper. But if nothing is done, with peace the devils will return sevenfold, and the last state will be worse than the first. The barriers between Whitehall and Westminster, between the departments and the diplomats, between the Foreign Secretary and the depart-

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ments, will be rebuilt and behind them the camarilla will again entrench itself for a new lease of power.

Finally, I would sum up this defence of the diplomatic service by pointing out that it is the demand that regulates both quantity and quality of the supply. A comparison of the work of Englishmen and of foreigners in many occupations both in peace and war proves abundantly that Englishmen of the upper class, though less well educated, can develop a greater energy and *expertise* than their peers of other races if called on to do so and given a fair chance. If the English do not get energy and efficiency from their diplomatists it is because others require of them more esoteric and exotic excellences.

GEORGE YOUNG.

Russian Contradictions

[*The author of this article is the newly-arrived London correspondent of the great Russian newspaper, the Russkoe Slovo (Moscow: Liberal in tone). A man of moderate views but wide democratic sympathies, he is well fitted to interpret the confusing contemporary movement of Russian politics to the British public.—ED.*]

THE greatest mistake of the new Russian *régime* is that everyone has too soon forgotten the old Russian *régime*. The fall of Riga, for example, was certainly a sharp stab for Russian patriots, and a blow for all the friends of Russia; but one must have utterly forgotten the immense tragedies of the past, Warsaw, Kovna, Vilna—this disastrous road of Tsarism, from the Vistula to the Dwina—in order to condemn the new *régime* by the fall of Riga in itself. We can, and we must, express our repugnance of the Bolsheviks, of their want of patriotism, their exaggerated cosmopolitanism; but, for all that, let us ever remember their evil predecessors, that band of cosmopolites in the gilded livery which surrounded the Tsarina, Alexandra von Hessen—the Suhomlinovs, the Stürmers, the Protopopovs, not to mention the Kaiser's great friend, Colonel Miassoiedov. The enemies of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council may perhaps be right in their strictures, but they would certainly do well to remember the romantic and sinister meeting of Tsar Nicolas with Kaiser Wilhelm, when Admiral Birilev, for lack of more sober and more responsible witnesses, countersigned the famous treaty against England.

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All this shame of the Old *Régime* is too easily and too soon forgotten, because it was obscured by the glorious light of the first days of the Revolution. Russia lives now as if she had no past. Our English friends will do well to look at Russia independently, measuring her not by the shame of the Old *Régime*, nor by the mistakes of the new, but by her true character. Beneath the shame and the mistakes there is a great people—a people who know how to suffer and how to endure, how to fall and how to rise the greater after the fall. It is to be regretted, for instance, that those who give information about Russia, absorbed as they are in the events of each day, have not thrown a sufficiently steady light upon the remarkable fact that the Russian people never, even in their moments of deepest exhaustion, wanted to buy their rest by treachery to their Allies. I do not speak of the responsible people who see far, who understand what such a rest is worth. I speak of the great masses in town and country, of those masses without political education, without “far-sight.”

Let us see under what aspect this idea of a separate peace was suggested to them by German propaganda.

“What do you want, poor Russian people?” whispered the voice of Berlin. “In the name of wonder, why, crucified by every misery, do you want to shed your blood again and again? For Constantinople? That, surely, is foolishness. You have decided yourselves that it is not worth the trouble. Poland? You have renounced Poland. Annexations and indemnities? You have denounced these aims as shameful. Treaties? Who signed them? Your Tsar, your oppressors, your tyrants! Where are they? In exile and in prison. And must you drag with you the corpses which they load on your backs? For three years you have borne misery and starvation, and the future has worse things in store for you. You cannot even give a name to the reasons for your war-madness. Be quiet. England and France would not be so stupid as to shed their blood in your interest. If we, Germany, gave to France Alsace and Lorraine, she would certainly say “enough.” As for England, what is she to you—with her Ireland, her India, and her Egypt? Do you want her to have the German colonies too?”

I do not want to add infamies to the stupidities with

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which the German agents in Russia tried to poison the minds of the people. I will only point out with great satisfaction that the whole nation, from the highest to the lowest, never listened to the sordid tempter. It is significant that even the most extreme "pacifists" never dared to whisper of a separate peace. The masses refused this talk, not from political reasons which they did not understand, nor from "legal pedantry," which they cannot fathom, but largely and chiefly from an unconscious instinct of honour and a simple sentiment of national pride—if you like, of patriotism. This may seem at first quite natural and as it should be. Yet one has to realize the extraordinary misery of the Russian people, their limitless sufferings from the war, in order to appreciate the significance of this seemingly natural fact. In Russia it is impossible for a man to live one moment, to take one step, without feeling the oppressive burden of the war and its consequences. In the getting of food, the struggle for communication, the little things of every day, from the moment he opens his eyes till the moment he puts out his light, the Russian—be he peasant or workman—lives in something like torture.

On my journey from Norway to England I met an Englishman coming from Petrograd. I knew him as a calm, rather solid type. He was a mass of nerves, jumpy and irritable; and his state of mind showed itself in his every word about Russia. I asked him: "My friend, what is the matter with you?" He replied: "Oh! life in Russia is hell!" I understood him, though I would not recommend him to exhibit his nervous mentality as an objective truth in letters to the editors of certain London newspapers. Now take this nervous, excitable man, multiply him by one hundred and fifty millions, and you get Russia, a gigantic boiler full of seething discontent, excitement, anger, and fury. It was so already under the Old *Régime* and if it is now worse, the reason is not to be sought solely in the Revolution, but largely because more time has passed—that is to say, more war-time. The old disease in the body politic, which has had no doctoring, has simply progressed. Life in Russia, for every single soul, is travail. It is true that the only surgeon who can make a radical cure is peace. Yet, in spite of this the only reply of the Russian

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people to the German tempter has been: "Get thee behind me, Satan."

Russia is indeed paying for her loyalty, coin by coin. If our friends in England would think a little about the psychological state of the Russian people, I am sure they would listen indulgently to the following few optimistic remarks about Russia.

Through all the fogs and shadows which have enveloped the Russian story from March till to-day, there has always been a glimmer of light. An instinct of self-preservation has guided, and is guiding, the country through the maze of mistakes, tragic and disastrous, to the opening which leads to the high road. I will say even more. Most of the mistakes were committed, in a measure, through this very sense of national self-preservation. Here are a few examples. The leaders of the Duma, the Miljukovs, the Rodziankos, the Gučkovs, the Konovalovs, the Maklakovs and Šidlovskis, were keenly aware of the dangers of the Old *Régime*, which they did all in their power to lay bare to the whole country. It would perhaps have been better if these men had rebelled, if there had been another sort of revolution—before the great "Street Revolution" (in Russia men spoke much of a "Palace Revolution"). But patriotism and national self-preservation restrained them: for they feared that the Revolution might compromise the defence of the country against Germany. Through patriotism they were forced to expose the Old *Régime*, and thus fostered the spirit of revolution by heaping fuel on the flames: but, at the same time patriotism drove them to resist all plans of open rebellion and to tame the rampant spirit of revolt which was growing in the people and the extreme parties.

The "Street," under the influence of its actual life, rebelled, in spite of these forces at work, and became the master of the situation.

When the revolutionary masses felt the dire necessity of co-operation with the Duma in order to organize the Revolution, and form a legal government, the Duma, being at that moment very popular, could probably have imposed on the people most of its ideas, and many of its methods. Why did it not do so? The only reply is the same as before: national self-preservation. It feared a national break-up,

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an internal struggle which might compromise the defence of the country against Germany.

This motive, national self-preservation, which gives us the right to be optimistic, is not confined to the "*bourgeois*" or the moderate party, of whom I have spoken so far. It is also to be found in the general policy of the Democratic Organisation which I hope to be allowed to analyse in a future article.

S. POLIAKOV LITOVZEV.

The Political Importance of Salonica

No enterprise during the war—not even the attempted seizure of the Gallipoli peninsula—has been the subject of more divergent criticism than the provision and maintenance of the Anglo-French armies based upon Salonica. Diplomatic and military experts alike differ widely both as to the objects to be sought in the Near East of Europe and as to the means through which these when ascertained are to be pursued.

Originally designed to save Serbia from being over-run, but despatched too late and in insufficient force to achieve that purpose, the expedition has remained for two years a visible symbol of hesitant policy and uncertain strategy.

To some of us the Balkan front is only second in importance to, or even co-equal with, the Western. To others it is a theatre of war inferior not merely to Flanders but to Mesopotamia and Palestine. There are some who tell us that we ought to come to terms with Bulgaria; there are others who desire a separate peace with Turkey. A friend of mine, a man of great ability, who has lived for some thirty years in various Balkan capitals, assured me only the other day that the Turks and the Bulgars would fly at each other's throats were it not for the pressure of Allied troops in Greece. Therefore, as he put it, every soldier at Salonica counted two for the Germans.

The advocates of a separate peace with Turkey or Bulgaria find indirect support from military writers of the extreme Western school. These assure us from time to time that the war can only be won in the West, that physical conditions render any advance from Salonica impossible,

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and that we are running useless risks and wasting men and material in an enterprise which is from a military standpoint wholly futile. For my own part I have never been able to understand how a peace could be had with Turkey which would not spell slavery and recurrent massacre for the Armenians, the Greeks of Asia Minor, and other unhappy races subject to the Ottoman Empire. Nor do I see how we can detach Bulgaria from her conspiracy with the Central Empires unless at the expense of our loyal and gallant Serbian allies; or, if we were disposed to commit so mean an action, what we could offer to the Bulgarians comparable with the promises made to them by Germany. It is, I suppose, indisputable that, over and above acquisitions of territory which would render her by far the greatest of the Balkan states, Bulgaria attaches immense importance to her position on the trade route between Berlin and Constantinople, and looks for German capital as a means of exploiting the commercial possibilities of the new territories.

Of the purely military aspects of the business I am little qualified to speak. Yet it is inconceivable that the shortcomings of Salonica as a base of military operations were not seen at the start. No earthquake has altered the physical conformation of the Balkans in recent years; nor were German and Austrian submarines unknown two years ago. I find it hard to believe that the same ingenuity which has overcome difficulties as great upon the Western front and in the distant theatres of Macedonia and East Africa could not, if there had been the same determination behind it, have triumphed here also. One cannot help feeling that in influential quarters the expedition is out of favour, and that it has never been given a fair opportunity to show its mettle.

With what is ordinarily called prestige I am not concerned: I leave it to the experts to say how British influence in the Near East would be affected by the evacuation of Salonica following upon that of Gallipoli. But of one thing I am quite certain, that our loyal friends in Serbia, Greece and Roumania would regard such a withdrawal as a cowardly betrayal.

One must say plainly that the long inactivity of the Anglo-French force in the Balkans, an inactivity imposed upon it against its desire, has given far too much colour

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already to the slander that we are ready to carry on the war in that quarter "*jusqu'au dernier Serbe.*" The Serbian Army has borne the brunt of the fighting throughout. Their loyalty to the Allied cause is unquestionable, but even that may be tried too far. Little less important is the position of our friends in Greece and Roumania. Within the last few weeks we have seen the Roumanian army, at a moment when the Russians were most disorganised, repel enemy onslaughts with the greatest skill, courage and tenacity. 60,000 Greek troops are already in the field and another 60,000 are in training; by the spring there may be some 300,000. The triumph of the Venizelist cause is bound up inseparably with our continuance at Salonica. To withdraw from active participation in this region would be to desert our friends, and to justify in the eyes of the world all the actions of the Pro-Germans. Who would thenceforward dare to blame King Constantine for having desired to keep Greece out of the war or the Serbian and Roumanian peoples for relinquishing a hopeless struggle?

I assume, then, that the Allied armies based upon Salonica will be maintained. Comparatively inactive as they have been for many months, they nevertheless continue to fulfil a *rôle* of high political importance. Of what they may achieve in the purely military sphere I have already confessed myself incompetent to speak. But even a civilian may venture to ask how it can be easier to provide troops, transport, and stores for Mesopotamia and Palestine than for the Balkans, and this at a moment when the adhesion of Greece and the Italian occupation of southern Albania offer us the choice of a shorter sea route between Brindisi and the Gulf of Corinth or Santa Quaranta? And he may perhaps be allowed, also, to ask what military objects are sought in striking at the Turk in outlying parts of his Empire, rather than upon the direct route between Berlin and Constantinople? I can understand a man who says that we need every man, every gun, every aeroplane in France; I cannot understand those who would starve Salonica and yet send expeditions to the uttermost ends of the earth.

HUGH A. LAW.

Plain Speaking by a German

[*The Viennese Socialist Arbeiter Zeitung of 20 September published an extraordinarily outspoken article, entitled "What is at Stake in Germany? By a bourgeois German from the Empire," from which we publish the following extracts. The censorship has been greatly relaxed of late in Austria, and it is highly entertaining to find the "Imperial-Royal Socialists" as the most eager supporters of the feudal Conservative, Count Czernin. Their chief, Dr. Viktor Adler, defends him in Parliament against the charge of encouraging a counter-revolution in Russia; and one of their ablest members, Otto Bauer (author of "Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie" and editor of Der Kampf), who was taken prisoner by the Russians, and has just been allowed to return home, has received a post in the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office as a specialist on Russian affairs.*]

The article opens with the argument that in peace time the German nation went about its business, leaving political power in the hands of a qualified caste, and in war had done its duty, without caring for the screamers and agitators who perform their war-dances "like painted Indians" at the fair. . . . "All the hatred which is directed against the (German) nation, as a whole, by the outer world, is earned in reality merely by these sword-swallowers and fire-eaters who pass as typical representatives of the race. And thereby these blustering out-and-out Germans (*Echtdeutsche*) insult the majority of the German people in as great a degree as they challenge all other peoples by their racial boorishness. They presume upon the long-suffering patience with which the German people tolerates their monstrous behaviour even to the point of now demanding the shelving of popular representation. And, as yet, no force stirs in the German people that should tame this handful of wild men, with their head-dresses and nose-rings.

"But there is no small danger that this placidity and patience may be misinterpreted both at home and abroad. It is very questionable whether the ruling classes are really so eager to fulfil the Kaiser's late Chancellor's promise of constitutional reform. When, on the one side, only the clamour of the 'patriots' can be heard, and, on the other, the claimants remain silent, it is very easy for the powers above to come to the conclusion that they have allowed themselves to be quite needlessly hustled into far-reaching concessions. And yet the whole future of Europe depends upon the timely fulfilment of the demands of German democracy. . . . The ruling power in Germany must be transferred from these arrogant, strident bullies (*Autoritätensmenschen*), who are hated throughout the world, to the efficient, sound and well-conducted citizens, in whom Germany is as rich as any country in the world. The accents of the drill-sergeant and the barrack square must be replaced by quiet official directions, the aggressive bearing of the genuine feudalist, or his Jewish copy (*Talmi-feudalen*) by an unassuming and bourgeois manner. This cannot be done without a root-and-branch reform and

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a mighty inrush of new blood into the highest brain-cells of the State. And against it the hereditary possessors, 'the saints and the knights,' will fight tooth and nail, together with the handful of jingo (*vassenuütig*) professors, who plead their claims. . . ."

The wire-pullers of the anti-reform movement have, he argues, "only one aim, to discredit the hated Majority party in the Reichsrat, and the most obvious way of doing this is to accuse them of having sacrificed the interests of the State in the Peace Resolution. But this is merely the means to an end. The real object is the prevention of universal and equal suffrage in the Prussian Landtag."

With this object in view they seek to prove that "the vast majority of the nation is for a 'Hindenburg peace' and against a 'renunciatory peace.'" They seek "to mislead and intimidate the Government itself to create an atmosphere of contention, to mobilise the young man (*den jungen Herrn*, i.e., the Crown Prince) and the military demi-gods, and then, at a favourable opportunity—say, after some important fresh victory—to send the Reichstag itself to the devil; such is the plan and the method by which they hope to attain their object. Indeed, who would ever trouble, under the victorious military dictatorship, about the reform of the Prussian franchise and the democratisation of the Government machine? . . . Only let the intolerable alliance of Crown and Majority in the Reichstag once be destroyed, and the old dynastic-feudal front re-established, then everything else would settle itself. That both the dynasty and the ruling caste might collapse in the process does not trouble these gentlemen, nor do they believe it. Nothing venture, nothing have, and anything is easier to bear than their present isolation.

"But what is the German people doing against all these manœuvres? It does not stir. . . . Certainly it is very difficult, under the conditions of *Burgfrieden* and a state of siege, to arouse a great popular movement, and the Majority party cannot avail itself of the riches of the great armament firms for an intensive literary propaganda, as is the case with their Pangerman opponents; but since the *Burgfrieden* has already been broken from the other side, cannot the parties of the Left, by energetic action, re-establish the right of assembly? But then the tables must be turned, and the whole catalogue of Pangerman sins remorselessly enumerated; if to-day the German is outlawed throughout the world, if for whole decades to come he will be unable to set foot in a foreign land, if even in Allied countries enthusiasm for their wonderful military ally has cooled off to a positively alarming degree . . . then for all this nothing is to blame but the unbearable arrogance of the Pangermans, their Imperial, or rather drill-sergeant's tone to all but their superiors, and the patience with which the people proper have borne the tyranny of these would-be world-rulers. The war can only be won against the Entente and the Pangermans at the same time!

". . . It is not possible to range the world like a beast of prey; sooner or later one must be killed by superior numbers. And the

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German people simply *cannot* live unless it resumes commercial intercourse with other peoples. It cannot nourish its masses without export, and despite all 'victorious' commercial treaties, it cannot export without being received once more into the family of the nations." The means to this end is "the manly shaking off of those classes which have attracted to themselves in so high a degree the hatred of the world. That is really not so hard as it may seem at first sight. The German people must 'declare itself in permanence,' until the political reforms are safely through. . . . It must prove itself master in its own house, and not as fittingly represented by the sword-rattlers and the Luxburgs. It yields to none in a sense of justice, morality and humanity, but it has the defect of its quality—excessive respect for those in authority. . . . It is now faced by a new attempt of the caste, to assure its old monopoly of power by a political game of evasion; and this manœuvre must be countered by a political offensive in the grand style. . . ."

"The Freedom of the Seas"

[We take the following candid statement of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from an article by Herr Bacmeister, the well-known Pangerman National Liberal, in *Das Grössere Deutschland*.]

"If it were really possible for Germany to renounce Belgium, that would involve the renunciation of the coast of Flanders and therewith the true freedom of the seas. This freedom cannot be built up upon a foundation of treaties but only on might, which England would be compelled to fear. Indeed, what did Seton-Watson say:—"Military supremacy can be shared between several States; the supremacy of the sea is an indivisible unity." That is to say, there is only one freedom of the seas; that form based upon English naval supremacy, which is a very old English principle. In Germany we have been astounded at, and deplored, how England in the present war has acted contrary to all maritime law. As if she could have done otherwise! As if she had not declared long ago that in any life-and-death struggle with a first-class Power she would create her own system of naval law—the naval law of British sea-power! As if a great people could be asked to lose a war, to sacrifice its existence for the benefit of international law. The British Empire with its larger portions separated by oceans, and with its world network of commerce entirely dependent upon the seas, will never voluntarily renounce its supremacy of the seas—for the simple reason that such a course would be suicide.

"Furthermore, it would never renounce such naval forces as would guarantee naval supremacy, and also, when engaged in a life-and-death struggle, it would never be able to renounce their employment to obtain victory. Because all this is obvious—although German brains are often incapable of apprehending it—therefore, there can be no arrangement with England on this question, unless Germany

"THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS"

renounces the true freedom of the seas or England the supremacy of the seas. For the true freedom of the seas is the freedom which England must also recognise in war time; not the freedom which England promises in time of peace or peace treaties to recognise also in time of war.

"The vital necessities of existence of great nations ruthlessly ignore treaties. The true freedom of the sea in war is that freedom which is so strongly protected by might, that the English navy may not dare to infringe upon it. If Germany renounces her right to this freedom, then the more populous the German Empire and Austria-Hungary become, the promise of success for England's encircling policy after the war will become greater than before it. For then she could assure, with good right, all our old antagonists that a blockade which had nearly succeeded in starving out a nation of 68 millions, would find little difficulty in starving out a land with 75 millions or more inhabitants."

Reviews

La Réorganisation de la France: Ch. Seignobos, Ch. Chaumet, R. Legouez, Marcel Vacher, Adolphe Dervaux, Ch. Gide. (Félix Alcan.) 3 frs. 50. The seven chapters which compose this compact and readable book were delivered as lectures at the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales* during the winter, 1915-1916. They deal with Politics; Home and Foreign; Economic Development; Industrial Organisation after the War; Agriculture; the Soil of France after War; le Beau, le Vrai, l'Utile et la Réorganisation de la France (a most suggestive essay by *l'Architecte du Gouvernement*); and the Reconstitution of the French Population. This is a wide field to cover in 275 pages; but it is one of the supreme aptitudes of the French mind to take wide views with clear horizons and yet to give the intervening landscape in sufficient detail to bring out its salient points. The chapters which are most apposite to these pages are the opening pair devoted by Professor Seignobos to "La Politique intérieure" and "La Politique extérieure." Examining the achievements and shortcomings of the French Republican system under the stress of war, he comes to the conclusion that the *régime* has not only given proof of strength by surviving, but that it is actually stronger to-day than in July 1914. From that judgment he proceeds to ask whether the reforms demanded by the bourgeois parties and those whom he calls *les lettrés paisibles* before the war are necessary to give stability to French Governments, and declares that there neither was nor is anything fundamentally wrong. Party struggles and press polemics, he concludes, are not *le produit artificiel des fantaisies*; they are not even merely the expression of the *tempérament frondeur*; "they have their deep roots in the superior degree of civilisation which France has reached." In a word, they are but one manifestation among many of the multiplicity and diversity of life which is a sign of exuberant vitality and not of decay.

REVIEWS

Turning to foreign affairs, as becomes an historian, Professor Seignobos deals with politics and persons in a spirit of restrained criticism. The facts compel him to pass severe judgment upon the practice of diplomacy, both French and British; and his observations of France in war time prove to him that the ordinary civilian turned soldier has proved a better "expert of war" than the professional experts themselves. Into that dispute we cannot enter. Probably the most striking pages in this book are those which contain Professor Seignobos' plea for "l'alliance, non plus l'alliance diplomatique, partielle, temporaire, fragile, en vue d'un intérêt particulier et dépourvue de garantie, mais l'alliance démocratique, générale, perpétuelle, solide, fondée sur le respect réciproque du droit et garantie par la morale internationale." The League of Nations has a whole-hearted partisan in Professor Seignobos.

A. F. W.

It is hardly surprising to find a Belgian statesman subscribing to the paradox that "the place of the true pacifist is among those who are resolved to continue the war up to the decisive victory of the allied nations" (*The True and the False Pacifism*, by Count Goblet D'Alviella. Fisher Unwin. Pp. xv+85. 6d.); but when he goes on to submit that "every war has for its object not war in itself—not even victory—but peace," the plain man may fail, unless he remembers his Clausewitz, to see the point of so general a proposition. In the main, however, he will agree that the book is well written, sensible and interesting. It reveals a healthy appreciation of the root causes of the present war, and leads up to a practical programme of European reconstruction, based on the principle of nationality, to which THE NEW EUROPE can heartily subscribe. The author translates his "dream" into the terms of an excellent little map, in which the political frontiers coincide with the delimitations of nationalities. "To achieve this result," he says, "it would be enough to break the artificial chains which bind to the Central Empires a dozen provinces which would thereafter be free to follow the guidance of their own national affinities and antipathies." The book also contains a very interesting, concise sketch of the history and development of the various pacifist and internationalist organisations, whose work at the present time seems to have crumbled to dust, but which in the new world-order will, one hopes, find more fruitful soil.

G. G.

A Bulgarian Diplomatist on Russia

"It is quite incomprehensible how the diplomatists and the press of the Entente could fail to understand a situation which was so clear and simple." So writes the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, Mr. Rizov, in his newly-published pamphlet, *Bulgarien und Russland* (Berlin: Kronen-Verlag, M. 1). In view of the persistence with which our British Bulgarophiles have maintained that Bulgaria could have been won to our side by the cession of Macedonia, it is refreshing to find so representative a Bulgarian as Mr. Rizov fully

NOTES

confirming THE NEW EUROPE'S view of his country's further war aims. It ought from the first to have been obvious that Bulgaria, quite apart from her own territorial ambitions in Macedonia and elsewhere, was, as Mr. Rizov assures us in so many words, resolved to prevent at all costs the territorial aggrandisement of Serbia (united Jugoslavia would be almost twice the size of Bulgaria) and the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.

His account of Russia's attitude towards Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars contains a mass of inaccuracies which could only be dealt with in very considerable detail. But what he has to say of British policy contains an uncomfortable grain of truth. England, he reminds us, whispered for thirty-five years in Bulgaria's ear, "that Russia was her most dangerous enemy, and that there would be an end of Bulgarian independence, if Russia established herself in Constantinople. Thus England ought to be satisfied, if Bulgaria to-day pursues the policy suggested to her yesterday." We are indeed paying for the follies of a past generation, and above all for the fatal anti-Russian policy of Disraeli.

The remainder of the pamphlet deals with the Russian Revolution and the Entente's programme. Much of it is the merest claptrap, but as Mr. Rizov has an intimate knowledge of Russia, it is specially instructive to find him deliberately siding on every point with the Germans and against the Slavs.

Frano Supilo

The view expressed by Mr. Seton-Watson in his character sketch of Supilo (NEW EUROPE, No. 51) receives sympathetic confirmation in an article published by the *Secolo* of 28 September: "Supilo was animated by a true apostolic fervour for ideas. In these last three years he devoted himself, apart from Jugoslav propaganda, to creating a movement in favour of Italo-Jugoslav friendship, and frequently repeated that Jugoslavia must be for Italy a more northern Albania—in other words, a wide field of intellectual and commercial penetration. In future, he argued, Jugoslavia must inevitably fall under the influence either of German or of Italian culture. It rested with us Italians to decide which was to be the choice of the future nation. Hence he was furious with the Italian Nationalists, who, for a few kilometres of territory, threatened to compromise a future of incomparable prestige and political influence. During the last few months he had been in touch with many Italian politicians, with a view to interesting them in the idea of the need for an Italo-Jugoslav agreement, such as should establish cordial and fruitful relations between the two nations in future centuries. In this connection he had also sent direct to the Italian Foreign Office a short memorandum laying down the fundamental bases of such an agreement."

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“Germany is a rich, powerful, and brave country; but she is in sore need of a good head and governor”

—Martin Luther

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Martin Luther and Germany

It was the privilege of the writer to represent his own denomination at the quatercentenary celebrations in Geneva in 1909 of Calvin's birth. All branches of Protestant Christendom were there represented; and in the cathedral where Calvin had preached, the Holy Communion was celebrated, in which Lutheran and Reformed laid aside their ancient differences, and, as united in Christ, remembered the Lord's death together. In the preface to the Report of the proceedings sent to all who were present stands this sentence, "The Jubilee has made us the better feel that Protestantism is really a unity in diversity: the spirit common to all the children of the Reformation has there revealed and manifested itself." Only five years later the two leading Protestant Powers in Europe were at war with one another; so swiftly was the fair promise of better days blighted.

No such reunion of the Protestantism of the world will be possible at the quatercentenary celebration of the beginnings of the Reformation in Germany. On 31 October, 1517, Luther posted a placard on the door of the castle church at Wittenberg inviting theologians to a disputation on ninety-five theses attacking indulgences. "In the desire, and with the purpose," so runs the announcement (quoted in McGiffert's "Martin Luther," p. 89), "of elucidating the truth, a disputation will be held on the subjoined propositions at Wittenberg, under the presidency of the Reverend Father Martin Luther, Augustinian monk, master of arts and of sacred theology, and ordinary lecturer upon the same in that place. He therefore asks those who cannot be present and discuss the subject orally to do so by letter in their absence."

He did not attack merely the abuse of indulgences, although it was the abuse as practised by Tetzels that at last roused him to action, but the practice itself. In the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh theses he declares "every Christian who feels true compunction has of right plenary

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remission of punishment and guilt without letters of indulgence," and "every true Christian, whether living or dead, has a share in all the benefits of Christ and the church, given him by God, even without such letters." His theses involved the rejection of the whole penitential system accepted in the Catholic Church, the assertion of the central principle of the Reformation, justification by faith alone, the denial of the necessity of the mediation of the Church for salvation, and the claim of the individual conscience to challenge the doctrine and practice of the church. It was an intense personal experience which had forced Luther, despite his own inclinations against change, to throw down the gage of battle to a system which he believed was destroying the souls of men, and robbing them of the salvation freely offered and fully provided in Christ. How far-reaching in its effects his action was to prove it is certain that Luther himself did not, and could not, estimate; but it can be said without exaggeration that his protest against indulgences was the death-pang of the Mediæval and the birth-throe of the Modern Period.

Luther was not the first to make such a protest against the abuses of the Church. We must not forget our own John Wycliffe, himself as great a man as Luther, even if not greater. But he was born out of due time. The age was not yet ready for the man. We must not forget also John Hus, the disciple of Wycliffe, who sealed his testimony with his blood. It does not detract from Luther's greatness that he found his own times were propitious; for the influences that proved favourable to his movement did not make his task easier although they made it more hopeful. It required his conviction, courage, constancy, to concentrate for effective action the manifold forces that tended to bring about a change. The Renaissance without the moral passion and the religious fervour of the Reformation would not have had influence deep and wide enough to make a new world; and much as the Reformation owes to others, it was in Luther that it found its most vital and vigorous impulse. While it might be too much to say that without Luther there would have been no Reformation, it is at least allowable to say that apart from his personality it would have lacked much of its popular appeal. While Protestantism in Great Britain and the United States owes

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more directly to Calvin than to Luther, yet Calvin was not a pioneer in unexplored regions as was Luther; and although in some respects Calvinism has proved a more potent factor in human development than Lutheranism, it would have been gain, and not loss, to our Protestantism had we felt Luther's influence more.

While the fact that we are at war with Germany prevents our being represented at the celebrations in Wittenberg, and so acknowledging our debt to Luther, it would be an unworthy national prejudice to withhold from him such tribute as it is possible for us to pay. As an evangelical Christian, Luther stands in the succession of Paul and Augustine, and is a follower not unworthy of them. To Christian theology he made a contribution that the thinker of to-day neglects to his own great loss. As the founder of Lutheranism, which is not confined to Germany, but includes the Scandinavian peoples, as well, he is still a living force in the religious life of to-day. Because the type of Christianity associated with his name has in the course of its history shown certain inherent defects we must not allow ourselves to belittle what he did as an epoch-making personality. While the writer's own studies and tastes would lead him to dwell on Luther's contribution to religion, theology, and church, yet the interest and purpose of THE NEW EUROPE point rather to a treatment of his influence on social and national development.

Revolutionary as was the action of Luther in the religious realm, in politics he was thoroughly, nay even violently, conservative. When the spirit of discontent and revolt which his teaching had undoubtedly helped to evoke found extreme and forcible expression in the Peasants' War (1524-1525), he was not content with condemning the resort to force in seeking reform, but in his pamphlet, "Against the murdering, thieving, Hordes of Peasants," he "hounded on the princes to crush the rising." "It is this pamphlet," says Lindsay, one of the most sympathetic biographers of Luther, "all extenuating circumstances being taken into account, which must ever remain an ineffaceable stain on his noble life and career" ("History of the Reformation," I., pp. 336-7). The few sentences quoted by Lindsay fully justify his judgment. "In the case of an insurgent, every man is both judge and executioner. Therefore, whoever can should knock

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down, strangle, and stab such, publicly or privately, and think nothing so venomous, pernicious, and devilish as an insurgent. . . . Such wonderful times are these, that a prince can merit heaven better with bloodshed than another with prayer." His attitude had far-reaching consequences. Not only did it estrange the common people from him, but it also made him thoroughly distrustful of the "common man." He did not give to the Evangelical Church a representative constitution as did Calvin to the Reformed. Lutheranism has not been, as has Calvinism, the inspiration of any movement for national or political liberty. From the people Luther turned away, and in spite of the Psalmist's warning he put "confidence in princes."

It is not possible to follow in detail the political fortunes of the Reformation in Germany, but the character of the settlement at the Peace of Augsburg (1555) deserves mention. "It was agreed that the Lutheran religion should be legalised within the Empire, and that all Lutheran princes should have full security for the practice of their faith; that the mediæval episcopal jurisdiction should cease within their lands, and that they were to retain all ecclesiastical possessions which had been secularised before the passing of the Treaty of Passau (1552). Future changes of faith were to be determined by the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*. The secular territorial ruler might choose between the Romanist and the Lutheran faith, and his decision was to bind all his subjects. If a subject professed another religion from his princes, he was to be allowed to emigrate without molestation" (Lindsay's "History of the Reformation," I., p. 397). While Lutheranism thus gained tolerance within the Empire, in any province of which the prince was Lutheran, the Reformed Church was not included in this religious peace, nor did the individual gain freedom of conscience; and yet this was the first step on the path of religious liberty.

For the management of the affairs of each territorial church Luther adopted the consistorial system, ecclesiastical courts modelled on the old mediæval episcopal courts, but appointed by and subject to the supreme secular authority. "We can see in it," says Lindsay, "his desire to make full use of whatever portions of the mediæval church usages could be pressed into the service of his Evangelical Church;

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his conception that the one supreme authority on earth was that of the secular government; his suspicion of the 'common' man, and his resolve to prevent the people exercising any control over the arrangements of the Church" ("History of the Reformation," p. 413). While in England a sovereign, resolved to rule in the Church no less than in the State, forced her will on often reluctant ecclesiastics, Luther accepted *con amore* the subjection of the Church to the State. It is worth noting that in Scotland Calvinism as represented by John Knox and Andrew Melville produced a democratic constitution for the Church, and insisted on the Church's independence of the State as regards its self-government. The subservience of the Church to the State has been a characteristic of Lutheranism from its beginning; but, as a result of the Illumination, and the consequent deadening of religious life, the State made further encroachments on the little that was left of independence in the Church; and early in the nineteenth century the Church in Prussia became "an institution of civil instruction and education under the sole care of the State" (Ecke's "Die Evangelischen Landeskirchen Deutschlands," pp. 97 ff.). Against this Erastianism there has in Germany been no effective protest; nonconformity has been negligible; and so the philosophical doctrine of the absolute authority of the State has not been challenged by any claim of an independent authority for the Church. Before the present war had offered so tragic a commentary on the principle of such a relation between Church and State, the writer, much as he owes in all his philosophical and theological knowledge and thought to German literature, was always strongly repelled by this Erastianism "naked and unashamed." While we in this country must beware of Pharisaic self-righteousness, yet without prejudice we may note how disastrous for Germany has been the subservience of the Church to the State, not an inevitable result of the establishment of the Church by the State, but due to the special conditions in Germany of that connection for which we cannot acquit Luther of all responsibility, for it was not forced on him, but welcomed by him.

In spite of these defects of Lutheranism, such a moral and religious movement could not be without influence on human society. This subject has been discussed fully by

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Dr. H. Andrews in an essay on "The Social Principles and Effects of the Reformation" included in a volume entitled, "Christ and Civilisation" (pp. 335-373), and some of his conclusions as regards Luther may be briefly reproduced. Luther "introduced a new ideal of life;" to monasticism he opposed the free Christian man, enjoying in the world all that is not sinful, and seeking his Christian perfection in the fulfilment of his earthly calling. In so doing he also "gave a new sanctity to home life and the family relationships." While with his instinctive conservatism he was hostile "towards the methods of the new commerce," especially "to the great trading societies and bankers," "a further result of the abandonment of the monastic ideal is found in the sanctification of the commercial and civic activities of men." But Calvin, far more than Luther, set himself to transform human society in accordance with the conception of the Kingdom of God as "a spiritual force which is present here and now working in the world, leavening society, purifying commerce, ennobling art, ameliorating the conditions of life, striving towards the creation of an ideal society where the will of God would be perfectly carried out." For Luther had not the insight to discover how far-reaching must be the social changes that would give due effect to this new ideal of life. In his challenge of the authority of the Church on the ground of his own personal experience, Luther "enhanced the value and the meaning of personality" as in direct individual relation to God; and, intolerant as he himself often was, his appeal to conscience and reason against authority gave an impulse to intellectual liberty, the right to private judgment. While "Luther gave to the doctrine of passive obedience an ununction which it had not possessed for ages," yet his doctrine of "the priesthood of all believers," their spiritual equality before God, inevitably stimulated the desire and the effort for political and social liberty; and so, despite his own inclinations, his moral and religious movement became a potent factor in the development of modern democracy, but only when and where Calvinism gave it this direction.

Of the political theory of Lutheranism itself Troeltsch writes this judgment ("Protestantism and Progress," pp. III-III3): "Lutheranism, in its conception of the Law of Nature, is thoroughly conservative; and in its complete

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confidence in God's providence it regards the powers called into being in the natural course of things as *ipso facto* instituted by God and commissioned to be the protectors of the *justitia civilis*. The Old Testament, moreover, supported this theory by representing Saul and David as appointed by God. God is the *causa remota* of the constituted authorities, and consequently men owe them, as powers whose authority is directly or indirectly derived from God, an unconditional obedience. . . . Lutheranism is thus far politically favourable to absolutism, but, on the whole, is essentially conservative and politically neutral. . . . The doctrines of Stahl and the Prussian conservatism still express its spirit; only, it must not be forgotten that in the older Lutheranism 'By the grace of God' applied not only to the sovereign, but also to the magistracy of the imperial cities, and represents simply a religious interpretation of natural events, unconnected with feudal romanticism." To Lutheranism, Calvinism in this respect forms a striking contrast; but the difference is not entirely due to the personal difference of Luther and Calvin, although the latter was certainly more logical in the application of his principles than the former. There is the influence of events on opinions to be reckoned with. "In its great struggles with the Catholic Governments which proscribed the pure word of God, that is to say, the Huguenot, Netherlandish, Scottish, and English struggles, Calvinism gave a much more radical development to its Law of Nature. It successfully established the principle of the right of resistance, which must be exercised on behalf of the word of God in the face of ungodly authorities. . . . This more radical conception gives to the Calvinistic Law of Nature a tendency towards progress, an impulse to reorganise governmental conditions when these are of an 'ungodly' character" (Troeltsch's "Protestantism and Progress," pp. 113-114).

While Luther's moral and religious principles then held the promise of the freedom of a new world, his social and political ideas hampered the development of that freedom by the fetters of the old age. Germany to-day is showing how disastrous was this inconsistency, for she is using the resources of the modern world in the spirit and for the objects of the mediæval age. The new Europe cannot draw its inspiration from Lutheranism in its political and

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social characteristics; and yet the moral and religious spirit of Luther, freed from the limitations he himself imposed, may well be cherished by it as an invaluable treasure and imperishable possession.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

The Hungarian Deadlock

"WITH the exception of an insignificant group of non-Magyars, who count almost as little in weight as in numbers, Parliament is exclusively composed of elements in whose political *Credo* the Magyar Unitary State and the unimpaired maintenance of its national character take the first place." In this phrase one of the leading Hungarian papers sums up the position which confronts any would-be reformer and makes optimism well-nigh impossible for those acquainted with the forces at work in Hungary.

For twelve years past the whole political life of the country has centred round the problem of electoral reform; the various attempts to solve it have evoked one crisis after another, and despite all the fine phrases expended upon it, its solution seems almost as far off as ever. At first sight it might seem unnatural that a purely internal problem like electoral reform should assume such urgency in the midst of the world-war. But it is internal only in name; it is essentially international—not, indeed, in the technical sense of the word, but in the sense that with its solution is bound up the whole fate of central and south-eastern Europe, with all its conflicting nationalities. Hungary is in the hands of a narrow oligarchy whose power rests almost equally upon racial monopoly, feudal proprietorship, and economic exploitation; and it is their desperate efforts to retain the control which is slipping from their corrupt hands, that supply the key to all recent political development in Hungary.

The fall of Count Tisza last May* marked the first stage in a process of which the end is not even remotely in sight. Its contributory causes were the Russian Revolution, the new international situation created by it and by the American intervention, and the consequent disfavour of

* See the articles "The Fall of Count Tisza" and "Half-Gods in Hungary" by Rubicon, in Nos. 33 and 41 of THE NEW EUROPE.

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the young Emperor, who is as strong-willed as he is inexperienced, and whose Ultramontane entourage had poisoned his mind against the masterful and tactless Calvinist Premier. But it would be quite a mistake to ascribe the change even mainly to considerations of high policy. Still more decisive were the petty jealousies between the rival party leaders—complicated tenfold by personal relationships and family quarrels. The new Premier, Count Maurice Esterházy, owed his position partly to the fact that he was a brother-officer of Charles, but, above all, to his political insignificance, which enabled him to act as a buffer between Tisza and Andrassy.

Almost from the first the Esterházy Cabinet showed signs of progressive paralysis. The Premier himself lacked the necessary parliamentary experience, and, in his desire to conciliate everybody, offended no one, but also won no whole-hearted support from any side. He failed in his original intention of detaching sufficient numbers from the Tisza party to secure him a majority in the House, and Tisza virtually maintained a second government behind the scenes, and posed as Esterházy's protector in the House. Thus a deadlock ensued. The serried ranks of the Tisza party blocked all advance, while the only alternative, an appeal to the country, was open to even graver objections than a similar step in more western belligerent countries. As the summer advanced, the idea of a compromise with Tisza on the subject of reform was mooted with increasing frequency. Count Apponyi, the Cabinet's veteran member and leader of its strongest section, the Independent Party, favoured a "deal" with the Tisza party at the expense of the non-Magyars, while the smaller Károlyi group and all the Radical and Socialist elements were strongly opposed to such a course. Behind the scenes the various groups worked with mine and countermine, some to produce an open rupture between the Andrassy and Károlyi fractions, some to win both over to a deal with Tisza, some to detach as many members of the Tisza party as would secure to the Government a working majority in Parliament.

By August the existence of an acute Cabinet crisis was common property; the paralysis from which Austria had long been suffering had spread to her Hungarian partner. Repeated official denials were followed with unusual sudden-

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ness by a reconstruction of the Ministry, and then, forty-eight hours later, by the resignation of Count Esterházy, who withdrew to recuperate at Davos, amid wild and unconvincing rumours that he had secured his release from office by threats of suicide.

During the final week of crisis everything pointed to Esterházy being succeeded by his party chief, Count Julius Andrassy, and there was general surprise when the Premiership was assigned to Dr. Wekerle (to whom we referred last May as the strongest candidate for the post). The appointment is still surrounded by mystery and sensation. *Világ*, the Radical and pacifist organ, has asserted that the three Joint Ministers (of Foreign Affairs, Finance and War) had threatened to resign if Andrassy were appointed; and the latter's own newspaper, in endorsing this story, pointed to Count Czernin himself as the ringleader in the plot, and left its readers to infer that Andrassy's known devotion to the German alliance and his opposition to all idea of a separate peace were responsible for his being passed over. Herr Ganz, however, the well-known Viennese correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, whose support of Count Czernin would seem to acquit the latter of anti-German views, gives a different version. He hints darkly at a mistake of Andrassy, of which it is "not yet time to speak," and lays the intrigue at the door of Baron Burián, Tisza's *famulus*, now once more Joint Minister of Finance. If this be correct, Tisza is still strong enough not only to prevent his rivals from securing a parliamentary majority, but also to maintain a nominee of his own within the inner counsels of the Crown.

Dr. Wekerle occupies a special position of his own in Hungarian politics, and has already held the office of Premier during two eventful periods in recent history. In the early nineties he introduced the much-needed reform of the currency, and succeeded in steering through Parliament the so-called Church Laws (regulating mixed marriages, divorce and similar thorny problems), without unduly offending the powerful Ultramontane vested interests of Hungary. In 1906 he was summoned from his retirement to preside over the famous Coalition Cabinet, which aroused such exaggerated hopes among the Jingoës of Budapest and collapsed so ignominiously barely four years later. It is important to remember that then, as now, Dr. Wekerle and his colleagues

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took office for the express purpose of introducing a measure of universal suffrage. His previous record should serve to make us modest in our expectations. A ministry of all the talents, which included Counts Andrassy, Apponyi and Zichy and the late Francis Kossuth, spent two and a half years in elaborate attempts to delay the reform which was the main plank in their common programme; and when at last, in 1908, their spokesman, Andrassy, introduced a Bill which was a gross travesty of every democratic principle, the Coalition, unable to agree upon a constructive policy, slowly dissolved into its component parts.

Dr. Wekerle possesses two great assets. He is unrivalled as a parliamentary tactician, and, though far too elusive to inspire personal enthusiasm, he has no open enemies and enforces respect by his great knowledge and experience. Above all, he is one of the strongest financial talents in Europe, and his return to power is regarded as a guarantee that Hungary's shattered credit will be restored and her economic interests duly protected. Unlike Tisza, he is not identified with the policy which provoked war; unlike Andrassy, he has not committed himself publicly to any definite views on foreign policy. But his attachment to the German alliance stands beyond all doubt; and as he is known to favour the conclusion of a twenty years' *Ausgleich* as a basis for closer relations with Germany, his selection can hardly fail to be acceptable in Berlin.

The circumstances of the crisis throw into fresh relief the irresolution and sudden changes of mood which have characterised the action of the new monarch ever since his accession; and this is apparently one reason why Dr. Wekerle's reception by Hungarian public opinion has been the very reverse of cordial. It is felt that in Hungary, as in Austria, there is no guiding principle, and the general *désorientation* is getting on everyone's nerves. Dr. Wekerle, in his first great speech, declared that his Government stands or falls with electoral reform; but it at once became clear, from the qualifying phrases which he employed, that an attempt was to be made to correct the principle of universal suffrage to the disadvantage of the non-Magyar population. Clear proof of such an intention is supplied by the truly amazing pronouncements of Mr. Vázsonyi, who, as the most advanced advocate of reform, remained in the new Cabinet, and has been entrusted

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with the drafting of the Bill. He states most emphatically that his reform "will not merely not undermine, but will positively reinforce the political predominance of the Magyars in Hungary," and he actually declared his intention of dividing Transylvania, "which is regarded as the stronghold of the Roumanians, into 64 constituencies, in such a way that they will not command a majority of electors in more than four of them." What is known as "electoral geometry" has been reduced to a fine art in Hungary; but if Mr. Vázsonyi is able to produce such a result he will unquestionably have far eclipsed all previous records. If such be the spirit of Hungary's leading demagogue, it is easier to understand the motives which led such arch-reactionaries as Count Apponyi and Messrs. Mezössy and Ugron to accept him as their colleague.

One aspect of Dr. Wekerle's appointment deserves special attention at a moment when it is being whispered in the ears of carefully-selected neutrals that Charles of Habsburg is on the point of satisfying the subject races of his dominions by the introduction of federalism. Dr. Wekerle has always been one of the foremost champions of the existing Dual System, which is, of course, utterly irreconcilable with federal ideas; and he has lost no time in reaffirming its necessity. He denounced the claims of national unity put forward in the Austrian Parliament by the Czech and Southern Slav deputies, and declared that they "must be relegated to the realm of dreams," not merely because Hungary would take care that they remained dreams, but still more because they had no support either from the Crown or from Austrian governmental circles. He added that, on taking office, he had obtained His Majesty's "express assurance" that the introduction of national autonomy in Austria would have no influence, direct or indirect, upon the integrity of Hungarian territory—in other words, that the idea of forming single units out of the Czecho-Slovaks or the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy had been abandoned in high places. A week later, evidently under pressure from Budapest, the Austrian Premier, Dr. von Seidler, solemnly committed his Government as "adhering irrevocably to the Dual System," and condemned in advance the idea of constitutional reform in Austria by pledging himself to maintain the existing anti-national divisions between the seventeen provinces. A clear sign that

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Seidler has given up the idea of satisfying the Slavs is provided by the declaration of the German leader, Dr. Denk, after three hours with the Premier, to the effect that "a course will now be followed which is Austrian, and in this case Austrian is identical with German."

Dr. Wekerle, not content with repelling Slav claims, carried the war into the enemy's country by demanding that Austrian law should be revised in order to permit the prosecution of persons guilty of "acts hostile to Hungarian territorial integrity." Count Tisza went still further, and protested energetically against the fact that men whose national programme involved the cession of Hungarian territory should have been invited to become members of the Austrian Cabinet. This is a pointed reference to the Slovene leader, Father Korošec, who, on 30 May, in the Reichsrat, put forward the programme of Southern Slav unity against Hungary, and to whom Dr. von Seidler made definite overtures at a time when he still hoped to prevent the formation of a Slav *bloc*.

The Jugoslav claim Dr. Wekerle met very characteristically by putting forward a counterclaim to Dalmatia in the name of the Holy Hungarian Crown. In the Austrian Parliament this was countered soon after by Dr. von Seidler, who, with great emphasis, described Dalmatia as "an integral part" of Austria. These public pronouncements are, it is true, merely the *façade* behind which the real contest is proceeding; but they at least illustrate the completeness of the deadlock resulting from the incompatible claims of nationality and constitutional form.

Meanwhile the Wekerle Cabinet stands condemned as thoroughly reactionary in racial matters. The Minister of Education, Count Apponyi, has introduced highly arbitrary restrictions upon the teachers' training colleges of the Roumanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches, justifying them by the behaviour of their inmates during the advance of the Roumanian army into Transylvania. Count Tisza in Parliament, so far from condemning Apponyi's new "Magyarising devices," argued that the decision ought to be extended to all Roumanian clerical seminaries, "since the effect of the clergy on the minds of the faithful is incomparably greater than that of the schoolmasters." It is highly significant that Tisza, who last winter, in answer to the Entente Note to President Wilson, declaimed about the absolute loyalty

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and devotion of all Hungary's Roumanian citizens, should now let fall the remark that "the experiences on the occasion of the Roumanian invasion must fill the responsible leaders of the Orthodox Roumanian Church with consternation." Count Tisza was, of course, from the very first well aware that the overwhelming mass of the Roumanian population in Hungary welcomed its kinsmen from Roumania as liberators from an intolerable yoke. The difference in his speeches is simply due to the fact that, in September, he was speaking for Magyar consumption; in January, for the outside world.

Tisza also urged that similar methods should be applied to the Serbian Orthodox Church in Hungary, and that the moment was favourable for this, because its affairs were in a state of transition. This is a delicate reference to the fact that before the war the Hungarian Government arbitrarily suspended the constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, has since then prevented the election of a Patriarch, and has administered the revenues of the Church in defiance of its General Assembly (which is practically on the Scottish model with a hierarchy superimposed). As the Serbian Patriarchate has very close religious ties with Serbia, this whole affair provided yet another cause of friction between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. It is quite clear that the Wekerle-Apponyi Cabinet is preparing designs for the Magyarisation of the Serbian and Roumanian Churches, and is likely to outdo even Tisza's party in its racial intolerance. As one of the few remaining Roumanian deputies in the Hungarian Parliament courageously pointed out in this very debate, "a democracy which seeks to construct an artificial supremacy of the Magyars is no true democracy." There are no real grounds for confidence in the new Government's good intentions, and, in any case, the uncertainties of the parliamentary situation are likely to produce the same delays, evasions and distortions as dogged the path of reform during the second Wekerle administration. It is but seldom that an oligarchy can be induced to reform itself, and that of Hungary has lived too long in an atmosphere of quite unusual intolerance and corruption, and is, moreover, too conscious of its approaching bankruptcy, not to stake its all upon a gambler's last throw.

RUBICON.

The Rhine Frontier

“LA France au Rhin, ou la capitale à Bordeaux” is a war-cry which finds many echoes in France and some in other countries of the Alliance. It has a certain historical, if not a strategic, justification, for the Rhine was once the republican frontier of France, and the soldiers of the Revolution might properly claim that their conquests right up to the left bank of the river were triumphs of an idea rather than feats of arms. The “Marseillaise” was born in an upper room in Strassburg, and the tricolour waved over all the lands now known as the Palatinate, Luxemburg, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, as well as that portion of Rhenish Prussia which lies west of the Mainz-Wesel stretch of the Rhine. The Treaty of Lunéville (1802) laid down the eastern frontier of the Revolution from Basel to Clèves; and the general acceptance of French allegiance as expressed in a preference for French democracy (as yet not wholly obscured by the Cæsarism of Napoleon) as against the autocracies—great and small—of eighteenth century Germany may perhaps be said to give the twentieth century heirs of the Revolution a good title to the territory in question. It is not without significance, however, that the Left Wing in modern France, which we may truthfully call the only legitimate descendant of the parent movement of 1789, is the least inclined of all parties to insist on the mere historic claim; and in its reluctance it shows a better understanding of the political kernel of the Revolution than those who claim the Rhine as *la frontière républicaine de la France*. In their minds the truest and strongest frontier runs, not by this stream or that mountain-range, but along the line of willing popular allegiance. Bismarck was right when he deplored the presence of “too many Frenchmen in the German house”; and no Frenchman in his senses to-day will desire to incorporate a province full of “the Boches” into France simply for the sentimental pleasure of restoring the “historic” frontier of the Rhine.

This consideration applies equally to the French annexation of *le pays rhénan* (excluding her recovery of Alsace-Lorraine) and to all other projects which would make the fate of western Rhenish Prussia depend solely on force of arms. When public men in Allied capitals speak of driving the Germans back to the Rhine we must ask what they mean. If they mean that, having driven the enemy out of Belgium back to

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a line running from Wesel through Cologne to Mainz, we are going to make peace by planting tricolour frontier-posts along the left bank of the Rhine they must surely know that the peoples and armies of France and Great Britain are not at war with the Central Powers for any such purpose. If they do not mean that, they are merely goading the jaded spirit of Germany into new efforts and thus plainly defeating our purpose. The respect in which the Allied democracies hold the principle of nationality is a political reality which moves them to espouse the cause of unliberated peoples all over Europe, and, with equal emphasis, to refuse the annexation of Rhenish Prussia by France, of Dalmatia by Italy, or of Belgium by Germany. The day is past when such annexations are either politic or possible. Europe has learned by this time the lesson which Bismarck taught her in 1871; and we hope it may yet be said that, with the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France at the close of the Great War, the age of annexation in Europe came finally to an end. No plea of economics or strategy—the former is to-day far stronger than the latter—can be allowed to prevail over the established principle which entitles the adult peoples of the earth to “self-determination,” and thereby forbids the introduction of alien rule in any form or under any pretext. This is not mere sentiment; it is a sober truth drawn from European experience recent enough to be familiar to the majority of men and women; and if we fail to guide our course by it we shall pay for our failure in the blood of the next generation. Even the temperate argument and measured conclusions in favour of an autonomous Rhenish province presented by M. Edouard Driault (*La République et le Rhin*: par E. Driault. Recueil Sirey, 22 rue Soufflot, Paris, V^e. 3 francs. 1916) seem to me to fall under this ban; for, while they avoid the fatal word “annexation,” they imply the equally fatal thing, dismemberment of Prussia, of which the Rhenish region—whatever may have been its feelings in a not very remote past—is now a prosperous and contented part. Many a page that has been written on the historic wrongs that France has suffered on her eastern frontier would never have seen the light if the writers had more carefully checked their arguments by reference to facts. “A Student” has done well to remind us in a letter to the *Times* (see *Times*, 15 October) that “all that France lost in the valleys of the Rhine and Moselle by the Treaty of 1815 was two small strips of terri-

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tory. One lay along the bank of the River Saar, and was determined by the existence of the fortress of Saarlouis, and not by the ironfields. The other was a patch of the left bank of the Rhine taken in order to deprive France of the fortress of Landau . . . with the exception of these two small patches, all the adjoining French losses in Alsace and Lorraine date from 1871." The Rhine frontier further north may have been *la frontière républicaine*; it became also *la frontière Napoléonienne*. If it were restored to France to-day, nothing but a new Napoleon with a new *Grande Armée* could keep it. Is that the will of France?

The Rhine frontier in Alsace has a different story. The Reichsland stands on quite another historical foundation from Rhenish Prussia and even from the Palatinate. The left bank of the Rhine from the Palatinate to the Dutch frontier lay, indeed, within the frontier of ancient Gaul; but throughout the intervening centuries it acquired, on the whole, a more Germanic character than Lorraine or even lower Alsace. The speech of its inhabitants, like that of every region in the No Man's Land between Antwerp and Basel, is, indeed, akin to Dutch and Broad Scots; but probably, at any time since the Reformation, a man from Trier or Andernach could make himself easily understood both in Ghent and in Colmar. The dialect varied, but the language root was the same. Language, therefore, is not the true test; for by it Flanders, Holland, Rhenish Prussia, the Palatinate and Lower Alsace would form practically one unit. It is the political leaning of the people that counts; and, by all available evidence, the population of Alsace and Lorraine has shown as decided a preference for republican France as the peoples of the Rhine basin to the north have shown for Germany. The restoration of the Rhine frontier from Switzerland to the river Lauter is restoration of a true boundary between nations; its continuation northwards to Cologne and Wesel would make it a line of dismemberment which could not remain. There is, therefore, one sense in which the Rhine will once more become the frontier between Germany and France, and another in which the attempt to carry the limit of French territory to its left bank would mean the inauguration of a new era of European discord, with a German *revanche* hanging over us like a thundercloud. For concord in the new Europe, the former is as indispensable as the latter is inimical.

A. F. WHYTE.

Anti-Russian Intrigue

WE have reached a moment when plain speech is necessary. The strain and vicissitudes of the war, the native folly of those to whom foreign policy is a blank page, and the manœuvres, direct and indirect, of an artful and unscrupulous enemy, combine to threaten that sacred union between the Western Powers and their great Eastern Ally, which is, after all—who but a fool dare deny it?—the greatest and the most decisive factor in this war. The entry of America, momentous as it is and far-reaching as its effects upon the future of the world must be, can never be as vital as the fact that Germany is fighting upon two fronts, that just as we of the West, by our pressure in Flanders, Champagne and the Carso, are saving Russia from utter disaster to-day, so Russia's immense sacrifices during the first year of war alone made it possible for France to hold out until the British armies were ready. Why do the carping critics of our splendid Eastern Ally never remind their readers now of what was a commonplace in every mouth two years ago? There is not a word to suggest that, even amid the internal chaos which her enemies have laboured so successfully to promote, the number of enemy troops whom Russia has kept permanently occupied reaches a figure which would certainly impress the man in the street if he were allowed to hear it, and that the New Russia, unlike the Russia of the Tsar and of the Camarilla, has definitely refused Germany's highly plausible offers of peace without indemnity and without loss of any territory. It is matter for deep regret that little or no attempt has been made in England to do justice to the loyalty of Mr. Kerenski and his colleagues under the most trying circumstances imaginable. Lamentable mistakes have been committed under the new *régime*, but the moral responsibility for the situation which rendered such mistakes inevitable lies with that vanished order which disorganised front and rear alike for its own selfish ends. Never was there a more crying injustice than the suggestion, too often re-echoed by men of high standing and wide experience, that Russia has betrayed and deserted us; and those who make it are playing straight into the hands of Baron von Kühlmann and of the vast army which, acting on his orders, seeks to "organise" sympathies and antipathies throughout the world.

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Kühlmann's main interest lies in the East of Europe, and this, of course, explains his readiness to disgorge Belgium and even Alsace-Lorraine (it is already known that his famous "Never" was merely a *beau geste* to cover up a secret and unsuccessful "Now"), if only we, in our righteous disgust at Russia's betrayal, would consent in our turn to betray Russia to the Germans. There is abundant evidence that the two foremost aims of Germany to-day are, in the first place, before peace comes, to establish full economic control over her more and more exhausted allies, especially Austria-Hungary, and, in the second place, to prepare the way for a new commercial agreement with Russia such as would place that country's vast resources at her mercy immediately after peace was declared, and would thereby save Germany from imminent economic disaster. In order to attain this latter end Germany is striving to maintain Russia in a state of weakness, and, lest order should replace anarchy, is engaged in organising, through the medium of countless agents, the wholesale *sabotage de la guerre* in Russia. Here economics and politics are inextricably blended, and it is a two-fold object which Germany is pursuing alike in the Dual Monarchy, in Poland, in Lithuania, in Courland, in the Ukraine, in Roumania, and among the Jugoslavs.

With these vast stakes in view, it is a vital interest of Germany's present rulers to kindle suspicion between Russia and the Western Powers, and towards this end all Kühlmann's efforts are now directed. The bait of a separate peace has been dangled before one nose after another, and attempts were made to veil each successive failure by an elaborate system of imputing to the other party the very manoeuvre to which it had refused to lend itself. Meanwhile, each of our Allies is being plied, through 'devious channels, with plausible accounts of our own willingness to come to terms, and each and every opportunity is taken to suggest, now our readiness to make overtures behind the back of our friends, now our obstinacy in dragging our unhappy friends at our chariot wheels when they might so easily obtain honourable and easy terms. Of their wholesale campaign of calumny and misrepresentation it is unnecessary to speak. It follows an infinite gradation from the *communiqués* of Wolff and the German wireless to the insinuations and suggestions which are inserted under a hundred carefully-veiled disguises

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in the neutral press, but really intended for the consumption of London. It is most unfortunate that our own press, in its natural impatience at the success with which German *sabotage* in Russia has dislocated our own military plans in the West, should sometimes have walked straight into the trap of the German fowler and published statements which could not fail to create tension and misunderstanding between London and Petrograd. We fully admit how difficult it is for the plain man to preserve his patience under such exasperating conditions; but it is for that very reason that we regard it as essential to proclaim, in season and out of season, the true nature of Germany's policy in the East—which is not merely to defeat the Russian army, not merely even to destroy the Russian Revolution, but to destroy Russia herself, and to replace her by a moral chaos in which the material spoils will fall to Germany. Instead, then, of preserving gloomy silence towards a nation which is peculiarly sensitive, and responds like a magnet to advances or rebuffs, it is for us to remember that imagination is not our strong point as a nation, and that, without a special dose of it, we can scarcely grasp the full tragedy of Russia's situation at the present time. As a prominent Russian said to us the other day, "We would far prefer it if, instead of congratulating us when we take a town, you would send us a word of sympathy and encouragement when we lose one."

Providentially, we are led to-day by a statesman who is, above all, pre-eminently endowed with this saving quality of imagination; and it is to Mr. Lloyd George himself, whom we know to be a whole-hearted and loyal friend of the new *régime* in Russia, that we make a special appeal. Many different interests, utterly irreconcilable in normal times, are now converging in an insidious attempt to "rush" him into commitments from which he could not easily escape, and which might produce the most far-reaching and incalculable effects.

A test case for the future of Russo-British relations is the question of Poland. Last week Reuter's Agency announced that "the Governments of the Great Powers of the Entente have formally recognised the Polish National Committee" which has been formed in Paris under Mr. Roman Dmowski. If this were accurate it would mean that the Entente had accepted as the representative of Poland as a whole a single

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party which only represents a section of Polish opinion, and which had become identified with the old reactionary *régime* in Russia and with an Imperialistic territorial programme which threatens the national unity of Russia, and which, therefore, every Russian must repudiate. But in the particular form in which it was given to the press the announcement is as false as it is misleading. Russia is presumably still one of "the Great Powers of the Entente," though some people would like us to think that she is ruined; and Russia has given no such recognition. Russia, who is far more vitally concerned in Poland than any Western Power, is entitled to be consulted beforehand on such a matter, and not to have her hand forced at a moment of distress. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that France and Britain have really committed themselves to a step which Russia is not prepared to take. Certainly Russia could not fail to be seriously affronted at the recognition of a party which has for months past devoted itself to abuse of Russia and of those Poles whom she *has* officially recognised. Their abuse has specially concentrated on Mr. Alexander Lednicki, who, as official adviser of the Russian Government on Polish affairs (with Ministerial rank), enjoys the confidence of all the democratic Polish elements in Russia, and who is intimately connected, not merely with Mr. Kerenski (who spoke in the Duma in favour of Polish independence at a time when its Polish members were afraid to do so), but also with the Cadets and Octobrists—with men such as Messrs. Miljukov and Gučkov. If it were the intention of the Western Powers to alienate from themselves all the saner opinion in Russia, they could not do better than throw themselves into the arms of Mr. Lednicki's enemies.

We do not for a moment suggest that there should be no criticism of Russia. Under the old *régime*, we wrote: "Between friends and allies frank and fearless criticism and discussion is absolutely essential, and we do not believe that our outspoken treatment of present miseries in Russia will be misunderstood by those whose opinion we value, and with whom rests the future of the alliance." To-day our attitude remains the same, and we have openly attacked the wreckers in the Soviet and even individual Extremists by name. For us, Černov is no more sacred than Goremykin or Stürmer; and the statesmen of our Allies cannot expect to be any more

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immune than our own leaders from the breath of criticism. But such criticism is a very different thing from systematic onslaughts upon the great principles which underlie the Russian Revolution, and which make of it an event in world-history no less momentous than even the Great War itself. Amid the stress of battle we may not fully realise this fact, but it is daily becoming clearer, and nowhere is it more clearly understood than in Austria-Hungary, the last stronghold of the autocratic principle. The Russian people knows that America shares its ideals; they must not be allowed to think that France and Britain are lacking in the same enthusiasm.

Ultramontane Pacifism

SOME alarm is felt among British Roman Catholics at what they regard as an Ultramontane intrigue for a German peace. Since the war broke out there have been few stronger supporters of the Allied cause than the majority of British Roman Catholics, including many British Jesuits. They have deplored the attitude of their Church in Italy, Spain and parts of Ireland, and have stood, in spirit, much nearer to Cardinal Mercier than to the Roman Curia. But since the publication of the Papal Note (which, as Cardinal Bourne recently insisted, is by no means invested with "infallibility") they have seen, with misgiving, the growth of a tendency in some Catholic quarters to follow the Pope in regarding the war as "a useless massacre," and to work for an inconclusive, and therefore a pro-enemy, peace.

It cannot be said that the fears thus entertained are unjustified. It would be deplorable if Ultramontane tendencies on the part of any considerable section of British Roman Catholics should cast suspicions upon the patriotic loyalty of their fellow believers or should undermine the influence which they wield in the State. British Roman Catholics hold high office in various Government departments and in the diplomatic service. They are, in particular, powerful in the War Office and in the Foreign Office. To some of the posts nearest to Germany—as at the Hague and at the Zurich Consulate-General—Roman Catholics have recently been appointed. It is, therefore, eminently desirable that the distinguished men who hold these important positions should not be compromised in the eyes of their

ULTRAMONTANE PACIFISM

fellow subjects by any evidence of secret or open pacifism on the part of Roman Catholic individuals or organisations in this country.

In the fourth number of *THE NEW EUROPE*, published on 9 November, 1916, there appeared an appreciation of the pacifist campaign, in which the Vatican organs were then engaged, from "a highly competent neutral observer whose position has enabled him to watch the under-currents of the War." "There exists," he wrote, "a distinct understanding between the Roman Curia and International Plutocracy. . . . Germany is, in reality, an organisation for plunder, armed to the teeth and devoid of any political or religious doctrines. Yet she has succeeded in associating with her the great international forces of the Roman Curia—with whose help she invokes the support of religion and of the principle of authority—and of International Socialism, by which she hopes to guide the masses in all countries. . . . Unless the Allies are careful, the public spirit of their peoples and its moral and economic foundations will be undermined while their armies are fighting Germany. 'Peace' will fall upon the world like an entangling net or like a fog, rising, one knows not whence nor how. This is the victory at which Germany now aims. She is preparing for it as she alone knows how to prepare, with the help of the Roman Curia, on the one hand, and of high finance on the other, and followed by the bleating and imbecile flocks of Socialist pacifists and humanitarian pacifists. If her subtle campaign succeeds, the peoples of Europe will hardly know why they have fought."

This warning is even more pertinent to-day than it was a year ago. In the meantime we have had various international financial conferences in neutral countries, the Stockholm "peace offensive" and the Papal Note, with its "useless massacre" doctrine. As Allied diplomatists now know, the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments were, at least, consulted before that Note was issued. It is now being used in this country as a stalking horse by Roman Catholic pacifist Ultramontanes. Hence the alarm felt by patriotic Roman Catholics, who know how hardly their position in the State has been won and how sorely it might be jeopardised should any just occasion be given for public wrath.

IGNATIUS.

Sidelights on "Bulgarian War-Weariness"

ON 15 October the *Times* published an article entitled "War-weariness in Bulgaria," which gave a very fair idea* of the character of party politics in Bulgaria and of the corrupt and high-handed methods of the Radoslavov Government. It went on to prophesy—probably with good reason—an imminent change of Government, and to attribute this coming event to "the strong anti-German reaction which has been taking place in Bulgaria." These remarks have been widely interpreted as meaning that before long a separate peace with Bulgaria would be practicable and advisable: yet the true facts of the Balkan situation show this to be a dangerous delusion. Fortunately the *Globe* of 17 October was in a position to publish an authoritative statement to the effect that "neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister shares the standpoint of the *Times* correspondent, who appeared to be preparing the ground for pourparlers with the vain object of negotiating Bulgaria out of the war. As this operation could only be successful at the expense of our Serbian and Roumanian Allies and the Greece of Mr. Venizelos, who have made immense sacrifices in the common cause, we can appreciate their apprehension at any suspicion of a suggestion that anyone connected with our Government might conceivably

* Unfortunately the article contains also several errors of fact. To take three examples: (1) "Germany's steady refusal to permit Bulgarian administration of the conquered Dobrudja." True, the General of the whole of occupied Roumania is a German general, but Bulgarian, like Austro-Hungarian, officers are fully represented on his staff. Further, the local officials in the Dobrudja *are* Bulgarians. Bulgarian churches, schools, local banks and societies have been founded everywhere in the province, and Bulgarian Ministers pay it frequent visits of inspection. (2) "Radoslavov has now lost completely the narrow majority he used to command in the Săbranije, since the imprisonment of Genadijev and the defection of Genadijev's followers." The correspondent does not mention that Radoslavov substituted ten of his own nominees for the ten Genadijevists he imprisoned (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 29). (3) In his account of the Opposition parties the correspondent does not distinguish between the two Socialist groups—a vital point, as all readers of THE NEW EUROPE know—and omits all mention of Danev's "Progressive" and Gešov's "Narodnjak" (Nationalist) party unless it be to them that he refers under the vague and misleading term "pro-Entente Conservatives."

SIDELIGHTS ON "BULGARIAN WAR-WEARINESS"

contemplate some excursion into the diplomacy of the backstairs. Any Bulgarian trap would be cunningly baited with von Kühlmann holding the line in the background."

It is not a trap which readers of THE NEW EUROPE are likely to enter. There is no "reaction" in Bulgarian policy: nor is Bulgaria now "anti-German," after having once been "pro-German." The Bulgars have never loved the Germans, nor, in fact, any nation but their own. Politically, they were pro-German, as the Magyars were pro-German, because from a Chauvinist point of view that was sound policy. In October, 1915, they were frank enough to admit: "We will use the German alliance to win the hegemony of the Balkans; later on we can come to terms with Mother Russia and play off Germany against Russia and Russia against Germany in the Balkans." But in March, 1917, came the Revolution, and a new Russia opposed to the annexations and political intrigues which Bulgarian policy favoured. Russia, Bulgarians believe, is now both unfavourable and useless to them, and for that reason they are turning their attention to the Western Powers, in particular to Britain and America. For this intrigue Mr. Gešov's party is the chosen vehicle. His ties with Manchester raise hopes of capturing British hearts. Through the Robert College connection he is in close touch with the United States, where the Bulgarian Minister, Mr. Panaretov, himself a former Robert College professor, on 29 September committed a studied indiscretion in publicly proclaiming Bulgaria's affections for the Entente Powers.

Meanwhile, in Switzerland, Gešov's "Alliance of Bulgarian Scholars, Writers and Artists," is hard at work. Professor Milev, editor of the *Government* organ *L'Echo de Bulgarie*, is now rendering the "Alliance" valuable service as a propagandist. In an article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (9 October) he claims for Bulgaria the possession of the whole Dobrudja, as belonging "geographically, ethnically and economically to the land south of the Danube." Except for this demand for the Dobrudja, says Professor Milev, "it is important to emphasize the fact that Bulgarian claims have not altered in the course of the war."

In other words, the story still disseminated by well-meaning sentimentalists in this country, that Bulgaria entered the war only to "liberate Macedonia," is disproved by Mr. Milev, as by every Bulgarian who opens his mouth.

SIDELIGHTS ON "BULGARIAN WAR-WEARINESS"

Bulgaria wants the Dobrudja. She also wants and *always intended to get*, not only Macedonia (Serbian and Greek), but considerable portions of Old Serbia and the Morava valley, giving her permanent territorial contact with the Central Powers. To the many evidences of this demand, provided not only by the Government, but by all sections of the Opposition press (except the "Narrow" Socialists), may now be added Radoslavov's official pronouncement to Herr Emil Ludwig, correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* (4 October): "The world knows our aims; especially the Entente knows them: for before we intervened in the war I repeatedly put them before its representatives. In a word they are: The union of all Bulgarian lands, which we must strive for and attain—Macedonia to a line south of Monastir, the Bulgarian Morava and the Dobrudja up to the mouth of the Danube." These aims are supported by the *Mir* (Gešovist), the *Preporec* (Malinovist), and all the other Opposition papers, including the *Narod* (Broad Socialist). Therefore if, as the *Times* foreshadows, there is going to be a change of Government in Bulgaria shortly, Bulgarian war-aims are likely to remain the same.

The Bulgarian peace campaign is, indeed, a very complicated move. It is partly, as we have seen, the natural and necessary sequel—planned since October 1915—of Bulgaria's intervention then. But it is also inextricably part of a highly complicated German intrigue, with which there is not, for the moment, space to deal, but which we hope to discuss in full before long.

BELISARIUS.

A Russo-German Dialogue

[Herr Samuel Sanger, a well-known German Liberal publicist, who sometimes writes with unusual frankness under the name of Junius, is publishing in the *Neue Rundschau* his impressions of a visit to Stockholm during last June. Of special interest is his account of a conversation with one of the editors of the big Russian Cadet organ *Vjedomosti*, over which, to use his own words, "floats the spirit of Miljukov and Western bourgeois liberalism, as presiding genius."]

GREAT STATES AND SMALL.

"As far as I can see," I [Sanger] said to him, "the holy trinity of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality, as Dostoievski understood them, is played out; the three rocks which once supported your Holy Russia have been undermined; the three abysses which

A RUSSO-GERMAN DIALOGUE

lie across Russia's path to the future, to her European future, in which we Germans, for our life and salvation's sake, wished to share loyally and without *arrière pensée*, are beginning to fill up. Is that not so?"

Mr. B. is still monosyllabic. "Let us get closer to grips," he said. "I should like to know what you mean by our nationality. Does it belong to the abyss of which you spoke?"

"I hope you do not take too seriously the learned twaddle (*Gefasel*) which may, perhaps, have reached you too. No sensible man in Germany can desire . . . that the Great Russian element should abdicate, that the national separatist movement should burst the framework of the State as a whole, and that Russia should become an *omnium gatherum* of greater and lesser States. Were this possible it would be for us anything but desirable. . . . Since Prussia's rise under Frederick William I. and Frederick the Great we have needed two centuries to cement the various parts of the State, to weld the old and new provinces, the Prussian half-Slavs and the more German Germans. So we know that such developments are natural processes, which, quite apart from cultural and other reasons, cannot for economic reasons be reversed. The tendency of world-history goes far beyond the national State: there is a universal movement (*Drang*) towards united states, towards bundles of nationalities forming vast utilitarian leagues for the purpose of ensuring their economic existence and protecting the development of their cultural individuality. The self-determination of small nations and "nationlets" takes place *inside* these leagues: it is only *inside* them that national feeling and State consciousness can be reconciled. There are many Central Europeans who have long understood this and who aspire to this in a more honourable way than the Entente fortune-bringers, who would fain break up our alliance by a formula, and above all annihilate Germany, the strong wild beast. You may call that democratic federalism or what you like—it is our watchword."

"For us also?"

"For you also. Hence to-day there is no nation or State on earth for whose own existence the Balkanisation of the East and South-East would be more fatal than for us. There can be no rest, no *modus vivendi* for Europe, for the two groups of nations which specially concern us. I measure a statesman by the way in which he grasps this fact, and thereby overcomes the obstacles in himself and around him. Now, after three years of blood . . . he must step forward and inscribe this principle [presumably "Federalism." —*Ed.*] in golden letters upon the banner which he unfolds, for he it is, he alone, who for us Europeans means freedom and liberation. And I demand of him that he should now unveil before the whole world the main details of his programme."

"Splendid. We Russian democrats could wish nothing better. But the results—have you weighed the results?"

"Yes, to their very last consequences."

"This principle, applied to the whole East and South-East—all round, as the English say—revolutionises your whole official policy

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up till now. According to it, for instance, the regulation of the Polish Question can only be undertaken jointly by Germany, Russia, and Austria; none of the Powers interested in the Polish partitions can act alone. That is equivalent to a renunciation of the precedence which your achievements in arms have given you."

"But is also equivalent to liberation from an eternal unrest. It would lay the first foundation-stone for a *modus vivendi* in the East."

THE BUFFER STATE.

"You would thus have given up the idea of buffer States, so far as the East is concerned?"

"The idea of the buffer is completely bankrupt after the experiences of this war. Were a break-up of Russia possible, . . . were the Finns, Esths, Letts, the handful of Baltic Germans, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Jews—a chaotic hotch-potch—given their self-government by the Central Powers . . . then what remained, the Grand Duchy or Republic of Moscow, without its Asiatic possessions, would still include eighty million Great Russians. What would then happen is clear as daylight. Amputated Russia would be driven completely into the arms of England and America. The buffer States of alien races could neither alone nor together preserve their economic or political existence, and deadly enmities, such as those between Poles and Ukrainians, would never give us a day's peace. A great section of them—Poles and Jews—would rather attach itself to the Republic of Russia and the great Anglo-Saxon democracies, from which they hope for help, money, freedom and salvation. No, that does not lead to the *modus vivendi* with you. I hate the buffer with its sham sovereignty."

"Are such ideas current among you in Germany?"

"All over the place (*massenhaft*). I can imagine your making your reconstructed State so elastic, infusing your administration so thoroughly with liberal ideas . . . that all your foreign peoples would very quickly forget the bloody wounds of the Russifying machine, and reconciling their demand for self-government with the needs of the State as a whole, would feel happy as autonomous members of a vast federal State. . . ."

RUSSOPHILES AND RUSSOPHOBES IN GERMANY.

"That is all very well. I am listening with astonishment, and I repeat the question, 'In whose name are you speaking?' For almost three years we have watched the struggle between your two Russophile and Russophobe schools, the activities of your Rohrbachs and Schiemanns, of your anti-Russian Balts (*Spezialbalten*). . . ."

"For the moment they are in disgrace."

"These wildly anti-Russian publicists all wanted, or want, not only to separate from us the western frontier lands and block our window to the Baltic, thus erasing Peter the Great's work and its consequences from our history; they even wanted, or want, to turn the Ukraine, with its treasures of corn and ore, into an independent empire. To-day that is waste paper, but to-morrow? Facts have

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been accomplished, liberations officially announced, which erect walls between us."

"That is past and over" (*Gewesen, gewesen*).

"You say that is past. I know that. I read your papers. I know your Hoetzschs and Bernhards. I can picture to myself the consequences of the American duel in which you are engaged with England—forced to it by a world-historical process, *you* say—and I am well aware of the subterranean games (*Gemächle*) which are being played here and in Copenhagen. You want to make us forget: you base yourselves on the distant effects of the Russian Revolution, which strike deep into the Danubian Empire and among the Austrian Slavs; you feel how difficult it is to build up political edifices in defiance of the tendency of history and economic interest. The thorny Polish Question has staggered the boldest brains in the Wilhelmstrasse, and so the Russophil current seems to be more than a mere whim or the result of embarrassment, it seems far rather to be intended as a permanent policy."

GERMANY'S PROFFERED HAND.

"Absolutely. Could you wish anything better? The simplest reflection should tell you that under such circumstances the liquidation of the war without humiliation and without any burden upon your future is for you the most bitter necessity. If the aggressive imperialism which aimed at the destruction and partition of Austria and Turkey is abandoned, then an agreement regarding the Dardanelles and Armenia is altogether conceivable. And I personally cannot imagine under any circumstances the Balkan problem being solved in one-sided fashion by one group of Powers. Naturally, the distribution of forces which the sword has produced in the Balkans must be the basis of agreement. This view would correspond to present day facts, and to the conditions of a permanent peace. But the West, which will not give up its imperialistic aims, seeks to confuse you by hysterical phrases. One of them is the stupid analogy to the French Revolution, where amid the internal ferment stormy and surging forces survived to hurl back the monarchic coalition and usher in the new epoch at Valmy. That is a criminal game. The vast distances, the bloody sacrifices heaped up in three years of war, the collapse of every organisation, the ethnographic and cultural differences, the existence side by side of mediæval and modern ideas in economics and habits, the incapacity of your masses to produce to-day without transitional troubles a combination of freedom with order and loyal devotion to work—all this leaves you no choice, if you consult your own interest. You ought to bless the hand which is loyally stretched out to you."

RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES.

"Do not let us speak of loyalty; you no doubt know why you are interested in us just now. You seem now at last anxious to exercise the option with which world-history presented you twenty years before the outbreak of the war. A little late, to your and our misfortune. Even though we deny the imperialistic aims ascribed

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to us, and above all our claim to Constantinople and our share in the new order in the Balkans, we are forced by our very regard for our own consolidation not to dissolve the alliance with the Western Powers, with America and—with Japan. We have no free choice. We need capital on a vast scale, and the most modern technical machinery; we need, too—and this you Germans underestimate again and again—the *ideal* link with the great democracies of the world, in order to introduce order in the State. Who else could place all this so liberally at our disposal to-day as England and America? Our Allies have the united financial power of the globe, they control all territories capable of exploitation, and they command the seas—in spite of your U-boats. . . .”

“ But the conditions of this fraternal help, the conditions? You lamented over the German-Russian commercial treaty of 1905, and your savants and hack writers called us blackmailers. It did not hinder the country's fabulous progress in technical, economic and cultural directions. You clenched your fists against the German instructor, against the Prussian pedant, against Germany's greed of gain. . . . But what is all that beside Anglo-American arrogance which, as a matter of course, hangs round your neck the chains of an indebtedness which is reckoned out for many generations? And all that pales before the sacrifices of blood for those imperialistic aims to which Germany's destruction are to open the way. . . . As I came in here a telegram announced the beginning of a Russian offensive. There is not a child from whom you can conceal who prompted it. . . .”

“ We need the offensive to restore morale in the Army, to breed in the disorganised masses (I speak quite openly) a kind of all-Russian State consciousness, to strengthen our prestige at home and abroad, to give weight to our voice in the Council of the Allies, and, finally, to have an instrument for the prompt restoration of internal order. Why play at blind man's buff? I am betraying nothing to you, especially as I saw you with those gentlemen of the Agrarian Bank in Moscow. Out of all that your official policy ought to draw the obvious conclusion. It is possible that we shall collapse, it is possible that chaos will set in, it is possible that the Maximalists may be able to play at governing for a time and to make themselves the agents of the general longing for peace. Russian Russia, the *bourgeois*-democratic and peasant Russia, the Russia of sacred tradition, will never dare to recognise a separate peace produced under such circumstances. I repeat, and I beg you to proclaim this sentence in Germany on the housetops: ‘ A choice such as you wish us to make, is not possible for us, quite apart from reasons of honour.’ And supposing you were tired of standing at attention and were to begin a successful offensive, in order to force us to our knees . . .”

“ What then?”

THE INTERNAL FRONT.

“ What then? You would produce what neither force nor persuasion has hitherto been able to produce—namely, a People's War,

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a *guerre à outrance*, organised with the help of our Allies. Then we should get what we have hitherto sought in vain—an Internal Front. And if it were conceivable that we should go soft, and if a civil war paralysed the will of the State for all outward purposes and we had to give in, our position would then be still more uncertain than before. Our friends would become our enemies. You have enough to do at home in order to hold out to the end and prevent yourselves from being fought down by nine-tenths of the human race marshalled against you. With what means and in what way could you free us from ourselves? No, I see only one road which can bring us together, and that lies in an understanding with the Anglo-Saxon Powers."

"Aha! I was waiting for this conclusion."

"I see no other way towards liquidating the world-war."

"That means there is no way—unless the U-boat turns madness into reason."

NO PEACE WITH AUTOCRACY.

"I know a road which leads more quickly to the goal, because it utterly renounces the terrorism of force. The Russian Revolution was, God knows, not desired or reckoned upon by the Western Powers. But now that it is a fact, there is nothing else for them but to adapt themselves to its consequences. I know that your autocracy is in no way comparable to the autocracy which we have thrown off. It is constitutional; it is clothed in Parliamentary forms; it has a conscience. It has not merely a moral tinge, but has its roots in a patriarchal system with moral restraints, a system such as enables us to understand how a nation so cultivated as the Prussian Germans . . . should have submitted to this *régime*. But the origin, length, and course of this war have forced you, too, on to the path of emancipation from semi-feudal ideas of authority, on to the path of democratisation; and in the same way the new men in Austria-Hungary have taken refuge at their need in similar tactics of conciliation and reconstruction. . . . If once the new consciousness were to find expression among you in the language, attitude, and composition of your government, then the Western Powers, and for quite special reasons, the America of that strange Saint, Wilson, . . . would have to reckon with the consequences of this great event in world-history. For even in Cincinnati and Manchester and Paris and Rome the man in the street is capable of grasping these consequences. And their reverberation in the New Russia, which still suffers so unspeakably from the legacy of the Old, would be incalculable."

Review

Mr. George Young's *Portugal, Old and Young* (Clarendon Press. pp. vi + 342. 5s. net), is not only a comprehensive and penetrating historical study of the Portuguese nation. It is a good deal more. By the author's way of presenting the story, by his suggestive comments on permanent political values, as exemplified in the case of Portugal, his work may almost be described as a philosophy of

REVIEW

nationality. He gives us a striking and living picture of the national characteristics of the Portuguese, and traces the working of these characteristics through the various phases of the country's history; he shows how the patriotism of Old Portugal, which manifested itself in loyalty to the Crown, gave way to the patriotism of Young Portugal, which consists in loyalty to the State, and how the forces of Republicanism, set free by the Revolution of 1910, have inevitably ranged Portugal on the side of the Allies in the present war. The spirit of the Republic, which has triumphed over that of the reactionary Royalists, is of the essence of that national idea which the Allies are maintaining against the German idea. Incidentally the difficulties which Young Portugal has had to contend with since her Revolution may serve as a guide and encouragement to Russia; and Portugal's example may also be taken to heart by those hasty critics of Russia in this country, whose impatience for "results" has led them to ignore the principle that is at stake. The value of Mr. Young's book is, indeed, almost inexhaustible. He writes throughout with that pleasing originality of thought and expression, of which he gave us a sample in these pages last week; and his sense of humour saves him from idealising his theme at the expense of the truth. Of particular interest at the present moment is Mr. Young's picture of the Portuguese President, Dr. Bernardino Machado, who was entertained in this country last week, and whose work for Young Portugal has been of such great moment in the success of her cause.

G. G.

The International Financial Conference

The announcement, first made in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 42), that a mysterious conference of international financiers had met in Switzerland, seems likely to receive confirmation through the arrest at Geneva, on 2 October, of Herr Jellinek, formerly Austro-Hungarian Consul at Nice. Herr Jellinek took part in the conference. There were also present the international financier, M. Rosenberg, who was only too well known in Paris before the war, and the circle of whose acquaintances once included King Nicholas of Montenegro; an Austro-Hungarian official who was long at the head of the Press Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office; together with four or five other suspicious inhabitants of the No Man's Land that lies between international finance and politics. The conference discussed and decided sundry questions of Austro-German finance and propaganda in Allied countries, including, it appears, the support of a newspaper with a double-barrelled name that was destined to promote enemy interests in France. The very fact of this conference having taken place has been vigorously denied in various quarters, not all of them unofficial. The Swiss Authorities who have now examined Herr Jellinek doubtless know how much credence those denials deserve, and could, were they so inclined, furnish much valuable information supplementary to that which we have published.

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“L'Angleterre a la gloire de tenir en ses
mains la balance politique”

—Emerich de Vattel (1758)

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The Balance of Power

"THE peace for which we are fighting," said Mr. Asquith at Leeds on 27 September last, "has two aims, one immediate, the other ulterior, neither of which should be left out of view. The first is—not the restoration of the *status quo*—not the revival in some revised shape of what used to be called the balance of power—but the substitution for the one and the other of an international system, in which there will be a place for great and small States, and under which both alike can be assured a stable foundation and an independent development."

The principle of an international federal system, or of a league to enforce peace, thus once more authoritatively proclaimed, has been widely accepted, and has been welcomed by a war-weary world as bringing within the sphere of practical politics the realization of the long-cherished dream of perpetual peace. I have elsewhere indicated what seem to me the dangers and the all but insuperable difficulties inherent in any attempt to translate this principle into practice.* In the present article I propose to criticise only the assumption that this principle excludes that of the balance of power. Mr. Asquith is by no means alone in making this assumption; he is supported by many politicians and publicists of repute. Mr. Delisle Burns, for instance, expounding a new and lofty ideal of international morality, holds that the methods of the balance of power are obsolete. "The principle of the balance of power," he says, "belongs to the Renaissance situation, where the relationship between States was not so intimate or continuous, in economics and ideas, as it is to-day. It is not a false principle if applied to the situation out of which it arose; but that situation has simply disappeared."† It was devised, in short, for a system of States both *de jure* and *de facto* independent, whereas, under modern

* "The Confederation of Europe" (1913) and articles in the *Edinburgh Review* for April and July, 1917.

† "The Morality of Nations," p. 110.

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conditions, whatever their *de jure* status may be, *de facto* States are not independent but interdependent. For Mr. J. A. Hobson the situation has not indeed disappeared, but it ought to disappear. "It is only," he says, "by making it too obviously dangerous for any one Power to attack any other Power that the balance of reasonable motives is firmly weighted against armaments. This can only be achieved by substituting for a world of isolated independent States, or balances of power, a world in which the united strength of a sufficient number of States is brought to bear immediately and certainly against any disturber of the public peace."* Elsewhere, indeed, he remarks very truly that a balance of power is the most favourable condition for an international understanding, but this is apparently only to reinforce his argument in favour of "peace without victory." † As for the expression "balance of power," this, says Mr. Hobson, "is nothing else than the core of diplomatic falsehood. The statesmen who employ it do not want to preserve a just balance, but always to tip the scale in favour of the Power or group of Powers they represent." ‡ After these appreciations of the balance of power, which leave a somewhat confused impression on the mind, it is refreshing to turn to the unequivocal judgment of a speaker at a meeting of the Newcastle War and Peace Circle on 30 January, 1915. "The first definite thought is," he said, "that the balance of power must go."

The balance of power is not to be so lightly dismissed. Everyone would understand the absurdity if, in the confusion of recovering from the effects of a heavy fall, one were to stammer out, "The first definite thought is that the law of gravitation must go." Yet to say this of the balance of power is scarcely less absurd. The whole order of nature, inanimate and animate, rests on the balance of forces, and

* "Towards International Government," p. 23.

† *Ib.*, p. 15.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 182. This is, of course, equally true of the representatives of parties, or of any other group-interests, in any political society. *Apropos* of this, Gentz said of the balance of power that "perhaps the highest of its results is not so much a perfect equipoise as a constant alternate vacillation in the scales of the balance, which, from the application of counter-weights, is prevented from ever passing certain limits."—"Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe" (English ed., 1806), p. 63, note.

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the same is true of the social order, which, so long as there is a conscious difference between the interests of men and of groups of men, will depend for its stability on the adjustment of the balance between them. This was clearly understood by the framers of the American Constitution when they established it on an elaborate system of checks and balances. "Divide your powers," wrote John Quincy Adams in the "Letters of Publicola," "so that every part of it may at all times be used for your advantage, but in such a manner that your rights may never depend upon the will of one man or body of men." "The powers of government," said Jefferson, "should be so divided and balanced between several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others." This was, in fact, the principle of "constitutional balance," championed by Montesquieu; and Friedrich von Gentz pointed out the remarkable analogy with it, "both in its structure and operations," of the system of "political equipoise" in international relations. So far as the principle is concerned, the analogy becomes obvious if we compare the words of Adams and Jefferson just quoted with, *e.g.*, the definition of the balance of power given by Vattel.* By the balance of power, he says, is understood an arrangement of things such that no Power is in a position to dominate absolutely and to give the law to the rest.

Clearly, the principle of the balance of power thus defined is precisely that for which we and our Allies are contending in this war, as our ancestors and their Allies contended for it in the wars against the France of Louis XIV., of the Revolution and of Napoleon. It does not belong to any particular situation; it was not the creation of any particular political theory; it is rooted in the most primitive instincts of self-preservation. The eighteenth century may have invented the phrase "balance of power," as it certainly sought to define the legitimate application of the principle it connoted, but—as David Hume pointed out—the idea is as old as recorded history.† It is expressed by Polybius as a self-evident maxim of common-sense. "Never," he said, "should anyone be allowed to acquire

* "Droit des gens." Ed. 1758, liv. iii, chap. 3, I, p. 40.

† "Essay on the Balance of Power."

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a power so great as to make it impossible for you to dispute with him concerning your just rights."* "Here," comments Hume, "we have the aim of modern politics stated in express terms." It remained the aim of British policy up to and including the great settlement of 1815, of which the underlying principle was, in the language of British statesmen, the establishment of the permanent peace of Europe on the basis for a "just equilibrium."

If Mr. Asquith is to be believed, this principle is to play no part in the great settlement to come. Mr. Balfour, however, uses a more cautious language. In describing to the House of Commons, on 30 July, "the peace we desire," he declared that it must involve "such a rearrangement, such a modification of political forces in Europe, that there will not be a balance of power *in precisely the old eighteenth century sense of the word*, but such an arrangement among the communities of Europe as will make it far more difficult for the disturbers of peace to find a soil in which to sow their bitter and fatal seed." This forecast is vague, perhaps intentionally so; but it seems to imply that, in Mr. Balfour's opinion, the principle of the balance of power will not be abandoned, but will in some way be adapted to the circumstances of a new age. It is, then, of interest to inquire how far the principle as understood by the eighteenth century is, in fact, no longer valid.

In examining the works of the old writers on the balance of power one is at once struck by the remarkable similarity of their language with that of those by whom its principle is now attacked. Emerich de Vattel ascribes the origin of the balance of power to the very conditions which in Mr. Delisle Burns' view have now rendered it obsolete.

"Europe constitutes a political system, a body politic, in which everything is bound up together by the relations and various interests of the nations which inhabit this part of the world. It is no longer, as formerly, a confused mass of isolated pieces, of which each one thought itself little interested in the fate of the others, and rarely troubled about matters which did not affect it immediately. The continuous attention of the Sovereigns, ministers permanently in residence, perpetual negotiations, make of modern Europe a sort of Republic, of which the members, independent yet bound together by ties of common interest, combine to preserve the order and freedom. It is this that has given birth to that celebrated idea of the political equilibrium, or balance of power."†

* Lib. i., cap. 83.

† *Loc. cit.*

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Gentz, half a century later, defined the balance of power in language differing not at all from that of the champions of an international league to enforce peace.

“What is usually termed a balance of power is that constitution subsisting between neighbouring states, more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or the essential rights of another, without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and consequently exposing itself to danger.”*

It is not, he argues, a question of the equalisation of the power of the States, but of a system by which “the smallest as well as the greatest is secured in the possession of his right” against “lawless power.”

“The proper character of a union of States, such as has existed in modern Europe, and the triumph of its constitution, is that a certain number of States, possessing various degrees of power and wealth, shall remain untroubled within their own confines, under the protection of a common league.”

In the absence of any central executive and judicial power, he admitted, indeed, that the organisation of this league is imperfect; but he claimed that its objects had been approximately attained by the gradual development and consistent application of the principle of the balance of power, of which the practical maxims were as follows:—

“If the States system of Europe is to exist and be maintained by common exertions, no one of its members must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together.

“If that system is not merely to exist, but to be maintained without constant perils and violent concussions; each member which infringes it must be in a condition to be coerced, not only by the collective strength of the other members, but by any majority of them, if not by one individual.

“To escape the alternative danger of an uninterrupted series of wars . . . the fear of awakening common opposition, or of drawing down common vengeance, must be of itself sufficient to keep everyone within the bounds of moderation.

“If ever a European State attempted by unlawful enterprises to attain to a degree of power (or had in fact attained it) which enabled it to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even an alliance of the whole, such a State should be treated as a common enemy.”†

As to the practical result of the application of this principle in the eighteenth century, the most various opinions

* *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

† *Op. cit.*, pp. 61, 66.

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have been expressed. Sorel says scornfully of "the state of law" which it was supposed to guarantee, that "it was known only through the declamations of publicists and its violation by the Governments," and certainly the balance of power was made the pretext for many wars of aggression. Yet, as Gentz very justly remarks, a principle is not condemned by its occasional abuse; and he points out with great force, that the balance of power did, in fact, during three disturbed centuries, preserve the political existence of all the independent Powers "which originally belonged to the confederacy."

Such was the principle of the balance of power "in the eighteenth century sense of the word." How was it that this principle, regarded as a political axiom in 1815, came some fifty years later to be wholly discredited? The root cause was that the whole structure of "public right," as conceived by the eighteenth century, had been shattered by the Revolution. It had, indeed, as Gentz pointed out, already been destroyed by the partitions of Poland, an act "incomparably more destructive to the higher interests of Europe than previous acts of violence, because it originated in the very sphere from which was expected to flow nothing but benefits, namely, a union of regents" (*ib.*, p. 76). As we have seen, the principle presupposed certain well-defined rights in the members of the "family of nations," which it was the interest and the duty of all to join in defending if unjustly attacked. One defect of the system which led to constant trouble had been, as Vattel pointed out, that among these rights were some which led to the over-setting of the balance by quite legitimate means, *e.g.*, by inheritance—as in the case of the vast power of the Emperor Charles V. The Congress of Vienna, taking advantage of the fact that most territorial rights had been thrown into the melting pot during the Revolutionary epoch, attempted to remedy this defect by stereotyping those which survived, were restored, or were created. It is easy, in the light of all that has happened since, to criticise the Vienna settlement. Certainly too great a part was played in it by the bandit spirit of the Partitions; certainly the new forces unchained by the Revolution were fatally ignored in its provisions. But, equally certainly, it constituted the nearest approach ever made to a practical balance of power, based

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upon rights generally recognised and clearly defined in "the treaties," and thus preserved the peace of Europe for an unprecedented length of time. It was an evil day for the world when British statesmen allowed the treaties to lapse by default and the methods of the balance of power to fall obsolete.

That they did so was due partly to the exhaustion following the great war, but more particularly to the growing sympathy in England with the struggles on the Continent for the realisation of national aspirations, which resulted in the destruction, for the time being at least, of the very foundations of the public law of Europe, by substituting for the rights of States, as defined in the treaties, the indefinite and indefinable rights of nationalities. Under the influence of these sympathies the principle of the balance of power, which in 1815 had saved France from disruption and set bounds to the ambitions of Prussia, fell into discredit. There were spasmodic efforts made to reconcile it with the new principles, as in the settlement of the Belgian question by the Conference of London (1831-1839), and the abortive collective guarantee of the integrity of the Danish monarchy in 1852; but in the Italian war of 1859 "Europe," as such, took no active interest, and with the rejection in 1863 of Napoleon III.'s proposal of a Congress, for the revision of the treaties of Vienna, the idea of the "European confederacy" was finally dissipated. The principle of "non-intervention" had triumphed, and Bismarck was free to embark, under pretext of asserting the just rights of German nationality, on that policy of aggression of which the results are apparent to-day. In 1864 the rape of the Danish duchies, opposed by the Western Powers only with impotent protests, laid the foundation of German sea-power. In 1866 the victory of Königgrätz gave Prussia the hegemony of Germany. In 1871 the downfall of France established the military supremacy of Germany on the Continent, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine—as M. Vidal de la Blache has recently convincingly shown*—made possible for the new Empire the realisation of the dream of the economic domination of Central Europe. The situation in 1875 was described by the late Mr. Henry Reeve in words which have the ring of prophecy. "At the present time," he wrote, "the military power of the German

* "La France de l'Est."

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Empire far surpasses that of any other State, and could only be resisted by a general combination of all the rest. The balance of power, as it was understood fifty years ago, has been totally destroyed."*

Under the influence of the danger revealed by this situation the principle of the balance of power presently reasserted itself, not as the result of a conscious theory, but as an almost instinctive expedient of practical politics; and for many years before the war Europe was divided into two groups of Powers acting as a counterpoise to each other, the ostensible object of each being the maintenance of peace. The fact that peace has not been maintained has, in view of this grouping, been held to have once more discredited the principle of the balance of power. The fault really lay, however, not in the unsoundness of this principle, but in the failure of British statesmen, under the disastrous influence of the mid-Victorian tradition, to apply it consistently and whole-heartedly. M. Chevrillon has shown very convincingly how it was the failure of Great Britain to make her attitude clear during the critical days of July, 1914, that emboldened Germany to declare war.† Had Great Britain at once openly thrown her sword into the scale of the Entente Powers there would have been no war. That she did not do so was due, as M. Chevrillon well realises, to motives very honourable in themselves. But the fact remains that, so far as the principle of the balance of power is concerned, this is in no wise affected by the catastrophe of the war, which broke out, not in spite of the balance, but *because the balance was uncertain*. "L'Angleterre," wrote Vattel in 1758, "a la gloire de tenir en ses mains la balance politique. Elle est attentive à la conserver en équilibre." In the years preceding August, 1914, England still held in her hands the political balance of Europe; but she was not careful to keep it in equilibrium.

So far, then, as the past is concerned, I do not think that anything has happened to discredit the principle of the balance of power as the eighteenth century understood it and as our statesmen applied it, with more or less effect, until far into the nineteenth century. It remains to examine the question of its applicability to the new international order which it is

* Art. "Balance of Power" in "Enc. Brit.," 9th ed.

† "L'Angleterre et la guerre."

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hoped to establish after the war. To the eighteenth century theorists the main defect of the system of "political equilibrium" was that there was no central court to define the public law of Europe and no central executive to enforce it. "To create the one or the other," said Gentz, "has long been a fruitless pious wish, and the object of many a vain, well-meaning effort."* The "European confederacy" thus lacked the security enjoyed by a well-ordered national State, and the success of the system of political balance in maintaining peace was only approximate. But it never occurred to these thinkers that the establishment of an effective international system would supersede the principle of the balance of power; to them, on the contrary, such a system seemed the natural culmination of its development. Thus Gentz wrote:—

"In every considerable alliance, in every treaty of peace, particularly in every congress composed of several considerable powers, the parties must mutually engage themselves not to endeavour to extend their territory by unjust means and not to enter into any scheme or association directed against the rights or possessions of an independent State, by whatever name it may be called, whether of dividing, of rounding, of concentrating, of uniting, or of indemnifying themselves for other losses. A sort of anathema must be pronounced by anticipation against all such as shall project such violations of right, or call upon others to assist them."†

The setting up of a central executive and a central court would, at best, only be to carry the principle here enunciated a step further in the direction of effective application. But the ultimate guarantee of the system thus established would still be the balance of power.

* All efforts to elaborate a constitution for these central bodies have hitherto broken down on the difficulty of making them accurately reflect the balance of forces among the Powers. The weight of each one of the constituent States in the alliance would depend on its effective power, and any system which should ignore this root fact would be foredoomed to failure. See further my article on "National Federations and World-Federation" in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1917.

† Later Gentz was to deplore that the work of the Vienna Congress had issued only in agreements "of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe"; that it had produced "no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or for the general good"; and that at best it had only prepared the ground for "a political system by which wars of conquest would be made impossible."

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It would be so because, as has already been pointed out, it is the ultimate guarantee of the stability of every composite political organism, which without this balancing of forces would degenerate into the tyranny of one man or group of men. The units of the new world-federation would still be nations which, by very reason of their nationality, would be more conscious of their separate group interests than of those of the general community of nations; and, even in the very improbable event of the federation as a whole developing a group-consciousness comparable with that of a national State, there would still be a struggle between its constituent groups for self-assertion, if not for predominance, within it. "The enthronement of the idea of public right," said Mr. Asquith at Ladybank on 1 February last, "means, or ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambitions, for the groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will." With the ideal of peace and co-operation between nations, based on the universal recognition of "public right," I am of course in hearty agreement. But to believe that this ideal will necessarily be realised by merely setting up a "European partnership" is, as I have elsewhere said, to suppose that it will be possible to establish an international system in which the harmony of the general will is more pronounced than it is even in national States.

"For in these, too, it is force that in the last resort gives dominion; in these, too, there is a clash of competing ambitions; in these, too, there are groupings and alliances of organised interests and parties, and an equipoise which, so long as there is liberty and movement, must always be precarious."*

We have ourselves had painful experience during the war of the grave peril of neglecting the balance of forces within the State, and of allowing excessive power to fall into the hands of certain organised groups in it; and the process of readjusting the balance is likely to be difficult and critical. If such an assertion of the interests of particular groups within the States be possible, even in time of overwhelming national danger, it is hardly to be supposed that the State and national groups inside the universal

* *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1917, p. 10.

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league would be, on occasion, less self-assertive. Where I differ from Mr. Asquith and those who think with him, then, is in rejecting utterly the assumption that a League of Nations, if it is to be successful in preserving peace, can be based on any other principle than that of the balance of power, or maintained by any other processes than those growing out of this principle, in whatever new form it may be applied.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS.

The Cossacks : (I) Before the Revolution

THERE are two institutions in Russia which no amount of association with the West has been able to destroy—the village *mir* or commune and the Cossack *voisko* or military community. Both of them have suffered from the attacks of centralising Tsars and meddlesome bureaucrats, but they have survived and preserved their ancient characteristics. The *mir*, based as it is on the principle that the land belongs to the people and should be owned by the people in common, represents the ideas of the peasants of Central Russia. The Russian peasant is peace-loving and has no military traditions; his first thoughts are for the land that belongs to God and to the people. Very different are the traditions of the Cossacks. Though they are, for the most part, peasants of Central Russia by origin, they have not been able to possess their lands in peace. The lands they now possess were won after years of struggle and, when won, needed a standing army to guard them.

The earliest mention of the Cossacks is in the fifteenth century. The word "Cossack" is of Tatar origin, and, in its proper form, means "freebooter," for the Cossacks lived, not by trade or agriculture, but by hunting and plundering. In the sixteenth century they spread along the steppes of both Eastern Russia and of the Ukraine. In the East, runaway serfs from Central Russia and others who courted adventure moved across the steppes as far as the river Don, where they halted and occupied the flat and fertile lands of the present Don province. In the sixteenth century the *voisko* of the Don Cossacks was formally recognised by the Tsars of Moscow, who saw in these turbulent and warlike subjects a useful defence against the Turks and Tatars of the south-east.

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More interesting, however, is the early history of the Cossacks of the Ukraine, for, situated as they were between Moscow and Poland, they played a part in international politics. They, too, were by origin peasants, who crossed the steppes to escape from the tyranny of their masters. These peasants of Little Russian race had lived contentedly under the rule of their Lithuanian and Russian masters, but, with the union of Poland and Lithuania, Polish administration began to penetrate to the Russian provinces of the Ukraine, and Polish administration meant the introduction of the Polish *szlachta*, in whose eyes it was no greater crime to kill a peasant than to kill a dog. In self-preservation the peasants fled into the boundless steppes of the Ukraine, until they arrived at the lower courses of the Dnieper, far beyond the reach of the *szlachta*. In their new homes they were exposed to the constant attack of the Tatars, and were forced to form themselves into a military community or *voisko*. This *voisko*, founded in the sixteenth century, was known as that of the Zaporogian Cossacks, as they lived in the islands of the Dnieper "beyond the rapids" (*za porogi*). Once settled in their new home they developed their own form of government. They elected their own Ataman, who held office for a year, and they brooked no interference from foreign rulers. The ties with Poland became looser and looser, though it was not until 1654, by the Treaty of Pereyaslav, that they were formally broken, and that the Ataman Bogdan Chmielnicki came to terms with the Tsar of Moscow. But this treaty, though it freed the Cossacks from Poland, brought them under still more powerful rulers, and after an abortive rebellion under Mazeppa, who joined Charles XII. of Sweden against Peter the Great, they were slowly but surely deprived of their autonomous rights. It was not until the reign of Catherine II. that the Zaporogian Voisko was finally abolished and its members dispersed. Many of them became simple Ukrainian peasants, amongst whom the Cossack tradition is still powerful, while others withdrew further East and formed themselves into the Kuban Voisko, east of the Black Sea, where they occupied themselves in constant struggles with Circassian tribes.

The Cossacks of the Ukraine were not alone in revolting against Peter the Great, the first Tsar who attempted to bring the outlying provinces directly under the Central

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Government. The Cossacks of the Don also rebelled, but they were far too useful to the Tsar, as guardians of the eastern frontiers, to be treated with undue severity. Their independence was curtailed by the withdrawal of the right to elect their own Ataman, who henceforth was nominated by the Tsar. In addition to this the administration of the *voisko* was placed directly under the Central Government; otherwise their military organisation remained intact. Though, since that time, the Cossacks have loyally served the Tsars on many a battlefield, both in Europe and Asia, their treatment by the Central Government has always rankled in their breasts. They have complained that, when Russia was in danger, they were called upon to help, while, when Russia was strong, they were ignored.

The Don Province is rightly regarded as the home of all Cossack tradition, for it was from the Don that all the later *voiskos* were formed save that of Kuban, which still prides itself on its Ukrainian ancestry. Towards the end of the sixteenth century Yermak with a small band of Cossacks crossed the Urals into Siberia and drove back the native tribes. He then offered the new territories to the Tsar of Moscow, who gratefully accepted them. The band of Cossacks who followed Yermak was supplemented by others, who formed the nucleus of the first Siberian *voisko*.

The extension of the Russian frontiers by the conquest of Western Siberia in the seventeenth century led to a rapid development of the Cossack *voiskos*. The achievements of the Don Cossacks had impressed the Tsars with their value as guardians of the frontier, and efforts were made to increase both their numbers and their duties. New *voiskos* were formed both in the north-east of the Caucasus in 1586, known as that of the Terek, and in the Urals (on the river Yaik) in 1591. Later, in the eighteenth century, the *voiskos* of Orenburg and Astrahan made their appearance. Meanwhile, in Siberia, the Cossacks had rapidly been spreading eastwards. During the nineteenth century their conquests had extended so far that the Siberian *voisko* was enlarged and divided into several branches, and the existing *voiskos*, of what are loosely known as Siberian Cossacks, include those of Amur, Ussuri, Transbaikalia and Semirechensk.

The part played by the Cossacks in Russia's development as a great Power both in Europe and Asia has been of such

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use to the Central Government that, under the old *régime*, every effort was made to keep them distinct from the rest of the population. The administration of the Don Voisko was so devised as to preserve the military qualities of its inhabitants. The province was put under the Ministry of War, not the Ministry of the Interior, as the other governments of Russia. The Acting Ataman (this was his title before the Revolution, when the Tsarevich had the title of Ataman) was responsible to the Minister of War; otherwise he had the same administrative powers as an ordinary provincial governor. The civil administration closely resembled that of other provinces, though the nomenclature was different. The *voisko* was divided into a number of *okrugs* or districts and *stanitsas*, the Cossack equivalent for the Russian *volost* or group of villages.

The chief difference, however, between the Cossacks and other Russians was in the question of military service. Unlike the rest of Russia, where military service is enforced by means of a selective draft, every Cossack between certain ages is liable to military service. Those who are unfit have to pay a contribution to the funds of the *stanitsa*. The rest have not only to perform a longer and more arduous term of service than the ordinary Russian peasant, but have to provide their own horses and equipment. Where a Cossack is too poor to pay these expenses he is assisted by the *stanitsa*, which sets aside funds for this purpose. On the other hand, they are free from direct taxation and own more land than the ordinary peasant. The object, and, indeed, the result of these regulations has been to form the Cossacks into a special caste and to keep alive the military tradition. Its unfortunate side is that, in the new democracy, where castes are abolished, it makes the relations between Cossacks and peasants somewhat difficult and strained.

Peasants and Cossacks have many conflicting interests, both social and political, but the fundamental difference is the difference of tradition. If a conflict is to be avoided it is for the peasant to understand and appreciate the tremendous power of the Cossack military tradition. He has no longer any ground for fearing that the Cossacks can be used again as in 1905 as the agents of reaction. This war has been one long education in revolution for every class in Russia from peasant to nobleman, and the Cossacks are now

THE COSSACKS: BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

as good revolutionaries as the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. "Nobody," said General Kaledin at a recent meeting of the Cossack Congress, "who had lived through the year 1915 in the army could ever desire the return of the old *régime*." It was the treachery of the old *régime* that aroused the old military tradition of the Cossacks and made them revolutionaries, and it is only treachery that will turn them against the revolution.* The Cossack soldiers have drunk deep of the revolutionary spirit, and many of those stationed in Petrograd have not remained deaf to the doctrines of the Extremists. But deep down in their hearts the old tradition has remained alive. At a recent meeting of the Congress of the Don Voisko at Novocherkassk a resolution was passed condemning those Cossacks who had fallen victims to the teaching of the Bolševiks and excluding them from the ranks of the *voisko*. After the resolution, representatives of the disgraced Cossacks who had come from Petrograd asked for a hearing. They had come, they said, to beg forgiveness, as their conduct had been unworthy of Cossacks. In the face of the whole assembly these men, who had been false to their tradition, shed tears of shame.

Such a tradition cannot be roughly treated or ridiculed by the revolutionaries of Petrograd. The Cossacks are not their enemies, but they will suffer no one to trample on what they hold sacred. "We have never been serfs," said General Kaledin at Moscow, "but have ever been free and independent. We are not drunk with freedom; what we desire is freedom combined with order." RURIK.

Allied Portraits : (IV) General Verhovski

THE General is 32 years old, but at least ten years should be added to his real age. His experience of life, especially of Russian life, began when his schoolmates in the select military college, where he was educated, were still either cramming their heads or idling away their time. When he was quite a boy his studies were rudely interrupted by the college authorities on account of his "revolutionary

* Although Cossack troops were used against the Revolution in 1905, the Cossacks themselves were not reactionaries. The members they sent to the four Dumas, men like Karaulov, Voronkov, and Bardizh, were all prominent in the ranks of the Opposition.

GENERAL VERHOVSKI

proclivities;” in other words, for trying to preserve his self-respect against the onslaught of the arbitrary college *régime*. Instead of trying to find some other path to the privileged profession of arms, for which he was intended, he enlisted voluntarily in the army as a private and joined the Russian forces in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. From Manchuria he returned with bitter impressions of military defeat and a private’s Cross of St. George for gallantry. A soldier to his finger-tips, he entered the Russian Staff College in order to prepare for more responsible work in the Army. After graduating in the Staff College he passed into the General Staff. The Revolution found him a colonel of the General Staff attached to one of the Russian armies in the field, an officer of ripe experience gained on different fronts and the possessor of an officer’s Cross of St. George, gained for valour. His participation in the great Galician retreat added to his rich experience and gave him a bitter sense of patriotic sorrow. It is this man who is now called upon, as Minister of War, to revive the Russian army.

I have not known General Verhovski long enough nor intimately enough to give a synthetic portrait of him. But I have spent a few eventful days in his company—in the train, in a motor-car, on the battlefield—under conditions which best reveal the soul and the nature of a soldier. It was in a foreign country during a time of defeat—in Roumania during the first triumphant march of the Bulgarians on the Dobrudja—and perhaps a few fleeting remembrances of Colonel Verhovski at that time may give, if not a portrait of the general, at least an impression of the man.

The Roumanian army, now fighting so stubbornly and with such wonderful courage against General Mackensen’s troops, was then running from the enemy. The foreign officers who witnessed the flight of the unseasoned Roumanian units could not refrain from expressing a certain amount of contempt for the luckless soldiers. Colonel Verhovski strongly and repeatedly protested against this attitude.

“How can you be so unjust?” he would say. “Fresh, untried troops cannot help retreating at first before such artillery as the German. It is only human nature. Did not our Russian soldiers, to whom, now, no one will deny the qualities of courage, run away during our first campaign in East Prussia, when they found themselves for the first

GENERAL VERHOVSKI

time under the concentrated fire of the heavy enemy guns? Have patience. The Roumanians only need to get used to this bombardment. They will make good soldiers yet."

This keen sense of justice and fairness is characteristic of the man. It is part of his warm affection for the common soldier, and there is nothing sentimental or flabby about it. On the contrary, where a soldier's duty is concerned he is severely exacting. He does not flatter but he respects the manhood of the rank and file. In this self-respect he sees the best material for the fighter. Once I asked him what modern war demanded above all from the fighting man. He replied: "Velikoe serdtse" (a big heart); and went on to say: "Of course this is a war of machinery, but man must rise above this infernal engine by his spirit. A slave cannot go through it."

It must be added that the last words, "a slave," were said by the colonel without any revolutionary accent. He spoke merely as a professional soldier, a patriot and a man who believed in *la victoire intégrale*, and not as a political dissenter. As a matter of fact, in his mental make-up there is a good deal of conservatism. At the same time one is conscious that his inherent democratism and deep love of his country would never allow him to oppose anything that might lead to Russia's salvation.

General Verhovski and anarchy in the army cannot be named in the same breath. We learnt lately with what energy he, as Revolutionary Commandant of Moscow, suppressed the Bolševik rising among the garrison of Nižni-Novgorod. One may be sure that he will show similar energy in re-organising the army and in eliminating from it pernicious Bolševik influences.

It is in this respect that he differs from General Kornilov, not in his aims, but merely in his methods.

S. P.

The Internal Crisis in Italy

THE overthrow of the Boselli Ministry, which took place last Thursday as the result of an adverse vote on the Government's declarations, coincides most unfortunately with the military disaster on the Isonzo. Of neither event can the full effects yet be foreseen, and it would be futile to deny that in both cases there is ground for grave anxiety.

THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN ITALY

The origin and meaning of the crisis is somewhat complicated. It was not entirely due, as casual observers might be inclined to suppose, to the dissatisfaction of the Interventionist groups with the weaknesses displayed by the Government. This dissatisfaction was very strong, and had three main causes: (1) the failure of the Government to deal efficiently with the supply and distribution of food, and especially of grain; (2) the tendency shown until a few weeks ago, in particular by the Ministry of the Interior, to compromise with Neutralism; (3) the refusal of the Government to take the public or the press into its confidence, and its unequal use of the Censorship in order to suppress criticism. Dissatisfaction on the first head was brought to a culmination by the Turin riots in August; that on the second by the publication of the notorious circular addressed by Signor Lazzari, Secretary of the Official Socialist Executive, to Socialist mayors and town councillors asking them whether they were prepared to resign *en masse*—a step which would obviously have disorganised, and was meant to disorganise, the local machinery for food control and distribution. The indignation aroused by this revelation was heightened by the declaration of the legal authorities, to whom the circular was submitted, that under existing legislation no case could be made against the author of the circular.

During September the Government definitely capitulated to the insistent demands of the Interventionists, and in particular of the Nationalists, for strong measures to counter the peace propaganda and *sabotage* of the war carried on more or less openly by the Official Socialists, and more insidiously by Giolittian Neutralists and Clericals. This change was registered by the resignation of Signor Vigliani, the Chief of Police, and of Signor Corradini, Chief of the Staff at the Ministry of the Interior—suspected of being on too friendly terms with Neutralism. Turin, Genoa and Alessandria were added to the zone already placed under military jurisdiction. One special decree, designed to meet such cases as that of the Lazzari circular, and a second against *sabotage* of the war were issued, and certain prefects were replaced. The Interventionist demand for repression and the denunciations hurled against neutralists and pacifists had for some time previously produced a sort of revolt among the followers of Giolitti and the Clericals, who in the press raised the cry of reaction,

THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN ITALY

and proclaimed themselves champions of constitutionalism and the rights of Parliament. Meanwhile the Official Socialists, always in revolt, had been rather encouraged by the result of the Lazzari affair. Shortly before the meeting of the Chamber on 16 October, this movement took Parliamentary shape. A number of deputies of no particular prominence, popularly known as "the 47," although their number soon rose to something like 100, issued a manifesto inviting deputies from all parties to combine in defence of the authority of Parliament. An Interventionist paper classified the signatories as "(1) Nobodies; (2) Pure Giolittians; (3) Germanophils; (4) Clericals." The Interventionist press, suspecting that the real object of the movement was opposition to the war party and a rehabilitation of Giolittism, tried to smother it with ridicule. But the number of its adherents steadily swelled, and it soon became obvious that it would have to be reckoned with, especially as the Socialist Parliamentary group openly declared its intention of co-operating with it in order to create a Government less hostile to Socialist ideas.

Thus the Government, before the session opened, had alienated both the Interventionists and the enemies of Interventionism, whom the division of the 25th brought into the same lobby. When, however, it comes to constituting the new Ministry, the two groups will again be divided. The champions of *la victoire intégrale* will want to retain Bissolati and Sonnino, and to create a War Cabinet pledged to a policy of "Thorough." The self-styled champions of civil liberties will be implacably hostile to Bissolati. Sonnino they will, for the time, be willing to retain for fear of losing the confidence of the Allies.

Signor Boselli, whose self-sacrificing patriotism was acknowledged even in his fall by the cheers of the whole Chamber, makes way for a younger man, and it was fairly obvious that Signor Orlando would be his successor. The Radical *Secolo* (22 October), commenting on the speech delivered by Signor Nitti in the Chamber, in which, under cover of a non-party, all-round conciliatory and strictly objective attitude, he virtually placed himself at the head of the new anti-reaction movement, suggested that, though Signor Orlando would be Premier, Signor Nitti would be the real head of the Government, and was obviously suspicious of

THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN ITALY

the policy likely eventually to be followed by a Government supported, as such a Government would be, by Giolittians, Clericals and Socialists.

These doubts were expressed before the opening of the German offensive. Now that this blow has fallen, and Italy is facing the enemy on her own beloved soil, we trust that foolish talk of revolution and of compromise may once and for all be silenced, and that the scales may finally fall from the eyes of such as refused to see in Germany the enemy of their country.

The hearts of all Englishmen are with Italy in their critical hour of her destiny. We have the fullest confidence in the courage and tenacity of the Italian race, and this faith has been splendidly confirmed by the experiences of the present war. We look upon Italy as an integral part of the single front, not only for purposes of war, but in the peaceful struggle for a better Europe after the war. We trust that before many days this faith and sympathy of ours may have translated itself into effective action, and that Englishmen and Italians may be fighting shoulder to shoulder to the cry of "Italia! Italia shall be free!"

30 October 1917.

J. C. POWELL.

War Aims and War Debt : A German Plan

[Six months ago a pamphlet, entitled "Germany's Future as the result of a good or a bad peace," appeared in Germany and gained an immense notoriety. It was distributed wholesale among the German troops by order of the War Office and the Commander-in-Chief, and its publishers boasted that, within a month, they had disposed of 200,000 copies of it. It was written by four Prussian officials with the intention of heartening the German armies and people with the prospect of infinite booty. The Berliner Tageblatt rightly brands it as "Pan-german trash"; but we cannot overlook its significance as an expression of the hopes of that military party of which Herr Michaelis is the Vertrauensmann. The extracts below are taken from the chapter which deals with the financial problem (written by K. A. Fischer). The author begins by tabulating a quantity of statistics, divided into four groups for purposes of comparison. Group 1 comprises a number of figures of Germany's revenue and expenditure for 1913, the last year of peace, taken from official sources. Group 2 gives a synopsis of Germany's expenditure on the war up to the end of 1917. The figures, says the author, are based on estimates mostly founded on reliable material not suitable for full publication, and err, if anything, on the side of

WAR AIMS AND WAR DEBT

understatement. Group 3 outlines the character which Germany's economic life will have to assume "if a peace is made on the principle of each party bearing its own burdens." This is what he calls a "Scheidemann peace." The figures, adds the author, may seem fantastic, but they are, in fact, by no means exaggerated, and are only the logical outcome of the immense figures of Group 2. Finally, Group 4 attempts to show how Germany can shift the burden on to the shoulders of her enemies in the event of a favourable peace. Fischer remarks that the figures for the natural resources of the occupied territories, &c., are only approximate, but near enough to the truth to give a reasonably reliable picture.]

"The German Imperial Budget in 1913 balanced at Mk. 3·7 milliard. The expenditure on armaments amounted to Mk. 1,859 million (1,379 million for the army, 480 million for the navy). Of the revenue Mk. 143 million is on account of Post Office net profits, Mk. 417 million on account of the armament contribution (*Wehrbeitrag*), and Mk. 1,655 million on account of customs duties, taxation, and other dues. The national debt in 1913 of the German Empire was Mk. 5 milliard (Mk. 75 per head of population), that of Prussia Mk. 10 milliard (Mk. 246 per head), and that of Bavaria Mk. 2·3 milliard (Mk. 332 per head). The net revenue derived from the Prussian State Railways in 1913 was Mk. 561 million, the gross yield of direct taxation in Prussia was Mk. 444 million, and about Mk. 10 per head of the population was levied in direct State taxation in Prussia and Bavaria. The national wealth of the German people in 1914 amounted, according to Steinmann-Bucher, to about Mk. 400 milliard. If we deduct from this sum Mk. 40 milliard on account of the State (railways Mk. 25 milliard, other undertakings Mk. 15 milliard) there remain Mk. 360 milliard as the sum total of private wealth.

GERMANY'S WAR EXPENDITURE AND LOSSES TO THE END OF 1917.

1. German Empire :—

(a) Direct war expenditure (loans, Treasury bonds, &c.)	Mk. 95 milliard.
(b) Allowances to dependents, &c.	5 ..
(c) Reconstruction of East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine	3 ..

2. Federal States :—

Expenditure on social objects: soldiers' dwellings, rent allowances, support of land- and house-owners, unemployment allowances, war bonuses, &c.	10 ..
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3. Local Authorities :—

Expenditure as under (2), extra allowances for dependents, food purchases, &c.	5 ..
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Grand total Mk. 118 milliard.

WAR AIMS AND WAR DEBT

"LET EACH PARTY BEAR ITS OWN BURDEN."

The war debt of the German Empire amounts to	Mk. 120 milliard.
By a very drastic war profits tax, going far beyond the laws of 21 June, 1916, and 9 April, 1917, it would perhaps be possible to raise	8 "
By this means the debt might be reduced to	110 "
We should then still have to raise for interest and sinking fund (7·15 milliard) as well as in pensions (1·5 milliard) and for increased armaments (0·5 milliard) an annual sum of	9·15,,

We thus arrive at the following comparison of the indebtedness of the German Empire—

Before the war and in the event of a "German peace,"	After the war in the event of a "Scheidemann peace":
Mk. 5 milliard.	(a) without pensions and armament expenditure, Mk. 123 milliard.
	(b) including pensions and armament expenditure, Mk. 170 milliard.

[The effect of the above figures is driven home by a diagram representing three figures, the first of Bismarck holding a sword and a small money-bag marked "5," the second of a civilian staggering under a huge sack marked "123," the third of a similar figure crushed double under a still huger sack marked "170."]

These figures are equivalent to a debt per head of the population of—

Mk. 75 before the war and in the event of a "German peace."	(a) Mk. 1,835 in the event of a "Scheidemann peace" without pensions and armaments
	(b) Mk. 2,537 in the event of such a peace, including pensions and armaments.

The taxation to be borne would, in each case, be as follows:—

Imperial taxation per head of population:—

Before the war, Mk. 36.	In the event of a "Scheidemann peace," Mk. 172.
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[These totals are again illustrated by an appropriate diagram.]

WAR AIMS AND WAR DEBT

“ THE ENEMY BEARS THE WHOLE BURDEN.”

In the event of a peace favourable to Germany our enemies will have to pay :—

(a) The war expenditure, including Federal and local expenditure, about	Mk. 120 milliard.
(b) The expenditure on pensions and armaments, viz., about Mk. 2 milliard annually for about 40 years, representing a capital value of about	45 ..
(c) Losses in the colonies	5 ..
(d) Private losses	30 ..
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Grand total	Mk. 200 milliard.

This is equivalent to a service of about Mk. 13 milliard per annum.

Such enormous sums, the author observes, cannot, of course, be paid cash down, nor would it be desirable if they could. Germany would have to obtain her indemnities by the exploitation of the conquered territory, principally by taking possession of all public and private property which can be profitably administered by the State, as follows:—A. Railways, canals, ports, warehouses, &c. B. Natural resources, such as coal, ore, salt, petroleum, &c. C. Land (forests, estates, and all land suitable for the settlement of German farmers).

On this basis Germany would be interested in the following :—

(a) Belgium : Railways (3), coal mines and deposits (20), other mines, State land, &c. (1), total	Mk. 24 milliard.
(b) France : Railways (2), coal-mines, &c. (10), iron-fields in Lorraine (Briey and Longwy) (10), total	22 ..
(c) Courland and Lithuania : Railways (one-fifth) forest land and land fir settlements (four-fifths), total	1 ..
(d) Roumania : Oil-wells, which could be pledged to and administered by Germany, at least in part	6 ..
(e) Poland. [No “ property suitable for State administration ” is specified in the case of Poland, but as two lines are given to the heading, something appears to have been taken out of the text on second thoughts.]	6.5 ..
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Grand total	Mk. 59.5 ..

WAR AIMS AND WAR DEBT

To the above may be added :—

- (f) Livonia and Esthonia: Railways (one-third) forest land and land for settlements (two-thirds) Mk. 1 milliard.

COLONIAL BOOTY.

“ The property specified above thus accounts for only about 60 of the required 200 milliards, leaving 140 milliards more to be covered. In view of the great demand for cargo space which may be expected after the war, the value of the part of the enemy merchant navies ceded to us may be estimated at about Mk. 4 milliard. If the Suez Canal, where shipping dues are high, is put under German administration, this would mean a further Mk. 1 milliard. Moreover, in the event of a favourable peace the addition to Germany's African colonies of the Portuguese and Belgian colonial possessions, as well as of large sections of the British and French, and conceivably the Italian also, will be a necessity (a) from the military point of view, France having so far sent about 350-400,000 coloured troops from North and West Africa against us; (b) from the naval point of view, as Germany would then have new naval bases; (c) from the economic point of view, to safeguard our supply of raw material. This extension of our African colonial empire may be estimated at about Mk. 10 milliard. The 128 milliards still required must be paid for primarily by the import of raw material, half-products, and foodstuffs required by our national economy. In 1913 Germany imported Mk. 9 milliard worth of these things, and in consequence of the great destruction of stocks our requirements after the war will be much greater and may well be put at Mk. 12-15 milliard for a number of years. Before the war England, France, and Russia, with their colonies, supplied us with about one-third of what we needed, and they will have to give us about a quarter in future also. The remainder of our imports must be procured from other countries and paid for with enemy money. . . .

PLUNDER FOR GERMANY'S ALLIES.

“ It must be borne in mind that the figures given above refer to the war expenditure of the German Empire only; the war expenditure and losses of our allies amount to far more than Mk. 150 milliard in addition, and will also have to be met by the enemy. Austria-Hungary will look principally to Italy and Serbia, and Bulgaria to Serbia and Roumania for this purpose, while Turkey will insist in the first instance on the restoration of Egypt and Tripoli, which belong to her.

“ A peace by which we are made to bear our own burdens condemns us to an inevitable decline and to a permanent inferiority to America, Japan, England and Russia. England will still continue in a position to exploit half the world in the shape of her colonies; she will make good all her losses from this inexhaustible source of supply; she will oust us from every market by every possible device; she will continue to rule the seas and live freely in them. Russia, again, whose strength

WAR AIMS AND WAR DEBT

is founded entirely on her dominion over vast areas and their increasing colonisation by the peasantry, is in such a primitive stage of economic development that she cannot be shaken at all so long as she remains in possession of these areas; she will very rapidly develop her industry, her agriculture and her means of communication, exploit her natural resources, and in a few decades herself grow and work up almost all classes of raw material, including cotton. At all this Germany will be compelled to look impotently on."

General Gurko and the Late Tsar

[An announcement has been made in the British press that General Gurko has escaped from Russia and arrived in England. General Gurko is a fine soldier, with a distinguished record, and deserves a cordial welcome from his brother soldiers of the British Army. But if his visit is turned to political uses we shall have to remind our military authorities that he is not in favour with the Russian Government and Republic. Official favours to distinguished emigrés like General Gurko might have a bad effect upon our relations with Russia. It may, therefore, be of interest to the British public to read the full text (see Russkoye Slovo, 4 October) of the letter written by General Gurko to the late Tsar two days after the latter's abdication. It was this letter which led to General Gurko's arrest and banishment.]

"In these grievous days that all Russia is living through, and which cannot fail to affect you most painfully of all, allow me, Sire, out of heart-felt affection to send you the following lines, in the conviction that you will see in this merely the need I feel of telling you with what pain I and millions of other faithful sons of Russia have learnt of the magnanimous act of your Majesty. Actuated by your wishes for the welfare and happiness of Russia, you preferred to take upon yourself all the consequences and the burden of what had occurred rather than to subject the country to all the horrors of a long internecine struggle, or—what would have been still worse—to expose it to the triumph of the enemy's arms. Your conduct will receive its due reward from history and the grateful memory of the people. The knowledge that, in this grievous moment, you decided without hesitation on an act of the greatest self-sacrifice for the sake of the integrity and the welfare of our country, to which, following the example of your crowned ancestors, you were always loyal, indeed, the most loyal servant and well-wisher, will serve you as a worthy reward for the unexampled sacrifice you have made on the altar of your country.

THE TSAR'S SACRIFICE.

"I do not find words to express my respect for the greatness of the sacrifice you have made, both in your own case and in the case of your heir. I fully understand that you could not decide to give up to the service of the State your only son, who within four years would have had to take within his hands, before they were strong enough, the reins of government. Moreover, there is little hope

GENERAL GURKO AND THE LATE TSAR

that by that time Russian life will have returned to its ordinary tranquil course. But the ways of the All Highest are inscrutable, and it may be it was He who guided you. It may be that you are keeping for your son the possibility of a more regular and gradual education until he is mature, that he may make a wide study of political science and become acquainted with people and life, so that in due time, after a stormy period in the life of the State, the eyes of those that wish well to Russia will turn to him as the hope of Russia. Fully equipped with the living experience and knowledge that he has gained, he will then be able to take over his lawful heritage for the welfare and happiness of Russia.

"But, apart from this comparatively distant future, it is impossible not to foresee the possibility that, after painful experience of internal troubles, after the reconstruction of the State and a form of government for which, historically and socially, the Russian people is very far from being ready, have been tested, the country will again turn to its lawful Emperor and Anointed of God. The past history of peoples teaches us that in this there is nothing improbable, and the exceptional nature of the conditions under which the change of government has taken place in Petrograd, and the fact that to the majority of the people this change was just as unexpected to us as it was to your army, gives ground to suppose that this is extremely probable.

"The possibility of this, however, involuntarily compels me to think of those events which now are taking place in Petrograd. The Provisional Government has now proclaimed and is carrying out a full amnesty of all those people who suffer punishment for political crimes, whether judicial or administrative. At the same time it is imprisoning your former faithful servants, who, if they offended in anything, acted at any rate within the bounds of the laws existing at that time. Such conduct with regard to them appears to infringe that very freedom which the people who have seized power proclaim on their banners.

HINTING AT REACTION.

"But there is another side to this. If one can foresee the possibility that the country may wish to return to a state of law and order, then it is necessary that those who form a centre able to unite round themselves all who care, not for temporary power, but the regular development and gradual evolution of the Russian people, must not be stopped by the memory that, in the year when their ideals were temporarily defeated, they could not achieve, even with exceptional efforts, the security of personal freedom and perhaps also the life of those, the majority of whom in their time faithfully and truly served their country, though guided perhaps by laws which were out-of-date, but nevertheless legally in force.

"Allow me, Sire, to direct your attention to this fact merely because in view of the tremendous events which are so quickly advancing upon you, you may not be able to realise all the importance of that step which in the future may have incalculable consequences.

GENERAL GURKO AND THE LATE TSAR

both for your dynasty and for the fate of Russia. Remembering your unfailing graciousness towards me during the few months when by your will I was called upon to be your closest assistant in the High Command, I flatter myself with the hope that you will accept with the same graciousness the outpourings of my heart which suffers anguish because of these days which threaten the life of Russia, and that you will believe that I have been guided merely by the feeling of devotion to the Russian Monarch which I have inherited from my ancestors, who always had the courage and the honesty in moments of danger to the Russian State to express to their Emperors their outspoken opinion and the whole truth.

"Accept, Sir, my sincere wishes to see brighter days, which at the same time must herald the dawn of Russia renewed after her period of trial, and accept my feelings of unbounded devotion."

Reviews

The admirable little series of *Les Cahiers Belges* (Paris: Van Oest, 60 c. each), the first of which we have already noticed, has been augmented by five fresh numbers. M. Crockaert's account of "the epic days of Liège" (*La Surprise*) and M. Davignon's attractive and touching description of the "Jasse" at the front—the Belgian equivalent of the "Poilu" and the "Tommy"—(*Le Soldat Belge peint par lui-même: Lettres et Impressions du Front*) are certain to make a very wide appeal; while *L'Armée et La Nation*, published under the pseudonym of "Memor," shows us what some Belgians are thinking with regard to their future military problem. Politically, however, much the most interesting is M. Passelecq's study *Le Testament Politique du General von Bissing*. Here we have the full text of the late German Governor-General's memorandum on Germany's Belgian policy—as first published last May in the Pan-german review *Das Grössere Deutschland*—and of private letters addressed by him shortly before his death to the Reichstag deputies Bacmeister and Stresemann. In the former he definitely advocates the annexation of Belgium "by right of conquest," and faces the necessity of maintaining "for years still the present dictatorship," expelling the dynasty and eventually using the weapon of expropriation. "Whoever remains in the country," he wrote, "will have to recognise Germany and after a certain time to accept "Deutschtum." To Stresemann, an annexationist, Bissing wrote, in January, 1917: "I go still further than you. . . . I draw the necessary conclusion that if we do not subject Belgium to our power, if we do not give a German direction to its Government, the war is lost for us." M. Passelecq enables his readers to judge of the full perfidy and bad faith of Bissing by comparing this Memorandum and letters with the "Open Letter to the Belgian Nation" which he placarded throughout Belgium on his first arrival in Brussels in July, 1915. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* appears to have been shocked at Bissing's quotation from Machiavelli ("whoever

REVIEWS

intends to seize a country is forced to get rid of its king and government, even by death"); but the conflict between his public professions and his real sentiments shows him to have been a very apt pupil of the great Florentine. Nor must it be forgotten that Bissing enjoyed to a signal degree the favour and confidence of William II, whose own behaviour to King Albert in the years preceding the war was not a whit less treacherous. That the Emperor and Bissing were in absolute agreement on the Belgian question is something far more than a mere supposition.

R. W. S. W.

Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's Diary during the Dardanelles Expedition, April-September, 1915: Lewis Einstein, late Special Agent at the American Embassy, Constantinople. (Murray.) 6s. "Enver is no longer the modest young officer fresh from Macedonia I knew in 1908, who blushed professionally when praised as 'the hero of liberty.' The Bulgarian Minister calls him 'The Prophet of the Prophet,' and on either side of his desk at the War Office hang portraits of Napoleon and Frederick the Great!" With these words Mr. Einstein opens his diary on 23 April, 1915, and the record of the ensuing five months is to be read as a footnote to the history of Enver and of Turkey under German control. "Deutschland über Allah" was the German motto; but Mr. Einstein's diary shows that "Deutschland" was not always "über Enver." The book, as a whole, hardly fulfils the promise of its title, for it adds but little to the knowledge we already possess. It corroborates Mr. Morgenthau's report of the German Ambassador's account of the secret Berlin Conference of 5 July, 1914; and it helps us to fill in the details of the picture of Constantinople living in fear of the Allies' success at Gallipoli. It is interesting to know that the German naval officers "took their hats off" to the British submarine service for their exploits in the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and that in June, 1915, "there are no illusions here as to the war's duration. A year is the minimum date; only London remains incurably optimistic." Further, Mr. Einstein bears witness to the ferocity of Turkish policy in Armenia, but attributes the outbreak in the spring of 1915 to "the failure of the Allies on 18 March." On the political side, especially, this diary is very disappointing; it throws no new light upon the Turco-Bulgar situation during those critical months, and pays excessive attention to the entry of Italy, with whose diplomats Mr. Einstein was in as close touch as he was in bad odour at the German Embassy. The latter circumstance perhaps explains his comparative ignorance of contemporary Balkan affairs. For the general reader, however, and for those who took part in the Dardanelles Expedition, it cannot fail to have great interest, for it is a full record of life in Constantinople in 1915.

A. F. W.

Germany's Annexationist Aims: S. Grumbach; translated and introduced by J. Ellis Barker. (Murray.) 3s. 6d. Pp. x + 148. In this abbreviated form Mr. Ellis Barker presents Herr Grumbach's "Das Annexationistische Deutschland" to English readers, who, on

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studying its pages, will be able to form some opinion of the magnitude of the annexation propaganda which has been conducted in Germany for the past three years. We are inclined to doubt, however, whether the multitude of quotations which the book contains really represents the true influence of the annexation movement at the present moment. Extreme demands have recently suffered a severe set-back; and none of Germany's war aims would now be stated in the terms of crude rapacity which appear on every page of Grumbach's book. This does not detract from the value of the volume as a collection of historical evidence which students of war literature will find indispensable as a work of reference. It is provided with an excellent index.

Catalogue of War Publications (to June 1915): Compiled by G. W. Prothero and A. J. Philip. (Murray.) 2s. 6d. Mr. Murray has done a good service by publishing this catalogue on behalf of the Central Committee for National Patriotic Associations. In certain respects, however, it is not as complete as it might be. Thus under Austria-Hungary there is no reference to Friedjung, Baernreither, Bahr or Louis Eisenmann. Professor Masaryk's important work on Russia is not mentioned, nor is his "Vasić-Forgach-Aehrenthal." The Abbé Wetterlé does not appear under Alsace-Lorraine, nor does "Alsace-Lorraine: la carte au liséré vert" figure in the list. In view of the growing importance of this question the next edition should contain a section devoted solely to Alsace-Lorraine. Other omissions are M. Sembal's "Faites un roi: sinon, faites la paix," the "Preussische Jahrbücher," Mr. Seton Watson's "German, Slav and Magyar," Naumann's "Mittel-Europa," and E. D. Morel's "Morocco in Diplomacy."

Roumania's Cause and Ideals: Leonard A. Magnus (Kegan Paul. Pp. xiii + 165, 3s. 6d. net), is a short account, based upon diplomatic and other authentic documents, of the causes which brought Roumania into the war. It is a valuable record of essential information, sifted with care and discrimination—the author sees the advantage to be gained, for instance, from relying mainly upon enemy evidence to substantiate the case against Magyar oppression in Transylvania—but it is a pity that he did not make it more attractive reading; and his compressed treatment of Roumania's past history is hardly adequate for his purpose. G. G.

Le Parlement Interallié

"Le Parlement Interallié" is an institution which we hope has come to stay. It is the outward and visible expression of that community of interests between all parliaments, which, for the parliaments of the Allied Nations, has been greatly increased by the war. In days gone by, European parliamentarians possessed no institutions specifically devoted to their mutual instruction on constitutional affairs, and consequently nothing but the most desultory exchange of opinions and experience ever took place. The suc-

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cess of the International Association for Labour legislation is an indication at once of what might be done by the efficient co-operation of all Parliaments and of the absence of any organ to do it. The day of the banquet with its polite post-prandial prevarication—for use as the cement of international relations—has passed away for ever, let us hope: and in its place we look for new light shed upon all our problems by the many varieties of experience in other parliamentary countries. The "Bulletin des Informations Parlementaires," published fortnightly at the General Secretariat of the Parlement Interallié (243, Boulevard Saint Germain, Paris), is the first step in this direction, giving a kind of index to the proceedings of the parliaments of France, Great Britain, the United States and Italy. We presume that disturbance in Russia and the distance from Japan alone account for their absence from the Bulletin. Our interest in Le Parlement Interallié prompts us to invite its ruling authorities to enlarge their Bulletin so that it may become an important organ of international parliamentary co-operation. Meanwhile we hope that the British members of L.P.I. will collect every scrap of evidence bearing on the immediate and urgent problem of the parliamentary treatment of foreign affairs. Their recent journey in Italy must have given them many useful opportunities of discussing with Italian public men the part which the representatives of the people should play in watching and controlling the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service. In foreign affairs L.P.I. can do permanently useful work.

Mr. Morgenthau and the Secret Berlin Conference

The *New York World*, 14 October, contains an account of a conversation which Mr. Morgenthau, former United States Ambassador to Turkey, had with the German Ambassador, Baron Wangenheim. The latter was present at the secret conference of 5 July, 1914, in Berlin, in order to report on the position of Turkey: and he informed Mr. Morgenthau in August that the conference was held to discuss German readiness for war. In the course of his indiscreet remarks to the American Ambassador, he said that "Count Moltke, the Chief of Staff was there." This raises a question regarding the accuracy of the whole report: for it is known that the revelations in the Reichstag last summer were due to the fact that a certain person closely related to the late Count von Moltke took steps to prove that the latter was not responsible for the aggressive policy of Germany in July, 1914, by showing that he was *not* present at the conference which took the fatal decision to prepare for and provoke the war. The person in question, being in a position to know with absolute certainty the movements of the late Chief of Staff, wished to clear his memory of the reproach which had been made, namely, that he wantonly abetted the bellicose party; and placed the relevant facts before a member of the Reichstag with the results which we know. Count von Moltke was supposed to be an opponent of aggressive action, and, according to the most

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credible form of the story, to have been deliberately kept in the dark until the first irrevocable decisions were taken. Mr. Morgenthau's report seems to show that we have not yet heard the whole story.

Luther on Germany

(From "The Table Talk")

"The Lord God does with nations as I do with an old rotten hedge; I pluck it up and plant another in its place. And so Germany was at one time a fine and a noble country; but it will soon be said of her *fuit Ilium!* Tacitus describes old Germany very well. He extols the old Germans by reason of their adherence to their promises; in which respect they once excelled all other nations. In former times it stood well with Germany; but now her people are fallen from virtue, and are become rude, and proud, and insolent. Germany is like a brave and gallant horse, highly fed, but without a good rider. Germany is a rich, powerful, and brave country; but she is in sore need of a good head and governor. I often reflect with sorrow how utterly Germany rejects all good counsel in this respect."

The Congress of Jewish Soldiers in Russia

Le Temps recently published the following telegram from Odessa. We reproduce it in order to show that multitudes of Jews in Russia have thrown in their lot with the new régime with good hopes of a brighter future. "The Congress of Russian Jewish soldiers, composed of representatives from the Russian armies on all fronts and from the military schools of Odessa, Kiev, and the Caucasus, has unanimously passed a resolution expressing its absolute confidence in the Provisional Government and its unshaken desire to see Russia, side by side with her friends and allies, carry the war to victory against the German invader and thus establish the liberty of all peoples."

Dr. Korošec on the Yugoslav Programme

The Hungarian paper, *Az Ujság*, Count Tisza's personal organ, published on 11 October an interview with Dr. Korošec, the Slovene leader in the Austrian Reichsrat, and President of the Southern Slav Club. He said: "Our programme is the erection of the independent Slav State. This must not only embrace all the districts of Austria inhabited by Southern Slavs, but also Croatia and Slavonia. I therefore share Dr. Wekerle's opinion that Dalmatia belongs to Croatia-Slavonia, but I maintain that it must be united therewith as an integral part of the Yugoslav State. It is also included in our programme that we shall thereafter perform the important economic and political tasks of the future in friendly agreement with the Hungarian National unified State (*Einheitsstaat*). To the Austrian Government we stand on a footing of strict opposition. We shall

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not support the Budget *provisorium*, nor shall we take part in any active policy."

Signor Canepa on the Turin Riots

In the debate which led to the fall of the Italian Ministry, Signor Canepa, the Food Controller, said that without injury to public health, the consumption of meat had been reduced by 50 per cent., and that of sugar from 2,400,000 to 1,700,000 quintals. Last May he had proposed the rationing of grain, and it was not his fault that this measure had never been adopted. In the case of Turin, Signor Canepa said: "It is not true that for the month of August a lesser supply of grain was assigned to the Commune of Turin. So far from it receiving less grain in August, it actually received 5,000 quintals more than in June." He read aloud four telegrams sent by him to the Prefect of the city, "suggesting, entreating, ordering him to provide himself by means of local requisitioning." The telegrams showed that the submarine trouble was not the real cause. "There was grain at Turin. 2,900,000 quintals of flour were found hidden in the bakers' shops; and bread ran short, because in those very days the milling itself was delayed in two of the most important mills of the city. One of the mills was closed owing to the breaking of a pipe and the other owing to lack of oil for the machinery." These revelations produced a veritable storm of indignation in the Chamber. Cries of "Names! Names!" were heard on all sides, and some deputies exclaimed that "there are people who need shooting." The Pacifist Socialists showed a marked reluctance to learn the names. Signor Canepa clinched his arguments with the telling phrase that "in any case, shortage of grain is no sufficient reason for the incidents of Turin. Calabria has suffered worse in silence." (Tumultuous applause.)

The Turin riots were part of an elaborate scheme of *sabotage*—including the simultaneous destruction of large ammunition depôts behind the front—which aimed at paralysing Italy's internal activities at the very moment when Germany's supreme effort was about to be launched against her.

The *Neue Freie Presse* on the Reichstag

The *Neue Freie Presse* (15 October), discussing the German domestic situation, makes the following candid remark about the Reichstag. It is as apposite as the quotation from Luther which we print on page 95:—"If the majority of the German Reichstag had known whom to recommend as Michaelis's successor, it would perhaps have been unbending in the conflict which broke out on Saturday (6 October). It could have overthrown the Chancellor by a vote of no confidence, but would be embarrassed to answer the question 'Whom does it trust?' or 'What statesman will uphold its policy in such a manner as to put an end to friction and suspicion?' The majority has a policy, but lacks an executive mind that can put it into execution."

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sabotage of the peace"**

—*Baron Sonnino (21 October)*

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8 November 1917

The Internal Crisis in Germany (I)

EVEN amid the absorbing interest of the events which are taking place on the field of battle it would be a grave error to ignore what may prove to be of equal importance in the political sphere. The contest which we are conducting is one not only of armies, but of ideas, and ultimately it is the ideas which are the more important. We are fighting against German militarism, which finds its external expression in army corps and howitzers and poisoned gas, and to overcome it we have to meet them by similar weapons. But these German weapons have only been brought into existence in obedience to a form of thought and attitude of mind, a reasoned conviction, passions and emotions; and if the thoughts, beliefs, ideals and desires which were their origin cease to exist, then the whole machinery and panoply which has been created would crumble away. In the ultimate analysis we are making war against Germany in order to convert the German nation from the false gods whom they have been pursuing. Has this conversion in fact taken place? Have the German nation overthrown the intellectual tyranny under which they have been kept for two generations? Are they ready to come over to our side and, with us, to accept the principle that the future to which we look must be one by which the States into which civilised mankind is divided shall be constructed on the basis, not of irresponsible control from above, but of the free determination of each community, and, ultimately, on the free and self-poised individual man and woman? For the internal and external questions are inextricably interwoven, and freedom at home is the necessary condition of a peaceful policy abroad.

This is the great question which is now being debated in Germany itself, and this it is which gives its interest to what, during the last few months, has been happening in Berlin.

If we look at these events from the point of view of ordinary political controversy, what we see is that within the

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space of four months we have had two Chancellor crises. One Chancellor has resigned, his place has been taken by another. The new-comer has failed in his task; he has resigned in turn, and after some delay and many negotiations his successor has been appointed. In countries other than Germany events of this kind are of frequent occurrence. The creation and fall of an administration occurs too often to excite more than a passing interest. Especially is this the case when, as might at first appear, the question is mainly one of personalities. It does not seem at first sight to matter to us much in England whether the man who, under the Emperor, holds the seals of office is Bethmann Hollweg, or Michaelis, or Hertling, or one of the other obscure candidates whose names have been bandied about in the German press.

But, as a matter of fact, events of this kind in Germany have more special significance. The Empire has now existed for nearly fifty years. Many changes have taken place, but through them all the office of Chancellor has never ceased to have some of that special dignity, weight, authority with which it was necessarily invested during the long period during which the founder of the Empire held this great post. During forty-five years there were only five Chancellors; the shortest tenure of the office, that of Caprivi, was four years, and there has always been a feeling that the Chancellor, just because he held his office direct from the Emperor, stood—or ought to stand—above the parties; he is not, as is well known, a member of the Reichstag; he does not address that body from the floor of the House, but, surrounded by the other holders of great official positions, from a tribune or platform facing the House. He is not of the Parliament; he comes to them as one appointed from above (*von oben*) to announce decisions, to explain the policy of the Government, to request or to require their assent. The Reichstag comes and goes, but the Chancellor remains.

This position which he holds is the key of the German Constitution; it is, as we have been told again and again, by statesmen and jurists and historians and politicians, the peculiar greatness of Germany, that it has not a parliamentary government; and if it has not a parliamentary government, the reason is that the whole authority of government in every department centres in the hands of a

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single man, who has to assist him, not colleagues, but subordinates, and this single man is responsible, not to the Parliament, nor to the people, but to the Emperor.

So it was at the beginning of the war, and so it remained for the first three years of the war. In the last few months a change has taken place. The office of Chancellor has lost its glory, and, in doing so, it could not but be that the authority of the Emperor himself has become involved.

It is instructive to compare what happened in July with what has happened in October. The fall of Bethmann Hollweg had been often discussed, repeatedly predicted, and, just for that reason, came all the more unexpectedly. The immediate occasion was a debate held in the Main Committee of the Reichstag, in which Erzberger, a very prominent, a very vociferous, member of the Centre Party, notorious as the most active of wire-pullers, both in domestic and in international affairs, made a sudden and unforeseen attack upon the Government. The particular occasion of the attack was the failure of the submarine warfare; his speech has never been published, for the meetings of the Committee are secret. But we now know, from the reports which have got out, that it was a very effective and damaging criticism, which at once shook the confidence of the Reichstag in the whole conduct of the war. When this unlimited submarine warfare began it had been confidently predicted that England would be brought to her knees by the beginning of August. To this were pledged those parties who from the beginning were responsible for the war itself, and who throughout were associated with the demands for a purely military solution, the Reventlows and the Tirpitzes, and all the tribe of generals and jingoes who demanded the annexation of half Europe to the German Empire. He showed that they were wrong, that their figures were wrong, that their predictions were false. The submarine warfare would not bring England to her knees by August; its chief effect had been, not the subjection of England, but that it had brought another Continent into the war with Germany, and, by doing so, it would insure her final fall.

The effect of the speech was catastrophic; there was a panic; the Reichstag at once got out of hand, and the panic extended outside the walls of the Reichstag, even to the ranks of the great bureaucracy itself, by which Germany

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is governed. For a short time it appeared that anything might happen, but there was one weakness. A coalition of three great parties, the Socialists, the Catholics, the Radicals, had, indeed, a majority in the Reichstag, but they had no leader. The weakness of German Parliamentarism, a weakness which it is curious to note has increased as the power of the Empire has increased, became apparent; there were party meetings, meetings of leaders of the parties, but there was no one leader who, by his super-eminent ability could command the suffrages of all. For, again, it is the weakness of Germany that the system of Government adopted has had, as its inevitable result, that the Reichstag no longer produces or attracts men who are real leaders.

Against a leaderless coalition of parties the Government could re-assert itself. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were hastily summoned to Berlin that the Emperor might consult with them; with them there came the heir to the throne. It was soon found that the Chancellor himself had no longer a grasp of the situation. He appeared before the Reichstag, but he vacillated; as so often before, he tried to compromise between the two great parties into which the nation and the Parliament were divided, the military and the moderates, the annexationists and the non-annexationists; this time his accustomed device failed; he had long been bitterly opposed by the military, now the Liberals turned against him, and declared that the country could not get on without a man who could lead. He fell because he was suddenly deserted from all sides; if he failed in his task of controlling the Reichstag he could no longer serve the purpose of his master.

There was nearly a week of conferences, rumours, intrigues, and all the signs of a political crisis which we know so well in England. Meanwhile an important event took place in the Reichstag. The Socialists, the Radicals and the Centre agreed together on the now famous Resolution of 19 July; this Resolution was eventually adopted by a majority of more than 100 (the Conservatives and the National Liberals both voted against it) and declared that the object of the war was to defend the liberty, independence and territorial integrity of the Fatherland; the Reichstag stood for peace and understanding and the lasting conciliation of nations, and declared that "annexations, political, economic, and

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financial oppression, are contrary to such a peace." This Resolution is a landmark in the history of the war. It is a definite declaration against the plans of the annexationists and the wild schemes of the Pangermans. It is the outcome of a feeling, the growth of which had long been manifest to the press, that the Pangermans are a curse to the country. It is the evidence that—if we may venture to express it—the German nation was beginning to recover its sanity. They had begun to ask themselves why it was that as war went on and they appeared to be passing on from victory to victory, every victory which they secured seemed but to intensify the hostility to them of the outer world. "Why is it that we are so hated?" The question was asked again and again, and the answer was obvious. What else can be expected if there are among us a noisy and powerful clique who, while they profess to speak on behalf of the German nation, publicly avow plans which, if successful, would mean the destruction of the political and economic independence of all other nations in Europe. The Resolution was not directed so much against the Government as against the Pangermans, and the crisis was a struggle between the moderates and the extremists for control over the Government.

The fact that this Resolution won the support of a majority of the Reichstag had the additional importance that attainment of the war aims suggested in it became identified with the principle of parliamentary control; if this was the view of the majority of the existing Reichstag, and if, as has been maintained—and probably with truth—it represented the voice of an enormous majority of the German nation, then the object to be attained was clearly indicated. The Government must direct its policy in accordance with the wishes of the people; there must be parliamentary control over foreign policy in Germany as in other Western countries. And this demand was strengthened by the growing feeling that the Foreign Office of the Empire had been scandalously mismanaged. Whatever view might be taken of the outbreak of the war, even those who maintain that the ultimate responsibility must be found in the establishment of the Entente, and who attribute to it hostile intentions which it did not have, could not avoid asking the question how it came about that this great coalition against

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Germany had been established. In the papers of the opposition press, such as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, well-informed writers pointed out that there must be something very much to blame in the conduct of German foreign affairs. After all Germany did find herself confronted by the united hostility of France, England, Russia, and Italy. Why was this? It was no good to say that Germany was innocent, for if this were the case her very innocence would be the best proof that there had been extraordinary and unprecedented mismanagement. The whole course of German policy must have been wrong, for if it had not been, this disastrous state of affairs would never have arisen. And was there not evidence to show that ever since the beginning of the war the faults in which it had originated still continued? What about the events which brought America into the war? What about the revelations showing German intrigues in the United States, the crude and foolish attempt to create a union between Japan and Mexico, the Luxburg revelations? It was this kind of thing which was bringing Germany rapidly to disaster, and for this, it was represented, not the nation, but the governing clique was responsible. Therefore the parole was given, the Government had been shown to be incompetent; let the control be transferred to the Reichstag.

The passing of this Resolution was the high-water mark of the movement. Meanwhile, the resignation of the Chancellor had been offered and had been accepted, and his successor was appointed. The appointment was a great surprise. There was chosen a man who was almost completely unknown in Germany, as abroad, a man who had no experience in parliamentary affairs and no knowledge of foreign politics. The explanation given is that the military leaders had presented to the Emperor a list of three names; the others were unacceptable to him; he chose a man against whom nothing could be said because of him nothing was known. At any rate, for the moment, the solution had this advantage, that the control of the Emperor and the army was secured; the Chancellor was at least their nominee; he was not a parliamentary candidate.

It was generally supposed that Dr. Michaelis would not hold office long. His tenure has been even shorter and more ignominious than was anticipated; it is a pitiable record

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of incompetence. He failed as a speaker; the reports of debates in the Reichstag had to be held up in order that his speeches might be properly revised for publication. His first duty was to come to some agreement with the Reichstag concerning the July Resolution. On this he vacillated and equivocated; while professing to accept it, he did so in words so framed and with so many clauses and parentheses and conditions, that it was obvious that in accepting it, to use his own expression, "as he understood it," he intended to reserve to himself full power to reject it. In the conduct of foreign affairs he was soon eclipsed by the new Secretary of State, Herr von Kühlmann. Herr von Kühlmann, though still comparatively young, had become one of the most prominent figures in German life. He is well known in England, and his conduct in this country before the outbreak of war earned for him the reputation of an arch intriguer. He justified his reputation by publicly announcing his intention of producing an "atmosphere" favourable to negotiations, but the object of the "atmosphere" was not a genuine peace; he would use it, as he has clearly shown, in order to make secret overtures to each of the belligerents; he hoped, in this way, to break up the hostile alliance, or, at least, to sow distrust among the enemy by making each of the Allies believe that the others were considering a separate and dishonourable accommodation.

J. W. HEADLAM.

[Mr. Headlam will conclude his survey next week, when he will consider the position of the present Chancellor.—EDITOR.]

Italy and the Single Front

[We recommend to the serious consideration of our readers the following communication from a particularly well-informed Italian source.—EDITOR.]

IF the great offensive of Germany and Austria against Italy has taken the British public by surprise, it ought not really to have surprised any of the statesmen of the Entente, and still less their "military experts." Ever since the German offensive in Roumania it was clear that Germany's next military effort would be on the Italian front. During

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the winter of 1916 Italian military circles openly discussed this probability. It was obviously a logical development of the German strategic plan, which has always been inspired by the realistic idea of striking the enemy at his weakest point, whereas, unhappily, the Allies have always clung to the old military maxim that we must go on striking the enemy where he is strongest and damn the consequences. Even if the Revolution had not intervened to disorganise the Russian army, it was clear to all Italian military critics, and still more to the Italian High Command, that Germany would stake her reserves of men and material in order to help Austria to remedy the dangerous situation produced by Italy's advance on the Isonzo and the threat to such vital centres as Trieste and Laibach.

Nor is it any longer a secret that the Italian High Command has repeatedly urged upon the Allies the need of taking measures to forestall this German plan. All the various factors which could throw light upon these views were brought to the knowledge of the other High Commands from the period of the inter-Allied Conference at Paris onwards. It was at that time that the first serious studies were made regarding railway communications between Italy and France in the event of a serious Allied effort on the Italian front. A frank Italian memorandum, laid before the Paris Conference, reckoned up the number of battalions and batteries which Germany might be able to employ on the Italian front at a time when Russia's military efficiency was still unimpaired. It was argued that the enemy's designs ought to be forestalled by a vigorous Allied offensive on the Julian front, which, breaking down the Austrian defences on the Carso, would have made it possible to carry the war into the very heart of Austria, while at the same time Russia, by a similar offensive on her southern front, kept the Austro-Hungarian forces opposing her fully engaged. Taken between these two combined assaults the Monarchy might have been overpowered with comparative ease and reduced to a serious plight. Clearly Austria constituted the most vulnerable point of the enemy against which the efforts of the Allies should have been concentrated.

This project offered more than one advantage:—

(a) It would have cemented, by something more than mere platonic declarations, the great principle of the "Single

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front" among the Allies; in other words, it might have anticipated by at least six months what is now being done under the inexorable pressure of events.

(b) It would also have led to the formation of a real strategic reserve on the part of the Western Allies, capable of being employed at the most favourable point—in this case, on the Austrian front.

(c) It would have deprived the enemy of any serious prospect of success in an offensive against Italy, by producing a better balance of forces on the various fronts, above all in the matter of armament. It was certainly no secret to any of the belligerent staffs (including those of the enemy) that the supply of artillery, ammunition, and machine guns at the disposal of the Italian armies was infinitely less than that of all the other Western armies, including Austria herself. That was due to the more backward state of war-industries in Italy, owing to that lack of iron and coal which makes her absolutely dependent on the resources of the other Allies, and especially of England. As long as this state of affairs prevailed and the Austrians retained the advantage of dominant positions along the frontier, it was evident that the temptation of striking a decisive blow on the Italian front was too great to be abandoned by the Austro-Germans. The events of the last week of October prove how accurate was the Italian forecast in this respect, and how truly they had estimated the danger resulting to the Allied cause from an enemy success on the Isonzo and Trentino fronts.

(d) Finally, the plan of a vigorous Allied offensive on the Isonzo against Austria would not merely have crowned with military success the wonderful work achieved by the Italian armies with distinctly inadequate means in over two years of hard warfare; it also offered the promise of great political results. Every military success in that theatre of war would have weakened still further Austria's powers of resistance and hastened the solution of those problems which the Allies have described in their war-aims as the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy and the reconstitution of Serbia and Roumania.

The Italian plan was not, as some may have feared, one of Imperialistic conquest and merely Italian interest. It

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was, above all, a logical and strategic plan, which offered immediate and obvious advantages to the Allied cause; for its military value Cadorna was ready to answer, and he is neither an "amateur" nor a "politician." It was at once an offensive and defensive plan, instead of a mere "tactical" plan, such as those which outweighed it in the counsels of the Allies. It offered the advantage of carrying the war fiercely into the enemy's territory, and of detaching districts in which there is already a deep separatist ferment. In its political aspect it is vouched for by the fact that its doughtiest supporter was the Socialist Minister Bissolati, whom none could accuse of Imperialist or Jingo feeling, and who is the most ardent champion of the principle of nationality.

It is known that these Italian plans were discussed at the inter-Allied conferences of Paris and Rome. It is not yet possible to publish details of these discussions, though they are known to many persons, and probably also to the enemy. But it is now generally known that Mr. Lloyd George always showed himself personally convinced of the merits of the Italian plan. And as it has been affirmed, with little regard to the truth, that the Italian High Command has never expressed doubts as to its ability to repel an Austro-German offensive, it is well to point out that it was at the conference of Rome early this year that France gave a pledge to supply an important contingent of men and artillery in the event of an Austro-German invasion of Italy. This fact ought to put an end to all discussion, since it proves that, even before the Russian Revolution had taken place, the dangers to which a combined Austro-German attack on the Italian front might give rise had been clearly recognised.

Italy has never assumed that attitude of boastful self-confidence which has been ascribed to her by certain superficial critics. She has never rejected the co-operation of the Allies on her own front, but has repeatedly requested it. Signor Bissolati, during his visit to England early last March, eagerly pleaded the advantage of adopting Cadorna's plan, and it is extremely unfortunate that the views which he advocated, and the undoubted sympathy with which more than one English statesman received them, did not prevail.

The truth is that, while it seemed clear to the Italians and to many clear-sighted observers elsewhere that the Italian

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front was an essential part of the western front as a whole, there prevailed in other circles the idea of a war conducted in water-tight compartments, of which Italy was one of the less important. And yet, as the front which was weakest and most exposed to the enemy's onslaught, it ought logically to have been regarded as the decisive front of this year.

This decisive character was accentuated by events in Russia and by the collapse of our Eastern Ally's military power, which imposed upon all the Allies a radical revision of their war-plans. In point of fact, the balance of forces, already unstable enough, was unexpectedly changed, to the special disadvantage of Italy, who had, together with Russia, kept the Austrian forces occupied, and who now saw herself compelled to face fresh concentrations of reserves and artillery outnumbering her own military resources, quite apart from any help sent by Germany. The danger became specially acute after the brilliant offensive of the Italian Second Army beyond the Isonzo, which resulted in the capture of the plateau of Bainsizza. This was the occasion to supply Italy with the full means of exploiting her success, and thus neutralising any movement on the part of the Germans. But, instead of treating the Isonzo as the decisive front before the enemy could impose upon us the necessity for doing so, we know that the precise opposite was done. To-day the fate of the whole war depends upon the manner in which this error is repaired.

Russian Contradictions (II)

My optimism about Russia, an optimism insisted upon in my last article (*THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 53), is founded on the conviction that the active Russian political parties are, in spite of some superficial evidence to the contrary, patriotic, and inspired by a motive of national preservation. It was not necessary for me to emphasize the patriotism of the moderate party—the Cadets, for example—for no one doubts them. Even the Russian reactionary elements (who still have their echo in certain European papers) which condemned the Cadet party before the war, accusing it of disloyalty and want of statesmanship, now put all their hope in its wisdom and patriotism. This is, of course, easily understood. But

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it is a much harder task to persuade an English reader, not too well versed in Russian affairs, that even the democratic organisations are not the unpatriotic monsters they are so often and so angrily painted. May I repeat that through all the fogs and shadows which have enveloped their activities there has always been a glimmer of light.

I know beforehand that I can never hope to persuade those people who are ready to applaud a revolution without revolutionaries, or revolutionaries without revolutionism. A revolution, for those people, is rather like a *tour de valse*, where the partners, after having danced together, make their bows and part. I write for those who understand that the great Russian revolution was a tremendous shock of elemental forces which could not settle down calmly and vanish in a harmonious languor. In an ideal world things might have been otherwise. The hard-handed labourers and the fiery-headed fanatics of the revolution, who, in a common enthusiasm of rage, tore down the pillars of Tsardom, would certainly, in this ideal world, have gone to the level-brained moderates and said to them: "It is your turn now. We have destroyed. You must build. We are too ignorant, too fiery. Give the country your experience, your steadiness, your competence, and we will give it our toil and our enthusiastic help. We will return to our factories, our mines, and our ploughshares."

Alas! We do not live in an ideal world. The conquerors would not disappear humbly and give place to the other social classes—classes, it must be remembered, against whom they have an old mistrust and suspicion. And that, after all, is only human.

All the mistakes, all the crimes, all the follies committed by certain parties of the democratic organisation have sprung from one and the same source. They have identified Russia with the revolution. That is to say, they have not been able to imagine the well-being, the life, the future of the country apart from the consolidation of the new *régime*. Since the fate of the revolution was in their hands they considered themselves responsible for this well-being, this life, and this future of their country. This fact made them in their own eyes the supreme guardians of the new *régime*.

And here begins the tragedy. The revolution had too much the appearance of a miracle. In two days an edifice

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that had taken a thousand years to build crumpled to dust. The miracle seemed too good to be true, or rather too good to last. The new masters of the situation, in their moments of greatest triumph, were obsessed, perhaps unconsciously, with the haunting dread of waking up to find it was not true. They thought that the elements which supported the old *régime* before the war, the forces of conservatism, could not vanish in a night. They had to hide themselves somewhere, and must appear at some opportune moment. Where should they look for them? Without doubt, and before anywhere else, in the army—among the officers, especially among those of high rank. So, in order to fight against the “counter-revolution” they began to “democratise” the army, of course, with the best intentions, but in struggling against imaginary dangers they created very real ones. Such aberrations are not new. The Tsar Nicholas himself created the real revolution through fighting against an imaginary one.

Having introduced politics into the army, which was already degenerate enough from the old *régime*, the doors were opened to every danger, to demoralisation and defeats. Perhaps the greatest disaster from this fear of a “counter-revolution” was that the moderate elements of the Soviet, wishing to keep the “unity of the democratic front,” tolerated for too long the extreme elements in their ranks—the Bolševiks—and, incidentally, laid the way open to German agents. The part attributed to German gold in Socialist circles is no doubt enormously exaggerated—even among the Bolševiks a few people only are suspected of being Russian Bolos—but in the country, in the lines and behind the lines, German agents have used the Extremist catchwords for their own demoralising ends. This state of things was possible only because the moderate Socialists feared a “counter-revolution,” and felt that in that event they would need the help of the extremists to fight it down.

The same obsession (the danger of a counter-revolution) influenced also the peace policy of the democratic organisation, and thus very nearly led Russia to ruin. Peace propaganda, had it remained in the normal limits of Socialism, would have been justified by the Soviet's general ideas of war and peace—the horrors of war and the blessings of peace. It would not have endangered the country. It exists in every

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nation without compromising its defence. But the organisation's longing for a state of things which would consolidate the new *régime* pushed them to extremities which did much harm to the country and democracy itself.

Intoxicated by their success in the interior revolution, and encouraged by the praise of the whole democratic world, they dreamt the proud dream of introducing their revolutionary methods into foreign politics.

The traditional universalism of the Russian intellectuals and democrats, in themselves not opposed to love of country, met, on this ground of pacifism, the exaggerated internationalism of the Bolševiks, who deny all patriotism. There was a moment when this internationalism of the Lenins, the Trotskis and the Černovs seemed to swallow up the national sentiments of the best democrats. That was when the Soviet, through mistrust of the imaginary "Imperialism" of the Cadets, broke up the first Coalition Cabinet with Miljukov, and so destroyed the last bridge between them and the moderate elements.

If this tendency had been developed still further, there would have been no cure for Russia's sickness, and optimism would have meant stupidity or a desire to deceive. Happily in the democracy itself—I mean in the best elements of the democracy—there were hidden forces which woke in time to avert disaster. One could give a long series of examples showing the evolution of the Russian democracy from a sick Utopia to a consciousness of hard realities. I will only give a few.

In order to appreciate this evolution it is necessary to realise the general situation in which the first of Kerenski's offensives in Galicia took place. The Soviet had started a big peace propaganda. It was working for a Conference at Stockholm. It threw out manifestos to the proletariat of every country, including Germany. It was up to its neck in pacifism. Then it was that the forces of the Central Powers in the East stopped short. The German general staff, after a blow struck at Russia on the Stohod, proceeded almost to excuse itself for the enterprise, explaining that it was simply an episode, and did not mean the opening of another offensive against Russia. And suddenly the Russian Government urged an attack, which was, in effect, not against the German army occupying Russian territory, but against

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the Austrian army, which was defending its own soil—Galicia. And this, in spite of everything! The pacifists, the Stockholmists, the anti-annexationists of the Soviet sent their fiery blessing to the Army just like the priests of the old *régime*. If there was a difference it was that, instead of the ikons of the priests, they used the red flag of revolution. We can well understand the anger that raged in the entire German press against this magnificent eloquence, this patriotic appeal of the Soviet to the Army. Where did this “paradoxal” transformation come from? We have already had the reply. When the best elements of the Soviet understood that the Russian military inactivity was the same thing, morally, as a separate peace, that it was a treason against the Allied peoples, who were pouring out their blood in the battlefields, they called for a return to the offensive, looking for no justifications in the code of Zimmerwaldism. When they felt that the destiny and honour of their country were in the balance they threw all their weight into the common cause.

Another example, not so important, but very characteristic. When the notorious Swiss Socialist, Robert Grimm, who had played in Petrograd the part of the great pope of disinterested pacifism, was compromised in an enterprise smelling of pro-Germanism, the Soviet, by a crushing majority, applauded his expulsion from the country. It would not spare the personal *amour propre* of Grimm, nor even the honour of Zimmerwaldism, which he represented. Again it felt the good name of the country threatened.

At last came the turn of the Bolševiks. When the Soviet began to understand, alas, a little too late, that the Bolševiks were in themselves a danger to the country no less great than a counter-revolution from the Right, it began an energetic fight against the Extremists. No honest man in Russia can deny that the best representatives of the Soviet (the Tseretellis, the Voitinskis, the Libers, the Gotz's and the Dahns—excuse the “German” names—at the same time as the Kropotkins, the Plehanovs and the Deutschs) conducted against the Bolševiks after 4 July, a campaign as violent as that of the Moderate party. This evolution of the sincere Russian Socialists was emphasised by a deed of striking symbolism. At Minsk a demoralised regiment of soldiers nearly killed, by the most brutal methods, a

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propagandist, sent by the Petrograd Soviet to combat the Bolševik mentality in the regiment. This propagandist was a Senator of the new *régime*, Mr. S——, the author of the infamous Prikaz No. 1, which had proved the first and the most disastrous blow against the discipline of the army.

One cannot deny that Kornilov's enterprise interrupted, for a moment, this healthy evolution. When the threat of a counter-revolution became a fact, the Soviet felt a real need of "unity of democratic front," and flung itself among the Extremists. It is true that the "Bolos" among the Bolševiks remained in prison, or under the threat of arrest, but the others, who had been arrested in July, were released. It seemed as if the Soviet had not only liberated the Bolševiks, but had locked its own political liberty in their cells and given them the key.

Happily this state of things did not last for long. At the decisive moment the good sense of Russian democracy threw off the yoke of Bolševism, and, in spite of the Extremists, energetically supported the new Coalition Government of Kerenski and his conciliatory policy. It is true that the Bolševiks had won (for the moment) the majority of the Petrograd Soviet, but, like Joseph, who left in the hands of Potiphar's wife only his coat, the Russian democrats left in the grasp of the Soviet only their worn-out kaftan. Their soul and their hard experience they carried with them to the Provisional Parliament, where Bolševism has no inch of foothold.

At the very moment of writing Reuter wires from Russia a singular fact. *Izvestia*, the organ of the "All-Russian-Soviets," states that the Petrograd Soviet has entirely lost all its influence in the country. It affirms that the provincial Soviets—the echoes of the Petrograd Soviet—exist for the most part only on paper, and play no part at all. The *Izvestia* draws from these facts the reasonable conclusion that the Soviet's day is over. That is to say, the kaftan, left in the Bolševiks' hands, has been ripped in every seam.

Russia has, of course, paid very dearly for the experience of her democracy, but we think that the largest bill has already been settled, and that we are very nearly approaching the moment when the experience will bear fruit. Russia is on the eve of a big movement of reorganisation. Certainly there are bound to be some ups and downs, but the general tendencies are now healthy and hopeful.

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I will make so bold as to draw a general conclusion. The quickness or slowness of the process of Russia's rejuvenation will depend, in a large measure, on the attitude of her great Western Allies. Words like those spoken by Sir Edward Carson at Portsmouth, or Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons, words of faith and sympathy, are more than ever necessary for Russia at her present stage. Such manifestations, accompanied by corresponding deeds, strengthen the spirit of Russian patriots. Concerning the after-war relations between England and Russia, they fortify the position of England's friends in Russia and destroy her enemies. All who understand the situation will loudly applaud the important speech of Mr. Nabokov, the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, at Glasgow, and the excellent article in THE NEW EUROPE of 25 October, called "Anti-Russian Intrigue."

S. POLIAKOV-LITOVZEV.

Mr. Balfour's Balkan Speech

"DIVIDE ET IMPERA" seems to be Mr. Balfour's motto for his office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in dealing with the House of Commons. We should be content to have it so if we were sure that he laid at least equal emphasis on both parts of that time-honoured process. He is an adept at playing off one party against another; and, in the case of the Balkan quarrel, in which he placed Mr. Buxton and Dr. Seton-Watson as protagonists, he gave a very pretty instance of his method. But the onlooker cannot resist the suspicion that Mr. Balfour's mind is so congenially occupied in exploiting the conflict of Balkan partisans that he is in danger of paying too little heed to the constructive task implied in the word *impera*. He does not cry, "A plague on both your houses," for the Montagus and the Capulets of his world are specimens of interesting humanity which he would not lightly miss. To be the spectator of their feud is one of the things that give zest to life. But we suspect that Mr. Balfour murmurs, as he listens to Mr. Buxton or reads Dr. Seton-Watson's books:—

Now, who shall arbitrate?
Ten men love what I hate,
Shun what I follow, slight what I receive.

MR. BALFOUR'S BALKAN SPEECH

This attitude is doubtless the true caution of the responsible Minister, but it can be carried too far. When it finds expression in a reasoned scepticism concerning the repentance of Bulgaria or the promise of liberal reforms in Austria, it enlists the approval of the vast majority in the House and the country. We note Mr. Balfour's desire "that Bulgaria should be left at the end of the war without a grievance," and we must make a point of emphasising his recognition of the community of interest which ought to unite the Balkan peoples. His regret that these peoples "have never contrived to live in friendship with one another," and his refusal to countenance any Bulgarophil manœuvre at the expense of our loyal Balkan Allies strike the true note, which is most timely in view of the renewal of the Bulgar peace-offensive in Switzerland (*see* page 125).

On these grounds Mr. Balfour's speech is welcome. But we think it a misfortune that, for the second time, and at a moment when a word of encouragement would have been of great value, he did not voice the feeling of the House and the country by some generous reference to Italy. The Italian people are entitled to hear from our Foreign Minister a declaration of our sympathy and an assurance of our support and in view of the close connection between the subject-matter of his speech and the war-aims of the Italians, a tactful reference to the growing sense of the solidarity of Italian and Balkan interests, which has been the most striking feature of Italian public opinion in recent months, could not fail to have had a good effect. Italy desires to be assured of two things at this moment: first, that we regard her misfortune as ours; second, that we appreciate the honourable and legitimate motives which impel her to place the Austrian question in the forefront of her war-aims. Without committing himself or the Government to any extreme view of that question, Mr. Balfour, by a judicious word, could have strengthened Baron Sonnino's hands, and thus might have given the new Italian Ministry valuable assistance in reassuring Italian public opinion in its hour of trial. It is just in such things that our Latin Allies look for the encouragement of the spoken word, which means more to them than we realise. It is our national habit to take much for granted, and therefore our psychology is not a good guide to the national temperament of other peoples. Of all this the Foreign Office should be aware,

MR. BALFOUR'S BALKAN SPEECH

and it should be the constant care of our Foreign Minister to see that the appropriate opportunity is graced by the appropriate word.

Poland's Trustee in Russia

At the request of Mr. Lednicki, the Polish leader, the Russian Government has decided to create a Polish Council, which is to assist him as President of the Liquidation Commission in his work in so far as it concerns general Polish policy. Its members are to be nominated by him, and appointed or dismissed by special decrees of the Russian Government. This decision was arrived at on 23 August (N.S.), and the decree was signed on 29 September. "The Act of 30 March, concerning Polish Independence," says Mr. Lednicki's official comment, "has changed fundamentally the relation of Russia to Poland, because it marks the passing of the governmental powers into the hands of the Polish nation settled at home in its native land. There remained, however, Polish affairs in Russia which were, and will be, decided by the Russian Government authorities, being matters concerning the Russian State." The Russian Government, as well as different Polish organisations, the *communiqué* goes on to say, used to submit to the President of the Liquidation Committee (Mr. Lednicki) all kinds of questions and problems concerning Polish affairs, and, in view of their importance, the need has arisen to provide the President with the assistance of a representative Polish Committee. Its creation does not in any way affect the position of the President, except that in future his action "will lose the character of individual decision, and will be based on the common joint work of the members of the Council, of which the list is to be made up in consultation with the different Polish political organisations."

The Liquidation Commission was created by a decree of the Russian Government on 28 March, 1917, and Mr. Lednicki, who enjoyed the confidence of the moderate Liberal statesmen then in power (Prince Lvov, Mr. Miljukov, etc.), as well as of Mr. Kerenski, was appointed its President. The fifteen departments into which this Commission is divided are occupied with different technical problems (finance, Church affairs, war damages, refugees, prisoners, etc.), whilst problems of general policy have been left to the President

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himself. The President has to unite in his person several different functions. He is a kind of trustee for the new Kingdom of Poland, and in a way, therefore, its ambassador in Russia. He has to look after the interests of those Poles who are, and will remain, in Russia, *i.e.*, those scattered in Lithuania, the Ukraine, or the interior of Russia, and, with regard to them, he discharges temporarily the functions of official representative. His position might, in a way, be compared with that of the Secretary of Scotland, or a "Landsmannminister" in Austria—Mr. Lednicki has been accorded ministerial rank by the Cabinet of Prince Lvov. But although in the present emergency Mr. Lednicki has been entrusted by the Russian Government with work appertaining to a Polish ambassador and a Polish representative, he does not claim the status of either, nor does the Russian Government ascribe to him any such character. Polish ambassadors clearly cannot be appointed by any one except a Polish Government—and there is no regular and free Polish Government in existence; the representatives of Poland cannot be selected by a foreign Government, but have to be freely elected by the Polish nation as a whole. In order to avoid all make-believe, and the raising of claims to a representative character, which could neither be conclusively proved nor disproved, the Russian Government has openly adopted the method of nomination.

The choosing of its members, however, is to be left to the Poles themselves, and the part played by the Russian Government would hardly be greater than that of the Imperial British Parliament with regard to changes in the Canadian constitution. On 3 October (N.S.) Mr. Lednicki addressed a letter to the Polish bishops, to all the Polish members of the Liquidation Commission, and to all the existing Polish political organisations asking them to come or send representatives to a meeting to be held on 9 October, at which the question of the new Council was to be discussed. On the same day four National Democrat members of the Liquidation Commission (joined later on by a fifth) addressed to Mr. Lednicki a sharp letter, condemning his action. They accused him of having prepared the scheme without first communicating with them, they objected to the appointments being in form made by the Russian Government, and

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refusing to share in any way in Mr. Lednicki's policy, resigned their seats on the Liquidation Commission. "Please realise," they wrote in the letter to Mr. Lednicki, "that even in the worst days of political decay in Poland there has not been a case of a Pole proposing to a foreign Government to form a Council which this Government would appoint at his recommendation. If such action had been admitted, foreign Governments could have got Poles to justify their worst acts, and Poles desirous of gaining influence could always have obtained influence with the help of foreign Governments."

But how have the National Democrats formed their "National Committees"? is the question now asked by the Polish papers which are opposed to their policy. They used to do so in secrecy, under the wing of the Russian *ancien régime*. "Not so long ago, though undoubtedly at a time of 'political decay,'" writes the Petrograd *Dziennik Narodowy*, "there existed a Commission of twelve, which included the nearest political friends of the four signatories of the letter, and it had in no way a 'free mandate from the Polish nation,' but had been summoned by the Government, and not by the revolutionary Government, but by that of the Tsar." [This refers to the mixed Polish-Russian Commission appointed in August, 1915, by Mr. Goremykin and in which also Mr. Dmowski and Count Wielopolski had been appointed.] Having mentioned the so-called Citizens' Committee and the Polish National Committee, which had also been created under the Russian *ancien régime* by a National Democrat party caucus, the *Echo Polskie* of 9 October goes on to say: "Recently the same method has been applied in the case of the Polish National Committee at Paris, which is to represent the Poles towards France or towards the Western Powers in general. Who elected or who authorised Messrs. Dmowski, Piltz and their companions? . . . We do not know even now who are the members of that Committee. . . . It was selected by an individual or individuals to voice the will of the nation . . . and its position was regularised by the approval of the French Government."

On 9 October to the meeting convoked by Mr. Lednicki came the representatives of the Polish Roman Catholic clergy, Mr. Horwatt, a late member of the Russian Council of Empire

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from the Government of Kiev, Mr. Meysztowicz, a Polish member of the Duma from Lithuania, and representatives of the so-called Union of Political Parties (which is entirely under the direction of the National Democrats and was formed at their Moscow Conference), of the Party of National Work, the organisation of the Polish Conservative gentry in the Ukraine, and of the Democratic Committee, Mr. Lednicki's own party, which represents the Moderate, Liberal and Democrat elements; of the Left were present only the right wing of the Polish Socialist party, the international "Minority" Socialists not being represented. The representative of the Union of Political Parties (National Democrats) refused to take any part in the discussion, and left the room, but the representative of the Party of National Work, which, in the Conservative camp in the Ukraine, is practically equal in strength to the National Democrats, declared that although his party is affiliated to the Union of Political Parties, he will continue to participate in the discussions and resolutions.

Meantime the National Democrat press is developing a furious campaign against Mr. Lednicki, throwing at him all kinds of accusations, and describing him as a man with whom no common action is possible. Their opponents, on the other hand, suggest that the National Democrats are furious because they insist on having everything to themselves, and do not wish to admit the other political parties, the Centre or the Left. They have regularly frustrated all attempts at a real consolidation of Polish political parties, and will continue to do so.

Their latest action seems to create a serious and difficult position. It is clear to any one who observes the attitude of the Russian Government to Polish matters that although it naturally does not sympathise with the National Democrats, who were closely associated with the *ancien régime*, and are now trying to force on Russia schemes which the Russian Government absolutely refuses to entertain (*e.g.*, the scheme of the Polish army), the Russian Government wishes to deal out even justice between the different Polish parties, and not to support any sectional interest. It desires to bring about a consolidation of all the Polish parties which oppose Germany and work for Polish independence.

Baron Sonnino and the Papal Note

On 21 October Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, delivered an important speech in the Chamber. At the very outset he emphasised the importance of political unity, with significant references to party manœuvres, "which might compromise the supreme aims for which our country entered the war. The entire nation," he went on, "has approved of the war and sustains it with spirit, without distinction of class or party. The entire nation, represented by the Government with the aid of Parliament, will have to make peace. Every separate party action, in accord with enemy elements, must be prevented."

Baron Sonnino announced that at the Conferences held in Paris and London in the summer it had been decided that during the war France, Britain and Italy should maintain a naval and military base at Corfu, the island remaining under Greek sovereignty; that the Allies should evacuate Old Greece (Thessaly and Epirus), but that Italy should provisionally hold the road from Santi Quaranta to Monastir.

He then turned to a consideration of the Papal Note "in which with the high authority of his spiritual mission, the Pope solemnly reaffirms the benefits of peace and announces the general measures to be taken after the war by the concert of the nations, with a view to preventing a repetition of this vast conflict. On this more general ground we cannot but agree with the Pope's authoritative words: but when we turn to examine the Note from the practical side of peace conditions, we are met with that same vagueness (*indeterminatezza*) which characterises the communications of the enemy and which renders impossible and useless any exchange of views. The last speeches of the Chancellor, of the German Foreign Minister, and of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister surely ought to put an end to every one's illusions. No practical basis of discussion has been offered us either by the Papal Note or by those speeches, as regards conditions of future peace. . . . In order to set useful negotiations on foot it is not enough for one or other belligerent to express his war-aims or the conditions on which he would like to see peace. The Allies have always declared themselves ready, as is their duty, to examine and discuss between them any peace proposal seriously put forward by the enemy: but that certainly does not mean entering into negotiations on such proposals, when they are not sufficiently serious in character or are such as . . . do not offer even a distant probability of any practical solution. . . . If the Central Powers seek to (negotiate) . . . without being committed to any precise scheme of conditions such as might serve as a basis, it is merely because they are speculating on the results of the slackening of nerve and effort ('*sfibramento e rilasciamento*') which the news of negotiations would produce in the mind of our populations, by creating the false illusion of an impending end to hostilities.

"Once the Central Empires had reached negotiations . . . they count upon attaining two results—first, to create dissensions among

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the Allies by making the main concessions offered to one Power depend upon the curtailment of the aspirations of the other . . . ; secondly, to kindle vain illusions among populations thirsting for peace, so that the Allied democratic Governments might find themselves forced to accept even the harshest conditions owing to the difficulty of restoring public opinion in their respective countries to the pitch necessary for a vigorous resumption of hostilities. (Prolonged applause.) What is not sufficiently borne in mind by all those who are inspired solely by humanitarian sentiments or by *the mere desire to use the cry for peace as a weapon of war* . . . is that any public proposal of peaceful mediation, if put forward at an inopportune moment, is more apt to hinder than to promote a *rapprochement* between the belligerents. (Loud applause from all except the extreme Left.)

"In the Papal Note there is distinct reference to the questions: (1) general disarmament and obligatory arbitration between the nations; (2) freedom of the seas; (3) the ruling-out of material reparation and war indemnities, except in certain cases; (4) evacuation of occupied territories; (5) examination, in a conciliatory spirit and possibly with regard to the aspirations of the peoples, of the special territorial questions in dispute between the Powers. The two questions of disarmament and arbitration are closely intertwined because it would be all the easier to obtain general consent to disarmament, the better the defence of each one was guarded against the surprises of others. For both there already exists the theoretical agreement of all the belligerents, in their answers to the first message of President Wilson. The difficulty is to find a means of translating into practice such desires, in order actively to substitute, in the words of the Pope, "the moral force of law for the material force of arms." Cardinal Gasparri, in his Note of 28 September to the British Government, proposes the general abolition of compulsory conscription. I do not wish to discuss this in detail; but it seems to me not easy of attainment either to-day or to-morrow. . . . As for the freedom and common possession (*comunanza*) of the seas—in time of peace no one challenges it, in time of war it is difficult to enforce it. The Central Powers accept it in theory, but their reply in practice you have had in the method repeatedly recommended with impunity to his own Government, as the most natural thing in the world, by the German Minister in Buenos Aires, while all the time he was pledging that Government's word to full respect of the immunity of Argentine ships. . . .

THE RIGHTS OF BELGIUM.

" 'Reciprocal condonation of losses and war indemnities, save for certain exceptions in special districts.' These exceptions, the Cardinal Secretary has explained, include the case of Belgium. Allow me to observe that the question of Belgium deserved to be treated separately and explicitly in the Papal Note, and not to be included tacitly among possible exceptions, and then merely mentioned as one among so many examples in the question of evacuating

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occupied territory. But even leaving aside Belgium, it seems clear that when invoking the rule of the moral force of right we must necessarily distinguish the question of so-called war indemnities and inevitable losses from that of the reparation of losses committed against all the rules and conventions of the Law of Nations.

“ ‘Reciprocal restitution of occupied territory.’ Here the Papal Note quotes the complete evacuation of Belgium with a guarantee of its full political, military, and economic independence as against any Power whatever—a *phrase suggestive of German inspiration, as if it were desired to excuse or tone down the guilt of the original invasion. The invasion of Belgium . . . has thrown back for centuries the whole Law of Nations*, by depriving the plighted word of every value as a guarantee, and thus rendering absolutely vain all methods hitherto devised for the preservation of peace. . . . It turns us back to the savage and prehistoric era of mankind. There is no longer any guarantee beyond the pledge of possession. . . . *Not hat kein Gebot*, proclaimed Bethmann Hollweg in the Reichstag. Hence plighted faith has no value as against the advantage of the moment. Necessity has no laws, for necessity means one’s own advantage and the satisfaction of one’s own desires. To compare the Belgian question to that of any other loss in a war lawfully and loyally conducted is to give a solemn sanction to this new right of violence and arrogance.

THE MORAL ISSUE.

“ *Belgium occupies . . . a situation different from that of other States*, and therefore deserves special treatment. In the case of Belgium it is not a question of territories occupied as the result of the vicissitudes of a war honestly fought out according to the fundamental laws of war which even the most savage populations recognise. . . . In the case of Belgium there has been an open, specific, flagrant, and scandalous violation of every law of war and peace, of all the most elementary and fundamental principles not only of international law, but of good faith between men, of respect for a word of honour solemnly and freely given. Hence to put the Belgian question merely side by side with the restoration and exchange of other occupied territories is to tamper with the true facts. . . . It would in reality be claiming for the future, by a solemn historical precedent, the full justification of any violent or fraudulent occupation of neutral territory, even if previously guaranteed by the invader himself, when such occupation might prove advantageous to him as a pledge for recovering, at the end of the war, other territories of his own of which the enemy had gained possession.

RESTITUTION.

“ If we turn to the definite proposal of reciprocal restitution of occupied territories, I may point out that in the Papal Note there is no reservation as to those territories on which the questions between one Power and another specially turn; for these the Pope expresses the hope that they may be examined ‘in a conciliatory spirit, taking account, so far as is just and possible, of the aspirations of the peoples.’

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The invitation thus formulated undoubtedly forms the most important and original portion, the most luminous point of the Papal Note, though it does not provide any possible or practical basis for initiating negotiations. In any case to this invitation to consider the aspirations of the peoples the Central Powers have given a categorical answer—Czernin in his speech of 3 October, and Kühlmann in the Reichstag on 9 October; and the reply alike for territories claimed by Italy as Italian and with regard to Alsace-Lorraine for France is summed up in the word 'never.'

ESSENTIAL AIMS.

"To sum up, all want peace. For a peace which would not be a mere truce, we are disposed, always in full accord with our Allies, to examine any serious proposal from whatever side, laying completely aside any spirit of revenge and rancour, as also of imperialistic claims. But there are certain essential points on which there can be no bargaining. We cannot throw over the supreme ends for which we entered the war and for which we have asked so many sacrifices from the nation—the *liberation of our brothers and security for our independence*. Among our war-aims are neither the disarmament of enemy States nor changes in the internal affairs of others. The guarantees of peace must above all be found in the conditions of that peace, respecting so far as possible the aspirations of the populations, not running counter to a fair recognition of the fundamental conditions of the independent life of every State, not tending towards easy aggression against others. . . . Such peace guarantees as may be organised by a league of nations and the introduction of compulsory arbitration, will be one more addition to the normal duration of a just and reasonable peace, in so far as they serve to combat the dangers arising from ambitions and desires, from the turbid passions and unjustified designs and caprices on one side or the other. But peace, if it is to be preserved, must be such as deserves to be preserved, because it conforms to the general principles of justice, liberty, and respect for human dignity.

"*In the Papal Note we find no adequate indication of the fundamental conditions of that equitable and just peace which it invokes.* An appeal to the spirit of conciliation between the parties provides no basis for negotiation and does not even suggest grounds for transaction; and still less is it sufficient to say that the advantage of recovering peace will compensate any unrepaired wrong.

"The Allied nations entered the field for the high ideal aim of defending and re-asserting international justice which had been violated and the rights of peoples barbarously oppressed; but they are also pursuing special aims of their own which, far from being inspired by ideas of imperialism, correspond fully to the legitimate application of the general principles of international justice and the rights and liberties of the peoples.

THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM.

"France, the victim with Russia of that aggression of 1914 which has few parallels in the world's history, aims at the restitution of

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the provinces which were torn from her by violence in 1871, and Italy is fighting for the completion of her natural frontiers, for the liberation of her brethren oppressed by the foreigner and to guarantee in the Adriatic the conditions necessary to her existence and legitimate security. The Adriatic question is for Italy one of the essential aims of the war, and is outside all discussion alike for us and our Allies. *There is nothing imperialistic in our claims.* I will not dilate upon our intolerable situation as the result of the artificial Adriatic position before the war. The difference in the conformation of the coasts of that sea produces in practice grave consequences of a strategic nature. From the ethnical point of view it is now well enough known that *our claims* are inspired by essentially conciliatory ideas, and *fully respect the political and economic needs of the Slav peoples*; and this is only natural, since it is a matter of territories whose population is mixed. Despite the high economic, historical, and political value of the pure Italian centres on the opposite coast, our programme is specially inspired by the need of mutual sacrifices and concessions, and aims at establishing a state of things such as will permit in the future the most intimate, cordial, and friendly collaboration of our race with the Slavs who border upon it.

THE NEAR EAST.

“As for the Near East, Italy, owing to her own geographical situation cannot possibly divest herself of interest (*disinteressarsi*) in Mediterranean conditions. Thus both for political reasons of independence, and with a view to guarding her interests in the field of economics and emigration, she has no absolute aspirations, but merely aspirations of balance and proportion, dependent upon the general situation resulting from the war. Italy's Mediterranean function is one of balance and constitutes, as in the past, a precious guarantee for the peace of Europe.

THE SECRET OF VICTORY.

“Consider, gentlemen, the supreme gravity of the hour. It is not a question of party, still less of hastening some special reform; it is a question of the future fate of the whole country, and every error may prove irreparable. Every ardent supporter of peace must hope that public order shall not in the least degree be disturbed under any pretext or form, and must consider how that would hinder and delay peace by regalanising the depressed war-spirit of the autocratic empires, by increasing their hopes and illusions. . . . *To-day sabotage of the war means sabotage of the peace.* . . . To demand immediate peace or peace at any cost is equivalent to invoking the worst of all peaces, a peace not merely of dishonour and opprobrium in the face of our Allies, but also one which means the complete ruin of our country, by prolonging even after the war all the most serious popular losses and sufferings. The country has put the whole force of its proud and noble spirit (*della sua anima fiera e gentile*) into this war—as a war which affirms the most sacred obligations of security and independence.

“There is only one secret of victory, there is only one way which can lead to it; it is to persevere and to resist, not only at the front

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by arms, but also in the interior of the country, by curbing one's own sufferings, limiting one's own expenditure, putting a firm brake upon passion, ambition, and impatience, overcoming privations and difficulties by the spirit which wins every battle. . . . He will conquer his enemies who best knows how to conquer himself."

Reviews

Le Dossier Diplomatique de la Question Belge: Fernand van Langenhove. (Van Oest.) 4 fr. This volume contains the full recital, in the form of a catena of official documents with notes, of the acts of the Belgian Government in defence of Belgian neutrality. It is a compact and easily-consulted work of reference which the historian of the war will find most valuable. Its more familiar portions call for little notice here; but we cannot refrain from drawing the reader's attention to the Swiss declaration of neutrality (pp. 99-100), which was almost identical with the Belgian declaration—a fact which can hardly fail to impress candid Germans if and when they have eyes to see. But even more significant is the account (given by M. de Broqueville in the debate on the Belgian Military Law of 1913) of the warning from King Charles of Roumania to his nephew King Albert in July 1912:—"I give Belgium the friendly advice to pay serious attention to her national defences; for the miracle of 1870, by which Belgium was preserved from harm from both of the belligerents, will not be renewed." In view of the Roumanian monarch's close relations with Berlin his warning has a significance which none will miss.

A. F. W.

Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw's *Main Currents of European History, 1815-1915* (Macmillan, pp. xv + 367, 7s. 6d. net), may shortly be described as a study in perspective. It is a very interesting panorama of Europe in the 19th century, with the leading *motifs* thrown into strong relief. The book consists of a series of lectures originally delivered to audiences of teachers. The value of a saner and truer outlook in the teaching of history than the one commonly associated with our schools can hardly be over-estimated, and Mr. Hearnshaw's clear lead cannot fail to do an immense amount of good. Although his "currents" are often and necessarily submerged in the mass of events which together formed the 19th century, yet he succeeds in clearly showing that the main forces at work were the principles of nationality and democracy, and that the end to which they were tending was the establishment of a lawful, pacific Commonwealth of Europe. Those forces, and the ideal with which they are bound up, are now face to face with their great enemy, militarism, in its strongest form. Their complete vindication is indispensable for the peace of Europe, and one of the keys to their vindication, upon which Mr. Hearnshaw rightly insists, lies in South-Eastern Europe. Those who still doubt the necessity of a radical reconstruction in those parts of Europe where the principle of nationality has been consistently flouted, will do well to study the warnings inherent in the whole history of the last century.

G. G.

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A "Peace" Telegram from Bulgaria

The following telegram, a copy of which we have received from an unimpeachable source, was lately sent by the Bulgarian Government to the Bulgarian Minister at Berne:—"The Council of Ministers has approved your project; it would be a useful thing if you could circulate in the French-Swiss press, in a disguised form, articles relating to our national aspirations, with a view to propagating in the countries of the Entente a true sense of the part we are playing in the war. We have entrusted Dr. Stoyanov with an important mission in Switzerland, and have credited to the branch of the Deutsche Bank a sum of 200,000 francs, which is at your disposal from this moment. We beg of Milev [editor of the *Echo de Bulgarie*; see NEW EUROPE, No. 54.—EDITOR] to study the question of the *intransigence* of the French-Swiss Press, and of the possible means of making an impression upon it. Bunev] Burov?—EDITOR] and Tsanov will be able to give you effective help along with Kostov. Signed ZLATANOV, Secretary-General."

We need not labour the significance of this revelation that Mr. Tsanov, the reputed advocate of the anti-German Opposition in Bulgaria, is being financed by the Government itself through a German channel.

The Austrian Slavs and the Church

The legend that religious differences are an obstacle to Yugoslav unity and concord dies hard, and it is therefore well to place on record the public adhesion of the Catholic Bishop of Laibach and the Prince-Bishop of Lavant and many of the high Slovene clergy to the programme of Yugoslav Unity, as announced on 30 May. The alarm caused by this step is reflected in a speech delivered on 19 October in the Austrian Parliament by the German National deputy, Herr Marckhl. "High Slovene ecclesiastics," he declared, "with all their followers, have attached themselves to the struggle which is being quite openly waged against Germanism in the South and against the State itself." A special feature of "this regrettable and dangerous" movement, he added, lies in the fact "that the higher and lower Slovene clergy acts in favour of the Orthodox Serb element and ignores the feeling of its German co-religionists."

During the same debate, Father Korošec, the Slovene leader, gave fresh expression to his nation's "deepest distrust" towards the Austrian Government, "which does not understand the momentous importance of the Southern Slavs for the Monarchy's Adriatic and Balkan position. It is hostile to the Southern Slav problem; and yet, if this problem is not placed on a right footing in good time, it will be taken in hand before a forum outside the Monarchy, and this cannot be in the interest either of the Monarchy or of the dynasty." Even the most sceptical could hardly demand plainer speaking than this.

The Catholic Church has always played an honourable part in the national movement among the Yugoslavs, and the great Bishop Strossmayer was but the most eminent of the many patriots whom the hierarchy has produced. The recent tendency on the part of

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the Vatican to throw in its lot with the dynasty rather than the peoples, would, if persisted in, produce a deplorable effect among the Catholic Slavs. In this connection nothing could be more significant than the speech of the Czech deputy, Father Zairadnik, a prominent member of the Praemonstratensian Order, who openly criticised the Pope for not mentioning the Czechs, but declared that they would survive this, and that they would have one person fewer to be grateful to afterwards!

"Lest we Forget"

Too much is being made in certain sections of the press of an alleged remark by Mr. Kerenski regarding Russia's exhaustion. In point of fact, as is announced from an authoritative French quarter, Russia, with the effective help of the Roumanians, is still holding 115 enemy divisions on her front. "Let those who are tempted" (we quote from the *Evening Standard* of 3 November) "to repeat the mischievous assertion that 'Russia is practically out of the war,' realise what 115 divisions mean. At the Continental rate of 12,000 men per division, it means that 1,380,000 of our enemies are still diverted by Russia and Roumania from the Western front, the Italian front and the Balkans. . . . A legitimate feeling of pride on the rôle we are playing should not blind us to the achievements of our Russian Allies in the past and to the possibilities of the future on their front. We should never forget that the victory on the Marne, which sealed the doom of Germany in the West, was, to a very large extent, rendered possible by General Rennenkampf's great raid into Eastern Prussia."

Mr. Perris, the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent with the French armies, has been allowed to state that the number of German divisions engaged upon the Western front are 149, as against 83 German and 32 Austrian on the Eastern front, and 44 Austrian on the Italian front. These figures ought to make loose talk about Russia's "desertion" of the common cause impossible.

Meanwhile, though the number of German divisions engaged against Italy is (quite rightly) not known outside military circles, a deliberate attempt is being made in certain sections of the press to represent their number as almost negligible. Surely it is out of all order that those who are always declaiming about the interference of the politicians in strategy, should themselves persist in misrepresenting military facts for political reasons. When shall we learn the lesson that, for good or for bad, strategy and politics are inseparable, and that the Allies will not win the war unless they can harmonise them? As *The Times* reminds us in a notable article (5 November) "the intimate association of our political and military forces" is "more than ever of vital importance. . . . Every attempt to pit 'the soldiers' against 'the politicians,' lest the latter should interfere, or the former be distracted. . . . is, in effect, to reduce the sum total of help which we can bring to our Allies in Europe. The province of the specialist is plainly defined, and must be rigorously guarded against amateur strategists. It is one of the functions of the statesman, not always too plainly fulfilled, to see that that protection

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is always forthcoming. But the notion that a Government has no other function, that its business is merely to keep the ring while the soldiers fight it out, is the kind of imbecility which would be almost inconceivable if it were not so constantly expressed."

A Warning for the Balkan Front

In a letter to *The Times* of last Saturday Dr. Ronald M. Burrows sounded a timely warning, which it is to be hoped will be taken seriously to heart by the War Cabinet. "I learn on the best authority," he said, "that the friends of the ex-King Constantine are confident that within a few months they will be carried back to Greece on the crest of a German-Bulgarian offensive. Constantine has been definitely informed by a high German official at Berne that arrangements are already made for a concentration in force at Bucarest, that von Mackensen is to be in supreme command, and that success is regarded as certain. To use the actual words of the German personage—'The offensive will take place a month before the completion of the Greek mobilisation.' . . ." In support of the possibility of such an offensive, Dr. Burrows adduces the fact that "In the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for October, Delbrück has been explaining that Hindenberg has reverted to the policy of Frederick the Great, who, when forced by circumstances to resort with his main forces to a strategy of exhaustion, revived the confidence of his people by quick and crushing blows against detached enemy forces."

"There is still time," he concludes, "to prevent the possibility of such a disaster. Are we with the utmost speed arming and equipping the forces of Venizelos? Are we counteracting the intrigues of his enemies by importing into Greece even more than a bare minimum of food? Are we taking precautions here and now that the Allied forces on the Salonica front hold an absolutely impregnable defensive position?"

German Bait for Russia

The following extract from an article by Herr Hans Vorst in the *Neue Freie Presse* of 23 October on "Russia and Peace" is interesting as showing the arguments which German propagandists would fain bring home to their would-be dupes in Russia:—

"If it be asked how Russia could win back her lost influence upon the shaping of world policy and make a serious effort to hasten peace, then there is but one answer. Russia must, in spite of all objections to such a course, abandon her policy of unconditional alliance and instead of general phrases must declare clearly and in detail, for what she is determined to fight on and for what not. In other words, Russia must keep open the possibility of separating from her allies under certain definite conditions—namely, in the event of an agreement upon war aims being attainable between Russia and the Central Powers, and an agreement between Russia and her allies *not* being attainable. Only by such a step, violent as it is, can Russia, which is fighting for the self-determination of the nations, win back her own self-determination: only thus can she once more throw her whole weight into the scales with friend and foe in the sense of her democratic peace aims. . . ."

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Painlevé, Barthou and L'Union Sacrée

When M. Albert Thomas refused to join the Painlevé Cabinet France entered upon a new phase of war-politics. Hitherto L'Union Sacrée had governed all political action in the sense that unity of front is the most essential of all civilian sinews of war. As long as we remained on the defensive in the field it was idle for responsible statesmen to talk of constructive war-aims in any detail. Politics had but one face: *face à l'ennemi*. Nothing but the emphatic reiteration of our resolve to defeat the enemy could be made. But as the military balance slowly tilted in our favour the common people began everywhere to ask: "What are we going to do when we've won?" Out of this question Stockholm arose; and with Stockholm a great array of speeches, notes, enemy-whispers, and offers of separate peace. It was clearly to the enemy's advantage to make his offers—now to France, now to Russia—before the Entente as a whole had reduced the general phrases of its declarations to specific and detailed terms. The enemy has made his offers and has failed to break the unity of our alliance; but we must not flatter ourselves with the delusion that his failure is permanent or that his efforts can be ignored unless we put ourselves in a posture to meet them. We must take steps to forestall his next peace offensive by removing all ambiguities and equivocations from our own policy. The existence of such ambiguities is proved by the debate in the French Chamber on 25 October, and by the form in which Lord Courtney put his open letter to Herr von Kühlmann (*Manchester Guardian*, 1 November). The fact that it was possible for the French Prime Minister and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to use widely divergent descriptions of French war-aims shows how the political truce, which was a vital factor in national defence for the first three years of war, is now becoming the prolific parent of equivocations. The fact is that nothing but prevarication can conceal the gulf that lies between the Right and the Left in France—as in other belligerent countries—on the question of essential war-aims. All are agreed about the future of Belgium; but even on a question so vital to France as Alsace-Lorraine there are conflicting opinions; and when we come to the economic policy of the future or the place of Germany in the world's comity after the war, we come to open rupture between, say, Louis Barthou and Albert Thomas.

M. Mayéras put the immediate political point very neatly when he said, after M. Barthou's speech, "M. Barthou, I think M. Ribot is waiting for you at the door." The question is, "After M. Barthou has gone out, who will come in?" It is idle to ignore the fact that in France L'Union Sacrée is dead; and we hazard the prophecy that before Christmas an almost exclusively Left-Wing Government will come into power in France. The British Government will then, or before then, be compelled to take a more definite stand one way or the other.

The New Europe

“Pour la Victoire Intégrale”

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15 NOVEMBER 1917

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“They will not save the Republic with us:
it shall be saved without them—saved in
spite of them”

—Danton (1793)

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
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Lenin and Kerenski

“ Si dans ce cloaque on demure,
Si cela dure encore un jour,
Si cela dure encore une heure,
Je brise clarion et tambour,
Je flétris ces pusillanimes. . . .
Et je déclare que ces lièvres
Ne sont pas vos fils, ô lions ! ”

THE voice of that dauntless revolutionary, Victor Hugo, rings in our ears as we read the latest news from Petrograd. And yet we can no more despair of Russia and her Revolution than the exiled poet, despite many a cry of rage and anguish, despaired of immortal France.

For the moment Lenin and his followers have gained a precarious control of the Russian capital, but we believe that this time Russia will have learnt her lesson. A persistent refusal to govern produces similar results, whether it be in Dublin during Holy Week of 1916 or in Petrograd in November of 1917. Our admiration for Mr. Kerenski's signal services to the cause of Russian liberty only deepens our regret that he has shown an undue preference for compromise when action was imperatively needed. But his work is not lost. The new Russia, which owes so much to him, will not throw away the great prize of liberty. The Bolševiks are not the true representatives of our Eastern Ally, and their day of power will be short. For us a Bolševik Government is something inconceivable; it is, in fact, a contradiction in terms, and, in any event, we can have no truck with it. If the impossible should happen, and the Leninists retained their grasp upon power, we should favour a refusal to recognise them and their acts and should be ready to continue the war without them. For one thing only are we grateful to them—that they have at last come out in their true colours as men of diseased outlook and impossible ideals.

In the rising of last July the Bolševiks had almost all the armoured cars and machine guns of Petrograd in their hands, and yet they failed to maintain themselves. Their incompetence was only surpassed by their cowardice; and there are authentic cases of armed cars being stopped and

LENIN AND KERENSKI

disarmed by unarmed convalescents. "Pour prendre cent canons vomissant la mitraille il suffit d'un baton!"

Not many weeks ago a wounded Russian officer, who had lost one leg, found himself in a crowded tram in Petrograd. A private soldier entered, looked round for a seat, and, finding none empty, roughly demanded that the officer should give up his. When met with a refusal he repeated his demand, ignoring the fact that the other could not stand alone. He was actually about to use force, when a French officer at the back of the tram came forward, struck him three times in the face with his fist and knocked him down. It was only when the insubordinate private slunk away that his fellow passengers roused themselves to applaud his discomfiture. Russia, like the occupants of the tram, has been for some months past under the spell of an odious tyranny of words and phrases; and there are times when even a cause whose justice is self-evident stands in need of the fist of an honest man.

In July the rising faded away before the first display of armed force. Its leaders either disappeared or were thrown into prison, and healthy public opinion turned against those who had sowed disorder. Mr. Kerenski, who became the Premier of a new Coalition Government, was hailed in this country as the strong man who was to save Russia, and his words were quoted with enthusiasm both at home and abroad. Unhappily, in his idealism he soon showed that his was a "peace mind" rather a than "war mind," suited to the rough and tumble of this iron age. When all seemed at his feet, and when the moderate elements, civilian and military alike, were rallying around him, he committed the amazing mistake of releasing from prison the *saboteurs* of the Revolution. That some of the Extremist leaders have throughout been inspired by the loftiest motives is absolutely immaterial, since their whole programme is in open conflict with all the principles upon which government, even the most democratic, has hitherto rested. Worse still, these prophets of confusion have been almost from the first made the cat's paw of an unscrupulous and far-reaching propaganda directed from the Prussian General Staff, and deliberately aiming at the disintegration of Russia. We are perfectly well aware that Lenin's real name is not Zederbaum, as some of our Jingoës would have us believe, and that he comes of

LENIN AND KERENSKI

an old, pure-blooded Russian family. But even if his motives could be proved to be as pure as those of Mr. Lloyd George or President Wilson, this could not affect the essential fact that his whole influence is being exercised in a direction not merely fatal to the Grand Alliance, but to the most elementary interests of the Russian people. It is not necessary to have proofs that he has accepted money from Berlin; this may be, for all we know, a very gross libel. But nothing can alter the fact that the German Government and Staff did everything to facilitate and encourage his journey through Germany, and that their calculations have been amply justified by the profit which Germany extracted from his mischievous influence.

To-day Russia stands once more where she stood when interested parties drove a wedge between Kerenski and the Moderates—but with this fatal difference, that the Ship of State is nearer the rocks and the need of a strong helmsman is infinitely greater. For some time past the Bolševiks have been attacking Kerenski as a new Napoleon, and parading the lifeless bogey of the counter-Revolution as though the *régime* which collapsed by reason of internal rottenness were not as dead as anything that this earth has ever seen. To-day it is abundantly clear that Kerenski is no Napoleon, but an eloquent man of high ideals detached from reality, too steeped in the Russian vice of compromise, too unfamiliar with organisation or administrative detail to save his country at her hour of need. So long as Kerenski and Kornilov, with the strong figure of Savinkov in the background, were prepared to act in close concert all might have gone well. Unfortunately, indecision on the side of the statesman and political ignorance on the side of the general produced confusion, and within a few weeks of the July rising the two men stood out with rival prescriptions for the recovery of Russia.

The fatal breach between them became more and more inevitable; though postponed for a time after the Moscow Conference, it finally occurred in September, and nothing but a miracle saved the country from civil war. The full details of the Kerenski-Kornilov incident have not yet been published; but whatever the truth may be, there is little doubt that it was essentially due to a misunderstanding. Rival factions, according to their bias, may lay the blame upon

LENIN AND KERENSKI

one man or the other; but the truth is that both are undoubted patriots, and that their difference of outlook was above all a matter of temperament. Both felt acutely the sufferings of their country; both felt the imperative need for unity and order. But the one, in his eagerness for unity, forgot that it is impossible to reconcile contradictions, while the other, in his anxiety to restore order, may possibly have neglected the susceptibilities of some of the Extremists. In a word, Kerenski and Kornilov represented two aspects of the Russian character which are always hard to reconcile. To western observers Russia has always appeared a country of extremes. The Empire founded by Peter the Great had spread rapidly throughout Asia and South-eastern Europe, and the Russian danger haunted the minds of our fathers and grandfathers. The daring of the Cossack cavalry had spread terror among those who faced them in the battlefield, and tales of plunder and rapine had pictured the Russian peasant as a ruthless barbarian. A very different picture had been revealed by Russia's great writers and thinkers. Tolstoi and Dostojevski opened to the West a new world of the spirit, a world whose religion was that of suffering humanity. The pages of Dostojevski breathe an infinite compassion for all men. "Every one of us have sinned against all men, and I more than any; every one is responsible to all men, for all men, and for everything." It may be that to-day the Russian Extremists are merely acting upon this charmingly impossible creed.

Kerenski and Kornilov are typical of these two sides of the Russian character. Kerenski's strength lies in his power to inspire men's hearts. Kornilov's in his capacity to convert impulse into action. If Kerenski has failed, it is by inability to seize the moment for action, while Kornilov's impatience led him to strike too soon. If Russia is to find salvation these two spirits must henceforth act together.

The Bolševiks we decline to recognise, not merely because they represent ideals with which we have no sympathy, but, above all, because they represent neither Russia nor the Revolution. The cause of the Russian people is our cause; the ideals of liberty and self-government for which the new Russia stands are our ideals; and it is for this reason that we repudiate those whose diseased fancy bids them proclaim nightmares as realities.

The Korakas Forgery

[We take this opportunity of extending to Mr. Venizelos, who arrived in London on Tuesday, our most heartfelt and grateful welcome.—EDITOR.]

THE month of December, 1916, marked the zenith of German propaganda in Greece. The Entente Powers had been humiliated, and it was still doubtful whether they would be able to agree on any effective reply. The Venizelist papers had been suppressed, and their printing offices wrecked. There was a free field for moulding public opinion, and the Royalist press took advantage of it.

What was perhaps the most successful feature in their campaign was the publication of a letter alleged to have been despatched to Athens on 7 November by Venizelos to General Korakas, a member of the Liberal party who had not yet joined the Provisional Government at Salonica. On 8 December the *Néa Heméra* (*Néa 'Hméra*), the most responsible Royalist daily, published a transcript of the letter, and followed it up on 9 December with a photographed facsimile. The purport of the letter was to encourage Korakas and the other leaders of the party who were still at Athens, and to assure them that the Entente had definitely decided to bring Venizelos back to Athens without delay and forcibly to re-instate him in power. The Entente Powers were thus made accomplices in the "Venizelist plot," which the Royalists alleged they had suppressed on 2 December. It was natural that this aspect of the case should appear to our representatives at Athens to be important, but the form in which they published their disclaimer was a grave error of judgment. Without waiting to communicate by cable with Salonica, they sent to the Greek press the following *communiqué*, which the *Néa Heméra* published in its issue of 12 December, accepting it with delight as a tacit acknowledgment of the genuineness of the letter, and assuring the Entente Powers of its confidence that Venizelos had lied when he claimed their complicity.

"The Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia," it ran, "have taken cognizance of documents published in the press under the heading 'Letter of Venizelos to General Korakas.' They are unaware, and have no means of ascertaining, whether this document is authentic, but for every eventuality, and in order to enlighten public

THE KORAKAS FORGERY

opinion on a most delicate point, they consider it necessary to state that, however much they may have desired to see Venizelos, the sincere and tried friend of the Entente, return to power by the lawful path of the verdict of the people, nevertheless since Venizelos left Athens they have never, either on their own initiative or by order of their Governments, done anything with a view to facilitate an attempt to bring him back to the capital and impose him on the Greek people."

Only a day later Sir Francis Elliot, having received from Venizelos a denial of the genuineness of the letter, sent the cable to the official Press Bureau, with a request that it should be published. Any impression, however, which this action might have made, was discounted by the Ministers' previous statement that they had "no means of ascertaining whether this statement is authentic." The *Néa Heméra*, when publishing Sir Francis's *démenti* on 14 December, appended to it a note saying that, naturally, no one expected Venizelos "himself to authenticate his criminal letter," but that the British Minister really ought to be more careful and less credulous. On the same page it published a totally false account of General Korakas's depositions before the examining magistrate, and actually printed, as a headline across the page over both items, "General Korakas confesses that the letter is genuine."

This attitude was maintained to the end in Royalist circles, and not only by the *Néa Heméra*. The letter was translated into English, French and Italian, published in pamphlet form along with the Greek facsimile, and officially distributed to the Royalist Legations abroad. In the only conversation which Sir Francis Elliot had with King Constantine after the events of 1 and 2 December (letter to me of date 19 July, 1917), the King maintained the genuineness of the letter. Nor were the Royalists alone in their belief. Many simple or faint-hearted Venizelists, even some English residents in Athens, were overawed by the circumstantial character of the whole business, the imposing publication of the facsimile and the want of any external support for the *démenti*. As late as 26 February, 1917, the leading Clerical paper in Italy, the *Corriere d'Italia*, quoted the letter as genuine.

Now that Venizelos has returned to power it may be thought that the question is no longer a burning one. It remains, however, that it has not been convincingly settled,

THE KORAKAS FORGERY

and may take shape again at the first revival of German propaganda in Greece. Apart from general historical interest, the question as to whether the letter is a forgery is important, first, because Venizelos has asserted it to be one, and his honour is therefore at stake; secondly, because if it were genuine, it would alter our conception of his methods of political action. The letter advocates a policy of ruthlessness to individual opponents, if not of actual assassination. "It is indispensable," it says, "that at the right moment all designated persons be put out of the way (*ἐκμηδενισθῶσι*, annihilated), whoever they are."

In the present article it is proposed to contest the genuineness of the Korakas letter from the standpoint of internal evidence. I have had the advantage of discussing the matter, not only with Mr. Gennadius and other representatives of the present Greek Government, but with Sir Francis Elliot and various members of the staff of the British Legation at Athens. If, however, I claim, as I do claim, that my arguments for the letter being a forgery amount to absolute proof, I rely mainly on my own study of the facsimile, and on the comparisons I can draw between it and genuine letters of Venizelos written at about the same time. The chief of these is a long letter of 32 pages written to myself in Venizelos's own hand. This letter was begun on 30 November, 1916, and 30 pages of it were finished and signed before Venizelos heard of the events of 1 December. The last two pages are a postscript, written on 3 December, and refer to the events of 1 and 2 December. The whole letter was despatched to me several days before the publication of the Korakas letter. What puts this beyond doubt is that it was despatched before Mr. Gennadius announced, on 4 December, that, as a protest against the outrages of 1 and 2 December, he had resigned his position as the diplomatic representative of King Constantine's Government in Great Britain. It was only then that Mr. Gennadius became eligible to represent the Provisional Government of Salonica. One of the objects of Venizelos' letter was to ask me to act, if the British Government would allow it, as his representative in Great Britain. This was the reason why he did me the honour of writing to me at such length with his own hand on the political situation. As soon as so eminent a Greek diplomatist as Mr. Gennadius was free to take the

THE KORAKAS FORGERY

position, this idea of having recourse to a British subject was naturally at once abandoned, and the matter was quickly settled by an exchange of cables before the letter reached me. It cannot possibly, therefore, be objected that this letter to me might have been written after the event, with an eye to its being used as evidence against the genuineness of the Korakas letter.

For subject-matter, style and handwriting I have been able to supplement my letter by the facsimile of an eight-page letter written to Mr. Raktivan by Venizelos with his own hand on 8 November, the very day after that on which the Korakas letter was supposed to have been written. These two letters will be referred to as "B. Nov. 30" and "R. Nov. 8." I have also been able to use several earlier autograph letters of Venizelos written to myself, and one to Mr. Stavridi. On the matter of handwriting, I have received the advice and suggestions of Mr. G. F. Gurrin, the well-known expert. On the accompanying plate are reproduced photographs of four lines of the Korakas letter and six lines of genuine letters, together with the signature of the Korakas letter and four genuine signatures.

The following is the evidence, arranged in approximately inverse order to its cogency. The plate illustrates points 4, 10 and 11*a, b, c*.

1. The subject-matter of the letter is inconsistent, not only with that of B. Nov. 30, but with that of R. Nov. 8. In neither, for instance, is there a hint or suggestion, that Venizelos either expected, or wished, to be brought back forcibly by the Entente to Athens. It cannot be urged that to Korakas alone Venizelos told the truth. B. Nov. 30 is more private in character than the Korakas letter, and R. Nov. 8 is as private. A *coup d'état* at Athens was, in fact, not Venizelos's policy. To his own party he laid emphasis on the anti-Bulgarian character of the movement. The nation was to learn that the Provisional Government was safeguarding its honour, and meeting the obligations to Serbia which Constantine had repudiated. It was this object-lesson that was to convert Athens, not the bayonets of the Entente. On the Entente he urged that the movement should be allowed to spread unhindered, so that the Government of Athens should become more and more isolated, and finally be driven to ask for reunion.

THE KORAKAS FORGERY

2. Korakas from first to last denied that he had ever received the letter, nor was there any attempt to prove that he had received it. Indeed, the *Néa Heméra* of 14 December, when falsely claiming that Korakas had confessed that the letter seemed to him genuine, put into his mouth the suggestion that other Venizelist agents had prevented the letter from reaching its destination. This, improbable as it was, was apparently the best explanation that the Royalists could offer. It is needless to say that Korakas denies having said anything of the sort.

3. The large quarto paper (10 inches by 8) used shows on the facsimile no sign of folding. It is improbable that a letter meant to contain a private message, and liable to interception, should be sent unfolded in the huge envelope thus required.

4. There is no precedent for Venizelos using this quarto size of paper. Both B. Nov. 30 and R. Nov. 8, though long letters, are written on small octavo sheets, 6½ by 5 inches, and 5½ by 4 respectively.

5. The original of the facsimile has never been shown to any independent witness. I have been assured by Sir Francis Elliot and other members of the Legation that when the representatives of the Entente asked to see it they were put off with excuses. It was not produced in court when Korakas was brought before the Royalist examining magistrate on 10 December, though Korakas asked to see it.

6. The letter opens "*Κύριε Κόρακα.*" This is as impossible as "Mr. Maude" would be in English in a private letter from the Prime Minister or the Viceroy to a general whom he knew intimately. It is unusual, even to a stranger. "*κύριε,*" "*φίλε κύριε,*" "*φίλε κύριε Κόρακα,*" "*φίλε στρατηγέ,*" "*φίλτατε στρατηγέ,*" would answer in Greek to the series "Sir," "Dear Sir," "Dear Mr. Korakas," "Dear General," "My dear General." The latter, according to Korakas, is the form which Venizelos has used in all letters he has received from him. In the French and English versions the Royalist editors, conscious that the forger had blundered, translate "Cher Monsieur Koraka," "Dear Koraka"! Curiously enough they left "Signor Koraka" in the Italian version.

7. There is an absence of paragraphing in the letter. In its four long pages, containing altogether about 1,000 words,

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there is only one break, which coincides with the bottom of the third page. The editor of the French, English and Italian versions found it advisable to break the letter up into six paragraphs. In genuine letters Venizelos is particularly careful about paragraphing. In R. Nov. 8, with its 550 words, there are four paragraphs, in B Nov. 30, with its 2,100 words, there are twenty-four.

8. The style is wordy and obscure. The writer, wishing his document to appear long and weighty, and apparently not venturing to commit himself to details which might be proved inaccurate or inconsistent, confined himself to generalities. The letter consists of sentences like the following, which is just as pretentious and fatuous in the Greek as it is in the unfortunately literal English version: "It is not my custom to calculate on the basis of dry logic and historical fact, but rather on the sudden psychological changes, together with the law of compulsion and imposition, which is stronger than all laws, whether written, unwritten, real or hypothetical." Venizelos's style, like the man, is singularly direct and lucid. One has only to contrast his speeches or interviews, *e.g.*, Anglo-Hellenic pamphlet No. 28 and NEW EUROPE, 29 March, 1917.

9. The writer confuses the familiar "thee" with the formal "you," and in a particularly offensive way. The subscription, in two succeeding lines immediately above the signature, is "σὲ ἀσπάζομαι, ὄλως ὑμέτερος," "I greet thee, always Yours." An educated man could hardly be guilty of this.

10. In his attempt to appear deep and philosophical, the writer makes great play with abstract substantives. One of these, which he uses five times, is ἐπιβολή, "imposition," a vague word derived from ἐπιβάλλω, to impose one's wishes or one's influence on another. But in all these five passages he writes the word as ἐπιβουλή, the ordinary word for "plot," connected with ἐπιβουλεύω. It is a bad blunder, and its repetition five times over shows that it is no slip of the pen. No man so well educated as Venizelos could possibly have been guilty of it. We remember how Pigott in the famous Parnell case was largely convicted of forgery by his spelling of "hesitancy" with an "e" instead of an "a." It may be noticed that in its transcript, the *Néa Heméra* uses the word ἐπιβολή in each

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case, naturally without calling attention to the mis-spelling of the facsimile!

II. The handwriting of the letter is not that of Venizelos:—

(a) The writing is cramped and often almost illegible; the letters of each word are continuous, as, indeed, is usual in modern Greek writing. Venizelos's writing is bold and legible, and the letters are not only well formed, but remarkably detached. This characteristic is not confined to his letters to me, in which he might be thought to be taking especial pains to be easily read by a foreigner. It is as noteworthy in his letters to Mr. Raktivan and Mr. Stavridi.

(b) Even the signature (of which numberless genuine examples could be found to copy) is not well written. I have seven genuine signatures to compare (R. Nov. 8, B. Nov. 30, B. Mar. 1, S. (Stavridi) May 18, B. Dec. 22/12, B. Jan. 30/13, B. Nov. 30/14). The proper name is fairly well done, imitating the characteristic capital B, with its bold sweep and the single loop on the right of the vertical stroke. But the capitals E and K of the two Christian names Eleutherios and Kyriakos are unlike any of the seven genuine examples. In particular, the "Ελ" lacks a remarkable and invariable flourish taken back round the beginning of the word, originally, perhaps, in order that the top curve might serve as the smooth breathing. Mr. G. F. Gurrin, the handwriting expert, himself drew my attention to the want of resemblance in the "Ελ." This disposes of a theory, broached in the Venizelist *Hestia* of 29 April, 1917, that the signature, and the "always Yours" above it, may have been genuine, photographed for the purpose. This theory was advanced as an ingenious explanation of the way in which the blunder recorded above, under 9, arose. It would not, in any case, have mitigated its stupidity, as it would have been as easy to photograph the signature alone, if the forger had been capable of noticing the incongruity of the "thee" and "Yours."

(c) Individual words and letters are, without exception, unlike the genuine examples. Differences in some letters, such as λ, can be followed on the plate without explanation. Two instances will suffice for detailed analysis, one from small, and the other from capital letters. The capital B, which the writer successfully imitated (see (b) above) in

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the signature, he forgot in the rest of the letter. Capital B occurs five times in the body of the letter, and each time it is wrong, being written without the characteristic sweep, and with two loops to the right of the vertical stroke. The form of the letter used in my seven genuine signatures is the form Venizelos uses everywhere. I have eighteen examples of this, besides the seven signatures. The only example that differs is one which, in the true sense, proves the rule, where my own name is written in English script. Finally, Venizelos writes the small "χ" in two separate strokes, and practically always uses an under, or concave, curve for the first down stroke. There are no less than 127 examples of this in my genuine letters, and 3 in which both strokes are straight. There is not one upper or convex curve. In the Korakas letter there are 25 examples in which two separate strokes are used, but either one or both are upper or convex curves, and not one stroke is concave. There are 15 examples in which the letter is written in one stroke, the pen being taken round and over. No one of the 40 examples resemble any one of the 130 genuine examples

It has been sufficiently proved that the Korakas letter is a forgery, and not even a clever one.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

The Internal Crisis in Germany (II)

Ich halt' es wenigstens für reichlichen Gewinn,
Dass ich nicht Kaiser oder Kanzler bin.

GOETHE'S *Faust*.

UNDER the circumstances which I described in my last article, it is not surprising that when the Reichstag met once more in October a new crisis arose. As before, the immediate cause was the struggle of the Majority Parties against the Pangermans. The occasion was the active propaganda which was carried on, not only in the country, but also in the army and in the navy, on behalf of what is called a "German peace." The attack on the Government, which was led by one of the Majority Socialists, was very damaging; conclusive evidence was produced that a systematic campaign was being conducted which, under the avowed object of confirming the patriotism of the soldiers by explaining to them the causes and objects

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of the war, was often perverted into a direct attack upon the Parliament. Attacks on Parliamentary institutions by the more noisy school of patriots are not confined to Germany; they could easily be paralleled in this country; what was peculiar to Germany was, that the campaign was conducted with the support of the higher military authorities; it is a dangerous situation when officers and soldiers meet together, and an organised expression is given to the contempt felt by the fighting man for the civilian rulers of the country. It is but a short step from this to say that it is in the army, and the army alone, that the voice of the nation must be heard, and that, if necessary, the army will insist on obedience to its orders. In Germany the struggle of the civilian authorities against the army is carried on under peculiar difficulties. The control over the press and over public meetings in each locality is vested in the Army; the chiefs of the Army have free access to and are the constant companions of the Emperor, in whose hands the final decision on all matters rests. And in Germany the officers are predominantly chosen from that class who desire to maintain those points in the Constitution which prevent the free development of popular government and parliamentary control. In criticising the conduct of this propaganda, the members of the House were therefore ultimately fighting for the privileges and, perhaps even the existence, of the Reichstag itself.

The answer to the interpellation was made by the Minister of War, General von Stein; he spoke as a soldier; he made light of the whole thing, but he completely failed to win the support of the House. Helfferich, who had just been nominated to the new post of Vice-Chancellor, followed. He was equally unsuccessful; he was shouted down; at last he closed his speech with the words: "If you have no confidence in the men who stand at the head of the military administration and the Government of the Empire there is no object in my continuing to address you"; he turned his back on the House and sat down by the Ministers' table. The Reichstag then took a serious step; they felt deeply aggrieved that the Chancellor himself had not been present, and they referred back to the Committee the new vote of 300 millions for war supplies. It was an action which showed a new spirit of independence. This happened on a

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Saturday; matters were not ameliorated by the events of the next week. It is true that on Monday Michaelis himself addressed the Main Committee, that Helfferich made a halting apology, but in the adjourned debate in the Reichstag, which took place on Tuesday, the Government made a more serious blunder. A member of the Socialist Party, Herr Dittmann, referred to disorder which had taken place in the navy, and accused the Government of unjust treatment of the sailors. Admiral von Capelle, the Secretary for the Marine, in his answer, said:

“ It is unfortunately a sad fact that the Russian revolution has also turned the heads of a few people in our fleet and introduced revolutionary ideas among them. According to the crazy plans of these people, leaders were to be selected on board all vessels to incite all the crews in the fleet to disobedience, in order, if necessary by force, to paralyse the fleet and to enforce peace. It has been established by documents that the chief agitator explained plans here in the Reichstag building in the rooms of the Independent Social-Democratic Party to the deputies, Herren Dittmann, Haase, and Vogtherr, who approved of them. The deputies pointed out the dangers of such procedure and advised the greatest caution, but promised their full support by the supply of seditious material for the incitement of the fleet. In view of this situation it was my first duty to prevent, as far as was in my power, the promised material from being delivered to the fleet. I therefore instructed the naval authorities concerned to prevent by all means the circulation of this material. As regards subsequent occurrences in the fleet, I can make no statement here. A few unprincipled and disloyal persons who committed a severe offence have met the fate they deserved; but, nevertheless, I want to state from a public platform that the rumours which are current, and which naturally also came to my knowledge, are immensely exaggerated. The preparedness of the fleet was not in doubt a single moment, and thus it shall continue to be.”

The Admiral's statement led to a long and angry debate. It was pointed out from all sides of the House, except the extreme Right, that he had been guilty of the most reprehensible action. He had used evidence given at a court-martial in order to throw doubts on the loyalty and patriotism of members of the House, but he had done so without allowing the incriminated members to be represented at the court-martial, to hear the evidence on the basis of which they were being accused, and to submit the witnesses to cross-examination. He had postponed using this evidence until the men by whom it had been given had been shot.

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Was the evidence serious and reliable? In that case the only course open to the Government was to ask the House to waive its privileges and allow the incriminated members to be put on trial for treason; they did not do this; the only conclusion that could be drawn was, that there was no real legal evidence against them, and the Government was using this procedure in order to destroy the position of political opponents. That this was the fact is now undoubted. It became known that the whole matter had been submitted to a small committee of leaders of the parties who had been appointed to consult with the Government on foreign policy, and that they had determined that there was no evidence which could be placed before a court of law. Notwithstanding this, Michaelis associated himself with the charges made by Capelle.

The position of the Reichstag was undoubtedly a difficult one. To pass a vote of censure on the Chancellor would have been to provoke a conflict for which they did not feel themselves capable, and to endanger the future of the country. It would hardly be expected that in the middle of a war they would continue to hold up the estimates; they passed them, and at once the Reichstag was prorogued and has not yet met again. But it was clear that after this Michaelis could not again meet the House. His position was too deeply compromised. He made it worse by asking for or accepting the proffered resignation of Capelle; this looked as though he was trying to shield himself by throwing the blame on a subordinate. From this time it became certain that he must retire. The situation has been described with exceptional frankness in the *Vorwärts* :—

“It is enough to make one weep to think that we have a Chancellor like Michaelis, a Vice-Chancellor like Helfferich, a War Minister like Stein, and a Naval Secretary of State like Capelle. It is enough to make one weep that these gentlemen, after all that has happened, should still stick to their offices as if nothing had happened. It is enough to make one weep that in this most critical time of the Empire a Government should be in power which neither at home nor abroad can command or lay even claim to respect, a Government as to whose incapacity there is a general consensus of opinion, from Heydebrand to Scheidemann, from Reventlow to Ledebour, and that we cannot even tell whether or no this Government will be forced to make way for another more capable.”

At the time the Emperor was absent on a tour in the

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Balkans, where he received the hospitality of his Allies, the Tsar of Bulgaria and the Sultan of Turkey. He returned to Berlin on the 21st, and for more than a week was occupied with finding an escape out of the entanglement. It is stated that Michaelis, who probably looked upon himself as holding his office as the nominee of the military authorities, and did not feel at liberty to relinquish it without their consent, was not anxious to offer his resignation. In addition, it was not easy to find a successor. Many names were mentioned: there was none who would command the confidence both of the Reichstag and of the military. The choice eventually fell on Count Hertling. Count Hertling, who is 74 years of age, and till middle age occupied a position as teacher in the University at Bonn, had become prominent as leader of the Catholic Party; a Bavarian and a Catholic, he had also been the intermediary between the Government of Berlin and that of Vienna. He had been a strong supporter and a loyal adherent of Bethmann Hollweg, and had done much to smooth the way for him. He was a parliamentarian, but he was opposed to parliamentary government. His appointment, however, met with serious difficulty, and now there happened something for which there is no precedent in the history of the Empire. The appointment of the Chancellor, as we have seen, rests with the Emperor. Hitherto on every occasion he has made the appointment on the advice of his own intimates and then it has been announced as a *fait accompli*. Now, for the first time, it appeared that nomination by the Emperor was not sufficient; acquiescence of the parties was also necessary. For nearly a week Count Hertling, like any Minister in a parliamentary State such as England, went about interviewing and bargaining with the party leaders, and there came a time when it was announced that the negotiations had failed and he was to return to Bavaria. Then, apparently, Herr von Kühlmann, always ready, always adroit, interfered; he took up negotiations again and succeeded in framing a formula by which the party leaders agreed to withdraw their veto. A curious situation, for there can be little doubt that Kühlmann hopes and intends to be the Chancellor who will negotiate peace.

And so now we have Count Hertling as Chancellor and Prussian Minister President. The appointment was

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announced on the 400th anniversary of the day on which Luther nailed his theses to the door of the Church at Wittenberg; an ultramontane, a Bavarian, is Prime Minister of Prussia, and there is entrusted to him the arduous task of carrying through the reformation of the Prussian franchise which has been promised by the Emperor.

He starts, indeed, with doubtful prospects. Apparently all the political parties, except, perhaps, the Socialists, gave their assent to the appointment, but each now finds that the assent has been extracted from them under a misapprehension. The Conservatives were prepared to accept a man who belonged to the Right Wing of the Catholic Party, but they now fear that he is not sound on war aims. The Liberals would accept one who was himself a parliamentarian and had given his adhesion to the July Resolution, but they are now beginning to fear that he will, in reality, though less brusquely, put impediments in the way of any development of parliamentary influence. He will put them off with apparent concessions, which will be the more readily granted the less he really means them. And even the Left Wing of the Catholic Party, represented by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, though they cannot refuse their support to a Catholic Chancellor, give it with reserve. Above all, it is feared that what his appointment means is, an attempt to govern by a blue-black majority, which means a return to the old system by which the Socialists were kept out of influence. But, as the Radicals recognise, it is impossible to govern Germany during the war, and it will be equally impossible to govern it during the period of transition, when the war is over, without the co-operation of the Socialist Majority. Hertling is not the man to enforce his will on these discordant elements, and the probability is that he will fail, as everyone else must fail, who has not the courage, the strength and the resolution to stand and fall by his own principles and his own programme. It is not the time to govern a great country by a clever diplomatic political manœuvring.

What conclusion are we to draw from these events? There are some who suggest that the answer to the question with which these articles began must be in the affirmative, that the German nation have been converted, that they desire popular government and parliamentary institutions,

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and that they desire also a peace by agreement, and will put an end to that policy of aggrandisement and conquest which has called up against them an armed coalition of almost the whole world. It would be foolish to deny that there is some truth in this; there are many people in Germany to whom this would apply; if a poll were taken of the whole German nation, and they were asked for their opinion, they would perhaps subscribe to these statements. But even though this may be the case, it would be a profound blunder to suppose that at this moment there is any firm political will and purpose, and if we were to act on this view the results would probably be disastrous. There is an intellectual appreciation of the truth, but, as far as we can interpret what is going on in Germany, what is lacking is the political co-ordination, the concentration of energy which could alone give to this intellectual attitude political importance. We know of old these German Liberals—learned, doctrinaire, comfortable, argumentative—who for a century past have talked and planned and written and discussed, but the one thing in which they have consistently failed is action. We have ideas, velleities, intentions, but not will and determination. This their own organs have repeatedly pointed out. The vigour of propaganda, the initiative in action, rests not with them, but with their opponents, and their opponents are always able to appeal to that which remains and will remain the dominant cord in the heart of every German who is worthy of a moment's consideration, the instinctive feeling of patriotism and the determination that Germany shall come out of the war victorious, and that the German Fatherland shall not be diminished. The Government cannot entirely ignore the opinions of the people; they play with them, they use them so far as it may be convenient, and at this moment it is convenient to lay stress on the view that the German nation is willing to accept an agreed peace. But it is a long step from this to the transference of power and authority. The power of the German Government is based on a series of successful wars, and it can never be overthrown until the nimbus of success has been removed from it.

Something, indeed, has happened; a movement has begun; but it is as yet far from completion. The change which has taken place has been the result of the disillusion-

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ment and disappointment of the war. But the change has not gone far. After all, the men who voted the July Resolution are those who, a year before, had supported the policy of annexation, and we have evidence that even now they do not take it very seriously; the change is one, indeed, not of conviction, but of opportunity; let the prospects of the country improve, let a conclusive military success become probable, and the pendulum will swing back, and then again we shall hear of nothing but of conquests and of annexations.

But there is something further. We have seen that the Reichstag has, on two occasions, shown a desire to assert its authority, that it has interfered in the conduct of affairs and has used the liberty of speech which its members enjoy in such a way as seriously, for a moment, to cripple the Government. What they have done they may do again, and if the Government makes further blunders, they may do so with more effect. We must not suppose that the Government would, in this case, acquiesce in seeing the authority taken from their hands. What is at issue is not only the conduct of the war but the whole character of Germany after the war is over. As the years go on, and as the desire for peace grows, this occupies a larger space in the minds of men, and for us this is a matter of the first importance. Are we to have to do with a Germany such as we have known in the past: warlike, self-assertive, aiming always at supremacy, or is it to be a Germany accepting the ordinary usages and conventions of modern Europe? This is the same as if we ask whether it is to be a Germany with a popular or an autocratic government. But a reformed Germany means one in which those classes which have hitherto enjoyed a predominance will lose their privileges, in which the Prussian nobility will cease to be the all-powerful element behind the throne. Is it to be supposed that they will resign their position without a struggle? As well might we expect that the slave-owners of Virginia would surrender their peculiar institution without a struggle. And is it to be supposed that the leaders of the army will tamely stand by while Parliamentary control over the army is established? If the Reichstag presses its authority beyond a point they will meet with a resistance which will not be easy to break, a resistance which will not be stopped by legal and constitu-

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tional scruples. The ruling factors in Germany would be as little reckless in their treatment of their own countrymen as they have been of other nations. When the truth is known of what has happened in Alsace during the last three years, we shall find that their German blood and speech have been little protection to the inhabitants of the Reichsland, and the spirit of Zabern has not yet been exorcised. A hostile Reichstag would, if necessary, be treated with as little consideration as was the Parliament by Cromwell or the Chambers by the two Napoleons.

Bethmann Hollweg has failed; Michaelis has failed; Hertling is now on his trial. Much depends on his success. A country cannot be governed, above all, during a great war by a succession of transient and embarrassed phantoms. With the example of Russia before her, Germany is not going to plunge into the hazardous experiment of revolution; if civilian Chancellors prove themselves incapable of dealing with the situation, the time will come for a military Chancellor.

J. W. HEADLAM.

The Cossacks : (II) Since the Revolution

IN March, 1917, the Cossack troops in Petrograd threw in their lot with the revolutionaries. Their action was immediately endorsed by their fellow-countrymen of the Don, and the first Proclamations of the Provisional Government were read to enthusiastic crowds in Novočerkassk. The Acting Ataman of the old *régime*, Count Grabbe, was arrested together with his entourage and a Cossack Colonel was temporarily appointed Ataman.

The Provisional Government issued its first proclamation to the Don Cossacks on 21 April, assuring them that "the historic rights of the Cossacks to the land would remain inviolate." Meanwhile it sent Voronkov, a Cossack member of the Duma, to act as its commissary and to settle all disputes until the Constituent Assembly met. It was not long, however, before the bright days of the Revolution became clouded in the Don Province. Reports of disorders and the seizure of Cossacks' lands became more and more frequent in Novočerkassk, and landowners began to bring their families into the towns. It was in these cir-

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cumstances that the first Congress of the Don Voisko met at Novočerkassk on 29 April. The first and the most burning question that had to be dealt with was that of the land. So long as the Revolution was purely political in character there were no differences between Cossacks and peasants, but once it passed from the political into the social stage the differences became acute.

The land question in the territory of the Cossacks is quite different from that of other parts of Russia. In Central Russia the idea of the common ownership of land is highly developed, and since the Revolution has become an article of faith among the peasants. In the Don Province—and the Don is typical of other provinces occupied by the Cossacks—there is also common ownership of land, but it is confined to a class, and there is a clear line of demarcation between Cossack and peasant. The whole land is the property of the *voisko*—the military organisation which corresponds for administrative purposes to an ordinary Russian "Government"—and is divided by the *voisko* in three ways. Part of the land is assigned to the *stanitsa* (a group of villages), and is cultivated by small Cossack farmers, who, since they have ceased to guard the frontiers of Russia, have abandoned hunting and plundering for agriculture. The next division of the land is that set aside to recompense distinguished generals or retired soldiers. Land thus assigned to them becomes their private property, and many officers of high rank have now large estates which are spoken of as appanages. The rest of the land is known as the reserve, and it is this land which is rented to the peasants, who, in numbers, are almost equal to the Cossacks. The rent paid by the peasants yearly brings in as large a sum as 1,200,000 roubles. Under these conditions it is natural that the peasant should look upon the Revolution as primarily a means of satisfying his land-hunger—the average peasant allotment in Central Russia is from 10 to 16 dessyatins per family (27 to 43 acres), whereas the average for the Cossack is 52 dessyatins (140 acres). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Peasant Congress, which met at Novočerkassk on 31 May, should have demanded radical land reforms, though at the same time they volunteered their help for a peaceful settlement to avoid civil war between Cossacks and peasants.

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So long as the first Provisional Government remained in power the Cossacks had little to fear as regards the ownership of their lands. Their ancient rights had been guaranteed to them in the first proclamation of the Government, and they had received assurances that social reforms should await the decision of the Constituent Assembly. But with the collapse of the *bourgeois* Government and the appearance of a mainly Socialist Coalition, with Černov as Minister of Agriculture, their fears were roused. From this time dates the steadily growing conflict between the Don Province and Petrograd, which culminated at the time of the Kornilov affair and threatened to plunge Russia into civil war.

It would be unfair to describe the Cossacks' antagonism to the Socialist Government in Petrograd as merely dictated by their selfish economic interests; their growing indignation with Petrograd was due to deeper and more generous motives. It cannot be denied that the control exercised by the C.W.S.D. over the first Coalition Government did not help to counteract the growth either of insubordination in the army or anarchy in the interior provinces. The Cossacks, as the most compact and united force in Russia, resented keenly the growth of these tendencies and were prepared to act against the Government that proved itself incapable of stemming them. The growing disintegration of Russia promoted a closer unity among the Cossacks, which was shown not only at the All-Russia Cossack Congress that met in June in Petrograd, but by the support given to the decisions of the Don Voisko by the neighbouring *voiskos* of Kuban and the Terek.

It is unfortunate that the activities of the Cossacks should have been suspected and misunderstood in Petrograd, for the unity of the Cossacks was in reality the surest defence of the Revolution. Cossack support of the Revolution was made unmistakable both at Petrograd and Novočerkassk. Resolutions passed at the Cossack Congress in Petrograd spoke not only of working for a democratic republic, but of keeping in close touch with the C.W.S.D. One of the representatives of the Yaik or Ural Cossacks declared that the *bourgeois* must understand that the Cossacks would not let themselves be used against the people. They were ready, he added, to obey any orders of Kerenski. Right up till 1 July, the date of the Russian offensive, the Cossacks

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were giving their fullest support to the Provisional Government in spite of their intense dislike of Černov's land programme. On 30 June, the day on which General Kaledin was elected first Ataman of the Don Cossacks (since the right of election was taken away by Peter the Great), the Cossack Congress in Petrograd declared that "the Cossacks were ready to support the Provisional Government in its struggle with the foreign foe and with those who sow anarchy within Russia. In restoring order, the Government can rely upon the Cossacks and the Cossack regiments."

The July offensive that opened so well and ended so disastrously produced a profound impression among the Cossack *voiskos*. Kornilov's efforts to restore order were followed sympathetically, and pride was taken in the fact that the Cossack regiments knew no deserters. As the Moscow Conference approached towards the end of August preparations were made at Novočerkassk to send deputies, whose instructions should be to defend the integrity of Russia, to support a Coalition Government, to insist on the reorganisation of the army, and to protest against the socialisation of the land. Both the economic interests and the military traditions of the Cossacks were thus combined in resisting what they considered the dangerous policy of the Provisional Government. Before the disasters in Galicia the democratic forces in the Cossack Congress had made themselves felt as strongly as the Conservative, but from the time of the Moscow Conference the Conservative elements represented by General Kaledin have spoken for all the Cossacks.

Shortly before the Conference an interesting political agreement was made between the Cadets and the Cossacks, and the first open conflict between the Cossacks and the Provisional Government occurred at the Moscow Conference, where General Kaledin spoke in the name of the twelve *voiskos* Don, Kuban, Terek, Orenburg, Yaik, Astrahan, Siberia, Amur, Transbaikalia, Semirečensk, Yenisei and Ussuri. These were the first political steps taken by the Cossacks. But in this agreement with the Cadets, while claiming to stand for law and order, they had no thoughts of political reaction.

At the Moscow Conference Kaledin went even further than did Kornilov at that time, and, not content with

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deploring the conditions of the army, did not hesitate to formulate his demands on the Provisional Government. By so doing he cut right across the compromise that Kerenski was at that time striving to reach with Kornilov, and incurred a public rebuke from Kerenski. Kerenski afterwards explained to Bardizh, one of the most moderate Cossack members of the Duma, that he regretted that the Cossacks should have been represented by Kaledin, whose political opinions were those of the Right Wing. Had a representative of moderate Cossack opinion spoken at Moscow all fears of counter-revolutionary tendencies among the Cossacks would have been dispelled.

On 11 September, just after Kornilov had sent his ultimatum to Kerenski, the Petrograd papers announced that Kaledin had thrown in his lot with Kornilov, and had threatened to use the Cossacks to cut off Moscow and Petrograd from the south of Russia. Kerenski's suspicions had already been aroused by Kaledin's conduct at the Moscow Conference. There is no doubt that both Petrograd and Moscow anticipated a rising of the Cossacks, and the Provisional Government took it so seriously that it declared Kaledin a traitor and ordered his arrest. The Don Voisko Congress seems to have been taken by surprise. It denied all the stories about Kaledin or any intended rising of the Cossacks. Kaledin, it said, was travelling through the Don Province on ordinary official duties as Ataman and had made no attempt to incite the Cossacks to revolt.

The next week brought a series of misunderstandings and explanations, and even to-day it is difficult to know the whole truth. From the evidence published it appears that false news was telegraphed to Petrograd about the movements of Cossack troops in the Don. The Don Province itself is almost entirely agricultural, but on three sides is surrounded by industrial centres. On the east Tsaritsyn, a large port on the Volga, is one of the strongholds of the Bolševiks, and its C.W.S.D. is bitterly hostile to the Cossacks. Further south lies the sea-port of Rostov, to the west the coal mines of the Donets Basin. Thus the Cossacks are surrounded by hostile centres where the local C.W.S.D. are in the ascendancy. It is not impossible that false news was sent to Petrograd from one of these centres deliberately.

While Kaledin was being accused of mutiny in the Don

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Province, the Union of Cossack Voiskos in Petrograd was trying to mediate between Kerenski and Kornilov. Unfortunately, both for himself and for Russia, Kerenski refused their offers. Even after Kornilov had surrendered it was not too late to retrieve the position, and it was for Kerenski to realise that his only sure support lay with Savinkov and Alexeiev on the one hand and with the united forces of the Cossacks on the other. From the time of the Bolševik rising in July Kerenski's only open enemies were the Bolševiks. At any time both before and after the Kornilov episode both the Cadets and the Cossacks were willing to co-operate with him on conditions that were not unreasonable, and it was sheer madness to follow a middle course between the Extremists on the one hand and the Moderate parties on the other. The political alliance between the Cossacks and the Cadets had made it clear that no danger of reaction was to be feared in this quarter. The time had passed for compromise; appeals were no longer of any avail; those that were not with the Government were against it. There was but one policy for Kerenski to pursue without faltering: *Sauvons aujourd'hui la Russie, nous serons justes demain.*

RURIK.

How Austria-Hungary Treats the Jugoslavs

[It is not the custom of THE NEW EUROPE to deal with the atrocities which are so indelible a stain on the history of our unhappy times. Apart from other reasons, what has happened in Belgium and Northern France is graven for ever upon public opinion in this country, and even the most ignorant understands only too well why the Belgians and the French feel towards the Germans as they do. But meanwhile our sentimentalists, in their eagerness to create an Austrophil atmosphere, would fain represent the Slavs of Austria as unreasonable in their desire to shake off the Habsburg yoke. Why should not the Czechs and Jugoslavs in particular abandon their obscure and inconvenient claims in favour of some scheme of Home Rule inside Austria and Hungary? To those who ask this in good faith we would commend the following document—truly one of the most hideous arraignments of the war. It is the first half of a speech delivered on 19 October in the Austrian Parliament by the distinguished Dalmatian Croat poet and politician, Dr. Tresić-Pavičić, and is reproduced from the Croat newspaper *Novosti*, of Agram. Its charges have remained unanswered, and the German and Magyar press barely alludes to the speech at all. The second half has been suppressed altogether.]

“ Upon the outbreak of war a veritable tempest of destruction was let loose upon all Jugoslav patriots. . . . All the nationally

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enlightened, responsible and honest elements of the male population were arrested, interned, imprisoned, ruined, condemned to death, executed; the very young and the aged were fated to die of hunger, the remainder were terrorised, demoralised, and dishonoured. At Dubrovnik (Ragusa) alone 75 people were arrested in the course of one day. . . . For a long time past arrangements had been made to throw all the leaders of the people into prison at a given hour in order to employ them as hostages. . . .

"When, after three months' imprisonment at Maribor (Marburg), I was for the first time brought before a judge he said to me: 'I do not know what the accusation is against you, and this you will readily understand when I tell you that in Dalmatia, Istria, and Carniola alone we have arrested *more than five thousand persons.*' You can now imagine how many have been arrested in Bosnia, in Herzegovina, in Slavonia and in the south of Hungary!

"When we were embarked at Split (Spalato) by hundreds, in the company of the lowest class of criminal; when at Rieka (Fiume) we were marched to the station through such torrential rain that not a stitch remained dry upon us; when we were obliged to travel for three days and four nights *viâ* Zagreb and Budapest to Maribor in loathsome carriages, without food, without sleep, exposed to the insults of the Magyar riff-raff, and to the blows and maledictions of the infuriated Magyar soldiery . . . then many of us lost our reason through terror, and I myself saw one unhappy wretch throw himself out of the window of a train going at full speed into the darkness of the night and of death. At the end of these four sleepless nights we were put into the stables of a riding school, out of which a few days later over a hundred barrow loads of horse-dung were taken. It was on these heaps of manure that we had to lie and to sleep, almost stifled by their fumes. We also saw with our own eyes the soldiers spitting into the cauldron which contained the soup intended for us. . . . I must mention, in particular, the doctor attached to the prisons at Graz, the Imperial Councillor Dr. Hoffmann, who mercilessly taunted the miserable prisoners, being in the habit of saying that it would be far better to give poison to these traitors *who were reluctant to die a natural death.* . . . The fate of those who were imprisoned at Mostar, at Doboï and at Arad was much more horrible. Two witnesses who were at Mostar, and who later shared my fate at Marburg, have told me what happened there. They are the deputy Ivo Lupis and the publicist Domic.

"At Mostar these unfortunates slept in a cellar, on the ground, propped up one against the other, together with thieves, brigands, and gypsies. The closet pail was always full, overflowing on to the floor on which they had to move about, sleep, and eat. In this murky den the most terrifying figure was that of the gaoler, Gaspar Scholier. This man, armed with an iron rod with a crook which he dubbed '*Kronprinz,*' beat the prisoners over the head and shoulders with it until the blood ran down their faces. It is unnecessary to describe his insults, his bestial invective and his furious and Satanic shouts. It was only with money that the fury

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of this Cerberus could be appeased for the moment and his mouth shut. Among the prisoners were Rinda Radulović, editor of *Narod*, and the Orthodox priest Tichy, who later on died at Arad as the result of tortures inflicted by this wild beast. Tichy, out of the goodness of his heart, shared his ration with some of the starving prisoners, which infuriated Scholier to such a degree that he beat the priest with *Kronprinz* till he lost consciousness. Tichy died a true martyr's death.

"... The words 'hostage' and 'traitor' were synonymous. Common thieves and cut-throats were looked upon with more favour. The best-educated and most prominent men of the community were chosen as hostages, and there were few indeed of them who managed to play this part to the end and save their skins. Ordinarily they were brought up from the dungeons, on the order of some officer, into the courtyard, where each of them was put into the charge of two Moslems armed to the teeth. The officer then gave the guards half an hour's lecture, in which he enumerated the various cases in which they should kill their hostage. 'At the least noise, plunge your bayonet into his heart. If you hear a gunshot in the forest, blow his brains out. If he goes to the left, kill him, if he goes to the right cut him to pieces.' . . .

"From Mostar the remnant of these poor wretches were taken to Arad, where there were already thousands of living corpses, brought from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Symnia. All along the route the Magyar populace insulted, spat at, and stoned them. They were brought starving, naked, half-dead, driven along like cattle under blows from the butt-end of rifles, into the dungeons of this fortress, which were infested with millions of bugs and lice. As soon as they tried to sleep they were awakened by the invading vermin, which covered their bodies and their clothing.

"Although they were in subterranean passages these miserable people did not feel the cold, so closely were they packed; the air was full of a steamy vapour like that of a Turkish bath and the electric lights flickered feebly through this fog. Obligated to sleep in close rows along both sides of a very narrow tunnel they could not stretch out without kicking one another. Before long *exanthematic typhus*—'tif,' or *tunnelitis terribilis*, as the poor wretches called it with the humour of despair—began to rage. At first only three or four died a day, later on they perished in masses. When the cold weather came *they stripped the dead in order to clothe the living*. Very often the dead and the living lay side by side throughout the night. There were some who had become unconscious through fever and who died and lay hidden in the straw in some remote corner; it was only some days after that the smell of decomposition revealed their presence. The bodies were thrown into carts in heaps. Some gypsy or other placed himself at the head of the convoy, a cross in his hands and a cynical and hideous smile on his lips, while the Magyar soldiers howled exultantly round the carts as though they had taken a whole company prisoners. It was a veritable Witches' Sabbath, which filled the spectators with loathing and horror.

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"The food was uneatable; there were many who went for days without eating, as their stomachs could not retain it. . . . As a rule there was no water, but on the other hand alcohol was plentiful, as the gaoler Rosner wanted to do good business. The poor wretches drank to stupefy themselves, to forget this life of horrors and in order to exchange this vitiated atmosphere and putrid typhus-infected straw for the cold ground as soon as possible. The number of deaths at Arad is estimated at between three and four thousand. Many died soon after their liberation as the result of what they had suffered; among these I can quote the merchant Kundić of Gradiška, who gathered up just sufficient strength to reach his own house and there fall upon his bed, never to rise again. As witnesses of all these horrors I can quote the sub-prefect of the Commune of Gradiška in Bosnia, George Djurić, and the doctors Vladimir Kujundžić, Bokonjić and Jovo Malić, who also were imprisoned at Arad.

"At Doboj it was still worse. On 27 December, 1915, there arrived the first batch of Serbian and Montenegrin prisoners, accompanied by a crowd of people from Bosnia, forced to leave their homes near the frontier. Women, old men, children, had to travel in open cattle trucks, exposed to cold, rain, wind, hunger, lack of sleep. But this was nothing compared to the necessity of satisfying the calls of nature in the trucks, women under the men's eyes and *vice versa*. They were shut up in huts which had once served as a veterinary hospital, and which, infected with all kinds of horses' diseases and full of manure, had never been disinfected or cleaned out. Soon exanthematic typhus, small-pox and cholera broke out. Every kind of vermin abounded. At this moment the warders, taking pity, ordered the women to undress and took a delight in clipping off the hair from their bodies, in spite of their cries and groans. . . .

"A confidential order from the military in Sarajevo enjoined upon the warders the most drastic treatment of the prisoners, and all was done to send them as quickly as possible to the other world. The most convenient and paying method was starvation. Women with four or five children were only given one loaf every five days. . . . Often the mother was already dead when the child tried to wake her crying for bread.

"At first 15 to 20 of these people died daily. On 5 April, 1916, 92 died. The bodies were driven through the streets of Doboj in open daylight. According to reliable persons over 8,000 innocent victims met their death there.

"The autocrat of Bosnia, General Potiorek, ordered all Serbs to be removed from the frontiers of Bosnia, and his orders were carried out. The inhabitants of the village of Sirče, when they reached Mount Rudo, were forced by their guards to dig their graves and to lie down quietly, each in his own. Many women lay down with their children at their breasts. The soldiers did not shoot them all at once, but one by one. The living had to heap earth upon the dead, until their own turn came to be covered by the soldiers.

"Near Samirovac, in November 1914, soldiers, by order of their officer, killed 16 notables and also the priest Trifko Maksimović,

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saying that they were certain 'to obtain sanction afterwards for condemning them to death.' At Čelebić, in the district of Foča, the soldiers killed every male between 14 and 60; the priest Vladimir Popović had already been hanged as hostage. According to the deputy Majkić, nearly 10,000 persons (exclusive of those hanged) passed through the military prison of Sarajevo."

Dr. Tresić-Pavičić went on to give full details of the murder or summary execution of a number of priests and local notables in Slavonia, even at Peterwardein itself. "At the village of Golubinci the soldiers with their bayonets drove the people into the courtyard of the school and there shot them down like hares at a shooting 'drive.' . . . Human imagination cannot picture all the methods employed to kill these people. They were shot down by machine guns, drowned in the Save, tied to hayricks which were then set on fire. Many of these innocent victims were left unburied for weeks, and the ravens pecked out their eyes. At Semlin Professor Dušan Savić was killed in his own house: 50,000 crowns were stolen, and his body was thrown into the Danube. Outside Zubac 82 people were hanged without trial, at Trebinje 102 in all, and of these 39 for the excellent reason that they were notable; at Foča 71 for the same reason. A single Magyar battalion had 1,000 yards of rope with it, when it was sent from Sarajevo to the frontier. At Tuzla over 300 Serbs were seen hanging on the trees. The whole Serbo-Montenegrin frontier has been almost cleared of its population and transformed into a desert, like the Palatinate under Louis XIV."

A German Bolševik's Confessions

Among recent German publications some reference is due to a small pamphlet entitled "The Social Balance-sheet of the War" (*Die Soziale Bilanz des Krieges*) by the notorious Socialist "Majority" publicist, "Parvus," who for years past has acted as the subterranean agent of Germany in Constantinople, in Sofia, in Bucarest, in Stockholm, and, above all, in Petrograd. The pamphlet is not specially original in outlook, but it contrives, under cover of freshly-worded platitudes, to produce an atmosphere of insinuation and doubt exactly identical with that "Bolševism" which to-day paralyses Petrograd. He begins by laying down as an axiom that "so great is the damage caused by the war that no victory, on whatever side, could make it good. Victors and vanquished alike lie under the ruins." Here, as was only to be expected, he treats the whole matter from the purely material side, and, on the material side, he is right; but of the moral and spiritual issues at stake he gives us no indication. He criticises the principal States involved on the ground that they have all, without exception, utterly failed to secure the aims for which they set out to fight. England, we are told, "has collected for decades past grudging discontent (*Groll und Verdruss*) against German competition," and to the business men who pushed us into war the real thorn in the flesh was German exports to British colonies!

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A little later he reminds us that England could have built her whole mercantile marine over again for the interest upon her war debt. Thus his whole argument, which rests upon the assumption that British business circles, acting solely on the basis of selfish interest, were able to direct the policy of their country, leads directly to the conclusion that those very circles were blind to their purely material interests to a degree bordering upon sheer insanity. It is an argument which is in flagrant contradiction to the facts, and which is only likely, and probably only intended, to carry weight with doctrinaires in Petrograd.

France, in claiming Alsace, is "cutting off her left leg because her right leg has been amputated," while Russia "is not far from sinking to the level of an English colony. . . . Russia was industrialised by Germany, financed by France, and now, through the war, has been placed in England's debt." Parvus takes care to convey the impression that Russia is being exploited by England, and that German economic exploitation of Russia before the war was a mere myth.

What Parvus has to say of Russia is specially interesting, because it is so obviously calculated as an appeal to "Bolševism in general." "Through the victory of the Revolution Russia has fallen upon a period of the most prodigious mental and spiritual activity. . . . Social forces are unloosed which one could hitherto hardly think of. But that these influences may have full play *it is necessary that the war, with its sorrows and tendencies, should be eliminated.* Thus further democratic development demands peace. The Revolution is no justification for war; the Revolution itself requires peace. False friends and hypocritical advisers are telling the Russian revolutionaries: 'You have overthrown Tsarism, now let us together destroy Prussian militarism,' and are demanding the support of the Russian army of freedom, just as before they claimed that of the army of the Tsar.

"With all respect for the heroic struggles of the Russian revolutionaries, we, too, had our share in the overthrow of Tsarism—we, the *Social Democracy of the Central Powers.* *It was for this that we went to war, and we have reached our goal.* Without the Russian defeats, there would now be no victory of the Russian Revolution. We it was who did it, and certainly not those who, when the workmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary were bleeding in the struggle against the legions of the Tsar, fell upon them in the rear with barrage and gas bombs, and with cold cruelty condemned the women and children of Germany to death by hunger in order to paralyse the strength of their men. Had they been successful and not we, the Tsar would now be surrounded by a fresh halo, while the Russian revolutionaries would be languishing in the prisons of Siberia. . . . We dared to fight and take upon us the responsibility, and truly it was not easy to carry through such an enterprise.

"In order to win freedom in Germany we do not need the Russian army of freedom; we shall do it ourselves. During the war we have had to give up the struggle against the Junkers, because we had a worse enemy to fight, namely, Tsarism. We have had to give up our whole fighting position in internal politics in order to stand fast in this dreadful war. Now that we have saved our organisations and

A GERMAN BOLŠEVİK'S CONFESSIONS

democratic institutions from destruction by the armies of the Tsar, we shall take up with tenfold energy the struggle for Democracy and Socialism. Those who doubt this see nothing, hear nothing, know nothing. Those who believe that the industrial workmen of Germany will, after this war, be untrue to the fighting aims of Social Democracy, have no understanding for the driving forces in the modern workmen's movement, and are concealing with a revolutionary phrase their own internal hollowness. The struggle which we shall have to wage after the war goes far beyond the frontiers of Germany; this is the struggle for Socialism."

After arguing that the fight for Prussian electoral reform concerns the Socialists of other countries as little as did the Dreyfus affair in its day, and that the Germans will settle matters for themselves, he enters a warning as to the effects of the Revolution upon the masses in Russia. "It is still," he says, "an army of discontented peasants, not an army of the revolutionary proletariat. . . . In order to secure the progress of the Revolution in Russia the Russian army must be demobilised. The war and everything connected with it must be removed from the discussion. *The masses which are now concentrated at the front must return to their homes*, as also the others who are in foreign prisons. Once war has ceased, the whole attention of the people will be directed to internal social conditions, and the millions who return from the front and from imprisonment will become so many revolutionary agitators." "By an irony of fate in this war the army has had a revolutionary effect, while to Social Democracy is assigned the task of saving Europe from anarchy and ruin."

To-day, in the Lenin rising, we see the effect of such insidious propaganda as that of Parvus.

An Allied Super-Staff

It has needed a great disaster in order to enforce the vital principle of the single front and unity of control. But if at long last it has now definitely established itself the gain will be incalculable; and we therefore heartily welcome the appointment of Generals Foch, Wilson, and Cadorna as a kind of deliberative Super-Staff, as one of the most decisive events of the war. We yield to none in admiration of Sir W. Robertson, who has created order out of chaos, and of Sir Douglas Haig, whose soldierly qualities have won him the confidence of our fighting men and finally established British moral superiority over the enemy. But, as Mr. Lloyd George said, "the battlefield is continental," and it has long been obvious that the Allies urgently needed a central directing force, capable of envisaging the war as a whole, with that breadth of vision and sympathy which is so essential between allies. Strategy must not be dwarfed by tactics, still less must it be imposed as the sole guide in matters of high policy. Mr. Lloyd George said in Paris that, so far, our strategic unity has been sheer make-believe. That is the truth: and the tardy recognition of it brings a welcome change. But unless there is a frank acceptance of all its implications in London, Paris and Rome we shall not achieve anything more than the shadow of that unity of command which is Germany's greatest military asset.

NOTES

The Government and Speeches of Enemy Statesmen

It is an old and sage maxim in war that you should spare no pains to know the mind of the enemy. The truth of the maxim is universally recognised in its military bearing, though the course of the war has shown that its observance by the Allied Governments has not been all that could be desired. On the political side of the war it is equally pertinent, and as the months pass it will certainly gain in importance; for the enemy has shown an increasing tendency to exploit the political movements of contemporary Europe for his own purpose. In view of the growing inferiority of his military power—an inferiority which is not altered by his Italian successes—he has every incentive to pay the closest attention to the varying moods of the nations allied against him. We for our part ought not to lag behind him. It is therefore surprising to hear Mr. Bonar Law declare that the speeches of enemy statesmen are not available in a form reliable enough to justify their publication as an official document for the enlightenment of the British public. We can hardly believe that this is true. The Government can surely have little difficulty in obtaining the official reports of the Reichstag, and other parliamentary assemblies; and we think it is their clear duty to publish the exact statements of German and Austro-Hungarian statesmen on such questions as Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and the Balkans. The over-strict control of the import of enemy literature of all kinds into this country only enhances the desirability of this course of action. We must add here that we hope the House of Commons will remedy a serious defect in its equipment by placing in its reading-room a liberal selection of European newspapers, both those of our Allies and those of our enemies.

“When Thieves fall out . . .”

Dalmatia has been the subject of an undignified quarrel between Austria and Hungary. The latter's Premier, Dr. Wekerle, publicly in Parliament laid claim to Dalmatia as belonging of right to the Hungarian Crown, just as in 1908 during his former premiership he had asserted Hungary's mediæval claim of suzerainty over Bosnia. This means that Hungary's plan for solving the Southern Slav question is the union of Dalmatia—and eventually of Bosnia—with Croatia under the Crown of St. Stephen. A week later the Austrian Premier, Dr. von Seidler, in the Reichsrat, declared most emphatically that his Government regards Dalmatia as “an integral part” of Austria. The most effective comment upon these rival claims is the speech delivered in the Austrian Parliament by the Istrian Croat deputy Mr. Laginja, Vice-President of the Yugoslav Parliamentary Club. “Austria and Hungary,” he said, “are at issue over the Dalmatian question. But the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes reply to the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers: ‘There is a third party which will say: Dalmatia belongs to the nation whose kings are buried there, to the nation whose language is spoken there, to the nation whose life is lived there.’”

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"The field is north, south, east and west"

—Mr. Lloyd George, 19 Nov. 1917

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THE LETTISH WAR VICTIMS' RELIEF FUND COMMITTEE.

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The Lettish people have been great sufferers from the War, and they are certainly deserving of sympathy.

Lettonia was a rich country, and the great ports of Riga, Windau and Libau were responsible for 30·9% of Russia's pre-War exports and for 21·2% of her imports. Courland, the richest province of Lettonia, is now occupied by the Germans, and two-thirds of the inhabitants are Refugees. Riga, with its 550,000 pre-war population, has lost half of its inhabitants, and the same applies to regions on the border of the Dvina. There are now 800,000 Lettish refugees, forming the highest percentage of refugees in this War, as the total number of Letts in the world does not amount to more than 3,000,000. The German invasions have involved the loss of the entire property of the people.

The spirit of the nation, however, remained unbroken. When the Russian Government authorised the formation of Lettish Legions for the defence of the then unconquered portion of Lettonia, Lettish Officers, Lettish Soldiers, and Lettish Volunteers flocked to the Lettish Colours. This Army has covered itself with glory.

Since the Revolution the Lettish Officers have kept alive the splendid spirit of their men by frequent raids on the German trenches and they have upheld their authority. It was from Riga that the first warnings and protests against the agitations of the Pacifists came. It was Riga which first boycotted the newspapers agitating for a German peace. But all that was done in vain. The provisional Government decided to abandon Riga, the capital of Lettonia, to the Germans. The Lettish Brigades, in the south of the City, still continued to counter-attack violently when the whole Russian army was already in full retreat. They saved the honour of the Lettish name in this *débâcle*. The Lettish faith in the ultimate victory of the Allies still remains unbroken.

Meanwhile the privations of the old, young and feeble are daily increasing, and there is a continuous increase in the number of orphans, widows, sick and wounded. Whilst the world over the greatest sympathy has been shown with the War Victims of all countries, the Letts have been somewhat overlooked, for, being a northern and a silent race, they have not attracted much attention.

The Committee of the Lettish War Victims' Relief Fund hopes that the appeal which is now being made will receive the sympathetic and generous support of the public.

The Lettish War Victims' Relief Fund Committee had the honour to receive from the Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil a letter of approval (No. 164553/X/Relief), from which we cite the following passage:—

“I am to say that the draft has been read with interest and sympathy and that His Majesty's Government see no objection to the terms of the appeal, which they hope may be successful.”

All donations should be sent to the Honorary Treasurer, Mr. F. C. GOODENOUGH, Chairman of Barclay's Bank, 54, LOMBARD STREET, LONDON, E.C. 3; or to M. HENRI SIMSON, Honorary Secretary, 30, BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON, W.C. 1.

Cheques should be made payable to the Honorary Treasurer, Lettish War Victims' Relief Fund.

The Lettish War Victims' Relief Fund has just been registered as a War Charity.

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ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, February 19, 1915. Address by the Hon. W. P. Reeves and list of publications.

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ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, July 5, 1917. Addresses by Hon. W. P. Reeves, R. M'Neill, M.P., Hugh Law, M.P., Dr. R. M. Burrows.

THE ABDICATION OF KING CONSTANTINE, June 12, 1917, by Dr. R. M. Burrows.

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The New Europe

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The Allies and Italy

(I) THE EXTERNAL SINGLE FRONT

THE military disaster sustained by Italy is a new and—it is to be hoped—an ultimate proof of the blunders committed by the Entente, which, till now, has been unable to oppose to the single front, enforced upon the Central Powers by the prevailing and despotic will of Germany, a front made solid and compact through the voluntary and intelligent co-operation of all the Allies, who are all animated by the same unfaltering resolution to conduct the war to final victory by the most efficient and most adequate means. Whatever may have been the causes which have produced what General Cadorna in his *communiqué* of 28 October last called “the defaulting resistance of some sections of the Italian Second Army”—and there is no doubt that among other causes was the despondency of the soldiers in consequence of the failure of the Entente to foresee and counteract the unfortunate effects of the Russian Revolution, which have been skilfully and sedulously exploited by German intrigues in all Allied countries—it is more than certain that the breaking of the Italian line on the Julian front would not have been possible had the Governments and General Staffs of the Entente early conceived the supreme importance of the war against Austria-Hungary, and had they not been so long in understanding the tactics of Germany, who systematically seeks to isolate her enemies in order to strike at them one after the other. This lamentable slowness of the Entente in realising the practical necessities of the war, in forestalling the well-planned attack of the enemies, has been the cause of numberless political and military failures. It has given to the autocracy ruling in the Central Empires the conspicuous advantage of being able once more to galvanise their domestic public opinion through the lure of another clamorous military victory.

This is not the moment for recrimination. The responsibility for error and disaster falls not upon this Ally or

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that, but belongs to them all, because of the fact that all of them, more or less, have sinned in the same way, having failed, in the spirit of an old Diplomacy bound to the principles of secrecy and of "Balance of Powers," adequately to perceive the true character of this war, which is a sheer undertaking of collective international defence enforced upon the peace-loving democracies of the world by the brutal lust of conquest and domination of a feudal autocracy.

Therefore, it has happened that, while in their solemn declarations the Allied Governments have always proclaimed the imperative reasons of Justice and Right, by which they were compelled to take up arms for the vindication of treaties and the liberty as well of the great as of the small nations to govern themselves according to their own will, nevertheless every Government and every Allied country has, in fact, kept its eye too often fixed upon an egoistical preference for some of the ends of the war, which more particularly concerned itself, and betrayed an ill-concealed anxiety lest some other of the Allies might succeed through the war in winning a position of privilege and of greater advantage. This is certainly true of the action of Allied diplomatists in more than one centre; but the important thing to mark is that it is not true of the peoples, whose common sense makes them keenly aware of the wrongs and inconveniences which such shortsighted egoism creates.

Let us hope that it may not be too late to acknowledge the common fault and to mend it!

What profit is it to France or to Great Britain to add some new slice of territory to their Colonial Empires in Africa or in Asia? What gain is it to Italy to extend her sway over the whole of Dalmatia or to concur in the division of Asia Minor if in so doing she violates the principles of liberty and nationality, which are her purest glory and the very reason of her existence as a great and civilised nation in the world?

But all our war aims, the greatest as well as the least, are now endangered by our failure to recognise the principle of the single front, both in politics and in strategy.

Continued stubbornness in pursuing that course of politics would simply mean the complete failure of the general programme of the Entente. It sends a message of good cheer

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to the enemy; for the Central Powers could wish nothing better in order to be enabled to continue their campaign of world-wide intrigue, intended to take advantage of the increasing tiredness of the peoples in pursuing a war, the ends of which are not quite clear to their minds and may not meet with their whole-hearted approbation.

On the contrary, the peoples of the Allied countries will not hesitate to pledge their utmost resistance and their greatest efforts to the attainment of the one general end for which this war appears justified to their minds and consciences:—the breaking of militarism and the solid foundation of a partnership of nations, which ought now at this very hour to find its first practical expression in the complete unity of the political, military and economic front, for war and for peace, among the Allied democracies of the world.

EDOARDO GIRETTI.

(II) THE INTERNAL SINGLE FRONT

THE tragic collapse of Allied fortunes in Italy seems, after three years of groping, to have forced a decision in favour of a single military front; but it would be a mistake if this opportunity were not taken for realising unity in another no less urgent direction, by establishing the *Internal Single Front*.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech at Paris, denounced the mistakes of Allied military strategy. But as this is the time for frank speech, it is well to recognise that the whole war-policy of the Allies has suffered from the same fundamental error—namely, the lack of a solidarity more real than that of mere written agreements or newspaper articles, the lack of a true community of programmes and materials. Certainly “we have pooled our honour,” to use Sir Edward Carson’s phrase; but we have not yet sufficiently pooled our resources. In the economic, as in the military, field, we have conducted the war in watertight compartments; and the results have been scarcely less disastrous. If we are not to abandon the hope of victory, we must realise that the moment has at last come for changing our attitude. It would be illogical to liquidate that “Extreme Westernism” to which our military failures are due and

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yet to leave other forms of Westernism untouched. In a war such as the present, Westernism, Easternism, and any other "ism," are equally mischievous, alike in matters military and economic; for they represent particularist feelings, which must be overcome if the Allied cause and the common interest of us all is to triumph. The ideal position was expressed by M. Poincaré when he summed up the programme of the Allies in the concise and limpid phrase: "One Front, One Army, One Nation."

Hitherto we have remained terribly far from this ideal. We have each of us thought that we could wage war on "our" front with "our" resources, strong in "our" powers of resistance; whereas it was really necessary to reduce everything to a common denominator—forces, sacrifices, resources alike. What has hitherto been left undone must now be done without an instant's delay, even at the risk of causing inconvenience to many. The hour has come for closing our ranks.

There has been much recent talk, in connection with the events on the Italian front, of inadequate propaganda, of imperfect knowledge of the help supplied by one Ally to the other, and of Boloism. It should be said quite plainly that the most effective argument of the Boloists has consisted in throwing into relief the inequality of sacrifice between the various Allies, while the best method of putting an end to such propaganda consists in suppressing, so far as possible, the causes of such inequality. Here, also, as in the case of the absence of unified strategy, the mistake is due to shortsightedness. A convoy of ships of different types, if it is to keep together, cannot move at the pace of its swiftest member, but must adapt itself to the pace of the slowest. In the same way it is a mistake to measure the collective powers of resistance of a group of States by that of their richest and best equipped members. There was need for unification, co-ordination, pooling of resources. A fair average should have been enforced, such as would remove dangerous inequalities. It is the slowest who sets the pace.

For these reasons the dominant aim of strategy should have been to shorten the war and to take every opportunity of dealing decisive blows at the enemy where he was weakest, and where positive results could have been obtained, instead

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of nursing the illusion that a series of negative results and a long war of exhaustion could damage the enemy alone, while leaving the resources of the Allies intact. On the other hand, in proportion as the war dragged out, the main aim should have been to stiffen the powers of resistance of those Allies who, as the result of events apparent to all, were specially in need of help.

Having laid down these logical premises, let us consider what has happened in the case of Italy. Undoubtedly Italy has received most generous aid from the Allies, and, in particular, from England—aid which took the form of tonnage, coal, provisions and money. It would be positively criminal to reproach the Allies with a disregard for Italian interests; nor is there any one in Italy who does not recognise this debt of gratitude. But in war there can be only one aim, and this is not to earn gratitude, but to secure victory. It is by this standard that the acts of the Entente must be judged. The help given to Italy, though extremely generous from the sentimental point of view, has been inadequate from the point of view of victorious results. In other words, the Allies have helped Italy too much for Italy's sake, but too little for the Allies' sake.

It is not difficult to prove why Italy of the three Western States of the Alliance should be the one most in need of help. She entered the war when her economic position was still insecure; when her agriculture had not yet reached a safe stage of development, and was passing through a dangerous period of growing pains, characteristic of all young organisms; when her industry was not yet properly consolidated, and, finally, without possessing a tonnage even remotely proportioned to her needs as an importer. In fact, out of sixteen millions of goods landed in Italy in 1913, only a quarter was carried in Italian ships. Besides all this, Italy's declaration of war produced a serious economic situation by automatically cutting off her two main markets of supply and outlet, namely, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

All this was well known to the leaders of the Entente and ought to have influenced their calculations. They should have understood what grave dangers might arise, when a country placed in such exceptional circumstances came to feel a shortage of coal for its industries, of grain for its consumption and of tonnage for both alike. And yet, by a complexity

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of causes, some of which derive their origin from the theory of military westernism, and which certainly represent an economic westernism, Italy, of all the Allies, had, so far as the apportioning of tonnage, grain and coal was concerned, a quota which did not correspond even to her minimum requirements.

Thus, in assigning tonnage, there was not sufficient regard for the geographical situation of Italy, who, being further than all the others from the English and Transatlantic centres of supply, requires special allowances to make up for the greater length of the voyage and the comparative absence of tonnage of her own.

In assigning coal, it was overlooked that in Italy there are no coal mines, while, under normal industrial conditions, and apart from the intensified production demanded by the problem of munitions, the country requires to import 10,000,000 tons of coal per annum. In the first six months of 1917, on the contrary, only 2,579,500 tons of coal were landed in Italy. Thus Italy is the only Allied country in which the factories which are not working for directly military purposes have had to close down for lack of fuel. As the Government only guarantees coal to war industries, the virtual impossibility of private firms procuring it has raised the market price to 600 or 700 lire a ton (£24-£28), which is not very different from the price of bread. The best advice which the Italian Government could give to the rich classes who asked for fuel for heating purposes in the winter, was to invite them to go to Sicily in order to warm themselves in the southern sun. But this is not advice which can be followed by everyone, and many have had resort to burning wood. As also the railways and many important ammunition works must supplement with wood fuel their insufficient coal supplies, the demand has driven up the price of wood to 400 lire (£16) per ton, with the melancholy result that, in a country already poor in forests, the few which remain are in a fair way to being destroyed, and that even the older olive trees are being cut down. The lack of coal has reduced railway traffic to an incredible minimum, and this has seriously hampered the distribution of supplies. It has also had the effect of hampering the production of munitions, which, instead of following a regular course, works by fits and starts with alternative periods of extreme activity and lethargy.

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Finally, the question of bread has not been sufficiently estimated at its true value. In fact, a shortage of bread could be borne in England or in France or in Germany, where it can be made up for by the use of other means of sustenance; but in Italy it represents the staple food. It may be said that, in the form of either bread or macaroni, grain represents 75 per cent. of the food of the entire population. Not only the working-classes, but a considerable section of the middle classes depend upon bread for their very existence; and all the more so to-day because, in Italy as elsewhere, other sorts of food are running short. The prolongation of the war has greatly reduced the stocks of animals and has thus produced a lack of milk food, which constituted a food reserve. Italy, who has always exported butter and cheese, to-day has not enough for her own consumption. Practically all the "Parmesan" which is still produced is reserved for the army. Butter, which has been requisitioned as long as seven months ago, is practically unprocurable. Meat costs 8 lire the kilo. (about 3s. a pound), and fish 10 to 12 lire the kilo. (or 3s. 7d. to 4s. 6d.), which makes its use by the poorer classes impossible. Even for the army the shortage is such that the meat ration, which was 375 grammes (13 oz.) for fighting troops (not those in the rear, who are limited to 7 oz.), has been reduced to 250 grammes (9 oz.), including bones. But for more than a year past meat has not been the daily food of the Italian soldier, and dried fish and cheese are frequently substituted. The other day a food expert in England noted with pride the excellent results produced by the abundant use of meat in the British army, whose soldiers eat meat three times a day. It is but just to place on record that the brave defenders of the Piave line do not eat meat as many times a week.

This year, unhappily, the harvest has been a million tons less than the harvest of the preceding year, which already represented a deficit of at least two million tons upon the requirements of the population. Thus at least three million tons of grain must be imported into Italy in order to remove the spectre of famine. This was threatening enough in the period between the old and new harvest, when all reserves were exhausted; and it was then that in quite a hundred places in Italy violent demonstrations took place against the lack of bread. An all too short-sighted censorship merely succeeded in concealing for a long time from the Allies

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these incidents, of which the enemy was all the time fully informed, and which have served as the basis for his widespread and criminal propaganda among the Italian soldiers.

And when, finally, they were known by the Allies, it was at once found convenient to ascribe the bread riots to defective distribution on the part of the authorities. But it is forgotten that difficulties of distribution depend upon inherent and irremediable causes, such as the geographical configuration of Italy and the peculiarities of her railway system, which was planned for the purpose of importing from both the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coasts, whereas the war has made only the former practicable. If to this be added the curtailment of railway traffic owing to lack of coal, it need not cause much surprise if sometimes supplies of grain sent from Genoa to the Adriatic towns take months to reach their destination. There was only one means of repairing this defect—the formation of large reserve stocks in the various centres of the peninsula. Under present conditions it is something to be able to live from hand to mouth without lacking real necessities.

This survey of the economic situation in Italy may seem unduly pessimistic. The fact that it is not so explains the success of certain enemy propaganda. Here, too, the Germans follow the usual rules of their military strategy, which consists in ascertaining the weak point of their enemy and then "going for it hard." Very probably the Allies were unaware of it; but certainly the enemy knew of and exploited the discouragement of many Italian soldiers, who, returning home on leave, saw the privations produced among their wives and children by the prolongation of the war, and responded with a bitterness of which the Allied countries know nothing. The allowance given by the Italian State to the families of men with the colours is about 4s. a week, and this is certainly of little use when prices are so high as to-day. The real miracle is that under such conditions the pacifist and Socialist propaganda has not taken far greater hold, and only succeeded in undermining the *moral* of a single brigade, composed, for the most part, of neutralist socialists.

But this situation is fraught with peril, and imposes upon the Allies the duty of helping Italy, not only in the interests

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of Italy, but in their own most vital interests. It is necessary that a better balance should be struck between their respective sacrifices, lest a further weakening of Italian powers of resistance should have a deleterious effect upon the Allies as a whole. The time has come for looking hard facts in the face. The crying need of the hour is "the Single Economic Front."

GUGLIELMO EMANUEL.

British and German Intelligence

As the struggle of the nations proceeds it becomes ever clearer that, apart from material resources, the deciding factor will be the strength and quality of the intelligence of the combatants. There is nothing to choose between the courage, the endurance, or the religious devotion of the opposing forces. Given equality of *moral*, victory will lie with the side which shows greater knowledge and greater intellectual resource. Even excessive fanatical devotion on one side will not save it from disaster if its intelligence or equipment is inferior to that of the enemy, as the history of the Soudan campaign sufficiently illustrated. It is worth while, therefore, at the present stage of the struggle to compare the German intellect with that of the British.

The repeated expression of wonder at the "cleverness" of the Germans creates a feeling of irritation. The avowal proceeds partly from reluctant generosity, partly from latent envy. But it is constantly forgotten that there are different sorts of intelligence; and while one mind may be strong in one direction, it may be weak in another. We may distinguish three kinds of intellect: scientific resourcefulness, good judgment, and commanding forethought.

In scientific capacity no person qualified to judge would consider the German mind superior to the British; the history of science refutes such a contention.

In the possession of the other two types of intellect, however, the British mind and the German mind are sharply distinguished and even radically opposed. The very genius of the British race lies in its "good sense," its "sound judgment" when face to face with a definitely known situation. The common sense of the British mind is the head light

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of its ship of fate. In its successful application of this form of intelligence it is unrivalled by any people on the globe. And with this goes its almost superstitious regard for plain uncovered facts, however trivial, its instinctively correct appreciation of their bearing, and its balanced sense of proportion.

The German mind, on the other hand, is endowed in almost an unique degree with the capacity for comprehensive foresight, due to a peculiar mental combination of the power of imagination with an uncommon faculty for systematic arrangement. This combination induces or compels the German mind always to work within and towards an organised plan. Whether the system is a system of thoughts or a system of action, matters not. System it must have of some kind; if it cannot construct a good one it will devise a bad one. The German lives and moves according to a pre-arranged scheme, and is helpless without it. All Germans take to this course by mental instinct, and love system with a passion which to us seems incredible or even ludicrous. So completely are they dominated by this tendency of mind that, to them, it is the very hall-mark of intelligence. Any nation or individual whose mind does not reveal this characteristic they regard with contempt, as barbaric or uncivilised. For them civilisation just means the systematic organisation of the resources of human life. All aspects of life, large or small, must be brought under this principle.

Until we grasp this distinctive peculiarity of the German intelligence, and lay our account with it, we shall never understand their politics, their institutions, their plan of campaign, their terms of peace. It is absurd on our part to speak with lofty pity of the manner in which the German nation is disciplined and drilled; for they regard us with disdain because we are not disciplined, and because we positively dislike discipline on a systematic scale. They are perfectly happy only when everything is carefully arranged beforehand, and nothing, or as little as possible, left to chance and individual caprice. For them the perfection of human life is found when an organisation is so complete that the system will run of itself, and not be at the mercy of any individual component. Since they always think of

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human life in terms of organisation, it is easy to see how their soaring imagination rises in ever-widening circles until it embraces with perfect assurance and consummate audacity a Pangermanic Empire or a World-empire, organised as thoroughly as the Prussian State, which is the working model of political perfection.

When we cease to ridicule this conception of human life we stand aghast at its dangers and see nothing in it but fanatical folly and the distortion of human welfare. That is because the whole principle is alien to the mental instincts of our race. We see only its defects; the Germans see only its advantages. Its defects, indeed, are obvious. Organisation at any price may turn human society into a machine, and destroy individual freedom altogether. But the German does not suppose that detailed organisation of social life is hostile to his freedom. On the contrary; a highly-educated German once told the writer that he did not know any country in the world where the individual was so free as in Germany. The mental effect on the individual of living within, and thinking only in terms of, such thorough-going organisation of human interests is to destroy all reliance on individual judgment, to make it impossible for him to cultivate a sense of proportion, and to put him completely out of sympathy with other races and other types of social life. These are precisely the characteristic defects of the German mind, for which organisation is literally a sacred and inviolable principle. Hence the pathetic, or, as we think, the ludicrous attempt of individual German writers to convince the other nations of the righteousness of their cause, or to persuade other nations to adopt their terms of peace. Who but a German could have written a Hymn of Hate? Who but a German could have solemnly offered proposals of peace in language such as this:—

“Here the Bible saying applies: ‘Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you.’ First bring about the peace by understanding which secures Germany’s political independence, territorial integrity and economic freedom of development, and then Germany will have shown herself so strong that ‘all these things’ shall be added unto her.”

The strength of the British intelligence lies in an entirely

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different direction; but we must beware of misunderstanding the essential nature of the mind of our enemy. We do not understand thorough-going organisation at all in this country, and cannot expect to acquire the instinct for it in the middle of a war for our very existence, even if we wished to do so. We must therefore rely for our success on those qualities in which we are undoubtedly supreme. Our substitute for the principle of organisation is the principle of individual leadership. We try to get the best man, and then we trust him, and we trust those who follow to "play the game," as we quaintly put it, when they know what the game is. We do not arrange the future beforehand and work according to a fixed plan from beginning to end. We experiment with facts; we chop and we change; we await events before taking action. In the long run we succeed, because we get all the facts in time; but the long run is apt to be very long, and our success often costs us dearly. But it is our way; and we must follow a way we are sure of, instead of attempting a path we distrust. There is much significance in the remark which is said to have been made in a letter of a German naval officer: "We shall never beat the English, they are too casual." There is our peculiar secret; we wait for things to turn up, knowing well that we shall be able to deal with them with sound judgment once we are sure of what they are.

It would therefore be a mistake for us to try to beat the Germans at their own game of organising human life. They will always organise in a more thorough fashion than we will. We will beat them best by attacking and defending—politically, economically, and in a military sense—on principles which we completely understand and which they do not, on lines where we are strong and they are weak—by the methods of individual initiative, individual judgment, good leadership, and self-reliance in the face of facts. Nothing endangers a machine-like organisation so much as the unexpected. The individual always provides the unexpected, and our wholesome and thorough-going trust in the resourcefulness of the individual is the best guarantee for the failure and destruction of the German machine.

J. B. BAILLIE.

The Economic Position of Germany after the War

THOUGH there may be two opinions concerning Germany's military situation, there can be but one economic outlook. If the war continues Germany is economically beaten, and this will result in the annihilation of all her activities, including those of a military character. This is inevitable by reason of the formidable economic coalition which Germany has succeeded in organising against herself.

It is recognised in Germany that a military victory is necessary to prevent her economic exhaustion. But a military victory is to-day impossible. The Allied Powers possess such resources, that, whatever victory is achieved by Germany will assume, in comparison, the proportions of a local success. The German General, Freytag-Loringhoven, in his "Folgerungen aus dem Weltkriege" (Berlin, 1917), the export of which has been prohibited, expresses this view; and his opinions, by virtue of his position as Quartermaster-General at the beginning of the war, are certainly worthy of note. Because even Germany's submarine campaign has not attained the results expected, her press has for some time expressed the need for "political strategy." The task of "political strategy" will be very difficult, if it is to involve the retaining of some other military gains, and yet obtaining peace. But peace is essential. Only during the war can the economic blockade of Germany be exercised to the full, and it is dangerous for the Allies to base any expectations on an economic blockade of Germany after the signing of peace. As we shall see, such a blockade might not be altogether advantageous to the Allies.

Of course, peace once signed, Germany could not, even though the economic war were to cease, resume the economic position which she occupied before the war. The Allied countries, by reason of their alliance, have realised already the benefits to be derived from closer economic relations with one another; and they will naturally formulate economic treaties to their mutual advantage. On the other hand, owing to the shortage of tonnage after the war, the transport of overseas products and the import of European goods will be considerably reduced, and as this is due to German action, it is natural that she will pay the penalty by having to await supplies until the needs of the Allies

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have been satisfied. However successful German "political strategy" may be in reducing these economic results, it cannot eliminate them immediately peace is signed. It is hardly to be expected that Germany will be satisfied to remain a closed State, consuming only what she produces; she will endeavour to regain her place in the world market. But this can only happen gradually, and in the meantime she must produce and consume, and find occupation and food for her population. She can regain her place in the world market by her trade following the inter-European economic routes: railways, rivers and the Baltic and Black Seas. To dominate these economic lines of communication will be Germany's primary need and great desire, and for this purpose she will try to take advantage of her military successes.

To study Germany's economic situation in the future we can only analyse her statistics for the past. Naturally any figures for the future can only be conjectural, as many new factors will influence the world market after the war. Still, past figures will serve as some indication of the needs and economic capacities of the countries under review.

If we examine Germany's foreign trade in general we see that she exported in 1913 goods to the value of 10,097 million marks, and imported to the value of 10,770 million marks. As about half the total of this trade was overseas trade, it is clear that under any circumstances Germany's trade will be considerably reduced. If we leave out of consideration overseas trade, we find that Germany, although she exported in 1913 goods to the value of 7,677 million marks, imported from Europe only 5,888 million marks' worth of goods, which is just over half of her total imports. This trade, too, will have to be considerably reduced.

If Germany's European trade is considered more closely, we see that an important part can be maintained by means of trade routes of which she will have command. These routes belong, first, to her Allies; second, to the Neutrals; and last, to countries which, though belonging to the Allied Powers, she will try to dominate economically because of their special geographical position. Thus, the first group comprises Austria - Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey; the second, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland, and the third, Russia, Roumania and Serbia.

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An examination of Germany's trade with these countries shows that her exports amounted to nearly 4 milliard marks (3,875 million). As for her imports, these amounted to two-thirds of the value of her total imports from European countries (3,534 million marks).

An examination of the classes of goods which Germany exports and imports by inter-European roads makes her interest in these roads even more apparent. In order to resume after the war normal economic life, Germany must adapt her economic production to the necessities of a very reduced foreign trade. She must develop her economic activities in such a manner as to become, as far as possible, a self-supporting country. Doubtless many commodities hitherto produced for exportation will be utilised for internal needs. This is true of raw materials as well as of industrial products. To take one example only: the German export of sugar before the war was very large (110,000 tons), and this was supplied mainly to Great Britain. No doubt the German beetroot fields will have to be converted into cornfields. But even after such adaptation to the new economic conditions, the shortage, especially of raw material and foodstuffs, will be great.

Let us therefore examine, first, German import trade.

As far as foodstuffs are concerned the inter-European routes are of the greatest importance for Germany. We have not space for a detailed analysis; but let us take some of the principal foodstuffs: wheat and meat.

The German wheat deficit in 1913 was 2,546,000 tons; she exported 538,000 tons; therefore her real deficit was about 3 million tons, nearly three-quarters of which came from overseas countries. But, at the same time, Germany imported from Russia 519,000 tons; from Roumania 94,000; from Serbia 6,000; and from Bulgaria a little over one thousand tons. Of course these countries produce much more wheat than they exported to Germany, and her object will be to monopolise their total wheat production for her own import. This policy of monopoly will be the distinguishing feature of her foreign trade.

We have selected the most unfavourable example of essential foodstuffs. The import of other foodstuffs by inter-European routes was in every case greater. For instance, the total import of rye from all sources in 1913 was 352,000

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tons, of which 304,000 were from Russia, 13,000 from Roumania, and from the U.S.A. and the Argentine 32,000.

An examination of the statistics for meat is even more conclusive. Germany imported in 1913 30,276 tons of beef, which came (with the exception of 3,053 tons from France), from Denmark, Holland, Russia and Sweden. Germany imported in 1913 164,000 head of cattle from Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Switzerland. The import of pigs was 147,000, of which 145,000 came from Russia. There was a large import of fat from America; but were this to cease some substitutes would be available which could be obtained by inter-European roads; moreover, during the past few years there has been a great increase in the import of fat from Denmark, Holland and Serbia.

To summarise: If Germany succeeds in maintaining the same inter-European relations as before the war she can thus obtain sufficient food. The same applies to her demand for raw materials. The principal materials necessary for an industrial State are undoubtedly iron, coal, wool and cotton. Germany has an enormous quantity of iron and coal. Her export of these materials was very great, and she will be able to maintain at least part of this export, by supplying neutral countries which are deficient in these products. The greatest shortage will be that of wool and cotton, which come largely from overseas countries. In this respect German industries will suffer, but her actual needs will still be satisfied by devoting to her own use the manufactured articles of cotton and wool which were formerly exported, provided she can secure sufficient raw cotton. Moreover, Germany will obtain a gradually increasing supply of wool from Russia, the Balkans and Turkey. The natural riches of these countries are unlimited, and it only requires better communications and organisation to enable Germany to exploit them all for her own advantage.

The inter-European roads are no less important for German export. Even before the war she was the greatest exporter of iron goods, machinery, electric appliances and chemicals. These exports she will try to increase; because she will have to a great extent the necessary raw materials at her disposal. If we consider German statistics for the past, we find that Russia and Austria-Hungary were always amongst the foremost continental importers of these articles.

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The future development of German trade with the East will have a double significance. In the first place it will help her to pay for the necessary foodstuffs and raw products imported from the East; and, secondly, it will tend to develop the railway and river communications, which will be to the advantage of German trade as a whole. Since after the war oversea communications for Germany will be restricted, the European railway and river routes are the next best means for Germany to escape from her economic isolation. Her import of food and raw materials from the East will be very important from a financial point of view. The money exchange there is very favourable to Germany compared with what it is in the West. If Germany succeeds in maintaining a monopoly in the East she will be able to maintain also that favourable exchange, so that for imported goods her money would at least have the same buying power as in her own country. As long as this is so the unfavourable exchange in the West will be a great stimulus to her eastern export trade. Presuming that the rate of exchange remains approximately the same after the war as it is to-day it will be possible for Germany to sell her goods to the neutrals at half the price the Allies would demand for them. In this special case, therefore, the unfavourable rate of exchange, which is usually an enormous handicap to trade, would be of advantage to Germany.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from this examination of Germany's economic position?

Under any conditions Germany's position after the war will be very difficult, but notwithstanding these difficulties she possesses the chief elements necessary for a strong economic country. She has the principal raw materials for many industries, and a large and active population. The land routes between herself and her Allies and the neutral countries cannot be blockaded after the war, and other countries in the North and East, especially Russia, because of her bad maritime communications, will be forced to trade with her. After the war, on account of the shortage of tonnage, land routes will assume special importance. Therefore, under any conditions, economic inter-European relations will be very extensive. A complete sea blockade would hamper German trade, but would, at the same time, create a strong common economic interest between Germany and

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most of the European Powers. That blockade, moreover, would result in pushing German interests even more towards the East, whither they are already leading her. There is always the danger that this powerful growing economic expansion towards the East will in time lead to territorial expansion, to which the political conditions of this part of the world affords special facilities.

An economic blockade, however, which is powerless to prevent German territorial expansion in peace times, is the most effective weapon which can be employed against her in war. In peace it will be impossible to prevent Germany adapting herself to the new economic situation. Her watchword will change. Before the war it was—"Our future is on the sea"; after the war it will be "Our future is in the East." While war continues it is impossible for a country to adapt herself to new economic conditions. Germany cannot produce what she most needs; she has to produce what the exigencies of war compel her to produce, and this production occupies all her economic forces.

Though for the Allies the present war means impoverishment, they have at their disposal the economic products of the whole world, their credit being assured. For Germany the present economic conditions lead to misery and the utmost privation.

The duty of the coming Economic Conference of the Allies should be so to plan their economic conditions in the future as to develop their trade to a sufficient extent to cover the deficit brought about by unproductive labour during the war. This plan should be in harmony with their political aims, and should, moreover, secure the complete economic independence of all the Allied Powers.

Part of the economic aims of the Allies was correctly formulated at the Paris Economic Conference: "The Allies must take all necessary steps to develop the future economic relations between them." But nothing has been done, so far, in this direction. It seems to me that the development of the economic relations between the Allies can be achieved by different measures, which fall into two groups: (1) measures for the regulation of their oversea trade, owing to the general shortage of raw material and of tonnage; (2) the conclusion of economic treaties between the Allied nations.

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All these measures to produce their full effect depend on one condition; the Allies must secure for one another such geographical frontiers as will admit of direct economic relations between them. If they leave one of their Alliance under the economic domination of any of the Central Powers, they will thereby divide the general economic interest which at present binds them together. If, on the other hand, this condition is assured, then complete harmony in the Allied plan for political and economic independence will result, and political freedom and economic independence for all nations will be secured. Economic freedom for the Allies means the power to regulate their respective economic activities to their mutual advantage.

By securing such an economic policy the Allies will at the same time prevent the danger of German economic and territorial expansion. The realisation will be forced upon Germany that the future development of her economic activities cannot be based on foreign domination, either political or economic. Such a definite economic policy between the Allies would be much more effective than vague statements about a future economic war. Economic war must not be a distant dream of the future, but a reality of the present. Germany, under the thrust of this economic weapon, will one day be forced to accept the conditions of such an Allied policy, and the sooner she does so the better for her.

G. DJURIĆ.

A New Spirit in Russia

“ ‘ Je ne connais qu'une chose—délivrer la France de l'ennemi.’
 ‘ La question est de savoir où est l'ennemi.’
 ‘ Il est dehors, et je l'ai chassé,’ dit Danton.
 ‘ Il est dedans, et je le surveille,’ dit Robespierre.”

VICTOR HUGO: *Quatre-Vingt-Treize.*

IN the darkest moments of the Revolution there are already signs of a new spirit in Russia. Not, indeed, in the stifling atmosphere of Petrograd, but in the South, Russia still breathes freely, and the longing for unity is being translated into action. At a Conference in Moscow on 26 October, at which, besides various well-known politicians, Generals Brusilov and Ruzski also spoke, the foundations

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were laid of a new political *bloc*. In the face of the awful crisis through which their country is passing these men are seeking to forget all their old party differences. Unlike any of the Coalitions hitherto attempted, the present *bloc* is not a coalition of parties, but of all men, whose first thought is for Russia. During the last eight months party strife has played havoc with Russia; it has created in the minds of the masses visions of enemies in their midst far more dangerous than the enemy at the front. Herein lies the tragedy of Russia. The masses do not know where to look for salvation; party shibboleths have lost their meaning; they are waiting and praying for men to arise who will speak in the name of Russia. At one of the last meetings of the Provisional Parliament a woman member, Kuskova, pleaded for unity. "In Moscow," she said, "the queues before the churches were as long as before the bakers' shops. When I entered a church out of curiosity I heard how earnestly the congregation prayed that Russia should be delivered, not from the foreign foe, but from her enemies at home."

Kerenski strove for a coalition of parties, and failed. He failed because he tried to preserve an appearance of unity in what was, essentially, irreconcilable. Coalition became with him a profession of faith; he threw his whole soul into it, and fought, as no one else in Russia has fought, for what he thought the only way of salvation for his country. But the foundations on which he based his power crumbled away in a few days, for his coalition was a coalition of parties, not of wills.

Russia must now look elsewhere for her leaders, for leaders who are united by a common purpose. The new coalition must know neither Octobrist nor Cadet nor Socialist, but must contain men from all these parties, provided they think, first and foremost, of their country. Rodzjanko, Miljukov and Savinkov have one common purpose, which, for the moment, can smooth over their differences of party; their common desire for strong government is in the interests, not of any one class, but of all classes. Such a government, and such a Government alone, can gather round it the military talent with which Russia is so richly endowed.

The force that such a government could rely upon already exists. The Cossacks are the strongest united force

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in Russia to-day, for they know their own mind. Their leaders, men like Kaledin and Dutov, are simple but straightforward; hitherto they have played no part in politics, and they will follow no *party* leaders, whether Cadet or Socialist. To these free men of the Steppes, who have never known serfdom, and have for centuries managed their own affairs, theories of government make little appeal, and, provided their own liberties are safeguarded, they make no claim to interfere with the liberties of others. They are little versed in the social and political problems of Petrograd and Moscow and other industrial centres, but recent events have made them the sworn enemies of reaction. The Revolution was welcomed with enthusiasm among the Cossacks; and nowhere is there greater determination to defend it.

RURIK.

Allied Portraits : (V) Georges Clémenceau

MEN are apt to judge their own age harshly, and an eminent Russian complained to the writer, a few years ago, that "chivalry was dead in France." He did not live to see the battle of the Marne and the defence of Verdun. Nor can he have known, or, if he knew, can he have rightly appreciated M. Clémenceau. It is true that the modern Frenchman and especially the modern Parisian of the years before the war, seldom seemed to be made of the stuff of, say, Bayard or "*Les trois Mousquetaires*," or even Balzac's more everyday heroes. One never seemed to meet a "César Birotteau" or a "Cousin Pons." The race of Cyrano de Bergerac seemed to have become materialistic, reserved, cool, calculating. The cleverness survived, but was there the old, generous fire beneath it? No one who knows M. Clémenceau well can for one moment doubt that, in the matter of all these *desiderata*, he is a Frenchman of the noblest type. He is the most nimble-witted of Parisians, the cleverest of intellectual and political fencers, quick as lightning with the thrust and parry, quelling his adversaries, disciplining his friends, and urging them on with *le mot cinglant*, the word that cuts like a whip. But behind all this inimitable play of the rapier stands a great personality, the biggest heart and the clearest head in French public life.

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It was the Clémenceau of the nimble wit and quick rapier-play whose acquaintance I first made in March 1888. He was then in his physical prime (he is now seventy-six). The Boulanger movement was at its height, and, after having interviewed "le brave Général" himself, I wanted to see the man who, in a sense, had launched him on his official career, and who was now awaiting the moment to spring upon the foolish agitation and the vain ambitions which Boulanger had allowed to grow up around his name. I wanted to elicit M. Clémenceau's opinion about it all, but I did not succeed. With infinite difficulty I obtained a rendezvous, and he received me in the handsome library of his flat, where I found him in converse with Mr. H. M. Hyndman. When Mr. Hyndman left I thought my chance had come, but to all the questions of the young and inexperienced journalist Clémenceau replied by little more than sharp, quick monosyllables. "Peut-être," "Cela se peut," "Je n'en sais rien." Yet I really got my money's worth before I left. Another visitor was announced, and there entered a personage who looked as if he had come straight from the stage of the Palais Royal. He had a round jovial face, and wisps of yellow hair tried in vain to cover his ample skull. He was dressed in buff-coloured trousers and a blue jacket, and he wore a bow-tie, blue, with white spots. He was a horse-couper, and I was asked to pardon the brief interruption, as Clémenceau had asked him to come and talk about a horse he wanted to buy. I cannot reproduce the conversation here, particularly as the horse had some inconvenient habits which it required Biblical language to describe. But the rapid play of talk between two men, so different in training and class, yet so alike in the keenness of their wits and the raciness of their speech, made the interview a thing which would have made my fortune could I have reproduced it in the *Gil Blas* of that period. Clémenceau was in a big leather arm-chair, in the depths of which he twisted and turned like an eel, so lithe was he, his body being kept in perfect suppleness by daily riding and fencing.

He is not so lithe now; he misses his annual visit to Marienbad, but his wits are as keen as ever. He gets up at some unearthly hour—four or five o'clock—does some physical exercises and gets through an enormous amount of work before his frugal luncheon at 12.30. He drinks only

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water or milk, and considers wine or coffee poison—for him. He is very particular about the brand of the water—a brand which is unknown in England. At his flat on the ground floor in the Rue Franklin he receives visitors from all parts of the globe in the room filled with books and adorned with one or two classical busts—a room with one big window looking out upon a little plot of garden. He sits encompassed by a horseshoe writing-table, on which, among books, newspapers and magazines, there is always an open atlas, and one or two maps bearing upon questions of the day. If you have leisure to examine his bookshelves before he enters, you will find one of them full of Biblical works, for this “secularist” reads and studies the Bible. He is also an enthusiastic reader of Greek and thinks Thucydides the greatest of historians. He has always been a Philhellene, and he once said to me in reply to some criticism of the modern Greeks: “Yes, but there is something more in them than that.”

Nowadays he will not lunch or dine out. His daily outing, when the Chambers are in session, is his drive to the Senate, where he remains till it rises at five, six or seven o'clock. He always sits at the end of the second or third bench on the left of the Chair. In the Senate he is a power and has a host of friends there—all of them, as he sometimes says with a lightning smile, his “excellent enemies.” For many of them are ex-Ministers whom he has upset, some of them old colleagues in his (for France) long-lived Ministry (October, 1906–July, 1909), in which he chastened them with the scorpions of his wit or sarcasm. Everyone fears him, but, though he may not know it, many love him. For, as I have said, he is the biggest-hearted man in French public life, whose hatred and whose scorn are reserved for injustice, hypocrisy and foolish vanity. With these things he has no patience at all, and sometimes, if you talk to him of some empty, pretentious fellow, he dismisses the subject abruptly with “d'ailleurs, c'est un imbécile.”

M. Pichon is again his Minister for Foreign Affairs, as he was in his former Cabinet. But Clémenteau's policy is his own, though M. Pichon knows how to trim its rough edges and recommend it to such ambassadors as are over-sensitive, of whom—thank Heaven!—Lord Bertie is not one. When the ambassadors go direct to M. Clémenteau himself, they sometimes hear unpalatable truths. “Voulez-vous la guerre?”

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he is reported to have said to one of them, the mildest mannered of men, whose Government was shamelessly trying to bully France. "Vous l'aurez!" Tableau!

For many reasons it is impossible now to touch upon the part he played in the period before and after the election of M. Poincaré to the Presidency of the Republic. Some of his action has been public, and of that his countrymen—especially those who read his daily paper, *L'Homme Enchaîné*—must make what they can. It is evident that his ideal of the Presidency is that it should be held by a man who emulates, even to political colourlessness, the strictest of constitutional monarchs. He does not think the Presidency the proper place for brilliancy or initiative. The working of the French constitution is thwarted by any interference from above. It is the Ministry, especially the Prime Minister, that must govern, and M. Clémenceau has no patience with Ministers who let the reins drag. He himself did not hesitate to incur great unpopularity by his prompt and stern suppression of the wine-growers' riots at Montpellier and Narbonne in 1907 and of the labour riot at Villeneuve Saint-Georges in 1908. He exhibited the same firmness and decision in dealing with the Casablanca incident with Germany (1908), and brought about an arbitration which resulted in favour of France. "Il a de la poigne, celui-là," the French are wont to say of him ("He has a bone in his sleeve"). Others call him *le tigre*, for he knows when to pounce, and he seldom misses. On a day of crisis you will see him pass like a tornado through the lobbies of the peaceful Senate—assuredly the best club in Paris—followed by a breathless throng of senators and journalists, unaccustomed to such rapidity. He sees to the heart of the situation in a trice, and everyone knows that he knows what is going to happen. There can be few men living who have such an "intelligent appreciation of events before they occur."

During the war his heart has been with the *poilu* in the trenches, and he has frequently visited him there. It was he who raised a tempest about the antiquated and defective medical service at the beginning of the war. He has been personally touched by its agonies. Almost the last time I went to see him he said: "I am going to pay a visit. Come with me." And he took me with him in his car. We

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stopped at a fine new building, with wide, heated corridors and white-aproned nurses silently stealing through them. One of these he stopped : " Comment ça va adjourd'hui ? " " Mieux, M. le Président, assez bien," was the reply (he is always called " M. le Président "). He opened the door from which she had just emerged, and we entered. There were two or three beds, but only one was occupied, and on it lay—one side of him all bandages—a very fine-looking boy, over whom Clémenteau bent with infinite tenderness and kissed him, asking a host of questions in low, quick words, while his breath seemed to catch. Then he presented me, and I felt it was perhaps the greatest honour of my life. The boy's shoulder had been shattered a few weeks before at Verdun. It was M. Clémenteau's grandson.

G. S.

Italy and Germany

[The most important new figure in the Orlando Cabinet is Signor Francesco Nitti, who holds the portfolio of Finance. For some time past he has been regarded as the coming man, occupying as he does a middle position between his former chief, Signor Giolitti, and the Interventionists. In order that our readers may judge of his attitude towards the war we have extracted the following passages from a reprint of his speeches and articles published late in 1916 under the title " War and Peace " (La Guerra e la Pace : Bari, Laterza and Figli).]

" Germany is and has always been a warlike country. Placed in the centre of Europe, surrounded by expanding peoples like the Slavs and warlike peoples like the French, which make up for their deficient numbers by their fighting spirit, Germany has always found in war the perennial spring of her development (p. 9). ' To organise Europe ' was a dream to which (German) commerce, finance, nationalism, even the currents of Social Democracy, flowed by various paths. This frame of mind, which found its theorist in Treitschke, has had thousands of apostles and propagandists, has been cultivated in the schools, proclaimed at the universities, reinforced by capitalist activities. *Der Staat ist Macht* : the power of the German State has accustomed its citizens not only to obedience but to admiration. . . . (p. 11). Germany was penetrated by the war spirit. It is enough to read the Reichstag discussions, political literature, the books spread in the schools, the speeches of representative men, to convince oneself that Germany, in the conviction of her superiority, regarded as a condition of development and life the great war which was to lead to the organisation of Europe according to the German type of industrial civilisation, and to the penetration of Asia. . . . (p. 12).

" The saddest thing about this war is not the destruction of riches,

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nor even the destruction of life, but the fall of a great ideal. For over a century the greatest wars that have been waged were illuminated by a ray of thought and life. When Napoleon brought war upon Europe, he also brought with him the ideal of the Revolution, and everywhere a whole world fell with feudalism, with the dynasties by right divine, with the servile quietism in which all Europe lay. Thus even his enemies, from Byron to Goethe, felt attracted towards him as towards a mysterious and divine force.

“When, on the plains of Lombardy, France and Piedmont imposed upon Austria the liberation of Italy, the whole world watched the fate of war with feelings of sympathy. Even in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when the dreams of German hegemony were unknown, it was possible for independent spirits like Carlyle to rise in defence of Germany. The great war between Russia and Japan was conducted with nobility and clemency, and never led to acts of fierce reprisal. If Japan came out of it aggrandised and powerful, Russia, too, gained force; and between the two countries there remained no lasting rancour or hatred. The German Emperor considers Russia as the barbarous northern enemy and Japan as one of those yellow races to be brought to Christianity after the educative march of the Huns. When did Russians and Japanese commit one of those acts of violence with which Germany has covered Belgium? When did they ever affirm that cruelty was needed to bring the enemy to the ground? (Pp. 17-18.)

“The present war will be settled by the victory of one of the two contending groups, and he will succumb who has less power, not only of armed, but also of civilian, resistance. Modern wars mean the participation of the whole nation, and not of a fraction of it. He who speaks now of parties, of responsibility, of struggles which have nothing to do with the war, is doing mischievous and reprehensible work. . . . Italy must unite all her forces; and every persecution, above all of men who have long served their country with honour, is to be regarded as anti-patriotic. Looking with faith to the end of the war, we must assure to our sons a life less insecure and uncertain. In the profound revolution which is now taking place in Europe, there is under different forms a phenomenon analogous to the movement of races and nations which occurred in Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries after Christ. It is not a question of a great military contest, nor merely of a struggle for predominance. It is a far deeper movement. . . .

“We must think of to-morrow, of our defence and our life (as a nation). Italy must not leave this war without having established a system of alliances such as will render her safe against fresh conflicts. We must be certain that our claims and the protection of our interests are honestly embodied in the Allied programme, and that the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean questions, in so far as they concern us, shall be solved to our satisfaction. Moreover, the system of alliances must be laid down now. The Pact of London is essentially negative, and the wise and skilful work of our Foreign Minister must transform this negative work into positive work *before the end of the war.*

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"Germany will not forget that without the honest, yet perhaps not quite friendly, concern with which Italy declared her neutrality on 2 August 1914, the battle of the Marne would have been impossible, and the Teutonic dream of power and empire would perhaps have been realised. Tenacious in her hates, she will not forget that Italian intervention in May 1915 occurred at the most critical moment for the Entente. She will not forget that it was only Italy's exit from the Triple Alliance which made Roumania's attitude possible. The Germans forget nothing, and one of the fundamental characteristics of their race is this community between past, present and future.

"If we leave the war without having guaranteed our future by solid and lasting alliances we shall be risking hours of grave difficulty for our existence. . . . I regard this as our main task at present. I am also sure that the announcement of a long-period alliance between the States now sharing the same dangers and the same hopes, would serve greatly to shorten the duration of the war, by robbing Germany of all hope of future dissensions. . . .

"Italy, by her character and moderation (*mitezza*), by the very fact that, as a country of ancient civilisation, she is not tempted into coarse violence—Italy will never be a danger in Europe. In the past she was the object of every desire, the theatre of every struggle, the admiration of every predatory race; when she was powerful she made her mark by arts and commerce. The peoples of Central Europe have, for over 1,000 years, had no other thought save the formation of the great Empire which now comes in under new forms. Hence we must have alliances which shall save us from vengeance or reprisal; but no violent or overweening act will ever come from us."

An Appeal to the Russian Soviet

[*The following open letter sent by Professor Masaryk to the Committee of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates was published by Russkoye Slovo (30 October . It deals with the instructions given by the C.S.W.D. to its representative at the Paris Conference.*]

"In the instructions there were laid down the bases for the future constitution of the whole world and, indirectly, of our people also. Consequently, I have the right to speak about them; it is also my duty, as the instructions violate the principle of self-determination of peoples, as accepted by the Russian Revolution, and also are opposed to democracy. The instructions hold to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and even establish the autonomy of Dobrudja (where there are 250,000 Turks), but say nothing about the Czechs and Slovaks who number ten millions. The people of Hus and Komenski, a people not less cultured than its oppressors, is forgotten. The Roumanians of Hungary, who number more than three millions, and almost six millions of Jugoslavs are forgotten, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are part of the Jugoslav people, are separated from their own people.

"The principle of self-determination pre-supposes not only the

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freedom, but also the union of peoples. Here the instructions are opposed to the interests of a whole number of peoples; the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Roumanians, the Jugoslavs, the Italians. Thus the instructions recognise in words the principle of self-determination of peoples, but in reality only propose its realisation through existing States. Thus it accepts the superior importance of the State over that of nationality which is the fundamental view of German Imperialism, and is opposed even to the teachings of Socialism about the State, especially to the teachings of Engels and Marx. The instructions forget that nationality itself is social, as a people that is enslaved descends to the level of a cheap working class. For that reason the Socialists of all countries recognise nationality; it is only the Scheidemanns and Bauers who incline towards the views of German Imperialism.

"The instructions which speak of self-determination of nations are opposed to the meaning of the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution. The instructions protect Austria-Hungary, forgetting that it is just this State which is the cause of the present terrible war, owing to its dishonourable Balkan policy. The authors of the instructions do not know that Austria-Hungary during the war has executed from 30 to 60 thousand people; they do not know that all the politicians and deputies from the Czecho-Slovak, Italian, and other peoples were imprisoned and condemned to death; they do not know that the Germans and the Magyars maintain their supremacy by open violence both at the elections and in the administration; they do not know that the peoples of Austria and Hungary have for centuries fought for freedom and independence. Austria-Hungary represents an open organisation of violent rule by the majority over the minority, and the instructions defend even a mediæval and an artificial State, defend a dynasty which, with the help of the army and of militarism, in alliance with a greedy aristocracy together with the Germans and the Magyars, keeps seven peoples in a state of slavery.

"Being in a position to choose between a degenerate dynasty and seven free peoples (containing a population of more than 30 millions) the instructions have taken the side of the dynasty. At the same time the instructions also defend Prussia and her militarism, to which the Poles and Danes have been sacrificed.

"Europe and mankind have been delivered from Russian Tsarism, but the Tsarisms of Prussia and Austria are to be preserved.

"The instructions wish to re-establish Belgium by means of an international fund, as though the Allies were guilty of the war just as much as Germany and Austria. The instructions make a quite incorrect distinction between an aggressive war and a war of defence. Without going into further criticisms I would contrast the instructions with the Note of the Allies to Wilson and the explanations of Wilson, Briand, Asquith, Lloyd George, and other politicians who have understood the meaning of the war, which was caused by German aggressiveness, and have quite rightly proclaimed the democratic principle of equal rights for all peoples, not only for the great,

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but also for the small. A lasting peace cannot be realised until German and Austrian Imperialism is crushed; the division of Austria-Hungary into its natural national parts is in itself a fundamental war aim. The danger of German Imperialism lies in the fact that it disposes of the Habsburgs and their Empire.

"I hope that when I return to Petrograd the Executive Committee of the C.W.S.D. will enable me to explain more fully the views of the Czecho-Slavaks on the conditions of a really lasting, just and democratic peace."

Review

The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles: Coleman Phillipson, LL.D., and Noel Buxton, M.P. (Stevens and Haynes.) 12s. 6d. Mr. Coleman Phillipson and Mr. Noel Buxton are a strong combination for dealing with that complication of inter-nationalism and nationalism that has always made the question of the Straits the nodus of the Eastern Question, and their joint work "*The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles*" is as thorough as it is timely. The collaboration is very complete, and only readers who know the work of both writers very intimately will amuse themselves by guessing where Mr. Buxton is taking counsel's opinion, or where Mr. Phillipson is relying on expert evidence. The book is divided into three parts, of which the first, in two chapters, is introductory, and includes a review of international institutions connected with waterways; the second, in eight chapters and two chapters of the third part, are historical; and the last two chapters reconstructive. Its two hundred and fifty well-printed pages are a mine of information, where the best equipped expert will find new munitions for his own particular "push," and the most inexperienced reader will feel confident that he has all the materials he requires to form his own solution. He will, however, probably find himself convinced that the settlement suggested by the authors is sufficiently satisfactory. This is—quoting from page 236—"to internationalise the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the lines of the *régime* applied to the Suez Canal, and place them, together with sufficient hinterland to safeguard the strategic position, under the administration of an International Commission, somewhat similar to that which has existed in the case of the Danube." As to Constantinople, which no settlement of the Straits question can exclude (p. 247), "the best solution in the circumstances is without doubt to constitute it a free town and place it under the conjoint protection of the Powers, including the United States."

Some such solution as this is, indeed, rather a natural development, long overdue, than an experiment requiring explanation by analogies and exposition through precedent. The one criticism that may occur to the reader is that the advantage gained by the close partnership of two authorities on different points of view of the problem—the advantage of getting a greatest common measure of

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their minds very convincing in its weight—is counterbalanced by the disadvantage of losing the greater penetrating power of the personal point of view of either partner. We would, for example, gladly have exchanged the resurrection of the views on this question, held by obsolete personalities and parties in Russia for, shall we say, the opinion of Mr. Buxton as to the extent to which the nationalism of the Near-Eastern nations, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, could be made use of for fortifying an international settlement of the Straits and Constantinople, or, for an opinion from Mr. Phillipson as to how far the existing international institutions in both the Straits and Constantinople could be utilised as a basis. To the “man in the street” sidelights from the Danube and from Suez may be illuminating—but to the “man at the wheel” a few bearings and soundings taken on the spot are far more valuable: and it is the public service of the authors of “International Law and the Great War,” and of “The War and the Balkans,” to so educate the man in the street that he can, when called on, take his trick at the wheel. That he will do so, whether called on or not, is becoming daily more probable.

But there is no criticism less profitable than that which regrets that a book does not provide what it does not profess, and if only as a book of reference, this work will be found indispensable to-day; nor is it likely to be displaced as an authority, unless the “Eastern Question” takes a new lease of life. It may do so.

G. Y.

Internal Conditions in Austria

The following statement comes from an Austrian Slav who recently gave himself up to the Russians on the Roumanian front:—“The harvest of this year has been much less plentiful than in previous years. In Istria, Dalmatia, and Bosnia the yield has been practically nil. There is a great scarcity of many necessaries of life. Clothes and footgear have reached fabulous prices; in fact, they are no longer to be bought, because the State requisitions everything in advance. Cards are issued for all articles, and tobacco is vanishing, though every soldier still gets his ounce and a half at the expense of the civilian, who has to go without. Coffee and tea are not to be had. A great financial crisis prevails throughout the land. In spite of all the military successes, the whole people is convinced that this war will be lost by the Central Powers, and therefore the whole population is crying for peace.

“It is interesting that the Roumanian and Serbian bank notes have greater value in exchange than the Austrian. During this last summer great riots occurred in many places, and particularly in Hungary and Bohemia. In Budapest the rioters took possession of a munition factory, and the revolt was not suppressed without the loss of some thousands killed and wounded.

“Every man is taken for the Army from the age of 17 to 54. Even those who have returned home as unfit on account of wounds

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have been taken back to the Army. There are many deserters who have taken refuge in the mountains and become outlaws, bidding defiance to both police and soldiery, who are unable to subdue them. In Petrovgora alone are more than 4,000 of such outlaws. With my own eyes I have seen the latest recruits for the Hungarian Army; youths and old men from the 102nd Honved Regiment marching through Budapest with rifles without *bolts*, and at their side Bosnian Mussulman soldiers marching with fixed bayonets. A similar condition of things almost prevails at the front. If the Slavs are in the firing line the Hungarians form a reserve, and the general reserve is always composed of Germans, who are there to keep discipline by force. The new Austrian Emperor Charles is endeavouring to restore discipline and raise the *moral* of the army, and therefore very often visits his troops. He looks very ill, and his health is generally very bad. He was received by the army coolly enough, in spite of the endeavours of the officers to arouse some enthusiasm. My regiment, after the offensive of General Brusiloff, was reduced to 120 men, and the other regiments did not come out of the fighting any better. Owing to their enormous losses, not only on the Russian, but also on the Italian front, the Austrians have been compelled to fill up the gaps in the regiments five or six times, and my impression is that, notwithstanding the successes of the Austrians on the various battle fields, the Russians, if they chose to take the offensive, could break through whenever they like."

Parliament and Foreign Newspapers

There is no more striking evidence of British indifference to continental politics in peace and in war than that afforded by the newspaper room of the House of Commons. The whole continent of Europe is represented by three French newspapers (of which *L'Humanité* is not one), and yet this extraordinary defect in equipment seems to arouse but little comment. It surely cannot be that our legislators are content to accept the column in *The Times* headed "Through German Eyes" as an adequate portrayal of belligerent Germany; nor can they believe that the sporadic and, frequently, tendentious telegrams of British journalists in foreign capitals are in any sense a substitute for the authentic national press of European countries. What is wanted is a liberal selection of newspapers from all important centres—there should be at least ten of the leading German papers from Berlin, Cologne, Frankfort, and Munich—and care should be taken that the newspapers of the Left and the Extreme Left are given a fair representation. We are convinced that from the moment that such a foreign section is set up in the reading room of the House of Commons it will be largely and continuously patronised. Members of Parliament are in a receptive frame of mind on all European questions and may be trusted to make full use of these newspapers. Electors, with an eye to the efficiency of Parliament, might do worse than write to their members in support of the proposal.

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Count Hertling through Austrian Eyes

The Arbeiter Zeitung of 3 November contains an article entitled "Reichskanzlerwechsel," from which we take the following paragraphs :—

"Count Hertling is 75 years old, and it is questionable if he possesses the elasticity necessary for his office, which is the most comprehensive and exacting in the world. He was for long the spokesman of the Centre on foreign policy, and is president of the Bundesrat Committee on foreign affairs. . . . When he took office in Munich, as Bavarian Premier, he had to meet the distrust of the non-Clericals and anti-Clericals, and he largely succeeded in abating it. Count Hertling is no Rupert: he eschews all adventure; and, as befits his age, he pursues his way definitely but urbanely. Though he is no leader of a forlorn hope, he has seen the power of the Centre grow great under his guidance. . . . He, who stood forth as an opponent of the parliamentary system of government in the Reichstag, was the founder of that very system in Bavaria (for light upon this contradiction see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 41, p. 34). By nature conservative, he is none the less sufficiently opportunist to understand the needs of the time, and to accommodate himself to uncongenial necessities. In him the Empire has drawn no great prize in the lottery; but, at least, he is not a dismal blank like his predecessor. In foreign policy he pursues the Bethmann tradition, with a leaning to the side of peace by negotiation. His connection with the Centre gives him some bias towards the resolution of 19 July, and his good relations with Vienna and the Vatican will influence his war aims in the right direction. He is thus in no sense to be regarded as a Chancellor after the annexationists' own heart.

"Party attitudes towards him are various. At the first whisper of his appointment the Social Democrats and Progressives were uneasy, doubtless owing to his Conservative associations. Their fears have proved false; they have made friends with him, and although they do not see in him a resolute pioneer in democratic reform, they have hopes of his adaptability. It would certainly seem that he has made his pact with the Reichstag majority and is prepared to give the parties a greater influence." *The Arbeiter Zeitung* then proceeds to say that the appointment of von Payer—"once a stalwart Swabian democrat"—is some guarantee of good intentions, though that of Friedberg, the National Liberal member of the Prussian Diet, is most ominous for Prussian electoral reform. "But, fortunately and certainly, Helfferich goes." As for the Social Democrats, Hertling offered them representation in the Government; but they refused, preferring to give him benevolent but independent support. In respect of this, *Vorwärts* declares that he has accepted the Reichstag programme "without reserve," and that "the foreign policy of the Empire will now be conducted in strict accord with the reply to the Pope." Hertling's intentions thus pass muster. But the *Arbeiter Zeitung* points out that the test of his worth will be his dealing with the Prussian franchise, and in that his Bavarian origin is a severe handicap.

An apposite entry in a political diary runs as follows: "Michaelis looked like a gargoyle; Hertling looks like nothing more than a distinguished surgeon—will he be one?"

SEP 17 1918

PRINCETON, N. J.

The New Europe

“Pour la Victoire Intégrale”

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“The statesman must design the tasks which
the strategist’s genius is to accomplish”

—*Vossische Zeitung*, 3 Nov. 1917

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The New Europe

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From Rapallo to Versailles

THE Prime Minister's speech at Paris was greeted by friend and foe alike as an event of high significance. Enemy newspapers saw in it only evidence of the desperate plight of the speaker's cause, and gloated over the prospect which it seemed to offer of a grave political crisis in London. The event will prove that their *Schadenfreude* is based on false hopes. But they have been encouraged in their expectation by the tactics adopted by some of the less discreet friends of the Prime Minister in London and elsewhere, who would fain fasten upon Mr. Asquith the responsibility for the political unrest to which the Paris speech itself gave rise. The suggestion is that the so-called crisis was due to the eager desire of Mr. Lloyd George's critics to exploit against him the rather thoughtless polemics of certain passages in that utterance. We are not here concerned with the motives of the Prime Minister's critics; and we will only say that we do not attribute to Mr. Asquith any sinister intentions whatever, nor do we consider that his speech in the House of Commons was anything but a legitimate and pertinent examination of an important departure in public policy. It would have been a better augury for the success of the new Allied Council if Mr. Lloyd George had shown the House that he felt the weight of Mr. Asquith's measured criticism, and that he had, in reality, forestalled it by his own measures. Further, we feel bound to say that the time has come for the Cabinet to declare, in unmistakable terms, that the civil power must be supreme. The crisis, if any exists, is due to a usurpation of national authority by those who do not rightly possess it, and would not be able to wield it even for a brief moment but for the hesitations of statesmen. Behind the whole press campaign of the last fortnight we can see the hands of those whose responsibilities elsewhere ought to forbid their participation in controversy. The Government have only their own pusillanimity to thank if, on the one hand, their supremacy as the first executive authority is undermined, and, on the other, the Higher Command in the Army becomes a prey to illegitimate

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polemics. Clear decisions, and the foresight which visualises the responsibilities which they create, are the superlative need of the moment.

Our chief concern, however, is to lift the debate clean out of the atmosphere of personal jealousy and purely political controversy, and to place it, if possible, in its true war setting. Stripped of its rhetoric and purged of its false history—parts of Mr. Lloyd George's narrative were, indeed, travesties of the facts—the Paris speech gave a true picture of the conduct of the war by a group of Allies, each acting on the principle of its sovereign national right. It laid great, but not excessive, stress upon the contrast presented by the practice of the enemy, and invited the Allies to take up the policy of the Rapallo agreement without any *arrière pensée*, and translate it into an effective unity of military action. Had the speaker's name not been the very symbol of polemics, had there been no controversy between "Easterner" and "Westerner," the idea of the Single Front thus presented would have raised no storm comparable to that which raged in the press a week ago. But, partly owing to the manner of its presentation, and partly owing to the tenacious preconceptions of those whom it most nearly affects, it can hardly receive the impartial consideration which it deserves. For our part, we believe that the victory of our arms will be jeopardised unless this doctrine finds adequate and immediate expression in the whole Allied conduct of the war.

The military conduct of the war lies outside the province of THE NEW EUROPE; and hitherto we have refrained from discussing it except where strategy touched broader questions of policy. We have always maintained that the divorce of strategy and policy is a fruitful cause of disaster; and we should not be guilty of labouring this truism were it not for the attempt made in certain quarters to put the civilian commentator out of court by the unwarranted assumption that the question at issue to-day is wholly military in character. Even at the cost of wearisome re-iteration we must ever insist that a matter of such moment as the co-ordination of plan and of action on all fronts is not solely a question for soldiers; it belongs to that borderland between statesmanship and strategy on which the soldier and the civilian leaders must meet for discussion on

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frank, cordial, and equal terms. When it comes to decision, however, the statesman must have the last word; for, in such a case, the crux of the matter is whether or not the military effort of three nations—four, when American power becomes effective—shall be directed on one plan or on three. And when we speak of national effort, we speak of something for which the civilian authority is alone responsible. In such a decision the soldier is a deeply interested party, too deeply interested, perhaps, to be able to give an unbiassed answer. It is neither derogation of the dignity of the soldier's calling nor a slight upon his personal worth to say that the last word belongs here to the civil statesman. With us that is the very condition of the soldier's existence, and in the long run it is a system well adapted to the British genius.

And, before we go further, let us address a word to the soldier out of his own experience in the war. During the first few months that followed the declaration of war the main theatre—practically the only theatre of any account—lay in France; and the splendid effort concentrated upon it is already enshrined in history with the names of Mons, the river Marne, and Ypres. The British Army outstripped all praise in those heroic months; but it soon also outstripped its own cadre, so to speak. Not only did its numbers grow both at home and in France, but the theatre of its operations was gradually extended to several widely-separated corners of the earth. This expansion of military effort soon compelled us to re-create the thinking part of the army *in London* by the appointment of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, upon whom was laid the duty of assessing the competing claims of each front according to a strict account of their relative importance. The Staff which had sufficed for the highly-concentrated task of the great retreat and the defence of Ypres could not possibly weigh the merits of, and justly apportion the necessary supplies to, an expeditionary force in Egypt or elsewhere. Only a central co-ordinating staff, free from the weight of responsibility for local operations from day to day, could exercise the necessary judgment. For this purpose Sir William Robertson was appointed; and, in him and his Staff, the true military adviser to the civilian Cabinet came into being.

The bearing of this experience upon the problem of to-

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day is surely clear. From one cause or another the same extension of operations, which we have described in the purely British sphere of war, has occurred over the *whole* field of war covered by the Allies. With that extension a similar need of co-ordination arose. What was required was, broadly speaking, a repetition of the process whereby the British Government acquired the necessary organ of centralised supervision. Every change in the war emphasised the defect caused by its absence. The entry of Italy, of Roumania, of America; each in a different way gave the problem greater urgency, which the Russian Revolution did not lessen. Doubtless it could not be a question of absolute centralisation by the appointment of single Commander-in-Chief for the three Allied armies in the West; but between that and the present state of affairs there are certain steps which the Prime Minister rightly invites us to take. The manner in which France has taken his proposal, and the appointment of General Foch—one of the greatest military minds in Europe—may be read as indicating two things. First, that the French, whose *flair* for the essential in military affairs is better than ours, regard the problem of co-ordination as (i) so far unsolved; (ii) not insoluble; (iii) capable of solution on the lines of the Rapallo agreement. Second, that they do not regard the post of military adviser to the new Allied Council as an infringement of, or as incompatible with, the Commander-in-Chief's legitimate authority or liberty of action. In our own case there would have been less conflict of opinion and personality if the British nominee had been chosen in a manner which indicated a real accord between Downing Street and its military advisers. As it is, we are bound to say that the memory of the Calais Conference and of General Nivelle's three-day tenure of a military post of unprecedented eminence is sufficient to put the High Command on its guard against the hasty action of civil ministers. But all these minor *contretemps*, personal or accidental, are the merest flotsam on the surface of a great current setting in a true direction. We recognise their importance only because a certain tact and sagacity are necessary to deal with them; but we refuse to turn aside into the desert of polemics to which they lead, because the main road to victory is our only care.

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Our argument would be incomplete if we did not say a word to the Government on what we regard as the fundamental origin of the whole trouble. In a recent article, entitled "Strategie und Politik" (*Vossische Zeitung*, 3 November), Herr Georg Bernhard said "... the statesman must design the tasks which the strategist's genius is to accomplish. That has never been the case with us. From the very outset our statesmen have had the task imposed upon them of finding solutions for the problems which our military successes have created." It would be a great comfort to read such words from an enemy pen if we were not conscious of their all-too-close application to ourselves. Enemy statesmanship has been as great a failure as enemy strategy has been a success. Let us thank Heaven for it, else we had, indeed, been undone. But our statesmanship, except in the conspicuous instance of America, has also been gravely at fault. When we speak of a lack of military co-ordination, we are conscious that its true origin lies in a region far deeper than that of strategy. There has been a lack of unity in idea, a failure to clarify the spiritual purpose of the war by any common accord upon it. Just as in the military sphere we did not quickly accommodate ourselves to a new situation, so in the political sphere we acquired but a halting conception of the change wrought, for instance, by the Russian Revolution. Politely, but coolly, we received the Russian request for a conference on war-aims, and we showed no eagerness to assist the more responsible Russian Revolutionaries against those who were spreading calumnies about our intentions. Our coldness only served to deepen suspicion against us, and to swell the ranks of those who wished to break Russia's alliance with the Western Powers. With that lack of imagination which dogs our every step we failed to see that our contribution to stable government in Russia was to allay suspicion by instant action, to deprive the wreckers of their chief weapon against us by accepting the Russian invitation and preparing for a conference. We have no desire to exaggerate the influence of British action upon recent phases of the Russian Revolution, but we cannot escape the uneasy feeling that part of the moral responsibility for Kerenski's fall lies upon us for our failure to succour him in the manner suggested above. Is this not yet another instance of our failure to think in terms of the Single

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Front? And if we have failed thus to place the political problem of the Russian Revolution in its true setting, is not the failure of military co-ordination elsewhere due to the same cause? We under-estimate none of the difficulties that stand in the way of complete co-ordination. The great diversity of national psychology is one of the chief of them, and to it a British Government should pay heed, for it is just in that region that the British mind goes easily astray. Other difficulties will quickly present themselves to our readers; but they must not be magnified into insurmountable obstacles. The Allies must show the measure of their belief in the doctrine of the Single Front by overcoming them. They will thus prove that the cause which unites us is greater than that of any one of its partisans, that the new Europe, now being forged in the fires of war, can evoke a new patriotism in those who serve it.

Why Russia cannot make a Separate Peace

THE Bolševik leaders have proclaimed a Government in Petrograd, but they do not govern either in Petrograd or in Russia. Their theories of Government might, perhaps, be applied with success in a new Laputa or Erewhon, but are utterly impossible under the conditions that prevail at the present day. Lenin and Trotski take no account in their foreign policy of Russia's particular interests. To them the Russian Revolution meant not so much the liberation of the Russian people as the first stage in a world-wide war of classes. Far from being pacifists, they are the theorists of a world-war more terrible than the present one. They would set not nation against nation, but class against class, and for this sacred end no means is to be scorned, not even the taking of German gold. But Lenin and his followers are not German agents; the only thing German about them is their aggressiveness. Leninite militancy, with its hymn of hate against the bourgeoisie, is as great a danger to civilisation as Prussian militarism. It is well, therefore, that Lord Robert Cecil should have made it clear that the British Government has "no intention of recognising such a Government." Any attempt at compromise with them would be as useless as

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it would be undignified, and would be opposed to the interests of Russia and of durable peace.

It was this spirit of class militancy that was utterly repugnant to Kerenski. While Lenin stood for the exclusive interests of one class, Kerenski strove to unite all parties. Events may have proved such a union of parties a well-nigh impossible task, but in attempting it Kerenski's instinct was sound. The alternative course, the appeal to force and strong government, would, in the beginning, have still further widened the differences of class. Kerenski was haunted by the spectre of civil war; he saw the danger and he strove to avert it, not by violence, but by conciliation. He could not secure peace at home because he could not secure it abroad. He neither could nor would conclude a separate peace, because he knew that peace could only be had by fighting those who stood in its way. He failed to secure peace, and he failed to make his countrymen wage war. And so they deserted him and turned to others whose promises were more attractive. It was not the teaching of Lenin that made them Bolševiks. The class war, as preached by him, makes little appeal to them; what they want is not war, but peace. Lenin's Government stands or falls by its success in satisfying the desire for peace.

Peace between Germany and Russia is impossible until there is a stable Government in Russia. It is impossible both from the German and the Russian point of view. Lenin has now come forward with his promise of peace, which he cannot redeem because there can be no point of contact between a bourgeois and Imperialist Government and an anti-bourgeois and anti-Imperialist Government. There are no common terms that they could agree upon. Granted that Lenin cares nothing for Russia nor the interests of Russia as a nation, that the "self-determination of nationalities" is a mere idle phrase on the lips of a man whose very theories fly in the face of the national idea (as understood by all except the Bolševiks), nevertheless, he is the sworn foe of all bourgeois Governments, and however little he may care for the rights of nationalities, he cannot conclude peace with a Government that refuses to renounce annexations. For he knows that to make peace with a Germany that annexed the territory she had won in the war would be the death-blow to the class war in Germany.

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Thus, whatever offers of peace the Bolševiks may make, they cannot succeed. Germany must refuse such a peace in her own interests, however good the terms may appear. In the first place, she knows that neither Russia, as a whole, nor her Allies, would recognise such a peace, and that a new Russian Government in the future might disown it. The advantages she would gain by a Bolševik peace are negligible, whereas the difficulties and dangers it would cause her are manifest. It would not profit her either in a territorial, a military, or an economic sense, whereas it would cause dangers at home that she cannot afford to risk. The Independent Socialists in Germany have demanded a separate peace with Russia; if the German Government gave way to them, it would strengthen the influence of the very parties it fears most. The readiness of the German Government to conclude a separate peace with Russia has been made a test case by the Socialists. But apart from dangers at home, what are the advantages to be gained abroad? Germany has set her heart upon annexations in the East in the interests of national defence. As a military State she must secure her Eastern frontier and guard herself against the unknown Russia of the future. The Bolševiks, whose main idea is a revolution in Germany, cannot make such concessions.

Again, from the point of view of Germany's economic interests, a stable Government and a non-Bolševik Government is essential in Russia. With America arrayed against her, Germany knows that her trade in the West, if it is not entirely cut off, will labour under many difficulties. After the war she will be faced with appalling economic conditions, and it is to Russia that she now turns as a future field for exploitation. But what economic concessions can she hope for from a Bolševik Government that is fundamentally opposed to all forms of foreign capitalism and will not offer any security of life and property?

The chief advantage, however, that Germany would gain from a separate peace will be military. At first sight this advantage would appear decisive, and so it would be if it enabled Germany and Austria to transfer their divisions from the Eastern to the Western front. But here again there are complications. A separate peace between Tsarist Russia and Germany would have offered some security, but

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not so with a Russia in a state of anarchy. Even in the event of a separate peace with the Bolševiks, Germany would have to maintain a strong cordon of troops on her frontiers to keep out marauding bands. Even if such a revolution as the Russian had broken out in time of peace, Germany would have had to mobilise part of her armies and keep them on the frontiers. Under present conditions, a strong army in the East will always be necessary until Europe again settles down to a general peace. It is true that she may be able to spare several divisions for a new offensive in the Balkans or in Italy, but she can never strip her Eastern frontiers of anything like the bulk of the troops she now holds there. The populations of the territories she has conquered in Courland, Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine are her enemies; once the German armies were removed they could rise in open revolt. But the greatest danger of all lies in the uncertainty as to what may happen in Russia itself. It is inconceivable, and the Germans know it, that the Bolševiks can govern Russia; even now, when they are at the zenith of their power, their authority is disputed in the places where they are strongest. The Germans, like the Bolševiks, are haunted by the fear that a strong Government may again arise in Russia, and that Russia will again count for what she really is.

RURIK.

New Lamps for Old in Spain

THE Spanish crisis was no mere change of Cabinet: it was a change of system. One may say that, unless the hopes set on it are suddenly shattered by an unforeseen movement or rendered sterile by the uncompromising attitude of the Left, the system called in Spain "the Restoration" is dead and gone. This system, as was explained in *THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 32, was essentially based on an artificial Government, which, though devised on a constitutional pattern, was nothing but a political machine worked by an oligarchy, and defended against internal trouble by the combined action of the Army and the Church. This political machinery rested on the principle of the division of the available personnel into two monarchical organisations, called the Liberal and the

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Conservative parties. The doctrinal differences between these two parties were never clear in theory, still less in practice, since in all matters of real interest the policy of the Government was previously submitted to all the partners of the system, including the Church, the Army and the Crown. Both branches of the political machinery were intimately connected with trade and finance, and this fact, together with the numerous personal and interest relations between the two parties contributed to make the Spanish political world a kind of big family, if not very harmoniously united, at least not divided beyond any possibility of co-operation.

It is well known that the working principle of the system was the alternate enjoyment of power by both parties, a principle which those parties faithfully respected, so that a period of two years became the recognised unit at the end of which Government and Opposition exchanged places. This change took place in the following way:—The Government, representing the party in office, having run its course, resigned for some reason or other, usually pressure from the Opposition. Thereupon the King called in the head of the Opposition, *i.e.*, the head of the other party, and *granted him his confidence*. This formula meant that the King signed a decree dissolving the Cortes, to be produced by the new Premier whenever his Home Secretary advised him that the necessary arrangements for the general election were completed. These arrangements, prominent among which were the appointment of new governors and new mayors for all the provinces and municipalities of Spain, were of such an elaborate character that the Home Secretary was usually in a position to draft a list of candidates which was a very close forecast of the composition of the future Parliament. In this list there were three types of members: members from uncontrolled districts (Republicans, Socialists, Carlists, usually elected in the big towns and some country constituencies of the north); Government members; "His Majesty's Opposition" members. The sum total of the constituencies included in the second and third categories varied but little, whether the Government which *made* the elections was Conservative or Liberal, but the number of controlled constituencies which voted Liberal or Conservative naturally changed according to the party which enjoyed His Majesty's confidence. Thus, ultimately, His Majesty's choice was ever confirmed by the

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vote of a majority of controlled constituencies, and the constitutional fiction was respected.

Neither morally nor politically can this system be defended. Yet it has an historical explanation which, in the heat and passion of reform, the new generation tends to overlook. When the accession of Alfonso XII. put an end to the period of political chaos which began with a premature revolution in 1868, the nation was composed of an overwhelming majority of ignorant and indifferent peasants and two small minorities of extremists; a Republican and Radical element, which included part of the middle classes and most of the workers, and a Carlist element, the main strength of which lay in the mountainous districts of the north, the middle classes and the old aristocracy. Universal suffrage was a practical impossibility. Yet Sagasta, the head of the Liberal party, passed it into law. Cánovas, the Conservative chief, and the real leader of the Restoration, at once set to work with a view to turning the new electoral law into a Government instrument which would supply a working basis for a stable policy, since the lack of all moderate opinion in the country made full political life incompatible with order. *Order* became the motto of the Restoration, and it must be owned that if the forty years during which the *régime* has been working have not brought Spain anything else, they have at least secured it a period of stability during which the country has reached a state of political and economic maturity which is the real cause of the present crisis.

For, in spite of its complexity, the crisis which the Restoration is undergoing may be summed up by saying that the nation feels grown up, and calls upon its tutors to relinquish their function and to emancipate it. And the trouble need not have arisen had the tutors realised this fact as well as they did the advantages and privileges of their position. The nation had been undergoing a continuous evolution towards moderation in politics. The two extremist parties of Spain are not of equal origin. Carlism and, in general, ultramontane opinions are a remainder of the old world, spots of absolutism which linger here and there, untouched by the light of the French Revolution. But Radicalism is born of the French Revolution itself. For a whole century the progressive part of Spain has received its ideas through the medium of France. Progress and republic,

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liberty and anti-Clericalism, were synonyms in Spain. All the evils of Spanish political life, those inherent in it as well as those which still await a remedy in every other nation on earth, were laid at the door of the *régime*—a task made the easier by the political mistakes of those responsible for the *régime* itself. The natural extremism and even oppositionism of the Spanish character was thus fostered by a Republican bias due to the predominance of French culture. But with the treaty of Paris, which put an end to the Spanish-American war, the intellectual life of the country took a different course. More attention was directed to the real facts of the case, as against mere political theories suggested as remedies for them. Writers like Joaquin Costa, Macias Picavea, Ganivet, showed conclusively that the evils of Spain could not be explained away by a kind of esoteric action of the Crown, but had deep historical, racial, geographical sources. The theory of the incompatibility of the Monarchy with the regeneration of the country vanished at the first attack of really vigorous thought. Meanwhile, growing numbers of Spanish students—through private or State action—were sent abroad to complete their studies. The experience they acquired was not limited to the university. They observed material and intellectual life as well. They learnt in Germany that efficiency is universal under a Kaiser; in England, that the liberty of the subject is unlimited under a King; in France, that all is not well with the Republic. The lesson of *Realpolitik*, learnt in 1898, turned people's minds towards facts and immediate, though moderate, results. A sense of proportion was awakened in the middle classes. People began to think of ways and means, of the action of time, of the virtues of compromise.

The change was particularly marked in the evolution of the Catalan party and the secession of the Reformist party from the anti-dynastic block. The aim of the Catalan party is home rule for Catalonia. Born among poets and orators, it went at first through a platonic period, during which most of its energy was spent in floods of passionate eloquence against "the Castilian foe." Eloquence is not altogether useless in politics. It attracts the many and gathers the crowd which will ultimately be shaped into a party. But it has its risks. The two modern leaders of Catalanism realised them. Señor Prat de la Riba, whose untimely death several

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months ago all Catalans deplore, directed most of his time and energy towards the creation of Catalan institutions, mainly educational and economic, and thereby gave his party all the weight and prestige which go with knowledge and actual achievements. He was an administrator and an organiser. Señor Cambó is more of a political leader. Señor Cambó has enlarged the scope of his party by convincing it of the necessity of democratising Spain and popularising regionalism in the whole country as the surest way to Catalan home rule. This new orientation of the Regionalist party, which transforms it from a local into a national force, is of great importance, for the Catalans bring into the sphere of Spanish politics an element which is, at the same time, moderate and hostile to the artificial system of government.

Another similar attempt was the formation of the Reformist party in 1912, which meant the rallying under the Monarchy of most of the intellectual forces of Republicanism with a view to giving political expression to such forces in the *bourgeoisie* which, though hostile to the artificial system, were unwilling to enter the ranks of anti-dynastic parties. The creation of the Reformist party put at the disposal of the Crown an instrument of political renovation which might have eased the task of adapting old ways to new situations. At first the attitude of the Crown towards the new party justified the highest hopes. Yet time went by, and the Reformist party saw many opportunities go past without a movement from the Crown to break through the set system of parties and enlarge the basis on which the throne stood. It is difficult to understand the attitude of the Crown towards the Reformist party. That help offered by the ability and prestige of modern educated Spain should be refused, and that a monarchy beset with fanatics right and left should discourage the new valuable recruits and drive them back into the enemy camp, would be incredible were it not a fact. Whatever the cause of it, there is no doubt that if the 1912 movement from the Left towards the Crown had been reciprocated by a movement, however small, from the Crown towards the Left, the events of last August would have been avoided.

As it is, the summer of 1917 saw a final effort from the country to seize power and destroy the artificial system which usurped it for the last forty years. The attack was almost simultaneously launched by three separate forces :

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the working classes; the "Assembly"; the Army Committees. Though having one aim in common—namely, the overthrow of the party system—these three forces acted without co-ordination. Indeed, their attempts were so unconnected as really to constitute three parallel movements wholly independent, so that the fact that they were simultaneous is but a further proof of their historical necessity.

The intervention of the army, which was decisive, is the most surprising. Yet its evolution seems to have followed the same line from particular to general interests which ultimately explains the action of the Regionalists and that of the working classes. Just as the Regionalists decided to democratise Spain in order to attain home rule, just as the working classes were driven to seek more political liberty in order better to fight their economic battles, so the army officers have declared that they came to politics because they despaired of reorganising the army under the old *régime*. The prejudice against intervention by the army in civil matters is not smaller in Spain than in France or in England. Yet the Army Committees managed to present their case in a very favourable light. They claim to have acted in the general interest and not for the sake of military power; they demand a Government free from party ties, and capable of presiding over genuine general elections, and, what is more remarkable still, they have acted up to their claim. Since the collapse of the August revolutionary attempt the Army Committees have been the real masters of Spain. Colonel Marquez, their leader, had in his hand the whole of the armed forces of the country. His secretariat of seventeen officers received every day more than a thousand letters. He was consulted by cabinet ministers and political leaders; he received emissaries from the King; yet nobody can say that he and his fellow-officers have used their power otherwise than for the common good—when the very abnormal position in which they found themselves, and for which they frankly apologise, is once accepted. Their demand is the minimum demand of the whole country, namely, that the country should be heard. True, their intervention in the August troubles was directed against the working classes, which, in a certain sense, were the left wing of the movement which had its centre in the "Assembly" and its right in the Army Committees. But the general strike had for its aim the overthrow, not only

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of the party system, but of the Monarchy as well, and that the officers were resolved not to tolerate. Yet it is typical of their attitude towards the people that they have since made a special grievance against the fallen Government of that fact that the Cabinet allowed the strike to develop into a revolutionary attempt in the hope, they say, of dividing the people and the army by putting the army under an obligation of shooting down the people. The accusation is to be found in a published letter from Colonel Marquez to General Primo de Rivera, the Minister of War in the late Government. Once the Crown had been saved—and saved by them—the officers went on to help the movement of “Renovation” for which the Assembly was agitating. Their threatening attitude forced Señor Dato to abolish the censorship which Señor Sanchez Guerra, the Home Secretary, had been skilfully utilising in order to prejudice the country against the Assembly and the Committees. But once the censor was gone, the movement made up in a week all the time it had lost in two months’ forced silence. So that the message to the King which the officers had prepared as the last effort to force Señor Dato out of office was unnecessary. The King saw in time the driving power of the Assembly and wisely resolved not to countenance any longer the open hostility which Señor Dato showed towards it.

Meanwhile the Assembly had come to an agreement as to its immediate aims. They consisted in the convocation of a constituent Cortes in order to secure the reform of those articles of the Constitution which allowed the Crown to dissolve Parliament and to convoke it at will, and, therefore, to choose its ministers without any national control. So that when the King called Señor Cambó to the Palace for a consultation on the crisis, Señor Cambó, who had all along acted as the leading spirit of the Assembly, was in a position to submit to the King a definite programme to the acceptance of which the Assembly subordinated any co-operation of its members in a cabinet.

The negotiations of Señor Garcia Prieto, which culminated in the formation of the new Cabinet, have caused a split in the Assembly. Two Regionalists have entered the Cabinet; Señor Ventosa, the new Finance Minister, is the lieutenant of Señor Cambó; Señor Rodés, the new Minister of Education, is a very able Republican deputy, who has joined the

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Regionalists. The Reformists claim that Señor Garcia Prieto has not pledged himself to an election of constituent, but only of ordinary, Cortes, and, therefore, accuse the Regionalists of breach of contract. Señor Cambó alleges that the new Cabinet exactly follows the lines which he advised the King, namely, a coalition Cabinet with a non-political Home Secretary, in order to preside over genuine and impartial general elections. As for the character of the future Cortes, it is, Señor Cambó argues, for the Cortes to determine, since all Spanish Cortes can alter the constitution if they so decide. On the whole, it seems that Señor Cambó's position is quite sound. There is, of course, the danger that the old-system elements in the Cabinet may try to wreck the movement of renovation by wrangling, dodging and delaying; but the two Regionalist ministers are there to prevent that, as they have already made clear in a separate note which they gave to the papers after having signed the very mild profession of faith of the Cabinet. This is also the line which Señor Lerroux, himself no Moderate, has taken. The Government has the advantage of being backed by the Army Committees; and the opposition of the Left to Señor Lacierva, certainly an objectionable name to all true Liberals, may be considered as a mere declaration of principle, since the Cabinet does not come to stay and govern, but merely to carry the nation on to the general election and to see that the new Cortes are elected without a shadow of official fraud. The best proof of their sincerity that they can give the nation is to bring in a House which will dismiss them at the first sitting.

S. DE MADARIAGA.

The Ishii-Lansing Agreement

THE exchange of diplomatic Notes at Washington on 2 November between Mr. Lansing, representing the Government of the United States, and Viscount Ishii, the special envoy representing the Government of the Mikado, is clearly one of the most important events of extra-European policy during these momentous years. It marks the close of a period which Mr. Lansing himself has not hesitated to describe as "critical" in relations between two great nations. This phase took the British public by surprise. Pre-occupied by events nearer at hand and by the pressing problems of the European war, it had neither the time nor the means

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to follow the political situation in the Far East. But its attention once called to it, it could not fail to grasp the importance of the subject.

It is well known that a "Japanese Question" existed in America and an "American Question" in Japan. In the Russo-Japanese War American sympathies were with Japan, and even took the concrete form of financial help. But when Japanese policy assumed, or seemed to assume, an expansive tendency to the detriment of the other Far Eastern peoples, public opinion in America changed. The question of Japanese immigration to the Pacific Slope, where the social, economic, and political status of the yellow immigrants was viewed with disfavour, constituted a serious obstacle to friendly relations between the two States. The immigration of cheap labour threatened various powerful American workmen's organisations. On the other hand, the measures taken by the Federal Government and by the States of the Far West seemed to run counter to Japan's economic interests and touched the susceptibilities of a people which, unlike its Eastern neighbours, has preserved intact its ancient pride of race.

During the world war the problem of Japanese immigration naturally fell into the background. But another and far graver question arose providing possibilities of conflict—namely, the question of China. Ever since Japan began to realise her dream of taking an equal place among the great Powers of the world, she has naturally turned her eyes towards China, with which her economic and industrial future is bound up. Japan is a poor country, has a surplus of labour, and is lacking in coal and iron. Her industries, inspired by a curious spirit of conservatism, only compete in the world markets with the great industries of the West by reason of the extreme skill of her business men. China can furnish Japan with the raw materials which she needs to create modern industrial products, and with her vast population she can also supply a market capable of absorbing all the manufactured goods that Japan can ever hope to turn out. It is thus natural that the centre of gravity of Japanese foreign policy should lie in China; and the world-war has brought Japan fresh opportunities of development in that country. As the great European Powers saw themselves driven step by step towards *désintéressement* in the Far East, Japan's activity in that field tended to grow more intense.

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Meanwhile America viewed with disapproval the prospect of so enormous an increase of power for Japan as the political absorption of China would have involved. Having grown rich during the period of neutrality and being partially debarred from European markets, American finance followed with ever-growing interest the possibilities of trade and investment offered by the huge Chinese market. The Americans were afraid that Japan, even if she did not openly oppose them, might place diplomatic obstacles in their way. Thus, for example, American capitalists were planning the regulation of the Yellow River and thus checking the periodic floods and changes of course which check the development of one of the richest districts in the world. But the Chinese Government refused the concession, and this refusal was ascribed to Japanese influence behind the scenes. Incidents of this kind were regarded by many Americans as indicative of a regular system.

In the diplomatic attitude of the two countries towards China the difference was even more marked than in the field of economics. When the Chinese revolutionaries first proclaimed the republic, America was the first Power to recognise the new form of government, to congratulate China, and to welcome her "as a new free nation in the Congress of the Nations,"—a message which certainly had no welcome sound in the ears of Japanese Chauvinists. On the other hand, when Japan, in the spring of 1915, presented an ultimatum to China in order to wrest from her real concessions in Manchuria, in the province of Fu-Kien, and in Eastern Mongolia, as well as political concessions bordering suspiciously upon a renunciation of sovereignty, America protested and declared that she would oppose such concessions wherever they might conflict with American interests. When this year America broke off relations with Germany she invited China, as all the other neutral States, to follow her example. China accepted advice which offered her a possibility of political and economic regeneration; indeed, her action was an attempt to shake off the moral hegemony of Japan and to free herself from the indemnities imposed by Europe for the Boxer massacres.

The tension between America and Japan culminated when last spring the *coup d'état* in China restored the Emperor for a few days to his throne, and when the struggle between

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north and south, whose causes are still obscure, assumed an acute and violent character. On 4 June President Wilson addressed a Note to China, pointing out that her participation in the European war was of secondary importance, and that her main care must be the maintenance of internal order. Some Americans interpret this Note as a direct hint to Japan, who was accused of stirring up strife in China—though, of course, the proofs of such a charge were not forthcoming. At the same time America requested Japan, Britain and France to back up her request with the Chinese Government. But the Japanese Government, in reply, challenged the right of the United States to interfere in China's internal affairs, adding that in any case they ought to have previously come to an agreement with Japan and the other Powers with a view to collective action, instead of producing a *fait accompli*, and inviting the latter to support American initiative. Great Britain, for her part, replied that "while greeting with sympathy the principles laid down by the United States, she must naturally consider the matter from a point of view slightly different from that of America, and, therefore, could not do all that President Wilson desired." There thus seemed to be a real disagreement. Great Britain, bound to Japan by definite agreements respecting the Far East, could not, of course, evade them. On the other hand, her situation between two Allies was distinctly delicate, and a definite solution seemed unattainable save through the direct initiative of one or other of the interested parties. It was then that Japan decided to send a mission to the United States, as her European Allies had already done, and to place at its head one of her most skilful and trusted diplomats, Viscount Ishii, former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Government of Tokio declared that the Mission to President Wilson merely aimed at proving Japan's friendship and desire to co-operate in the common struggle; in other words, that it was merely an act of courtesy towards a new and powerful ally. No one accepted this explanation. It was obviously improbable that a man of Viscount Ishii's weight, a profound specialist in matters of foreign policy, should have been sent across the Pacific merely for the sake of official banalities when questions of such vital urgency

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and importance were pending between the two countries. And the unprecedented official honours, elaborately offered to the Mission in a series of banquets and receptions, which lasted nearly a fortnight, blinded no one to the fact that something more than lavish courtesy was on foot.

The Notes exchanged on 2 November show that Viscount Ishii's mission was even more comprehensive and important than the shrewdest observers had guessed. America recognises Japan's "special interests" in China, but explicitly upholds Chinese territorial sovereignty. Japan, on the other hand, adheres to the principle of the Open Door, which offers to all nations equal commercial and industrial opportunities in the Chinese market. In a certain sense America recognises a Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" with regard to China, while Japan undertakes not to hamper American capital or trade in China. The agreement, if faithfully observed, is destined to inaugurate a new and happy era in the political relations of America and Japan. For the present there can be no doubt; President Wilson's moderation in foreign policy is well known. The less conciliatory actions of Japan towards China were the work of the late Cabinet, whose head, Marquis Okuma—according to the general opinion in America—was more under Chauvinist influence than the present Premier, Field-Marshal Terauchi, who, though a soldier by profession, seems to be in touch with liberal elements in Japan.

The Ishii-Lansing agreement closes a period of tension which had lasted for about two years, and which, though it had largely escaped the notice of French and British public opinion, had not been ignored by German statesmen, as was shown by Herr von Zimmermann's attempt last January to unite Mexico and Japan against the United States. The Germans calculated that the detachment of Japan from the Entente would not merely neutralise the value of American intervention, but would also ensure the reconstruction of the Far East after the war on German lines, and the collapse of the system erected by the shrewd policy of Great Britain during the past half century. The programme was seductive but its success problematical, as Zimmermann himself admitted when publicly defending his action. Japanese psychology is fundamentally indisposed towards such *revirements*. In any case the skill of the secret

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agents of the State Department at Washington made it possible to publish the document before it reached its goal, and thus to destroy its whole effect.

American intervention in the European war was bound to lead automatically to a *rapprochement* between the two countries. If the formidable preparations which the United States is now making by land and by sea are read by the militarists of Japan as a serious warning for the future, her statesmen, under the influence of liberal ideas, are finding, and will find, it far easier to deal frankly with a loyal ally than with a neutral whose attitude was doubtful. For it must not be forgotten that to-day China, Japan, and America are in substance, if not in form, Allies. It is, however, certain that Germany has involuntarily been of the greatest possible service to the *rapprochement* between Japan and America, by showing them both, in the Mexican affair, the need for direct contact and explicit agreements, in their common interest. Thus the situation of a year ago has really been reversed. The desire for an understanding exists not only among the politicians of both countries, but also in public opinion. In America, while the sceptics are diminishing in number and importance, there is a strong current growing both among the intellectuals and in financial and commercial circles, in favour of still closer friendship between America and Japan. Events are moving in a direction which cannot fail to strengthen such tendencies, and this will be greatly to the advantage of world-policy after the war, since Japan's adhesion to the policy of the Open Door in China is a fresh and very essential adhesion to President Wilson's principle of "international collaboration." It is also to the advantage of the Entente in the conduct of the war, since it eliminates friction which constituted a real diminution of force.

The benefits resulting from this new-found friendship are taking a concrete form. In the first months after intervention the American Government embarked on an ambitious shipbuilding programme, and imposed an embargo on the export of steel plates to Japan in order to complete her own programme of naval construction. Japan was thus reminded of those material links which, no less than common aims and ideals, bind together all the Allies. When Japan undertook to employ her new ships in the manner most favourable to the common interest, and to make

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Japanese liners at once available for trans-Atlantic service, the embargo was withdrawn. The agreements on this point between Japan and the Entente were concluded through the medium of America.

After over three years of alliance, we still have not any clear idea of the way in which Japan can most effectively employ her resources for the common victory. If political events in Russia and military events on other fronts had not moved so fast, it is clear that a form of joint Japanese-American action in Russia could have been devised which would have strengthened the Eastern Front without wounding Russian feelings. Meanwhile, until new opportunities for closer co-operation arise, Japan can build ships for the Allies. The negotiations between America and Japan seem, for the moment, to centre on this point. America can furnish the necessary raw material, and, if required, can finance new loans, while Japan has no lack of labour. Some of the shipbuilding yards have a world-wide reputation, and have recently paid special attention to rapidity of construction. Last August a telegram from Tokio announced that a Japanese yard at Kobi had beaten the world record by launching a standardised cargo steamer of 6,000 tons within one hundred days of signing the contract, while the average time for urgent construction of this kind had been fixed in the chief yards of Europe and America at six months. This Japanese industry is capable of very great development, and if assisted from America with raw materials and capital, will provide a war contribution of the greatest value. Merchant shipping is the chief need of the present hour; America and Asia can come to the aid of Europe by co-operating in supplying it.

ALDO CASSUTO.

The "Quarterly Review" and Greece

THE Autumn number of the *Quarterly Review* contains an unsigned article on "The Final Settlement in the Balkans." With much of the article we agree. The writer believes in the creation of a united Jugoslavia and a greater Roumania, and realises that we shall not have won the war unless we are in a position to insist on such a solution. We differ from him on certain points in his treatment of the

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Southern Slav and Roumanian boundaries, and his attitude to Montenegro and Albania is open to criticism. We are not, however, for the moment concerned with these questions. If he assigns portions of Serbia and Roumania to Bulgaria, he only does so on the definite understanding that both countries will have immeasurably greater compensation to the North-West. Such compensation he incorporates in his map. With Greece it is another matter. The writer (p. 368) talks vaguely of Greece possibly obtaining "her legitimate expansion in the islands of the Levant and on the coast of Asia Minor." But in his map he does not incorporate such possibilities in his "proposed frontiers." On the other hand, the map definitely assigns to Bulgaria the whole of the Kavalla-Drama district, and a stretch of territory about 125 miles by 25 from the Struma to Lake Castoria; while North Epirus is given to a reconstituted Albania.

It is not our purpose, for the moment, to argue out the details of these suggestions. As to their merits, we would only enter this caveat. No one would deny that there are a certain number of Slavs in Greek Macedonia. They are infinitesimally few compared with the masses of Greeks who would be placed under Bulgarian rule if, as this map also suggests, Bulgaria were given Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line. In the latter case the writer brushes ethnology aside, and talks of "the Greek fringe on the sea coast" as constituting no valid objection to the strong political reasons for allowing Bulgaria to take Thrace and secure a seaboard. But he fails to see that the Slav inland fringe in Greek Macedonia is equally no objection to giving Greece much needed "back-country" for her commercial and maritime enterprise. This argument has always been valid, but it has gained force from the results of the last four years. Since the Treaty of Bucarest, a certain number of Bulgarians, probably some 50,000, have left Greek Macedonia and followed their flag. A far greater number of Greeks, at least 200,000, have already left Turkey and Bulgaria to settle in Greek Macedonia. There are over 2,000,000 that have not yet come. There is a tendency, though as yet it is only a tendency, for the mixed population of the Near East to concentrate within the boundaries of the states to which ethnically they belong. Does the "Quarterly

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Reviewer" realise that the whole Greek race is at least 8,000,000 strong, and that the whole Bulgarian race is only 5,000,000 strong? How, then, is it just or farseeing of him to assign Bulgaria an area which is about double that of the Kingdom of Greece? Greece imperatively needs every square mile of territory which she at present possesses.

Our immediate criticism on the *Quarterly Review* is not a matter of detail. It is that it has apparently not occurred to the editor that it is offensive to our Allies to draw maps assigning their territory to their enemies. The article is unsigned, and written without passion. If we really had a right to sit in judgment on our friends' property, and, in the writer's words, "to impose a settlement from above," the impartial superior-person tone might lend authority to the pronouncement. As it is, it will exasperate beyond measure.

If the *Quarterly Review* represented, which happily it does not, the views of our Government, why should Greece be our Ally? It is notorious that Germany guaranteed to Greece her existing boundaries if she remained neutral. Is Greece expected to go to war in order to lose territory? There are surely some limits to altruism. Venizelos is a moderate man, and free from any kind of Chauvinism. The *Quarterly Review*, however, may rest assured that no one would more indignantly reject such a solution. No one, too, would feel greater surprise that such an indiscretion should have been committed in a respectable English journal.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

M. Clémenceau

Mr. H. M. Hyndman writes:—"I well remember the occasion to which 'G. S.' refers when he came to M. Clémenceau's flat in the Rue Clément Marot. At that time Clémenceau did not think his relative Boulanger was so dangerous as he really then was. My opinion is that Boulanger would have beaten Constans and the Republicans, including Clémenceau, had he possessed half the latter's capacity and courage. The victory might have been short-lived, but he would have won for the time being. The feeling against the *bourgeois* Republic at that juncture was both widespread and bitter. Happily, Boulanger let the chance slip, and the opportunity for a reactionary stroke has never recurred.

"In regard to M. Clémenceau himself, a few further details concerning his career may not be out of place. It is now almost forgotten that he is a doctor of medicine, and that, like two or three of his immediate forbears, who were landed proprietors, he treated his

M. CLEMENCEAU

patients gratuitously. This practice he carried on in Paris, before the war of 1870 and the Commune. He naturally and deservedly gained great influence among the poor of one of the most populous districts in Paris on that account, and first came to the front as representative of Batignolles. Though, unfortunately, from my point of view, not a Socialist, and convinced, as he told me in 1889, that Socialism would never become a power in France, Clémenceau has always been a thorough-going Republican and fearless upholder of personal freedom and public fair play for all. He carried his Radicalism so far, and was such a terrible antagonist for all Clericals and reactionists that it is well that his extraordinary skill with rapier and pistol rendered him too formidable a person for the fire-eaters and *coup-d'état*-ists to challenge. Throughout the Dreyfus affair Clémenceau was one of the principal champions of justice for that officer. Not that he admired Dreyfus, but that he felt all law had been outraged in this case. That Clémenceau's life was more than once endangered during the agitation there is no doubt at all. I believe it was his opinion that, had Zola not been found guilty when indicted and tried, there would have been a massacre of the Dreyfusards in court.

"It is strange to recall now that he and Jaurès came together to lunch with me at the Café Marguery after that Dreyfus business. Then it seemed as if Clémenceau had little or no chance of taking office, even if he wished to do so. But with Clémenceau nothing is certain except the unforeseen. Within six months he was Minister of the Interior. Shortly thereafter he was Premier of France. What is more, he had three Socialists in his Cabinet!

"A close friend of England, and an earnest advocate of a cordial understanding between our two countries at times when this policy made him very unpopular in France, there is no man in Europe upon whom we Englishmen can more implicitly rely to carry on the war against Germany to the very end. If he could come to an arrangement with the Socialist party his administration might easily last until complete victory had been gained, not only in the field, but in the Council Chamber. It would be a glorious end to a brilliant career."

Captain Persius on the Economic Weapon

One of the most significant of recent events was the arrival of an American mission to perfect the co-ordination between the Allies, not only in the military sphere, but also in the economic. We referred in a recent issue (No. 51) to the importance of concerted action in the use of "the economic weapon," and there is no need to re-emphasise it. The American Mission arrived at a timely moment to counteract the faint-heartedness of those who do not realise that, in the words of the Deputy-Chief of the German General Staff—"the military situation is conditioned by the world-economic situation," and that "victories which once would have been absolutely decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, have not brought" the enemy "nearer to peace." It is interesting to note the growing anxiety of the German press about the economic future of the country. The following

CAPTAIN PERSIUS ON THE ECONOMIC WEAPON

extracts from an article by Captain Persius (*Berliner Tageblatt*, 18 October), in which he speaks with unusual candour, are worth citing.

RESTOCKING AND THE RESUMPTION OF FOREIGN TRADE.

“ When peace is concluded, the using up of even the last reserves of our materials will lead to a very large demand in all spheres of production. . . . The storehouses, completely denuded of raw materials and other supplies, will be in urgent need of re-stocking. We shall need to import from overseas: cotton, wool, jute, copper, rubber and leather, and also foodstuffs and fodder. . . . With regard to these last, one sometimes hears it said that, for the sake of our foreign exchange, we must remain satisfied for years to come with what is produced within our own borders. This is an erroneous view. If our ships go out to North and South America, India and Australia, fully laden with German goods—and this is what we shall try to do so as to raise our exchange—they must not be allowed to return empty. That would be bad business. They must, therefore, return with cargoes of foodstuffs as well as of raw material. We might even go so far as to say that foodstuffs will be our most essential post-war import, for without them our industries will hardly be in a position to take up peace-time competition with success. Our nutrition must first be placed on a sound basis. We must not forget that *the greater part of our oversea trade in pre-war days was conducted with England*. More than three-quarters of our exports went to European countries. Our best customers were England, France and Russia, who, in 1913, paid us more than three milliard marks (£150,000,000) for our goods, while Italy and Belgium paid us about another milliard. . . . Moreover, it needs no proving that the longer the war lasts, and the more peoples side with the Entente—there are over two dozen of them already—the more difficult it will be to resume commercial relations. A copious mass of hatred and bitterness is being stored up against us, as a result of certain concomitants of the war, not only in enemy countries, but also among neutrals. Our merchants abroad will have to suffer for the manifold sins of circles which need not now be particularised. . . .

THE LIBERALITY OF BRITISH POLICY.

“ It is necessary also to combat the erroneous view that previous to the war the English hampered our world-economic activities. The statistics are sufficient to prove the contrary. Compare, for instance, the following figures:—

German Imports into British India.

1900	-	-	-	-	56.8 million marks.
1913	-	-	-	-	150 " "

Into British Africa.

1900	-	-	-	-	23 million marks.
1913	-	-	-	-	229 " "

Into Egypt.

1900	-	-	-	-	15.7 million marks.
1913	-	-	-	-	118.4 " "

CAPTAIN PERSIUS ON THE ECONOMIC WEAPON

These figures show that the English placed no obstacles in the way of our steadily-increasing trade with the countries under their control."

As a significant indication of the trend of American feeling we add an extract from a speech by Mr. Redfield, the Secretary of Commerce in President Wilson's Administration, delivered at the Southern Commercial Congress in New York on 16 October:—

"When peace shall come, and her merchants take up the task of restoring Germany's ruined commerce, they will find that it is a strange world which they seek to re-enter. There will be difficulties in the way of future peaceful penetration of which they seem not to dream. It will hardly be said again to any Secretary of Commerce of the United States that the German dyestuff *Verein* will not permit the establishment of an American dyestuff industry. The monopolies on which German foreign commerce in large part seemed to rest secure will have passed away. Our friends beyond the sea and we ourselves have learned the danger of having our industries wholly dependent on foreign sources of supply which may become unfriendly. It is pitiful to read extracts from the German press which seem to show that they expect to take up the task of rebuilding their commerce where they laid it down. They reckon the world's demand for potash as a purely German asset. It was so, but it is no longer. They were the world's source for dyestuffs. That opportunity has gone. It was they to whom the world looked for optical glass. We do not look there now. They were the source of supply of chemical porcelain. We make it to-day as well as they. They had applied science to industry more than any other people, and had built up industrial power by means others had neglected. We have learned that lesson also."

"Germany's Peace Aims"

Professor Otto von Gierke, of Berlin University, is a jurist of European reputation and occupies in Germany a position not altogether unlike that of the late Professor Maitland in England. Thus anything to which he puts his name deserves serious attention, and the amazing doctrines which he advocates with considerable eloquence in a little book on "Germany's Peace Aims" (*Unsere Friedensziele*. Berlin: Springer, M. 1.60) cannot, unfortunately, be dismissed as negligible. They form, indeed, a supplement to the arguments of Professor Erich Brandenburg in "Germany's War Aims," which was fully dealt with in No. 47 of THE NEW EUROPE, and which Professor Gierke quotes with high approval.

The learned professor is nothing if not thorough. Like the Angel of the Garden, his flaming sword is turned in all directions, and Herr Scheidemann comes off almost as badly as the various States which have presumed to fall out with impeccable Germany. "With the idea of a peace without victors and vanquished, of a world-peace instead of a German peace," there can, he declares, "be for German men no compromise." For Germany is fighting for her existence, and, therefore, "peace must bring us an extension of power in East and

"GERMANY'S PEACE AIMS"

West, in Europe and beyond the seas—extension through closer contact with our allies, but also by securing better protected frontiers, and, further, by retaining a firm control in the conquered enemy territory, by winning equal sea power on seas freed from English tyranny, and thus, at the same time, an unrestricted share in world-trade, and, finally, by increasing our oversea colonial possessions and acquiring strategic points such as will secure their connection with the home country. Nor do we intend to renounce an indemnity for the huge sacrifices which we have made, and we expect in the East the cession of ample land for colonisation in place of cash payment." Scheidemann's "catchword" that what is French must remain French, and what is Belgian, Belgian, and that every nation must bear its own burden, is dismissed as "a doctrinaire outburst, which the German people does not take seriously." He is opposed to all constitutional change during the war, and to Socialist interference in foreign policy as peculiarly dangerous. The Russian Revolution and the entry of America can only steel Germany in her resolve—the more so as the latter "has robbed itself for ever of the possibility of playing the impartial, while imposing upon us a *Pax Britannica*." Above all, he is opposed to any idea of linking up peace decisions with the renovation of international law. Internationalism is a mere Utopian idea; "we must never give the instruments of power (*Machtmittel*) out of our hands." Foreigners, he sadly complains, fail to understand "the inner meaning of war." They do not realise "that war fulfils the world-historic task of pitilessly destroying decaying culture, worn-out law, degenerate freedom, in order, with native strength, to breed rejuvenated culture, a juster law and a more genuine freedom. They cannot understand that military power has the right to decide (*hat von Rechts wegen zu entscheiden*) the life or death of nations or States." Hence the principle of self-determination is "foolish chatter" (*Geschwatz*). Plebiscites are "juggling." The right of the conqueror rests upon "a verdict of God." Above all, our professor denounces the *civitas maxima*; the Germans were, in the past, far too cosmopolitan, but they will never be so again.

When he comes to discuss the fate of the conquered territory he distinguishes between three possibilities—restoration, incorporation (*Eingliederung*) and annexation with autonomy (*Angliederung*). The first he rejects offhand. Germany has already promised not to hand back Poland to Russia. "German honour" forbids the restoration of Courland, and "if we succeed in liberating Livonia and Esthonia we have the same debt of honour to pay to the Baltic Germans as far as the Lake of Peipus. A glance at the map makes it impossible to restore Lithuania. In the Balkans it would be irresponsible folly to restore Serbia and Roumania, and so pave Russia's way to Constantinople. In the West the restoration of Belgium would be equivalent to a German defeat, since it would give our worst enemy a Continental foothold."

Even Professor von Gierke, however, is not blind to the difficulties involved in degrading independent States to the rank of mere

"GERMANY'S PEACE AIMS"

provinces, and admits that the creation of vassal States of the Indian variety or of protectorates such as are sometimes possible under extra-European conditions, is incompatible with European legal forms. There is thus no precedent for the situation at which Germany must aim. A form must be found for their victims, under which State sovereignty is preserved, but "freedom of action towards third States, the independent right of making war and peace, of diplomatic action and of concluding treaties" is either wholly or partially withheld. The dominant State would have the right of garrisoning and controlling the military preparations of its subordinate, and at the same time of administering the latter's railways and waterways, and introducing its own commercial law and trade regulations. These are the methods, he argues, which must be applied to Belgium. "That historical contradiction, the State of 'Belgium,' must be carved into two States with new names." In other words, "the artificial link" between Flemings and Walloons must be broken, and, at the most, there must be nothing more than personal union under a single monarch. Courland and, if possible, Livonia must be connected in a similar way, but even more closely with Germany, while special measures are necessary in Lithuania, owing to the weakness of the German element. Austria-Hungary must apply the same treatment to Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania. Even in Poland certain limitations of independence are essential "if the new State is to be a strong support of the Central European union," and if there is to be no danger of a reconciliation between Poland and Russia, or of a movement for uniting the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria to the new Poland. For Poland, therefore, the professor proposes a permanent alliance—*fœdus inæquale*—with Germany, and various checks on the diplomatic and military powers of the new State. In a word, "we must reckon with the realities of world history, not with doctrinaire mirages." He ends with the hope that the flood of democracy to-day will not do the same mischief to the German cause as the flood of reaction after the war of liberation a hundred years ago.

One opinion of this eminent international jurist deserves special emphasis as throwing light upon the teaching which prevails at the German universities. When the observance of a treaty is irksome, he frankly tells us, "the *Clausula rebus sic stantibus* can always be invoked." "The decision as to whether there has been a breach of treaty is, in the end, a naked question of power." Here we have the root of the whole matter. It is on this doctrine that the whole edifice of Prussian power has been reared; and until this dogma has been overthrown there will be no peace for tortured Europe.

Reviews

Mr. Hyamson's *Palestine: The Re-birth of an Ancient People* (Sidgwick and Jackson, 10s. 6d. net) is issued at a fortunate moment. All those who are watching the progress of the Palestine campaign

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will find in it a valuable guide. But its appeal is more specially to the large public, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, whose imagination has been stirred by the recent declaration by the British Government of its sympathy with Zionist aspirations. As Mr. Hyamson's book shows in detail, this declaration was in the true line of British thought and feeling. Ever since the days of Laurence Oliphant and earlier, Englishmen have been found to cherish the dream of a Jewish Palestine. How much has already been achieved in that direction is made clear by Mr. Hyamson's fascinating account of the existing Jewish colonies, both in Judea and Galilee. Under the diligent hands of these latest immigrants Palestine has indeed become what Theodor Herzl called it, "Altneuland": a land of Hebrew-speaking peasants, holding fast to the immemorial traditions of their race, yet alive to the latest improvements in agricultural production and social life. "The houses are of stone," writes Mr. Hyamson of Rishon-le-Zion, near Jaffa, "with flower and kitchen gardens, vines and fruit trees attached. Every family owns at least a horse and cart, a cow and some poultry. The colony contains three large wells, a synagogue, schools, a splendid library, a club, public baths, municipal buildings, a hospital with six wards. Periodicals, Palestinian and foreign, are easily obtainable in the colony." It sounds like an Old Testament prophecy in a garden city setting! Let us hope that the retreating Turkish army has spared it to be a resting-place for British soldiers and a nucleus for the larger immigration which will assuredly follow after the war.

A. E. Z.

Les Batailles de la Marne: par un officier d'Etat-Major Allemand. (Paris: Van Oest.) 3 fr. In January, 1916, an anonymous *brochure* entitled *Die Schlachten an der Marne* appeared in Berlin and created some stir. A great demand for it sprang up, but the publishers were robbed of a promising market by the action of the censor, who prohibited its circulation. A perusal of its pages reveals the motive, for it is plainly the inspired defence of General von Kluck—possibly also of the late Chief of Staff, von Moltke—against the criticisms passed upon the operations which led up to the Battle of the Marne. It possesses all the interest of first-hand evidence. It is clearly the work of an eye-witness of the operations in question, in places also that of an ear-witness of the discussions at von Kluck's headquarters; and it must have been written after careful consultation of all the available material published in France and in Great Britain. Its weakness lies in the writer's ignorance of much that happened on other parts of the German line of advance and in his excessive praise of von Kluck, whom he calls "an army chief of transcendent genius." But with every allowance for these faults, it is a document of great contemporary interest, inasmuch as in it the obstinate silence of the German military world is at last broken by one who knows too much. In commending it to the public, we take this opportunity of congratulating the "Bureau Documentaire Belge," to whose ingenuity in securing a copy we owe the present French translation. The pro-

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fessional examination of its military merit we leave to others, but we can vouch for its interest to the layman. A. F. W.

The idea carried out by Sir Walter G. F. Phillimore in *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace* (Murray, pp. xvi + 227, 7s. 6d. net) is an entirely salutary one, and his execution of it is, up to a certain point, obviously sound. He clearly indicates the relationship between the unsatisfactory nature of former treaties of peace and the wars that followed them, and traces the evolution of their underlying principles. He gives us not merely a valuable, well-indexed book of reference, but proves a trustworthy guide in its interpretation. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that, in some aspects of the practical suggestions which he makes for the settlement of the present war, he should fail to carry his own principles to their logical conclusion. He doubts, for instance, whether the policy advocated by THE NEW EUROPE with regard to the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs, as opposed to some form of limited autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is justified either on grounds of expediency or of the wishes of the people themselves. Such a doubt is hard to understand. If, as the author submits, one of the main guarantees of the future peace is to be the principle of nationality, why not give it a fair chance, especially as the evidence as to the wishes of the people concerned is, for anyone who cares to read it, so overwhelming? G. G.

The Voice of Bohemia

In the Budget Commission of the Reichsrat, 23 October, Fr. Udrzal, the Czech deputy, who is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Reichsrat and leader of the agrarian party in Bohemia, spoke as follows:— "There is much talk at present of constitutional reform. The Bohemian deputies have made a sincere declaration that they desire an independent State, a free nation, and in reply we are offered a reform of the Austrian constitution. Why? Because those who offer it know that it cannot be realised. The Czech nation has no confidence in a form of State in which, after three bloody years of war, the minority is permitted to rule. We regard this as a crying injustice. On the return of peace, the Czech nation expects to enjoy the right of self-determination and national liberty. Whatever be the issue of the war . . . we believe that the day of the domineering master-nations is over, and that certainly gives us a guarantee of undisturbed existence. The Czech nation demands equal rights for all nations. Federation can only take place between free peoples."

Bavaria and the German Empire

The new Bavarian Premier, Baron Dandl, in his opening speech in the Diet on 13 November, laid the greatest possible stress upon Bavaria's position in the Empire and her relations with the other

NOTES

German Governments. " Bavaria's future and development can only be found in and with the German Empire. It is a matter of course for a Bavarian Minister to proclaim his contentment with and feeling for the Empire (*Reichsfreudigkeit und Reichsgesinnung*), and I would not lay such stress upon it here if it were not that, in the voices and actions of our enemies, deep-rooted hopes of dissension within the Empire and of ill-feeling between south and north are always cropping up again. These hopes are, and remain, vain. It is comprehensible and just that we should wish to share in the work and to make good our influence in the course of events in the Empire and in its activity abroad. We, who are so directly affected by the consequences of the Empire's policy, have the right and the duty to share in its counsels. As one of the most effective methods to that end I regard the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, whose activity was revived by my predecessor (*i.e.*, Count Hertling). When it is a matter of securing the rights assured to us by the federal constitution, you will always find me on the spot."

The Falling Lira : Voilà l'ennemi !

" The Entente," says the *Neue Freie Presse* in an address to Italy, 6 November, " has brought more States to ruin than perhaps any league of misery and corruption has ever done." And the *Pester Lloyd* takes up the tale in the words : " If the Italians want to learn their fate, they only need to cast their eyes towards Russia, their comrade in distress. Once a commanding Power, to whose word Paris and London listened attentively, Russia is to-day being heaped with abuse and shame by England. The Central Powers have beaten Russia, but it is her English ally who has humiliated and enslaved her. Italy, too, has fallen under the English yoke. . . . Despite the big phrases of Paris and London, the Western Allies will as little be able to give her help as they could check the military subjection of Russia. But there are already signs that the Italian nation, like the Russian, is to be assigned the helot's fate."

We hope that the Government will ponder the meaning of such quotations from the enemy Press in the light of the warning which we sounded here last March (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 24, " Thirty-seven lire to the pound sterling,") and of the following apt and welcome comment in *The New Statesman*, 24 November, 1917 : " It is no exaggeration to say that Great Britain, which formerly enjoyed unqualified popularity in Italy, has allowed herself to become intensely unpopular with large numbers, perhaps with the majority of Italians. German propaganda . . . has striven tirelessly to produce this feeling. But . . . when the consumer who paid 25 lire a ton for English coal in peace (in competition with German coal) finds himself asked to pay 720 lire for it in war (with German competition excluded) it does not require a very skilful propagandist to impute extortion to the British Ally." Very true! But is the British Ally skilful enough in propaganda to defeat the lying enemy?

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promises great results for the future"**

—Colonel House (3 Dec. 1917, in Paris)

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The Revolution of the Salle de l'Horloge

It is a singular truth that some of the greatest revolutions in human affairs have been wrought in silence by men who knew not what they did. History teems with the figures of such unconscious, even unwilling, ushers of a new era: and to-day history is repeating herself. The agents of such a revolution assembled last week in the Salle de l'Horloge under the presidency of the new French Premier, M. Clémenceau. The setting in which they met had no aspect of revolution: the spacious chamber in the French Foreign Office—known as the Clock Hall—is no ante-room to Utopia: and the Quai d'Orsai itself is one of the strongholds of European *bourgeois* common-sense. None the less, the work done in that room may yet prove to be the germ of a new era. The tasks upon which the great Conference of Allies was engaged were imposed upon them by the grim material pressure of war: and probably no such Conference could ever have been brought together except by the compelling instinct of self-preservation. Nor did the Conference itself imagine that it was, perhaps unwittingly, taking thought for the morrow after the war. "Sufficient unto the day" was its motto. Each member of the Conference interpreted his presence solely as the result of the experience of the last three years which has proved to all live minds the imperative need of close co-operation between the Allies. It is a truism that such co-operation is indispensable to our success: but, as it is a truism which is too often neglected by peoples and Governments, we are not ashamed to repeat it. Union is strength: and strength is victory. Those who read our comment on the Allied War Council in the article entitled "From Rapallo to Versailles" last week, will have realised that we stand firmly by the Prime Minister's plan, though we often dislike his methods. But they will also have realised that our support of the Rapallo-Versailles policy is inspired, not only by a fervent desire to win the war, but by the hope that success at Paris and Versailles may be the starting

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point of that new world-order which President Wilson has prescribed as the foundation of justice and peace.

It is for this reason that we describe M. Clémenceau, who only the other day poured unpremeditated scorn upon the League of Nations, as the president of a new revolution. On either side of his chair in the Salle de l'Horloge sat the members of a new Committee of Public Safety, devoted to upholding the public right of the world in a war of defence which had just received a weighty justification from the pacific Republic of the United States of America. Each national group in the Conference represented a sovereign national power: but, by its very presence there, it also denoted a growing sense in every nation that only a certain voluntary curtailment of the sovereign right of each nation can avail to equip the common cause with the means of victory. We have already "pooled our honour." The Pact of London was the first of a series of acts by which the voluntary surrender of sovereignty began. We are now pooling our resources: and the whole business of the blockade, recently brought to a series of satisfactory decisions during the visit of the American Mission to London, is based upon agreements which express the same surrender in another form. That there are grave difficulties we do not deny: the discussions and disagreements between Washington and Tokio on the subject of steel are a good case in point: but they are not to be regarded as anything but a hitch in the favourable process of "pooling resources" which has just been completed in Paris. The magnitude of the resources concerned is impressive. It suggests to the imaginative mind the true equipment of a League of Peace, and will probably be found to supersede the idea of making military power the chief weapon of such a body. The Paris Conference of to-day commands nearly all the great food-growing areas of the world: it controls the whole supply of vital raw materials from the tropics: it holds the submarine cable communications of the world: its own greatest cities are the financial capitals of the world: and it commands the sea. The body of a League of Nations is there: but it still lacks the breath of life which only the moral resolve of its constituent nations can give it.

The great transformation in international relations which is implied in the idea of a League has thus begun under the

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pressure of war. The great step forward will have been made if the unity of military control which is implied in the Versailles Council can be fully realised: for it is in the military sphere that the idea of unrestricted national sovereignty is most tenacious of life. And we freely confess that, if the experiment of Versailles comes to nought, its failure will react heavily against the whole idea of the League. If, in the face of to-day's danger, we cannot sink our nationalism to the limited extent demanded by the interests of the common cause, we must not delude ourselves with the belief that, when the danger has passed, the incentive to common action will remain. We are united now in a manner which gives us a unique opportunity to make the union a permanent nucleus for the new world-order: and if we let the moment pass it may not recur again for many a long day. In making their decision the peoples of Europe and America must realise that only two roads are open. Either they go back to the old Europe—which was a breeding ground of war—or they take courage to go forward to the new Europe and the new world of President Wilson's vision.

The first essential step is the reconciliation of the war aims of this whole alliance with the will of its peoples. Last July (*THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 40, p. 1) we made the following plea for a re-statement of Allied policy: "The matter of supreme moment is a true definition of the Allied war aims; that is to say, the expression in concrete terms of the faith that is in us, the statement of the objects for which we fight in a manner so clear, so convincing, so cogent, as to command the assent of all the belligerent Allied democracies. No business is more urgent. Its neglect would involve, nay, has already involved, grave peril to the Allied cause. . . . The advent of another winter with the Allied armies still in the field will undoubtedly expose the Allied peoples to a heavier strain than any they have yet borne . . . extremely arduous domestic problems will confront the leaders of the Russian Revolution when the winter sets in, and enemy intrigues will complicate them beyond measure. . . . In France and in Italy the prospect of a fourth winter in the trenches, and of coal and food shortage in the rear, is not alluring." Though we were then aware of some of the dangers which lay ahead, we little thought that

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events would give our warning the emphatic endorsement of Kerenski's fall and the Italian retreat. Of the two, the former has a significance to which we must not be blind. It is at least arguable—we believe it to be demonstrable—that the Bolševik campaign against Kerenski was largely assisted by the suspicion that Russia's Allies still harboured designs for which the new Russian democracy repudiated all responsibility. A shrewd political strategist would have grasped the fact that new Russia required new assurances, which could only be given at a collective Conference of the Allies. No such sagacious counsellor arose in London to make the plea; and the opportunity, which remained open throughout the summer, passed from our grasp in the autumn, when Kerenski fell. But the importance of a careful review of our war aims in a plenary Conference of the Allies does not rest solely upon its relation to the new *régime* in Russia, vital as the Russian aspect is. It rests equally upon the growing popular desire in Europe and America to establish an enduring peace upon foundations very different from those treaty obligations, revealed and unrevealed, in which international relations were expressed before the war. The democracies of the old world and the new seek an assurance that their statesmen and diplomatists are inspired with a new spirit.

We must, therefore, ask the question: "Did the new spirit pervade the Salle de l'Horloge?" If it did, we shall see a revival of the idealism which originally inspired the declaration of war against Germany. That the generous spirit of 1914 lost its hold upon the British and French Governments no one can deny. Little by little, they had been brought by a policy of secret negotiation and compromise to regard the war chiefly as a trial of strength that might have to end in an inconclusive peace. But they have been saved from that danger as much by the entry of America as by the Russian Revolution. Apart from popular feeling in France or Great Britain, of which Lord Lansdowne's letter to the *Daily Telegraph* is a symptom which only malice can misread, America and Russia have the clearest possible right to ask for a new statement of war aims which shall repudiate the rapacious designs imputed to us by the enemy. We know that the nation has been committed to engagements of great importance which, in some respects,

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contain the germs of grave dissension between certain Allies : we know, too, from the revelations made in Petrograd, that agreements made before the Revolution have now fallen to the ground, and that, for instance, the future of Constantinople is still undecided. As long as such questions remain in a position which makes it possible to suggest that there is a discrepancy between our professions and our secret engagements, the moral unity of the Alliance is not complete. And since moral unity is the only firm foundation for military and economic co-operation, we must achieve it, or else confess that, as Allies, we cannot live up to the faith that is in us. The achievement of moral unity would be the first breath of life to the League of Nations.

Reform in Germany and Prussia

(I) THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION

BEFORE giving some account of the latest phases of German and Prussian constitutional reform, on which a former article by the present writer appeared in *THE NEW EUROPE* of 31 May, 1917, it is desirable, in view of recent events, to enter a caveat. In the first place, as will presently be shown, the movement for the reform of the constitution of the German Empire has, on its formal side, at any rate, come almost to a standstill. This may be due in the main to two causes : first, the present concentration of attention and effort upon the reform of the Prussian franchise as an end which is desirable both in itself and in its ultimate bearing upon reform in the Empire ; secondly, the personal changes—involving important political principles—which have been effected in the high offices of State in Prussia and in the Empire. These personal changes—of which the chief were the enforced resignation of the Chancellorship by Dr. Michaelis and the appointment of Count Hertling as his successor ; further, the appointment of the veteran Radical leader, Friedrich von Payer, to the Vice-Chancellorship of the Empire and of the National Liberal, Dr. Friedberg, to the Vice-Presidency of the Prussian Ministry—were attended by such outspoken expressions of the will of the Majority Parties in the Reichstag as made the changes bear the aspect of achievements on the lines of parliamentarism. In

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the second place, it has become more and more necessary to guard against illusory inferences regarding the international situation, and particularly regarding the prospects of a just and durable peace, such as might in one quarter or another be drawn from the mere beginnings of constitutional reform or of parliamentarism in the German Empire and in Prussia.

The concessions which have been made and those which have been promised in the Empire and in Prussia are not, it need hardly be said, intended by the Emperor and the Government to promote pacifism or to undermine militarism. On the contrary, the object of them is to disarm opposition to the war-policy of the Government, to reconcile the Socialist malcontents, and, incidentally, to create among pacifists and waverers in enemy countries an impression that Germany is becoming Liberal and conciliatory. The Independent (Minority) German Socialists do not swallow this bait; the Majority Socialists are still suspicious of it; the Radicals (Progressives) are foolishly confident that the concessions will make an impression abroad and help to hasten a German "peace by understanding." The National Liberals and a section of the Centre feel that they are in the Imperial plot, and they hope the best results for Germany's war-policy from innovations of which they do not at heart, or sometimes even in word, approve. The Prussian Conservatives, and with them the Crown Prince and most of the military leaders, detest the whole business and want to win by fighting, by frightfulness, and by U-boat infamies. Count Hertling and Herr von Kühlmann play their game and try to manage all these divergent currents of opinion to the best advantage of the cause in which they have been officially enlisted—an early peace, on the basis, or with the leverage of the conquered territory which Germany now holds.

Besides all this, the constitutional changes which are assumed to have been accomplished by personal reconstruction of the Prussian Ministry and the new manning of high Departments of State (*Reichsämter*) will hardly alter the war policy of Germany until the new men are backed or are pressed by genuinely democratic majorities in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Chamber. Now, even if the Prussian Franchise Bill were carried to-morrow, and if a redistribution

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and increase of seats in the Reichstag were effected (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, 31 May, 1917, p. 213), these democratic achievements would not at once produce what might be called the mechanical pressure of a real democratic majority in favour of a just peace, such as would satisfy the Allies. For there is no probability of a general election either for the Reichstag or for the Prussian Chamber while the war lasts; and the present Reichstag majority is not steadfast even in such velleities for peace as it professes—witness the repudiation by many Deputies of the Resolution of 19 July and the substitution of the terms of the reply to the Pope; and witness the dissatisfaction of some of them even with the vague terms of that reply.

There is every reason to believe that the Independent Socialists express the real mind of the masses. And it is evident that the Majority Socialists are afraid of the Independents and shape their policy so as to avoid being unfavourably contrasted with them by the bulk of the electors. This, again, makes the Radicals gravitate toward the Left. The left wing of the Catholic Centre, constituting the great majority of that party, cannot afford to be outbid by the Socialists and the Radicals in the industrial constituencies; and the National Liberals cannot afford to be "dished" by the Catholic Centre. That is about the measure of the cohesion of the Majority *bloc* in the Reichstag. The munition workers, the trade unions, and the men in the trenches (who, as was brought out last October at the Würzburg Conference of the Majority Socialists, manage to send thousands of political letters home every week) watch the whole situation; and the Emperor and the Government are alarmed by the whole aspect of affairs and, therefore, yield what they dare not withhold—often, however, with manifest reluctance and with a very bad grace. Even Hindenburg and Ludendorff have just been receiving deputations from the trade unions, and Ludendorff assured them that the suppression of their meetings and the interferences with their organisation were not the result of orders from General Headquarters but were due to the local initiative of General in command of Army Corps districts in the interior. Such is the real background of the political situation in Germany, and such are some of the internal reasons that make for real and pretended reforms.

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The Reichstag Committee on the Constitution, under the Presidency of Herr Scheidemann, did very rapid work last May, immediately after its appointment. It passed within a week a number of amendments to the Constitution of the Empire which in my former article I summarised. With intervals of longer or briefer adjournment it has since continued its work, but it has not made much further progress; or rather, like the crab, it has moved backwards. This was due in part to the obstinate resistance of the official representatives of the Government who attended the meetings of the Committee, and who gave very little encouragement to the reforming zeal of its members. Nor, indeed, was that zeal very persistent. Interest became diverted to the Chancellor crises,—there were two, if not three of them— and to the personal questions to which the constitutional battle shifted, as if to another front. The Committee had meanwhile appointed sub-committees to consider the different series of reform proposals, and these sub-committees have drawn up their reports, some of which have already been submitted to the House.

The reporter of one of the sub-committees is that vociferous little Radical, Herr Müller, deputy for Meiningen, who, by the way, has just issued the second of three volumes of his "History of the World-War," a portentous publication, described in the reviews as a piece of fiery special pleading, and already extending to 1,315 pages. Herr Müller's report dealt with the Committees' resolution [No. 12 in my numbering in THE NEW EUROPE of 31 May] to the effect that—

"pending a new general settlement of the relation between the number of electors and the number of deputies, constituencies where the increase of population has been particularly large, and which form a connected economic area, shall obtain a corresponding increase of seats, together with proportional representation."

This report came before the Reichstag itself last 6 July, and the proposal was adopted by a large majority. The Government [to be correct, we should always say "the Federated Governments"] assented to the proposal with certain reservations and promised to bring in a Bill. No one knows exactly when the Bill will be tabled, although the beginning of next year is spoken of as the probable date. The great anomalies of the present distribution of seats and

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the inadequacy of their number was fully discussed in my former article. Suffice it to say here that the proposal accepted by the Federated Governments would be a very insignificant measure of reform. It would create about a dozen new constituencies, raising the number of deputies from 397 to 409, whereas if the terms of the existing constitution were fulfilled (a deputy for every 100,000 of the population) there ought to be about 670 deputies. Moreover, the one-sided adoption of proportional representation for the overgrown urban constituencies would probably secure representation for the conservative minority in those areas, while in the great rural constituencies the reactionaries would continue to hold the whole field. Thus, while the Prussian Government in accordance with the Royal message of 11 July, is proposing to establish something like *equal* suffrage, the Diet of the Empire is going to perpetuate, subject to a slight "eyewash" amendment, a franchise, which, if the Prussian reform be carried, will be perhaps the most *unequal* suffrage in the world.

The second sub-committee's report is presented by Herr Groeber, a very devout Catholic and a veteran leader of the Centre. Herr Groeber's report deals with the responsibility of the Chancellor and his "representatives," the Imperial Secretaries of State to the Reichstag and to the Federal Council; the institution of a Constitutional Court to deal with any violation by the Chancellor of his official duties; secret sittings of the House for the discussion of foreign affairs; the important question of the assent of the Reichstag to its own adjournment or prorogation in war-time; and the rights and privileges of the President and members of the Reichstag during the session and during the recess. All these subjects were dealt with in my former article under the headings 2-8 inclusive, and references were given to the articles of the existing Constitution which it is proposed to amend.

A new point is raised in regard to the position of members of the Federal Council relative to the Chair. Hitherto members of the Council, not being members of the House, were not subject to the authority of the President. A celebrated story about Bismarck and Simson, the first President of the Reichstag, illustrates this situation. Simson

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possessed great authority, having previously been president of the National Assembly of 1848 in the Pauluskirche at Frankfort and also of the North German Reichstag of 1867-71. He once censured Bismarck for some unparliamentary expression, adding that if the Chancellor had been a member of the House he would have called him to order. Bismarck replied with some heat; and, like a true Junker, remarked that Simson, who was of Jewish race, had not taken into consideration the social traditions of his (Bismarck's) class. "Do you say that to me," replied Simson, "to me, who am a descendant of the high-priest Aaron?" The House cheered, and for once, Bismarck was taken aback. "I confess I had not thought of that," he quietly rejoined.

Herr Groeber's report is remarkable for what it does not contain. The Constitution Committee had adopted an addition to Articles 53 and 66 of the Constitution, with the object of establishing the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor and the War Ministers of the separate States (except Bavaria) to the Reichstag for all appointments of officers and officials of the Army and Navy. This amendment was directed against the irresponsible Military and Naval Cabinets (or Secretariats) of the Emperor, the former of which was removed from the sphere of the Prussian War Minister in 1883. The whole subject was incidentally debated in the Reichstag itself last summer when the War Minister General von Stein repudiated any desire to have the control of military appointments and promotions subordinated to his Department. The whole proposal has now disappeared from the reform programme, and there is no mention of it in Herr Groeber's report.

The third report is by Herr Conrad Haussmann, the Württemberg Radical leader. Its principle subject is Article 9 of the Constitution, the last sentence of which enacts that "no one can be at the same time a member of the Federal Council and of the Reichstag." The Committee maintains in Herr Haussmann's report its proposal to repeal this prohibition, a proposal which was carried last September by a small majority—15 to 12. It is thought that the proposed alteration would establish the basis of parliamentarism, as, if it were adopted, a party leader who was appointed a Secretary of State and a member of the Federal

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Council would continue to be a member of the House and of his party. Herr von Payer, who has just been appointed Vice-Chancellor, seemed, for this very reason, to hesitate about allowing himself to be also nominated a member of the Federal Council, *i.e.*, of the Government. But the proposed change in Article 9 is strongly opposed not merely by the Conservatives but also by the Catholic Centre. Count Hertling himself, shortly before his appointment as Chancellor, declared in the Bavarian Diet that the proposed change was inconsistent with the Federal character of the Empire. He said :—

“ The members of the Federal Council vote as instructed by their Government ; the Reichstag deputies vote according to their own conviction and the policy of their party or of their electorate. That would result in an insoluble conflict, or it would be the beginning of the parliamentary system.”

But it is precisely the parliamentary system that the majority of the Reichstag wants to introduce ; and, as the Committee insists upon this vital change, Count Hertling will have to fight the matter out both with them and with his Vice-Chancellor, Herr von Payer, who is a good Radical and thorough-going reformer.

The Committee originally intended to propose other far-reaching changes, involving direct interference by the Reichstag and the Federated Governments in the affairs of the separate German States with a view to the democratic reform of reactionary constitutions like those of Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg, Hamburg, and others. They have desisted. The Prussian Franchise Bill is doubtless accepted by them as an instalment ; and some other reactionary German States besides Prussia are beginning to consider the question of their constitutions. The Committee has also abandoned its intention of insisting upon the assent of the Reichstag to decisions of the Emperor and the Federated Governments regarding war, peace, and international treaties.

The deputies, perhaps, think with Herr von Kühlmann (*see* his speech of last Friday), that what has been so far attempted is sufficient to impress the populations of enemy countries. But the allied peoples will probably be a little more critical than Herr von Kühlmann.

GEORGE SAUNDERS.

Lenin—His Career and his Methods

Vladimir Iljič Uljanov was born of a noble family in the Government of Simbirsk 47 years ago. The meaning of revolutionary terrorism was brought home to him at an early age. In the year 1887—one of the blackest periods of reaction in the recent history of Russia—Vladimir's elder brother was arrested at Harkov for complicity in a plot to murder Alexander III. Vladimir was still but a youth of 17 when his brother died on the gallows.

As soon as he entered the University, Vladimir Iljič threw himself heart and soul into the study of Social Democracy. It was not long before his activities roused the suspicions of the *ohrana*, and in the early 90's, while still a student, he was exiled to Siberia. His sentence, however, was not a long one, and a few years later he returned to Russia to resume his active work and his studies. His first book on the land question was published under the name of Iljin (his first *nom de guerre*) soon after his return from exile. In this work he set forth the views of the Social Democrat party on the land question in Russia, demanding that all the land should become the property of the State, which would lease it out to the peasants in proportion to their needs.

It was more, however, as a tactician than as a theorist that Lenin made his mark. In 1900 he left Russia, and joined Plehanov in Switzerland. For some years these two men—now poles apart—worked together and edited the paper *Iskra* (Spark) in common. Plehanov's early work in Lausanne was mainly educational. Having left Russia in the early 80's, he gathered round him in Lausanne a small group of devoted followers, whose object was to apply western Social Democracy to Russian conditions. For some years Plehanov and Lenin (by this time he had adopted his present *nom de guerre*) had much in common; it was not until the Socialist Conference at Stockholm in 1903 that the first differences revealed themselves. It was from this Conference that the cleavage between Bolševiks and Menševiks dates, the former being those who held a "majority" at the Conference, the latter a "minority." The tactics advocated by the "majority" under Lenin were those which he has pursued consistently ever since. The essence of his tactics may be summed up in the words "pure revolutionary

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action without any compromise with the bourgeois parties." Neither in 1905 nor in 1917 has he ever wavered, under any conditions, in the application of his rules of conduct.

In 1905 Lenin returned to Russia to take part in the revolution. Though not the President of the ill-starred Sovjet of 1905, he was the driving power behind it. In October of the same year he started the first Social Democrat daily with the help of Maxim Gorki. The collapse of the Sovjet and the failure of the revolution led to a compromise between the autocracy and the middle classes in the shape of the first Duma. True to his theories, Lenin persuaded his followers to boycott the elections, and there were no Social Democrats in the first Duma of May, 1906. Lenin's extreme tactics, however, forfeited him the support of many of his followers, who regarded the boycott of the Duma as a mistake, and in 1907 Lenin himself realised that his work in Russia was for the time being over. In the spring of that year he left Russia and took up his residence abroad, partly in Paris, partly in Switzerland, and partly in Austrian Poland, from which country he kept in touch with the revolutionary movement in Russia.

The outbreak of the war in 1914 found Lenin in the Carpathian Mountains. At first arrested as a Russian subject, he was afterwards released owing to the mediation of the Austrian Socialist leader, Victor Adler. He withdrew to Geneva, where he started a new Socialist paper, *Social Demokrat*, that preached the necessity of Russia's defeat in the war.

Previous to the revolution Lenin was a comparatively unknown figure to the outside world. Western Europe has since first learnt of his existence owing to the notoriety he gained by his journey through Germany to Russia. What more natural than that this unknown Zimmerwaldian, who had worked against the victory of his country in the war, should be branded by the West as a mere German agent! Even if it be true that he has himself taken German money, it is not for German ends. Men of his stamp are not over-scrupulous; they will stop at nothing that seems to lead them nearer the goal they have set before them.

The whole truth about Lenin will, perhaps, never be known to this generation. A man of iron will, fanatically devoted to a new religion of Social Democracy that he has

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himself created, he would achieve the salvation of the poor and oppressed, not by conciliation and agreement, but by violence. His fanatical ardour is not cooled by that sense of the ridiculous which leads most men along the path of compromise. Lenin is untouched by any sense of humour; he cares nothing for what the world may think of him, and tramples on the ideas of all who are opposed to him. In the pursuit of his goal he will leave no stone unturned; if the whole world falls over his ears, he will pursue his work of destruction without faltering until such time as he may build a new order on the ruins of the old. The destruction of order in Russia is to be but the first stage, to be followed by the disruption of the social system in every country, in Germany as well as elsewhere.

Lenin has proclaimed a new gospel of violence; those who believe that the cure for the wrongs of this generation can only be obtained by different methods must meet him with the same weapons. It is doubtful whether Lenin himself dreams of complete victory. He may well feel that the days of his triumph are already numbered, but he means to sow the seed that others may reap. With his brother's fate before his eyes, he is intent on bequeathing to Russia before he dies a legacy from which she is never to shake herself free. Before the gathering tide of reaction bursts upon him he is determined to put the peasants in possession of the land and to cripple the power of capitalism in Russia by giving the workmen rights that no Government will in the future dare to wrest from them.

The friends of Democracy in Western Europe can only view Lenin's meteoric course with dismay. We do not believe that his work of destruction will achieve the ends he anticipates. Lenin is the futurist of the revolution; he is obsessed by certain aspects of present-day life, and, excluding all others, takes them as his sole guide for action. More sober realists feel that the fate of Russia is in dangerous hands. History may prove that the forces that Lenin tramples upon have yet a great part to play in the future of the world.

RURIK.

Mittel-Europa in Search of a Policy

THE German Emperor is notoriously fond of anniversaries, and on 5 November, 1917, exactly a year from the day on which the Central Powers had proclaimed Poland's independence, a Crown Council sat at Potsdam discussing the future of the Polish State. News which appeared in several Berlin papers on 7 November alleged that an agreement had been reached at last between Germany and Austria-Hungary bringing into accord their war aims and policies in north-eastern Europe, and defining the political system to be set up on their borders in the territories which extend between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic Sea. It was alleged that Germany had agreed to a union of Russian Poland and Galicia under the Habsburgs, as a third partner in their Monarchy; and that it was proposed by a similar connection to attach to Prussia the small semi-dependent States which are to be established in Courland and Lithuania.

The news sounded hardly credible. If true, it would mean that Germany had reversed the policy which, since the outbreak of the war, she has pursued with regard to Austria and the Polish Question, and that a step had been decided upon fraught with incalculable consequences for the future of Central Europe. The way in which the Central Powers attempt to solve the Polish Question, apart from the results which it must produce in Poland, will almost certainly determine for a long time to come Prussia's Polish policy in her own Eastern provinces, the nature of Austria's internal development, her relations to Hungary, the relations of the entire Habsburg Monarchy to Germany, and of both Central Empires to Russia. In the immediate future it will seriously affect the chances of peace and open up the problem of "annexations" and the right of nations to determine their own fate. Lastly, the manner in which the decision is reached in these matters will be a test of the relative powers of parliaments and governments in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, to determine the national policy. In short, the proposals considered at Potsdam and Berlin in the first days of November trench upon the most intricate and most contentious problems which, during the war, have formed the subject of controversy within and between the Central European States.

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No wonder, therefore, if the news, having once received credence, became for a while the centre of all political discussion—it seems indeed astonishing that it should have been so easily accepted even by some of the best informed German and Austrian papers. One is led to suppose that either there was more truth in the original statement than has been subsequently admitted, or that its publication in the press was a manœuvre of the German Government itself, or at least of someone connected with it. Official denials followed, then explanations. During the debate in the Austrian Reichsrat on 9 November (reported in a supplement to the last issue of THE NEW EUROPE), the Premier, Dr. von Seidler, declared that so far one could not speak of the Polish Question as having been solved, that the negotiations with the German Government were not yet concluded, but that in no case would the Polish Question form an obstacle to peace, because there was no intention to impose any particular solution on Poland. Enlarging on this point the Vienna *Fremdenblatt*, the semi-official organ of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, wrote as follows in its issue of 10 November: "If on the day on which peace is declared, Poland expresses the wish for a closer union with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, we shall have no reason to drive that kingdom away from us. Poland is an independent and friendly State. It will decide for itself about its political future."

It thus results from the official Austrian statements that Germany has withdrawn her previous veto upon a union of Russian Poland with Galicia, but no light can be derived from them as to her reasons or the considerations for which she has done so, or as to the conditions on which the concession depends. In fact, Dr. von Seidler's speech seems to suggest that Poland's freedom to choose in future her own affiliation is not hedged in by any stipulations on the part of Germany—a thing which overtaxes our credulity. Possibly the Austrian Government deliberately detaches from its proper setting the one feature of the proposed settlement in which it takes a paramount interest, and tries to create a vested interest for the adherents of the Austrian Solution, in what in reality is perhaps so far only a claim, and not a right.

In the few sentences which Count Hertling devoted to

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the subject of the Potsdam conferences in his speech of 28 November, gravity and obscurity are equally combined, and it is difficult to determine their meaning. There is always the danger of reading too much into the speeches of statesmen, and of crediting them with a clearness of thought and an accuracy of expression which they do not invariably possess. Statesmen frequently say things which they do not mean, but also frequently do not mean things which they say. These are the words of the German Chancellor, as rendered in *The Times* of 1 December: "As regards the countries formerly subjected to the sceptre of the Tsar—Poland, Lithuania and Courland—we respect their peoples' right of self-determination. We expect that they shall give themselves a constituent form corresponding with their conditions and the tendency of their Kultur. In these matters, however, things are still entirely in the air. The reports published in the press some time ago to the effect that a definite agreement had been reached on one point are in advance of the facts." The exact meaning to be attached to the term "self-determination" is obviously one of the things which "are still entirely in the air." It is by no means clear whether Count Hertling meant thereby to confirm the Austrian assertion that Poland will be free to "express the wish for a closer union with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," or whether he meant to contradict it by his remark about the "one point" on which a definite agreement has been announced "in advance of the facts."

Anyhow, to say the least, Germany has gone a very long way towards admitting the Austrian solution of the Polish Question. She has revived as a subject of serious discussion an arrangement which, by settling Poland's claim against both Russia and Austria, would tend to focus on to the unredeemed part under Prussia the attention of the reunited 13 million Poles, who would then be numerically the strongest nationality within the Habsburg Monarchy. "The friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary is endangered," said an Austro-German Socialist in the Reichsrat on 9 November, "because our foreign policy will be partly decided by Polish interests which are irreconcilable with Prussian interests." But this point has been clearly understood at Berlin for a long time past. Germany insisted on maintaining a triple partition of Poland as most consistent

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with her own policy; the idea having been definitely dropped of ever handing back Russian Poland to Russia, the German Government evolved the scheme of a semi-independent Polish State which would not include either Prussian or Austrian Poland.* When, after the proclamation of that State (5 November, 1916), Austria tried to reintroduce her own pet plan, by having a Habsburg appointed regent of the new kingdom, Germany refused her consent, and finally succeeded in closing also that door to the Habsburgs by creating a Regency Council composed of Polish notables (12 September, 1917).

Why then should Germany now all of a sudden have revived a scheme which she had hitherto done her best to kill? Perhaps because, at present, the Germans for the first time believe it possible to detach Courland and Lithuania from Russia. If the Hohenzollerns obtained dominion over these provinces, they could hardly refuse to the Habsburgs a similar extension of their territories (for below all the modern phraseology, the ideas of dynastic or national "possession" still remain a mainspring of European politics). Possibly also the Germans counted on now being able to render safe the Austrian Solution by bestowing on Poland a truly Danaan gift. Russia no longer raises any claim to Poland. If, therefore, the new Polish State included nothing besides territory which is Polish by nationality and by the free choice of its inhabitants, there would be no immediate source for conflict between it and the Habsburg Monarchy on the one hand and Russia on the other. But the Poles, even those who formerly professed loyalty to Russia, now raise claims which would spell Russia's national disruption. It is certain that an attempt will be made to include in the new Polish State Eastern Galicia and Eastern Cholm, which is inhabited by Little Russians (*Ukrainians*), and it has been hinted that even parts of the White Russian Governments of Vilna and Grodna are to be assigned to it. Should that happen, the Polish State, by obtaining dominion over Russian land, would be placed in a position of a "natural and permanent hostility to Russia,"† and hence of an inevitable dependence on

* On "German Policy in Poland," see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 53, 18 October, 1917.

† It is on this basis that Herr Gothein, a Radical member of the German Reichstag, urges that Polish Imperialist ambitions should be satisfied.

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Germany. For this is certain, that whoever in any European chancellery favours an illegitimate extension of Poland at the expense of Russia, whoever supports the claims of Polish Imperialists to Lithuania or to Little Russian territory, works in reality for the profit of Germany.

Hopes of wider conquests and of sowing new strife may have been one reason for the change in the attitude of the German Government; disappointment may have been another. A year of experience with the new Polish State must have taught Germany that an attempt to maintain it under a protectorate, exercised jointly with Austria, would unavoidably lead to serious trouble in the relations between the two Empires, to a most bitter conflict with the Poles, and to a truly impossible position in Austria, where the Poles would pass into opposition. If, then, her own scheme is far from ideal, was it worth while to continue fighting a never-ending battle for its sake? Statesmen, like more humble human beings, when thoroughly tired, disgusted, and at a loss what to do next, are sometimes inclined to "let things rip," especially if there are yet other circumstances which render convenient that attitude of conciliatory *nonchalance*.

Negotiations for Central European Union have been proceeding for some time past between Germany and Austria-Hungary. But whilst these negotiations have been stimulated by the assumption that Poland would become a third partner in the Habsburg Monarchy, the principles have been outlined of a scheme which would serve as platform to the numerous adherents of Central European Union within Austria-Hungary, even should the Polish plan fail to materialise. In view of the changed circumstances, and as a result of past experience in Poland, Germany may have been honestly prepared to strike a bargain with her ally and to concede Poland to the Habsburgs at the price of *Mittel-Europa*. But it is equally possible that many of the German statesmen entertained the secret hope that such a concession might yet prove unrealisable—that it might be wrecked in one of the parliaments to which it would have to be submitted. And that may have been the purpose of prematurely publishing an incompleting treaty. There can be no doubt that those who earnestly wished it to materialise, therefore in the first place the Vienna Court, would have preferred to spring it on the

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world as a *fait accompli*. But, once the secret of the negotiations has been divulged, public opinion in Germany, Austria, and Hungary alike, will be able to prevent the Governments from concluding the treaty as part of the peace terms without the assent of those parliaments. Only a few months ago, Dr. von Seidler had explicitly claimed peace terms to be the exclusive province of the Emperor's prerogative—now he has had to promise that the Polish deal would not be concluded without the assent of Parliament. Whoever it was who communicated to the press the proposals discussed at the Potsdam conferences must have intended it as a warning, and has committed an act of sabotage.

An honest proposal for a union of Russian Poland and Galicia under the Habsburg sceptre runs least danger of being wrecked in a Polish Diet. The question naturally will not arise in an irrevocable form unless at the time when peace is concluded the Central Powers still retain in Poland a dominant position. But if this was to be the case, the Poles, at least for the time being, would have to abandon their hopes of a complete national reunion, such as would include Posnania, Upper Silesia and Danzig. If, then, their only choice lay between Russian Poland being formed into a separate semi-dependent State, under Austro-German influence, and a union of Russian Poland with Galicia in connection with the Habsburg Monarchy, they would undoubtedly choose the latter. They would find in reality a greater measure of independence in a connection with Austria-Hungary, because that would free them from German interference in the internal affairs of Poland, whilst at the same time the reunion of Russian and Austrian Poland (*Western Galicia*) would mark a considerable step towards complete national reunion. Anyhow the scheme as expounded by the Austrian Premier gives the Poles no reason to complain, since it promises to them a wider scope for the building of their national future. On one point, however, misgivings are expressed even now in Polish circles; it is feared that Germany would not hand over to the Poles the whole of Russian Poland, but would impose on them certain painful or even disastrous "frontier-rectifications" (*e.g.*, in the coal district of Dombrova!). These might, in fact, amount to a new partition: and then, of course, the scheme could no longer be

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treated as identical with the one announced by Dr. von Seidler.

In Germany the opposition to the alleged deal about Courland, Lithuania, and Poland, though general and bitter, could hardly be described as irreconcilable, and is due to different, and sometimes contradictory motives. The fears and misgivings which have hitherto restrained the German Government from agreeing to the Austrian Solution are far from having disappeared. If, however, the German Government ever seriously decided on realising it, one may assume (and most Germans certainly *will* assume) that there were some good reasons for such a change in its attitude. Those who desire a close friendship in the future between Russia and Germany—whether Conservatives like Otto Hoetzsch or Social Democrats like the contributors to the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*—are opposed to any scheme which means a taking away of Russian territory. Those more strongly Prussian in outlook contend that it is Prussia and not Austria who has the right to be predominant in Poland, which has been conquered by the soldiers of the German Empire. The proposed annexations in Courland and Lithuania, if realised, might, however, reconcile other circles to the proposals. Only it is just because they would stand in glaring contrast to the Reichstag resolution and are likely to delay peace that all those, whether Radicals or Socialists, who desire a peace “without annexations,” object to them. There are yet other reasons which in different circles in Germany evoke opposition to the Polish scheme.* Much will probably be heard about it during the coming session of the Reichstag, but it is not there that it will meet with the bitterest opposition.

In Austria the proposal of ceding Galicia to Poland has become the dominating fact of the entire political situation. It means a struggle for life to the submerged nationalities—the Czechs, Jugoslavs, Ukrainians, and Roumans—a bid for complete dominion to the dominant races—the Germans

* Some object to it just because it might lead to Central European union, which they do not want (thus, *e.g.*, the Hanseatic merchants, whose interests lie beyond Europe); others do not want the King of Prussia to be vested with extra-constitutional powers—as Grand Duke of Lithuania and Duke of Courland he would be free from the control of the German Reichstag and the Prussian Diet.

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and Poles. The three and a half million Little Russians (otherwise called Ruthenes or Ukrainians) if included in a Polish State would become a hopeless minority absolutely at the mercy of their old enemies, the Poles. One has merely to read the speeches of their members in the Austrian Reichsrat to feel the depth and desperate bitterness of their feelings. "We Ukrainians, then, are to be ceded to the Kingdom of Poland. . . . Our unhappy people is to be delivered up to its hereditary enemy [the Poles]," said Mr. Petruševič in the Austrian Reichsrat on 9 November. "But we are not altogether without hope. . . . Peace conditions will not be dictated by the Central Powers alone . . . and not only our brothers [the Russian Ukrainians], but also the representatives of those against whom our soldiers are fighting, will protect us against outrage. . . ." "We are told that the Poles will grant us national autonomy" said another Ukrainian speaker. "For fully five centuries the Poles have had an opportunity of showing their brotherly nature. In point of fact, we have had an uninterrupted struggle, and this must continue if we come under Poland. The real reason why Poland perished was because Ukrainian territory was incorporated in the kingdom."*

But whilst the union of Galicia with Russian Poland would deliver up the Ukrainians into the hands of the Poles, the withdrawal of the Galician, and probably also of the Bukovinian, members from the Austrian Parliament would leave the Germans in an absolute majority over the Czechs, Jugoslavs, and all the other non-German nationalities. The spokesmen of the Czechs and Jugoslavs implored the Poles not to desert the other Slav nationalities, but to stand by them, to make common cause with them, to try to conquer freedom for all alike, and to concede to the Ukrainians the same right of self-determination which they, the Poles, claim for themselves. Yet one can hardly suppose that these appeals were made with any hope of success. The traditional policy of the Poles in Austria has been one of complete aloofness from the interests of the other nationalities; fifty years ago they had made their separate bargain with the dynasty and the Austrian Germans,

* Compare special supplement of THE NEW EUROPE, No. 59, 29 November, "The Polish problem in its bearing upon Austria: the Reichsrat debate of 9 November."

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and their present policy is merely its logical continuation—if anything, it has become worse. The fact that their own true liberty can be safely re-established only in an Eastern Europe free of German and Magyar dominion does not appeal to a generation which has imbibed the cynical teachings of the *Realpolitik* of the Polish National Democrats, the preachers of national egotism and the devoted worshippers of force. The Galician Poles clearly prefer, by means of a further bargain with the dynasty and the Austrian Germans, to secure their complete dominion over the Ukrainians of East Galicia rather than to take any risks in a common struggle for the freedom of all the nationalities included in Austria-Hungary. One has to count with the fact that in the coming fight over the Galician Question, the Poles in Austria will act on an understanding with the more extreme German Nationalists. Fortunately, however, the Czechs and Jugoslavs can expect some help from another quarter—the Austrian Centralists. The prospect of the Germans obtaining complete dominion over the Czechs and Jugoslavs, and of the Habsburg dynasty acquiring yet a new kingdom, does not outweigh with certain sections of the Austrian-German Socialists, Clericals, and even of the more moderate Nationalists, the grief which they feel at seeing Austria proper in any way diminished by the loss of valuable provinces. Should that happen, they fear to see Magyar preponderance over Vienna grow still greater; indeed, if in a future Trialist Monarchy the Poles join hands with the Magyars, the centre of gravity in the Monarchy would definitely shift to Budapest.

A Bill in favour of ceding Galicia to Poland, as it implies a constitutional change, would require a two-thirds majority, which, under present circumstances, it has no chance of securing; not even the united votes of all the German and Polish members would suffice. It is perhaps this knowledge which has made the German Government assent to the Austrian proposals, and to make perfectly certain of their being wrecked, someone particularly hostile to them may have taken the timely measure of warning their opponents of the impending danger.

It is hardly worth while discussing, from the point of view of the Entente, proposals which can be realised only as the result of a victory of the Central Powers, and which turn exclusively on the question of how the spoils of such victory

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are to be divided between the dominating nationalities of Central Europe. We may look on these proposals merely as an interesting study in Central European contradictions and difficulties. Any settlement based on the spoliation of Russia, on the complete destruction of Czech, Yugoslav, and Ukrainian freedom, and on a partial and really illusory, emancipation of the Letts, Lithuanians and Poles, would spell at the present time the utter defeat of the Entente, whatever difficulties it might cause in future within the new Central European Empire.

Elsie Inglis

ELSIE INGLIS was one of the heroic figures of the war, one whose memory her many friends will cherish with pride and confidence—pride at having been privileged to work with her, confidence in the race which breeds such women. This is not the place to tell the full story of her devotion to many a good cause at home, but *THE NEW EUROPE* owes her a debt of special interest and affection. For in her own person she stood for that spirit of sympathy and comprehension upon which intercourse between the nations must be founded, if the ideal of a New Europe is ever to become a reality.

Though her lifework had hitherto lain in utterly different fields, she saw in a flash the needs of a tragic situation; and when war came offered all her indomitable spirit and tireless energy to a cause till recently unknown and even frowned upon in our country. Like the Douglas of old, she flung herself where the battle raged most fiercely—always claiming and at last obtaining permission to set up her hospitals where the obstacles were greatest and the dangers most acute. But absorbed as she was in her noble task of healing, she saw beyond it the high national ideal that inspired the Serbs to endure sufferings unexampled even in this war, and became an enthusiastic convert to the cause of Southern Slav unity. To her, as to all true Europeans, the principle of nationality is not, indeed, the end of all human wisdom, but the sure foundation upon which a new and saner internationalism is to be built, and an inalienable right to which great and small alike are entitled. Perhaps the fact that she herself came of

ELSIE INGLIS

a small nation which, like Serbia, has known how to celebrate its defeats, was not without its share in determining her sympathies.

The full political meaning of her work has not yet been brought home to her countrymen, and yet what she has done will live after her. Her achievement in Serbia itself in 1915 was sufficiently remarkable, but even that was a mere prelude to her achievement on the Eastern front. The Serbian Division in Southern Russia, which the Scottish Women's Hospitals went out to help, was not Serbian at all in the *ordinary* sense of the word. Its proper name is the Yugoslav Division, for it was composed entirely of volunteers drawn from among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary who had been taken prisoners by the Russian army. Thousands of these men enrolled themselves on the side of the Entente, and in the service of Serbia, in order to fight for the realisation of Southern Slav independence and unity under the national dynasty of Kara George. Beyond the ordinary risks of war they acted in full knowledge that capture by the enemy would mean the same fate as Austria meted out to the heroic Italian deputy, Cesare Battisti; and some of them, left wounded on the battlefield after a retreat, shot each other to avoid being taken alive. Throughout the Dobrudja campaign they fought with the most desperate gallantry against impossible odds, and owing to inadequate support during the retreat, their main body was reduced from 15,000 to 4,000. Latterly the other divisions had been withdrawn to recruit at Odessa, after sharing the defence of the Roumanian southern front.

To these men in the summer of 1916 Serbia had sent a certain number of higher officers, but, for equipment and medical help, they were dependent upon what the Russians could spare from their own almost unlimited needs. At the worst hour Dr. Inglis and her unit came to the help of the Yugoslavs, shared their privations and misfortunes and spared no effort in their cause.

History will record the name of Elsie Inglis, like that of Lady Paget, as pre-eminent among that band of women who have redeemed for all time the honour of Britain in the Balkans. Among the Serbs it is already assuming an almost legendary quality. To us it will serve to remind us that

ELSIE INGLIS

Florence Nightingale will never be without successors among us. And in particular, every true Scotsman will cherish her memory, every believer in the cause for which she gave her life will gain fresh courage from her example.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

The Views of Count Hertling

[The following report of Count Hertling's last speech as Prime Minister in the Bavarian Diet on 23 October has something more than a passing interest. We therefore reproduce it from the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten (24 October). The italics are those inserted by the editor of the Munich paper.]

Undoubtedly the powerful effect of the Pope's call to peace is still felt amongst the people of the enemy countries, but, as far as we can see, we have not really advanced a step nearer peace. On the other hand, two things have appeared very clearly. The one is full of significance and decisive for the present moment; the other throws a sharp light on the dangers of the near future.

Our enemies have revealed their true war aims more clearly than ever before. The speeches, which have been reiterated till we are weary of them, about the protection of small States, the victory of democratic ideas and tendencies over out-of-date autocratic forms of government, have receded into the background. It is well known that England's main object is to destroy German trade. As lately as in August of this year the Minister, Winston Churchill, announced that it would be time enough to talk of peace when German world-trade ceased to have any prospect of further development; and quite recently an English paper with a wide circulation made the monstrous demand that for fifty years to come German trade should be boycotted, and said it would be time enough to consider after the conclusion of peace whether and how far this period could be shortened. To this object, which has long been well known, and for which England has taken part in the war from the beginning, another has now been added as against Germany. We know it now, and it has been confirmed by the statements of the English statesmen, Churchill and Asquith: it is the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine.

Both England and Russia have given this pledge to France. . . . Meanwhile, we do not know what England has exacted from France in return for her services. . . . Germany is fighting for her existence, for the security of her frontiers, for the freedom of her peaceful development. As soon as this is guaranteed we are ready for peace, but, *of course, not a foot of German territory can be given up.* The "never" which was recently uttered by Secretary of State, v. Kühlmann has found a thousandfold echo in the whole Empire. French passion for revenge and conquest, supported by English cunning, are the obstacles in the way of peace. Formerly

THE VIEWS OF COUNT HERTLING

it was said that England was fighting for the restoration of oppressed Belgium. The fact that less prominence is now given to this object than to the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine is indeed an admission that an understanding could be arrived at as regards Belgium which would afford a guarantee against the country being any object of or help to enemy intrigues in future. Thus the aspirations of our enemies to Alsace-Lorraine have become, in fact, the main obstacle to an understanding, but there is no doubt that at the same time the Entente plans to rob our allies remain unchanged.

THE AMERICAN MENACE.

And now, gentlemen, the second point. If those who hold power in France forcibly repress every suggestion of peace, and try to rouse fresh will for war by a show of assurance of victory, in spite of the frightful sacrifices the war has cost the country, and must cost still further, it is because they are sustained by the hope of help from America. In this hope they patiently tolerate the Americans also making themselves at home in France, turning Bordeaux into a great American harbour with immense loading and unloading wharves, and cutting down the forests of the Gironde in order to build a camp in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux for the expected American army. French workmen tolerate the competition of American workmen, with whom they are not in sympathy, in the factories, and the owners allow them to look into the secrets of their business, all so that the new Ally may help them to take revenge on the hated Germans. And what is England's attitude towards this American support so ardently desired in France? Even before the war there were those who spoke of England as the enemy of Europe, and it is certain that England has understood how to profit by every conflict between European Powers in the last century. The time may be drawing near, however, when the punishment England deserves for this will come upon her. Even President Wilson cannot believe that America is coming into the war only in order that democratic ideas may come to the front in backward Germany. A survey of the future shows a very different picture. If the Entente were to be victorious through America's help alone, that would mean that from now on America would take England's place. America would rule the seas with her fleet, and dictate the limits and objects of world trade. America would remain as she is now, during the war, the mighty capitalist, and would also take England's place as the world's banker.

GERMANY DEFENDS EUROPE.

"America against Europe"—that is the character the war threatens to assume more and more, thanks to the Entente. And therefore the Central Powers and their Allies are no longer fighting only for themselves; they are fighting for Europe's independence of the over-powerful colony, and with them are fighting the neutral States, who will not allow themselves to be forced into the war

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against the Central Powers defending Europe. Their manly endurance deserves the highest praise and the warmest thanks! If I think first of Switzerland in this connection, it is because of the close neighbouring relations, which link us here in the south to her, and, on the other hand, the geographical position which exposes Switzerland in particular to enemy pressure. But our feelings are the same towards Spain and the neutral States in the north. Therefore a victory of the Entente over the Central Powers would bring about America's supremacy, and—so long as they follow America—that of her Asiatic allies over the old Europe, including England. But with God's gracious help there will be no such victory. Our fronts in the West, South, and East still form an impenetrable wall; the offensive power of our army and our fleet is still unbroken, as the recent occupation of the islands in the Gulf of Riga proves; the activity of our submarines continues undiminished. Seeing all that our splendid armies have won and held against continued attacks, in conjunction with our allies, seeing what our people have accomplished, and the resources we can develop still further, we have every reason to look forward with full confidence to the outcome of this great struggle.

We shall also be able to hold out economically, and as far as the food supply is concerned, the exceedingly satisfactory result of the seventh war loan testifies to the undiminished solvency of the German people, and their readiness to make sacrifices.

"L'ALLEMAGNE INCOMPRISE."

As our enemies have no military successes of any importance to boast of, they always have recourse to their trusty weapons of abuse and calumny. In every announcement of their statesmen, and from every trumpet of the exemplary organisation by means of which the enemy influences public opinion, the old catchwords, German barbarity, inhumanity, and brutal force, piracy, and unlimited mania for world supremacy resound a thousand times—yes, a million times—over, whilst it is taken for granted that the highest moral possessions, right and justice, humanity and freedom, are their sole monopoly. This systematic agitation is certainly not a sign of strength, but it has undoubtedly contributed to cloud the judgment even of those who were not unfriendly to us at first, and above all it has brought about an attitude of mind in enemy countries which must make them little disposed to receive the Pope's peace exhortation. Let us maintain a dignified reserve towards it, trusting firmly in the justice of our cause, and in the assured hope that truth will finally triumph. There are plenty of impartial men in neutral countries who speak in very different language. A very eminent Swede, Professor Kjellen, of Upsala, speaks of Germany in his publication, "Studies on the World Crisis," as the most unjustly reviled people on earth and in history, and says elsewhere that every German heart feels that never in the course of history has a greater wrong been done to one State by another than that done to Germany in the world

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war by England, and—we must add—her Allies. And in undertaking to interfere in our internal concerns and dictate to us how we should order our State affairs, thus bringing about want of harmony between Government and people, the enemy has achieved the opposite result. Wilson's ill-bred attempt only produced an indignant outcry in Germany. In fact, the phenomena which have come to light in enemy countries have not conduced to make us admirers of their democratic constitutions and of the parliamentary system. On the contrary, as many of the speakers in your Committee have recognised, they must tend to revive belief in the value of the monarchical institution, the constitutional monarchy we possess in Germany, which is a historical growth.

WILSON THE REAL DESPOT.

We have no Government armed with the unlimited powers the President of the American Republic possesses. And what of England, the oldest and model country of parliamentarism? Which of the two former great parties is now responsible for the policy of the Government? All the highly-prized traditions of the past have been thrown over. It is not to be supposed on this account that everything is perfect here and needs no improvement. The call for *Neuorientierung* has been heard often and from various quarters, and here and there it has also been recognised as justified. A member of your Committee has reminded you that a hundred years ago, after the war of liberation (*Befreiungskrieg*), there was a similar agitation throughout the country, that then as now a greater share in political life and co-operation in the shaping of their destiny was demanded for the people, who had staked their all to drive out the Corsican robber. The reference was certainly apt. An echo of the currents and opinions of those days is perceptible in the immortal songs of Ludwig Uhland: but much has changed since the Swabian poet wrote "Untröstlich ist's doch allerwärts." The people have been drawn into regular participation in political life, legislation and financial matters, and particularly in the domain of social political questions Germany is in advance of all other States of the world. The Bavarian Government—I have already stated this in your Committee in the name of the whole Ministry—has and will always have it at heart, and regard it as one of its most important tasks, to *accommodate legislation and administration to the justifiable claims of the times*, though, on the other hand, it must refuse to tamper with the historic and tried foundations of the State.

And this applies not only to individual questions, it applies in general, and especially now that the German people are being tried as never before. Where there is political life there will always be political parties, and they prevent stagnation and fossilism. But, gentlemen, as long as the war lasts let us relegate all controversial political matters to the background. A world of enemies has risen up against us. They trusted to their numerical superiority, but our army leaders' knowledge of the science of war, and the heroism of our soldiers, has frustrated them. They fixed their hopes on

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our economic ruin, but the economic pressure has affected them at least as much as it has affected us. They believed in our financial exhaustion, but the result of the seventh War Loan has contradicted this opinion. Now they are fixing their last hopes on the internal discord. Certain occurrences in the sphere of politics, of which a very exaggerated and absolutely distorted version has been given in foreign countries, have given a powerful impetus to these hopes. The German people will show that these hopes, too, are vain. *Unity and solidarity are what the hour demands.*

Reviews

National Defence : J. Ramsay Macdonald, M.P. (Allen and Unwin). 2s. 6d. The pregnant commonplace, that armaments are the offspring of policy, and, in their turn, react upon it, is the theme of this book. Its thirteen chapters are devoted to an examination, by one who believes that International Socialism is the saviour of the future, of the European prospect created by the war. They lead to the conclusion that henceforth Europe must either live in a state of hitherto unexampled militarism, or else change its international habits root and branch. With such a judgment few will find cause of quarrel. Europe is faced with a momentous choice; but the act of choosing is not, to our mind, quite so simple as Mr. Macdonald would have us believe. If the nations of the world had all reached something like the same stage of political maturity, and if the common people were as fully instructed and as coolly sagacious as they ought to be, and must be, before democracy can be a secure and permanent reality in the world's government, the future would be more serene. But these two conditions are not at present realised, and until they are, it would seem that the only serious deterrent against war lies in that very union of democratic nations—called the League of Peace—to which Mr. Macdonald refuses his trust. Mr. Macdonald's solution is open diplomacy. "There is no other guarantee of peace and national security. No army can give it; no treaty under existing conditions can give it. It can only be given by the peoples themselves insisting upon knowing to what their rulers are committing them, and what game their diplomatists are playing, and upon taking responsibilities upon themselves. . . . Supposing Mr. Asquith had informed both Germany and ourselves, in 1912 that the two countries had failed to come to an understanding, instead of assuring us that we were on terms of the most complete agreement, how different events would have been! . . . Even assuming that the German authorities were then bent on war, an open diplomacy would have prevented the German people from being hoodwinked," and might have prevented the war. "Or, supposing that I am too pacifically optimistic, and nothing could have prevented war, an honest statement of our dangers, and an unmistakable proof that they were real, would have led to preparation adequate to the risk." The doubt here expressed is the doubt which will haunt many minds in reading

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this book. Mr. Macdonald is aware that open diplomacy will not remove the causes of war, but believes "that it will enable these causes to dissipate themselves without an explosion." This is probably true, but it entirely depends upon the spirit which animates Europe in the future. The change of heart prescribed by President Wilson is, indeed, the root of the matter.

A. F. W.

The collation of President Wilson's various statements on the war (*America and Freedom*, pp. xv + 76, Allen and Unwin, 1s. net) appears opportunely. At a moment when the question of mobilising our war aims for a political offensive has been brought into prominence by Lord Lansdowne, one may well be grateful for this handy conspectus of America's lucid expositions of the Allied ideal. It contains the sanest and truest presentment of our cause which has yet been given. Its value, however, would have been greatly enhanced by the inclusion of the Allies' answer to President Wilson's Note last December, although an admirable introduction by Viscount Grey and two speeches by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith respectively reproduce the sense, if not the details, of that document.

G. G.

"The New Austria"

Slovene papers from Ljubljana report that Slovene text-books for elementary schools have been confiscated by the Austrian censorship because of patriotic points in which the censorship saw an "overrating of the Slovenes and of their mother-tongue." Similarly many Czech school text-books were confiscated. In one primer the sentence, "The lion is the king of the animal world" was changed into "Austria is my fatherland" [the lion is the national emblem of Bohemia]. The sentence "The Czechs are Slavs" was changed into "The Czechs are Austrians." These are but two instances taken at random from the Austrian press to show that the old methods of the Police State still prevail in what some would have us believe is a "new Austria."

The Vatican and Church Lands

An interesting sidelight comes from Hungary upon one possible reason for the Vatican's anxiety for peace. The organ of that genuinely devout and clerical minister, Count Apponyi, announced on 9 September that a scheme was in preparation for regulating all the vast episcopal domains of Hungary, pooling their revenues, and after the assignment of fixed salaries to the hierarchy, using the balance for opening schools and augmenting the stipends of the lower clergy. Under such a scheme the Primate would receive an annual income of £12,000 (instead of £125,000!), and archbishops and bishops £7,500 and £5,000 respectively. This is intended to forestall the demand of secularisation of church lands, which is one of the main

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planks in the programme of the Radicals. The vast wealth of the episcopate and the great monastic orders in Hungary and Austria, and the alarming growth of Mortmain, already presented a very serious problem before the war. In view of the Dual Monarchy's approaching bankruptcy it is almost inevitable that after the war this wealth should be utilised by the State as one of the means of paying its debts. Considerations of this kind probably help to explain the presence of the Cardinal Primate in the chair at a recent peace meeting in Budapest endorsing the Papal Note.

Germania contra mundum

The well-known German Socialist deputy, Herr Lensch, contributes to *Die Glocke* of 3 November an interesting article on "Revolutionising the World," which, though mainly devoted to his views on constitutional changes in Germany itself and Germany's need for a democratic system that shall be neither English nor French, also contains comment upon Britain's prospects which deserves to be pondered very carefully. Nowhere, he argues, has the war produced "a greater social revolution" than in England, whose foundations as a world-power it has shaken. "The more wildly the English bulldog bites into Flanders, the clearer it becomes that the whole British army, combined with the whole French army and supported by America's gigantic war industries, is not capable of beating half the German army; that the British fleet has to look on while the German fleet conquers the islands of the Gulf of Riga, and that the German army, despite Flanders and the Chemin des Dames, is still able, in alliance with Austro-Hungarian troops, to roll back the Italian lines. But the knowledge of this military impotence must not only act as a deep humiliation in England; it must also shake more and more England's leading position in the Entente. But if England does not issue in triumph from the world-war; if she is not able to press her knees on Germany's breast, then she is moving towards the most frightful internal convulsions, for that would mean that English economics would draw the consequences from the collapse of its world-dominion. And these consequences would weigh first of all upon the necks of the British working-class, which would then feel in its own body the loss of its privileged position as against the working-classes of other lands."

These words of a German Socialist leader may be commended to those who fail to realise what peace on the basis of the present military system would mean. In the outspoken words of the *Observer*, it would mean "the mightiest victory by far ever won by a strong people in arms against the world. German militarism is to stand in glory, unbroken, erect, triumphant. The German political system and its whole theory of war-made-to-pay, of thorough crime approved by success, would be vindicated anew in the eyes of the German people as against all the confused and discomfited democracies who could not see it through." That is the brutal truth, and men, or nations, who are blind to it are doomed to go under.

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“Their war is our war”

—Sir E. Carson (on Roumania,
7 Dec. 1917)

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13 December 1917

Allied War Aims

THE restatement of Allied war aims has become imperative. Any doubt that may have persisted has been dispelled by President Wilson's latest battle cry and by the courageous logic of his action in declaring war upon Austria-Hungary. The outstanding feature of his great speech is its clear grasp of the fundamental conditions of the future peace of Europe. It is the speech of a man who, for nearly three years, watched as a deeply interested spectator the course of the world struggle, saw it in the truer perspective that geographical distance sometimes gives, and has now, eight months after his own decision to enter the lists, stated with compelling force and lucidity the objects of the war—objects at once ideal and practical. He sees, as many European statesmen—soldiers and politicians alike—do not see, that the only chance of securing the peace and prosperity of the world in the future lies in waging the war whole-heartedly until the enemy shall be constrained to accept in practice the same ideals.

Mr. Lloyd George has repeatedly shown—and never more clearly than in his Paris speech—that he possesses those gifts of intuition and imagination which are so essential to the equipment of a national leader in times of crisis. And yet, for reasons which in the main lie outside our province, his performance has not yet fulfilled the promise implied in his incisive periods. Those who gave him nine months ago the title of "Prime Minister of Europe" would to-day be the first to admit that he has resigned that rank in favour of one who is not an European. The political leadership has been transferred, at least for the moment, from London to Washington. This fact, which a narrow national pride might tempt us to regret, should in reality be welcomed as a further sign of that growing spiritual community between the two branches of the English-speaking world, whose frank co-operation is essential both to their own welfare and to a lasting peace.

In January 1917 the statesmen of the Entente, who in their official pronouncements of policy had hitherto carefully

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avoided all details, published in the form of a joint Note to President Wilson their first collective definition of war aims. The frankness of its language is in marked contrast to the evasive secrecy in which the Governments of the Central Powers have to this day veiled their intentions. Nothing which has happened since—neither the Russian Revolution nor the intervention of America—has altered the broad lines of policy there laid down. Indeed, its underlying principles are in full accord with the democratic watchword of “self-determination.” But so far from taking advantage of this essential agreement in principle and using every opportunity to work it out in detail, the diplomatists of the Western Powers have shown a singular and growing reluctance to define their policy and a tendency to revert to the vague and no longer effective generalities of the earlier stages of the war.

Last July we expressed the conviction that “the matter of supreme moment is a true definition of the Allied war aims; that is to say, the expression in concrete terms of the faith that is in us, the statement of the objects for which we fight in a manner so clear, so convincing, so cogent as to command the assent of all the Allied belligerent democracies. No business is more urgent. Its neglect would involve, nay, has already involved, grave peril to the Allied cause.”

To-day this peril has been accentuated by collapse and anarchy in Russia, by sabotage and disaster in Italy, and by the political results which have followed from them. It may be true that no effort on our part could have altered the course of the Russian Revolution, but it is no less true that such efforts as were made from the West fell lamentably short of what was required. In the tactful but suggestive words of President Wilson, “All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset, the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once and for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs towards an ordered and stable Government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the

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very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often."

It is equally safe to assert that the full significance of Trotsky's action in publishing the diplomatic documents within their reach has not yet been realised in England. They have dealt a deadly blow at the methods of the old diplomacy, and we believe that the effects of that blow are likely to be far-reaching and permanent. Thus, though we regard the Bolševik leaders as political desperadoes and utterly reprobate their whole policy and outlook, we are grateful to them for letting light into the dark places of Allied diplomacy. It may be that some of the worst "secrets" which they have unveiled had already leaked out in many quarters, but they have supplied a wealth of detail such as will, when public opinion has once had proper time to assimilate it, show up in its true light the indecision, and too often the cynicism which the accepted leaders of every European nation has found it convenient to conceal behind lofty moral platitudes and empty assurances of loyalty.

These revelations should clear the air. They render inevitable, not indeed that repudiation of solemn treaty pledges at which certain pacifist organs are already beginning to hint, but a careful reconsideration and restatement of the Allied war aims as a whole. Trotsky has made clear to all the world what was already known to many, that there was a difference between the public and private profession of the various Powers; and though that difference is not as great as he and others would like us to believe, it is none the less real and must be promptly eliminated. The Allied Note to President Wilson remains the charter of the Allies; but its principles must be restated and elaborated in fuller detail, with the help and approval of the nation to whose leader it was addressed.

The two main pronouncements of the last fortnight emphasise still further the need for such a restatement. One, spoken in the accents of that old world which is being consumed before our eyes in the fires of war, invites us to halt in our progress, take stock of profit and loss, and survey the chances of an accommodation with the enemy. The other, having patiently tested every method of accommodation with that very enemy, tells us that there is no way out but victory.

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Thus Lord Lansdowne and President Wilson range themselves and us in two opposing schools of thought, the reactionary and the liberal. Without adopting the savage polemics with which the press attacked the Lansdowne Letter, we are bound to say that, in so far as it represents that very spirit of the Vienna Congress which President Wilson so trenchantly condemns, it is an invitation to reaction. That is to say, it bids us not merely moderate our expectations, but jettison some of our ideals. It has, indeed, two aspects. On the one hand, it is the expression of war-weariness by an experienced statesman of the old school, who believes that a peace by negotiation could be obtained at an early date; and on the other, it is a plea for a revision of war aims, coupled with what we may call a moral offensive against Germany. Practically all press comment upon it referred to the first aspect, and ignored the second. The first aspect deserves most of the criticism which it has received. Lord Lansdowne thinks of the world as diplomatists have always thought of it. In his mind the Great Powers are the only factors which carry weight; smaller nations are but pawns in their game. But, even so, we must protest against his assumption that the Western Powers could enter upon negotiations on the basis he has sketched. He practically invites us to repudiate all interest in Eastern Europe, and to return to that attitude of detached *désintéressement* which marked our Balkan policy before the war. We refuse his invitation. Eastern Europe is linked with Western Europe in war; the two regions form the wings of one front in politics as in war; and to both the same broad principles apply. And we are convinced that a peace forced upon all the belligerents merely by a horror of prolonging the war, would be fatal to that very security which he postulates as the first of all war aims.

President Wilson, in striking contrast to Lord Lansdowne, has, from the first, made it clear that the war is being fought for certain very definite ideals, and that it must not end by a reversion to the methods of Vienna, San Stefano or Mürzsteg. The real danger in our own country is lest the two pacifist wings—the sinister and the emotional (which, though quite distinct, are more and more consciously playing into one another's hands)—should allow their ideals to be reinforced by an unworthy desire "to save their own skins." In

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revolutionary times extremes meet, and it need not surprise us to note the gradual formation of a new coalition between reactionaries like Lord Lansdowne and Radical doctrinaires like the *Nation*, in accordance with lines of development previously indicated by the German jingo press and by those Dutch circles whose aim it is to provide a link between Berlin and London.

It is not yet sufficiently realised that there is a small but active school of individuals who would have us "scrap" as Utopian many of the war aims of our Allies—especially, of course, those of our smaller Allies—and concentrate upon our own selfish aims. Nor can there be any doubt that Germany would be ready to-morrow to conclude with us an offensive and defensive alliance such as would enable the two conspirators to dominate the world, and that there are some who would gladly succumb to this new temptation. We should be glad of the certainty that all our leading statesmen—and no less our leading soldiers who, despite their cry "Hands off the army," are careful not to observe a self-denying ordinance in regard to politics—realise that many a British and Allied war aim which is sometimes dismissed as "Utopian," is in very truth a vital postulate of lasting peace and of our own national security. Sir Edward Carson went to the heart of things when, at the Mansion House on 7 December, he said of Belgium, Roumania and Serbia, that "their war is our war, just as our war is their war, and nothing is more disastrous than that one man should be putting forward one war aim as taking precedence of some other war aim. No one nation can end this war by merely obtaining its own selfish ends." And yet this speech has elicited from the *Daily News* a savage attack, in which no attempt is made to offer Roumania her due tribute in misfortune, and which culminates in the assurance that "there is no desire for a peace that will achieve the just minimum of our aims." Are, then, *our* aims to be achieved, but those of Roumania and other inconvenient partners who have staked their all upon our word of honour, to be left in the lurch?

For three years the statesmen of the Entente have described the present struggle as "a war for the smaller nations," and have talked *ad nauseam* of the rights and liberties of allies whom they could not, or would not, save from martyrdom or conquest. We venture to suggest that the time has come to

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lay down the principle that if it should ever really prove necessary, as Lord Lansdowne hints, to sacrifice certain of the Allied war aims, we should begin by sacrificing those of the greater, not of the smaller, Allies. For our part we would rather make a self-denying ordinance and come out of the war without a single material gain than submit to the ignominy of attaining our own extra-European ends at the expense of our weaker Allies inside Europe. Lord Lansdowne's plea for the abandonment of our war aims in South-Eastern Europe is, in effect, an attempt to save the dynastic principle and its handmaid, the old diplomacy, from the threatening attacks of democracy and nationality. But the democratic nations of the West are not fighting for the re-establishment of dynasties, and any peace which buttressed the thrones of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg would be a defeat of the purposes of the Allies. The domestic future of these two dynasties lies in the hands of their own peoples, but their power to disturb the peace of Europe, or to exploit the lesser nations for their own ends, is a European concern which must not be brushed aside in any revision of Allied policy.

Hitherto the Allies have haltingly and incompletely, but nevertheless with sufficient clearness to make their general purpose unmistakable, shaped their war aims in accordance with the principle of nationality, the freedom of small peoples and the right of every nation to choose its own way of allegiance. Lord Lansdowne's evident intention is to press for some less revolutionary "elucidation" of the Allied purpose. At the back of his mind there is the unexpressed assumption that, if we will only let things be, the enemy would also gladly return to the *status quo ante bellum*, and might even make partial reparation to Belgium, since full reparation is scarcely practicable. He ignores the patent fact that the enemy has long prepared his plans for a "wholesale rearrangement" not only of South-Eastern Europe but of Central and North-Eastern Europe; that those plans aim at the establishment of German domination, military, political, and economic, from the Gulf of Finland to the North Sea, from the Black Sea to the Ægean and the Adriatic, from Hamburg to Mesopotamia; and that, were we now to conclude peace, we should be sanctioning the triumph of Germany in this war and laying the foundations of her undisputed mastery over the world. She would then need no "next time." Worst of all, we should be betraying and

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condemning to German servitude tens of millions of freedom-loving peoples who have looked with faith and hope towards us, who have bled and suffered for us, and in whose nostrils the name of England would stink for ever.

Let our war aims be defined; let them be stated not only in terms of the "rearrangement" of Europe, but of the social and political ideals that can only be attained by their fulfilment. The chief offence of Allied statesmen hitherto has not been that they have gone too fast or too far, but that they have been too slow and too shortsighted. They have never undertaken a real "peace offensive," designed to break the "home fronts" of the enemy. There is ample evidence to show that the enemy's domestic front is vulnerable, that German public opinion is influenced by ideas and emotions which come in from abroad, and that the ideal of democracy which the Allies have proclaimed has created a ferment in Germany which is a serious embarrassment to her rulers. To press home this advantage ought to be the constant concern of our statesmen.

Mr. Balfour's Loyalty

MR. TROTSKI has provided us with a model to which all replies to German offers of separate peace should conform. On 4 December he published Mr. Balfour's reply to the German inquiry which reached London in October through the Spanish Foreign Office. The terms of our Foreign Minister's despatch were brief and firm: "His Majesty's Government would be ready to receive any communication which the German Government felt itself able to make respecting peace, and would consider the matter in conjunction with the Allies." It has sometimes been suggested that if we would but consent to inquire we should find that Germany was ready to offer reasonable terms. Mr. Balfour's reply leaves that door open, but plainly reminds the German Government that Great Britain signed the Pact of London, and that he refuses to treat that important document as a scrap of paper. We are grateful to Mr. Trotski for providing us with this object lesson in the honest diplomacy of the British Foreign Secretary, and we do not doubt that his secret archives contain equally cogent proof of the loyalty of France and Italy in this respect. We imagine that, by this time, the German Government must be aware that the Western Allies have, in the strict sense of Sir Edward Carson's words,

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"pooled their honour," and that none of them will entertain proposals for a separate peace.

It happens that the publication of Mr. Balfour's despatch comes at a moment when Germany is busier than ever in fomenting "*défaitiste*" intrigues in all the Allied countries. And the argument now in vogue in certain quarters that the war will end in an Anglo-German compromise is calculated to suggest that the official world in London is preparing to lay the foundations of European peace in a process of barter. It is suggested that Germany will reconcile herself to exclusion from Africa in return for a free hand in Eastern Europe. Mr. Balfour, by his reply, clearly repudiates this doctrine and stands loyally by his Allies, great and small. He is not deceived by the suggestion that a solution of racial problems in Central and South-Eastern Europe lies outside the scope of our purpose in the war. It is true that he has disclaimed any intention to take sides in a Balkan dispute in the House of Commons or to enter upon a discussion of new frontiers; but we may recall the Allied Note to President Wilson (10 January, 1917) to prove that Mr. Balfour, as one of its signatories, understands the part which nationality will play in the ultimate settlement. With that assurance we are well content.

Reform in Germany and Prussia

(II) THE PRUSSIAN DIET

THREE Bills have just been introduced in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies. The object of the first is to reform the system of election for the Chamber, of the second to alter the composition of the Upper House of the Diet, and of the third to readjust the constitutional rights of both Houses with regard to finance. The first and second Bills were heralded by edicts of the Emperor as King of Prussia on 7 April and 11 July of this year. In his first edict William II. announced that the mass of the Prussian people, by their attitude and their sacrifices during the war, had merited a reform which they have long been insistently demanding—the abolition of the three-class system of voting for members of the Chamber on the basis of universal suffrage, and the introduction of direct suffrage and secret voting, *i.e.*, the ballot as we know it in England. One thing was wanting in the first edict, the promise of *equality* of franchise.

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The three-class system might have been abolished and some other system substituted whereby, as in the Kingdom of Saxony, a second or even a third vote is assigned to electors in respect of age, education, or income. There were rumours that the Prussian Government was studying the constitution of Saxony. For these reasons the first edict did not put a stop to the popular outcry, and the reformers in the Reichstag, as was stated in my former article, contemplated Imperial legislation for the reform of all those constitutions of the German States which are reactionary. Prussia, which is as particularist as Bavaria, could not regard with equanimity the menace of such interference with her autonomous rights, and William II. hastened to concede the last point in dispute by promising *equal* suffrage in his edict of 11 July.

The present three-class system of voting in Prussia is, like the Prussian Constitution itself and like the composition of the Upper House, the legacy of that unhappy King Frederick William IV., who, after a long period of irresolution, decided in December, 1848, to impose (*octroyer*) upon his subjects a Constitution elaborated by himself and his Court Camarilla. There had been a long and bitter dispute, culminating in the Berlin insurrection of 18 March, over the question of a Constitution. On 22 May, 1815, the King's father, Frederick William III., had promised that a representative assembly, chosen out of the Estates of the Prussian Provinces, should be summoned, and in June of the same year Article XIII. of the Federal Act of the Congress of Vienna had provided that in each of the States forming part of the German Confederation, a Constitution, with assemblies of Estates, should be established. The Royal promise and the Federal Act were not fulfilled, in any sense, in Prussia till February, 1847, when Frederick William IV. summoned a United Diet of the Provincial Estates, and, with it, a sort of Upper House or *Herren-curie*, consisting of 72 great landed proprietors and others selected by the Crown from the Estates. But the King would not grant a written Constitution. "No written sheet of paper" (*Kein beschriebenes Blatt*) should intervene between himself and his people. Nor would he promise periodicity for the meetings of the Diet. He would summon it when he pleased. King Frederick William's political ideas were what might be called mixed. He was a religious mystic with a preference for episcopacy, which he tried to introduce into the Prussian Reformed Church. He had a firm belief in the Divine right

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of Kings, especially in his own Divine right, and he was at the same time an admirer of the British Constitution, on the virtues of which he was instructed in letters and memoranda, by Prince Albert (the Prince Consort) and by the enlightened Prince of Leiningen, Queen Victoria's half-brother, as well as by his own minister in London, Bunsen. But he failed to see that institutions of the peculiar British type require time to take root in a foreign soil. The general discontent fomented by distress in various parts of the country was not appeased by the action of the King. A new age was dawning with the development of industry and the construction of railways. The financing of the latter was one of the problems with which the Diet of Estates felt that it could not take the responsibility of dealing, in view of the vagueness of its own rights. Upon this unsettled situation burst the news of the February Revolution in Paris, the flight of Louis Philippe, and the establishment of the Second French Republic with universal suffrage. All Germany was in a ferment, and the question of a real Union of the German States and a German National Parliament was everywhere being agitated. Prussia was drawn into the vortex of this great question, for it became generally acknowledged, in the Spring of 1848, that Prussia, as the most powerful German State, in point of population, territorial extent, military strength and intellectual progress, alone could take the lead. The essential condition, however, was, that she should provide herself with a democratic Constitution.

The Paris Revolution was quickly followed by the upheaval in Vienna on 13 March and the flight of Metternich, the great champion of European reaction. The political life of Prussia became, often against the will of her Sovereign and statesmen, more and more identified with the national movement in Germany, and has remained interwoven with it to this day. The temporary collapse of Austria in March 1848, owing to the revolution, rendered it necessary for Prussia to act swiftly, and on the very morning of the day on which the street fighting broke out in Berlin (March 18), Frederick William had issued a memorable Edict, in which he declared his views on the German question, advocating, among other reforms, a German national representative assembly, and adding, significantly, that this implied the Constitutions in all the German States.

It is not necessary to trace, even in brief outline here, all

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the phases of the Prussian Constitutional movement in 1848.* Its intimate connection with the German national movement was again symbolized by the extraordinary scene, when, in order to appease the populace, the King, at the head of a cavalcade of princes and generals, rode through the streets of Berlin, swathed in the black, red and gold flag, which had in those days been adopted as the ensign of United Germany. He also issued a proclamation "to my people and the German nation," whereby he again summoned the Prussian United Diet, and announced that its meeting would furnish the Sovereigns and Estates of Germany an opportunity for joining in a United National Assembly. The proclamation ended with the famous words, often re-uttered but never to this day genuinely fulfilled, "Prussia is absorbed in Germany" (*Preussen geht in Deutschland auf*). What the Prussian people then wanted, and what the King hesitated to give, was a Prussian Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage. This was, nevertheless, obtained after a change of Ministry, and the Prussian National Assembly met on 22 May, 1848. Its fate and the fate of its projects was decided, not only by the reactionary personal policy of the King and his Court Camarilla, but also by the political impotence of the German National Assembly at Frankfort, by the recovery of Austria, and by the reactionary influence of Austria and of Russia (Nicholas I.) upon Prussia. The Prussian Assembly was first chivied from pillar to post in Berlin, and then removed to Brandenburg-on-the-Havel, where the rump of it was finally dissolved by Royal Decree on 5 December. Another Royal Decree at the same time imposed on the nation what was practically the Constitution under which Prussia lives to this day.† In particular, the Chamber

* An excellent account of it and of all that led up to it is that of Sir Adolphus Ward in Vol. I. of his "Germany" [Cambridge Historical Series]. The second volume is about to appear.

† The refusal of Frederick William III. to allow Prussia to be democratised sealed the failure of the unification of Germany on a democratic basis. Without Prussia at its head the new National Government at Frankfort had no military, political or administrative power. On 3 April, 1849, Frederick William declined the German Imperial Crown, which had been offered him by a vote of the Frankfort National Assembly. He did not want to be "anointed with a drop of democratic oil." What Prussia in 1848-49 failed to achieve on a democratic basis she afterwards won in 1866 and 1870-71 by Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron," the policy by which Prussianised Germany is now trying to win the hegemony of Europe and of the world.

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of Deputies was to be elected by an indirect method on the basis of universal suffrage.

The method of election for the Chamber which was ultimately adopted and imposed by the King's Decree was that of the three-class system and electoral colleges.

Each constituency is divided into several wards. In each of the wards a register of all the male population who have resided in that ward for six months and are 24 years of age is made up before each general election. The total income tax assessment of the ward is then taken and divided into three equal parts. The classes of electors are divided in correspondence with these parts. Let us, by way of illustration, assume that the income of a ward is £300,000 and the population 3,000. The first £100,000 is taken, and it is ascertained how many electors are represented by that assessment. There may, perhaps, be three electors who together return an income of £100,000. In that case they alone form the first class. There may be 30 electors whose united assessment makes up the second £100,000. These go into the second class. The remaining 2,967 electors go into the third class. But each class elects the same number of representatives to the ward's section of the electoral college, that section having 30 members. Thus the three electors in the first class elect 10 members of the electoral college, the 30 electors of the second class elect 10 members, and the 2,967 electors of the third class likewise elect 10 members. The combined electoral colleges of all the wards in the constituency elect the member of Parliament. The result is that the votes of the three electors in the first class have 989 times the value of those of the 2,967 in the third class. A situation like this actually occurs in more than one Prussian constituency, and it has happened in the Berlin ward, which includes the Wilhelmstrasse, that all the Prussian Ministers and the Imperial Secretaries of State were in the third class of electors, while two or three rich bankers formed the first class. It is no wonder that Bismarck called this the "most wretched of all electoral systems."

The first of the Bills now submitted to the Prussian Diet abolishes this system and makes the election direct. The principle of "one man one vote" is maintained and that of "one vote one value" introduced, apart from such inequalities as arise even in really democratic countries in consequence

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of the unequal size of constituencies. The voting is to be by ballot. The elector must have been a Prussian citizen for three years and the residential qualification is raised to one year. The elector must have resided for one year *in the same ward of the constituency*. The minimum age for electors is fixed at 25 instead of, as at present, at 24. Men serving with the active army may not exercise the franchise, and there are to be no proxies. To remedy the worst inequalities arising from the wide differences in the size of the constituencies 12 additional seats will be assigned to certain overgrown industrial constituencies, raising the total number of deputies from 433 to 445.

It is generally admitted that on the whole this Bill fulfils the demands of the mass of the Prussian people with regard to the franchise, and it has been welcomed in this sense by the whole democratic press. No doubt it has serious blemishes. The qualification of three years' citizenship is contrary to the principle of *Freizügigkeit*, unrestricted right of migration within the German Empire. It would exclude the Minister-President, Count Hertling himself, who has just become a Prussian by his appointment to Prussian office. The raising of the residential qualification to one year would exclude, for a time at least, many of the men at the front, whose homes have been broken up by the war and for whom the future adjustment of the labour market may make it impossible to settle down at once in a district. The raising of the franchise age from 24 to 25 will also exclude many of the same class for no sufficient political reason. But these things can be amended in the House or in Committee, if, indeed, they are not accepted as part of the price which may have to be paid to the reactionary majority in the Chamber and the Upper House for allowing the essential reform of the electoral system to pass.

For there is a strong reactionary majority in the Chamber, as is natural, in view of the present system of election. It is composed, according to circumstances, of the Conservatives (who represent the Prussian Junkers, the bureaucracy and the army) together with the Catholic Centre; or the Conservatives together with the National Liberals, who largely represent the great industrialists, and are considerably more reactionary than the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag; or, at times, all three parties together.

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Before William II.'s second Edict of 11 July, some of the Conservative wire-pullers, particularly the leader of the Free Conservative Section, Baron von Zedlitz-Neukirch (a very old parliamentary and journalistic hand), had been intriguing to get a Bill which would re-establish inequality of suffrage in the Saxon, or some kindred form. They were on the point of succeeding, when Bethmann Hollweg frustrated their scheme by getting the Emperor-King to issue the second Edict, which smashed it by proclaiming *equality of suffrage* as an essential part of the reform. It is chiefly for this reason that the Conservatives still pursue Bethmann Hollweg into the obscurity of his retirement with their undying hatred. They are still calculating upon frustrating the democratic provisions of the Bill by obstruction and by working up a majority for plural votes in the course of the parliamentary proceedings, which are sure to be protracted for many months. But, for the moment, the Edict has had the effect of breaking up the reactionary *bloc*, some of the members of which recognise that it would not pay them to be *plus royalistes que le roi*. Among the National Liberals who now realise that the day for petty expedients against Prussian democracy is over, is Dr. Friedberg, the new Vice-President of the Ministry. He has lately confessed that, although he had advocated a differentiation in the values of votes, it is now too late to attempt any scheme of that kind. It is nevertheless certain that the efforts of the Conservative Opposition will be very determined and persistent. They know that, although the Bill, if it were carried, would not be in time to influence Prussian policy in the Federal Council with regard to the war, it would certainly put an end, after the next general election, to the Junker domination in Prussia, and, indeed, to the old Prussia itself as the world has known it during the last seventy years.

The second of the Bills which have been tabled relates to the reform of the Upper Chamber or *Herrenhaus*. We have seen that in 1848 Frederick William IV.'s ideas of constitutional government were limited to the representation of the provincial estates, or orders of society, in a central Diet. He succeeded in carrying out those ideas in the Prussian Upper House. The method by which it was chosen made it the "King's House" as opposed to the Chamber. There were (1) the Princes of the Royal House who had attained

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their majority, and the Head of the Princely House of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the senior and Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family. Then there were (2) the 103 representatives of the different classes of nobility on whom hereditary rights of representation were conferred; (3) the holders of the four great State offices in Prussia; (4) 45 members appointed by the King on the ground of his special confidence in them; (5) 170 members presented by various corporations, and summoned by the King. The right of presentation lay with (a) the Cathedral foundations of Brandenburg, Merseburg and Naumburg; (b) the nine Universities of Prussia; (c) the eight provincial unions of the Counts who own properties with manorial rights (*Rittergüter*); (d) 12 unions of noble families with large landed property; (e) 48 towns upon whom the King had conferred the right of presentation; (g) 90 associations of landed proprietors of old standing.

The two characteristics of the existing Upper House are, first, the unlimited right of the King to appoint members, and, secondly, the great preponderance of the old nobility and of the landed classes.

Membership of the proposed new Upper House will still be dependent upon the King's summons, but the right of presentation, which practically amounts to nomination, will be extended to wider classes of the community. The element of representation of the Prussian Provinces will be retained, but it will now include the lands which were annexed, and organised as provinces in 1866. Nominations to the Upper House have hitherto been for life. In future, in a large number of cases, they will be for the period of the tenure of the office in virtue of which the member has been appointed, and in other specified cases for the period of twelve years. The new House, as contemplated by the Bill, would be composed as follows:—

A. On presentation:—

1. Life members:—

(a) Representatives of the former nobility of the Holy Roman Empire	10
(b) Representatives of the Princes, Counts and other noblesse	24
(c) Representatives of other categories of members who have hitherto sat by hereditary right and of families with the right of presentation ...	26

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2. Members for the period of their office or of tenure of property or of the management of a business enterprise :—		
(a) Burgomasters of Prussian towns	36	
(b) Representatives of landed property at least fifty years in the same family	36	
(c) Representatives of great enterprises of commerce and industry	36	— 108
3. Members for twelve years :—		
(a) Representatives of local self-governing communities (towns, 36; country, 36; Berlin (special representation), 3; Principality of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1)	76	
(b) Representatives of the great economic classes (agriculture, 36; commerce and industry, 36; independent artisans, 12)	84	
(c) Representatives of science, learning and the Church (universities and technical colleges, 16; Roman Catholic and Protestant State Churches, 16)	32	— 192
B. Without presentation and appointed by the King on the ground of his special confidence—Maximum number ...		150
Maximum Total		<u>510</u>

In the official explanation of the Bill it is claimed that both the traditions of the Upper House and the modern commercial, industrial and scientific development of Prussia have been taken into account. The frequently recurring number of 36 is intended to facilitate the representation of the 12 provinces by three members each in the different categories:

To many Prussian citizens the proposed composition of the Upper House will still wear a very reactionary aspect, although it is hinted, in the explanations attached, that the King will be able to redress certain inequalities by summoning among his 150 personal nominees representatives of certain classes, *e.g.*, labour, which do not figure in the scheme. On the other hand, the limitation of numbers of direct nominations by the King will increase the power and independence of the House and prevent his advisers from having recourse, through him, to wholesale nominations in order to carry popular measures which the Upper House wants to reject. It is probable that the Chamber of Deputies will let the Bill go

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through with few alterations, and regard it as a price paid for franchise reform and as an evil which may be removed when democracy comes into its own through the new franchise.

The third Bill, which readjusts the Budget rights of the two Houses of the Diet, is a more serious matter, and will undoubtedly provoke vigorous popular and parliamentary opposition. The provisions of the Bill may be summarised as follows :—

1. If the Chamber of Deputies, against the will of the Government, rejects any item of expenditure in the ordinary estimates, the Upper House, which has hitherto only had the right of accepting or rejecting the estimates as a whole, must vote on this item before voting on the whole budget.

If the Upper House does not assent to the decision of the Chamber, a joint Committee of both Houses will discuss the item. Thereafter, the Chamber of Deputies will vote again on the item, and its decision will be final in that regard. Only then will the Upper House vote, as heretofore, on the whole budget.

2. New items or increased items cannot be introduced into the estimates without the consent of the Government.

3. If the budget for the ensuing year is not passed by the end of the current financial year, the Government has the right to incur such expenditure as is requisite for the conduct of existing institutions and enterprises, to fulfil all legal obligations and to continue all constructions and purchases on the scale on which provision was made for them in the previous financial year.

The first clause of this Bill can, at worst, exercise a dilatory influence upon financial decisions of the representative Chamber; the second, I believe, corresponds with the practice of our own legislature. It is the third clause around which controversy will rage. The explanatory statement says that it only gives legal consecration to an existing practice, but this is hardly correct. The existing practice is that when the Budget cannot be passed before the beginning of the new financial year (1 April), the Diet gives the Government a general authorisation to carry on. In France what are described as *douzièmes provisoires*—monthly instalments—are voted in similar cases. A South German journal says that the Government evidently regards the proposed change as a very simple matter, but that the Deputies will be “very simple” if they consent to this wholesale abandonment of the power of the purse. They will rather be inclined to remember the *Konfliktzeit* (March, 1862, to September, 1866), when Bismarck governed without a Budget, which the Chamber

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refused to vote. Bismarck, after the military and political successes of 1864 and 1866, sought and obtained an indemnity for the action of his Government. A Prussian Government which acted as he did would, if the present proposal were carried, require no indemnity. Its conduct would have been perfectly legal.

GEORGE SAUNDERS.

Roumania Irredenta

It is a very well-known fact that European democracies, both old and new, have fought for and realised great reforms in internal politics. It has not been the same in regard to foreign policies. Here practical results of their activities are small or almost non-existent. For illustration it is enough to refer to the powerlessness of the "International" in the present war. Besides that, the education of the masses about the external problems was either insufficient, or wrong; it was carried out either by interested informers or by writers in the service of a particular cause. The result is that even when the Governments, knowing the facts, have taken the right course, part of the badly-informed public opinion has not agreed with them. To some extent, the attitude of the masses in Great Britain towards Hungary and Bulgaria is due to something of this kind. The British citizen has been accustomed for long to consider these peoples as friends; and even now, when they are fighting against Britain, some people cannot realise the change of the position. Consequently, one sees in the press articles still advocating the integrity of Austria-Hungary, or friendship and sympathy for Bulgaria! What is worse is that even in high circles official and learned people toy with the same idea. This, I confess, I cannot understand. What, up to a certain point, is comprehensible, perhaps even pardonable, in the people and the press is difficult to understand on the part of well-informed people. In real life—and in politics, which are a very serious part of real life—you are bound by the facts of reality beyond which you cannot pass. What *is* reality in this case? Let me shed light upon it from my own country.

Roumania, at least, entered into the war with an express condition: the liberation of their brethren from the Hungarian yoke. This cannot be done without the dismemberment

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of Austria-Hungary. The rulers of public life in the Allied countries accepted it, the British as well as the others. Then every British citizen is bound by that acceptance, otherwise we should have anarchy, as in Russia. It would be indeed indescribably ignominious that, with Roumanian and Serbian fields still wet with the blood shed by their sons for the integrity of their nations oppressed by Austria, some among this people in whom they put all their hope, their only hope, deny the right of their cause, and say that they have died in vain, and still fight and die in vain! No, I do not think that there is a single Briton who can support such an idea, such a feeling! But I admit that, apart from this, there is free room for discussion. I admit that there may be some who could say: "It would have been better that England had not engaged herself to the dismembering of Austria, because this State *must* remain such as it is." Let us see if such an opinion may be sustained, first, from a general point of view, then from an English one.

What is it that justifies the existence of a State with its structure and organisation? In the last analysis it is justified by the maximum of comfort, of good life, given to every citizen individually; by the whole amount of the means of education, and of self-development for every man in such a manner that each is able to give the best yield for society, for progress and general prosperity; by the institution of such laws as will give equal justice to every individual, to every class or nation when there are many nations in a State. Did Austria-Hungary carry out a single part of this task to be worthy of the compassion of English idealists? Enquire into the books, examine the works of Dr. Seton-Watson, of Wickham Steed, and others who have lived and observed in the country itself, and you will know the answer. In the multinational State of Austria-Hungary two governments divided their prey; the Austrian took the Czechs, Slovenes, Poles, and Roumanians from Bukovina; the Hungarian took the Serbs, the Croats, the Roumanians from Transylvania, Banat, Crisana, and Maramures. To speak of progress and culture for these peoples, considered by the oppressors as inferior and enslaved, is a mockery. In all Hungary there is no official Roumanian school, either elementary or superior. The poor Roumanian peasant since the beginning of the last century has established schools for his children by voluntary subscription. The

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Hungarians became furious, and when by the settlement of 1868 they became, unjustly, and contrary to all historical rights, masters of Transylvania, they did all they could to annihilate those schools. The last hint given to them was Count Apponyi's draconic law of 1909—the same Count who in England wrote books and made speeches about the ideal freedom of Hungary! Under this law, in one year alone, 400 Roumanian schools were destroyed and replaced by Hungarian ones. The 4,000,000 Roumanians from Transylvania, representing 75 to 80 per cent. of the population, send only five deputies to the Hungarian Parliament, and the Serbs only two, while the Hungarians, whose number is far inferior to these two nationalities, send 300! How can the rights of these governments be defended? The vote is not secret, each election ends with bloodshed and corpses; in fact, in a real civil war! Justice is administered in the Hungarian language, so the people refuse to apply to the courts; and when they do apply their cause is lost in advance. The freedom of the press does not exist. Those who dare to raise their voices of protest are imprisoned. The Roumanian members of Parliament for Transylvania are in gaol at this moment! To escape from this hell thousands and hundreds of thousands of Roumanians emigrated, mostly to America, where they are so numerous that they will form an important unit in the American Army in France, by the side of their British and French comrades.

I think you, British reader, will be astonished. You, whose ideas about the Hungarian people were so high! You, in whose mind passes the heroic personality of the fighter for freedom, Lajos Kossuth, whose memory is so popular in England! But, *quantum mutatus ab illo!* How little the Hungarians of the last decades resemble Kossuth. I think he would be ashamed of them if he had lived in present times. Hungary of to-day is not that classical country of freedom which exists in your imagination! Prussia and Hungary are the only two countries in Europe whose ideal is domination by force and by oppression of other people! Not in vain is Count Tisza the best friend of the Kaiser William, and their sinister acts are closely connected in the responsibility for the beginning of this war. That is the plain truth. Thus the Habsburg Monarchy is not able to provide for its citizens of various nations either good material life or sufficient

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instruction, or justice and freedom—none of the moral postulates which might justify its existence. Where are, then, the reasons for its continuance? There are none. The Habsburg Monarchy in committing or permitting such injustices and wrongs upon its people became a political immorality amongst the peoples of Europe. The inherent justice of things requires that an end should be put to this anachronistic feudal State, born in the thirteenth century, and extended since then by craft and conquest, as the appanage of one family.

If, then, the idea of an Austrian Empire cannot be supported by any moral democratic or modern plea, is it in England's interests to continue to support it? I know that the British mentality does not admit an interest which is opposed to justice; but suppose for an instant that interest may be allowed to obscure the right. Does such a British interest exist? I cannot see it. And those who believe they see it are victims of an illusion produced by tradition, by the habit of considering Austria as a friend, as it was in bygone times. But things have moved quickly in the world during the last decades. To avoid mistakes a people, as a whole, and its leaders must consider things in their aspect of continual development. During the last century, when friction was everywhere, in Asia, in the Balkans, between the British Empire and Russia, friendly feeling with Austria was perhaps a necessity; but this reason has ceased to exist, since Russia is an Ally, and now after the democratic revolution, there is no threat of Russian Imperialism. Now that Germany exists as a continual menace, because of its enormous military force, and its trade and its demand for economic expansion, and Austria has become, for the present and the future, its principal satellite and Ally in this trouble directed straight against England, Austria is, and will be, not a friend or an indifferent people, but a permanent enemy of England. Her existence is no longer necessary for the British Empire, and this idea does not merit the smallest effort of thought of one single British thinker.

Instead of old and degenerate Austria-Hungary, which intrigues for sympathy in Great Britain, and, on the other hand, through its guns and soldiers kills your sons, there have arisen two great peoples of nearly 15,000,000 each, young peoples, full of courage, with powerful will to live, with democratic conceptions based on right and justice, real friends of

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the English people, whom they admire and take as an example. To sustain the free development of the Roumanian and Serbian peoples is the real interest of Great Britain in the present and in the future. Through their past sufferings, through their present sacrifices and martyrdom in the fight against the common evil that threatens Europe, they merit the deepest sympathy of the British thinker. We believe that in the New Europe a great Roumania and a great Serbia, comprehending all their fellow-nationals, will be realities. This is our only hope in life.

N. LUPU,

Member of the Roumanian Parliament.

Russia, Islam and India

OUR relations with Russia are going awry at the most critical stage of the war. That is the price, no doubt, of a century of misunderstanding, but is it inevitable that we should go on paying it to the uttermost farthing? A consideration of what is at stake may brace us to the effort of revising our attitude.

During most of the nineteenth century Russia was ill-looked upon by both parties in Great Britain—by the Right, as our chief rival in the imperial field, and by the Left as the chief opponent in Europe of the democratic principle. Even the Entente between the two countries in 1907 was received in Great Britain with the same double hostility. The Conservatives criticised the agreement about Persia as a change in the balance of power to Russia's advantage; Liberalism and Labour as a sacrifice of the liberties of a small nationality. The same currents of feeling were visible after the outbreak of the war. Some talked jokingly of: "After Germany, Russia"; some feared for our democratic war-aims with such a dubious ally. Then came the Russian Revolution, which ought to have reconciled both parties at once, since at the same stroke it rendered Russia both democratic and unaggressive. Russians certainly expected our sympathy, but, instead, we have apparently become more alienated than before, and hardly now take pains to conceal our disapproval. Of course we are disappointed that Russia has dropped out of the war, but have we really "no use for" Russia except as a counterpoise to a certain number of German divisions?

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Such an attitude is ungenerous towards an ally, but it is also unintelligent as an interpretation of our own interests—in the first place, because it inclines Russia more than ever to leave her place in the Allied ranks, and, secondly, because, apart altogether from the war, we have a vital stake in Russia's future.

The Russian Revolution is not a breakdown, but a synthesis of momentous experiments. It is an experiment in the transformation of an autocracy into a democracy, which may also solve the problem of the Central Empires if it succeeds, and, if it fails, will settle the fate of the "League of Nations"; since the League presupposes the successful regeneration of reactionary "Great Powers." It is at the same time an experiment in finding a federal structure for a world-state of different races and cultures, a political problem in the solution of which the future of the British Empire is involved. And there is one aspect of this problem in Russia in which we are particularly concerned—the search for a *modus vivendi* between Asiatics and Europeans.

In the British Empire this particular problem presents itself in its most difficult form. Take India, for instance, and England. They are separated, physically, by thousands of miles of sea, they are far apart in race, their pasts are unconnected, the one has imposed itself externally upon the other; at every point of contact the suture is apparent; they have so far shown little sign of penetrating each other. In the Russian Empire, too, there are breaks of continuity. The Central Asiatic provinces, like India, belong to the ancient civilisation of the East, and are half-secluded, geographically, by a belt of steppes and deserts. But the steppes are bridged by railways, and the civilisations of Bokhara and Moscow find their interpreters in Baku and Kazan.

The Kazan Tatars are a blend, that is perhaps unique, of Europe and Asia. They have been Russian subjects for more than three hundred years; they are surrounded by a Russian population; they have entered into the economic, social and political life of Europe; they are Mohammedan Europeans, and not Asiatics under European rule. Yet they have preserved their religion and their Turkish dialect, and thereby their links with the unassimilated Turkish and Moslem populations of Russia to the south and east.

The Tatars of Baku are rougher clay, incorporated in

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Russia less than a century ago and adhering more closely to their kinsmen over the border in Turkey and Azerbaijan. But they have been profoundly affected by the modern industrial centre which has sprung up on the oil-fields in their midst. Baku has produced its Tatar journalists and Tatar millionaires, self-made men of the world, who are taking their place by the intelligentsia of Kazan in the leadership of the All-Russian Moslem movement.

This movement has been initiated, since the Revolution, from Kazan and Baku, and bears the mark of all three factors. It presupposes a democratic Russian Republic on a territorial federal basis or at least with wide cultural autonomy. Within this framework it proposes to organise the twenty million Moslems scattered through Russia into a political *bloc*, with the object of reforming Russian Islam in a progressive direction, of making its weight duly felt in the Russian State, and of influencing Russian foreign policy in favour of Moslem liberty abroad. The leaders of the movement have not failed in courage. They have taken up the emancipation of women, the democratisation of ecclesiastical government, the "self-determination of nationalities" for Asia and Africa as well as Europe. In all this they have shown themselves true children of the Russian revolution, and the maintenance of their All-Russian *bloc*, on which their policy depends, is bound up with the territorial integrity of Russia. Their movement is a constructive, centripetal factor, as far as it goes, but the fate of Russia as a whole will be decided by larger forces, not least by the attitude we ourselves adopt towards her.

There is no doubt that the attitude of Britain towards Russia now will be a powerful factor in Russia's ultimate disintegration or preservation, and the developments described above surely demonstrate that we are vitally concerned in the outcome, from the political point of view. If the Russian Revolution succeeds, and the All-Russian Moslem movement succeeds with it, we shall have on our Indian frontier a peaceful, stable, democratic commonwealth which has grappled under favourable conditions with the problem of the relation between Asiatics and Europeans; and this must affect the Indian situation, externally and internally, for good.

But if Russia falls to pieces, and the All-Russian Moslem *bloc* dissolves, reactionary, fanatical Central Asia will drift

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away from the mediating influence of Kazan, and Baku will become a link, not between Bokhara and Moscow, but between Bokhara and Stambul. For the bricks of ruined Russia will not be left lying where they fall. Turkey, and Germany behind Turkey, are already watching for the opportunity to build them into another structure of their own—a "Central Asia" which would carry "Central Europe" up to the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs. They are preparing the ground by their Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian propaganda, which runs counter to the movement initiated from Kazan and Baku, and is intended to attract the same Moslem populations in another direction—away from Russia and democracy, towards fanaticism and chauvinism, towards Constantinople and Berlin. Which neighbour are we to have for India? That is our stake in the destiny of Russia, and it is a stake that demands a revision of our point of view.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

A Southern Slav Socialist Manifesto

A curious scepticism still prevails in certain quarters with regard to Southern Slav aspirations; the Austrophil legend dies hard. We have just received from Russia an interesting document presented by the Stockholm delegates of the Socialists of Croatia and Bosnia to the Petrograd Soviet, shortly before the Leninist *coup d'état*. It should be remembered that its authors are men whom the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office thought it safe to allow to proceed to Stockholm last summer, and who are, therefore, obviously the *least* Austrophobe of the Southern Slav Socialists. The following extracts are therefore all the more impressive: "No class of the Yugoslav population has suffered more than the proletariat, and that is why the Socialists were the first to recognise the true source of all the evils from which the entire nation suffers, who understood the need for unity, and who, instead of being carried away by separatist national ideas, adhered to the collective national name of Yugoslav. This division of the Yugoslavs into three national units—Serb, Croat and Slovene, often pitted by their oppressors against each other—has injured the progress of each of the three, and consequently their common progress, quite as much as their political and administrative subdivisions. The Socialist ideal, one and indivisible, suffered in a peculiar degree within the bosom of a single people by being forced into local Serbian, Croat, Bosnian, Dalmatian and Slovene groupings. Each of these parties was obliged to express itself in different conditions of life, to direct its main efforts in divergent directions, and thus to exhaust its common force in action which was generally sterile and almost always in-

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adequate. This situation and their knowledge of where the root of the evil lay, drove the Yugoslav Socialists to unite in a congress. In January, 1910, they succeeded in calling together an Inter-Balkan Socialist Congress, in which the union of all Yugoslavs in a single State organism was laid down as the foremost claim of the Southern Slav proletariat.

“ Our *bourgeois* politicians at the time had greeted this claim with a sceptical smile and treated us as Utopians. Who at that moment among the ‘ wise and Realist statesmen ’ would have said that this attempt could ever be anything but a *pium desiderium* ? To-day the problem of Jugoslavia is there, and is being discussed not only by our statesmen, but by those of the whole world. Consequently, it will be understood that at this moment, when the principle of the free self-determination of the nations is triumphing, we cannot fail in our duty as the first pioneers of the Yugoslav idea. The Socialist interest, more than any other interest, demands that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who inhabit Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, Styria, the Mur district, Baranya, Bačka, the Banat, Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be united in a single Yugoslav State, independent and sovereign, including all the territories in which they live in compact masses. As for the Southern Slavs outside this future Jugoslavia, we demand for them autonomy on an individual basis. In order to prevent sanguinary struggles in future, we demand on the Adriatic free access for all nations, and in the same way, in accordance with the principle, ‘ the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, ’ we demand liberty for the Albanians.”

Their views on more general war aims are summed up as follows : “ As true Socialists, we have nothing against a general peace such as would serve the common interests of the international proletariat and of humanity at large. We demand the international regulation of the rights of labour, and we claim a special attention for the workmen of backward countries, that they may be set free from slavery and brought nearer to civilisation. The *Internationale* must be transformed into a supreme, legislative and executive organ of the world’s proletariat in order to be able to act in the interests of world peace.

“ The delegation is in favour of an international League of Nations, resting on the following foundations :—

- (a) Suppression of secret diplomacy.
- (b) Democratic control of foreign policy.
- (c) Disarmament.
- (d) Freedom of the seas.
- (e) Obligatory international arbitration, with obligatory delays for the pronouncement of decisions.
- (f) Internationalisation or neutralisation of world routes of communication (straits, canals, etc.).
- (g) Free trade.
- (h) The ‘ Open door ’ in the colonies.
- (i) Regularisation of world production.
- (j) General democratisation of public life.
- (k) Political emancipation of women.

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"In order that the peace of to-morrow may be a real peace, conceived in accordance with the principles laid down at the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates in Russia—namely, a peace without annexations and contributions, based on the free self-determination of the nations—we claim, in the name of the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), and in the interest of the proletariat as a whole, as also of world peace, that the Southern Slav nation should also be accorded the right to form itself into a State economically and politically independent—a sovereign State provided with all the attributes which are proper to it, so that it may join the republican confederation of all the other Balkan States, and may, in the future, serve to the best of its powers the cause of universal peace. All this in conformity with the decisions of the first Inter-Balkan Socialist Conference. This we regard as the sole definitive solution of the Balkan problem as a whole."

An article published last October by *Naprej*, the organ of the Slovene Socialist party in Laibach, is a significant comment on the above document. "The Slovene proletariat," it writes, "is against the Government because it is neglected politically and economically, and because the Slovene workman needs, for his free development, a free Yugoslav State, which is refused to him by the Government. The proletariat, just as it defends itself against dependence upon stronger classes, defends itself against political dependence upon a stronger nation. To refuse all liberty to a nation, simply because it is numerically inferior, is not only unjust but supremely immoral. That is why the Slovene proletariat will remain united with the other classes until the primordial right of the nation has been attained, and as long as the Yugoslav declaration" [*i.e.*, of 30 May] "has not been realised. That is why it honestly welcomes the attitude of the Yugoslav [parliamentary] Club" [*i.e.*, in demanding unity]. The declaration of 30 May, already referred to more than once in our columns, demands the union of all Yugoslav territory in a single independent State under the Habsburg sceptre. For the most obvious reasons the Yugoslavs at present under Austro-Hungarian rule could not omit from their proclamations and speeches the saving clause, "*under the Habsburg sceptre*," and those who insist on treating this as a sign of affection for Austria are past all argument. The Croat and Slovene Press, however, has for weeks past—ever since the Declaration of Corfu, which evoked so profound a sensation in all Yugoslav lands—emphasised again and again the fact that *the programme of 30 May is a minimum programme*, and that the Serbo-Croat Coalition (now in office in Croatia), in not adopting so advanced a programme, is merely avoiding all commitments and aims meanwhile at consolidating the national resistance by internal reforms.

Edinost, the chief Slovene paper, wrote on 2 November: "It is a great mistake of the Germans to think that the Yugoslav desires, like those of the other Slavs, depend on the military and moral force of Russia at the moment, or are related to the success or defeat of the Entente at the moment. Our future Yugoslav State would have a very feeble foundation if its resurrection depended on the military force

A SOUTHERN SLAV SOCIALIST MANIFESTO

of no matter what State. Our desires have a moral basis far deeper than military force . . . in such modern ideas as democracy and the right of nations to dispose of their own fate."

The sayings of Father Krek, whose recent death is so cruel a blow to the Yugoslav cause, are being widely quoted in the same sense. "He is a traitor who is against the liberation of our nation." "The idea of our unity will conquer despite all and against all—because it *must* conquer. There are no forces which could check it." At the grave of Krek, Father Korošec, the President of the Yugoslav Parliamentary Club, declared: "We, thy closest colleagues, will rally all our strength to realise the idea of a Yugoslav State. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, we shall fight united for that great ideal."

From a statement in *Hrvatska Riječ* of 31 October it appears that after the Italian *débâcle* the Austrian Premier made fresh overtures to the Southern Slavs, which were once more declined. Other newspapers comment on the complete absence of rejoicings in Croatia over the victories in Italy—victories which merely strengthen the German grip upon Austria and postpone the coming of peace. In Fiume the Croat students ostentatiously held aloof from a Magyar "procession of victory," and were consequently set upon by the police.

A New Ally: The Bohemian Army

[The following article, published by M. René Pichon in L'Œuvre of 2 December, is, we believe, the first detailed public reference to one of the most remarkable movements of the war, the creation and recognition of the Bohemian Army as an independent factor on the side of the Allies. The consequences of such a step may be far-reaching.]

In this connection it may be worth referring to a memorable meeting held on 16 September at the Carnegie Hall in New York by the Czech National Alliance: The then Mayor of New York, Mr. Mitchell, took the chair, and the chief speaker was Mr. Franklin-Bouillon, Chairman of the Inter-parliamentary Committee, who hailed the new Bohemian Army, and invited the Czechs and Slovaks of America to join its ranks:—]

"Last July, in referring to the Czechs of the Foreign Legion, I pointed out that there were not many of them under our flag, but that soon many more would come. To-day it is an accomplished fact. An impending Decree of the President of the Republic is to regulate the formation of the Czecho-Slovak Army, and we can now give details about what could then only be indicated in a veiled form.

"This organisation comes after two years of effort—a delay due solely to the complexity of the problem. It comes, too, at a good moment, to console us for a disappointment and to preserve us from an injustice. In our bitterness at the defection of the Russians, some of us might be tempted to bear a grudge against all that is Slav. A false and unjust generalisation. In Russia the Slav temperament has been depressed by centuries of servility, corrupted by a morbid mysticism and by Socialistic Utopias; in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia it survives firm and robust. Morally the Czechs are more

A NEW ALLY: THE BOHEMIAN ARMY

like the Serbs than the Russians; this shows sufficiently how they can be relied upon.

"The new army will be composed partly of Czech and Slovak citizens living in Allied countries, partly of prisoners who surrendered to the Russians and Serbians, and who only ask to serve side by side with those against whom their oppressors had sent them. No pressure, no material or moral constraint, was needed to enrol them. In Russia, as soon as the enrolment of prisoners was authorised, over 20,000 Czechs offered themselves. The work of the Czech politicians consists in spreading, by persuasion, this patriotic enthusiasm, and to negotiate with the Allied Governments, the ways and methods of execution. This was the task of the members of the National Czech Council—Professor Masaryk in Russia, Mr. Stefanik in Russia and America, Mr. Beneš in Paris, London and Rome.

"The Czecho-Slovak Army will number about 120,000 men. This is something even among the gigantic effectives of to-day. The valour of its fighting men is known. We have seen them in Artois and Champagne, and in the East Brusilov has done full justice to the Czecho-Slovak Brigade. In one of his *communiqués* he quotes it among the exceptions which throw into relief the general collapse: 'The Czecho-Slovaks, perfidiously abandoned at Tarnopol by our infantry, fought in such a way that the world ought to fall on its knees before them.'"

"These 120,000 men will be distributed on the various fighting fronts. An important section of them is to be included in the French Army; the highest cadres will be, for the time being, French, for a reason which is worth mentioning. There are very few higher officers among the Czechs. In the Austrian Army the highest posts were for the most part closed, in practice, to the Slavs, as in Germany to the Jews. Thus the Czech troops at present lack leaders; but good ones will soon be formed.

"In return for this collaboration in our defence the Czechs ask us nothing! There has been no bargain between them and the Allied Powers. They claim no pledge which might embarrass us. They only claim the right to shed their blood for the cause which they feel to be just and to coincide with their destinies as a people.

"This does not mean that we ought to forget, later on, what they do for us; but such an attitude on their part is at once the most generous and the most happily inspired. Like the philosopher who proved motion by walking, the Czech nation proves its existence by action and struggle.

"Thus we possess a new Ally—not a State, it is true, but a people, and what is better, a people personified in its heroic army. Let us welcome it, let us salute its Red-and-White banner, and re-echo its National Anthem:—

'Were the world of devils full, for every man a devil,
God the Lord is on our side, and Death our foes shall vanquish.
O'er our heads may burst the storm, the rocks may reel and
shudder,
Crashing oak and trembling earth shall not avail to daunt us.

A NEW ALLY: THE BOHEMIAN ARMY

Resolute we stand, unshaken as the mountain summits;
 May the black earth yawn and swallow every shrinking traitor!

"France is with Bohemia, and Bohemia with France, for the greatest good of both alike."

Review

It is a pity that Mr. Norman Angell, by a certain tactless and, perhaps, ingrained inability to appreciate fully the ideal which brought the present Alliance into being, has very largely discounted in the public mind those saner views of his which, if enunciated by a less controversial pen, would carry with them a large measure of conviction. The main proposition of his *War Aims* (Headley Bros., pp. 127, 2s. 6d. net) is, in essence, the same as that propounded only the other day by President Wilson himself; and yet his unfortunate aggressiveness of tone does actual harm to the very cause which most of us have sincerely at heart, and which is of the very essence of the Allied purpose. No one in his senses now-a-days talks of crushing the German nation; we are all agreed that the one enemy, common alike to the German people and to the world at large, is that immoral militarism which has been carried to cynical perfection by the Prussian Government. But we most of us differ from Mr. Angell in this, that we clearly recognise the imminence and the reality of that danger, and can see no hope of any sort of peace until that incubus is finally and irretrievably crushed, and until the European comity of nations is infused with an entirely different spirit. Liberal opinion in this country is quite as alive to the danger from without as it is to that from within; it is the latter which seems to obsess Mr. Angell. One turns, by way of contrast, to the sane, idealistic and yet practical exposition of the Liberal attitude to the war as given by Professor Gilbert Murray and reinforced by a preface by Lord Grey, in *The Way Forward* (Allen & Unwin, pp. 43, 1s. net). Here one may read the interpretation by a gifted and imaginative mind of the true goal to which those who have not lost the idealism of 1914 are striving: the substitution of public right as the law of the civilised world; the realisation of freedom for all nations and for all the men and women within the nations; and the final deliverance of mankind from the power of the sword.

G. G.

Searchlights on the "Home Front"

The importance of the "home front" in the war against what President Wilson has just described as "a thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace" is now being more generally recognised, and one looks eagerly for any signs, no matter how slender, of a change for the better in German public opinion. The following three pieces of evidence may throw some light on the actual conditions which obtain on that front:—

NOTES

1. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* [Conservative: chiefly famous for Reventlow's diatribes] of 22 November reports a meeting of the Conservative Union for the Province of Brandenburg, at which the following resolution was unanimously adopted:—"The Prussian State, fundamentally a people of its Princes, is the foundation on which the German Empire rests. Not the sovereignty of the people, but kingship by divine right is its corner-stone. . . . We implore our deputies to do their best to prevent the kingship being debased into a sham kingship, and being replaced by the sovereignty of the people by means of the alteration of the Prussian franchise."

2. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* [Progressive: vigorously backs Reichstag majority: openly advocates the complete parliamentary system: moderate in tone, with Anglophil tendencies] of 25 November quotes from an article by the well-known historian, F. Meinecke, in the *Hilfe*: ". . . With us, both Government and people began, and to-day are carrying on, this war as one of compulsory self-defence. Do not shake this pure and honourable conviction, do not uproot it, since otherwise you overthrow the tree of our strength! For our German people is held together and made capable of bearing the burden of this war not only by means of the iron bands of State authority, of military discipline, of the old habits of loyal obedience, but also by our own apprehension, our own proving, of what this war means. . . . From the moment when we are forced to see that the war, overstepping the measure of sound national self-maintenance, is expanding into a war of conquest, the moral cement which holds us together would begin to crumble. . . ."

3. In the *Berliner Tageblatt* [extremely popular: has come under ban of censorship for pacifist tendency] of 25 November Leopold von Wiese submits that the new world to which both the annexationists and those who, like Lensch, talk about the downfall of Tsardom and the impending downfall of British tyranny look forward, is not going to be any better than the old. "I myself," he says, "think that those are right who will help us to build up a peaceful Europe and a free Germany. . . . There must arise a new state of affairs for Europe, in which Germany, while strong and free, is yet bound to her present opponents by mutual interests and by actual, not merely paper, agreements, so that fresh wars between Europeans are excluded. In order to build this new League of Nations, which would by no means, as some assert, be exclusively controlled by Great Britain, it appears to be the first preliminary condition that we should make concessions to one another, dropping everything which must have a continuous and disruptive effect on the whole structure of Europe." Is the curious phrase, "actual, not merely paper, agreements" an uneasy stirring of the conscience? The writer proceeds to draw a contrast between the League of Nations and Herr Naumann's former conception of a *Mittel-Europa* girded by trenches. The League of Nations, he concludes, does not require that men should become angels. It only requires somewhat more common-sense and boldness than the average man at the present time thinks practical.

NOTES

The Anglo-Roumanian Society Inaugurated

When the Provisional Committee of the Anglo-Roumanian Society was formed in the early autumn we welcomed it as a sign of the growing public interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe. The Society has now been formally inaugurated under the presidency of Lord Hugh Cecil, and was introduced to the British public at a highly successful meeting in the Mansion House on 7 December. Sir Edward Carson, who delivered the leading speech, gave the Roumanian nation an explicit assurance of British support, and linked the fortunes of the greater and lesser Allies in the words, "Our war is their war." The Anglo-Roumanian Society is assured of public support; and we hope that it will enter into an alliance with the Serbian Society of Great Britain and the Anglo-Hellenic League, and thus provide the Triple Entente of the Balkans with a solid phalanx of British citizens pledged to uphold the just claims of Roumania, Serbia and Greece.

The Austrian Slavs and Self-determination

The German victory in Italy, followed by the betrayal of Russia and her Allies by the Bolševik leaders, has freed the Governments of Vienna and Budapest from all immediate military danger, and at once their spokesmen are beginning to revert from the fair-spoken democratic phrases of the past nine months to the reactionary sentiments which come more naturally to them. Already the Joint Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, the Austrian Premier, Dr. von Seidler, and the Hungarian statesmen, Counts Tisza and Andrassy, have publicly repudiated the doctrine of self-determination as in any sense applicable to the Dual Monarchy. We shall have more to say when the full text of these speeches reaches us. In the meantime it is worth quoting the following *communiqué* issued as early as 1 December by the Czech, Southern Slav and Ukrainian Parliamentary Clubs at Vienna:

"The peace offer of the present Russian Government rests not only on the principle of 'No annexations or contributions,' but also on the principle of the right of self-determination of all nations—a fact suppressed by our Government. We therefore point out that the basis upon which the Austrian Government, according to the Premier's statement, is ready to enter into peace negotiations, stands on this essential point in direct conflict with the conditions of the peace manifesto of the present Russian Government to all belligerent peoples; for the offer preassumes guarantees for national self-determination, whereas the Austrian Premier's statement, made in agreement with the Foreign Minister, seems by its silence directly to exclude this self-determination. In view of this conflict on the most important point in the offer of armistice, we find that the negotiations already begun cannot lead to peace, and we should have to hold the Government fully responsible for this. From our standpoint we repeat that, in accordance with our declarations of 30 May, 1917, we still adhere unreservedly to the demand of self-determination."

SEP 17 1918

PRINCETON, N. J.

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"Pour la Victoire Intégrale"

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"If one hundredth part of the consideration and the thought that has been given to this war is given to schemes of peace, then you will never see war again"

—General Smuts (14 May, 1917)

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The League of Nations

(I) AS A PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLE

WHAT do we mean when we say, as we now do daily, that this war will end war and establish a League of Peace? Do we ever think how we are to constitute, conduct, and, still more, control a League of Peace, that is to say, a League of Nations, contractually bound to certain principles and procedures for the preservation of peace? Do we, especially those of us who have some knowledge of international relationships, ever try to realise how the forces of national instincts and of international ideals, or the foundations of wrecked or unfinished international institutions can be used for the erection of a structure that will be a defence rather than a danger to peace?

A League of Peace is at present no more than a large draft on our optimism—first drawn by “Tender-minded” promoters of monopolies in Utopia, and since endorsed by “tough-minded” prosecutors of a “knock-out.” Owing to this propaganda and our own great need for a panacea, we have come to accept the League of Peace at even more than its face value, and to give it magic properties, like the simple folk who swallow the prescription instead of getting it made up. The League of Peace is, indeed, fast becoming the “New Jerusalem” of our “Crusade”—“its bulwarks with salvation strong and streets of shining gold.” “There shall our troubles have an end in joy and peace”—so we sing—but do we really think so?

The test of our faith is whether we are prepared—or believe our Allies or enemies are prepared—to let anything that has hitherto been guarded by national forces be henceforth only guaranteed by international formulæ. We know that it is the diversion of the expansive force of new national energies into war preparations and war policies that has caused this and every other modern war. Shall we, as a result of this war, reduce our armaments or renounce our alliances? Not we. Will our Allies or antagonists give us a

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lead? Not they. The revolution in international strategic relationships, caused by the substitution of war in the air and under water, for war on land and sea will, no doubt, prevent us from merely dropping back into the old simple beggar-my-neighbour of dreadnoughts and divisions, and into the old balance-of-power between naval supremacy and military predominance. But the undefined and undeveloped possibilities of future warfare and the equality of advantage to which it again reduces great and small, will make competition doubly keen. The aeroplane and the submarine have simultaneously introduced into land and sea warfare changes such as came when the war-horse and the war-boat were first invented. The best we can hope for is that the new chivalry will not prove so heavy and lasting a yoke as the old, and that the new piracy will not maim and starve the civilisations of the oceans as it did those of the Mediterranean. But so far this war has made for war, not for peace. For while the old warfare, in one plane, may be ending in desolating deadlock, the new warfare is only entering on its future domains. A new warfare which threatens each individual man, woman or child with sudden destruction, or, at best, slow starvation. A new angel of death is abroad in the land, you can daily hear the beating of his wings—a new Lord of the Sea lurks in its depths. It is against their temptations that the League of Peace has to ensure Europe.

If, as a result of the war, all nations were to undergo a political and economic renaissance, such as that of Russia, there would no doubt be moral forces disengaged that could deal with this new situation and give a League of Peace between such reformed governments both a sanction and a soul. Both sanction and soul it must have, for without the first it is dangerous to our lives by its profession to defend what it cannot, and, without the second, it is dangerous to our liberties by its proclivity to attack what it should not. But, short of such a general renaissance, do we consider that the Governments of Europe, as at present constituted for the conduct of international affairs, are capable of carrying out an idea of this character? To expect the Foreign Offices of Europe to give effective expression to such a movement is merely to make the same mistake again that made the Holy Alliance into an instrument of tyranny and the pre-war alliances, all professedly pacifist, into intrigues for supre-

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macy. In both these cases the purpose of the popular movement and the policy of its leaders were pacifist and altruist; but both international systems were so conducted that the conditions created could end only in war. Both systems, for want of popular inspiration and control, could develop no positive force and remained purely negative.

The policy of the British Government in the two years before the war, when the imminent menace had sobered even the *insouciance* and ignorance of the Foreign Office, was almost exactly that which it is proposed should be followed by the partners in a Peace League. But it failed, because of the utter inadequacy of the national institutions responsible for foreign affairs to convey the international point of view so as to carry conviction in their sincerity and confidence in their success. We could scarcely expect Kaiserdom and Tsardom in 1914 to believe that platitudes about honour from so isolated an individual as our Foreign Secretary would be made good at such cost by the British Empire that he so very remotely represents; nor will the new Russia and the new Germany believe that platitudes about peace mean anything unless we at least give our spokesmen some democratic credentials. If we ourselves really believed in a League of Peace, we should have by now taken the first step toward it by so strengthening our imperial and national institutions that they would give us our proper place in the League. But so little do we really believe in any foreign relationship other than that reposing on our own superior force, that we have not even taken steps to secure a reasonably intelligent diplomacy. We have already lost the support in war of renascent communities such as the Turks and the Russians, and we had to wait for the Americans until Prussianism did our work for us. But our losses from want of democratic driving power and direction in war will be insignificant compared to those we shall incur by the same want in the peace that will be no peace. The League of Peace can only be begotten by sound vigorous national institutions on healthy young international institutions. If we expect without effort to enter a new kingdom of heaven, we shall only find ourselves back again in the same old fools' paradise that is at the gate of hell.

What are the efforts that are required of all Europeans in general and of us Englishmen in particular to make the

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League of Peace anything other than a peace-trap of the most dangerous kind? And what are the existing beginnings which these efforts might develop?

If we examine the international region as we would a new capital under construction, we find that the Law Courts are the most advanced of the new structures. This is in accordance with the general law of growth of social institutions, and in so far the fact that international arbitration, with its Claims Commissions and Courts of Enquiry, has developed to this point, seems satisfactory. But the danger is lest the projectors of Peace Palaces should appropriate these promising beginnings and raise on their foundations superstructures they were never intended to carry. The international differences that can be dealt with by the judicial method, are only those in the region next in importance above what is usually described as "private international law." In this region small disputes can be settled and large differences gradually solved or at least suspended, but international arbitration when you get to the bottom of it—as only those can who have been at the back of it in every form—is really no more than a development for specific purposes of the existing diplomatic relationship. The sanction for the enforcement of arbitration or for the execution of an award against states is only the same moral appeal to national honour slightly strengthened by an assumption of judicial authority. On the other hand, looked at from inside, this quasi-judicial procedure by oral argument and award has proved most useful in making acceptable to the public a fair compromise that might otherwise have created international ill-feeling. But all that this really proves in principle is that the difficulties of secret diplomacy are due quite as much to its excessive secrecy as to its defective diplomacy. The people that has seen and heard its case fought out by its own counsel is prepared to accept a decision against its claims that it would otherwise have repudiated. Judicial arbitration is, in fact, a modernised and somewhat democratised form of diplomacy; and while all those who have used it must realise its great practical possibilities as an international institution, they must also recognise that its political potentialities have been vastly over-rated. You can by arbitrary instruments and institutions aid the pacifist elements in a people to keep national pugnacity under control.

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You cannot by means of compulsory arbitration and a "Council of Conciliation" coerce, in the common interests of civilisation, any community temporarily under control of its criminal and covetous elements. International arbitration will avail, for example, to "clean the slate" between the British Empire and the United States of controversies whose settlement has been delayed by local feeling or constitutional obstacles, provided the driving power and direction be as adequate as that of Lord Bryce's mission. But international arbitration could have availed nothing to clear the issues as between us and Germany. There is no royal road to peace along the straight level avenues of the Hague.

If the judicial sphere of international relations has been over-idealised, the political sphere is still much under-developed. We have in this again another consequence of the backwardness of our national institutions for the conduct of foreign relations. In this region the European bureaucracies exclusively succeeded the autocracies in control of affairs, whereas in internal affairs bureaucracy has had to surrender a varying share of control to democracy. In other words, the Foreign Offices having usurped the functions of Parliaments in the national control of foreign affairs have made impossible any material development of parliaments in international affairs. We have paid heavily for this backwardness; for, by allowing its political inter-relationship to become purely bureaucratic, Europe so weakened that relationship that when the crisis of 1910-14 came it had nothing stronger than the personal philanthropies of Foreign Secretaries to oppose to the disruptive forces of militarist nationalism.

We ourselves have been the worst offenders in this respect. No foreign State, now Tsardom is obsolete and Kaiserdom obsolescent, has so obscurantist a system of controlling and conducting its foreign affairs. The lessons of this war and the years preceding it not only show that something must be done but suggest what it must be. The position of the Foreign Secretary must be reinforced by being made more representative, and by a restoration of the participation of Parliament in the conduct of foreign policy by association of the Foreign Office with a permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs. International instruments should be invalid until approved by Parliament in secret session and all treaties considered valid should be annually re-approved. Our diplomacy should

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be strengthened by adopting the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service of 1914, reproducing as they do in many respects recommendations made as long ago as 1890 by the Ridley Commission.

But beyond such modest reforms designed only to give us indispensable efficiency we must be prepared to second more radical proposals that will be made by more democratic states. Such will be, for example, the proposal that the Peace Congress responsible for the reconstruction of European civilisation and international law be given an element of popular representation. If a democratic convention of popular representatives were to co-operate with the diplomatic congress of plenipotentiaries the first step and a long one would have been taken towards the Parliament of man. Working through committees such a convention would be able to impose to some extent on the national policies of the plenipotentiaries that international point of view which the participant Governments—excepting those of Russia and America—would be constitutionally incapable of putting forward. But however important this innovation might be, and however immense the possibilities of such incipient Federal institutions, we cannot look to them for the guarantees that we require in the years immediately following the war.

Now that we have seen how the most civilised and cool-headed communities of Europe can be swept into general war by immoral acts such as most governments are capable of committing, and by moral appeals such as any Government is capable of composing—we must recognise that no international political institution will for several generations, or until after a series of revolutions, be capable of meeting such a crisis as that of 1910-14 with any better success than, for example, the Socialist international. All that such institutions can do in our time is to prevent the League of Peace, which is our old friend the Concert of Europe in a new and enlarged form from becoming, as was the Concert, merely a policy of stereotyping the *status quo* and stabilising the balance of power. They will do this by giving expression to the sentiment of solidarity that will revive in civilised communities with the cessation of hostilities. This sentiment is especially strong in the proletariat, and should the national Governments of the Great Powers be captured by their labour parties there will be a good prospect in the next generation of the great armies

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of labour being organised internationally for the preservation of peace.

But what can be done to secure peace during the anxious transition period that will follow this war—a transition likely to last for several decades? Even if the settlement satisfy sufficiently all conflicting claims and defy no national forces the moral movement for peace will not avail without some material forms of expression. Treaties, however solemnly worded, will not be enough. We can only eradicate war from our system by reinforcing the internationalism created by war itself. The second part of this article will suggest how in this way we may make war to end war.

GEORGE YOUNG.

* * * The second part of Mr. Young's article [“(II) As a Practical Procedure”] will appear in the next number.—EDITOR.

Politics in Japan

(I) THE BACKGROUND OF HISTORY

IN the course of my voyage home from Europe many years ago I was one day asked by an English fellow-passenger on board whether we had in Japan a system of castes. My prompt reply to this query was that we had as little caste as they had in England. This being a few months before the first opening of Parliament in Tokyo, I do not wonder that my English friend knew so little of the great progress my country had already made in the line of liberalism, in entirely reconstructing her feudal form of society, with its privileged aristocracy above and oppressed semi-serfs below. On my own part I have since repeatedly recalled this conversation, and asked myself whether I was really right in my reply, whether I did justice to the actual state of things, by implying that Japan was as little aristocratic in her social structure as England. After a mature consideration I have reached the conclusion that I was substantially right. It must be remembered that in 1868-9 there took place in Japan a great political and social upheaval, generally known as the Restoration, which not only restored the time-honoured Imperial House to its rightful authority over the whole Empire, but led to the overthrow of a most rigid feudal *régime*, by abolishing class privileges and liberating the great bulk of the

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people from thralldom which had lasted for centuries. And what was true nearly a generation ago is even more true now, after the liberating and adjusting processes which the country has since gone through.

Now in saying that Japan has to-day as little of caste system as England, or that her social structure is essentially democratic, I have in mind, first of all, the position of the aristocracy in its relation to the rest of the community. Japan has a nobility which boasts of very ancient lineage, some of the houses dating back to the seventh century of the Christian era, or earlier. But as a factor in the actual affairs of the country, the influence of the Japanese aristocracy is even less than that of its English equivalent. It is true that until some thirty years ago there had been kept up a form of ancient exclusiveness in the highest service under the Crown—the dual posts of the “Left and Right Ministers” being reserved only for members of the proudest nobility. But this anachronism was finally abolished in 1888, when the sole Prime-Ministership, with a modern Cabinet system, was established, and the late Prince Ito (then plain Mr. Ito) was appointed to the post. Thus was thrown open to the commonalty even the very highest post under the Japanese Crown. We count since then five or six new names among the premiers of the Empire; but all of them, though bearing titles of nobility, had risen from the ranks of the people, except one—Marquis Saionji—who indeed belongs to the very highest court nobility, but, strangely enough, has always been the most liberal and progressive of them all. It is well known that the House of Peers enjoys a high prestige, and it might be thought that here the nobility is entrenched as a great political power. But the real strength of the Japanese Upper House lies in a body of veteran administrators, who exercise a decisive influence in all its debates. Practically all the well-known leaders are found among these veteran administrators or else among the new nobility. Without these the Peers would be powerless, and the House would never be able to exercise that check it sometimes exercises against the apparently over-hasty licence of partizanship in the other House.

But it is in the army, where, above all else, aristocratic influence would be thought to predominate, that democratic principles are most marked. Japanese conscription knows no

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class distinctions. The law operates among the nobility as among the rest of the people. And if there are comparatively few young men from the nobility serving in the rank and file, the fact is due either to there being among its members a larger proportion of the physically unfit, or to their generally availing themselves of the privilege of the one-year voluntary service. But this privilege is not confined to the aristocracy alone, and is exercised largely by young men who do not belong to the nobility. It is a privilege open to all, provided they are graduates of the middle grade schools and pay a small fixed sum for expenses during service. But the operation of democratic principles is particularly thoroughgoing among the commissioned officers. It might, indeed, be presumed that the Japanese officers are largely recruited from aristocratic classes, but the fact is exactly the reverse. No doubt there are found among them a goodly number of noblemen, even of the Imperial family, but the immense bulk belongs to the common people. But are not these latter recruited mostly from the old *Samurai* families—the stipendiary soldier class of feudal times—ruled by the famous code of chivalry, known as *Bushido*? It is true that in the past this class has produced a majority of the officers of the army, but within recent years the conditions have completely altered. Other classes—farmers, merchants, mechanics—have come to have an equal, if not larger, share. Indeed, as a matter of fact, a larger majority of the army officers come from families of very narrow means, and all that they depend upon for their subsistence is limited to their comparatively small salaries. Japanese military officers are not a fast-living, fashionable set. Their lot, from a social point of view, is by no means enviable. Even in peace they are expected to live a Spartan life. Ability and faithful service are for them the only means of promotion. No doubt a good backing counts for something. But favouritism is powerless without personal abilities, while an officer of ability is sure to rise in the course of time, even though he be without powerful friends. I make rather a bold claim, but I do not think I am wrong when I say that the Japanese military service is one of the most democratic of the kind in the world.

What is true of the army is, of course, true of the navy and of the Civil Service. The members of the latter, from the permanent under secretaries to the younger assistant secretaries, all are required to pass a severe examination. Civil officials are

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all recruited from all sorts and conditions of society, and among them there are even fewer aristocrats than in the army. Young men from families of low social grade are just as open to promotion in the service as others from higher classes, provided they show signs of promise. No note is taken at all whether one belongs to the nobility, the *Samurai*, or the *hei-min*, and his social status is solely determined by the rank he occupies in the service itself. In fact, the rigid distinctions which once divided the *Samurai* from the *hei-min* (or commons) have now been practically done away with, the former having latterly become merged in the latter.

In order to show how the *Samurai* (more technically *Shizoku*) as a class distinct from the general body of the *hei-min* is rapidly passing out of existence, I may record the fact that according to Japanese law all younger sons of the nobility, when they set up a separate household are required to register as *hei-min*, instead of as *Shizoku* (*Samurai*)—showing that neither in point of law nor in social standing the *Samurai* is any higher in rank than the *hei-min*. In popular parlance, the members of the *Samurai* are all *hei-min*, or common people, as distinct from the nobility. Complain as we may of the inevitable red-tape which too often clogs the speedy working of official routine, there is no reason whatever to complain of any predominance of aristocracy. The front door of the Imperial Civil Service is always thrown wide open to every well-qualified young man of the whole nation, irrespective of class or station whatsoever.

Such is the background of Japanese politics; but are their politics correspondingly democratic? Considered in this light it will strike one as remarkable that the Japanese suffrage for representation in Parliament is exceedingly limited and that there is not yet any widespread cry for universal suffrage. Electors for the House of Representatives must be male Japanese subjects of not less than 25 years of age, paying direct taxes to the central Government to the amount of not less than 10 yen (20s.) a year. This gives something like 1,500,000 electors in a population of 56,000,000, for choosing 381 members of the Lower House. Comparing this with the present electorate of the United Kingdom, one might say that Japan was to-day almost where England was after the great Reform Act of 1832. That the system of suffrage now in operation is ridiculously narrow is admitted by all, even

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by the most conservative. Suffrage reform now occupies a prominent place in the programmes of political parties. Proportional representation, too, is being advocated. But in all questions of electoral reform party interests are bound to play an important rôle, and the question whether we ought to change the present secret ballot and large districts system into one of open ballots and small districts has been the bone of contention; and no decision has been reached yet. But reform is bound to come in the near future, and when a new electoral system comes into force, Japan will find herself, politically, more in harmony with the progress she has already made in other directions.

Foreign observers may find it strange that there has not as yet been any great public outcry against these anomalies. Are the Japanese of to-day so ignorant of the value of the vote, or are they indifferent to the working of representative government? Nothing of the sort. Certainly their intense zeal at election times does not seem to leave any doubt on the matter. To a certain extent it is doubtless true that the Japanese are kept from entering into full community of democratic ideal with Western peoples, owing to the immense distance of the country from those lands where the ideas of personal liberty have reached their fullest development. But as I look at the matter, the chief cause for this apparent indifference must be sought for in the absence of any strong discontent with their lot, or, in other words, in the prevailing sense of satisfaction with their social and political conditions. As already pointed out, the aristocracy of Japan is the most harmless body in the world. Of their own free will, they have restored to the Imperial authority all the domains held by them in fief—the large and small principalities of *Daimios*, comprising nearly the whole of Japan—which they had governed as *de facto* sovereigns for several centuries. This retrocession of feudal domains put an end to feudalism and opened the way for the emancipation of the bulk of the people from a state of semi-serfdom, and for the introduction of all the reforms which characterise modern Japan. The military and civil services were thrown open to the ablest brains of the country. Closely following these fundamental reforms there was promulgated the Constitution of the Empire, which guaranteed personal liberties and partnership in the Government of the country. All the essentials of reform in other

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departments of the body politic, had already been introduced, and when now the people found themselves partakers in the government of the country they saw no anachronistic institution blocking their path, no flagrant abuses staring in their faces. No dire necessity to compel them to reflect that without universal suffrage the great cause of progress and reform was in danger. To be sure, they had reason to grumble a good deal during the first years of the constitutional *régime*, owing to monopoly of chief offices by the so-called clan leaders, but by degrees these posts came to be thrown open to other classes of men. Finally, some of the most far-sighted of the clan statesmen, like Ito and Katsura, came forth as leaders of parties, founding politics on a broad national basis. Thus the commonalty of Japan never found themselves obliged, as has been the case at certain periods of history in Europe, to engage in a life-and-death struggle with an oppressive caste of aristocracy. Hence, in my humble judgment, the comparatively faint recognition of their right to the vote.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

. The second part of Mr. Yokoi's article [“(II) The Issue of To-Day ”] will appear in the next number.—EDITOR.

China, the War, and the “Open Door”

THE entry of China into the war on the side of the Allies is a signal event from many points of view. It gives one more proof to the whole civilised world that the policy of isolation which is alleged to have characterised her diplomacy for the last fifty years, is definitely given up, and that there is opening for her a new epoch, in which she will take her full share, so far as her power permits, in the maintenance and development of international rights and human civilisation.

An examination of the diplomatic history of China will contradict the view held in Europe, that China has always endeavoured to maintain her isolation. In fact, within the past fifty years, she has never been indifferent to the welfare of the family of nations. She was represented at the two Hague Conferences, and is signatory to most of the conventions. In all the international conferences of a social and economic nature she has always taken a keen interest.

The only occasions when she attempted isolation were

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those on which Great Powers, backed up by armed forces, pressed on her with unreasonable demands, which the lack of military strength prevented her rejecting, and the non-effectiveness of her moral vindication forced her to accept.

The real intention of the Chinese being always to cooperate with the rest of the world to promote peace and to attain a high ideal, it is not difficult to understand the motives of her participation in the present war. It is true that a war in Europe does not directly affect her material interest, and her shipping industry is almost non-existent in the submarine zone. Moreover, she has no particular grievance against the Central Powers on her own account, and desires no share in any spoliation of Germany, if such there is to be. But the issue of the war is no less vital to her than to any Western Ally. The truth is, that the safety and security of a country like China, whose defence is not well organised, and whose material resources are not fully developed, depends much on the decision whether the world is to be governed by the principles of law and morality or by those of "frightfulness" and might.

The part which China has played, and will play, when the details are forthcoming, will be far from being insignificant. To use the language of Mr. Balfour, in answer to a question in the House of Commons on 23 October, she is doing her utmost to support the Allies. China has a standing army of 800,000 strong, which, created through the exertion of Li Hung Chang and Yuan Shih-kai, is well drilled, well equipped and well disciplined. These troops have, at one time or another, been trained by European officers employed by the Chinese Government, among whom I may mention General von Falkenhayn. Should the Allied Governments agree to finance and officer them, they would make good fighters, for it is an established fact that the physical characteristics possessed by the Chinese qualify them to be good soldiers, if they are only properly trained and under good command.

The difficulties of transport have so far prevented the Chinese Government from entertaining the idea of sending an expeditionary force to Europe, difficulties, it may be mentioned, which have also been appreciated by the Government of Tokyo.

Meanwhile, China is very active in other lines of support. The enemy ships seized in Chinese ports have been generously

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placed at the disposal of the Allies; and a strict censorship has been established to stop any further German intrigue. The vast continent produces a large quantity of foodstuff, and the excess of production over home consumption is now constantly shipped to America, and thus releases a corresponding part of American produce for export to Europe. This roundabout way adopted of supplying the Allies is as ingenious as it is prudent upon the part of China. The transport between Shanghai and San Francisco is shorter than that between Shanghai and any European port, and it avoids the passage through the dangerous Mediterranean.

The help of China to the Allies in man-power is also very great. Both the British and the French Governments have employed thousands of Chinese in auxiliary work behind the fighting line, and France employs many of them in the production of munitions. The inaccurate language of newspapers described them all as coolies, but many of them are highly skilled mechanics, who have gained their experience in modern factories in China. I am not allowed to disclose the number of our workmen in France, but I can say that it is almost as great as the American Expeditionary Force.

In China the Government has seized the German banks, captured the German Concessions, and abolished German extra-territorial rights. German firms have been mostly closed down, and German residents have been carefully restrained. The activity and exertion of the Peking authorities in dealing with Germans have been admirable and remarkable, and this especially so, when we remember the fact that the Government is not always stable, and that internal struggle always threatens to break out.

While I have thus shown that China is heart and soul in the war, it remains to be confessed that the new agreement between the United States and Japan is a puzzle to her. By this agreement, the Governments of America and Japan deny that they have any intention to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "Open Door." The question for Peking is: "Is this a menace to China?"

The open door policy, as expounded for the first time by Secretary Hay, in his Note of 3 July, 1900, namely that the market of China should be open to all on the basis of equal

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opportunity of commerce and industry to all, was highly justifiable at a time when the scramble for concessions was at its height, and the claims to "spheres of interest" by different European Powers threatened the integrity of China. The madness of the Boxer rebellion and the corruptness of the decaying Manchus Court gave sufficient grounds to believe that her days were numbered, and that steps should be taken to prevent her domination by any single Power. To-day the situation is distinctly different; the Young Republic, though it remains politically unstable and militarily weak, is nevertheless conscious of its responsibility, and endeavours to overcome every difficulty in order to develop the country and to re-establish the prestige and respect to which she is entitled in the international family.

The great war, to which China is now a party, is, as it is constantly pronounced by Allied statesmen, waged to ensure to all nations, great and small, an equal opportunity to develop themselves in their own ways. This being so, the success of the Allied arms, let us hope, will not fail to meet China's only demand, a demand unmistakably real, noble and just, being, as it is, a demand for an immunity from foreign pressure for fifty years, in order that she may have time to educate her people, to open her resources, and to organise her defence. With the certainty of the Allied victory and the destruction of the German foothold in the Far East, China, with a request so righteous, has every reason to expect that she will be spared the danger and threat of an alien domination. Under such circumstances, therefore, the need for "the Open Door policy" does not arise. That policy, let it be remembered, is not directed against herself, but against Powers interested in China. On her own part "she always observes treaty obligations and adopts the principles of equity and justice."

The "Open Door policy" apart, the American-Japanese agreement, which no Chinese can afford to overlook, provides that America recognises Japan's special interests in China, especially those in that part to which the Japanese possession is contiguous. The question may be asked, what are these special interests? Are they political or economic, or both? The propinquity between China and Japan is like that between France and England, with the difference that Japan possesses a part of the Asiatic Continent in Korea. To what

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extent can it be said that the Chinese territory is contiguous to Japanese possessions? The ambiguity of treaties and the diversity of their interpretations have been a source of international conflict; and, consequently, it can only be hoped that the new American-Japanese agreement, while it is concluded with good-will between themselves and towards China, will not turn out to be a controversial document, at any rate, as regards China.

Another question may perhaps be asked. Why is it that Japan should seek an American recognition of her interests in China? The answer is to be found in the established fact that "since the Spanish War the American Federal Union has become an Asiatic Power." Moreover, Japan has concluded agreements with England, France, and Russia in respect of the Far East. In 1908 Secretary Root signed an Exchange Note with Mr. Tahihara, then Japanese Ambassador at Washington, to the effect that the two Governments would maintain the "Open Door policy" in China.

The new agreement, it must be acknowledged, is no innovation, when we have reviewed its historical background. But in the light of recent events, it has some special importance. Early in 1915, when Japan demanded of China an extension of the lease of Port Arthur, and railway and mining concessions in Manchuria and East Mongolia, the State department caused an informal enquiry to be made as to the basis of negotiation. In June, 1917, when the provincial Governors revolted against the Central Government in China, the U.S. Government addressed a Note to the Foreign Office in Peking, deploring the internal dissension, and urging the need of national unity. The Note was received in Japan with stormy indignation, on the ground that the State Department had not previously consulted Japan. Should such contingency occur again in China, what attitude would America adopt in view of the new agreement?

It is suggested that undue emphasis should not be laid on the Lansing-Ishii agreement, as it is an instrument more for the sake of clearing up the suspicion between the United States and Japan than for that of affecting the status of China. If this interpretation be accepted it is unfortunate that the terms should be so vague and that the future of China should be made a basis of agreement without her wishes being consulted.

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Since her revolution China, like Russia, is like a "woman in child-bed." In her troubled and anxious time it is hoped that no new anxiety will be added to her by an ambiguous document, which may ultimately affect her life but in the negotiation of which her voice is not heard.

S. G. CHENG.

Democracy and Discipline

IF the year 1917 has not, unfortunately, brought the war much nearer to a satisfactory end, it has at any rate served to define with unmistakable clearness the principles at issue between the contending groups. The Germanic Powers—or, at all events, their agents and spokesmen—have more and more ostentatiously proclaimed and displayed themselves co-workers with the "dark forces" everywhere; the Allies, on the other hand, have become no less clearly and pre-eminently the defenders of democracy. I do not for one moment wish to suggest that "darkness" and democracy are co-relative terms—that the one is the necessary anti-thesis of the other. It is, in fact, the very purpose of this paper to show that the democratic cause of the Allies is gravely imperilled by the operation of dark forces in the midst of the Allied camp. Nevertheless, it is broadly true to say that in the present war forces antagonistic to the light have become indissolubly bound up with the cause of military autocracy, while the conflict against darkness has come to be almost identical with the struggle to maintain and extend the sway of democracy.

In the early phases of the war the association of the Allied arms with the cause of democracy was not so clear as it is to-day; for one of the greatest of the Allies, viz., Russia, was apparently the most autocratic of all the combatants engaged. Even at first, however, this appearance did not correspond with reality, and acute observers from the beginning proclaimed the fundamental democracy of Russia, in spite of its Tsardom and its bureaucracy. Said Professor Allen in 1914 ("Germany and Europe," pp. 111-12): "I see a great deal of democracy in Russia; I do not see much of it in England. . . . Russia is probably the most democratic of all European countries. . . . At this moment it is not so much against Germany as against Germanism

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that Russia is fighting; against Germanism not only in Europe, but in herself. For Russia this is a war of liberation—a war to set free the great soul of Russia." Similarly, the very theme of Mr. Wesselitsky's notable book "Russia and Democracy" (1915) is that the essential genius of the Slavonic folk is democratic, and that all the gravest troubles in Muscovy during the past couple of hundred years have been due to the "German canker" of autocracy introduced by the successors of Peter the Great. "The sharp medicine of war," he concludes (p. 86), "is rapidly and thoroughly curing Russia of the German virus which for two centuries has poisoned the organism of that Empire. The Russian democracy is at last coming to its own again."

The fact which, even in 1914-15, was evident to those who knew—though not to the multitude—is now, owing to the Revolution of March, 1917, made patent to the world. Russia stands revealed as the country beyond all others wherein, through countless vicissitudes of central administration, has remained unchanged from time immemorial the spirit of local self-government, and the organisation of the primitive autonomous village community. Russia thus obviously falls into line with Britain, France, Italy and Belgium as a champion of the democratic principle against the attack of the panoplied despots. The entry of the United States of America into the conflict on the side of the Allies further emphasises the growing prominence of the democratic issue. President Wilson, indeed, in the great speech to Congress, in which he proclaimed to the world his reasons for taking up arms, laid prime stress upon the fact that at last had been joined the crucial struggle between militarist monarchs and industrial peoples—a struggle which the Transatlantic Republic could on no account allow to be decided in any way save one.

This battle between democracy and autocracy is, however, more than a duel between antagonistic ideas; it is also a severe test of practical efficiency. In the sphere of action, it must be admitted, democracy does not always display itself to advantage as compared with its rival. A survey of the history of the nineteenth century shows that time and again it has been its own worst enemy, and that by its own failures and follies it has brought upon itself discredit and destruction. The French Revolution perished of suicidal

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mania; the anarchic excesses of the Parisian demagogues of 1848 made the usurpation of the third Napoleon easy, if not inevitable; the paralysing garrulity of the German democrats of the mid-nineteenth century, combined with their hopeless inaptitude and unpracticality, delivered the Fatherland, and, with it, the Continent, into the control of the sinister efficiency of Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon. Democracy, indeed, has the defects of its merits. If it makes for freedom and progress, it tends to do so at the expense of discipline and order. In place of the concentrated, silent immediately-operative will of the despot or the bureaucrat it substitutes the indeterminate, conflicting, debating, compromising, vacillating, procrastinating wills of a number of kaleidoscopic parties or groups. Over against the knowledge and experience of the expert it sets the ignorance and *gaucherie* of the man in the street. It was, no doubt, the difficulty of informing, the danger of alarming, the fear of alienating, the British democracy which caused the politicians of 1911-14 to conceal the truth respecting the German peril, and pretend that all was well; it was the bitter rivalries of the multitudinous French cliques, with the consequent incessant change of ministries, that resulted in that unreadiness and disorganisation in the French armies (to say nothing of still greater evils) which were so nearly fatal in the early days of the war; it was the struggle between Liberals and Clericals in Belgium that in the end—by postponing until too late the introduction of universal military service, and by deferring until it could not be accomplished the refortifying of the frontier—left her naked to her enemies. (See "Main Currents of European History," pp. 348-51.)

This war is destined to show whether democracy can learn from its past errors, can recover from its initial catastrophes, can organise efficiency out of chaos, and can snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat. Up to June of the present year the omens were good. The central autocracies, having shot their bolt, were visibly on the defensive, their power was declining, the chances of escaping merited chastisement vanishing away. When Brusilov began his great offensive in Galicia the victorious end of the war appeared to be in sight. The Austrian prop of the mid-European coalition showed unmistakable signs of collapsing. Not only Lemburg, but even Cracow, began to be evacuated. The Russians had

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before them the pleasing prospect of a triumphant and almost unopposed sweep through the Galician plain. Then came the sudden catastrophe—the break-up of discipline, the flight from the trenches, the crumbling of the front, the outburst of anarchy; fratricide, chaos, *débâcle*. We know now that the whole tragic business was the evil work of a comparative handful of traitors and fanatics, and we see now how in a community which has attained to freedom the whole purpose and end for which the community is striving can be frustrated by the wickedness and perversity of an obsessed minority. The sad lesson was repeated and emphasized by the disastrous collapse of the defence of Riga and its gulf. The whole economic future of Russia has been jeopardised by the crime and folly of the Bolševik agitators, who, apparently, are ignorant or careless of the vital importance to Russia of her great Baltic harbours.

Now, as a second blow to the common cause of the Allies, comes the Italian calamity. Once again the action of a small minority, the failure in duty and discipline of a handful of men to whom the keeping of a point of vital importance had been assigned, has threatened ruin to the hopes of Italy, the loss of territory redeemed by long months of warfare, the sacrifice of a quarter of a million men, the abandonment of priceless material needed for future campaigns.

A few more such blows as have been administered to the cause of democracy by its professed champions in Russia and Italy, and that cause would be irretrievably shattered. And it is imperative to recognise that more blows of the same kind are by no means remotely possible. For the Russian and Italian *débâcles* were both caused by one and the same canker, viz., the working of insidious pacifist cosmopolitan and Germanophile doctrine upon untrained, ignorant, and ill-balanced minds. Preachers of those same subversive and disruptive creeds are busy, not only in Russia and Italy, but in France, Britain, and America. These corrupt or deluded men are enemies of the Allies more formidable than German generals, and it is necessary that by all means they should be defeated. For the lesson of the Russian and Italian disasters is this, that in the world of politics the fool is more deadly than even the knave, and

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that democracy is peculiarly at the mercy both of the fool and the knave. If the cause of liberty is to be saved there must be the sternest suppression of those much-abused "liberties" which, in the hands of men who are mentally and morally unfit to enjoy them, are made the means of widespread ruin and disaster. If unity, discipline, obedience, subordination of self-will to authority cannot be restored, then democracy will go down before autocracy, and who shall say that it will not have deserved its fate?

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

The Policy of the Ukraine Government

WE publish below the "Universal" or General Proclamation of the Ukrainian National Council of 20 November (translated from its official organ *Nova Rada* of the next day) announcing the formation of a Ukrainian Republic in close federation with the Russian Republic. This document is of historical importance, and we welcome the moderate terms in which it is couched. No excessive claims are put forward and no attempt is made to profit by Russia's temporary weakness in order to sever the ties with the great nation with which the Ukrainians have the closest historic and economic connections. If the Ukrainians, in close connection with the Cossacks, can restore law and order in the southern parts of Russia, an important step will have been made towards the recovery of the Russian Federal Republic.

The following facts deserve to be added. On 11 November the President of the Central Rada, Professor Hruševski, introduced a draft of the future constitution, and it was decided to lay this before the Constituent Assembly. A new Cabinet was appointed: Petljura (War), Kovalevski (Food), Holubovič (Commerce), Čačenko (Justice), Seburin (Post). In the debates the Social Revolutionaries were specially active. The Rada passed resolutions extending its authority over the governorships of Cherson, Yekaterinoslav, Harkov, Tauria, and parts of Kursk and Voronež, and accepting the Ukrainisation of the Black Sea Fleet. Colonel Pavlenko was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev Military District; and he, in his turn, appointed Colonel Paršenko as Chief of Staff and General Sisovič as Commandant of Kiev. The Russian south-west

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army under General Volodshenko has recognised the Ukrainian Minister of War.

“ Ukrainian people and all peoples of the Ukraine! An hour of trials and difficulties has come for the land of the Russian Republic. In the north in the capitals (Petrograd and Moscow) a bloody internecine struggle is in progress. A Central Government no longer exists, and anarchy, disorder and ruin are spreading throughout the State.

“ Our country also is in danger. Without a strong, united and popular Government, Ukraina also may fall into the abyss of civil war, slaughter and destruction.

“ People of Ukraina, you, together with the brother peoples of Ukraina, have entrusted us with the task of protecting rights won by struggle, of creating order and of building up a new life in our land. And we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your will, for the sake of creating order in our country and for the sake of saving the whole of Russia, announce that henceforth Ukraina becomes *the Ukrainian National Republic*. Without separating from the Russian Republic, and preserving its unity, we take up our stand firmly on our lands that with our strength we may help the whole of Russia, *and that the whole Russian Republic may become a federation of free and equal peoples*.

“ Until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly meets, the whole power of creating order in our lands, of issuing laws, and of ruling, belongs to us, the Ukrainian Central Rada, and to our Government—the General Secretariat of Ukraina.

“ Having strength and power in our native land, we shall defend the rights of the revolution, not only in our own lands, but in all Russia as well.

“ Therefore we announce:—To the territory of the National Ukrainian Republic belong the lands where the majority of the population is Ukrainian: Kiev, Podolia, Volynia, Černigov, Poltava, Harkov, Yekaterinoslav, Cherson, Tauris (without the Crimea). The further delimitation of the frontiers of the Ukrainian National Republic, viz., the addition of part of Kursk, Cholm, Voronež and the neighbouring provinces and districts, where the majority of the population is Ukrainian, is to be settled according to the organised wishes of the peoples.

“ To all the citizens of these lands we announce:—Henceforth in the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic *the existing rights of ownership* to the lands of large proprietors and other lands not worked by the owners which are fit for farming, and also to lands belonging to the Royal Family, to monasteries, to the Crown and to the Church, *are abolished*. Recognising that these lands are the property of the whole working people, and must pass to the people without compensation, the Ukrainian Central Rada instructs the General Secretary for Land Questions to work out immediately a law for the administration of these lands by Land Committees, chosen by the people, until the meeting of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

“ The labour question in the Ukrainian National Republic must

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immediately be regulated. For the present we announce:—In the territory of the National Ukrainian Republic henceforth *an eight hours' day* is ordained in all factories and workshops.

“ The hour of trial and danger which all Russia and our Ukraina is now experiencing necessitates the proper regulation of labour, and a fair distribution of food supplies and a better organisation of work. Therefore, we instruct the General Secretary for Labour, together with representatives of labour, to establish from to-day State control over production in Ukraina, respecting the interests both of Ukraina and also of the whole of Russia. For four years on the front blood has been shed, and the strength of all the peoples of the world has been wasting away. By the wishes and in the name of the Ukrainian Republic, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, firmly insist on the establishment of *peace as soon as possible*. For this end we make resolute efforts to compel, through the Central Government, both allies and enemies to enter immediately upon peace negotiations.

“ Likewise we shall insist that at the Peace Congress the rights of the Ukrainian people in Russia and outside Russia shall not be infringed in the treaty of peace. But until peace comes, every citizen of the Republic of Ukraina, together with the citizens of all the peoples of the Russian Republic, must stand firmly in their positions both at the front and in the rear.

“ Recently the shining conquests of the Revolution have been clouded by the re-establishment of the death penalty. We announce: Henceforth in the lands of the Republic of Ukraina *the death penalty is abolished*. To all who are imprisoned and arrested for political offences hitherto committed, as well as those already condemned or awaiting sentence, and also those who have not yet been tried, full amnesty is given. A law will immediately be passed to this effect.

“ The courts in Ukraina must be just and in accordance with the spirit of the people.

“ With this aim we order the General Secretary for Judicial Affairs to make every attempt to establish justice and to execute it according to rules understood by the people.

“ We instruct the General Secretary for Internal Affairs as follows: To make every effort to strengthen and extend the rights of local self-government, which shall be the organs of the highest local administrative authority, and until the establishment of the closest connection with the organs of revolutionary Democracy, which are to be the best foundation of a free democratic life. Also in the Ukrainian National Republic *all the liberties won by the Russian Revolution are to be guaranteed, namely, freedom of the press, of speech, of religion, of assembly, of union, of strikes, of inviolability of person and of habitation, the right and the possibility of using local dialects in dealing with all authorities*.

“ The Ukrainian people, which has fought for many years for its national freedom and now has won it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities existing in Ukraina. Therefore, we announce that to the Great Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other peoples of Ukraina we recognise national personal autonomy

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for the security of their rights and freedom of self-government in questions of their national life, and we instruct our General Secretary for Nationality Questions to draw up in the near future a measure for national personal autonomy.

"The food question is the foundation of the power of the State at this difficult and responsible moment. The Ukrainian National Republic must make every effort to save itself both at the front and in those parts of the Russian Republic which need our help.

"Citizens! In the name of the National Ukrainian Republic in federal Russia, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, call upon all to struggle resolutely with all forms of anarchy and disorder, and to help in the great work of building up new State forms, which will give the great and powerful Russian Republic health, strength, and a new future. The working out of these forms must be carried out at the Ukrainian and all-Russian Constituent Assemblies.

"The date for the elections of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly is fixed for 9 January, 1918, and the date for its summoning, 22 January, 1918.

"A law will be immediately published regulating the summoning of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly."

Austria, Hungary and the Slavs

[In No. 59 of THE NEW EUROPE we published a detailed report of the important Polish debate of 9 November in the Austrian Parliament, in the course of which a number of prominent Slav deputies attacked Hungary for its share in provoking the war and its gross oppression of the non-Magyar nationalities. This gave rise to a whole series of interpellations and protests in the Hungarian Parliament, the following summary of which throws considerable light upon the Magyar political outlook.]

Baron Perényi fiercely denounced the "disgraceful, impertinent and criminal" attacks of the Czechs upon Hungary's integrity. "Worse than the highwayman who by armed force tries to rob me of my property, is the burglar who uses my momentary embarrassment in order to stretch out a greedy hand towards my jealously guarded treasures." The treasonable activity of the Czechs will be greeted by the Entente and will provide Mr. Lloyd George with material for one of his great speeches. "I would gladly assume that only a few individuals had degraded themselves to be agents of the Entente and pupils of Masaryk, Koniček or Kopecki; of Masaryk who till now only wanted to make a republic of Bohemia, but now, according to his statement in the *Daily Chronicle*, would like to divide up the whole monarchy between Czechs, Italians, Serbs, and Roumanians; of Koniček-Gorski, who aimed at an autonomous Czech kingdom under a Russian Grand Duke, or of Kopecki, who has selected an English prince as king. Unhappily it is not a mere matter of individuals, but, as the Premier has admitted, of great and powerful parties.

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"Worst of all, these impertinent statements were made in the Austrian Parliament without being refuted by the President or the Premier or anyone else. *Qui tacet, consentire videtur*. Roman law adds that silence may be regarded as consent, if in the event of a contrary opinion existing a protest would have been fitting or necessary. And if ever a protest were fitting or necessary, as the most elementary claim of alliance and comradeship, then this was such an occasion, and those who neglected this duty became, voluntarily or involuntarily, accomplices of this criminal onslaught on Hungary."

In Austria there was a systematic agitation going on against Hungary, which was, he went on to argue, blamed for all the faults of food distribution in Austria itself. In conclusion, Baron Perényi declined to enter into polemics with the Czechs (*sic!*), but would merely say to them: "Neither 13 nor 3 counties, not one foot of Hungarian soil will we allow to be stolen from us. What they want, let them conquer by force of arms! Let them send the notorious Czech brigades against us! * But we also have a serious word to address to those Austrians who were till now our comrades, who have a heart for the Monarchy's interests, and are trustworthy supporters of the dynasty. Where do they think it will lead if they allow the peoples of Austria to be incited still further against us, and put no break upon this hatred and passion? Are they not afraid lest in Hungary also great and powerful parties might arise, whose only watchword was: 'Down with the false friends! Away from Austria!?' Halt, before it is too late, and remember that those who work at the break-down of Hungary are digging Austria's grave!"

COUNT ANDRÁSSY ON MAGYAR LOYALTY.

After a speech from Mr. Polónyi (the notorious Minister of Justice in the second Wekerle Cabinet, 1906-7), who argued that the formation of an independent Hungarian army was the only way of stopping such intrigues, the House was addressed by Count Julius Andrássy. He professed not to feel any alarm as to the national and federalist aspirations of the Czechs, Southern Slavs and Ukrainians: for the events of this war have shown "that *Hungary is the surest support of the Monarchy, while the tendencies of the Czechs are a grave danger for the dynasty and the Monarchy*. We (Magyars) devoted all our powers to the cause of the Monarchy and the dynasty, and we did this from duty, loyalty and also egoism. Count Széchenyi in 1848 summoned the nation to support the dynasty and assure to the Magyars a dominant rôle. At that time it was impossible, because there were vital differences between the outlook of the dynasty and of the Magyar nation, and because the dynasty stood for interests in foreign policy with which the nation had nothing in common. What was then impossible has now happened without a Széchenyi, without any great men: the nation has itself felt the interests of the dynasty and of the nation to be identical and placed all its forces at the service of the throne."

The Czechs, on the other hand, Count Andrássy continued, have

* A reference to the Czech volunteers in the Russian Army who distinguished themselves under Brusilov.

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proved disloyal, and part of their troops have joined the enemy. As there is no Czech army to enforce their claims by conquering Hungary they could only attain their aims in one way, by revolution; "and to admit openly such a policy is only calculated to weaken them and strengthen us. They think that with the Amnesty a political course was ushered in, such as justifies them in putting forward such claims. I believe them to be radically mistaken!" Meanwhile, from the standpoint of the Monarchy as a whole, "it is undoubtedly most harmful that the Slavs follow so revolutionary a policy. *That can only lead to the collapse of Austria!* It is to our interest that side by side with a strong Hungary there should be a strong Austria." Hence every possible step must be taken to suppress such tendencies. "It is quite certain that we can reckon in every way upon the support of His Majesty, both on account of his whole outlook (*Denkart*), of his interests of self-preservation and of the oath which he has taken to oppose every effort to violate Hungary's integrity. At first I, too, was hurt that the President of the Austrian Parliament did not find one word to repel the attacks against us, and that the Austrian Premier was also silent. If this meant that all the elements in the Austrian Parliament approve these attacks, then the Monarchy would really be faced by a grave crisis. *In that case a further common life between these two States of the Monarchy would be impossible.* Happily this is not yet proved. In the same sitting other invectives were uttered, which neither President nor Premier can have approved, but which were not reproved. An Ukrainian deputy declared that Austria and the dynasty were hostile to the Ukrainians, and that the Poles were hangman's assistants; but he was not called to order. . . . Another deputy asked whether the Foreign Minister was a gentleman; but was not called to order. Another speaker spoke of the self-determination of nations as the sole foundation of peace. Even this remark could be made without its authors being called to order." This sequence of crime throws a highly significant light upon the Magyar attitude towards national questions.

Count Andrassy ended by declaring that Hungary should not follow an anti-Slav policy. "But, on the other hand, we must act with the greatest energy against these excesses, and use all our influence to prevent Dualism being replaced by Federalism, which would make these small nations independent of Austria and render it possible for them, as equals, to place us in a minority over important common questions. . . . To give these forces the right to interfere in our common affairs as special autonomous States would be equivalent to consciously destroying the power of the Monarchy."

DR. WEKERLE DENOUNCES FEDERALISM.

The Premier, Dr. Wekerle, in his reply, dealt at some length with "the grave and shameless attacks" levelled against Hungary, and paraded the stock phrase re-echoed by three whole generations of Magyar Jingoese, that "nowhere in the world is there so much individual liberty as in Hungary." He assured the House that every

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possible step was being taken to prevent Czech agitation among the Slovaks of Hungary. He announced that he had presented both to the Austrian Premier and to His Majesty a detailed memorandum denouncing the Slav claims as both unjust and incompatible with Hungarian interests, and demanding that steps be taken to punish such attacks in the future, and to employ the censorship against them. "They cannot be tolerated, and in my memorandum I pointed out that these things make our co-operation difficult." Without going so far as to suggest that they endangered the Compromise of 1867 [on which the Dual System rests], he had reminded His Majesty that they were dangerous from the standpoint of Austria. "*And as it concerns us, too, whether our neighbour Austria is organised on a federalist or dualist basis, I went so far as to declare that unless the ground were energetically cut away from under these intrigues, the process of dissolution must begin.*"

THE CROWN FAVOURS DUALISM.

"These Slav aspirations must be revised—and that on the present Dualist basis—and a determined policy must be adopted against them. . . . The best guarantee against them is unity, and that is our strong and impregnable fortress, if the golden band which unites us is strengthened by the support of the Crown. And to prove its impregnable character *I venture, with His Majesty's permission, to announce his declaration, that there is not even the bare possibility of His Majesty's not employing all his authority to nullify efforts directed against the lawful independence or territorial integrity of the Hungarian State.* . . ."

Roused by these Magyar declarations, the Slav deputies in the Reichsrat (Messrs. Stanek, Kovošec, Klofač, Hruban, Tusar, etc.) interpellated the Austrian Premier as to his attitude in this matter, reaffirming their national demands and warning "*the Governments not to drag the Crown into political disputes, if only for the reason that, in these times, such a step could have no other practical result save to bring home with added force to the peoples whose interests and aspirations are thereby affected, the painful difference between a people which enjoys State independence and sovereignty and a people which has been deprived of its independence.*"

THE AUSTRIAN PREMIER CONDEMNS FEDERALISM.

This drew a long statement from Dr. von Seidler, who referred to certain assurances given by him to the Hungarian Government in the constitutional question. "I was all the more bound to do so, because certain Austrian parties take up an attitude which really conflicts with the integrity of Hungary's constitutional structure, and especially with the Dual System. What I had to say to the Hungarian Premier in this connection cannot have been new to him: and in the same way I really do not think I am telling the House anything new if I try to sum up what I had already

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several times expressly stated." With these extremely vague phrases Dr. von Seidler turned to the problem of constitutional reform in Austria itself, and laid down as the two fundamental points: (1) "the assertion of the unity of the Austrian State"; and (2) "the maintenance of the existing frontiers of each province (*Kronland*)."

"We all know of those efforts which aim at placing the individual units of the Austrian State in a looser relation to it and to each other; and in so far as those who hold this view honestly wish to contribute by such reconstruction to the welfare to the Austrian State as a whole under the Habsburg Crown, they certainly deserve all respect. But I must emphasize that such views do not coincide with the programme of the Government, which holds that any loosening of the State structure would not be of advantage to the State or to its component parts. It would in any case be quite impossible to try to solve such problems during the war. If, however, the aim of such tendencies is to get our enemies to enforce by means of peace conditions what could only come into being from within and by the will of the State as a whole, then such tendencies must be most strongly condemned and rejected.

"In maintaining the existing provincial frontiers, the decisive idea is that the Crown lands, as they are to-day, are organisms of historic growth, and are alive in the popular consciousness, and consequently that no organic change in our constitutional development could ignore these fundamental elements in the State." (Protests.) He concluded by assuring Hungarian public opinion "that the Austrian Government is planning nothing which could in any way impair the inviolability of Hungarian territory, or that foundation of the State, the Dual System, and that it must repudiate any tendencies towards such an upheaval."

Nothing could be more explicit than these pronouncements, and we hope that they will be taken to heart by the sentimentalists in Entente countries, who would have us believe that the Emperor Charles and his ministers are planning some far-reaching scheme of liberty and federalism.

Review

If there is one solid hope to which most men cling, in their horror of the existing international anarchy, it is that out of it there may emerge something like a practical League of Peace, which will co-ordinate and fructify the various dispersed motives and tendencies which make for peace, but which, for want of such co-ordination, have hitherto spent themselves fruitlessly. There are men, of course, to whom life without war suggests, in the words of one of them, "one damned long Sunday afternoon's walk," but they are, fortunately, a minority. To be a success, even to be a possibility, a League of Peace demands an immense amount of work and thought. The difficulties

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are well enough indicated in Mr. Young's article in the present number; and they are illustrated by the conflicting and often confused sentiments lately expressed upon the subject by leading Allied statesmen. It is well, therefore, that the public mind should be constantly exercised in this direction. In *The American League to Enforce Peace* (Allen & Unwin, pp. 92, 2s. 6d. net) Mr. C. R. Ashbee gives a good account of the American movement, having been present at its actual inauguration at Independence Hall on 17 June, 1915, and he contributes some sound thinking of his own to the subject. In *Enforced Peace* (League to Enforce Peace, 70, Fifth Avenue, New York, pp. 204), a full account is given of the League's first annual meeting, held in Washington on 26 May, 1916, with full reports of the many speeches delivered by the delegates. We here find worked out in greater detail how it is proposed to translate the American postulate of a change of heart in international relationships into terms of practical politics. Especially interesting are the contributions of Mr. Theodore Marburg, former Minister to Belgium, and of President Wilson. In another volume, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace* (Allen & Unwin, pp. 154, 4s. 6d. net), Mr. Leonard S. Woolf presents, in a collected form, the more important schemes for a League of Nations that have been put forward, whether in America, Britain, or on the Continent; and in an interesting introduction he indicates the main lines of agreement between them. If the reader is left with a healthy sense of the work that lies ahead, the volume will not have been in vain, for a roused public opinion is the best guarantee of success, and, as General Smuts said last May, "if one hundredth part of the consideration and the thought that has been given to this war is given to schemes of peace, then you will never see war again."

G. G.

The Internal Situation in France

The report of General Dubail has given a precise form to the charges which have been levelled for months past, alike in France and in other Allied countries, against M. Caillaux. That statesman has always had passionate opponents and keen supporters; and the discussions which centred round his name easily assumed a violent form and never led to anything for lack of proofs in one direction or the other. For the first time it will be possible to learn something at least of the truth on what has been called the *Affaire Caillaux*. An inquiry is about to open, and until some decision has been reached it would hardly be opportune to indulge in speculation. It may, however, be well to point out that certain newspapers which are friendly disposed towards M. Caillaux are giving out that in his forthcoming speech in the Chamber he will allege in his defence high political necessity. This style of argument irresistibly recalls memories of the early days of the Third Republic. It was in the name of political necessity that in the famous trial held at the Grand Trianon from 6 October to 10 December, 1873, Marshal Bazaine tried to justify his strategy before Metz.

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Bohemia and Alsace

In our otherwise fairly detailed report of the Polish debate of 9 November in the Austrian Parliament, we did not do full justice to one remarkable incident—for the very simple reason that it was slurred over in the German-Austrian newspapers upon which we depended for a report of the speeches.

Mr. Stanek, the president of the Czech Parliamentary Club, in the course of his speech recited, amid the approval of his colleagues, the text of the protest drawn up by the Czech deputies in the Diet of Bohemia in 1870 against Germany's intention of annexing Alsace-Lorraine. The essential passage runs as follows: "The Czech nation cannot but express its most ardent sympathy to that noble and glorious France who to-day is defending her independence and the national soil, who has deserved so well of civilisation and to whom we owe the greatest progress realised in the principles of humanity and liberty. The Czech nation is convinced that such a humiliation as the snatching of a fragment of its territory from an illustrious and heroic nation, full of just national pride, would be an inexhaustible source of new wars, and consequently of new injuries to humanity and civilisation. The Czech people is a small people, but its soul and its silence are not small. It would blush to suggest by its silence that it approves of injustice, or dares not protest against it. It is in this spirit that the Czech nation throws itself into action, ready for all the sacrifices which its conscience may dictate. Even if its appeal should prove useless, it would at least have the satisfaction of having done its duty at a critical moment, by bearing witness to truth, right, and the cause of the liberty of peoples."

That the accredited representative of the Czech nation should have compelled the German deputies of the Reichsrat to listen to this praise of France at the very moment when French troops were about to range themselves against Austria on the Piave, is an act upon which all comment of ours would be superfluous.

Magyar Jingo War Aims

While the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has disclaimed all desire for annexation, *Budapesti Hirlap*, the leading Magyar newspaper, which stands in close spiritual relation with Count Tisza, and close financial relations with Berlin, puts forward a very different programme in a remarkable leader of 15 November. "We have a right," it says, "to a part of Roumania—the 15,000 square kilometres, including Buzeu, Putna, and Prahovo. Why? To force the megalomaniac descendants of Trajan to put on again the straight jacket. It is preferable to have a frontier nearer to Bucarest. The Roumanian fox must not play the wolf between the *Magyar* town of Buzeu and the Bulgarian Dobrudja." The oil and salt of this district would be very useful to Hungary, and also to Germany for her submarines.

"We must also take 10,000 square kilometres near Orsova and in the bend of the Danube. Let us share the Danube with the Bulgars

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and render the Berlin-Bagdad route safer. . . . In the treaty of peace we must ask the right for twenty years of constructing through the Morava-Vardar valleys an Austro-Hungarian canal, under our own administration and exclusive control. To prevent this from being a dead letter we must ask in the treaty of peace for a special clause, by which the Serbian army is suppressed and the Serbian throne assigned to a sovereign acceptable as a neighbour to the ruler of the Dual Monarchy. The Berlin-Bagdad idea must find its equivalent in this river system. . . . On us depends whether torrents of gold are poured into the Magyar port, Budapest. Our capital must be the centre of all waterways; its system must extend to the Vistula (Warsaw-Danzig), to the Oder (Breslau-Stettin), to the Elbe (Dresden-Hamburg), and to the Rhine (Vienna-Frankfurt-Köln). Thus we would exploit the Balkan products gathered by us. . . ." It is worth noting that it was the same paper which on the very same day was in a position to make public the fact of lengthy conferences between Counts Tisza and Czernin and to express its satisfaction at their results.

Lenin in September

The *Neue Freie Presse* gives prominence to a letter written by Lenin last September, when he was still in hiding. It deserves to be reproduced as a clue to the mentality of the present ruler of Petrograd. It is all the more interesting to-day, when he appears to be applying to his opponents those very methods of intolerance of which he bitterly complains.

"The Minister of Justice, Pereverzev, has openly made known that he put forward unreliable charges with the object of exploiting the fury of the soldiers against our party. That is the man who only yesterday called himself a Socialist. Pereverzev has gone, but no one can say that the new Minister will not employ the same methods. The counter-revolution wants a new Dreyfus affair. It believes us to be spies just in the same way as the leaders of the Russian reaction, the authors of the Beiliss affair, believed that the Jews drink the blood of children. To-day in Russia there is no guarantee of justice. The charge of conspiracy and incitement to rebellion has a precise character, but neither the Government nor the Soviet give any legal definition of our crime. They know only too well that it is simply absurd to speak of a plot in connection with a movement like that of 3 and 5 July. The leaders of the Menševiks and Social Revolutionaries are trying to obtain pardon from the counter-revolution, by handing over members of our party as desired. There can be no talk of a legal basis in Russia, and not even of constitutional guarantees such as exist in well-organised bourgeois states. To surrender to these authorities would mean to place oneself in the hands of the Miljukovs and Alexinskis, in the hands of raging reaction, for whom the charge against us is a mere means of civil war. The decisive struggle between revolution and counter-revolution is on foot. We shall use our whole strength to help the people's revolutionary struggle to victory."

Lenin is an indomitable fanatic, and the more we may disapprove of his views, the more necessary it is that we should understand him.

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Krupp Propaganda in Switzerland

The Swiss fortnightly review, *Wissen und Leben*, for 1 December publishes, under the title of "Alldeutsches," an interesting paragraph from "a widely-esteemed and, indeed, eminent German-Swiss."

"The Pangerman propaganda has an advertisement agency for abroad, the so-called 'Ala.' It is a Krupp foundation, and its aim is that business advertisements by Germans from the Empire should only go to 'well-affected' papers—that is, to papers with Germanophil staffs—'Germanophil' in the Pangerman sense.

"In order to attain this end, the 'Ala' tries to influence existing advertising agencies and concerns. In so far as the German would-be advertiser does not use any agency belonging to the 'Ala,' he is enlightened by it as to his national duty; the 'Ala' indicates the papers in which he should advertise. At this very moment preparations are in full swing for starting the 'Ala's' business activity in Switzerland also. There have not been wanting attempts—we hope unsuccessful—to establish a foothold in Switzerland by buying up shares in Swiss advertising agencies. But above all the 'Ala' has acquired detailed information as to the political views of the Swiss editorial staffs.

"Those who know how dependent numerous newspapers are upon advertisements for their financial success, can at once realise how the 'Ala' can undermine those Swiss papers which do not submit to the Pangerman programme. The 'Ala' will use its thumbscrews to convert all editors who are not Pangerman in sentiment. Since the war began there has been no greater menace to Switzerland's intellectual independence than Krupp's 'Ala.' May publishers and editors remember their duty to Switzerland!"

A New Attitude towards Russia

The release of Messrs. Cičerin and Petrov has already been far too long delayed. Without discussing the rights and wrongs of their arrest, the refusal of the authorities to comply with Mr. Trotski's request was both stupid and unnecessary; what should have been a mere trifling incident has been magnified out of all proportion. It may not be remembered that a similar policy was adopted towards both Mr. Trotski and Mr. Černov; if they were traitors, they should have been treated as such, or if there was no evidence they should have been treated with courtesy and left free to return to their country unmolested. As Dr. Hagberg Wright most opportunely pointed out in his letter to *The Times*, this incident has been but one of a lamentable series of failures on the part of our rulers to understand the new spirit in Russia. We trust that the release of these two men will mark the beginning of an entire change of attitude towards Russia, which will ignore formalities, and impress upon our officials that they are the representatives of peoples rather than of governments. The brutal facts must be stated, however unpalatable they may be.

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of the world"**

—*Bakunin*

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The New Europe

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The Editor wishes to point out to his readers that, owing to the dislocation of work in Christmas week, the present number had to be printed off in the previous week; he therefore decided, for this number, to forego his usual comments on current events.

Christmas in Russia

ON Christmas Eve, five years ago, I passed through a village in Little Russia at nightfall.

My friend, at whose country house I was to spend Christmas, had sent a sledge to meet me at the nearest railway station, sixteen miles away. The three horses were harnessed abreast, and we travelled fast over the hard-beaten snow until, at the further end of the village, we were suddenly brought to a halt. The door of a cottage somewhat larger than the rest had opened, and a number of boys came pouring out across the road, hustling one another, shouting and singing. Through the confused babel of voices a rhythmic chorus caught my ear. Not a music hall ditty, or a merry carol, such as might be heard in England at Christmas time, but a kind of chant in which one word, frequently repeated, formed the refrain. Calling to the driver to keep his team at a standstill, I was soon able to assure myself that the song was not strange to me. It was, in fact, practically identical with one I had rendered into English some time previously. My version, for which I can only claim that it is tolerably faithful to the original, runs as follows:—

“ Beyond the swift-flowing river,
Stands the forest slumbering.
Hark! Kolyadka! Hark! Kolyadka!
In the forest fires are burning,
Fires are fiercely burning,
There are benches round the fires;
On those benches goodly youths,
Goodly youths and maidens fair
Sing in chorus of Kolyadka.
Hark! Kolyadka! Hark! Kolyadka!
In the midst an old man stands
Sharpening his blade of steel,
And a mighty cauldron steams;
By the cauldron stands a goat,
Here to kill him they are come.
Hark! Kolyadka! Hark! Kolyadka!”

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The boys swarmed round the sledge. I gave a handful of copecks to a lad who appeared to be the leader, and we were on the point of starting off again when another band of singers—girls this time—came round the bend of the road. The boys ran to meet them and soon some rather rough horse-play was going forward. Now a boy and now a girl measured their length on the ground amid the laughter of their companions. The cheerful sounds followed us as we passed rapidly out of the village. . . .

That trivial incident recurs to me now, and gives birth to thoughts which travel far beyond it.

Christmas in Russia, what used it to mean? What does it mean now? And what will it mean in the future? The answers to those questions are obviously interdependent.

Kolyada, the general Russian name for Christmas Eve and Christmas, is older than Christianity. According to the philologists, at some period of the early pagan time when Dazh-bog the Sun-god was worshipped in the primæval forest lands of Russia, his name was changed to Kolyada. Then came the dawn of Christianity, due in the first place to the drastic methods of the "Fair Sun Vladimir," Prince of Kiev, who converted his subjects by means of forcible immersions in the river Dnieper. The old gods, the old festivals, suffered a wholesale change of nomenclature, but retained their place in the hearts of the peasantry and were invested with new splendour by the Church. The Christmas season of rejoicing assumed the name of Kolyada, and the solar deity passed out of mind. At Christmas time, however, within living memory, in certain remote country districts, a girl dressed in white used to be seen driving in a sledge from one house to another attended by singers who introduced her as Kolyada. The presents they received probably typified the sacrifices made of old-time to the god, but it is difficult to account for the change of sex. In modern days the visits exchanged at Christmas, and especially of the visitations made by the priests, to bless the infant Christ in the dwellings of their parishioners, have been traced to the ancient pagan rite of seeking for the new-born God of Light, whose rebirth was supposed to take place in mid-winter. The moujik's innate love of symbolism betrays itself in all these songs and customs by which he celebrates the great religious festivals that date his year. He has songs to fit every occasion. Besides the

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Christmas songs that are sung at table, the cooking of the favourite dish of Kasha (wheaten meal, often mixed with honey) is accompanied by a special song in praise of buckwheat, oats, and barley. Another Christmas custom is to set a bowl of water on the table in which are placed a number of small trinkets, rings, etc. A cloth is put over the bowl and the singing of a song-cycle then begins. At the conclusion of each song a member of the party dips his hand in the bowl and extracts an object from which the future is divined.

This is one of many customs which closely resemble those still kept up in Ireland and parts of England on All Hallows Eve (21 December). Such forms of divination are very popular among Russian peasant maidens and, needless to say, are almost exclusively concerned with love-making and marriage.

But of all the simple symbolic rites with which the peasants have been wont to usher in the New Year, there is none which seems to me to present their ideals so faithfully as a quaint ceremony I once witnessed in a village near Kiev, where little bands of children were going the round of their neighbours' dwellings scattering handfuls of wheat on each threshold with these words: "May God give to every one his measure of grain, and may every man in the world be a Christian!"

Of the Christmas of the upper classes there is less to tell. There are in most parts of Russia an abundance of Christmas trees, but, strange to say, Santa Claus is unknown. As in France, New Year's Day counts for more than Christmas Day, and before the war "Etrennes" in the shape of flowers and bonbons were displayed in profusion in the shops of Petrograd and Moscow.

The churches have never been decorated with holly and evergreens at Christmas-time, but I believe that in olden days this custom did obtain during Whitsuntide until it was discontinued upon the passing of a law to protect forestry. Hitherto the ecclesiastical celebration of Christmas has chiefly consisted in elaborate services accompanied by clouds of incense, multitudes of candles, gorgeous vestments and the splendid choirs of men and boys unaccompanied by orchestral music, which are the special characteristic of the Orthodox Russian Church services.

But within the shattered walls of the Kremlin will be heard no more the solemn Liturgy of the "Imperial Hours,"

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consisting of prayers for the Tsar, his family and household, and if the prayer of thanksgiving for the deliverance of Russia from Napoleon be offered up as usual on Christmas Day, it may be safely prophesied that "the eternal memory of Alexander I" will be expunged from it.

Hitherto the fabric of the Russian Church has appeared to be so inseparably interwoven with the life of the Russian people that it would have seemed impossible to divorce the one from the other. We are now confronted with the fact that the Greek Orthodox Church, for centuries all-powerful as the Imperial throne, has been shaken by the fall of that throne to its very foundations. Despotism and dogma have been put on their defence and found wanting, even in the elementary arts of self-preservation. Scepticism veiled by conventional piety has long been rife in Russian society, and especially in that section of it known as the *Intelligentsia*; but the peasant is not ripe for the free-thinking doctrines of Western Europe. It seems as if, when vodka was put out of his reach, he began to awaken from the mental stupor in which he had lain so long. He began to prosper, to save money, and *to think*. By the irony of fate, the most beneficent act of Nicholas II. was one of the accessory causes of his downfall. Vodka filled the coffers of the Government; it performed a yet greater service to the autocracy by keeping the masses in a condition of besotted coma.

In the days before the war Christmas was a period of general feasting, merry-making and drunkenness. The Holy Synod, though it enforced a fast of 40 days before Christmas, made no stipulations with regard to vodka, which was then a Government monopoly. The so-called all-night services, which lasted from five in the afternoon till midnight, attracted large throngs of worshippers to the cathedrals in the cities of the Empire and in country places.

The churches were filled at daybreak on Christmas morning by throngs of gaily-clad peasant women, men, and children, with holiday written on their faces and devout reverence in every line of their bodies.

Many of the village "popes" have been killed in the frenzied convulsions of the last few months, yet it is not conceivable that the churches will be empty of worshippers on Christmas Day. It is not conceivable that "Holy Russia"

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has thrown aside a religious faith which is not merely an outer covering, but the very core of her being. If at this moment a John of Cronstadt were to arise I believe he could do more to establish order and peace in Russia than a military dictatorship. The Russian peasant that I have known, is not merely religious from the lips outward; he is a mystic in the sense that the things of the spirit are realities to him. I once met a way-worn old woman by the roadside in Russia, who told me how she had travelled from a far distant province to visit a holy shrine. "And have you come all that way alone?" I asked. "No, Barin, not alone, I had my soul for company." That answer was typical of all religious-minded Russians. They do genuinely feel that they possess their souls. How, then, can a change of Government destroy the pillars of their faith?

The attempts of the Extremists to abolish the offices of the Church in relation to marriage, birth, and burial are bound to strengthen the influences they are intended to destroy. Among the significant fragments of news that reach us from Russia comes the description of a funeral service conducted by a priest being disturbed by the intrusion of some Bolševiks, who bade the mourners content themselves with a short speech on the merits of the departed, and have done with ecclesiastical mummery. There ensued a sharp tussle in which one of the mourners, a woman, was killed. Such incidents can only result in vengeance on the authors of them. Physical violence has never yet been successful in effecting changes of faith.

It has been said of the moujik that he is imbedded in his native soil in the sense that his whole life is absorbed by agriculture, and his whole ambition is to own the land he cultivates and increase his tenure. To that land-hunger may be ascribed the greater part of the general anarchy that all true friends of Russia now deplore. But those who have known the moujik in the past know, too, that he is equally imbedded in his traditions. The peasant computes his year by Saints' days; his holidays are one and all regulated and ordained by the Church; he has alternately fasted and feasted for a thousand years according to the Church's ruling; even his familiar "House Spirit" is subject to the prayers of the village priest. What is he offered now in place of religion?

He has caught at the lure of free land, and at the same

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time he is menaced by starvation. He has murdered and looted the landowner and *bourgeois* whom he believes to be his worst enemies, and the conviction is, perhaps, even now coming home to him that those who incited him to such deeds of violence and horror are his worst enemies of all, but I am far from desiring to prophesy; perhaps even the good elements in Bolševism will prevail.

Not having been in Russia since the outbreak of war, I am not in a position to dogmatise upon the position of events in the present unhappy conditions, but I cannot believe that the sacred tradition of "Mother Moscow" has been brought to naught, and that pious pilgrims will throng the monasteries of Kiev no more at Christmas-time. The peasant's faith alone preserves any semblance of stability amid the general havoc and the destruction of old landmarks. The Dead Sea fruit of atheism can never suffice a people that have had "God in their souls." As in old times at Christmas-tide they sought the new-born Saviour, so in the years to come they will again seek comfort and inspiration from the Light of the World.

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

The Threshold of a New Europe

THE NEW EUROPE was founded to furnish a common platform for good Europeans in Great Britain. For the first year of its existence it devoted its energies largely to the unveiling of Central Europe. Germany and German militarism were the themes of a thousand pens, and the British public ran no risk of ignoring the danger to Europe which their unregenerate power represented. But Austria-Hungary and the Balkans were more remote, though no whit less important to anyone who has studied the causes and the course of the war. They were largely unknown to the British people; their political development had taken place behind that veil of ignorance and indifference which effectively shrouded the European continent from British eyes; and the part they were designed to play in the military and political plans of the German Empire was not fully known. The Habsburg monarchy was a curious remote entity, which was comprehended but darkly; the Austrian was a good fellow, the Hungarian a great democrat and patriot; and as for the Slavs, they were backward creatures

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who could not but benefit from the civilising and enlightened government of Vienna. So ran the common talk before the war; and the few open-eyed observers who sought to counteract it had an uphill task. But the ignorance of essentials went even deeper. The whole relationship of Great Britain to the Continent of Europe seemed to lie beyond the pen of the average man.

Study of the war, of its causes and its course, shows that the gravest dangers which have threatened and still threaten our welfare proceed from public ignorance of what have hitherto been called "foreign affairs." The very word "foreign" is misleading. It suggests that those affairs lie beyond the horizon of the ordinary citizen to whom it matters little whether they are conducted well or ill. They have been regarded as the special preserve of "diplomacy," that is to say, of a secret craft inaccessible and unintelligible to the ordinary citizen. In reality none of the affairs of a community is more truly the concern of its individual members than those arising out of the relationship between their nation and other nations. For few, if any, issues of "home" politics are men called upon to give their lives and risk their fortunes. This war has shown that, out of engagements entered into by British statesmen in past generations, and out of the interests which those engagements were intended to safeguard, such questions may grow over-night as to compel every man and woman in the community to throw their whole strength into a fight for national freedom and existence. Yet those engagements, and the play of international forces affecting them, may have been unknown to the very persons called upon to defend them. This is not a healthy state of things for any self-governing community.

Thanks largely to mistakes made by our enemies, the issue upon which the British Government declared war in August, 1914, was raised so clearly as to save the peoples of the British Commonwealth from the consequences of failure to recognise in time the sinister aims of German policy. But, had Germany refrained from violating the neutrality of Belgium, it is doubtful whether British statesmen and the British peoples would have understood, before it was too late, how gravely their future would have been endangered by Germany's attempt to secure the mastery of Europe as a stepping-stone to the mastery of the world.

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Only recently the leader of the Conservative party stated that he had assured the Foreign Secretary late in July, 1914, that this country would not let itself be dragged into war over any "Eastern squabble." We know now that the "Eastern squabble"—or, in other words, the Austrian attack upon Serbia—was intended by Germany and Austria to gain for them the control of the Balkan Peninsula and of Asia Minor; but ignorance might have led our statesmen not to oppose this enterprise had not Germany raised the question of Belgium. It is against the danger involved in public ignorance of this kind that *THE NEW EUROPE* desires to guard our peoples in future; and against the equal danger that the absence of a firm public opinion, based on sound knowledge, may lead to the acceptance of terms of peace containing the germs of future wars.

Without clear and general knowledge of the position of the British democracies in regard to other peoples, there can be no intelligent public control over what is known as "foreign policy," that is to say, the issues of peace and war. We have been for three and a half years at war; and we believe it to be the settled will of our people that, so far as in us lies, this war shall end war among civilised peoples, and that our sufferings and losses, and those of our Allies, shall be the ransom of the future peace and security of the world. This ideal cannot be attained unless our people are enabled now to grasp the essential requirements of a lasting peace.

The only alternative to the system of competitive armaments, which has weighed so heavily upon the world during the last half century, is the re-establishment of International Public Right, securely guaranteed against violation. Unless the German doctrine that Might is Right be discredited by defeat, the very idea of International Public Right will become a mockery, and under a yet heavier load of armour civilisation will stagger towards a new catastrophe. German success would accredit the belief that, if Might be not Right, organised force can at least assure comparative immunity from punishment. A sound peace must therefore be based upon the idea that the offender against Public Right must give full reparation to his victims whose security must thereafter have a new and effective guarantee. Such security cannot exist merely in written pledges exacted from the

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culprits. It must consist in such an organisation of the forces of civilised humanity as to make available, in future, an immense preponderance of moral and material strength against those who may be tempted again to infringe the Law of Nations. But the international co-operation which this implies cannot be realised until the old system of rivalry in diplomacy, armaments, and colonial enterprise, has disappeared as the result of an equitable settlement of the problems of nationalities in Europe, and of colonial development.

The problem of nationality has figured largely in political discussion during the war, because each oppressed race is at once a suitor for justice before the bar of Europe and a victim of misrule which drives it, in exasperation, to disturb the peace of its neighbours by revolt and revolution. The appeal which reaches the ears of Western Europe is thus peculiarly cogent. Justice and liberty combine with our inborn love of order to demand the end of all those oppressions which have made unsatisfied Nationality one of the great disruptive forces in European history. Until this demand is fully met the adult peoples of Europe cannot enjoy peaceful and unfettered development, and their unrest will gravely prejudice any new international order, such as a League of Nations, from the very outset. Inherent justice and high European expediency, therefore, impose an equitable national settlement as indispensable to the future peace of Europe.

A reconstituted Europe must rest on guarantees, for we have not yet reached the period when, in Mr. Asquith's words, "the sovereign authority will be recognised to rest in the commonsense of mankind." The first of these is the guarantee that the reparation and restitution laid down in the Treaty of Peace shall be faithfully carried out; and for this we hold security in the growing economic power over Germany now wielded by the Western Alliance, which must not be relinquished until the settlement is complete. The second is the guarantee that, when the causes of unrest and potential war have been removed, no disloyal Power shall ever be in a position to revive them. Whether security against this risk is to be found in the consolidated military and naval forces of a League of Nations, or in their combined economic power, or in both, is a question for discussion. The essential point is that the will of the world must have positive sanctions of

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force against the disloyal recalcitrant. Should the League fail—a possibility which we cannot ignore—we must maintain the existing alliance of democratic Powers as the sole means of rendering invincible the cause of democracy, national liberty, and justice. It is also clear that, if and when the moral and material debts of war have been liquidated and its ravages repaired, the plan to establish peace and order by uniting the peoples in a League of Nations will be imperfectly realised unless it ultimately includes all the Powers of the civilised world.

The League of Nations

(II) AS A PRACTICAL PROCEDURE

IN a previous article it was suggested that as at present proposed the League of Nations offered no guarantee for peace sufficient to secure the renunciation, or even reduction, of the factors that menace peace. It was argued that neither the principle of international arbitration, as expressed in a Council of Conciliation, nor the federal principle, as exemplified in any form of representative Congress, could, for many years, develop sufficient strength to break us of the war habit of mind and the war relationship.

Is there, then, no remedy capable of securing Europe against a relapse into war fever during the period of convalescence? Is there no power that will relieve us of the necessity of devoting all our newly-returning strength to preparations for a new war? As things are now, the only answer is that economic exhaustion on both sides will secure the world temporary respite, while maintenance of our alliances will give us time for recovery. We cannot get more than this unless we can really make war end war by converting the conditions created by war into guarantees for peace.

Hitherto, in looking for preventives against war, and guarantees for peace, writers do not seem to have taken into account the new international conditions created by war, but have generally returned to pre-war peace conditions, and have sought their remedies in law-courts, parliaments, international police, etc. But it is suggested that from the morbid products of war itself we can best procure our prophylactic. Misleading metaphors apart, it is a better principle, even

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in such transitions as that from war to peace, to proceed from what is prominent in the present rather than to return to what was the position when war broke out.

The two principal effects of the war in the sphere of international economics have been the continuous breaking down between allies of the barriers raised under pre-war conditions by competition, and, correspondingly, the complete barring off of antagonists from each other. National enterprises, hitherto conducted under conditions of keen competition, have been pooled, as between allies, while international enterprises, hitherto controlled in common, have been partitioned as between antagonists. Five years ago it would have seemed as impossible to re-organise the shipping requirements of the United Kingdom and of the United States on a co-operative basis, as to rend asunder the web of financial relationships between London and Berlin. But pressure of war has already developed military co-operation into financial, commercial and economic combinations that must continue to some extent and for some time after the cessation of hostilities.

A shot has, indeed, already been made at turning this development to account; but it was a "dud." The Paris resolutions and their menace of economic war were justifiable as a war measure provided they carried conviction to the enemy. To threaten your enemy with penalties unless he concludes an early and equitable peace is sound policy in so far as the penalties are inevitable. But these penalties were very questionably enforceable at all, inspired, as they were, obviously by an economic point of view still bitterly contested even in the United Kingdom, and by principles of international policy, with which our leading Allies did not concur. The Paris resolutions were a failure, for the same reason that many of our expeditions into political strategy have been a failure—for want of co-ordination and of concentration—for want of playing up to our Allies' trumps and for want of playing into the weak suits of our enemies. It is as great a mistake to try and kill one bird with two stones, especially when one stone is in Washington, the other in London, as to try and kill two birds with one stone, especially when one bird is Hindenburg, the other Cobden.

But it does not follow from this failure that we cannot use the developments of war both to force an earlier and better peace on Prussia, and to re-inforce peace against such as

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Prussia; for this is really one and the same object, and one that we share equally with Washington and the world at large. We have only, in fact, to carry out our war policy to its full logical developments in form, so as to secure the international institutions which will carry us through the transition from war to peace. The only effective League of Peace must grow out of war alliances. War alliances have already created an allied war council and numerous allied war committees for various specific purposes. The next logical step is to create supreme allied councils for the principal spheres of our joint action: such as councils for the control of credit, *i.e.*, co-ordination of loans and control of exchange; of communications, *i.e.*, shipping, railways, etc.; of commerce, *i.e.*, exchange of commodities and exploitation of resources, etc.; and of consumption, *i.e.*, a sort of international rationing. These councils would co-ordinate and concentrate the work of the allied committees already existing or contemplated, and would work through them with the national departments. They would give as much union, unity and universality as is possible to the military measures of the allied peoples. The advantage to our prosecution of the war will be assumed; for it is with the peace possibilities of this development that we are here concerned.

It has been said above that such far-reaching changes in our national economic activities as have been caused by this war must subsist for some time and to some extent after the war; but it has always been assumed that with peace they will lose their function and go into more or less lengthy liquidation. It is true that no pressure, short of the vice-grip of so vast and vital a war, could have imposed such international restrictions on our nationalism. But similar pressure short of this may suffice to maintain them once imposed; and we must remember that after the pressure of prosecuting this war will come the pressure of paying for it.

After the war the nations of Europe will be in the position of enterprises that have ruined themselves by cut-throat competitions and costly litigation. There is plenty of profit still in the business as a whole, but the various firms have squandered their capital and credit. In such a case public confidence can be recovered and credit re-created by an amalgamation; and the more comprehensive the combination, the

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greater will be the reduction in costs of administration, and the greater the relief in debt charges that can be affected by conversion. Or looking at it from the political point of view, Europe will be in the position of Turkey with such a load of debt that only by conveying a measure of control to its creditors can it recover credit enough to deal with its debt and develop its resources. Many communities reduced to bankruptcy by bad government have found in a measure of international control a helpful means to the restoration of their economic welfare, and ultimately to their political re-establishment on a better basis. There need be no question of our having bailiffs in our house or even of pawning our property, but we have already had to take quondam competitors into partnership and it has proved to our advantage.

It looks as though at the end of the war there would be two great international combines, we Allies and our antagonists, in competition for the remaining resources of the world in credit, and commodities. In this new realignment we find ourselves in a position the possibilities of which we have as yet only dimly discerned. The world at large being more or less actively leagued against the Germans, our combine can now secure for a limited term after the war exclusive enjoyment of the resources of the world in return for extending to certain leading nations the exercise of executive functions in our combined councils. We have already had so to admit them informally, and we have only to do so rather more formally and in more public form. By accepting such a measure of internationalism we can organise the supremacy which our encircling position gives us in four continents as against the superiority in Europe due to the central position there of our enemies, so that every month the war continues shall automatically augment our influence and the isolation of our enemies. This is a form of practical and progressive pressure for peace; and compares with Paris resolutions much as the drawing in of the trenches round a leaguered city compares to the original summons to surrender by a trumpeter.

The extent to which this menace can be carried will depend on the length of the war and the load of debt that it will accumulate. If this load even in its present dimensions be left to be adjusted naturally—that is nationally—the result

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will be that the more civilised communities with the better credit will be over-burdened for the benefit of the less civilised whose credit is not immediately realisable. Thus the reconstruction of our civilisation will be retarded by a load of debt incurred largely for the benefit of communities who cannot contribute as matters are now. Neutral profiteers may make vast private fortunes in exploiting these new nations, but our producers will remain hampered by debt charges. If, on the other hand, we can maintain our inter-allied control after the war, which we can only do by giving it an international basis, then any profits from these new resources together with the increased revenues produced by the combined control of credit, commerce, and communications might for a term of years after the war be gradually transferred from providing for the demands of warfare to the paying off of the debt incurred by it. As the soldiers slowly merged again into citizens the organisation would correspondingly metamorphose itself, so to say, from recruiting to reconstruction.

As a practical illustration of what could be done let us pass over immediate possibilities to see what will become practicable if the war is considerably prolonged. One development might then well be an allied Customs Union, under which the parties would by convention establish for a term of years the principle of tariff for revenue and most-favoured-nation treatment, referring to a council the revision of tariff legislation in the joint interest so that the maximum of revenue might be produced for the legislating party with the minimum of injury to the joint trade—and perhaps relegating to it the collection of duties so that there might be one customs frontier instead of two—the resultant revenues being assigned to debt charges. The terms on which neutrals would be admitted to the union would be possibly such loans to the weaker members of the alliance as would constitute a contribution to the common cause. Incidentally also such an arrangement as this might relieve the creditor countries like ourselves of some bad debts. As to the enemy, a general clause penalising or prohibiting admission to the union after a certain term would be an instrument for peace.

Again, looking to the revenues of raw material in neutral or non-civilised States, we find in a Council for the Allied Central

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African colonies, which should act to some extent as a federal authority, not only the means of securing that combination of international control and imperial enterprise that promises best for the future of Central Africa, but also a means of making the re-admission of Germany to citizenship and its rights contingent on a genuine acceptance of its responsibilities. The council would take charge of the German's share of the "white man's burden" until the world was satisfied that he was "a white man." But, indeed, there is no end to the possibilities which such combinations present both for profit and for the bringing of pressure to bear on opponents. Pages might be filled with proposals—but to little purpose; for the principle once recognised the application will come necessarily and naturally under pressure of war and post-war requirements. We have only to give political definition and direction to what we shall in any case be doing dispersedly and in detail as a military measure.

When finally not only the neutrals, but our enemies also, have been admitted on terms to the new international institutions, we shall find that almost imperceptibly institutions originally set up for the prosecution of war have transformed themselves into effective instruments for the preservation of peace.

For this League of Nations will not only be based on ethical principles but on an economic monopoly of the World, exclusion from which will mean ruin. The old competition between Governments for control of resources and raw materials conducted by diplomatists with dreadnoughts in the background will be replaced by competition in the new international relationship. This will take the form probably of combinations of capital competing for control of the various international managements with much log-rolling and lobbying. There will be much in this economic internationalism as little edifying as in any business enterprise, but it will at least have life and strength. It will give us peace in our time and in due course the ethical internationalism of the peoples will clean it up and keep it in order.

We do not think it good enough, you will say. We look for a Kingdom of Heaven on earth and you offer us adaptations of the British Council of Foreign Bondholders—of a German Banking "Consortium," of the French Bourse Committee, of

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the American Interstate Commerce Commission, of an African Chartered Company, and such like. Well, you will get "economic internationalism" anyway, whether you make the best of it as above suggested or no; and as to the Kingdom of Heaven, all we know is that it will come as a thief in the night.

GEORGE YOUNG.

* * * The first part of Mr. Young's article ["(I) As a Progressive Principle"] appeared in last week's number.—EDITOR.

Politics in Japan

(II) THE ISSUES OF TO-DAY

WE now come to the question of how far the Japanese Government is subject to parliamentary control. According to the theory of the constitution, the Japanese Cabinet is responsible to the Emperor alone. Although Parliament holds the power of the purse, the constitution expressly provides that in case it is refractory the House of Representatives may be dissolved, not only once but any number of times, and in the meantime the Government might be carried on on the basis of the preceding year's budget which had been passed. But, as a matter of fact, no such high-handed proceeding has ever been resorted to. If after one dissolution Parliament is still found hostile it has been usual to see a partial or an entire change of the Cabinet to make conciliation possible, or, failing that, a concession on the part of the Government to meet the views of the Opposition. Thus it has come about, though not without some fighting, that the Cabinet is obliged to be actually responsible to Parliament, for no government which cannot command the support of Parliament can fulfil the first condition of service to the country, hence of its responsibility to the sovereign. A reference to some of the more important Cabinet changes will make my point clear.

Prince Ito's fourth Cabinet broke down (in 1901)—it was a party Cabinet formed on the basis of the newly-formed *Seiyu-Kai*—because of the opposition of the House of Peers. Prince Katsura's third Cabinet, which he intended to place on the basis of a new party to be formed, was literally hounded out of office (in 1913) by the Opposition in the House of Representatives. Admiral Count Yamamoto, who succeeded him as Premier, was compelled in about a year to resign (in the spring

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of 1914), being relieved by Marquis Okuma, owing to a hostile vote of the House of Peers. But, on the other hand, it must be noted that in the case of other changes it was other than parliamentary opposition that was their cause. Such was the case with the first and second Saionji Cabinets in 1907 and 1912. In both cases Marquis Saionji had a solid majority of the Lower House on his side and the peers were favourably disposed, most emphatically so in the latter case. The real reason for his resignation was apparently the dissatisfaction of the elder statesmen, in the face of which he thought it unwise and imprudent to continue longer in office.

The case was somewhat similar with the recent fall of the Okuma Cabinet. About this time last year Marquis Okuma found himself still flushed with the victory gained in the election of the previous spring. From the parliamentary point of view there was apparently no reason why he should resign. No doubt a growing discontent among the peers was highly ominous. But the Marquis, with his well-known optimism and an unbounded self-confidence in his resourcefulness, would have made light of it and kept on in office had it not been for some sort of pledge he had made to one of the elder statesmen that he would not remain in office indefinitely (so it was generally understood at the time); so that he felt himself obliged to suggest a change. At first the Marquis proposed that Count Terauchi, as the most available man for the premiership, should form a *liaison* with his own party then in a majority, which being declined, he finally suggested in his letter of resignation to the Emperor that Viscount Kato as leader of the majority party be called upon to succeed him as Premier. But the Emperor, on the elder statesmen's advice, appointed Count Terauchi as Prime Minister, who accepted the office without the conditions suggested by the late Premier. So the fall of the Okuma Cabinet must be regarded as another case of a change caused by opposition from the elder statesmen. To make the list complete, I must mention the circumstances which led to the breakdown of Prince Katmura's first and second Cabinets in 1905 and 1910. In the former case the Cabinet died a natural death, so to speak. It had lasted for five years, during which time it concluded the British Alliance, and conducted a victorious war with Russia. But the Plymouth peace treaty gave profound disappointment to the nation at large, and it was felt by everybody, most of all by the Premier himself, that he did

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not enjoy enough confidence to take up the prospective *post-bellum* statesmanship; and Marquis Saionji was called on to form a new ministry. In the case of Prince Katmura's second Cabinet, however, it was a dawning sense of the impossibility of carrying on the Government any further without a loyal party support, in view of a growing restiveness which prevailed among the members of the *Seiyu-Kai*, which as a majority party had hitherto supported him.

It will thus be seen that of the eight Cabinet changes we have had in the space of the last seventeen years, four of those Cabinets fell on account of the opposition of Parliament, either actual or prospective, and three through an opposition emanating from the elder statesmen, while one case of change was due partly to both causes and partly to the wear and tear of the Cabinet itself through a long and arduous tenure of office. It will further be noted that whenever a Cabinet commanded a strong party support in the House of Representatives, like the Cabinets of Ito, Saionji, Yamamoto, and Okuma, its fall was chiefly due to the opposition of the elder statesmen, or of their friends in the House of Peers. The latter, which contains a powerful element of veteran administrators, generally acts in unison with the supposed wishes of the elder statesmen.

It will be seen from this very brief history—almost too brief, but it is impossible to go into detail in this connection—of the Cabinet changes in recent years, that political parties have been growing year by year in importance in the councils of the nation, but that there is as yet a very strong check placed upon their action through the elder statesmen and their friends in the House of Peers—the latter being commonly known as the “Party of Bureaucracy.” While party leaders, because they are party leaders commanding a majority in the lower house, are often appointed to the premiership, that is, however, not necessarily the case, as witness the present Cabinet, of which its chief, as also the majority of its members, are non-party men. But that no Government can be carried on without party support is shown by the fact that Count Tarauchi has thought fit to initiate a new departure by the creation of an advisory council on foreign affairs under his own chairmanship as premier, in which besides three or four members from the Cabinet and the Upper House, two of the leaders of parties supporting the Government in the House of

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Representatives have their seats. As far as can be made out, this council is Japan's war cabinet. Evidently a war-time measure, it shows, on the other hand, the difficulty of carrying on a government without some tangible recognition of party influence. At the same time, it is confidently and universally expected that if no untoward thing happen, the Cabinet which succeeds the present one will be a party Cabinet, whose chief and his colleagues, except perhaps those holding the portfolios of war, the navy and foreign affairs, will all be chosen from the party leaders.

No exposition of Japanese current politics would be complete without some words of explanation on the nature and position of the elder statesmen or *genro*. Who are these men, who, as the Emperor's closest and most trusted advisers, exercise such a potent influence in all the important affairs of the country? Now the so-called elder statesmen as they exist to-day, are a group of two or three men, who have won the Emperor's special regard and confidence through long and meritorious service in the highest posts in the Government, and whose wisdom and disinterested loyalty are recognised by the entire nation. Constitutionally, the Imperial Government is carried on by the Cabinet ministers, and for all questions of high statecraft the Emperor has besides the Privy Council, which sits regularly to give advice. The *genro* has no such constitutional standing, and is as much unknown to the constitution as the political party. But as a factor in high politics one is as potent as the other and as little to be ignored. The institution of *genro* is a legacy of the late Emperor. In the long course of his reign, Meiji-tenno, as he is posthumously known, met many a national crisis, and in each case it was customary with him to turn to elder statesmen for final counsel. As one by one many of these trusted public servants left the stage, the Emperor found himself toward the end of his reign surrounded by Ito, Yamagata, Oyama, Matsukata, Inouye, and, slightly younger than they, by Katsura and Saionji. These were the fittest who survived out of the galaxy of the great men of the heroic time of the Restoration. Before Meiji-tenno died, Ito, the most trusted of them all, had already passed away, and since, also Inouye, Katsura, and Oyama. There are now left Yamagata, Matsukata, and Saionji, who are supposed to constitute the present *genro* group. Whether Okuma is to be a member of it, or whether any

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other new member or members are to be added to it as these three in the course of time will pass away, nobody knows, for the whole thing depends upon the personal will of the Emperor, who will doubtless take into consideration the actual state of affairs in the march of politics. What is clear is that we find at present three statesmen of tried ability, on whose disinterested advice the Emperor is expected to depend for all changes of ministry and other affairs of national importance. In recent years particularly, much has been said against the unconstitutional status of the *genro* and their unwarranted interference in the affairs of the State. As an argument, these criticisms are no doubt just, and in certain cases the influence of the *genro* was not altogether for the good. But there is this to be said in their favour, that these men, by taking upon themselves all the responsibility of advice have succeeded, as in some of the recent cases of Cabinet change which gave rise to much bitter feeling, in keeping the Throne entirely above the reach of partisan criticism. The Emperor of Japan, whose claim to divine right is even more fundamental than that of the German Kaiser, is the best protected monarch from hostile criticism. Another thing to be said in favour of the *genro* is that as a depository of the traditional national policy, they have contributed toward moderating party conflicts, which might possibly have led to acts detrimental to the national interest, or to an adventurous foreign policy, discrediting Japan's good name in the comity of the nations. Of these three men, if perhaps Field Marshal Prince Yamagata may be compared to Wellington and Marquis Saionji to Lafayette, Marquis Matsukata is a celebrated financial statesman, full of sturdy commonsense, who has laid the basis of the coinage system of the empire by introducing convertible paper money and the gold standard. So long as these three men, or men like them, in their disinterested loyalty and patriotism, continue to act as the rudder to the ship of state, it may be presumed that Japan's course will not materially deviate from a safe line.

In the foregoing survey I hope I have succeeded in explaining candidly and concisely the actual state of affairs so far as they relate to the progress of democratic ideas in Japan. I now leave it to the reader to form his own opinion whether I am not right in my claim that so far as class distinctions are concerned, Japan is as liberal as England. But in politics it is

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obvious that we are not by any means so "advanced" as the so-called democratic countries are. The political parties do not yet exercise an unhindered sway over the councils of the nation. The Japanese Parliament is not all-powerful, as is the Parliament at Westminster, which, as we all know, has finally succeeded in doing the one only thing it has been said it could not do, namely, to turn the woman into a man. The political parties of Japan have to contend against certain influences emanating from the elder statesmen, who, it must be said in justice, acted generally as a wholesome check against extreme partisan licence. But as fast as the parties prove worthy of national trust, they are getting more powerful. The *genro* influence is conservative, but neither militaristic nor reactionary; and unless German militarism win the day in the present struggle, which (God forbid!) may turn the trend of affairs at least for a time, there is no fear that Japan will not steadily keep on its path of orderly progress. We have scarcely any radicals dreaming of a revolution, nor socialists marshalling half the nation for a class war. Our ideal is one of an enlightened and humane nation, with the Imperial House as the head of the body politic, and all the members of it, each at his place according to worth and ability, working in unison for the common weal. Our one earnest hope now is that out of the turmoil and upheaval of the Great War, Japan shall come out with her eyes undimmed in her vision of the future, at the same time proving herself worthy of a wholesome fear to the enemy and of implicit trust to her allies.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

* * * The first part of Mr. Yokoi's article ["(I) The Background of History"] appeared in the last number.—EDITOR.

Sir Charles Dilke

"It is a curious commentary on the wisdom of those who believe that, except at moments of special excitement or public danger, it is impossible to interest the electorate in foreign affairs, that during this period Sir Charles Dilke was constantly able to gather large audiences in the north of England and in Wales, and induce them to listen to careful criticisms of questions such as the delimitation of the

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African continent, the Newfoundland fisheries, British policy in the Pacific, and the future of the Congo State." ["The Life of Sir Charles W. Dilke": begun by Stephen Gwynne, M.P., completed and edited by Gertrude M. Tuckwell. (Murray.) 2 vols. 36s. Vol. II., p. 475.] The success which attended Dilke's exposition of foreign policy, both before uninstructed public audiences and in close converse with European experts of all nations, was due to a combination of qualities rarely found in one man. His speeches in themselves were seldom models of lucidity or compression; he himself often confessed that he spoke too long; but, in public and private, he always gave that impression of mastery which compels an audience to listen. Sir Charles Dilke was master of many subjects: but of none did he display that easy *maîtrise* so clearly, so often, or to such good effect as of foreign affairs. In his case, indeed, the word "foreign" is misleading. His whole life was a repudiation of the suggestion that the affairs of Europe lie beyond the ken of the ordinary citizen: and, despite his obvious respect for professional excellence in every department, he welcomed every attempt to bridge the gulf that lies all too deep between domestic and foreign politics and to awaken and sustain popular interest in the latter.

The position which Dilke occupied, in this respect, both at Westminster and in foreign capitals, owed but little to the accident of his tenure of the Under-Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs for thirty-two months (1880-1882): for it was based upon the possession and use of qualities which may perhaps be enhanced by the fictitious glamour of the Front Bench, but which shine brightly of their own light in any sphere of action. Some will say, indeed, that Dilke lost something by taking office, that after two and a half years in Downing Street his democratic sense was a little blunted, and that, but for the subsequent tragedy, he might never have regained the old fervour of his championship of the under-dog, whether in Greece, in the Aborigines Protection Society, or in the world of sweated labour. The criticism is one which readers of his life can judge for themselves. And in passing judgment they will realise that his experience of official work must have proved invaluable to him, and certainly gave him opportunities of which he made full use.

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Dilke was a realist in foreign affairs. "The present position of the European world," he wrote in 1887 ("The Present Position of European Politics"), "is one in which sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modern times since the fall of Napoleon." And he attributed it rightly "to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, which had left a permanent source of irritation in the European State system." His recognition of this dominant factor in continental affairs led him to lay great stress on military efficiency, and accounts for his life-long interest in Army reform. But it did not blind him to more ideal aspects in certain regions. His constant and vigorous support of the Hellenic cause sprang from a life-long belief in the Greek race. He "dreamed of a new Greece." He believed "in the ultimate replacement of the Turkish State by powerful and progressive Greece, attached in friendship to France and England, her creators—an outpost of Western Europe in the East; and I think the day may come when even Homer's city may once more be Greek." He did not live to see his dream realised: but the Greeks knew their friend and gave him a permanent memorial in the mother-city of Helles by naming an Athenian street after him. And we who have recently welcomed a great Hellene to London will best serve his memory by reviving his phil-Hellene policy and carrying it to success.

With all his strong attachment to certain ideas and certain nations, however, Dilke was no sectional partisan. He judged events, as he judged men, by their influence on Europe as a whole; and he looked at Europe through the eyes of a British patriot happily devoid of all insularity. In 1866 he looked with hope to Germany. Königgrätz delighted him, and he wrote home from America to say that he hoped "Louis Napoleon would quarrel with the Germans over it, and get well thrashed, with the result that German unity might be brought about." But if he disliked Napoleon III. he loved France; and, as his biographers aptly say, "contact with Prussian militarism showed where his real sympathies lay." The Germans were not long in realising where he stood; and we learn that by 1880 Berlin regarded him "as a most dangerous man . . . a French spy." A passage in a speech delivered after the war-scare of 1875 is apt for to-day:—"Poor German Liberals, who abandoned all their principles when

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they consented to tear Alsace and Lorraine from France, and who now find themselves powerless against the war party who say, 'What the sword has won, the sword shall keep.' " And he added: "For our own sakes, as well as hers, I pray that France may not be crushed. France is not merely *one* of the nations. . . . The place of France is one that no other nation can quite hold." On Gambetta he made the following judgment, which shows how clearly he could estimate the true value even of such an intimate personal friend:—

"Much as I loved his society, I did not think him a loss to the Republic, for he was too dictatorial, and too little inclined to let other men do important work, to suit that form of government, except, indeed, in time of war. It is quite true that he was the only strong personality of which France could boast; and it was possible that, so long as he was there, the people would not be likely in a panic to hunt in other camps for a saviour. But great as was his power—physical power, power of courage and of oratory—and terrible as was the hole made in France by his death, nevertheless the smaller men were, perhaps, more able to conduct the Republic to prosperity and to general acceptance by the people."

Of Bismarck he wrote in 1889 to his friend Reinach: "Bismarck, *c'est la paix*": and Bismarck himself left it on record that Dilke was "the most interesting of living English statesmen."

The European repute which Sir Charles Dilke enjoyed rested mainly upon first-hand knowledge of men and affairs marshalled in a marvellous memory and ever kept up to date by untiring industry. He could hold his own on any great question of nineteenth-century politics. By his independence of mind, by his industry, by a certain wide-mindedness coupled with an almost uncanny power of concentration, by his linguistic fluency, and by a powerful memory working upon a most minute knowledge of European history since the French Revolution, he acquired an authority second to none in Europe. His swift perceptions and tact in approaching men gained him friends in every country and every class, and his marvellous industry in letter writing enabled him to keep them. Merely to read the imposing list of his guests at Dockett Eddy is to read a European "Who's Who" covering two generations. Not the least secret of his power was his welcome to the young, whom he treated with an almost disconcerting respect. There was apparently no one from whom he was unwilling to learn; though none had a more

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withering contempt than he for the spurious and the charlatan. "Ce fut une energie, un cerveau, un cœur, une force," was Jules Claretie's tribute; and those who ever met Sir Charles Dilke will endorse the Frenchman's words. The greatest lesson he taught to some of us who had the good fortune to know him—even, like the present writer, only for a brief season in his last years—was to acquire the European mind. Himself first and foremost a good European, "he conceived of Europe as a body politic, bound in honour to regulate its own members. Isolation appeared to him a mere abandonment of the duty of the civilised Powers to maintain order in the civilised world. Corporate action was to be encouraged, because, in most cases the mere threat of it would suffice either as between States to prevent wars of aggression, or as between ruler and ruler to assert the ordinary principles of just government."

The picture which Dilke's biographers have painted is that of a man whose place no living parliamentarian can fill. "Amongst the men of his time he stood out as essentially a House of Commons man, but he was also a European personality. . . . Beaconsfield and Bismarck singled him out by their special interest; Gladstone looked to him as probably his own ultimate successor." The House of Commons to-day needs just such a man as he; and if his biographers can truly say that by his death he was "fortunate at least in this that he did not live to see the breaking up of the foundations of the great deep," we can but add that his good fortune is our great loss.

A. F. WHYTE.

Forerunners of the Russian Revolution

[For over half a century past new and mysterious forces have been simmering in Russia, and the Slav has been preparing his contribution to the theory of social upheaval. Yet while the literary genius of a Tolstoi and a Dostoievski has won the admiration and attention, if not the comprehension, of the West, the forerunners of that New Russia which is rising before our puzzled eyes have passed neglected and unknown, or have been dismissed as dangerous and subversive. The names of Černișevski, Pisarev, Lavrov, Mihailovski, are a sealed book to us; even Herzen and Bakunin are at best mere names. Nihilists and Anarchists are known from the pages of "skilling shockers," but their motives and reasoned philosophy have never been made accessible to us. The word "Bolševik" has acquired a sinister meaning to our public during the last few months,

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but absolutely nothing is known of the historical development of Socialism in Russia or of the Social Revolutionary movement—in other words, of the currents and tendencies which produced the fall of Tsarism last March and all that has followed from it.

In these circumstances it is a positive disaster that one of the great books of the century—Professor Masaryk's "Russia and Europe"—should be virtually inaccessible to this country, and, what is even worse, available as a vade mecum to the all-too-well-informed directors of German policy. With a profound historical and philosophical mastery of his subject and with an astonishing wealth of detail, the great Slav scholar analyses the many obscure currents of Russian thought which are now reacting upon Europe no less surely than the French Encyclopædia in the late eighteenth century. In accordance with a long overdue promise we propose in this and subsequent numbers to extract some of the most notable and illuminating passages of his book.]

(I) BAKUNIN

BAKUNIN* can only be understood as the product and the victim of Russian conditions under Nicholas I. Brought up from childhood in the memories of the Decabrists, he found his way to Europe, drank very deep of Hegel's philosophy, and was driven towards revolution by the Hegelian Left and Proudhon. The period before 1848 and the year 1848 itself provided him with all kinds of revolutionary employment, for he thought it would be possible to realise everywhere his ideal of free humanity by taking part in the revolution. His experiences in European and Russian prisons and in Siberia strengthened him in his hatred of the existing order, and he became a revolutionary by profession. The world—in *concreto* Russia, but Europe also with its civilisation and institutions—roused him to fury: his head was full of revolutionary ideas and plans.

* Michael Bakunin, born in 1814 of a wealthy Russian family, educated in Italy (doctorate at Turin); officer, 1833-4; translated Hegel; went in 1840 to Berlin, in contact with the Hegelians; then in Paris with Proudhon and Slav political exiles, but expelled; took part in Revolution of 1848 in Paris, Prague and Dresden; sentenced to death, but sentence commuted; handed over first to Austria, then to Russia; imprisoned in Peter and Paul, 1851-7, sent to Siberia and escaped; helped Polish rising in 1863; founded secret "international brotherhood" in Italy, 1864, and Alliance Internationale de la Démocratie socialiste in Switzerland, 1868; in the Commune at Lyon, 1871. Long feud with Marx ended in his exclusion from the Internationale in 1872; left the Fédération Jurassienne in 1872; died at Bern, 1876. Followers of Marx and Bakunin reached agreement at Gent in 1877.—(*Euvres*, 7 vols., Paris, 1907.)

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These plans and ideas were not worked out. For Bakunin method and order existed neither in practice nor in theory. A genius, but only half educated, and that not merely through his own fault, an egoist to the point of *naïveté*, he would never admit the question, whether after all he, too, in his own person might not share the responsibility for the general misery. He looked for every evil and its roots only outside himself. Bakunin felt this old order and its supports, even Nature, the world, God, as personal insults and provocations : and in this mood he spent his life in wild efforts to turn the whole world upside down according to his own idea. Without the faintest conception of how the new world was to be formed, without real knowledge of the old world, Bakunin revelled in the cosmopolitan ideas of the true agitator. Working in hiding, now in England, now in France, then again in Belgium and Germany, then in Italy and Switzerland, he could not find anywhere the point from which to heave the world off its hinges. And so he fell a prey to revolutionary unrest and nervousness, mistook his agitation for action, and lost all sense of reality and all measure for judging the actions of others.

He loves ideas, not men, says Byelinski of Bakunin. Men were to this man of half ideas and half-deeds always mere means to an end. Half ideas and half deeds : Bakunin scarcely ever finished any literary work, and never set himself any practical task at which he worked with persistence and steadfastness. If Herzen called history an improvisation, then there must be improvisors of life, and Bakunin was one of these.

Bakunin tried several times to find a philosophical basis for the revolution. In his chief work the moving force of the individual and of history is found in three principles—animalism, thought and revolt : Man has a natural need for revolt, a revolutionary instinct. . . . In the programme of the "Alliance Internationale de la Démocratie socialiste" (1873) Bakunin also produced an ethical theory of revolution, which is no less characteristic than his "instinct" theory.

Starting from a materialistic determinism, Bakunin denies the freedom of the will, in order to be able to deny law and, in particular, criminal law. The individual is the "involuntary" product of the natural and social *milieu*, out of which criminals and kings alike arise ! Criminals and kings are thus

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equally free from blame, for they are the natural product of one and the same society. In order to be able to punish criminals, society relies on the necessity for individual responsibility. But this theory originates in theology, that blend of absurdity and hypocrisy. The individual is neither punishable nor responsible.

The objection that even according to this theory, not only the criminal, but also the judge and the executioner are the "natural" product of the same society, does not occur to Bakunin. Nor has he worried himself as to why only kings, as the supreme heads, should be removed, if they are the innocent victims of their society.

Bakunin derives all immorality from political, social and economic inequality; but this inequality prevails only in the transition period, and will disappear as a result of Universal Revolution, that is, of simultaneous social, philosophical, economic and political revolution. In this transition period only Society has the right, out of self-preservation, to kill the criminals whom it itself produces; but the right to judge and to condemn it does not possess. Naturally by this right to kill, Bakunin is thinking of the assassinations and mass executions of the Revolution; hence, this right to kill and assassinate is really no right at all, but a "natural fact," sad but unavoidable. He states plainly that this "natural fact" will not be in any way moral, but simply natural; the idea of justice only holds good in the transition period, and is a negative idea, according to which the social problem and ideal will be posed, though only brotherhood and real equality will ever positively solve it. He further admits that "natural" murders will not even be useful, so long as existing oppressors are replaced by new ones. He condemns the Jacobins and the Blanquists, because they dream of a bloody revolution against men, whereas the final Universal Revolution must be directed against the "organisation of things" and of "social positions." This radical revolution must destroy private property and the State, and might spare men, in so far as that does not injure itself. Bakunin is not afraid to call this radical revolution Anarchy—"the complete expression of the life of the people"—out of which Equality will grow; but for that very reason every form of authority must be destroyed, whether it be called Church, Monarchy, Constitutional State, bourgeois Republic or revolutionary Dictatorship. This entirely new revolutionary state (so there has to be a state after all!)

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“will be the new fatherland, the alliance of the Universal Revolution against the Alliance of all reactions.”

Such is in its principles Bakunin's justly notorious “Philosophy of the Deed,” built up on the old confusion of determinism with fatalism, which denies ethical responsibility. On the one hand Bakunin would save individual freedom, on the other it is irksome to him. He hides himself behind the positivist Spanish wall of “natural facts.” In his apostrophes to the Russian youth he defends in the same way the “attentats” of Karakozov, representing them as the “natural” and “epidemic” passion of youth; but because he feels the awkwardness of this apology he demands that “these individual deeds” should grow more frequent, until they become “deeds of the collective masses.” The work will get steadily easier, in proportion as the panic spreads in that section of society which is doomed to destruction. The unspoilt youth must realise, so Bakunin harangues, that it is far more humane to stab and strangle dozens, even hundreds of hateful beings, than to share with them in systematic legal murder. Hence he preaches the sacred war of annihilation against all evil by all possible means: “poison, dagger, &c.—the revolution sanctifies everything in this struggle.” The true revolutionary knows neither scruples nor doubts, he has nothing to repent. “Repentance is good enough if it can alter and improve something: but if that is not the case, then it is not only useless but actually harmful.” Bakunin energetically attacks those who demand of “the men of to-day” a precise plan of future construction: it suffices to have a cloudy idea of the opposite of the loathsome machinery of present-day civilisation. The aim is only tearing down, “pandestruction”: “in the case of adherents of the cause of practical revolution we regard all speculations about this nebulous future as criminal, since they only serve as obstacles to the cause of destruction as such.” Bakunin attacks contemporary literature, which consists merely of denunciators and flatterers, hired by despotism to defend the old order in literature and science, and inventing the lie of a positive plan for the future. Certainly, he adds, there are honest, even Socialist dreamers, who spin plans for a better life, but that, too, is only the same loathsome stuff, because they build their pictures of the future out of the material of existing detestable conditions. “We desire that now the Deed should lead the Word. . . .”

How absurd, scholastic, sophisticated, nay positively Jesuitic, this Humanism of Anarchy is, is obvious enough to any

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thinking man . . . Bakunin in this Philosophy of the Deed permitted not merely revolution of the masses, but also murder and expropriation of the individual, as means of producing a general panic, and in terrorism he saw an educational means to revolution.

As Tsar of the Secret League, Bakunin was irresponsible, quite according to his Russian model : and so he had a horror of plans for the future. It is true that such plans are easily made, if they are merely a collection of wishes : but from one who for his reforms actually arrogates the right to kill, we must first of all demand a very detailed and conscientious analysis of social institutions and their shortcomings, and then a similar analysis of historical development, in order to be able with some degree of probability to risk some conclusion as regards future development.

Marx was not quite just to Bakunin in details, but was quite right in condemning his preference for blind risk. Meanwhile, Bakunin's great deeds are insignificant enough, when "pandestruction" is converted into deeds. He recommended continual small risings and conspiracies, peasants' and workmen's unrest, and indeed revolts and disturbances of all kinds, in order to keep up revolutionary feeling and prepare for the final catastrophe. This is what he and his followers called "*par-le-fait-isme*."

Bakunin's individualism ends with a negation of individuality, with absolutism. He wanted "An-archy" (treating the word thus etymologically) as the annihilation of all authority. He conceived the struggle *à outrance* on the lines of the robber chiefs of popular legend, and in 1869 declared brigandage to be one of the most honourable forms of Russian state life. "We need something else [than a constitution] : storm and life and a world without laws and, therefore, free," he cried in 1848. And in the same way we read in the secret statutes of 1869 that the international brother must combine intelligence, energy, honour, and secrecy with "revolutionary passion ;" in short, "must have the devil in his body." Bakunin had this devil and nourished him on feelings of revenge. It is natural that the *régime* of Nicholas I. should awake such feelings, but hatred and revenge cause blindness, and victorious battles cannot be waged with such blindness of feeling.

Marx and his followers, and even Liberals like Ruge,

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accused Bakunin of nationalist Panslavism, and, therefore, called him illogical. Even to-day many historians of Socialism keep asking whether he was not after all a Russian agent, as the Marxists often maintain. Now it is true that Bakunin, even in 1862, thought of the Tsar as a possible executor of his plans; but Proudhon indulged in similar illusions regarding Napoleon, while Mickiewicz and others sometimes hoped to convert their powerful enemies. Herzen shared these hopes, and to him Bakunin told this plan, which was, of course, the very opposite of "from below." It was not political and nationalist Panslavism, but Slavophil Messianism, which Bakunin shared with Herzen; but, unlike the latter, he laid stress more on its Slav than its Russian side. This was due to the fact that Bakunin came into personal contact with the Polish, Czech, and Southern Slav revolutionaries.

The Marxists and other German opponents of Bakunin are right in saying that he was wrong in his estimate of the capacity of the Slavs for revolution; but, otherwise, his Slav programme was not more national than that of Marx and the Liberals. Marx demands a German-Polish-Magyar union against the Slavs, and preaches hatred of the Russians, Czechs and Croats. Bakunin, in his appeal to the Slavs (1848), which Marx criticises so sharply, summons them to declare for the Magyars against Windischgrätz.* In the same way Bakunin is for the Poles and also for the Germans—for the people, not for Germany's despots. The real difference is that Bakunin was Russian, while Marx, Engels, Ruge and others were German. That the Marxists long afterwards, and even to-day, have German national feelings and antipathy towards the Slavs I have already proved in my book on "The Foundations of Marxism." Nor is any fresh proof needed, in view of the present national struggles inside Social Democracy.

This view, which is certainly not Chauvinistic, Bakunin never changed. He simply was a Russian, and as such wanted the Russians and the Slavs to be included in the revolutionary family of peoples. In 1848 he took part in the Prague rising, in 1863 he wanted to help the Poles; he took his part in the first revolutionary Russian organisations. He believed in the revolutionary power of the Slavs. His preference for the Poles was due to the general enthusiasm

* The queller of the revolution in Prague in 1848.

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which then prevailed for Poland, to his acquaintance with Poles in Europe and Siberia, and to the fact that he had a Polish wife. For the Czechs and Ukrainians Bakunin was won by the programme of federation put forward by them in 1848. Bakunin came from a State of mixed language, in which several nationalities were struggling for national linguistic rights; hence the contrast between the centralising State and the idea of nationality was clearer and more living with him than with Marx. On this distinction between State and people Bakunin laid special emphasis at the congress held in 1848 in Bern by the League of Peace and Freedom. That he did not attack Panslavism from the nationalist side is proved by the fact that he did not accept the Czech programme without criticism; in contrast to Palacky and Rieger, he wanted to go with the Magyars against Austria. Besides, he wanted to include the Roumanians in his Slav federation, since he thought of the destruction, not merely of Austria, but also of Turkey. In all these plans there were differences of outlook and estimate of the political situation between Bakunin and Marx or the German Radicals, but this cannot be traced to Slav Chauvinism.

Finally, Bakunin, just as Herzen, looked upon the Russian people as the born people of the social revolution. In support of this view he quoted the existence and importance of the Mir. According to Russian popular ideas, the whole land belongs to the people alone, that is, to the whole mass of real workers, who till it with their own hands: and it is just this idea which, according to him, contains in itself all social revolutions of the past and future. He also held that the Slavs, in particular the Great Russians, were the least war-like of peoples, and that they therefore aimed at no conquests, but set their sole and passionate desire upon the free and collective exploitation of the soil. The Russians, so his fantasy argued, are socialist by instinct and revolutionary by nature, and therefore the Russians will initiate the confederation of the world.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

ERRATUM: No. 62, p. 320, l. 2 from bottom, for "the brutal facts must be stated," read ". . . must be faced."

SEP 17 1918

PRINCETON, N. J.

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"Heaven grant us its peace, but not the
King of Hungary's!"

—Shakespeare, "Measure for Measure,"
Act I, Sc. II.

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The Passing of the *Status quo*

IN a previous article we emphasised the urgency of a re-statement of Allied war aims, alike for our own sake and in the interest of our relations with the outer world. The crusading fire which kindled an all-too-self-centred nation's imagination in the summer of 1914 has now burned low; and, in the words of the Prime Minister, the hour has come for a "cold zeal," no less sustaining, but far harder to achieve. But this "cold zeal" must drive us to the same goal. High principle must be our guide; and the words of our statesmen must ever show that the liberating democratic motive of our original declaration of war is still the paramount feeling. We do not for one moment deny that our own security combined with an unselfish anger to force us into war. Far-sighted men warned the nation that Great Britain would suffer grievous harm in her most vital interests if German aggression were not checked. But it is no less clear to all who lived through that memorable August of 1914 that it was the fate of Belgium which alone rallied the country to a policy of war and silenced all opposition. It is the literal truth that the real popular motive was keen resentment at the wrongs inflicted upon a small neighbour. Cold reflection, however, revealed the underlying fact that on the fate of Belgium, and no less of France, depended the national security of Britain. Security was the watchword by which Pitt sustained his countrymen in the long struggle with Napoleon. Security was the motive which inspired the policy of British statesmen throughout the 19th century, and notably that famous "scrap of paper," the Treaty of London of 1839, upon which Belgium's international position rested.

For close upon a century Britain hugged the security which her efforts had won, and congratulated herself upon her splendid isolation. Absorbed in many activities throughout the world, she well-nigh forgot Europe, or at most was conscious only of her immediate neighbours in home waters. But, in the interval, historical processes had slowly but surely dissolved the old aloofness of the nations, and interwoven their destinies by a hundred mechanical and spiritual ties. Events have shown

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that it is now impossible for Britain, and even for America, to resist the stars in their courses.

When war came there were many to whom the old cry of security merely meant the maintenance of the comfortable old order which they had known since childhood and whose natural appeal was summed up in the phrase *beati possidentes*. In a word, amid the dire shock administered to their nervous system their main desire was to revert as soon and as easily as possible to the *status quo* which Germany had so wantonly disturbed. Had the war been short, it is conceivable that but for certain territorial adjustments, the old Europe might have returned, and that with it materialism, Imperialism, and their fellowisms might have acquired a fresh lease of life. But the war has dragged on beyond all expectations, and the *status quo* has been blown to pieces as effectually as Ypres or Rheims. The old frontiers of Western Europe might conceivably be restored, but in the east and south-east political landmarks have been effaced by an irresistible flood. The Russia which we have known (or rather, not known) has given place to a number of units of which many of us were hardly conscious. Poland is rising again from her tomb, Finland is free to assert her most uncompromising claims, new national life is stirring in Lithuania, Lettonia, the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Those who know Roumania and Serbia know only too well that the very foundations of their former existence have been undermined and that they have no choice save between the achievement of their national unity and final political absorption by those who have hitherto held their kinsmen enslaved. In a word, we have already reached a stage at which one half of Europe could not under any conceivable circumstances be restored to even a semblance of the *status quo*, while in the other half such a restoration would indeed be a semblance, but not a reality. Thus when we assert that the "reorganisation of Europe" is the most essential of all war aims, we are not crying for something remote or unpractical: we are merely insisting that there should be a conscious and determined effort to complete a process which has already reached an advanced stage. Reorganisation of some kind cannot be avoided: do what we will, something entirely new will be evolved from the crucible of war, and the essential question is whether the Western Powers and America are to yield to dynastic and autocratic incantations and to accept their formulas for the future from the alchemists of Berlin and

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Vienna. National security remains the minimum upon which even the pacifists insist, but events, by overwhelming the *status quo*, have robbed them of the refuge to which they would fain resort, and have inevitably made our national security dependent upon a European resettlement.

We are engaged in a war of nations for which there is no precedent in history. Our fate and our interests are intertwined with those of other nations to a degree which could scarcely have been conceived four short years ago, and which proves that we have already entered upon a new era in the history of the world. Those who shrink from a programme which involves the reconstruction and regeneration of Europe as a whole are still thinking in terms of splendid isolation and "sacred egoism," and are not ready for the wider international outlook without which the idea of a league of nations cannot be achieved in practice. It is a curious irony that many of those who are loudest in their advocacy of a league of nations profess the keenest horror at prolonging the struggle for objects with which their own country is only indirectly concerned. We have heard distinguished statesmen express pious horror at the bare thought that Lancashire lads could be asked to shed their blood for the freedom of Bohemia. We can understand the standpoint of those who allow no consideration save the selfish interests of their own nation to weigh with them; indeed, under the dispensations of the old diplomacy, from Metternich to Kühlmann, this was the only sound basis of policy. But in the mouths of those whose avowed design it is to create a new political heaven and earth, to institute entirely new diplomatic methods and to establish a close community of nations resting upon freedom and equality, we entirely fail to understand this repudiation of the only true international doctrine. In any case, the events of the war have abundantly shown that partnerships once assumed cannot lightly be thrown off, and that the sufferings or gains of one nation react immediately upon the fate of all.

If in foreign policy the *status quo* has been effectually dispelled, it is no less true that in home affairs also the *status quo* has vanished beyond all possibility of return. The labour market has been shaken to its very foundations; Capital and Labour alike are faced by new and momentous problems. Entirely unforeseen circumstances have driven Trade Unionism

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into a position from which a return to the old order of things is, for good or ill, impossible. Railways, mines, shipping, have been subjected to State control. Problems of co-operation, distribution, labour-saving, have assumed a new importance. Women's labour has upset many standards. The fate of the invalid and discharged soldier is already affecting the questions of pensions and insurance. The creation of national factories has transformed the whole industrial system. The feeling against profiteering has struck deep root throughout the community. Above all, the fabulous financial charges imposed by the war have revolutionised all standards and converted many pre-war theories and formulas into so much scrap-iron. In every walk of life events have utterly out-distanced human comprehension, and we are left breathless and blinded as in the glare of an ocean sunrise.

The period immediately following the war will accentuate all these changes still further. State control of the most drastic kind will be inevitable during demobilisation. Iconoclasm will eclipse all previous records in the economic sphere. Conscription of wealth, already recognised to be the logical consequence of conscription of flesh and blood, may have to be extended even further than we imagine. The war has killed the Party system, cutting clean through all the old lines of cleavage; and our future rulers—the men who return from the trenches and who will have earned the right to express their political will—will insist upon an entirely new standard of living, a far more stringent control of affairs of State and the practical fulfilment of the theory of equal opportunity for all. The working classes are at last coming to realise their vital interest in foreign policy, whose neglect or mismanagement they may pay for in the blood of their sons; and they may be relied upon to demand not merely a reformed diplomacy and an extension of democratic control, but all those educational facilities that alone can give them the knowledge which is the key to that control.

Thus, on the one hand, the war is raising standards, whetting appetities, testing and challenging what but yesterday seemed unchallengeable, and creating on all sides fresh needs and fresh demands such as only a vastly increased expenditure can satisfy, and on the other hand the available margin is shrinking every day. One thing alone can secure the future of all those causes for which the collective name of Social Reform will serve as well

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as any other—one thing alone, a drastic limitation of armaments. Any peace which is inconclusive will render such limitation impossible, and would therefore be suicidal from the point of view of internal national security; for it would destroy all hope of progress save under the guidance of a rigid militarist caste.

It is idle to pretend that the impending transformation of society is regarded with anything like unanimous feelings. Now that it is obvious that only immediate peace can save the last surviving fragments of the old order, the little group of reactionaries who under various disguises have attached themselves to the two veteran parties in the State, find themselves agreeing in the desire to make peace as soon as even tolerable terms seem within reach and in the hope that they may thereby pass into the new order with a minimum of change. The feudal landlords who scent danger to their estates link up with certain radical doctrinaires whose early Victorian shibboleths are powerless before the strong spells of a more revolutionary age. There are others who will the end, but not the means, because they cannot discern the connection between the two. But the number of those is growing who understand that in the life of nations, as of individuals, there are moments when it is necessary to take our destiny into our own hands and to stake everything upon the result. In 1914 we took the risk, not realising how great it was. To-day we are faced by a similar decision. In England, as elsewhere, it is becoming more and more obvious that there are only two parties which really count—those who mean to win the war and those who do not. In other words, those who consciously will a new Europe, and those who are cravenly content with a bankrupt past.

La Victoire Intégrale is the chosen device of those who seek to rescue Europe from an evil past and to set her upon the road that leads to a new and abiding security. Rightly interpreted it means a victory of principle by which every people on this distracted continent may acquire a new lease of life and liberty securely guaranteed against misrule and war alike. In a former issue [THE NEW EUROPE, No. 47] we endeavoured to expound the meaning of our expressive motto by examining three victorious wars of the past and by testing the claim of each of them to be called an integral victory. To-day, as we pass from the old year to the new, we may ask whether the victory we desire is in sight. If we judge this matter solely on military

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grounds, we must admit that, for the moment, the outlook is not clear : the events of last autumn seem to have dimmed our prospect. But military grounds are not the sole nor the main factor in our calculation. The influence of political ideas plays a larger part : and, provided we face the future with that confidence which finds full justification in our resources, the triumph of our principles is assured. The proviso is important, for the effect of events in Italy and in Russia has been to suggest to certain minds that a compromise is the only way out. Such a suggestion is at once the effect and the cause of lack of confidence ; but mature reflection will prove that if we were to accept the terms of the Central Powers at present we should achieve neither security nor peace. The negotiations at Brest have shown that Berlin and Vienna are prepared to welcome " self-determination " for all the Russian peoples, while denying it to their own : and since this principle is to-day the true test of the good European, its acceptance by all the belligerents must be laid down as the first foundation of peace. Until Herr von Kühlmann and Count Czernin subscribe to it, not merely by the lip-service of the Brest-Litovsk parleys, but by honestly reorganising Central Europe upon it, there can be no agreement between us and them.

It is because we are firmly convinced of this essential factor in European reconstruction that we lay such emphasis on nationality. Our belief in racial freedom, whether in a liberal confederation of self-governing peoples or in the absolute independence of each, is no fetish. It is an historic truth driven home to our minds by the experience of the British Commonwealth. We hope that our Government, and the Governments of our Allies, realise that we are to-day in the presence of one of those great spiritual movements which create and recreate whole peoples, for only by realising it can they guide us aright out of the chaos into a new order. The common people in every land is awake to the issue. The Labour Party of Great Britain, for instance, has recently shown that the working-man grasps firmly the fundamental principles now at stake : and the Bolševiks themselves have pushed some of them into the forefront of discussion in their negotiations, though they have shown a strange reluctance to insist upon the same rights for other peoples in Europe which they demand for themselves. It is too early to say whether Russia has compromised the future of the other Slavonic peoples or not, but we suspect that

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they have fallen a prey to the craft of Herr von Kühlmann and have thus given Prussian power a new lease of life for 1918. Be that as it may, the stars in their courses fight against the Prussian idea. The success of German arms in Italy conceals from no one the broad fact that the year 1917 has witnessed a large advance of democratic thought all over the world, and that the year 1918 promises to give us that triumph of principle which we have called *la victoire intégrale*.

Austria and Europe*

I

In all essentials the Habsburg Monarchy is a dynastic estate. Its history is largely that of the Imperial House, a history not to be explained solely by chronology or by ethnology or in the light of the "Constitutional Rights" which figure so largely in the political demands of the Habsburg peoples. If Austria-Hungary be regarded as a Sultanate and the Emperor as a Sultan, much that seems obscure becomes intelligible. The singular, albeit baffling, charm and interest of Austrian affairs for a Western European, is that they constantly raise what he imagines to be fundamental issues of political and moral philosophy. Time and again a foreign observer in Austria is obliged to ask himself: Are my beliefs well based or are they merely prejudices and preconceptions? Are liberty, truth, justice, sincerity, and progress mere words, or do they correspond to essential realities? Is everything relative, does all depend on circumstances, or are there, after all, absolute principles in politics, morals and religion? At every turn, a man is driven back upon himself and forced to probe the reasons for whatever faith may be in him, if he would escape scepticism or save himself from being submerged by the light and lusty, thoughtless and sensuous current of life that swirls around him in Austria.

Kürnberger, the ablest Austrian essayist of the 19th century, dealt with one aspect of the moral puzzle that Austria presents, when he wrote in 1871:—

"What is incomprehensible to every non-Austrian, nay, the eternally unintelligible about Austria, is what is Asiatic in Austria. . . . Austria

* A lecture delivered at the University of London, King's College, to the London County Council teachers, on 8 December, 1917.

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is not really unintelligible; it must be understood as a sort of Asia. 'Europe' and 'Asia' are very precise ideas. Europe means law; Asia means arbitrary rule and caprice. Europe means respect for facts; Asia means the purely personal. Europe is the man; Asia is at once the old man and the child. With this key you may solve all Austrian riddles. Above all, Austria knows no 'must' and no 'shall.' In their place, the Austrian will give you 'Asiatic' reasons for what he has done or left undone: 'It pleased me' or 'it bored me.' . . .

"The way our people, lively, easy-going, variable, dance up to all things with verve and grace, is like a rosy children's ball. But note well that, in all this South German liveliness and Slavonic changeability, in all this rapid whirl of *persons*, the thing itself remains Asiatically stiff, inert, conservative, sphinx-dead and spectrally hoary, not having budged an inch for ages. That is why the most daring novelties come easier to us than to other States—because they are only new *names*. Freedom of the press and confiscations, Ministerial responsibility and violations of the constitution, the Concordat with the Pope and an anti-clerical middle-class Government—we can stand them all! . . . Were we at once to establish atheism as the State religion, the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna would celebrate an atheistic High Mass in the cathedral!"

The history of Austria, within the last 150 years at least, fully bears out Kürnberger's statement that the most sweeping changes come easier to Austria than to other countries, because they are only "new names," which leave the substance of things untouched. The reforms of Maria Theresa and her Radical son, Joseph II, were, indeed, serious changes; but they had this much in common with almost all the internal changes made in Austria—they were wrought with the object of strengthening the hands of the dynasty. Two principles may be distinguished as guiding the Habsburgs up to and including the year 1870: first, that their "home lands" were always regarded and treated by them as a military and economic base for their operations abroad; and second, that the changes and reforms introduced in their home lands were never made or sanctioned with a single eye to the welfare of the people, but almost always under the influence of disaster and with an eye to the interests of the dynasty. When I say "dynasty," I mean not only the Emperor, but the Habsburg family. It consists of some scores of archdukes and archduchesses, governed by the special laws of the Habsburg House, and possessing, apart from their private fortunes, which may be large or small, a joint family fortune or family fund, of which the reigning Emperor is the warden. Its members enjoy many special

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privileges and exemptions, but are kept in order by a discipline of the most rigid, patriarchal type that entitles the reigning Emperor to banish, arrest, imprison, or even to inflict corporal punishment upon them.

This Habsburg family, therefore, constitutes a close corporation that strives to "run" the State in the family interest. Around the Imperial family are grouped what are known as "the families"—two or three hundred families of courtiers, bureaucrats or adventurers, drawn from every race and nation, who have, within the last 300 years, been the agents and satellites of the reigning house. To quote one of the shrewdest contemporary Austrian writers:—

"Rudolf II. was the first to see whence he could fetch those adaptable beings, devoid of will, out of whom the Habsburg spirit could create its own men. He sought them among peoples for whom there was no room in the traditional orders and castes; people who were nothing in and by themselves; who could become something only under the Emperor's hand; people without a real life of their own and whom Imperial favour must first turn into men. They were people of the kind that have sometimes founded colonies and who, in Austria, formed a colony—the colony of the Imperial House. They formed a new race, the race of men whom the Emperor Francis was afterwards to call 'patriots for me.' Thus arose the 'nation of Court counsellors,' a nation artificially begotten by order, at Court, in the Imperial service and in the chanceries—artificial in thought and feeling, nay, even in language, since the Austrian spoken even to-day in our Government offices and by Jews who desire not to be Jews, is an invention. These men, fashioned from above, have now been for 200 years the pillars of our State and Society. I have called them 'the nation of Court counsellors.' They are also called 'the Families.' They are not a nobility. There are nobles among them and burghers among them; one can gain admittance to them from all quarters—on one condition: those who would enter must break with their class, deny their race, denationalise themselves. They must be unloosed from every tie, torn up by the roots and thus prepared for the mysterious Austrian transfiguration, which consists in taking on the form of the ruling spirit."

With a State thus organised it is easy to understand that apparently drastic changes may be in reality little more than changes of political fashion. After Maria Theresa, in the middle of the 18th century, had curbed the feudal rights of the nobles and had begun to centralise dynastic control over the church, the police, the administration of justice, taxation, and military service; after Joseph II. had continued the work of centralisation, not, indeed, in a "liberal" spirit, but

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in a spirit of Germanising unification based on "enlightened despotism"; after the reaction that set in against the excesses of the French Revolution under his successors, Leopold I., Francis II., and the half-witted Ferdinand; and after the temporary interruption caused by the Revolution of 1848 in Austria and in Hungary, the youthful Francis Joseph, who came to the throne at the age of 18 on 2 December, 1848, found the same materials and methods of government lying ready to his hand as those of which his predecessors had disposed. The oppressive "System" of Metternich—who had been Francis Joseph's chief tutor—was revived and perfected by an ex-revolutionary plebeian, Alexander Bach, who brought the science of compressing the people with the help of the police, the church, the army, and the bureaucracy to a greater pitch of perfection than had ever before been attained—until the war of 1859 against France and Sardinia, and the defeats of Magenta and Solferino, reminded Francis Joseph, for a moment, that gallows and bayonets, crucifixes, and red tape, are poor materials with which to build a solid throne.

His education was long and painful, and was never really completed. Though not illiberally inclined when he came to the throne, the influence of the revolts in Vienna and Prague, and of the revolution in Hungary, rendered him more accessible to reactionary counsels than he might otherwise have been, and committed him to courses and to acts that weighed as a *damnosa hereditas* upon the rest of his life. Let us take the struggle with Hungary. His predecessor, Ferdinand, had conceded to the Hungarians practical independence, and had sanctioned laws to that effect voted by the Hungarian Diet. Those concessions were then withdrawn, and the Hungarian leaders felt that the dynasty had broken faith with them. They rose in revolt, and war ensued—a bitter, pitiless war, in which little quarter was given on either side. Against the Hungarians, that is to say, the Magyars, were ranged, not only the Austrian army, but most of the non-Magyar peoples of Hungary, like the Slovaks, the Roumanes, and the Croats, whom the Magyars had long oppressed. Kossuth and his associates dealt with these non-Magyar peoples as cruelly as the Austrians dealt with the Magyars themselves. The struggle lasted well into 1849, and was ended by the action of the Tsar of Russia, who sent an army into Hungary to succour the Emperor of Austria. The action of Russia was

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taken in a chivalrous spirit, but in homage to the idea of the solidarity between dynasties against revolutions. It was the last flicker of the spirit of the "Holy Alliance" against what Metternich always termed "the Revolution"—(with a capital R)—by which he meant the attempts of peoples to free themselves from despotism and to determine, in President Wilson's phrase, "their own way of life and obedience." However reprehensible and reactionary the Russian action in assisting Francis Joseph to crush his revolted Magyar subjects may seem to us, we must remember that, from the point of view of the Habsburg dynasty, it must have seemed, and should have seemed, a knightly act worthy of gratitude and requital. General Görgei and the bulk of the Magyar forces surrendered to the Russians, who stipulated that the Magyar generals should be treated as prisoners of war. The Austrians broke that stipulation, and hanged thirteen of them at Arad. Thus they and their Emperor earned for a generation the fierce hatred of the Magyars. What gratitude did Francis Joseph show to Russia for her help? Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian statesman, declared in advance that Austrian ingratitude would astonish the world. He might have added, in the bitter but veracious words of another Austrian, that "the history of the House of Habsburg is the history of ingratitude."

Why, indeed, should the Habsburgs be grateful? Are their subjects not their personal property? Are they not divinely-appointed to hold sway over the earth? Whoever serves and helps them does but his plain duty and should rejoice in the consciousness of rightful service well done.

When, five years later, Russia became involved in the Crimean War, not only did Austria lend her no help but, after a period of vacillation, actually joined England, France, and Sardinia against Russia. Similarly, when in 1867 Francis Joseph finally came to terms with the Magyars after the defeat of Sadowa, he handed over to the tender mercies of the Magyars, the Roumanes, Slovaks and Croats who had stood by him in his hour of trouble. Thus the Magyars were able to fling at the non-Magyars and the Croats the taunt, "You have received for loyalty the same recompense as we received for revolt!"

But I am anticipating. When Magyar resistance had been broken in Hungary, order restored in Austria, and the Constitution granted in 1848 had been revoked, the forces of reaction carried everything before them. Under their influence the

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Emperor concluded an agreement or concordat with Rome, which was promulgated as a "constitutional" law on 18 August, 1855, the Emperor's 25th birthday. It was hailed by the official press as "the true constitution of Austria, and much better than any other constitution." In fact, it was an abject capitulation of the State to the Church. In commenting upon it *The Times* wrote that "a crown worn under such conditions is not worth the metal of which it is made." Not only did it place education in all its forms under priestly control, but it abolished the *placetum Regium*, or the right of the Sovereign to give or withhold his assent to the appointment of bishops—a right which even the fanatical Ferdinand II. had maintained and which his successors had frequently exercised. The practice of the Habsburgs had always been to kick, cuff and trample upon the Church when it suited their purposes, and to fawn upon her when they needed help, but without sacrificing essential Habsburg rights. In the eyes of the Emperor Francis Joseph the real object of the concordat was to turn the clergy into the spiritual constabulary of the State, a constabulary more effective and less discredited than the "religious police" of Joseph II., because it would work with apparent freedom in the interest of religion and of the Church. Yet though the Concordat was declared to be "perpetual," to be founded upon the "imprescriptible rights proceeding from the divine origin of the Church"; and though it was promulgated as a constitutional law, Francis Joseph discarded it, as he had discarded the various civil constitutions of 1848-49, as soon as he believed that dynastic interests required a change. Not even the "sacred and imprescriptible rights" of the Church, however solemnly and perpetually recognised, were proof against Habsburg bad faith and ingratitude or, if you prefer, against the exalted opportunism of the "All-Highest Arch-House."

Thus in 1867, when it became necessary to grant another civil Constitution to Austria and to appoint a Liberal Ministry, Francis Joseph curtly sent a deputation of protesting bishops about their business, and in the next four years sanctioned a series of anti-Clerical laws that culminated in the abrogation of the Concordat itself on the specious pretext that—after the proclamation of the dogma of Papal infallibility by the Vatican Council in 1870—an infallible Pope could no longer be bound by a contract, and must therefore be released from it! Thus in 1897, when the successors of

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these German Liberals, with the help of North-German Protestants and Pangermans, started the *Los von Rom* (Away from Rome) movement, which was, in its essence, anti-Habsburg, Francis Joseph smiled again on the Church, and allowed his nephew and presumptive successor to become president of Clerical associations, of which the professed object was to work for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. Thus in 1903, on the death of Pope Leo XIII., Francis Joseph vetoed the election of Cardinal Rampolla to the Papacy, though the election of a Pope by the College of Cardinals in conclave is believed to be guided by Divine inspiration, and though the veto was exercised, not on spiritual grounds, but for the very mundane reason that Cardinal Rampolla had been hostile to the Triple Alliance, and was therefore obnoxious to Austria and Germany. The most singular feature of the veto was that the Austrian Cardinal, Puzyna, who pronounced it in the name of the Emperor, was quite unconscious that he was sinning against the Holy Ghost.

In fact, the Austrian clergy is one of the least religious bodies of ecclesiastics in the world, just as the Austrian people, while outwardly very observant of religious form, is very void of religious feeling. Immorality is proverbial both among the home-bred clergy and the people. There are strongly Catholic provinces in Austria where the illegitimate birth-rate is 40 per cent. of the total birth-rate; and the true history—as known to the Vatican—of some of the great monasteries in recent years would cause the salacious novels of the Middle Ages to appear bowdlerised. Yet no greater ecclesiastical festival has been held in recent years than the International Eucharistic Congress of Vienna in September 1912! It is characteristic that the occasion was made an apotheosis for the Emperor and the Imperial Family rather than for the Eucharist, and that the cost of organising the Congress was largely borne by Galician Jews in search of titles and Parliamentary honours.

But to return to the political developments that determined the character of Francis Joseph's reign and led up to the situation out of which the present war arose. The ten years of black reaction of which the Concordat of 1855 was the characteristic feature, ended in disaster on the Lombard Plain, when French and Sardinian troops overthrew the Austrian armies, liberated Lombardy from the Austrian grip,

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and laid the foundations of Italian unity. Just as the ancient history of Austria cannot be dis severed from the history of the Holy Roman Empire, so the modern history of Austria is inseparable from the modern history of Europe. Had the House of Austria been able to read the signs of the times, had it possessed the faintest inkling that moral factors—the sense of justice, respect for truth and sincere care for the well-being of peoples—play a large part in politics, it might to-day stand higher than any dynasty in Europe, and be surrounded by the respect of a peace-loving world. Its un morality, its greed, its lust of power and its shortsightedness are among the indirect causes of this terrible war. “Nowhere in the world has Austria ever done good,” declared Gladstone, who, with all his faults, was a great seer. Were he alive to-day in the presence of this world-catastrophe he might cry with truth, “Everywhere in the world has Austria wrought evil!”

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

(*To be continued.*)

Habeas Corpus in Russia

THE Bolševiks have proclaimed themselves as the heralds of a peace programme based entirely on democratic principles. If words mean anything, they stand irrevocably committed to the self-determination of all peoples, even of those within the frontiers of existing states who have not hitherto enjoyed independence. Unlike most theorists they are now in a position to translate their theories into practice: and the world will judge them by results. If they stake everything upon their principles, they will certainly be entitled to the credit of having introduced an entirely new spirit into the foreign policy of European states.

Meanwhile inside their own country the Bolševiks have trampled in the mud every principle of justice and individual liberty. They have flung into prison their political opponents on false or imaginary charges, and have flouted the sovereign will of the people by their treatment of the Constituent Assembly. At the same time they have had the effrontery to denounce the British Government for its brutal methods in imprisoning two Russian subjects, Messrs. Čičerin and Petrov, whose release they have demanded and have now obtained.

We have ourselves condemned the action of those British

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officials who thought fit to arrest Russian subjects on charges which they now admit to be inadequate. Their arrest and detention was not in accordance with the traditions of individual liberty that we as a nation have treasured as one of our most sacred possessions. But the shortcomings of our own officials are a mere drop in the ocean compared to the reign of terror inaugurated by the Bolševiks in Russia. It is not the province of the British Government to interfere in the internal affairs of another Government, but the British people, with its traditional belief in personal liberty, cannot stand by and watch without a protest the shameful acts of Russia's present tyrants towards their own people. Many loyal friends of the British people are now languishing in prison for no other fault than that they, the chosen representatives of the Russian people, raised their voices in protest against a policy which they considered fatal to their country's interests. Their fate cannot be a matter of indifference to the British people.

An essential feature of the German programme in Russia is the attempt to break or undermine the whole intellectual and educated class and deprive it of all share in public affairs. Success in this policy would leave the Germans and their tools face to face with the ignorant and disorganised masses, upon whom they could work their will.

Those who play the good Samaritan to Čičerin but pass by on the other side where Tereščenko or Savinkov are concerned, merely throw doubt on their own good faith.

The Ukraine and Russia

THERE are few questions in Europe of which so little is known in the West as that of the Ukraine. So long as the Russian eagle spread its all-embracing wings over the Empire of the Tsars, the existence of the Ukrainian people was studiously ignored; but last March, when the eagle was cast down and trampled in the snow, Western Europe slowly began to realise that in South-Western Russia there had come to light a new people, conscious of its individuality and prepared to claim its place among the peoples of Europe. The collapse of the Tsarist Government in March, 1917, raised the Ukrainian question in Russia; the *coup d'état* of November, by which the Provisional Government was overthrown, has for the

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time being made the Government of the Ukraine a factor of international importance.

A former article in *THE NEW EUROPE* (No. 45) traced the history of the Ukrainian movement in Russia from the outbreak of the Revolution till the agreement with the Provisional Government on 14 July. The subsequent history of events in the Ukraine may be divided into two periods, the first embracing the controversies between Petrograd and Kiev on constitutional questions from July till November, the second the disputes between the Bolševik Government and the Rada.

On 14 July the Provisional Government on the advice of Kerenski, Tereščenko, and Tsereteli came to terms with the Rada, according to which the General Secretariat was to be recognised as the highest administrative organ in the Ukraine, but the future constitution of the Ukraine was to be decided by the Constituent Assembly. This agreement led to the resignation of the Cadet members of the Provisional Government, and was the immediate cause of the riots in Petrograd which began on 16 July. A few days later, on 22 July, Kerenski became Prime Minister with a Coalition Cabinet. The inner Cabinet, consisting of Kerenski, Tereščenko, and Nekrasov, had all favoured the agreement of 14 July, but when the details came to be discussed it was found that the agreement satisfied neither Petrograd nor Kiev. On 8 August Ukrainian delegates arrived in Petrograd to discuss constitutional questions with a committee of the Provisional Government, consisting of Nekrasov and three well-known Russian jurists—Baron Nolde, Halperin, and Bart. It soon became clear that neither side was willing to abide by the agreement that had been concluded. The object of the Russians was to gain time and, as far as possible, postpone any further development of the Ukrainian question until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. With this end in view they raised a number of minor difficulties and accused the General Secretariat of demanding more than an autonomous federal constitution. The Ukrainian delegates grew impatient at these obstructive tactics, which they considered due to the influence of the Cadet party in the Provisional Government. The truth is that the Russians were very well aware that any concession made to the Ukrainians would only be used by the latter as a stepping-stone to further demands. They

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knew that the leaders of the Rada intended to profit by any weakness on the part of the Provisional Government to go much further than what they had themselves publicly proclaimed to be their policy. For this reason they preferred to gain time and throw the responsibility of a final decision upon the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in which the Great Russians would vastly outnumber the Ukrainians.

It was this object which guided them in the "Instructions" sent to the Rada as the result of the Petrograd Conference. The chief points in the "Instructions" were the following: (1) Until the meeting of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly the highest organ of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine is the General Secretariat, appointed by the Provisional Government and representing the Rada. (2) The decisions of the General Secretariat are to be confirmed by the Provisional Government, but can be discussed beforehand in the Rada. (3) The powers of the General Secretariat extend over Kiev, Volynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Černigov (with the exception of four districts). They may also extend over other Governments if the Zemstvos decide in favour of it.

The unwillingness of the Provisional Government to yield any further ground forced the Ukrainian leaders to reconsider their tactics. In continuing the controversy with Petrograd the first thing they had to do was to dissociate themselves entirely from the Austro-German *Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine*. At a meeting of the Rada on 24 August all the party leaders denounced the German attempts to sow disunion between Russia and the Ukraine. Kovalevski, the leader of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries, declared that his party had always taken the Russian orientation even in times of reaction. Vinničenko, the President of the General Secretariat and leader of the Social Democrats, maintained that his party had always fought against Germanophilism and had published pamphlets in which they declared themselves opposed to the Austro-German orientation. Professor Hruševski, the President of the Rada, stated that he knew no members of the Rada who supported the Austrian orientation. A few days later he made an official statement explaining that on several occasions the Rada had received greetings from the *Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine*, but that as far back as last May had decided to have no relations with them.

Having cleared themselves of the charges of complicity

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with the Germans, the Ukrainian leaders devoted themselves to the struggle with the Provisional Government. The "Instructions" of the latter called forth violent protests in the Rada, and on 20 August Vinničenko tendered his resignation. Vinničenko stood for resistance to Petrograd, and his object in resigning was to appeal to the Rada. After a stormy sitting the Rada condemned the "Instructions" by a majority of 247 to 36 in the following resolution: "The Instructions of 17 August break the agreement of July which alone will enable the Rada to prepare the Ukraine for autonomy and for the Ukrainian and Russian Constituent Assemblies. They create unnecessary complications and weaken the position of the Revolutionary Provisional Government."

The resignation of Vinničenko was followed by the attempt of Dorošenko to form a Cabinet, the only difference in policy being a more conciliatory attitude towards Petrograd. But the Rada was not in a mood for conciliation, and a few days later, on 3 September, Vinničenko returned.

The Ukrainians claim that it is they who for generations past have kept alive the federal idea in Russia. They have fought not merely for local autonomy, but for the transformation of Russia from a centralist into a federal State. As the most important of the nationalities of Russia after the Great Russians, they are the natural leaders of such a movement, and they were not slow to realise the importance of gaining the support of the other nationalities before coming to conclusions with Petrograd. In September, therefore, they called together in Kiev a Congress of the Nationalities of the Russian Republic. All the leading nationalities were represented as well as less known peoples such as the Crimean Tatars, the Bashkirs, and the Kalmucks. The Congress was presided over by Professor Hruševski, who opened the proceedings. "The desire for federation," he said, "has permeated the masses of the Ukrainian people. The idea of federation will in Russia play the same part as in the United States in saving the country from disunion." This Congress was a weapon with which to fight the Central Government in its opposition to the claims of the nationalities; once the Central Government collapsed it served as a rallying ground for those national units which are endeavouring to build up the Russian Republic on a new federal basis.

A new period in the history of the Ukraine opened with

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the Bolševik *coup d'état* in Petrograd. The General Secretariat, which has been denounced by the Bolševiks as a *bourgeois* Government, is a Socialist coalition, its *bourgeois* supporters remaining discreetly in the background. The Bolševik opposition is not due to the Rada's refusal to grant social reforms of a far-reaching character, but to its nationalism as opposed to the internationalism of Petrograd, for the Ukrainian Social Democratic party has adopted the national standpoint. "Hitherto," wrote *Robitniča Gazeta* (the official organ of the party), "we have agreed with the Bolševiks in many questions. We and they have demanded, and still demand, immediate peace, the transference of the lands of the big landowners and others to our poverty-stricken peasantry. We and they have fought and still fight for control over industry, for the maximum taxation of large property and capital. But even when we worked together against our common enemies we never wholly agreed. We stood for the Ukrainian democratic republic and federation with other countries of Europe; they were entirely indifferent to the national, cultural, and political needs of our people."

So long as the Provisional Government remained in power the opposition between Kiev and Petrograd was on constitutional questions. With the advent of the Bolševiks this was entirely reversed. The Bolševiks cared nothing for constitutional technicalities; they were willing to grant complete self-determination to the Ukrainians without a thought for the interests of Russia as a State. What they were not willing to abandon was their campaign in favour of social revolution in the Ukraine. Their declaration of war on Ukrainian nationalism was not because it threatened the interests of Russian nationalism, but because it showed itself an obstacle to the internationalism of their dreams.

When the news of the Bolševik success in Petrograd reached Kiev, the Rada formed a Provisional Committee to safeguard the revolution. It felt itself threatened on two sides. On the one hand, Šulgin and other Russian Nationalists in Kiev had been in close touch with the Cossack troops urging them to suppress the Rada as being in revolt against the Provisional Government; on the other, the Bolševiks were endeavouring to spread their subversive doctrines throughout the Ukraine as well as Northern and Central Russia. The opposition organised by the Russian Nationalists

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was of short duration. Cossack regiments and a body of Czecho-Slovak volunteers, who had been moved to Kiev to support the Provisional Government against the Bolševiks, refused to fight and offered to leave Kiev when they learnt it was against the Rada that they were being used. The danger from the Bolševiks was more real. On 10 November the General Secretariat published an appeal to the people to remain calm, promising that it would do everything possible to suppress any Bolševik movement in Kiev. But the spirit of unrest had spread to Kiev, and for two days there was a general strike, none of the bourgeois papers being permitted to appear. The Rada, however, with the support of the Social Democrat party which issued an appeal to the workmen, soon mastered the situation, and on 20 November issued its "Universal" or General Proclamation, transferring the land to the peasants, establishing an eight-hours' day and labour control over industry and fixing the frontiers of the Ukrainian National Republic in federation with the Russian Republic [NEW EUROPE, No. 62].

Having secured its position in Kiev the attention of the Ukrainian Government has been concentrated on the frontiers. On the east it has entered into an alliance with the Cossacks after the latter had agreed not to interfere in the Donets Basin, which is claimed by the Rada as Ukrainian territory. On the south the Ukrainians after some fighting have captured Odessa, which they still hold, while they have entered into an agreement with the Roumanians, recognising the "self-determination" of Bessarabia. It is on the north and the north-east, especially in the Government of Harkov, that they are still threatened by the Bolševiks, but fighting has not been of a sustained character, nor is it likely, in view of the general unwillingness to fight, that the Bolševiks will attempt to gain a military victory. Recognition of the Constituent Assembly by the Bolševiks would probably lead to an understanding between Petrograd and Kiev. So long as counsels of moderation prevail in Petrograd and no attempt is made to extend the reign of terror of which Petrograd has been the victim, the Ukrainians are not likely to wish to sever their connection with the north. Race, history, and tradition demand that Russians and Ukrainians should live together in the closest political and economic ties.

RURIK.

Forerunners of the Russian Revolution

(II) BAKUNIN AND MARX : ANARCHY AND SOCIALISM

A COMPARISON of Bakunin and Marx serves very well to illustrate the relation between Anarchism and Socialism, in so far as Bakunin is regarded as one of the most important founders of Anarchism and Marx as the founder of present-day Socialism, and in so far as the difference between the two men can be treated as the difference between those two creeds.

The philosophical starting point is the same for Bakunin and for Marx—Hegel, Feuerbach and the Hegelian Left. Both learn from Proudhon and the French Socialists, both become positivists and materialists, both live for some time in the same conditions and the same places, both take part in the revolution, both live through the same reaction and its effects upon personal security and freedom. But Bakunin remains under the influence of German philosophy rather from a subjective and individualist angle, while Marx—and this is true also of Engels—advances under the influence of French and English positivists to extreme objectivism, and comes to regard history and the masses as the deciding factors in social life. Engels even goes so far as to throw over the individual conscience.

Bakunin also rejected extreme individualism. Only a few days before his death, in a conversation on Schopenhauer, he said : “ Our whole philosophy starts from a false foundation, in treating man as an individual, instead of treating him as belonging to a collective whole. Hence arise most philosophical errors, which end by transplanting happiness to the clouds or kindling pessimism such as that of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.” In 1838 he looked upon suicide, in 1876 upon pessimism, as a necessary consequence of extreme subjectivism and individualism, and indeed there is no great difference between the two views.

Marx, as opposed to Bakunin, is more scientific and critical, in short, a theorist, while the Russian turned his attention more to political practice. In his beginnings, and even later, Marx did not in the main think differently from Bakunin. He took part in the Revolution of 1848, though far more cautiously than Bakunin : he, too, wanted to destroy the State, and believed in the speedy erection of an ideal social order. But Marx gave up the revolutionary ideas of his youth and took up scientific

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work: he was sitting in the British Museum and trying to find a positivist and materialist basis for economics and the philosophy of history, while Bakunin was helping to organise revolts and only incidentally trying to work out his thoughts in theory. That is why Marx is so far superior to Bakunin as a sociologist and interpreter of history.

At an early stage Marx broke away from Bakunin in his habit of ignoring the Church and its political importance. Bakunin remained closer to Feuerbach or, if you will, closer to his own views before he lost his belief. He formulated the essence of theocracy in the phrases: "Where there is no religion, there can be no State," and "Religion is the substance, the essence of the life of every State." To this view he always adhered, the only difference being that later on he sought to replace religion by philosophy.

From the very first they differed in their views on social and State administration. Marx is a centralist, Bakunin a federalist. Bakunin remains revolutionary; Marx and his followers do not give up the idea of revolution, but postpone its realisation to a more and more distant future, while seeking to prepare for its advent by a share in parliamentarism. When Bismarck introduced universal suffrage, Marx and Engels employed it so effectively as a weapon that the latter, shortly before his death, declared the revolution to be unnecessary. Bakunin would have nothing to do with universal suffrage or any political institution, and hence looked upon Marxism as mere State socialism. Bismarck he hated beyond words, Bismarckism was to him merely "militarism, police *régime*, and financial monopoly combined into a system." And with Bismarck he also condemned the Germans as a State-race, and expected of the Slavs and Latins, not that they would create a great Slav State against Pangermanism, but that they would through social revolution found "a new world, lawless, and therefore free." Bakunin will not recognise reforms, he desires "overthrow from the foundations": his aim is total disorganisation, political amorphism and chaos, in the hope that future society will form itself spontaneously from below. Marx and Engels are calmer in their judgment of the State, because, as historical materialists, they recognise the primacy of economic organisation in social politics.

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The expression "Social Democracy" started with Bakunin. Like Marx, he was for Communism; he merely wanted it to be organised on a federalist, not on a centralist basis. Marx sought to build up his society upon the mass of industrial workers—the proletariat—while Bakunin set greater hopes upon the peasants, especially in Russia. On the whole there is no such absolute conflict between Bakunin and Marx as their followers to-day would have us believe. Bakunin is more of an individualist than Marx, more revolutionary (revolution being conceived as instinct or "temperament"), and indeed more political; and this is due to the fact that he is not a logical historical materialist. Where Bakunin really differs from Marx, is in tolerating terrorism as an individual act and the expropriation of the individual. Marx merely appeals to the decisions of the mass, with the result that his whole policy thereby becomes riper, more fully thought out and more effective.

Bakunin is a revolutionary, Marx a statesman and tactician. Marx is more conscientious. . . . Nor must it be overlooked that Bakunin, especially in his second European phase, lived in the Latin countries, while Marx was in England. Both men involuntarily constructed the future and the organisation of society to a large extent according to the permanent impressions which they had received from their surroundings. Bakunin, everywhere the restless stranger, preferred to associate in the less organised workmen's circles and reckoned with these, while Marx had English and German impressions.

On the progress of the Russian Opposition towards revolution, and especially terrorism, Bakunin had a strong influence; it was he, and not Herzen, to whom the younger generation of the 'sixties and 'seventies listened. There were many hundreds of Russian students in Switzerland in 1872-73, and many of them became followers of Bakunin and transplanted his teachings to Russia. His strange unrealism links itself with realism in Russia. The "destructive criticism" of Pisarev becomes Pan-Destruction, the Nihilist Word becomes the revolutionary Deed, and "Word and Deed" become more and more the revolutionary watchword.

As a man Bakunin was amiable, but naïve, thoughtless and undisciplined. He sought to realise his ideals in a logical manner, but dared the "Deed" and risked his life for it,

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and for that he deserves a certain recognition as against his opponents, the hesitating Herzen and the calculating Marx. It was doubtless in this sense that Annenkov called him "the father of Russian idealism."

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

* * * The first article in the above series appeared in last week's number.—EDITOR.

Count Czernin on Self-determination

[It is unnecessary to remind our readers that, owing to the hostility of the Austrian Slavs to war with Russia and Serbia, the Austrian Parliament was not allowed to meet from March, 1914, till May, 1917, and then only under the stimulus of the Russian Revolution. As a result, the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations (the two Parliamentary Committees by which alone the Joint Foreign Minister can be called to account for his foreign policy) met on 4 December, 1917, for the first time during the war. Count Czernin made three statements of very considerable importance, but as the first has already been fairly fully reported in the British press, we limit ourselves to reproducing the second, which illustrates very clearly the fundamental difference of views between the statesmen of the two rival groups in the vital question of self-determination.

The note struck throughout is that of the Speech from the Throne—"We mean to remain masters in our own house"; and those who know anything of Austria-Hungary know very well that "we" are the two dominant racial minorities of the Germans and Magyars, who jointly rule the other races.

For the benefit of those ignorant sentimentalists who still hanker after a separate peace with the House of Habsburg, it may be well to add that, both in the Speech from the Throne, in the Addresses of the two Delegations, and in the speeches of the Foreign Minister, and other prominent statesmen like Counts Tisza and Andrassy, quite unusual stress was laid upon the closeness of the Dual Monarchy's ties with Germany and the need for strengthening them still further. In particular, the Hungarian Delegation expressed its conviction that "above all the alliance which, concluded nearly forty years ago with the German Empire and loyally maintained by us, has assured to us the blessings of peace, is the proper foundation for the defence of our interests, as the successes of this war so brilliantly demonstrate. But also the re-organisation (*Umgestaltung*) of our Monarchy fifty years ago on a Dualist basis has justified itself, since during this period we were able to make splendid progress in every sphere, alike of intellectual and economic development."

"We are at one with Germany, on the basis of a defensive war—a basis of which this House unanimously approves, which was laid down by the German Reichstag as the *Richtlinie* of its war aims and which Dr. von Kühlmann defined very clearly when he said: 'There is no

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obstacle to peace save Alsace-Lorraine.' It is true that we are in certain respects in a more favourable position than our German ally. We hold practically all our territory: Germany's colonies are in the enemy's hands. It goes without saying that Germany will not and cannot make peace until she is certain of getting back her colonies. If now I am reproached in some quarters for my weak policy in Germany's tow, which forces us to continue the war longer than would otherwise be the case and even to fight for German conquests—then I answer these arguments with a categorical 'No.' We are fighting just as much for the defence of Germany as Germany for ours. In this connection I know no territorial frontiers. We are fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as Germany has fought for Lemberg and Trieste. *I know no difference between Strassburg and Trieste.* If new constellations should arise, as is not impossible, and if great events should occur on other fronts, then I should eagerly welcome the moment when we, too, should fight jointly with our Allies on other fronts. *If, then, there are still people in the Entente who live in the idea that they might succeed in separating us from our ally, then I can only say that they are bad psychologists and childish minds.*

"Italian policy since the beginning of the war has been moving down an inclined plane. Before the war Italy could have spoken with us, because we had a lively interest to prevent *this superfluous war*: and Italy could have reached an arrangement such as she can no longer hope to reach to-day, even in her wildest dreams. . . . At best she can hope for the *status quo*. . . . I say it quite openly for Rome to hear: if Italy obstinately continues the war, it will come later on to a worse peace. This we owe to our troops and to those at home (*unserem Hinterlande*)."

Alluding to America's declaration of war, he made the positive assertion:—

"To the result of the war this will not make the slightest difference. I should, however, like to draw attention to President Wilson's speech, which is in many respects incomprehensible and obscure, but shows a remarkable progress in its views in one direction. Speaking of our internal situation he says: 'We must emphasise that we do not wish to injure Austria-Hungary in any way, and that it is not our business to concern ourselves with the affairs of the peoples. We in no way desire to prescribe to them their attitude and indeed wish that they should themselves regulate their affairs, great and small.*' If this view is compared with that launched against the Monarchy by the Entente, and designated by the catch-word 'Self-Determination of Peoples,' which is to be realised at a peace conference by aid of the Entente, then I find in the President's views an important progress to which we do justice and which it is our interest to fasten upon.

* What President Wilson actually said was: "We owe it to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not propose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands in all matters, great or small."—EDITOR.

COUNT CZERNIN ON SELF-DETERMINATION

“ The words ‘Right of Self-Determination’ cropped up fairly, late in this war in the discussion of war aims. It is impossible to give a general definition of it, since almost every statesman who has employed it has given it a different sense. If we search for this catch-word’s origin, we find that it tacks on to the war aim put forward by the Entente since the beginning, ‘the protection of small nations.’ These were the small nations whom the Central Powers were alleged to have outraged—Serbia, Montenegro, &c., for whose defence the Entente claimed to have taken up arms. In his Note of 18 December, 1916, to the belligerents, President Wilson defined it as one of his noblest peace aims, ‘to guarantee the rights and privileges of the small States.’ In their answer of 10 January, 1917, the Entente supplemented this sentence by the *brutal formula* that they are waging war ‘for the liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign rule.’ The protection of the small States fell into the background, the forcible detachment of single nationalities from the Monarchy took the first place, and, indeed, their forcible detachment *without* according a right of self-determination to the nationalities or their mother State.

“ In his message of 22 January to the Senate, President Wilson took a certain step towards the Entente standpoint by calling for internal reforms in the various States, and thus making their internal political affairs a subject of international discussion. At the same time, however, he declared that there was no right by which peoples could be transferred from ruler to ruler ‘as though they were their property.’ This message of the President, then, expresses the idea that the cession of portions of the territory of one State to another must be *enforced*, and also demands ‘the consent of the governed to the government.’ Here the right of self-determination is already a fairly complicated *mixtum compositum*—territorially the right of the State to determinate its territorial existence, but at the same time also a joint right of the nationalities, under international protection, to decide their internal relations. On 11 April, 1917, the Russian Government declared that it repudiated the intention of ruling other peoples and robbing them of their national heritage: it claimed for the belligerent States themselves the right to decide the fate of their peoples at the conclusion of peace. This is the self-determination of States over their nations.

“ Thus, now States, now nationalities are the subjects, and then again the objects, of this right of self-determination, which follows aims that fluctuate between autonomy won by constitutional means and State independence conferred by a European conference. Through the exploitation of this confusion of terms self-determination has in the speeches of Entente statesmen slowly assumed a definite form. It has become a mantle for the brutal Entente demand for a forcible detachment of portions of Austria-Hungary. Behind this word is concealed the demand that the Monarchy should renounce its right to control its territorial existence, its right to regulate of itself the relation of the nationalities to each other and to the State. It is the denial of all State sovereignty, the demand that Austria-Hungary’s internal

COUNT CZERNIN ON SELF-DETERMINATION

affairs should be left to the vote of a European conference or of a plebiscite.

“ But the right of self-determination—according to recent definitions—by which popular meetings, party resolutions and even individual press utterances have had international importance assigned to them—leads to pure anarchy, to *Mazerierung des Staatsbegriffes*, to a recognition of regionalism extending almost to the individual.

“ All this is ‘ the right of self-determination,’ and is it with this idea, or rather catch-word, that we are to work and make serious politics? Besides, the Entente only allows self-determination in all these versions for its opponents, but always finds an excuse for excluding its effect from their own conditions. Where the Entente feels the need for annexations or disannexations, it naturally does not recognise the right of the State which is to be cut down to make its own decision, and indeed not even the right of the populations which are to be annexed to have a say as to this amputation. When the Freemasons in Paris let it appear that the fate of the territories claimed by Italy was to be decided by a plebiscite of their inhabitants, there was a storm of indignation in Italy, and in the same way the idea of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine was rejected in France on the ground that in that case it was only an old wrong which had to be righted. The Entente has never run short of pretexts for not allowing the right of self-determination to be applied to itself.

“ If, then, I am to state the extent to which I recognise a right of the peoples to decide their own fate, I naturally prefer to express myself only in so far as the question bears an international character. The right of the State to decide upon its territorial existence is beyond all question : and equally beyond all question is it that one foreign State cannot claim the right to interfere in the internal conditions of another. Such are the boundaries of the self-determination of States from the international point of view.

“ As regards the question of nationalities inside the various States regulating their relations to one another and to the State, this is not an international but an internal question. I only have a right to express myself with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in so far as these questions might influence foreign policy. I do not scruple to declare that I repudiate most emphatically any interference with the shaping of our domestic affairs, and must on the other hand repudiate the idea, if it should crop up, that certain internal questions are to be settled internationally. The relation of the two States of the Monarchy to each other rests on legal foundations : and the possibility of alterations in it is provided for, by constitutional institutions. Where the desire for such changes arises, they must be solved constitutionally through the legislature, which guarantees ‘ the self-determination of the nations ’ within the framework of the State. Inside the two States of the Monarchy the individual nationalities possess every constitutional possibility of regulating their relations; and I am not in a position to recognise the possibility of other solutions.”

The Polish Democratic Congress

[THE NEW EUROPE has more than once alluded to the persistent efforts made by certain reactionary and Chauvinist elements among the Poles to alienate official British sympathy from the Polish democratic parties, to misrepresent their leaders as Germanophil, and to discredit not only them, but also their close allies, the Russian Liberals and Social Revolutionaries. The disorders which followed the fall of Mr. Kerenski have prevented information regarding the important Polish Democratic Congress, held at Petrograd on 25 October, from reaching this country; and we are now only in a position to give the text of the programme which it accepted, and which may, in some respects, be regarded as a charter of the progressive elements in the future Poland.]

(1) That this Congress is of opinion that the only just solution of the Polish question is the creation of an United and Independent Poland with access to the sea.

(2) That in the opinion of this Congress it is absolutely necessary that the organisation of the Polish State should be proceeded with forthwith. As the Provisional Council of State is now being superseded by the Regency Council, this Congress expresses its hope that the Regency Council will have the support of all the nation, and that the gains which have been already made on the road to complete Polish State organisation will prove to be permanent. The Congress trusts that under the wise and patriotic guidance of the Regency Council the nation will be able to achieve its most cherished ideals. In this hope the Congress expresses its allegiance to the Regency Council.

(3) That this Congress considers it to be absolutely necessary that the present Polish Government should enter into diplomatic relations with the Governments of other States. Furthermore, this Polish Government ought to take a part in the negotiations which will settle the future structure of Europe.

(4) That the activities of the Polish emigrants abroad ought to conform to the wishes and policy of the chief organs of the State in Poland. And since the most important task of the nation at the present moment is the organisation of its State life, this Congress considers that the Polish Democracy ought to help on by all means at their disposal the success of such State organisation in Poland.

(5) This Congress expresses the hope that all classes of the population will participate in the work of organising the Polish State. The Congress also hopes that the organs of the Polish State will do their best to secure an organisation of the Polish State on a democratic basis, as only a truly democratic constitution can ensure to the Polish State a stable and successful development.

(6) This Congress greets the arising Ukrainian State and expresses its firm conviction that the Ukraine as well as the Polish nation possesses the necessary qualifications for independent existence. The Congress hopes that the two nations will base their relations on justice and mutual confidence, and will combat chauvinistic currents which tend to interrupt the mutual relations of the two neighbours.

THE POLISH DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS

(7) The Congress hopes that the Lithuanian and White Ruthenian nations will found their own political existence on the basis of the self-determination of nations and that the bonds uniting these two nations with Poland will result either in a renewal of the previous union on modern lines or in the most cordial neighbourly relations.

(8) This Congress considers that all national minorities in all States ought to have a national and cultural autonomy.

It was also resolved to organise periodically Congresses of delegates of all Democratic groups and to elect a permanent body, consisting of 25 members, and called the Chief Democratic Committee, which would carry on from Congress to Congress the business of the party. A detailed scheme of the organisation was elaborated and members for the first Central Committee were elected.

Review

Japan at the Cross Roads, by Mr. A. M. Pooley (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.), is apparently intended to be an antidote to the too rosy view of Japan, not seldom held by certain friends of that country. Like all other countries, Japan has a dark side to her public and private life, and our author doubtless intends to do also a service to that country by pointing out her many shortcomings. All friends of Japan and the Japanese themselves will agree with the author that the country has not yet fully completed her transformation from a form of mediæval feudalism into a modern state, based on democratic principles, and that her public and private life is not by any means as pure as might be desired. With such an object in view the author has marshalled a large array of apparently formidable facts. These he has selected out of "the twelve basketfuls of notes" he made while staying in Japan, the notes consisting in the main of newspaper clippings and of the author's private conversations with partizan politicians. It is, however, a pity that the author has not taken more pains to be accurate. Let us give a few glaring examples. On p. 31 Mr. Pooley calls the last of the Shoguns by the name of Tokugawa Nobunaga, a curious mixture of the surname of that Shogun and that of another celebrated Shogun, who flourished some 300 hundred years ago. On p. 74 he writes as if the Nichiren sect of Buddhism is an entirely different thing from Hokke-shu, whereas they are one and identical. On p. 81 Count Okuma is made out to be a clansman of Tosa, whereas everybody knows he is from Saga. On p. 318 Mr. Pooley says that in March, 1912, a member of Parliament challenged "the whole Cabinet with keeping concubines as well as wives," and that the challenge "was answered with a smug smile of assent." On this point I do not hesitate to say that our author must be grossly misinformed. I might go on multiplying citations, but I go no further, except to say that the author is very unjust to the memory of the late Emperor when he charges him, on p. 63, with "meanness" because he forbade to have the paper screens of his sitting room renewed every year. The fact itself is probably true, but the interpretation is wrong, because that

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act of frugality arose, as is well known, from the Emperor's constant desire to keep his household expenses down so as to be as little burdensome as possible to the country, and perhaps to set a personal example of economy to his people. I cannot help thinking the book would have carried very much more weight if the author had been more careful in his selection of material, besides preparing himself better by acquiring a truer insight into the workings of the Japanese mind before passing judgment on the persons and incidents he has dealt with.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

Germany and Russia

Herr Paul Rohrbach, in *Deutsche Politik*, of 7 December, deals with the negotiations with the Bolševiks from a highly instructive angle. Germany, he argues, cannot ask better than that Russia should recognise the right of self-determination to all the nations of what has hitherto been the Russian Empire: for this means an end of "the real Russian danger for Germany and for Europe, namely, the hegemony and politico-military control of the Great Russians over the non-Russian peoples." Here we may take him at his word and point out that conversely *the real German danger for Europe* is the hegemony and politico-military control of the Germans (and Magyars) over 35 million Slavs and Latins of Central Europe.

"To conclude peace with a non-Socialist Germany," he continues, "with a German Government like the present, means for the Maximalists a strong self-restraint, such as only necessity could impose. It may be, however, that Lenin, Trotski, and their colleagues in supreme power in Russia will be driven by the inner logic of things not only to peace with Germany, but still further to requesting us for help in some form or other, so that they may escape from the claws of the Entente. This is not meant as a prophecy, but possibilities of this kind exist. We must, of course, have no illusions as to the fact that, in so far as the Great Russians are represented among the present Bolševiks, sooner or later the old idea of Great Russian rule over the subject peoples will come up again and find itself in conflict with genuine Maximalist principles. But for the present the pressure towards peace—due to the complete dissolution, in Russia, of transport, food supplies, authority, military discipline, credit—is so strong as to have won the upper hand. The decisive factor will now be whether the Bolševiks can remain in power until the Western territories of Russia have been made over to their peoples with a view to exercising their right of self-determination, and until the Russian troops at the front have been dismissed to their homes.

"The idea that in Russia ordered conditions should return immediately after the conclusion of peace, is incredible. Certain trade corporations in Germany are reported to have requested the Government to arrange for tolerable and permanent relations with Russia 'as soon as possible.' This wish assumes that after the peace there will be a recognised and lasting governmental power capable of taking

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measures—which is not at all probable. The internal discussions regarding the expropriation of land, its distribution among the peasants, State bankruptcy, the Socialisation of industrial concerns, and many other vital questions will for a long time to come keep Russia in internal convulsions and struggles. It is scarcely credible that a strong executive—whether personal or republican in character—will speedily arise and gain sufficient strength to create order.

“We may think ourselves fortunate if the vessels into which the idea of order and government in Russia to-day have been poured, remain unbroken till peace has been signed. The very conclusion of peace with Russia will be a kind of race with the arrival of the next stage of Russian anarchy. To look beyond and to try now to make plans for regulating our economic relations with Russia in the future, is a proof of no slight *naïveté* in judging Russian conditions.”

A separate peace is of little use to Germany unless she can rely upon the re-establishment of order in Russia. Rohrbach realises that for the present such a task is beyond the power even of Germany. His doubts should be a timely reminder to those amongst us who already see the whole of Northern and Central Russia in the hands of the Germans, and are therefore in childish petulance urging us to write off Russia as lost to the common cause. From the military point of view Russia is unhappily a negative quantity, but as a sower of ideas she has never before exercised such influence upon the world—as we shall realise when the veil is torn away from the Central Powers. Hence it is more essential than ever that we should study the Russian mind and outlook and grip the situation, moral and political, instead of allowing it to drift. There are two forces contending for the soul of Russia to-day: are we to leave the good without succour in the grip of its secular enemies?

Trotsky and the Revolution of 1905

[The following passage, extracted from Mr. Trotsky's book on the Revolution of 1905 (“*Russland in der Revolution*,” published in Dresden), throws an interesting light upon the theories which the Bolševik leader is now attempting to put into practice.]

“More than ten years ago Plehanov, at the London International Socialist Congress, said, ‘the Russian revolutionary movement will conquer as a workmen's movement, or it will not conquer at all.’ On 30 October, 1905, the autocracy admitted the Revolution's first serious victory, and this victory had been achieved by the proletariat. Plehanov was right, the revolutionary movement conquered as a workmen's movement.

“It must be admitted that the October strike was not merely promoted materially by the *bourgeoisie*, but also supported by the strike of representatives of the liberal professions. But that altered nothing. The strike of engineers, advocates and doctors could not

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have an importance of its own. It only slightly strengthened the political importance of the general strike of the representatives of physical work. On the contrary, it emphasised the unquestionable and unrestrained hegemony of the proletariat revolutionary struggle. The liberal professions, which, after 22 January, had adopted as their own the fundamental democratic ideas proclaimed by the Petrograd workmen, submitted, in October, even to that method of struggle which represents the specific strength of the proletariat—the strike. The revolutionary wing of the intelligenzia, the students, had already long ago, amid solemn protests from all the liberal professors, imported the strike from the factory into the university. The further development of the revolutionary hegemony of the proletariat introduced the strike into the courts of law, the chemists' shops, the agrarian bureaux and the council chambers.

"The October strike was a demonstration of the proletariat hegemony in the *bourgeois* Revolution, and at the same time a demonstration of the hegemony of the town in a peasant country. Instead of the power of the land, which was deified by the friends of the people, there now arose the despotism of the capitalist city. The city had become mistress of the situation. It concentrated in itself enormous riches, it subjected the village to its power by the iron of the railroad, it attracted to itself along these railroads the best initiative and creative forces in every walk of life, it subjected the whole country to its material and intellectual leadership. In vain does reaction point to the slight percentage of the town population, and console itself by arguing that Russia is still a peasant country. The political *rôle* of the modern city can no more be measured by the bare figures of the population than can its economic *rôle*. The recoil of Reaction before the strike in the towns, amid the silence of the village, is the best proof of the dictatorship of the city.

"The October Days showed that in the Revolution the hegemony belongs to the city, and in the city to the proletariat. At the same time, however, they revealed the political isolation of the consciously revolutionary city from the spontaneously aroused village. In practice the October Days raised on a colossal scale the question: 'To whom does the army belong?' They showed that upon the solution of this question the fate of Russian freedom depends. The October Days of the Revolution ushered in the November orgies of the Reaction. The dark forces took advantage of a moment of revolutionary stand-still, and assumed a bloody offensive. They owed their success to the circumstance that the strike and the Revolution could bring down the hammer, but was not yet strong enough to raise the sword. The October Days showed with terrible clearness that the Revolution was in need of weapons.

"To organise the village and coalesce with it, to link itself with the army, to arm itself—such are the great and simple consequences which are dictated to the proletariat by the struggles and victory of October. Upon these consequences rests the Revolution."

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—"*Deutsche Politik*" (23 Nov. 1917)

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La Paix Intégrale

"The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past"

—MR. LLOYD GEORGE (5 Jan. 1918).

SOMETIMES words are the most effective of deeds; if all words spoken in Britain during the war had been as weighty and as deliberate as those of the Prime Minister last Saturday the cause of the Allies would now be more prosperous than it is. One of the most sagacious of living statesmen has told us that public speakers ought to remember that the audience they address is fourfold :—(i) British; (ii) Allied; (iii) Neutral; (iv) Enemy. No speech could sound equally well in four such different ears; but it is none the less the obvious duty of every Allied spokesman to take some thought in preparation, with a view to exercising some influence upon all four, and especially upon the fourth. Speeches are often effective weapons. It is quite clear that German opinion *is* affected by what is said and done abroad, and therefore every speech by our statesmen must be regarded as an act of war. If it consolidates enemy opinion, *as too many so-called patriotic speeches have done*, it must be condemned; if it promotes the growth of liberal opinion in Germany it must be approved. The responsiveness of German domestic opinion to those currents of political thought that have flowed into Germany, first, from the West, and then, in overwhelming flood, from the East, may be read in these words which appeared in the Radical *Zeit* of Vienna, at the very height of the German domestic crisis last July :—

" . . . as the war drew on, the contention of the enemy gained strength. . . . The conception of a democratic Germany as the peace-bringer proved its power by influencing all neutrals. Wilson seized upon it and gave it even more striking expression than it had received on English or French lips. Then came the Russian Revolution, with its well-known motto; and under its influence even the Germans began to understand that their political *régime*, however admirably designed for war, was an obstacle for peace. To-day in Germany the democratic idea in Germany has as many friends as peace. . . . The friends of democracy and peace are a majority alike in the country and in the Reichstag, and *they do not shrink from quoting Lloyd George, Ribot and Wilson to prove that a speedy and lasting peace depends on the democratisation of Germany.*"

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The invitation which the *Zeit* thus gave us to use the undoubted political power of our democratic ideals as an effective re-inforcement of our military measures has been too long neglected. "Crude rhetoric" in public speech seemed to be the necessary accompaniment of "vigour in the prosecution of the war." Mr. Lloyd George showed on Saturday that this is not so. His speech was a declaration of our war purposes which should go far to satisfy even his extreme critics. Had it been delivered last spring, had it been followed by similar thoughtful and statesmanlike utterances, it might have saved the moral unity of the Alliance by giving Russia proof of our good faith. But, late as it is, we welcome it, even if certain passages seem to require elucidation and correction. It represents united Britain; it speaks in clear accents, and though it is silent on some points on which greater candour is necessary, it is inspired by a good international principle throughout. In "the most critical hour" the leaders of the nation are of one mind. They harbour no vindictive aim, they cherish no rapacious design; but they are inflexibly determined to secure reparation for wrongs done, and to set upon their feet once more all those peoples, small or great, who have suffered national and territorial loss.

Though Mr. Lloyd George, in speaking so felicitously of our national unity, said nothing of our Allies, we must assume that his speech voices their thought. It is on that assumption that we now examine in detail one or two of its passages. "Government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war." Such is the Prime Minister's strong foundation. On it he builds, with our willing aid, an independent Poland, a restored Serbia, Belgium, Roumania, Montenegro; and upon it will arise a new Italy "expressing the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue," and a new Roumania giving "men of Roumanian blood and speech" justice in their aspirations. *Union with their own race and tongue.* It is a great ideal for which men will live and will die. But in Central Europe what does it mean? It means the release of Western Galicia from Austria and its union with Russian Poland; it means the establishment of the Ukraine, taking Eastern Galicia from Austria; it means Transylvania incorporated in Roumania; it means the appearance of a new

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Southern Slav Union which will draw to itself all south-eastern Austria and all southern Hungary; it means the completion of Italian unity. And what is left? Germans in Austria, Magyars in Hungary, Czechs in Bohemia; and of these the Germans would soon turn to join their brothers in the German Empire. That is the meaning of "self-determination" in the Dual Monarchy. By what right, then, does any Allied spokesman offer national unity to Italy and Roumania, and withhold it from the Poles, the Southern Slavs or the Czechs? Poland and Bohemia are just as *historic* as Italy herself; and the Southern Slav cause is identical with that of Roumania to-day, or of Piedmont in 1859. You cannot take part and leave the rest as it was. "Self-determination" eludes your artificial definition. Therefore, though we agree now, as always, that "the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our official war-aims," yet we have espoused a cause and proclaimed a principle which must act as a solvent upon the artificially-cemented state of the Habsburg Monarchy. From that issue, call it a dilemma if you please, there is no escape. One of the shrewdest of the Czechs of America said to us recently, "You may leave Austria-Hungary, or you may dismember her, but have no illusions; if you leave her as she is the war will go on inside her long after you have made peace. The Habsburg peoples are at an end of their patience and will make an end of the Monarchy."

It is in no carping spirit that we present this argument. We believe that the Prime Minister and the Government are earnest seekers after a new Europe, and we hope that they will show no hesitation in courageously applying the doctrine of self-determination within that federation of unequal peoples that we call the British Commonwealth. India and Egypt are on a plane very different from any European region, but they, none the less, demand an equally generous statesmanship. With these reservations, we gladly admit that the contrast between Mr. Lloyd George's declaration and the uncandid silence of Berlin gives solid evidence of our good faith. But it would be dishonest on our part not to endeavour to correct inconsistencies and remove discords. And it is because we fear that neither Serbia nor Greece—nor for that matter any Southern Slav or Czech in Europe or America—will find much comfort in last Saturday's declar-

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ation, that we feel bound to raise our protest against certain features in it. In plain speech, we insist upon an equal respect for nationality and an equal opportunity of "self-determination" for all adult peoples, irrespective of their military power.

Austria and Europe

II

FRANCIS JOSEPH found himself in the early decades of his reign in the midst of two Liberal movements—the movement for Italian unity and the movement for German unity. Had he and his counsellors been capable of understanding the significance of these movements, had they not been dominated by the Metternichian fear of "the Revolution" which was held to be identical with the principle of Nationality, they might have led and have drawn strength from both movements. An enlightened view of the Italian *Risorgimento* would have enabled Austria to secure, by the sacrifice of direct political domination, a strong backing in the Italian peninsula; while the leadership of the German unitary movement would have made of Austria the acknowledged leader of the German race, and would have kept Prussia in a relatively subordinate position. Instead, Francis Joseph followed a policy of brutal resistance and repression in Italy, while in Germany he struggled only to maintain his presidency of the German League of Princes. Consequently, when there arose in Prussia a statesman of strong character and keen, almost infernal, intelligence, he found himself utterly worsted. Bismarck first defeated Francis Joseph's attempt to assert his leadership of German Princes at the Frankfurt Diet of Princes by preventing the King of Prussia from attending it. Then he enticed Austria into the joint Austro-Prussian attack upon Denmark in 1864, tore from Denmark the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and established an Austro-Prussian condominium, or joint rule, in them, with the deliberate purpose of making that condominium a pretext for picking a quarrel with Austria at a convenient season. The Liberal German movement for unity Bismarck had ridiculed and opposed, but he skilfully turned it into a Conservative and Chauvinistic movement against Austria, under Prussian guidance and for Prussian purposes. At the same time he allied himself with

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the anti-Austrian parties in Hungary and in Italy. The Italian Radical "Party of Action" was largely guided by Bismarck's clandestine agents. The Hungarian Independence Party was similarly guided. Thus when the moment came, in 1866, to pick his quarrel, Bismarck was able to make an alliance with Italy against Austria, so as to compel her to fight on two fronts and at the same time to sap her strength by fomenting Magyar discontent and opposition to her.

Thus, in a sudden campaign of six weeks' duration, the Austrian Army was overthrown at Sadowa and compelled to make peace. Prussia formed the North-German Confederation, suppressed Hanover and other German States, and dictated to Austria a peace which, while shrewdly sparing her susceptibilities in the matter of territory, left her in a position in which there could be no escape from Prussian tutelage.

What was that position? Since the disastrous war of 1859 Francis Joseph had felt some kind of constitutional reform to be necessary, if only to appease Hungarian resentment. In October, 1860, he issued a Diploma, or Constitutional Decree, that provided for the reform of the Monarchy on a federal basis with approximately equal rights for the various Austrian peoples and large representation for the Hungarians. This Decree, if adhered to, might have proved to be one of the few wise acts of his reign. It would have promoted the development of Austria-Hungary into something like its true character, which has been accurately described as "a Slav house with a German *façade*." But the Germans of Austria, influenced doubtless by Prussia, clamoured for its abrogation; and in February, 1861, Francis Joseph substituted for it a Centralist Patent or Decree calculated to establish German mastery over all the other Habsburg races. Magyar, Bohemian and Polish opposition to this Decree was strong; and had the Habsburg dynasty ever considered the welfare of its peoples, it would have seen in that opposition a warning and an admonition. The Bohemians, Poles and Magyars had no liking for the prospect of being eternally sacrificed to a hopeless attempt to place the crown of Charlemagne once more upon a Habsburg brow. They were overruled, and the Germanizing constitution was introduced. It failed; but before it failed it had destroyed Francis Joseph's only hope of holding his own against Prussia. Thus he drifted towards Sadowa, only to find himself

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after defeat obliged to cede the province of Venetia to the Italians, whom his arms had defeated, and to negotiate in haste a settlement with the Magyars that made them and the Germans of Austria the masters of his destiny, while each and both exercised their control in accordance with Prussian dictation.

Thus came the compromise of 1867 between the Crown and Hungary, which is known as the Dual Settlement. By it Austria-Hungary in its present dual form, that is to say, the Dual Monarchy, was created. Up to that moment Hungary, though technically and historically entitled to constitutional autonomy, had been practically a province of Austria, except during the Revolution of 1848-49. Into the history of Hungary and of her ancient constitution, her glories and her disasters, her struggle against the Turks and her final acceptance of the Habsburg dynasty after her overthrow by the Turks at Mohács in 1526, it is not now my purpose to enter. Hungary really becomes an important factor in modern European history only after her settlement with her king, *i.e.*, the Emperor of Austria, in 1867. It must not be supposed that in making this settlement Francis Joseph was actuated by love for Magyar liberties, or that he was thinking of organizing his "dynastic estate" on a modern or liberal basis. He was thinking chiefly of a renewal of the struggle against Prussia for mastery over Germany, and was striving at once to neutralise Magyar opposition and to remove the lukewarmness of the Austrian-German Liberals. He was working to undo the consequences of the defeat of Sadowa by effecting a kind of moral mobilisation of the most recalcitrant elements among his peoples.

III

Like the other constitutional experiments undertaken by Francis Joseph, the Dual Settlement of 1867 was an improvisation hastily conceived for immediate dynastic ends and bearing no real relationship to the needs of his peoples. He doubtless imagined that, when he should have defeated Prussia, it would be subject to drastic revision or even to total abrogation. But he forgot Bismarck. He hastily gave to the Magyars a separate Government in regard to all affairs of the "Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen," that is to say, Hungary proper, together with Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia. He left the Croats, who in the past had been his most loyal supporters, to make what arrangements they

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could with the Magyars; and the Magyars proceeded to exploit and oppress them unscrupulously. Except in regard to military and foreign affairs, the Dual Settlement of 1867 made the Magyars supreme in Hungary, and, through Hungary, all but supreme in the Monarchy. The settlement created a joint Austro-Hungarian War Office, a joint Foreign Office and a department for the administration of joint revenues; and as the Magyars insisted that they could only enter into relations with a completely constitutional Austria, Francis Joseph, King of Hungary, in his capacity as Emperor of Austria, bedizened Austria with a Constitutional robe cut to please the Austrian-German Liberals. This Austrian "Fundamental Law" of December, 1867, was, in fact, designed to assure the predominance of the German over the non-German elements in Austria, just as the parallel settlement between the Crown and Hungary was designed to assure the mastery of the Magyar over the non-Magyar elements in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy.

The point to be remembered is that while the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary are each the strongest race-nucleus in their respective halves of the Monarchy, they are each in a minority as compared with the non-German races of Austria, and the non-Magyar races of Hungary. In Austria the Germans now number some 10,000,000 out of a total population of more than 30,000,000; while in Hungary proper the Magyars number some 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 out of a total population of, roughly, 20,000,000. The Dual System thus consists of an arrangement under which a minority rules a majority in each half of the Monarchy, and is dependent for its privileged position nominally upon the support of the Crown, but really, as we shall see, upon the support of Prussia.

As soon as Francis Joseph had assented to this Dual Settlement, he seems to have seen that he had committed himself to an arrangement likely to curtail his dynastic freedom of action. He knew that both the Magyars and the Austrian-German Liberals were in sympathy with Berlin, and therefore he cast about for some other support for his dynastic policy of revenge upon Prussia. This support could only be found in Bohemia, where the Czech nation, numbering at that time five millions, was eager for the restoration of the old State rights which had been taken from it when Ferdinand II. had overthrown Bohemia at the battle of the White Mountain

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in 1620. In 1868-9 Francis Joseph therefore began to coquet with the Bohemian leaders, and in 1870 actually went as far as to promise them, in writing, to grant autonomy to Bohemia and to be crowned King of Bohemia at Prague, as he had been crowned King of Hungary at Budapest on the conclusion of the Dual Settlement. At the same time, he allowed negotiations to be begun with France and Italy for an alliance against Prussia. His Chancellor, Count Beust, actually consented, in principle, to the occupation of the Papal States by Italy in return for her prospective support. But Bismarck, who was doubtless well-informed of these manœuvres, played upon Russian resentment of Francis Joseph's ingratitude during the Crimean War, and induced the Tsar to throw the weight of Russia against any anti-Prussian alliance. Sure of the support, or, at least, of the benevolent neutrality of Russia, Bismarck then picked, in 1870, his quarrel with France, and crushed her. At the same time, and in order to paralyse any desire on the part of Francis Joseph to come to the aid of France, he mobilised both the Hungarian Government and the Austrian Liberals to compel Francis Joseph to dismiss his anti-Prussian Austrian Premier, Count Hohenwart, to break his promises to the Bohemians, and to surrender himself for the rest of his reign to the joint control of the Magyar minority in Hungary and the German minority in Austria.

The history of the Habsburgs since 1871 is mainly that of a fruitless attempt to escape from the toils in which their own foolishness and Bismarck's astuteness had entangled them. I know of no more confused and wearisome study in recent European history than that of the internal affairs of Austria and Hungary between 1870 and 1908. The first of those dates marks the firm establishment of the German grip on Austria, while the second marks the beginning of the process by which Austria became the active agent of Germany in provoking the present war.

From 1871 to 1879 Austria was ruled in semi-constitutional fashion by Liberal German Administrations. Those administrations were allowed to do much as they liked in home affairs on condition that they should supply unhesitatingly money and recruits for the army—the Emperor's Army. During the same period a Magyar, Count Andrassy, was Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. His tendencies, like those of the Austrian-German Liberal Administrations,

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were pro-German; and before he left office, in 1879, he concluded the Austro-German Alliance against Russia, which three years later was transformed into the Triple Alliance by the adhesion of Italy. In 1878 he secured at the Congress of Berlin (which made the peace settlement after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877) a mandate for Austria-Hungary "to occupy and administer" the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, like the Hungarian Crown Lands of Croatia-Slavonia and the Austrian province of Dalmatia, are inhabited almost entirely by Serbo-Croatians or Southern Slavs. This concession Andr ssy obtained with the help of Bismarck and, sad to say, of England. He would have wished to obtain authority to annex the provinces outright, but Bismarck shrewdly limited it to an occupation, in order that the hope of an eventual annexation might be dangled by Germany before the eyes of Francis Joseph to keep him subservient to German aims. By the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the Southern Slav question, that is to say, the question of the unity of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene race, began to assume a practical form. It confronted the Habsburgs with another problem not unlike those of German and Italian unity which they had so signally failed to solve in their own interest—and failed for lack of the moral sense that is inseparable from constructive insight in politics. The question was: "Should the Southern Slavs be united with and for, or in spite of and against, the Habsburgs? The territory they inhabit forms the main road from Central Europe to the Near East. By the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina all Southern Slav territory, except the Kingdom of Serbia, the Principality of Montenegro, and some districts then still held by the Turks, came under Habsburg control. Upon Habsburg policy it depended whether Serbia should play the part of a Piedmont in a Southern Slav *Risorgimento*, or whether she should be united—by force, fraud, or moral suasion—with the Habsburg dominions. Austria, as usual, chose the mean and shortsighted course. She sought to divide, oppress, and demoralise those whom in her own vital interest she should have encouraged, united, and developed. The Austrian-German Liberals seemed dimly to have apprehended some danger that the addition of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Habsburg lands might encourage the dynasty to follow a policy of Slav development in order to prepare for its own liberation

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from the German yoke. They therefore opposed the Emperor, violated the condition on which they held office—that of supplying unquestioningly money and recruits for the army—and were kicked from power within a few months and crushed at a general election in accordance with the Emperor's command. Bismarck, who knew how foolish were their fears of Habsburg wisdom, addressed to them many a bitter gibe. They were overthrown, and from the end of 1879 until 1896 Austria was governed by a combination of Slav and German-Clerical, that is to say, Habsburg Parties. The Bohemians, who after the Emperor's breach of faith with them in 1870 had abstained from political life, joined in the work of government and secured for themselves possibilities of development that would otherwise have been denied them. So indefatigable were they in their efforts that they decreased the percentage of illiterates among them to a vanishing-point. They secured also possibilities of higher education that qualified them to increase their share of bureaucratic appointments and thus to secure a part—the only effectual part in Austria—of the actual everyday work of government and administration. From 1879 to 1893, Count Taaffe, a nobleman of Irish extraction and a personal friend of the Emperor, remained uninterruptedly Premier of Austria. His work, which was certainly done in accordance with the Emperor's intentions, tended to give the Austrian Slavs—that is to say, the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, the Poles of Galicia, the Slovenes of Carinthia, Carniola, the Triestine Littoral and Istria, and the Serbo-Croats of Istria and Dalmatia—a larger share in the life of Austria, and thus to counterbalance to some extent the artificial predominance of the Germans. Taaffe fell in 1893. His successor, a Pole, Count Badeni, endeavoured to continue his policy; but in 1896 the Germans of Austria revolted against a Ministerial ordinance that placed the Czech and German languages officially on a footing of equality in Bohemia, and began a menacing Pangerman movement called *Los von Rom*, or, as I have explained, in reality, "Away from the Habsburgs." Ten years of confusion followed, during which constitutional government was practically suspended. It ended in the sudden introduction of Universal Suffrage at the command of the Emperor—a reform which at the elections of 1907 was seen to have broken

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for the first time the artificial German predominance in the Austrian Parliament.

In Hungary the Emperor left, from 1875 to 1890, one statesman in charge of the Government—Mr. Koloman Tisza, father of the late Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. He held office on an understanding similar to that which had existed between the Emperor and the Austrian-German Liberals between '71 and '79—that the Magyars should have a free hand in the oppression and Magyarisation of the non-Magyars provided that they voted, without wincing, money and recruits for the Army. This understanding Tisza and his successors observed until 1903, when the Hungarian Independence Party refused recruits and engaged in a conflict with the Crown. Then, after two years of crisis, the Crown turned against them and threatened to introduce universal suffrage, which would have broken the predominance of the Magyar minority over the non-Magyar majority in Hungary. Frightened, the Magyars yielded, and escaped the danger of universal suffrage, which, however, was taken up as a cry in Austria and was used by the Emperor in the hope of curtailing German predominance.

Now mark these dates. The Magyars began to fear for their mastery over the non-Magyars in 1905-6. In 1907 universal suffrage placed the German elements in a minority in the Austrian Parliament. Thus both the levers created in 1867 under Bismarckian influence to establish Prussian control of Austria-Hungary were seen to be weakening, and it became necessary to strengthen them. This could only be done by an anti-Slav policy. Therefore in 1907 the Magyar Government began a series of persecutions of the Croats and the Southern Slavs, accusing them with the help of false documents and perjured witnesses of treasonable relations with Serbia. In 1908 the Emperor Francis Joseph annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina at the suggestion of the German Emperor and made preparations for a war against Serbia, which was only averted by the withdrawal of Russian support from Serbia under a German ultimatum. In the autumn of 1909, a libel action brought by the Serbo-Croatian leaders against the Pangerman Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung, revealed the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office had prepared a whole series of forgeries designed to justify both the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the invasion of Serbia. The exposure of

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these forgeries defeated Austro-German schemes for a while, but during and after the Balkan wars of 1912-13 other pretexts for an attack upon Montenegro and Serbia were sought, and only the combined efforts of European statesmen averted a catastrophe. In 1914, when Germany was ready for war, the Austro-Hungarian heir-presumptive, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, was allowed to visit the capital (Sarajevo) without military or police protection, was shot down by assassins—one of whom was the son of an Austrian policeman. The Austro-Hungarian authorities promptly accused the Serbian Government of complicity in the crime, and the long-sought pretext for this war was created.

No official was punished for dereliction of duty in connection with the murder of the Archduke; and the more the details of the crime are studied, the more it becomes evident that the murder was deliberately permitted, if not organised, by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The Archduke had long been suffering from the effects of an incurable disease. His mental stability had been affected, and there existed a danger that should he succeed to the throne of his more than octogenarian uncle, even for a few months, he might appropriate the Habsburg Family Fund for his morganatic children. His death removed the danger and, at the same time, provided a pretext for a war which, by enabling Germany and Austria-Hungary to crush for ever Serbia and the Southern Slavs, should open the Germanic road to the Balkans, Constantinople and Asia Minor.

We are often asked whether it would not be wrong to dismember Austria, and whether Austria cannot become a counterpoise against Germany. The answer is that Austria is already a vassal and a possession of Germany; that she has been brought, little by little, into the power of Germany; that her strategic railways have been built at German dictation, her commerce dominated, her ablest professors and scientists drawn away, her banks practically incorporated, and her very freedom impounded, by Germany. When we are asked to save Austria, what is it that we are asked to save? Let me read you the verdict of an eminent French student of Austria—Professor Louis Eisemann, who is perhaps better fitted than any European to pronounce it:—

“ The Austria-Hungary which people want to save is the dynastic

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Austria-Hungary. It is a question of preserving an Empire for the House of Habsburg. It is to the interest of a reigning family that people would sacrifice—unwittingly and certainly without wishing it—30,000,000 souls, whose ardent sympathy goes out to the Entente, and would sacrifice with them the whole fruit of this terrible war, the future of Europe and of the world. 'Austria is a diplomacy and an army'—a celebrated formula, to which should be added 'the dynasty' that by its diplomacy, created its Monarchy in Europe, and by its army has sustained it against its peoples. The dynasty is German and will remain German. The young Emperor Charles may have the purest intentions; the young Empress may be pacific, anti-Prussian and Ententophil. What power have they against geography and history, against the German mass that presses upon the frontiers of Austria, against the Germanic traditions of six or seven centuries of Habsburg history, against the rooted prejudice of Vienna towards the Slavs, the obtuse infatuation of the Austrian Germans or the imperious, overweening spirit of the Magyars? . . . There are in Austria oppressed peoples forming at least three-fifths of the population who desire the destruction of the Monarchy and their own liberation. There are two oppressor peoples, Germans and Magyars, who desire the maintenance of the Monarchy because they wish to conserve their own domination over the other peoples, the preservation of the German Alliance and the realisation of *Mittel-Europa* which would guarantee German hegemony in the Old World.

"And there is a young couple, without great intelligence, without merit, who have not made great mistakes or committed great crimes but who are overwhelmed by a heavy inheritance of crime and error. Around them stand 20, 50, or 100 families without nationality, without a real fatherland, cosmopolitan as people were two or three centuries ago, a last refuge of a tradition which elsewhere has yielded to the new spirit of the modern world. . . . It is this group, this group alone, dynasty and aristocracy, that makes up Austria-Hungary. And we are asked to make peace with *that*, and, for its sake, to give up our ideals, sacrifice our friends and prepare our own undoing."

The question, the only question, that arises for us is: Are we, in seeking the future peace of Europe, to follow dynasties—degenerate, unscrupulous, incapable dynasties—or are we to support the peoples—the peoples who are struggling for liberty, who are our friends, and whose development will guarantee their security and ours? There can be but one answer: We must support the peoples with all our strength, and in supporting them, establish the freedom of Europe for ever against any menace of Hohenzollern or Habsburg tyranny.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

The Vacant Embassies

THE Embassies of Paris, Washington, and Petrograd are vacant. There are not three more important posts in any branch of the public service of Great Britain at this moment. Paris stands where she ever did—the exchange and mart of European opinion. Washington daily looms larger on the Western horizon, and, under President Wilson's guidance, promises to become the moral metropolis of the Grand Alliance. Petrograd is the melting pot of all European policies. The men chosen to fill the British Embassies in these cities will carry greater responsibilities than any of their predecessors, and will be regarded more than ever before as the representatives of the nation. The diplomacy of to-day is no longer the mere art of negotiation, in which "a knowledge of the world"—that narrow world of the higher social orders—was the hall-mark of professional excellence. It is more even than Sir Ernest Satow's "application of tact and intelligence to the conduct of official relations between the Governments of independent States," for the States engaged in war, and now elaborating in travail the great future scheme of peace, are no longer dynasties and oligarchies—some, indeed, are still all that in appearance—but are whole peoples, conscious of their corporate power, their responsibility for the future welfare of the world, and afire with a great resolve to wipe out the evil past. In a special degree these three cities play a high part in the new evolving world of war; and no discrimination can make the post of British Ambassador more onerous or more pregnant with fruitful possibilities in one than in the other two. But, clearly, the Washington emissary must be a man of different calibre than our envoy in Petrograd. In all three cases we most need a man who adequately represents the British People, in character and outlook upon the war, who combines reliability with high intelligence, who is not shy of Utopia, but also stands firm on Mother Earth. In Washington he must be ready to walk in step with President Wilson and the American People towards a new world-order, and, at the same time, to prove to hard-headed hustlers that the "idealist" can meet the "realist" on his own ground without fear. In Paris, the British Ambassador must be an Anglo-Saxon "with a difference." Recently, when the name of a distin-

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guished Englishman was mentioned for the Paris Embassy, a shrewd and witty Frenchman dismissed his claims thus, 'C'est un Anglais admirable; mais ce n'est pas *un article d'exportation*.' Our Ambassador must be both! For Petrograd I should nominate an Unconventional Envoy, for I understand that we shall conduct the polite farce of refusing the full recognition which an *Embassy* implies. He should be many things that most of my compatriots are not; yet he should also be, pardon the paradox, a typical Briton. It is not the business of an Ambassador punctiliously to do in Rome as the Romans do, though he should study with imaginative care the susceptibilities of the nation he lives amongst; and in Petrograd it must be the British Envoy's special task to uphold British standards of fair dealing and uprightness in public life while showing a hospitable mind to Russian ideas. He must sit at the feet of old Monsieur Callières, who will tell him, "s'il est dans un Etat populaire, il faut qu'il assiste à toutes ses Diettes ou Assemblées, qu'il tienne grande table pour y attirer les députés et qu'il s'y acquiere *par ses honnestetez et par ses presens*, les plus accreditez et les plus capables de détourner les résolutions préjudiciables aux intérêts de son Maître et de favoriser ses desseins."

Does the present Diplomatic Service hold three such men? I believe that it does, but that, owing to the depression of merit and the discouragement of initiative, they are concealed even from the eye of the Foreign Office, and are entirely unknown to the general public. Hence, at this moment, the Government will find that it must go outside the strict bounds of the profession to find new men for Paris, Washington and Petrograd. They may be found in Parliament, or in the Government, or even, more probably, in the ranks of those temporary commissions that have done such good work in all parts of Europe and America during the war. But best of all would be the discovery of new blood in the lower ranks of the Diplomatic Service itself, or the throwing open of the door of Diplomacy for men of outstanding merit in the Consular Service. Of one thing we may be certain, that the Government will not dare to observe the wonted conventions of promotion, but will seek the right man wherever he may be found.

A. F. WHYTE.

The New Polish Government

THE Austro-German Decree of 12 September, 1917, admitted the formation of a Polish Regency Council, of a Cabinet and a new Council of State. A month passed from its publication before the candidates for the Regency Council were accepted by the Central Powers, and three months before the Cabinet was formed. The new Council of State has not yet come into existence.

The reason of the interminable delays and deadlocks in building up the Polish Government remains all along the same. Before any step is taken an agreement has to be reached between the Central Government and the Poles, which is a matter of great difficulty as the two sides set out with diametrically different aims. The Poles desire a government exercising full powers; the Germans a government whose activities are restricted, while the war lasts, within a scope more appropriate for a county council than for a national government. The Poles themselves have no direct means by which they could compel the Germans to make further concessions or to refrain from obstructing measures already agreed upon. In November, 1916, the Poles could discuss the terms on which they would support the Central Powers against Russia, but now their help is no longer needed. As Germany does not ask the Poles for anything but what she can take without asking, they have nothing to give or to withhold. Germany's present policy in Poland is mainly determined by the diplomatic game which she plays with regard to Austria and to revolutionary Russia. As far as Poland itself is concerned she merely desires to avoid unnecessary disturbances. Her concessions are consequently small, and political developments in Poland are exceedingly slow, though the peace negotiations at Brest may possibly hasten them. Austria favours the Polish endeavours because she expects the Polish Government to co-operate with her rather than with Germany—which is an additional reason for the Germans to restrict its growth.

The Decree of 12 September, which in appearance conceded a complete government to Poland, in reality circumscribed it within narrow limits. The Regency Council in the discharge of its most important functions is subject to the control of the occupying Powers, and cannot appoint a premier without their consent. The power of the Polish Premier and Cabinet is

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limited mainly to the non-political branches of administration. They have no control over military matters and are explicitly forbidden to enter into diplomatic relations with other States. Indeed, the Germans endeavour to cut off the Polish Government from a normal intercourse even with the Poles themselves. They have vetoed beforehand the idea of convoking a Polish Diet whilst the war lasts. And the Council of State, however constituted, cannot replace a popular assembly.

Yet as peace draws nearer in Eastern Europe, the need of building up a Polish Government and administration, even though within such narrow limits, becomes every day more obvious and more urgent. The Belgian administration can be reconstituted immediately its country is evacuated by the enemy; the war has not destroyed its frame-work. But there was no Polish Government or administration before the war, and unless it is created now, the void will have to be filled somehow in the meantime, otherwise German and Austrian rule in Poland would probably obtain a new lease of life.

Again the question of the Polish Army now assumes a new aspect. In view of the anarchy in Russia, which is not likely to disappear immediately on the conclusion of peace, Poland will need a force to guard its eastern frontier. The propertied classes will need it also for "domestic purposes"—the Polish workmen and soldiers are taking a very prominent part in the Russian Bolševik movement, and when they come home they are certain to try to settle accounts with their own masters. Unless the Polish upper classes have by then an army of their own—how long that army will continue to do their work is another question—they will have to beg the occupying Powers not to withdraw their troops.

Lastly, whatever view one may take of the discussions between the Central Powers and the Bolševik Government, it is clearly essential that someone should represent Polish interests at these negotiations which, more than any other, may determine the future of Poland. At such a time Polish national policy cannot remain in abeyance, but it is from Warsaw alone that it can be conducted.

Attempts made in Western Europe to discredit the new Polish Government as "German-made" and the men in it as "pro-Germans" play straight into the hands of the Germans. An artificial barrier is raised between the Western Powers and the new Polish Government. Certain Polish politicians abroad

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have a personal interest in reviling a government of which they themselves do not form part, and their influence may make effective the German-made prohibition of diplomatic intercourse between Poland and the Western Powers.

The Polish Government has arisen in circumstances which certainly were not of its own choosing, and it tries to conduct its work under conditions which may be described as well-nigh intolerable. And yet the work which it has undertaken must be done, and the entire Polish nation wants to see it done. For after all there is such a thing as a common Polish national interest—otherwise all the Polish members in the Vienna Parliament could not have united in one club on a common platform. It would mark the greatest advance for the Czech or Yugoslav national cause if Austria-Hungary allowed a committee of Czech or Yugoslav members to assume the direction of their own affairs, and it would then matter little which deputies were chosen. They might be selected by lot or by the alphabet—on problems concerning their national existence all would act alike. Similarly the average Polish statesman in Warsaw is fit to represent the common Polish interest and no one has the right to call their Government “German-made” merely because it has to conduct its work under German-made conditions, *i.e.*, in a continuous struggle against German interference.

If the issue in Poland was as simple for the Germans as it is in Belgium they would never have made any concessions to the Poles. Concessions are the effect of difficulties encountered which would not exist if the Poles stood alone face to face with the Germans. They are international in their nature, and arise from Germany's present and future relations to Russia and to Austria. It is obviously to the Polish interest to try to profit from Germany's difficulties. Nor do such attempts run counter to Entente interests, for now that German claims are the only remaining obstacle to Poland's reunion and independence, every arrangement between Germany and Poland is merely a diplomatic truce, which cannot become a real alliance unless a common interest is created. No such common interest can arise within the boundaries of ethnic Poland. Only aggressive Polish claims against her neighbours, the Lithuanians, White Russians or Ukrainians can create such a common “cause.” Such claims cannot be effectively supported by anyone except the Central Powers; if realised, they would inevitably place the Poles in a position of permanent hostility to their

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eastern neighbours; and whether the latter form part of a Russian Federal Republic, or are independent, the Poles would then stand in need of Teutonic support against them. Claims of that kind have been raised by the Poles, but nowhere and never in a more cynical form than by the Polish National Democrats in Western Europe, and by discredited pro-Germans such as Count Ronikier (until recently himself a National Democrat) and Lempicki in Berlin. These pro-Germans now play towards the Central Powers the same part of interested suitors which the National Democrats once played towards the Russian *ancien régime*.

It is high time to speak out clearly about these matters. There can be for us no enemies among the Poles as long as they pursue their own legitimate national ideals, by whatever means they choose—by fighting the Germans with arms, or in negotiations, where armed resistance is impossible. But we cannot consider a Pole a friend who hatches schemes of aggression against a weaker neighbouring nation, for such schemes threaten destruction to the true liberty of all of them alike, including the Poles themselves, and can redound exclusively to the benefit of German Imperialism. A well-known Polish leader is alleged to have sent from Western Europe to his friends in Poland a report containing the following phrase: "The attitude of the Entente towards the Polish question is not determined by catchwords about 'the freedom' or 'the rights of nations,' &c., but by their State egotisms, by the interests of the different States within the Entente and of the Entente as a whole." If this was really his message, we give him the lie. The "freedom" and "rights of nations" are not catchwords to the British nation, and he who relies upon men to whom they are is building on sand. This is the message which we would like to send to all the Poles in Warsaw.

Who are the men in the first Polish Government? The Regency Council consists of three members, Prince Z. Lubomirski, Archbishop Kakowski and Count J. Ostrowski. Prince Lubomirski, one of the main leaders of the Warsaw aristocracy, did not actively enter politics until about 1909. A Conservative by birth and social position, and hence opposed to all revolutionary movements, he naturally has always favoured compromise with whatever powers there were, but with a dignified reserve. When on the evacuation of Warsaw in the summer of 1915 the camp followers of the

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Russian bureaucracy withdrew from Poland he remained, and, as President of the city of Warsaw, used the authority of his social position to defend the population against German misrule and exploitation. Archbishop Kakowski has been made a member of the Regency Council, not for personal reasons, but as the head of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Poland. He is a reactionary and a time-server. The third member of the triumvirate, Count Ostrowski, is one of the most prominent Conservative Polish statesmen. He was, from 1906 to 1910, a member of the Russian Council of the Empire, and from 1907 the Chairman of the Polish Club in that Council. He enjoys the respect of his political opponents.

The first and most important task of the Regency Council was to choose a Premier. The obvious candidate for that post, in a Conservative Polish Government which is to conduct Polish affairs at a time when international affairs are paramount, was Count Adam Tarnowski, one of the ablest diplomats in Europe. He learned his trade in the Austro-Hungarian service; he was their Minister at Sofia during the Balkan Wars, and on the recall of Dumba was appointed Ambassador to Washington. The part played by him in Bulgaria can hardly be called creditable—he acted there as the diplomat who thinks it unprofessional to consider the welfare and liberty of nations by which he is not employed. Together with King Ferdinand, Count Tarnowski bears the responsibility for the break-up of the Balkan League and for the Second Balkan War. Yet from his past one can hardly draw direct conclusions about the part which he is likely to play in Poland. He will now, no doubt, act as an Austrophil, because he is a Conservative and a Roman Catholic—Eastern Europe at present resembles Monte Carlo in that one must play either *rouge* or *noir*, or put one's money on the zero. But Adam Tarnowski is not a servant of the Austrian Government; he is a feudal aristocrat to whom it must have seemed natural to participate somewhere in governing the world, and who would claim, with regard to that inferior world, the exterritoriality of princes. Once there is a Poland, Count Tarnowski resumes the place of a Polish aristocrat whose family has a tradition of power and public service extending over many centuries. Austria favoured his candidature for the Premiership; Germany met it with an unbending veto. He was too clever for them, too well versed in European

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politics, and knowing too well the art of wire-pulling at the Vienna Court. But although for the time being excluded by the German veto from office in Poland, Count Tarnowski is certain to play a considerable part, even in the immediate future, as "the power behind the Throne."

When in spite of repeated demands on the part of the Regency Council, Count Tarnowski's candidature was refused by the Germans, Mr. Jan Kucharzewski was nominated by them and accepted by the Central Powers. He belonged, until 1907, to the National Democrat party, but left it when it entered into an understanding with the Russian reactionaries. He stood for the Duma in 1912, but was defeated by a Social Democrat. On the whole, he was hitherto better known as a historian than as a politician. Neither in ability nor political experience can he compete with Count Tarnowski. But he is a man of undoubted honesty, and represents the liberal-minded Polish gentry and Intelligentsia. The future alone can prove whether in executive ability, in strength and constructive statesmanship, he is equal to his task.

The Cabinet which he has formed seems to bode well for the future. Its most striking feature is the exclusion of professional politicians and the inclusion of real experts without regard to their previous party affiliations. Although the Polish Premier is personally hostile to the National Democrat leaders in Western Europe, his Cabinet includes two prominent members of that party; one of them, Mr. Stecki, a late member of the Duma, was until lately the chief leader of the National Democrats in the Austrian sphere of occupation.

The new Polish Government is certain to do as well as any one can from among those Poles who are not prepared to cross the Rubicon and to unite their national cause with the only force which, as things stand now, is capable of securing true national liberty throughout Eastern Europe—the social revolution.

The Bessarabian Question

THE Russian province or "government" of Bessarabia covers an area of about 17,620 square miles—a little more than Denmark or Switzerland, and a little less than Serbia. Its boundaries are clearly defined: on the N. and N.E. the river

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Dnjestr separates it from the governments of Podolia and Herson; on the S.E. it reaches the Black Sea; its western and southern frontiers are formed by the Prut and the Danube, into which it flows at Reni. Only at its N.W. corner, where the Dnjestr and Prut approach each other, is its frontier less clearly defined. But for all its compact shape Bessarabia is far from homogeneous. Physically, racially and historically it is divided into two parts with little resemblance to one another. Fully three-quarters of it—on the E. as far S. as Bender, on the W. almost to Cahul—is fertile; wooded, hilly, resembling the neighbouring country of Moldavia, to which a common race and common history also assign it. The southern departments of Akkerman, Ismail and part of Cahul are of a different character. Though watered by numerous rivers which, unlike those of Northern Bessarabia (which flow E. and W. into the Dnjestr and Prut), find their way down to the lagoons of the Black Sea coast, it remains an arid plateau, scorched by the burning summer heat against which nature has given it no protection. Its natural affinities are not with Northern Bessarabia, but with the adjoining Herson government. Unlike Northern Bessarabia, where (except in the department of Hotin) the population is overwhelmingly Roumanian by race and speech, this Southern region to which the Roumanians have given the name of Bugeacul—from the Turkish word *bujak*, “an out-of-the-way corner”—is populated by a medley of all the various races which the great waves of migration have brought into southern Russia and the Balkans. In modern times, again, it has been colonised for political purposes by Germans, Bulgars, and Turks.

The political history of Bessarabia has been equally variable. The name itself is a historical survival like the title “Sodor and Man.” For it comes from the dynasty of the Basarabs who, in the 13th and 14th centuries, established the first Wallachian principality. South-Eastern Bessarabia formed part of their dominions for about a century till the death of Mircea the Old (1418). In fact, for centuries it had been connected with Wallachia rather than Moldavia. Its coasts were known and colonised by the ancient Greeks and medieval Pisans. The Roman Emperors Trajan and Constantine included it within their sphere of influence, while Moldavia and Northern Bessarabia alike remained untouched. The powerful Moldavian prince Stephen the Great (1457–

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1504) first secured a strong hold on Bessarabia. But before his death the Turks had taken from him its two chief ports, Chilia and Cetatea-Albă (which they translated literally " Akkerman "). Suleiman the Magnificent formed two *Sanjaks*—Akkerman and Ismail—out of the conquered territory: and to secure it as a *Mark* against Moldavia and the Cossacks the Sultans of the 16th century encouraged the marauding bands of Tatars from Southern Russia to take up their abode there. By 1603 they were in full possession of the *Bujak*. The first step in the de-Roumanisation of the country had been taken. Bessarabia, in fact, remained part of the Moldavian principality, but over this southern part of it the Moldavian princes had little control. Tatars, Turks, Cossacks, Poles, later on Russians, invaded it in succession. In the 18th century Russian armies repeatedly conquered and then lost again various Bessarabian fortresses in their wars with the Turks. Finally, in 1806, the armies of Tsar Alexander I. occupied the whole of Bessarabia, and six years later the Treaty of Bucharest handed over this integral part of the Moldavian principality to the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Paris in 1856 forced Alexander II. to cede to Moldavia part of the *Bujak*—Cahul, Bolgrad, and Ismail—a totally inadequate act of justice since the *Bujak* is the poorest and least Roumanian part of Bessarabia. Moreover, since 1812, the Tsars had flooded it with German colonists, and though the Tatars had disappeared, Bulgarian political exiles and Russian religious refugees had taken their place. History even more than climate has severed the *Bujak* from Roumania. In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin again deprived Roumania of its recently restored territory, and Alexander II. offered the Dobrudja as compensation. In spite of strong protests, the Roumanians were forced to bow to the inevitable.

The " theft " of Bessarabia left an indelible mark on the minds of the Roumanian people. Good relations with Russia were poisoned for the rest of the century and Roumania's forced entry into alliance with the Central Powers widened the breach. Russian administration of the conquered province accentuated the bitterness. The Roumanian language was excluded from official use and from the churches and schools. The Russian *Činovnik* (petty official) was ubiquitous and all-powerful. Any assertion of " Moldavian " racial feeling was punished by repression and banishment. Thus there

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grew up in Roumania a circle of Russophobe exiles who could plead their outrageous ill-treatment as justification for an anti-Russian and consequently pro-German policy. Fortunately the incompetence and stupidity of the Tsarist *régime* saved Bessarabia from full denationalisation. The Moldavian boyars, indeed, fell easily under the spell of Russification. But the lack of primary schools saved the peasants—the bulk of the Rouman population—from a similar fate. No such active dangers threatened the Roumans of Bessarabia as their kinsmen in Hungary. But as against this must be set the fact that the lack of opportunities for progress and the deadening atmosphere of a reactionary government induced an apathy which was sapping the character of the people. In their homes, however, the peasants clung tenaciously to their "Moldavian" language and customs and their humble circumstances saved them from the suspicious interference of the Tsarist administration.

At the outbreak of the Great War Bessarabian exiles in Roumania like Professor Stere and their supporters—whether honest Russophobes like Mr. Carp or German propagandists—seized the opportunity to advocate war against Russia for the liberation of Bessarabia. Such was the daily theme of the new paper *Moldova*, founded by Carp early in 1915. Such was the doctrine preached by Mr. Marghiloman and his press. In Bessarabia itself there seems to have been little echo of these propagandist preachings, though the Russian Government from its inveterate habit of suspicion hastened to suppress the few odd papers allowed since 1905 to appear in Roumanian (in Cyrillic script) in the province. Roumania's intervention on 27 August, 1916, definitely shelved the question. Faced with a choice between Transylvania and the Banat (on one hand) and Bessarabia (on the other) no Roumanian in his senses could hesitate: the former was larger, richer and far more truly Roumanian than the latter. The need of the Hungarian Roumans was far more urgent and the opportunity of fighting side by side with the democratic Powers of Western Europe a unique one. The Bessarabian question could be settled later; it was postponed, but it was not forgotten.

The outbreak of the Russian Revolution introduced a new atmosphere. "Self-determination" must be the right of the Bessarabians as of all other nationalities of the Empire. By the end of May they had succeeded in following the example

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of the Ukraine and set up a "National Moldavian Committee." Their demands comprised political and ecclesiastical autonomy for the province; the free use of the "Moldavian" (Roumanian) language; a fairer distribution of land among the peasants; the prohibition of foreign colonisation of Bessarabia; the expenditure in the province itself of revenue raised there; and the concentration in one military unit, for service in the province, of all Bessarabian recruits. Other nationalities were promised reciprocal rights in Bessarabia to those granted to Bessarabians outside (for the Roumanian population is strongly represented in Herson and Podolia). The whole programme was eminently sane and moderate.

No demand was made for separation from Russia or union with Roumania. The Revolution had seemed to make of Russia a very desirable home for all nationalities. Roumania had not then—as she did two months later—voted far-reaching political and agricultural reforms. But their very restraint probably accounts for the suspicion with which the Ukrainian Rada at first regarded the movement. The Ukrainians dreaded the creation in their rear of a pro-Muscovite enclave and accordingly responded to Bessarabian overtures early in August by proclaiming the whole province part of the future Ukrainian autonomous state. Protests were at once made by the Bessarabian leaders despatched to Kiev. Their explanations as to their future orientation were obviously satisfactory, for on 8 August the Rada decided to exclude Bessarabia from its future jurisdiction. Since then relations between the two autonomous states have been most amicable. Sane Ukrainian claims on Bessarabian territory are limited to parts of Hotin. The settlement of this question presents no insuperable difficulty. The principle of reciprocal treatment must be applied to the Ukrainian populations of E. and S. Bessarabia and the Rouman populations of Podolia and Herson. Such minor matters must not, and will not, be allowed to prejudice the future relations of two neighbouring and mutually-interested peoples.

Meanwhile the Bessarabian movement has done much for this hitherto suppressed nationality. Roumanian schools are to be opened in the villages, with instruction in the mother-tongue. Primary instruction is to be compulsory and free, and chairs of Roumanian language and history are to be founded at the Universities of Kiev and Odessa. By the end

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of August 350 out of 418 candidates had succeeded in passing a test examination in Roumanian language and history. Roumanian papers in Latin script had begun to appear, chief among them the *Cuvânt Moldovenesc* ("Moldavian Word") in Chişinău (Kişiniov). Bessarabian delegates were welcomed at the Nationalities Conference at Kiev and the Ecclesiastical Congress at Moscow. The new national movement is, in fact, in full swing.

The Bessarabians are prepared to defend their newly-won liberties. The Committee issued a proclamation to its fellow-countrymen, calling on them to fight to the death against any invader of Bessarabia. General Ščerbačev has from the first treated them with consideration, and at once acceded to their request that they might form a reserve regiment of 40,000 men under their own officers. All we know of the Bessarabian movement hitherto points to courage and moderation as the characteristics of its leaders.

There remains the question of Bessarabia's relations with her neighbours—the Ukraine and Roumania. The first is chiefly a racial, the second a political, question. The Ukrainian Central Rada has now frankly admitted the right of Bessarabia to "self-determination." Its organ, the *Nova Rada* (18 November) counsels an alliance and friendly co-operation between the two peoples. It is realised that the majority of the Bessarabian population is "Moldavian." Recent exact statistics are lacking. In 1891 Russian statistical returns gave 1,089,995 "Moldavians," and 223,251 Ukrainians in a total population of 1,641,559. In 1913 the population was estimated at 2,588,400. (A Roumanian estimate in 1916 puts it at about 3 millions—2 million Roumans, 210,000 Ukrainians, 270,000 Jews). Presuming that the Roumans and Ukrainians had maintained their proportions of 66 per cent. and 13·6, this would give them a population of 1,725,600 and 349,380 respectively. Jews, Bulgars, Germans and Russians come next in order, forming respectively about 9, 5, 2½ and 2 per cent. of the population—the last three mainly in the Bujak, the Jews chiefly in Kişiniov and other towns. Only in the department of Hotin are the Ukrainians in a clear majority. The conflicting claims of Ukrainians and Roumans in Hotin and Bukovina must be settled by an amicable compromise. For Ukrainians left under Bessarabian jurisdiction the same rights will certainly

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be guaranteed as for the large Rouman minorities in Podolia and Herson.

As for Bessarabia's relations with the Roumanian mother-country, there can be no doubt that they must become closer and closer. If Roumania—as every lover of justice and lasting peace must desire—succeeds in securing the liberation and union, should they (as they undoubtedly will) desire it, of the Roumanian populations of Austria-Hungary with the kingdom; if, again, the Roumanian Government as soon as opportunity offers hastens to carry out without reservation the full programme of electoral and agrarian reform demanded by the overwhelming majority of the nation—of which programme Parliament has already voted a substantial part: *then* there can be little doubt, perhaps *no* doubt, that Bessarabia will claim admission to and union with the new great Roumanian Commonwealth in which she can play an honoured and important rôle. Between this new Roumania stretching from the Danube to the Dnjestr and the future Russian Federal Commonwealth Bessarabia can act as the link enabling countries that have in the past failed to realise themselves or understand one another to co-operate at last in the progress of mankind.

BELISARIUS.

A Swiss View of Peace Terms

[*The New Swiss Society, which we welcomed last summer* (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 44), *has published in its Bulletin, No. 24, an account of a debate on war aims held by the Geneva branch, which contains pertinent material for any discussion of terms of peace.*]

Switzerland's interests demands that the future peace shall not establish in Europe the hegemony of one nation.

“None of the contemporary nations can claim to be best and foremost of all, and in consequence of this to control the others in a moral and material sense. All tyranny seems to us unbearable, especially in international matters. Europe must be a society of nations where each shall be mistress of her own development. There is no such thing as the right of an almighty power to impose its will upon the masses. Imagine for a moment one of the present belligerents triumphing so completely over its adversary as to be able to impose its own law, mind and habits. It would not be long before we ourselves—standing as we do outside the conflict—would fall victim to such a conqueror. . . . The interests of Switzerland—a small country among large neighbours—demand that the Great Powers balance each other so that no one of them can impose its will upon the others. This balance is our security. We are nothing when confronted with a Louis XIV.,

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a Napoleon, or an almighty William II., but we count for something among States balancing each other. In the present state of the world this equilibrium of power is as indispensable to us as the air we breathe. An hegemony of whatever sort, while destroying Europe, would also threaten us from within. Switzerland is a heterogeneous state, requiring a balance of strength within. Her internal structure resembles closely to Europe itself. If Germany were victorious the percussion would be felt inside our borders. The corresponding element with us would want to exercise the same hegemony. That would immediately be the signal for a revolt—quite legitimately—by the other elements, and *vice versa*. Our national life is based on mutual agreement, the disturbance of which creates widespread uneasiness. Much bitter feeling has arisen during these last two years from the conviction in the French-speaking part of Switzerland that the German-speaking part wanted to lead us 'whither we would not.' Nearly always this conviction was wrong, but the rapidity with which it grew in the mind of the people is nevertheless astonishing."

Switzerland's interests demand that the independence of small States shall again be held inviolate.

"Here we deny the theory that civilisation is the work of large States: for civilisation owes as much to the Jewish and Greek peoples, to the Flemish communities, the Italian republics, the Swiss Cantons and the small German States as to any of the great Empires. An English writer remarked: 'No one need point out to me what civilisation owes to Athens, Florence, Geneva or Weimar.' It is a fallacy to think that civilisation is merely a question of volume and numbers. The 'grandeur d'esprit' does not necessarily manifest itself in the colossal but rather in wise moderation. The small States cannot be held to have concluded their mission: they strike their own particular note, giving a diversity of soul and culture which the world can ill afford to lose. Those of the west of Europe—Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark—march at the head of progressive nations. Those of the east of Europe—Serbia and Poland (if indeed Poland may be described as a small State)—only require liberty and independence in order to show their worth. Moreover, as these small States are devoid of imperialistic aims, they contribute to the general stability in the world. They enlarge the realm of peace, and, like an area of calm, they interpose themselves between rival and aggressive Powers. It was through the great Powers that the present war came upon the world. Instead of diminishing the number of small States in the future Europe it would be more befitting to increase them. It might be urged that Switzerland, herself a small State, has nothing to fear from the future rearrangement following peace. Our reply is that there is a *solidarité morale* among small States, just as we are told that there exists a feeling of solidarity among monarchs. If their number is reduced, Switzerland becomes an anachronism, an exception, and later on an anomaly in danger of its existence. When Belgium was invaded several German theorists, to justify this invasion, subjected the small States to general criticism and advocated

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their suppression. They struck Switzerland in her vitals. It is for this reason that we, in our national interest, demand the restoration of Belgium, in her entire integrity and that Germany shall furnish reparation and guarantees."

Switzerland's interests demand that the future peace shall re-establish the sanctity of treaties.

"The present war commenced with a glaring violation of a treaty; and other violations have followed. If the coming peace condones them, it will rob us of our security, abolish our rôle, and take away our moral weight in the world. . . . Switzerland owes its origin to no prince. Its origin cannot be traced back to the territorial ambitions of a reigning House as in France or Prussia. It does not constitute a geographic necessity like England or Spain. Its origin is an agreement. Three peoples wishing to support one another entered into a solemn pact to live together. From this noble and fruitful idea the Swiss Confederation sprang. In Switzerland large and small cantons live side by side, and the rôle of each is not allocated according to its relative strength. The law that forms the basis of their association is the same for all. The majority abstains (or should abstain) from tyrannising the minority; and the underlying idea is the mutual agreement which demands that it shall be scrupulously respected by all the parties. What it is possible to do within, should also be possible of accomplishment without. We hope for the coming of a Europe, where all the nations will form one corporate body. We have taken the initiative in order to bring about international agreements, we have among us the seat of different international bureaux. Switzerland may claim the credit for whatever intercourse there still exists between the different warring nations. We mean to remain true to this principle of mutual agreement where, notwithstanding the unequal importance of the contracting parties, all are treated on the same level. Our national interests demand that after the war violated right shall be restored to its former position, and there it shall reign supreme."

Switzerland's interests demand that the future peace be favourable to Democracy.

"It is indisputable that through the war the attitude of Europe towards the democratic principle has undergone a marked change. In habits and institutions a rapid evolution is taking place. With all the nations the war has called forth a stronger assertion of democratic sentiment which is the life-blood of Swiss institutions. It is a treasure in which every Swiss shares. Democracy re-unites us in one national inspiration. Its defects are numerous, but when called upon to defend it we must remember that without it there would be no Switzerland. To remain faithful to our country we must pray that the future peace will not constitute a triumph for militarism in any shape or form and that it will not mean a charter for autocracy. An armed autocracy is a danger for our existence and to our ideals; it would be contrary to our wish for an equilibrium of power, contrary also to the liberty of small nations and the respect for treaties."

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Switzerland's interests are opposed to a peace establishing the theoretical and absolute principle of nationality.

"On this point we see how sometimes the Swiss are blinded by influences from without. Switzerland, as M. Huber said at a meeting of the New Swiss Society, places herself above the principle of nationalities. She comprises within the same frontier and under the same ideal elements of different ethnical qualities. As we have shown, the basis is an agreement, its mainspring the aspiration to liberty and democracy. Those that share in this agreement and in this aspiration are men who under the strict principle of nationality would be forced to attach themselves to other States. We have no interest in the partition of States according to racial considerations. Such a classification, even if we were to escape it for a time, could not fail in the long run to bring us within its scope. It would act as a ferment for dissolution. Let us remember that the future peace will come by negotiation. What a chance for those who, wishing to recoup themselves or desiring of indemnifying others, could use us as pawns, under the cloak of a principle seemingly ideal? On behalf of Switzerland's interests we say that what constitutes a State is the free will of its citizens to constitute it independently of language, religion or the shape of the skull. To combat the absolute application of principle of nationalities appears to us as an elementary duty.

"There are reasons of a higher order to justify this duty. We believe the mere existence of Switzerland to be of moral value. She escapes the principles of nationalities because she attempts to constitute a truly human society. She does not surround herself with some narrow formula. She draws her force from the free will, the liberty of choice and agreement of the people. She endeavours to break with old fatalities, harbingers of violence and hate, in order to build up mutual understanding, tolerance, and friendships. In contesting the principle of nationalities we are not only protecting our State of to-day. We re-affirm its legitimacy and its perennial character. We are, perhaps, helping to prepare a better future; for Switzerland sends this message to the world: 'I am born not to hate, but to love.' *Our interests demand that the future image of Europe shall be like that of our country.*"

Review

Selections from the Correspondence of the first Lord Acton. Vol. I. (Longmans, 1917.) 15s. This book is full of interesting evidence of the strength and depth of the friendship which existed between Lord Acton and Mr. Gladstone—two minds that worked very differently. But though it also proves what to students of Acton is no novelty, that the writer of these Letters was the most catholic of Catholics, it is none the less surprising that Acton, who was intellectual sincerity incarnate, should have found companionship in the too-often Jesuitical mind of the great Liberal leader. The hundred pages devoted to the Gladstone-Acton Correspondence in this volume cover a great variety

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of subjects, many of which lie outside the scope of THE NEW EUROPE. Writing in 1888 he tells his correspondent that "the Grand Duke of Baden assures me that his cousin Prince William (the present Kaiser) is not at all the fire-eater we are told, but a studious, thoughtful young man." And the same letter declares that "there could be (for Austria) no effective league with Germany unless it assured either defence against Russia or expansion towards the Ægean." Elsewhere in these letters there will be found ample evidence of Acton's keen appreciation of the meaning of contemporary movements in Europe, and his foreknowledge of some of those stupendous events which are the commonplaces of to-day. Acton foresaw much of German development, both in commerce and politics, and there are passages in his lectures which should be read and re-read in the light of recent history. He was a man of European mind, at home in several languages, and scientifically devoted to the pursuit of historic truth. His editors truly say that "these letters afford evidence of the mingling in Acton of political and religious interests with those of the enthusiastic scholar, and with a certain *flair* for getting to know about people." They also reveal the guiding thought of Acton's career—"the idea that freedom is an absolute end for all men."

A. F. W.

Signor Orlando on the Peace Negotiations

In the Senate on 31 December the Italian Premier spoke as follows on the subject of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations:—"I think it is time to foil the manœuvre by which the Central Empires are exploiting a means of keeping up the spirit of their peoples and of depressing and corrupting the spirit of their adversaries, by appearing as defenders of peace and making out that the attitude of the Entente prevents peace. The Entente wants peace; it is only the Entente that wants it, for it wants it in the only possible form, namely, a just, honourable, lasting peace by means of clear and loyal agreements. The Central Empires are employing a strange form to ask the Entente to intervene in the relations between them and a Government not recognised by the Entente, for it is only a Government *de facto* until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, and it is not recognised by large parts of Russia." As regards the substance of the peace proposals, Signor Orlando said: "The Bolševik Commissioner felt himself justified in saying that two points—namely, (1) the integration of states which have lost their independence owing to the war, and (2) withdrawal from invaded territory and renunciation of annexations—have been accepted. We shall see that he is wrong. But it is certain that the third point, regarding the *régime* of people in subjection to states to which their national conscience does not wish to show allegiance, was not accepted by the Austrians and Germans, who replied that questions such as those of our national aspirations and of Alsace-Lorraine ought not to be treated from the international point of view, but from the interior point of view as regards each country. That is vicious word trickery. It would have been more simple to answer frankly, 'No!' That means a return to the *status quo* which would be the gravest historical

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crime, as so vast an upheaval of humanity cannot be conceived as not having grave consequences."

A New International "Problem"

The Peace Conference will have many outstanding problems of international delimitations to settle at the end of the war. Sir Thomas Holdich, in the *Morning Post* of 27 December, proposes to add still another. Under the heading "The Future of Greece," he seeks to provide a basis for a satisfactory "settlement" between Serbia and Greece. His main motive in writing, he says, is that "it is very important to the interests of Britain's communications with the East *viâ* the Suez Canal that friendly relations should be maintained with Greece." As he also wishes Serbia to have a port on the Ægean, he proposes to combine these two objects by the following strange scheme:—Salonica and "the whole Macedonian province" should be given to Serbia, and Greece should be compensated by Adrianople. In a letter to the *Morning Post* of 3 January Dr. R. M. Burrows makes this comment: "Sir Thomas says that it is difficult 'to meet the rival aspirations of Greece and Serbia.' The delightful and (to a student of Balkan politics) amazing feature of the situation is that Greece and Serbia have at present no rival aspirations. For heaven's sake, do not let us create them! Our one present asset in the Balkans is that in Greece, Roumania, and Serbia we have a friendly *bloc*. Our hope for the future is that if Bulgaria repents and is willing to give up her Prussian dreams of hegemony, she may some day be admitted into the *bloc* on equal terms. To bar Bulgaria from *both* Macedonia *and* Adrianople, and incidentally to estrange Greece from Serbia would sow the seeds, not of a Balkan Confederation, but of new Balkan wars." Incidentally it is safer for all concerned to approach Greek and Serbian questions from the Greek and Serbian point of view rather than from the point of view of British interests in the Suez Canal.

German Sayings: (I) Bismarck and Democracy

"In thirty or forty years our grandchildren will be taught very different things in school about Bismarck from what we learnt in our time. If Germany has once become more liberal and happily forced its way through the thick atmosphere of reaction which set in about the year 1880, then people will once more be able to say: Write and learn that the German people in the nineteenth century wanted two things, unity and freedom, and that Bismarck gave them unity, but destroyed freedom. In order to describe Bismarck's struggle against democracy and liberalism, we should need to have democratic historians, with the official archives placed at their disposal. It would be an interesting book, the work in which it was shown by documentary evidence how Bismarck uprooted the democratic idea in Germany—that Bismarck to whom the word 'progressive' was always a term of abuse."—LOTHAR ENGELBERT SCHÜCKING, "Demokratische Betrachtungen," 1917.

The Polish Problem in its bearing upon Austria

“ The detachment of Galicia from Austria is not possible until the internal political conditions of Austria have been radically revised in a manner just to all parties.”—*Zeit*, 8 November, 1917.

[On 5 November the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, visited Berlin in connection with a Crown Council convoked there by the German Emperor. It has been admitted that the main subject of discussion was the Polish question, and it was very widely believed that the project favoured in all the highest quarters took the following form :—(1) that the Emperor Charles should be proclaimed King of Poland ; (2) that Austria should cede Galicia to the new Poland, which would then form a new State within the Habsburg Monarchy, on an equal footing with Austria and Hungary ; and (3) that Lithuania and Courland should be linked up in a similar manner with Germany, each with a special autonomous position. This rumoured agreement caused a profound sensation in Berlin, where it was widely regarded as a direct challenge to the Reichstag, and also as calculated to raise the question of control of foreign policy in a specially acute form. In Austria the alarm and excitement was even greater, and at once found open expression in parliamentary circles. The effect of any such arrangement upon the internal political situation in Austria, upon German-Magyar relations, upon the prospects of the other Slav nationalities realising their dreams of national unity, and in particular upon the fate of the Ukrainian or Ruthene population of East Galicia, would be great and almost incalculable. It was also felt that it would radically affect the whole future of Austro-Russian relations, and create, in the obvious interests of Berlin, a barrier to direct intercourse between Vienna and Petrograd. Anxiety was heightened by the fact that simultaneously proposals of a very secret nature were under discussion, vitally affecting Italy, the Jugoslavs, and even the Austrian Germans, and calculated to assure to Germany her long-coveted access to the Adriatic.

The debate of 9 November in the Austrian Parliament, to which the whole incident gave rise, is certainly one of the most remarkable since parliamentary life was restored, and deserves the special attention of our readers. The general problems and policy raised will be dealt with in subsequent articles.]

A whole series of urgent interpellations were introduced in the Reichsrat on 9 November by the Ukrainians, who protested against the proposed “ enslavement of 3½ million Ukrainians ” as “ an insult

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to the constitutional rights of all nationalities"; by the Southern Slavs, who expressed "the greatest consternation" at the idea of solving the Polish question without simultaneously dealing with the Jugoslav, Bohemian and Ukrainian questions, and thus placing the Slavs in a permanent minority in Parliament; by the Czechs, who denounced the plan as a defiance of all democratic and constitutional principles by the diplomats, and as calculated to destroy all hope of peace; by the Ukrainian Socialists, who emphasised their nation's desire to form "an independent national unitary state formed out of parts of Austria-Hungary, Volhynia, Cholm and the present Russian Ukraine"; and by the Bukovinian Roumanians, who were alarmed at the prospect of being suspended in mid-air in the event of Austria ceding Galicia to Poland.

Most interesting of all was the interpellation of the German Socialists, who treated the intention of uniting Poland with Austria-Hungary, and Courland and Lithuania with Prussia, as bound to antagonise the Entente, and assumed Germany's consent to the former to be contingent on Austria's consent to the latter. "The realisation of this plan involves the overthrow of the rival coalition," and hence a great prolongation of the war for purely dynastic reasons, such as "would not permit of Austrian policy being determined by Austria's own needs." The new *régime* would mean leaving Austrian parliamentarism "in a state of swoon." "In a conglomerate state such as Count Czernin wants to create, real democracy is impossible." "For Germany and the German nation's whole position in Europe this plan is also dangerous. If Germany cuts off Russia's access to the ice-free sea, the enmity between Germany and Russia will be perpetuated. At the same time the friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary is endangered, for our foreign policy will be partly decided by Polish interests, which are irreconcilable with Prussian interests." It also means that the Central Powers turn against democracy, impose a monarchical constitution upon Poles, Letts and Lithuanians, and subject the Ukrainians to a foreign yoke. "The whole policy of the Central Powers will be turned against democratic Russia, the Russian Revolution endangered, and the danger of a counter-revolution conjured up, such as would bring into power a nationalist Bonapartism, eager for military glory. We wish the Polish people independence."

Mr. Petruszewicz, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Club, spoke as follows: "No Austrian people has had to put up with so much even before the war as the Ukrainians. Ever since the first constitutional era they were excluded from the most primitive civil rights, for the most part by imperial decrees regarding the Polish official language and the Polish schools. Their hopes of securing universal suffrage were not fulfilled. In view of the far worse conditions under which their kinsmen outside Austria lived under the yoke of the Tsar, they were grateful to the Austrian State for such few national rights as they had managed to win in long struggles. Then came the war, and the Ukrainian part of Galicia suffered most heavily. The Ukrainians were convinced that, in return for the terrible sacrifices

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which their people had made for Austria in this war, they would at least meet with different treatment afterwards.

"The committee of the Ukraine Club, being seriously alarmed by the first rumours of agreement between Germany and Austria as to a Personal Union with the Kingdom of Poland, visited Count Czernin on 1 November and begged him for explanations. Count Czernin gave us the solemn assurance that until peace came neither the Polish nor the Ukrainian question would or could be decided, because the solution of both questions depended on the results of the peace conference; till then not a single step in the solution of these questions would be made. And then, on the very next day, he went off to Berlin in order to begin the preliminary discussions. Thus the facts are clear. The negotiations regarding a solution of the Polish question have already gone on for months, and it was only when they seemed ripe for decision that the Crown Council was summoned and the question finally decided. We Ukrainians, then, are to be ceded to the Kingdom of Poland. As a reward for our loyalty and superhuman sacrifices, we are to be thrown over, and *our unhappy people is to be delivered up to its hereditary enemy* [i.e., the Poles].

"But we are not altogether without hope. There is one thing which consoles us. *Peace conditions will not be dictated by the Central Powers alone.* At the peace table there will be representatives of other nations, and probably also those of the Ukrainian State. And not only our brothers but also the representatives of those against whom our soldiers are fighting, will protect us against outrage, lest they should share the responsibility before the tribunal of the whole civilised world. . . ."

Father Korošec, President of the Yugoslav Club, condemned the idea of a partition of Poland between Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns as a danger to European peace, and did not oppose in principle the cession "of the Polish part of Galicia." "But to make decisions now and in a one-sided way with regard to conquered Russian Poland would simply mean that Count Czernin and the German Government were throwing overboard a peace by agreement, and postponing to a distant date the possibility of peace. . . . The Poles will realise that any such intention" [as the cession of Galicia to the new Poland] "cannot leave us indifferent. Unless other changes in the Empire were made, *such an act would place the Ukrainians in a minority in the Kingdom of Poland, and the Southern Slavs and Czechs in a minority in the remainder of the Empire.* Bureaucracy in the Crown lands, militarism and Germanisation, would be our fate for ever. We want a solution of the Polish question, but only in connection with a simultaneous solution of the Southern Slav, Ukrainian and Czech questions. *We want the liberation of the Southern Slavs, not merely of Austria, but also of Hungary. Therefore, Dualism, on which the hegemony of two races rests, must fall;* and the peoples who, by blood and language, belong together must be united, and live independent and free from every alien rule."

Mr. Stanek, leader of the Czech Union, attacked the German and Magyar hegemony, which forms the present basis of the Monarchy,

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and declared that, at a time like the present, the Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary have everything to win or to lose. He appealed to the Poles to declare here openly that they recognise the same rights for the Ukrainians. "Do the Poles wish to incur the same blame as we did formerly by leaving the Slovaks in Hungary so long without help? Unfortunately we did not protest much against Dualism in those days, against that unhappy form which the Germans also are now beginning to feel because they get nothing to eat. The Austrian Slavs are in duty bound to hold together, so that the whole public opinion of Austria may recognise that the Slavs with the other non-German peoples possess a majority. A country thrown into confusion by Dualism is incapable of organising its peoples on a constitutional basis. *In Hungary Dualism personifies the idea of national and political barbarism.* Under high patronage an unproductive aristocratic clique is left free to employ all its efforts on Magyarisation. The ill-treatment of the Slovaks in North Hungary, which has been tolerated even in the highest circles, is a warning, in letters of flame, as to how loyalty is treated. In Hungary, by His Majesty's orders, a government was formed to introduce electoral reform; but his orders are being carried out in such a way as to reduce the seven per cent. of non-Magyar mandates to four per cent. Would that be possible if there were people round the Emperor who really informed him as to these disgraceful conditions?" (Loud applause.) (A Czech deputy: "We are going to speak of Hungary here, and don't mean to be prevented.") "You forget that for his Majesty the speeches delivered here will perhaps be confiscated. Anything is possible under present circumstances, especially in Hungary; the Magyars presume to negotiate with our Government and demand a law by which we should perhaps be hanged if we spoke in this House against the integrity of the Magyar State.

"*The Hungary of to-day and its national system is the second greatest cause of the world war and the second greatest obstacle to peace.* (Loud applause.) No peace, no recovery of Europe is conceivable as long as in Vienna and Budapest the Dual System blocks every sensible move on the part of five small and medium nations, and until, on the ruins of the Dual Monarchy, there blossom flourishing national States.

"The Emperor Charles is not responsible for this terrible war; he did not declare it. Nor has he hitherto permitted any breach of the constitution on the part of the Governments, although such were intended. He is popular among the people owing to his democratic views and various actions by which he has lessened the terrors of war. He has also repeatedly declared that the war would not last a moment longer if it depended on him. If the responsible Government thwarts the will of the Emperor as the Hungarian Government has done with regard to electoral reform, this means a further obstacle to peace and a prolongation of war. If peace is to be concluded there must be open and honest discussion as to what is to happen to the peoples of Austria, and how their future is to be shaped. That is not a matter of secret diplomacy, but of representative bodies, who,

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it is true, must be elected differently from the Austrian Parliament, and still more from the Hungarian. You should work with a view to creating such conditions in this country as the representatives of the peoples have demanded in their declarations of 30 May."

The German Social Democrat, Mr. Seitz, spoke in favour of peace "without annexations and indemnities," and expressed deep sympathy with the Russian Revolution. He treated the rumoured arrangement regarding Poland as calculated to help the war agitators and to create grave complications between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and even more between Austria-Hungary and Russia. "What we desire is the independence and full sovereignty of Poland. But we must have a word to say in the matter, and we will not tolerate any one-sided decision according to dynastic interests." As a Socialist he desired freedom and independence not only for the Poles but for every other people in Austria and in Europe.

Mr. Wityk (Ukrainian Socialist) warned the Poles that to present them with Ukrainian territory was a Danaan gift. "The Ukrainian people desires an understanding with the Polish people, but will never go under the yoke of the Polish gentry. It has one hope—the Ukraine." Mr. Isopeskul-Grecul (Roumanian) described the alarm of the Bukovinian Roumanians at the prospect of the cession of Galicia to Poland, since this would vitally affect the relations of their own province to Austria. He protested against the bare idea of their being united to Hungary, and raised objections even to East Galicia being organised as a separate unit.

Mr. Kuranda (Viennese Progressive) criticised the Government's method of dealing with a question which concerns all the Austrian peoples from the Bistritza to the Rhine. "According to the fundamental laws, State-treaties relative to changes of territory—not merely losses of territory—are dependent upon the sanction of both Houses of the Reichsrat. Any change with regard to Galicia would involve a change of imperial representation and of the fundamental laws, and for this a two-thirds majority is necessary." He went on to treat the cession of Galicia as incredible and as calculated to destroy Austrian prestige.

The Premier, Ritter von Seidler, then made a short statement: "To-day the Polish question cannot yet be said to be solved. So long as the preliminary discussions with the German Government have not led to a complete clearing of ideas, it is naturally not possible to say how this question is to be solved. But if, in future, the Kingdom of Poland should seek a *rapprochement* with the Monarchy, then the whole of the complex questions which have to be treated by way of legislation would naturally be reserved for this purpose, and the representatives of the Austrian people would be given an opportunity in good time and without prejudice to express themselves in the matter. I should like further to emphasise that the Polish question, however it may be solved, cannot be an obstacle to peace, since a forcible solution (*Vergewaltigung*) is excluded. The Polish State is to have free choice in its future political orientation." The Premier added a vague assurance that all the nationalities affected by a solution

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of the Polish question would have opportunities for expressing themselves.

Mr. Ravnihar (Slovene) expressed the dissatisfaction of the Southern Slavs. "The Ukrainian question will contain a seed of permanent unrest not only for the Polish State, but also for the world's peace, especially if the Ukrainians in Poland should march with a free Ukrainian republic. If the Southern Slavs had their wish there would be between them and the Poles an offensive and defensive alliance built up on a solid community of interests." But a partial and arbitrary solution was intolerable and would be opposed by Southern Slavs, Czechs, Italians and Roumanians. "It is a step back into the Middle Ages for two dynasties to decide, by a simple act, the fate of this or that nation. This latest proposal is a very skilful move on the part of German diplomacy with a view to throwing the odium upon Austria. The Southern Slavs protest strongly against any such solution of the Polish question as would establish the German hegemony on solid foundations."

Dr. Eugene Lewicki (Ukrainian) protested against this attempt to present the whole world with a *fait accompli* and thus to provoke the Entente Powers. "East Galicia, the real Galicia, is the old Ukrainian land, the heritage of our princes and kings of Halics, and this heritage we shall defend by every means. We are told that the Poles will grant us national autonomy. For fully five centuries the Poles have had an opportunity of showing their brotherly nature. In point of fact we have had an uninterrupted struggle, and this must continue if we come under Poland. The real reason why Poland perished was because the Ukrainian territory was incorporated in the Kingdom."

Mr. Grigorovici (Roumanian Socialist) treated the attitude of the Ukraine in its first months of freedom as a happy proof that the Ukrainians will not attempt to enslave other peoples. He praised the protests of Ukrainian representatives against the idea of incorporating Roumanian Bessarabia in the Ukrainian republic. He finally described the Dual system as a fatal obstacle to any solution of national problems in Austria and Hungary.

Dr. Schoepfer (Christian Socialist) dwelt on the glorious victories in Italy as "a fresh step to speedy peace, for he who will not offer the hand of peace of his own accord must be forced to do so by the superior strength of his opponent. All the more regrettable is it that in this House, instead of patriotism, there should be indifference to a strong Austria. Undoubtedly the events of this war make a new order throughout Europe necessary, and the Monarchy as a conglomerate of different peoples is specially affected. A solution of the national question requires insight and strength. We want freedom to be assured to all the peoples who inhabit the Monarchy, but we also want these peoples to adopt the standards of the State and of the Empire."

Mr. Soukup (Czech Socialist) favoured Polish independence, but as the result of popular agreement, not as a monarch's act of grace. In the solution of national problems no single one can be treated

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separately. "Above all, the Czech question must be solved. It is not to be supposed that the Czech people, which has made such huge sacrifices in blood and property, can be pushed on one side, and that an independent Czech State is something which cannot be set up! Nor can one imagine that the Czech people will recognise the Magyar frontiers for all time."

Dr. Glombinski (Pan-Pole), speaking in the name of the Polish Club, reaffirmed the Polish declaration of 28 May, according to which the fate of Poland could not be settled without the knowledge of its representatives, but in which full reliance upon the Emperor's capacity to produce a happy solution was expressed. "We had no reason to doubt that all qualified factors, especially the Austrian Parliament, and notably its Slav and Progressive parties, who have always condemned the partitions of Poland as fatal international crimes, would make a point of unreservedly supporting our aims in order to atone for the injustice done to the whole Polish nation, and to secure for Europe and mankind the conditions of a permanent peace. We concede to every people freedom and self-determination, but we have the right to demand that the restoration of Poland, of which the reunion of Galicia with Poland forms the most vital point, shall not be bound up with provisos and conditions by the representatives of other peoples. Galicia belonged for centuries to the Polish Kingdom, and was united to the lands of the House of Habsburg in 1772. God has willed that in the eastern part of Galicia since time immemorial Poles and Ruthenes should live together. (Loud interruptions.) It goes without saying that, in the Polish Kingdom, all religions will enjoy full equality—(interruptions)—and that no objection will be made to the Ukrainian people exercising its full national rights within the framework of the Polish State. (Prolonged and stormy interruptions.) After all, there are numerous Poles in the wide Ukrainian territories of Russia, and we shall be happy if they, in the future Ukrainian republic, enjoy the same rights and liberties which the Ruthenes will receive in Poland. (Interruptions.) Thus, without taking further part in the debate or entering into polemics we declare that the reunion of Galicia with Poland forms an important step towards the realisation of our national programme, and we make no concealment of the fact that any reliable news of a final settlement will be greeted by us with lively delight."

Ritter von Onciul (Roumanian Conservative) treated the personal union of Poland with Austria as certain to endanger the Austro-German alliance. "It is impossible that the Emperor of Austria should at one and the same time be a good King of Poland and a good ally of the German Empire. That the King of Prussia should give up his Polish territories is out of the question." "The Poles have opted for the West because their experience of the East has been unhappy enough. Their geographical situation, their commercial and political interests, urge them to union with the German Empire. Hence the proper solution would be, not that Poland should be united to Austria, but in some form or other to Germany. There is no

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alternative save to unite East Galicia with the Ukraine—of course, not without compensations, since the simple cession of Galicia would mean a loss of prestige, population and riches. This compensation can be found. Qualified persons such as Carp, Marghiloman* and Maiorescu† have during the war offered the Crown of Roumania to the Emperor of Austria. So far as the actual form is concerned, the fates of these various countries must not be regulated by simple agreements between kings, or by diplomatic arrangements, but by agreements between one people and the other."

Mr. Zenker (Viennese Progressive) urged that the Austrian Parliament must not be confronted with a *fait accompli* in the Polish question, as happened in 1867 with the institution of Dualism, and in 908 with the annexation of Bosnia. "The representative of the Poles has declared with all the manners of a Hungarian statesman that the Polish question is not yet ripe for treatment in the Austrian Parliament. That this very statesman is at the moment still a member of this Parliament does not seem to affect him. Whether the extension of territory is the best means of improving the position of the friends of peace in enemy countries need not be discussed. But are those in high quarters clear as to the effects of such a solution on internal political conditions? It is only necessary to consider the flaming indignation and the very natural greed which found expression as soon as the news of the alleged Polish project became known. We, too, are ready to grant the Poles their independence, but we have not waged the war for the sake of Poland. The war has been waged for the freedom of all peoples and for a new and better Austria, but not that this Austria should be put up to auction in sections."

Dr. Waldner (German National) declared in the name of his party that the time had not come for treating this question, and that, as it would be premature and unprofitable to do so, they did not intend to take part in the discussion. "The Germans in Austria are glad that the Polish question is being taken in hand, and desire a solution in an Austro-Polish sense, that is, in a sense which shall secure the interests of the Ukrainian people. We emphatically protest against the solution of our internal constitutional questions being made contingent upon the Polish question or becoming the subject of any discussion whatever at the future Peace Conference. We repudiate as gross presumption any interference of enemy Powers in the solution of our internal questions, but we must also enter a protest against any interference here in the questions of Lithuania and Courland, which solely concern our ally Germany." He concluded by expressing his desire for a speedy peace, but only in such a form as "would not enable the enemy Powers to misrepresent our desire for peace as a sign of weakness."

* Two Germanophil Roumanian Conservative statesmen who remained behind at Bucarest and made overtures to Germany.

† Roumanian Premier at the Treaty of Bucarest (1913), who died during this war.

The Old Diplomacy

(The Russian Secret Documents)

The tremendous events of the war not merely make it difficult for us to preserve our perspective, but prevent us from keeping pace with the diplomatic revelations, of which the last few months have been so lavish. But all else has been thrown into the shade by the action of the Bolševik Government in Petrograd in publishing the diplomatic secrets of the Russian Foreign Office, and therefore of the Entente as a whole. These documents are now the property of the whole world, and their main features have already been outlined in the British press. But their actual value cannot fairly be judged unless the full text is before us; and we feel that THE NEW EUROPE, which exists to promote the study of foreign politics, would not be doing its duty towards its readers if it did not provide them with a careful translation of the documents themselves, before it proceeded to comment upon them in detail.

The present selection is drawn from such sources as are available to us, Russian, English, German and French.

According to a circumstantial statement of the Stockholm correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung*, Mr. Trotski obtained possession of the documents in the following manner:—On 15 November he went to the Foreign Office, and, finding all the rooms closed and none of the officials there, he at once had notices sent out to them, ordering them to attend at a certain hour on the following day. When in due course he arrived with Professor Polivanov, whom he had selected to sift the material, he found about thirty higher officials, under the Vice-Minister Petraiev, all of whom signed a written statement of their willingness to hand over the archives. The head of the Judicial Department, Mr. Dobrovolski, then surrendered the keys and gave the written assurance that this had been done voluntarily and not as the result of force.

(I) MR. TROTSKI'S REASONS FOR PUBLICATION

“ In proceeding to publish the secret diplomatic documents dealing with the foreign policy of the Tsarist and Bourgeois Coalition Governments during the first seven months of the revolution, we are fulfilling the obligation which we took upon ourselves when our party was in opposition. Secret diplomacy is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority in order to make the latter obey its interests. Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation and its rapacious alliances and arrangements, has developed to the highest extent the system of secret diplomacy. The struggle against imperialism, which

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has ruined and drained of their blood the peoples of Europe, means at the same time the struggle against capitalist diplomacy, which has good reason to fear the light of day. The Russian people, as well as the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know the documentary truth about those plots which were hatched in secret by financiers and industrialists, together with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents. The peoples of Europe have earned the right to know the truth about these things, owing to their innumerable sacrifices and the universal economic ruin.

“ To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition of an honourable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy. The Soviet Government makes the introduction of such a policy its object. For this reason, while openly offering to all the belligerent peoples and their governments an immediate armistice, we publish simultaneously those treaties and agreements which have lost all their obligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers, and peasants who have taken the government into their hands. . . .

“ Bourgeois politicians and journalists of Germany and Austria-Hungary may endeavour to profit by the published documents in order to represent in a favourable light the diplomacy of the Central Empires. But every effort in this direction would be doomed to failure for two reasons. In the first place we intend shortly to put before the public secret documents which will show up quite clearly the diplomacy of the Central Empires. In the second place—and this is the chief point—the methods of secret diplomacy are just as international as imperialist rapacity. When the German proletariat by revolutionary means gets access to the secrets of its Government chancelleries, it will produce from them documents of just the same nature as those which we are now publishing. It is to be hoped that this will happen as soon as possible.

“ The government of workmen and peasants abolishes secret diplomacy, with its intrigues, figures, and lies. We have nothing to conceal. Our programme formulates the passionate wishes of millions of workmen, soldiers, and peasants. We desire a speedy peace so that the peoples may honourably live and work together. We desire a speedy deposition of the supremacy of capital. In revealing before the whole world the work of the governing classes as it is expressed in the secret documents of diplomacy, we turn to the workers with that appeal which will always form the basis of our foreign policy: ‘ Proletariats of all countries, unite ! ’ ”—L. TROTSKI, People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

(II) CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE STRAITS

[This document, first published in the *Pravda*, appears to be a summary of various secret negotiations, presumably drawn up for the information of some minister.]

“ On 19 February/4 March, 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed to the French and British Ambassadors a memorandum

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which set forth the desire to add the following territories to Russia as a result of the present war: the town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace, as far as the Enos-Midia line; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, and the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and England in the above territories were to remain inviolate.

"Both the French and British Governments express their readiness to agree to our wishes, provided the war is won and provided a number of claims made by France and England, both in the Ottoman Empire and in other places, are satisfied.

"As far as Turkey is concerned, these claims are as follows:—

"Constantinople is to be recognised as a free port for the transit of goods coming from Russia and not going to Russia, and a free passage is to be given through the Straits to merchant ships.

"The rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey, to be defined by a special agreement between France, England and Russia, are recognised. The sacred Mohammedan places are to be protected and Arabia is to be under an independent Mohammedan sovereign.

"The neutral zone in Persia established by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 is to be included in the English sphere of influence. While recognising these demands in general as satisfactory, the Russian Government made several reservations.

"In view of the formulation of our wishes with regard to the sacred Mohammedan places it must now be made clear whether these localities are to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey with the Sultan keeping the title of Khalif, or whether it is proposed to create new independent States. In our opinion it would be undesirable to separate the Khalifate from Turkey. In any case freedom of pilgrimage must be guaranteed.

"While agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia within the sphere of English influence, the Russian Government considers it right to declare that the districts round the towns of Ispahan and Yezd formerly were fortified by Russia, and also that part of the neutral zone which cuts a wedge between the Russian and Afghan frontiers and goes as far as the Russian frontier at Zulfagar, was included in the Russian sphere of influence.

"The Russian Government considers it desirable that the question of the frontiers between Russia and Northern Afghanistan should simultaneously be solved according to the wishes expressed at the time of the negotiations of 1914.

"After the entrance of Italy into the war our wishes were communicated to the Italian Government also, and the latter expressed its agreement, provided the war ended in the successful realisation of Italian claims in general, and in the East in particular, and in the recognition by us for Italy within the territories ceded to us of the same rights as those enjoyed by France and England."

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(III) EXCHANGE OF ANNEXATIONS

[Secret telegram of the Ambassador in Paris, 11 March, 1917. No. 168.]

My answer to telegram No. 167.

No. 2.—The Government of the French Republic, wishing to emphasize the meaning and importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1915 with the object of regulating at the end of the present war the question of Constantinople and the Straits according to the aspirations of Russia, and wishing also to assure to her Ally in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for the safety and economic development of the Empire, recognises for Russia full freedom in the arrangement of her western frontiers.

(Signed) IZVOLSKI.

(IV) GERMANY'S FRONTIERS. POLAND AND SCANDINAVIA

[Secret telegram of Russian Foreign Minister to Russian Ambassador in Paris, 9 March 1916. No. 948, *re* my telegram No. 6063 of 1915.]

At the impending conference you can only be guided by the following general principles :—*The political agreements made between the Allies during the war must not be subjected to any revision.* This applies also to our agreement with France and England regarding Constantinople, the Sound, Syria and Asia Minor, and to the London Treaty with Italy. All proposals for fixing the future boundaries of Central Europe are at present premature. In general it is to be borne in mind that we are ready to leave to France and England full freedom to fix the western frontiers of Germany, and that we count upon the Allies leaving to us, in turn, full freedom to fix our frontiers against Germany and Austria-Hungary. *It is above all necessary to demand that the Polish question should be excluded from the subjects of international negotiation,* and that all attempts to place Poland's future under the guarantee and control of the Powers should be prevented.

So far as the Scandinavian kingdoms are concerned, the aim must be to keep back Sweden from action embarrassing to us, while taking in good time all measures for bringing Norway to our side. For the event of failure to prevent a war with Sweden, Roumania has already been promised all political advantages such as might enable her to resort to arms. Hence it is quite unnecessary to work in this direction.

The question of driving the Germans out of the Chinese market is of very great importance, but as a decision in this question seems impossible without Japan's co-operation, it is advisable to postpone its discussion until the economic conference, at which Japanese representatives will be present. This does not exclude the desirability of

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a preparatory exchange of views on this question through diplomatic channels between France and England.—(Signed) SAZONOV.

(V) THE RHINE FRONTIER

[Secret telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister—Mr. Sazonov's second successor—to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, 30 January/12 February, 1917. Apparently reproduced only from a copy of the original].

At an Imperial audience Mr. Doumergue [French Ambassador in Petrograd] informed His Majesty the Emperor of France's wish to assure herself of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine after the conclusion of the war, and also of a special position in the Saar valley, and to bring about the detachment from Germany of the territories west of the Rhine and their re-organisation in such a way that in future the Rhine may form a permanent strategic obstacle to any German advance. Doumergue expressed the hope that His Majesty will not refuse his sanction to this proposal. His Majesty was graciously pleased to express his approval in principle. I therefore request that Doumergue, after getting into touch with his Government, should communicate to me a proposal for an agreement, which could be concluded on the basis of an exchange of Notes between the French Ambassador and myself.

While we thus endeavoured to meet the wishes of our Ally, I wish at the same time to make clear a point of view which the Imperial Government laid down in its telegram of 24 February, 1916 (No. 948) [*vide* IV.], according to which, in the event of our recognising the unrestricted right of France and England to fix Germany's western frontiers, we reckon upon the Allies on their side recognising to us a corresponding right to fix our frontiers with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The impending exchange of Notes in the question raised by Doumergue gives us the opportunity for requesting the French Government to assure us of its readiness to receive freedom of action in fixing its future frontier on the west (*sic*). We shall in due course communicate more exact details in this question to the Paris Cabinet. Further, we regard as assured the consent of the French Government to the restriction as to the Aland Islands* being removed at the end of the war. Please put before Briand the views here set forth and wire the result.—(Signed) POKROVSKI.

(VI) "RUSSIA IS STILL A GREAT POWER"

(Mr. Kerenski and the Entente Ambassadors.)

[Secret telegram from the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government to the Russian Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Rome, 9 October, 1917].

The French, British, and Italian Ambassadors expressed the wish to be received by the Premier. They made to him a statement emphasising that recent events gave rise to fears as to Russia's powers

* *i.e.*, the veto on their fortification.

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of resistance and her capacity to continue the war. In this connection public opinion in the Allied countries may demand from their Governments details regarding the material help given to Russia. In order to make it possible for the Allied Governments to calm public feelings and instil fresh confidence, it was incumbent on the Russian Government to show by deeds its determination to use every means for restoring discipline and imparting a real war spirit to the army. Finally, the Allied Governments express the hope that the Russian Government will fulfil the task and thus assure itself of its Allies' support.

The Minister in his reply to the three ambassadors emphasised that the Government was taking steps in this direction, and that this step of the ambassadors was calculated to arouse great resentment generally, and made clear his astonishment at such a step. He also pointed out that the present difficult position of Russia was to an important degree connected with the legacy taken over from the old *régime*, whose Government had in its day claimed abroad a support and a confidence quite out of keeping with its merits. The Minister also drew their attention to the dangerous effects which were bound to follow any restriction by the Allies of the supply of necessities to the army. These effects show themselves after two or three months, and then can no longer be made good.

As regards the war, Kerenski emphasised that in Russia it was still regarded as a universal national affair, and that he therefore considered it unnecessary to lay special stress on the sacrifices made by Russia. The Imperialism of the Central Powers was the greatest danger for Russia, and the struggle against this Imperialism must be conducted in close accord with the Allies. Russia, who has suffered more than all others from the war, cannot end it without seeing her State interests and her independence assured. She will continue the struggle and do all that is possible to make the army capable of resisting. As regards restoring its fighting powers, the Premier pointed out that this task was the subject of the Government's attention, and that during his visit to the front, speeches were made regarding the need of working out a programme in this connection. Finally, Kerenski, in view of the collective manner of the Ambassadors' *démarche*, pointed out that Russia is still a Great Power.—(Signed) TEREŠČENKO.

(VII) GRATITUDE FOR AMERICA'S TACT

[Secret telegram to the Russian Ambassador in Washington, 9 October, 1917.]

The British, French, and Italian Ambassadors were received to-day by the Premier, and acting on instructions of their Governments, emphasised the need of taking measures to restore the fighting efficiency of the army. This step could not but make a painful impression upon the Provisional Government, the more so as all our Allies know the efforts made by the Government to continue the struggle against the common enemy. I beg you to inform Lansing

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in strict confidence, how highly the Provisional Government appreciates the fact that the American Ambassador held aloof from the *démarche* in question.—(Signed) TEREŠČENKO.

(VIII) "A PAINFUL IMPRESSION"

[*Ibid.*, 11 October, 1917.]

The *démarche* of the three ambassadors made a painful impression upon us, both by reason of its contents and of its form. Our Allies know very well the extraordinary efforts made by the Provisional Government to restore the fighting efficiency of the army. Neither military misfortunes, nor internal disorders, nor the gigantic material difficulties availed to break Russia's unbending determination to carry on the war against the common foe until the end. Under such circumstances we must ask ourselves with astonishment, what opinion could impel our Allies to such a step, and what practical result they expect from it. Please communicate to the Foreign Minister the contents of this telegram and convey to him my urgent request that he should represent the *démarche* of the Allies as the result of previous negotiations—in view of the dangerous excitement of our public opinion.—(Signed) TEREŠČENKO.

(IX) THE FINANCIERS' CONFERENCE IN SWITZERLAND

[Secret telegram of the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* in Bern to Russian Foreign Minister, 17 September, 1917.]

"In the local press a notice has appeared, according to which several financiers from the principal belligerent camps have recently had detailed and secret conversations in Switzerland. Who took part in this conference and what its aims were has been kept secret. Undoubtedly the following were present:—Jacques Stern, of the Netherlands Bank in Paris; Tuckman, of the Paris branch of Lloyd's Bank; Fürstenberg, Chairman of the German Diskontogesellschaft; and representatives of the Deutsche Bank and of the Austro-Bank [? Anglo-Austrian Bank]. The English, it is true, deny having taken part in the deliberations, but on 15 September the director of Lloyd's Bank arrived from London, on the pretext of founding a branch in Switzerland. According to rumours, the following possibilities were discussed as the basis of an agreement:—Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France, and Italy's claims to be satisfied. Nothing definite was said regarding the fate of Russia, and there was nothing beyond mere hints. The Germans present demanded in particular the cession of the Baltic provinces to Germany and the independence of Finland."

[The fact that a secret "conference of international financiers" took place in Switzerland was announced in THE NEW EUROPE of 2 August (No. 42). Later in the month the *Vorwärts* in Germany, and Mr. Snowden in the House of Commons, tried to probe the story, but encountered the usual blank wall of official denial and evasion. The publication of the above telegram in Petrograd has evoked fresh

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denials in Germany, and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* denounces the whole story at unusual length as "fantastic nonsense." It assures its readers that Berlin financiers do sometimes go to Switzerland, because they are members of the boards of Swiss companies, such as the *Zürich Bank für elektrische Unternehmungen*. But, of course, on these occasions they never trespass into politics. "Of Fürstenberg we know that during his stay in Switzerland he never spoke with others than Swiss or Germans, not even with other neutrals. We also learn from him that on the date in September mentioned in the telegram he was not in Switzerland; he was on the point of travelling to Vienna, but remained in Berlin, because he missed the sleeping car."

Closer perusal of the telegram would have shown the *Frankfurter Zeitung* that the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* mentions no date. It is quite conceivable that there was more than one meeting; in any case the one alluded to in THE NEW EUROPE took place at least two months before the telegram.

Lloyd's Bank and its Paris manager will probably have no difficulty in disproving all connection on their part with this peace intrigue; but we cannot help hoping that in doing so they will be able to throw some light upon the identity of the real delinquents]

The well-known Swiss publicist, Mr. William Martin, writing in the *Journal de Genève* of 28 November, devotes very considerable detail to proving that these revelations contain comparatively little that was not already known in its main outlines, as a result of the speeches of Trepov, Miljukov, Michaelis and the publications of Burtsev. He comes none the less to the following conclusion: "The publication of the secret documents, though their contents are hitherto unimportant, is, none the less, in our eyes a considerable historical event. It does not merely consummate the definite rupture of the Alliance and the end of a diplomatic era. It is still more important by its re-percussion. Nothing produces confidence so much as confidence. In order to answer these revelations and place them in their true relation, the Allies or the Germans, on their side, will be obliged to make other revelations. The Russian documents will act as a bait, and may, perhaps, drag down with them all the old feudal system of diplomacy—one of the few domains into which, until recent times, neither the spirit of democracy nor the methods of publicity had penetrated."

The Old Diplomacy

(The Russian Secret Documents) *(continued from last number)*

(X) RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS ROUMANIA

[Report of General Polivanov (No. 240) regarding the causes of Roumania's entry and recent events on the Roumanian front, 7/20 November, 1916.]

Since the outbreak of the European War Roumania had officially adopted a neutral attitude, which very frequently and noticeably inclined now to one, now to the other side, according to the course of military operations. This was based upon two main calculations: the wish not to arrive too late for the partition of Austria-Hungary, and the endeavour to earn as much as possible at the expense of the belligerents. Our successes in Galicia and Bukovina in 1914 and early 1915, the capture of Lemberg and Przemysl, and the appearance of our advance guard beyond the Carpathians, brought the question of Roumanian intervention to a head. At the end of May of the same year our retreat from Galicia and Poland took place and Bukovina was abandoned, and the feelings of leading circles in Roumania correspondingly changed. The negotiations for intervention came of their own accord to a standstill.

At the end of 1915 and early in 1916, after the destruction of Serbia and Bulgaria's intervention, Roumanian policy leaned very noticeably towards the side of our enemies. At that time the Roumanian Government concluded a whole series of very advantageous commercial agreements with Austria-Hungary and Germany. This circumstance forced our military, financial and commercial authorities to show great caution in the question of the export from Russia to Roumania of war material and various other supplies, such as might fall into the hands of our enemies. In consequence of the brilliant offensive of General Brusilov in the spring and summer, 1916, Roumanian neutrality leant once more to the side of the Entente Powers, and there arose the possibility of renewing the interrupted negotiations for Roumanian intervention. It is to be observed that, from the first, the Chief of Staff, for military reasons, held the neutrality of Roumania to be more advantageous for us than her active intervention in the war. Later on General Alexeiev adopted the point of view of the Allies, who looked upon Roumania's entry as a decisive blow for Austria-Hungary and as the nearing of the war's end.

In August, 1916, a military and political agreement was signed with Roumania, which assigned to her such accessions of territory (Bukovina and all Transylvania) as quite obviously did not correspond to the measure of Roumania's share of military operations; since she had undertaken only to declare war on Austria-Hungary, and had confined herself to operations in Transylvania.

The events which followed showed how greatly our Allies were mistaken, and how they overvalued Roumania's entry. Under the impression of the catastrophe currents arose in Roumania itself, which opposed a continuance of the war and made the early conclusion of peace, even of a separate peace, their aim. The misfortune which overcame Roumania is the natural result of the complete lack of military preparation under the two-sided policy of Bratianu. Roumania's easy victories in 1913 and her diplomatic success after the Balkan Wars

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contributed materially to both society and Government exaggerating their own importance. Politically and militarily the Roumanians greatly overrated themselves, and are now undergoing a bitter disappointment.

From the standpoint of Russian interests we must be guided by the following considerations in judging the present situation in Roumania. If things had developed in such a way that the military and political agreement of 1916 with Roumania had been fully realised, then a very strong State would have arisen in the Balkans, consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, the Dobrudja (*i.e.*, the present Roumania) and of Transylvania, the Banat and Bukovina (acquisitions under the Treaty of 1916), with a population of about 13,000,000. In the future this State could hardly have been friendly disposed towards Russia, and would scarcely have abandoned the design of realising its national dreams in Bessarabia and the Balkans [*sic*]. Consequently the collapse of Roumania's plans as a Great Power is not particularly opposed to Russia's interests. This circumstance must be exploited by us in order to strengthen for as long as possible those compulsory ties which link Russia with Roumania. Our successes on the Roumanian front are for us of extraordinary importance, as the only possibility of deciding once for all in the sense we desire the question of Constantinople and the Straits. The events now occurring in Roumania have altered to their very foundation the conditions of the Treaty of 1916. Instead of the comparatively modest military support which Russia was pledged to provide in the Dobrudja, she had to assign the defence of Roumanian territory on all sides almost exclusively to Russian troops. This military aid on the part of Russia has now assumed such dimensions that the promise of territorial compensations to Roumania prescribed in the treaty in return for her entry into the war must undoubtedly be submitted to revision.—(Signed) POLIVANOV.

(XI) SWEDISH COURIERS

[Secret telegram of the Russian Minister in Stockholm,
15 October, 1917, No. 629.]

The *Chargé d'Affaires* in Madrid announces that it is intended, as though in error, to open on occasion the Swedish courier's bag. In view of circumstances alluded to in my telegram No. 628 and of the recently mentioned readiness of the Minister to meet us in the questions there referred to, I urgently beg to take all possible steps to prevent what Solejov intends to do from happening. Owing to the diseased vanity of the Swedes we should risk the new Cabinet even more than its predecessor going against us and should thus lose the advantages which we expected from the change of Government.—(Signed) GULKIEWICZ.

(XII) MR. BRANTING AND RUSSIA

[Secret telegram of the Russian Minister in Stockholm,
18 August, 1917, No. 445.]

Branting, who was at first greatly excited over the situation into which the Socialists had been brought by the Allies' refusal of passports, gradually calmed down. At a private and strictly confidential meeting he expressed himself to me as follows: "If Kerenski, without himself

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rejecting the idea of a conference, would announce that for the moment he regards it as inadvisable, then the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee would submit to this (decision).” If you wish to make use of this news I ask you to keep its source secret, so as not to place Branting in a bad light and rob us of a valuable source.—(Signed) GULKIEWICZ.

(XIII) GERMAN POLICY IN RUSSIA

[Secret telegram of the Russian *Chargé d’Affaires* at Bern,
17 October, 1917, No. 815.]

An influential Anglo-Jewish financier, who took part at the conference mentioned [see IX in last week’s supplement], stated that Germany’s aim was to promote separatism in Russia so far as possible, so as to split her up into small states. For Germany it will be easy to conclude commercial treaties with weaker states (Lithuania, Courland, &c.). The maintenance of Russia’s unity is equivalent to leaving her in the economic sphere of the Allies, which would be above all advantageous to America. For England the Russian market is not of special interest, because England is more occupied with her colonies and sea trade. Hence, for England, the splitting up of Russia into several small states seems acceptable, all the more so because in the event of Russia being weakened England would secure a free hand in Asia. In a dismembered Russia German industry and trade will find work for a long time to come. America’s competition with Germany in the Russian market will be even more advantageous for England than the predominance of the influence of one or other of the two Powers. From the words of my informant it may be concluded that it was just these proposals which were the foundation for an exchange of views with the Germans at the conference in August and September. It can certainly be assumed that with the English, French and German branches of the international financial clique a political agreement also has been concluded in this sense. There is not any proof of the Allied diplomats having taken part, it is out of the question that Mme. Andrus could have taken part; but in order to divert attention various devices may have been resorted to, in which they may have had their share.

(XIV) RUSSIA’S READINESS TO PUBLISH THE TREATIES

[Secret telegram from the Russian Foreign Minister to the *Chargé d’Affaires* in Paris, communicated also to London and Rome, 24 September 1917, No. 4,225.]

With reference to your Nos. 947 and 952. The assurances made to you by Ribot* on the occasion of his declaration in the Chamber regarding the eastern frontiers of France, are unfortunately not altogether straightforward. The question of linking this agreement with the agreement regarding Constantinople and the Straits was raised neither in the exchange of Notes with Paléologue† nor in my verbal declaration to Noulens.‡ Noulens proposed to me the publication of the treaties concluded before the war—that is really the Russian military conventions. To this I remarked that such a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the

* Then French Foreign Minister.

† Then French Ambassador in Petrograd.

‡ The present Ambassador.

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agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Roumanian and Italian treaties is regarded by our Allies as undesirable. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position. In order, then, to avoid in the future such misunderstandings as have already twice arisen owing to his statements in the Chamber, I request you to intimate officially to the French Government that on the part of Russia no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements published before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting. Regarding the question of Asia Minor agreements I will communicate to you my views in a special supplementary telegram.—(Signed) TEREŠČENKO.

(XV) OFFERS TO GREECE

[Confidential Memorandum, exact source not indicated.]

Offer of South Albania.—On 22 November, 1914, the Ministers of Russia, England, and France declared to the Greek Government in Athens that Greece would receive the southern portion of Albania, with the exception of Valona, in the event of her immediate entry in aid of Serbia. For immediate entry Venizelos demanded a sure guarantee from Roumania against an attack of Bulgaria upon Greece. This guarantee was not given by Roumania. Consequently Greece gave no help to Serbia and the offer lapsed.

Offer of Territory in Asia Minor.—On 12 January, 1915, the British Minister in Athens, on instructions from his Government, informed Venizelos that if Greece at the moment of a fresh attack upon Serbia came to the latter's aid, the Entente Powers would recognise to Greece important territorial acquisitions on the coast of Asia Minor. On 15 January, 1915, the Greek Ministers in Petrograd, Paris and London handed in the answer of the Greek Government to the English proposal, containing a whole series of conditions. The negotiations begun on 20 January regarding Greek wishes in respect of Asia Minor were held up by negotiations regarding Bulgaria's entry, and were interrupted by the resignation of Venizelos on 21 February, 1915. On 9 March, 1915, the Greek Foreign Minister, Zographos, handed to the Ministers at Athens a Note in which the Cabinet expressed the wish to resume the negotiations interrupted by the departure of Venizelos. On 30 March, in answer to this, the Entente Ministers expressed the readiness of the Russian, British and French Governments to guarantee the vilayet of Aduin to Greece in the event of her entering against Turkey. They resumed the negotiations, adding verbally that the offer would lapse unless Greece without delay declared her readiness to intervene. In the reply Note the Gounaris Cabinet on 1 April declared its willingness to enter at once, if the Entente Powers would be ready to commence military operations against Turkey jointly with the Greek troops. Intervention was made dependent on a formal guarantee of Greece's territorial integrity, with the inclusion of North Epirus and the islands during the whole war and for a definite period after it. The territorial acquisitions of Greece in Asia Minor and elsewhere were to be the subject of subsequent deliberation. The negotiations were not renewed during that month, and on 1 May the Foreign Minister declared that the Entente Powers obviously did not wish to guarantee Greece's integrity and that the Gounaris Cabinet had decided to preserve its neutrality still further.

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
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